RULE 6
action before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered
Kinds Of Pleadings
Section 1. Pleadings defined. Pleadings are the written statements of the
respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment. (1a)
Section 2. Pleadings allowed. The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-
intervention.
The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim
against him.
An answer may be responded to by a reply. (n)
Section 3. Complaint. The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or
causes of action. The names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be
stated in the complaint. (3a)
Section 4. Answer. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth
his defenses. (4a)
Section 5. Defenses. Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts
alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of
action.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while
hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the
claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative
defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality,
statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and
any other matter by way of confession and avoidance. (5a)
Section 6. Counterclaim. A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may
have against an opposing party. (6a)
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. A compulsory counterclaim is one which,
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction
of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original
compulsory regardless of the amount. (n)
Section 8. Cross-claim. A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the
original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that
the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. (7)
Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. A counter-claim may
be asserted against an original counter-claimant.
A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (n)
Section 10. Reply. A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny,
or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the
answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file
such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so
alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or supplemental complaint. (11)
Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.) party
complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's
claim. (12a)
Section 12. Bringing new parties. When the presence of parties other than those
to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination
of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as
defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained. (14)
Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.)
party defendant may allege in his answer his defenses, counterclaims or cross-
claims, including such defenses that the third (fourth, etc.) party plaintiff may have
against the original plaintiff's claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a
counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect of the latter's claim against the
third-party plaintiff. (n)
RULE 7
1
Parts of a Pleading
Section 1. Caption. The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the
action, and the docket number if assigned.
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in
the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if
the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when
there are other parties.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. (1a, 2a)
Section 2. The body. The body of the pleading sets fourth its designation, the
allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the
pleading. (n)
(a) Paragraphs. The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided
into paragraphs so numbered to be readily identified, each of which shall
contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be
done with convenience. A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all
succeeding pleadings. (3a)
(b) Headings. When two or more causes of action are joined the
statement of the first shall be prefaced by the words "first cause of action,'' of
the second by "second cause of action", and so on for the others.
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of
several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be prefaced by the
words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the second cause of
action" and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of the answer are
addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to
that effect. (4)
(c) Relief. The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a
general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed just or
equitable. (3a, R6)
(d) Date. Every pleading shall be dated. (n)
Section 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a
post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was
due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files
an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change
of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
Section 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information
and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if
he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his
counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be
ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)
RULE 8
2
Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
Section 1. In general. Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts. (1)
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their
applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated. (n)
Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. A party may set forth two or
more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one
cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. When two or
more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or
more of the alternative statements. (2)
Section 3. Conditions precedent. In any pleading a general averment of the
performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent shall be sufficient. (3)
Section 4. Capacity. Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of person that is made a party, must be
averred. A party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the
capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall do so by
specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within
the pleader's knowledge. (4)
Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or
mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person may
be averred generally.(5a)
Section 6. Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign
court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver
the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it.
(6)
Section 7. Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense
is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or
document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be
attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading. (7)
Section 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded
upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be
a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused. (8a)
Section 9. Official document or act. In pleading an official document or official act,
it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with
law. (9)
Section 10. Specific denial. A defendant must specify each material allegation of
fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a
denial. (10a)
Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. Material
averment in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of unliquidated
damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of
usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied
under oath. (1a, R9)
Section 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein. Upon motion
made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is
permitted by these Rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after
the service of the pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the
court may order any pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false, redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom. (5, R9)
RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However,
when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or
by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a)
3
Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set up barred. A
compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up shall be barred. (4a)
Section 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the
time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to
the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default.
Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such
relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the
claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
clerk of court. (1a, R18)
(a) Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (2a, R18)
(b) Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any
time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set
aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on
such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(3a, R18)
(c) Effect of partial default. When a pleading asserting a claim states a
common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom
answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all
upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence
presented. (4a, R18).
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. A judgment rendered against a party in
default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed
for nor award unliquidated damages. (5a, R18).
(e) Where no defaults allowed. If the defending party in an action for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated. (6a, R18)
RULE 10
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
Section 1. Amendments in general. Pleadings may be amended by adding or
striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the
name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other
respect, so that the actual merits of the controversy may speedily be determined,
without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
(1)
Section 2. Amendments as a matter of right. A party may amend his pleading
once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the
case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. (2a)
Section 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next
preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court.
But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made
with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall
be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard. (3a)
Section 4. Formal amendments. A defect in the designation of the parties and
other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court
at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is
caused thereby to the adverse party. (4a)
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the
parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not effect the result of the trial of
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the
ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made. (5a)
Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse
party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the
supplemental pleading. (6a)
Section 7. Filing of amended pleadings. When any pleading is amended, a new
copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the amendments, which shall be indicated
by appropriate marks, shall be filed. (7a)
4
Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. An amended pleading supersedes the
pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded pleadings may be
received in evidence against the pleader, and claims or defenses alleged therein not
incorporated in the amended pleading shall be deemed waived. (n)
RULE 11
When to File Responsive Pleadings
Section 1. Answer to the complaint. The defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of summons, unless a different period
is fixed by the court. (la)
Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. Where the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of summons is made on the
government official designated by law to receive the same, the answer shall be filed
within thirty (30) days after receipt of summons by such entity. (2a)
Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. When the plaintiff files an amended
complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the same within fifteen (15)
days after being served with a copy thereof.
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the amended
complaint within ten (l0) days from notice of the order admitting the same. An answer
earlier filed may serve as the answer to the amended complaint if no new answer is
filed.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim, amended cross-
claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)party complaint, and amended complaint-in-
intervention. (3a)
Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. A counterclaim or cross-claim
must be answered within ten (10) days from service. (4)
Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. The time to answer a third
(fourth, etc.)party complaint shall be governed by the same rule as the answer to
the complaint. (5a)
Section 6. Reply. A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the
pleading responded to. (6)
Section 7. Answer to supplemental complain. A supplemental complaint may be
answered within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the same, unless a
different period is fixed by the court. The answer to the complaint shall serve as the
answer to the supplemental complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed. (n)
Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. A compulsory counterclaim or a
cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be
contained therein. (8a, R6)
Section 9. Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer. A counterclaim or a
cross-claim which either matured or was acquired by a party after serving his
pleading may, with the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim or a
cross-claim by supplemental pleading before judgment. (9, R6)
Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. When a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect,
or when justice requires, he may, by leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-
claim by amendment before judgment. (3, R9)
Section 11. Extension of time to plead. Upon motion and on such terms as may be
just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed
after the time fixed by these Rules. (7)
RULE 12
Bill of Particulars
Section 1. When applied for; purpose. Before responding to a pleading, a party
may move for a definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not
averted with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare
his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten
(10) days from service thereof. Such motion shall point out the defects complained of,
the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the details desired. (1a)
Section 2. Action by the court. Upon the filing of the motion, the clerk of court must
immediately bring it to the attention of the court which may either deny or grant it
outright, or allow the parties the opportunity to be heard. (n)
Section 3. Compliance with order. If the motion is granted, either in whole or in
part, the compliance therewith must be effected within ten (10) days from notice of the
order, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The bill of particulars or a more
definite statement ordered by the court may be filed either in a separate or in an
amended pleading, serving a copy thereof on the adverse party. (n)
5
Section 4. Effect of non-compliance. If the order is not obeyed, or in case of
insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order the striking out of the pleading
or the portions thereof to which the order was directed or make such other order as it
deems just. (1[c]a)
Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. After service of the bill of
particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion, the
moving party may file his responsive pleading within the period to which he was
entitled at the time of filing his motion, which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event. (1[b]a)
Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. A bill of particulars becomes part of the pleading
for which it is intended. (1[a]a)
RULE 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and Other Papers
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the filing of all pleadings and other
papers, as well as the service thereof, except those for which a different mode of
service is prescribed. (n)
Section 2. Filing and service, defined. Filing is the act of presenting the pleading
or other paper to the clerk of court.
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned.
If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his
counsel or one of them, unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.
Where one counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy
of any paper served upon him by the opposite side. (2a)
Section 3. Manner of filing. The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices,
orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original
copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending
them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the
pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of
motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the
post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the
date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the
record of the case. (1a)
Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. Every judgment, resolution,
order, pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice, appearance,
demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the court, and served
upon the parties affected. (2a)
Section 5. Modes of service. Service of pleadings motions, notices, orders,
judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail. (3a)
Section 6. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering
personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk
or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office
is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of
eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if
known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. (4a)
Section 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing
the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his
counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully
prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after
ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either
the senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. (5a; Bar Matter
No. 803, 17 February 1998)
Section 8. Substituted service. If service of pleadings, motions, notices,
resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the two preceding
sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown,
service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure
of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the time of
such delivery. (6a)
Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. Judgments, final
orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a
party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final
orders or resolutions against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the
expense of the prevailing party. (7a)
Section 10. Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual
delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days
after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is
complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he
received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (8a)
Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the
service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with
respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
(n)
6
Section 12. Proof of filing. The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its RULE 7
existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have
been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped SEC. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
registered mail, by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who did the
mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the
post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid,
and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10)
days if not delivered. (n) A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
Section 13. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written authentic records.
admission of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the
party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If
the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person
mailing of facts showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on information
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued and belief, or upon knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper verification,
by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.(4a)
receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee. (10a)

Section 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of
possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is RULE 41
claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province
in which the property is situated notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion,
description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket
filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property and other lawful fees within the reglementary period. (13a)
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order
The foregoing amendments shall take effect on May 1, 2000, following the publication
of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
of this Resolution in two (2) newspapers of general circulation not later than March
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the rights of the party
15, 2000.
who caused it to be recorded. (24a, R-14)

A. M. No. 00-2-10-SC. Re: Amendments to Section 4, Rule 7 and Section 13,

Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
CIRCULAR NO. 48-2000
AMENDMENT TO SECTION 4, RULE 7 AND SECTION 13, RULE 41 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

The Court resolved to AMEND the following provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
Procedure: (a) Section 4 of Rule 7; and (b) Section 13 of Rule 41, to read as follows: REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURTS, METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS.

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SUBJECT: A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC. RE: AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 4, RULE 7 AND
SECTION 13, RULE 41 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder are the
amended provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: (a) Section 4 of Rule 7: and
(b) Section 13 of Rule 41, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"RULE 7
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information
and belief, or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification,
shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (4a)
"RULE 41
SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal.- Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion,
dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or non-payment of the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.(13a)"
The foregoing amendments took effect last May 1, 2000.
G.R. No. L-23908 October 29, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendant-appellee,
THOMAS H. GONZALES, intervenor.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellant.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Stating that it involves questions purely of law, the Court of Appeals certified this
appeal to Us.
The prosecution at bar is for libel. An information, dated March 29, 1963, was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against Venancio H. Aquino, alleging: .
That on or about July 27, 1960, in the Municipality of Camalaniugan,
Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused Venancio H. Aquino, being the counsel for Demetrio B.
Encarnacion in Civil Case No. [N-] 151, for "Damages for libel", in the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, 7th Judicial District, Branch III, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with malicious intent of impeaching
the personal worth, integrity, honor and reputation of the complaining
witness Thomas M. Gonzales, circulate and publish and/or caused to be
circulated and published his "Reply and Answer to Counterclaim" a copy of
which was furnished and received by the counsel of the complaining witness
Thomas M. Gonzales at Camalaniugan, Cagayan, on July 27, 1960, which
the accused wrote, prepared and mailed and/or caused to be written,
prepared and mailed, containing highly libelous, derogatory and scurrilous
words and expressions among which are the following:
"To this, our applicable reply are the very words of the Honorable
Supreme Court to a party for shamelessly making untrue, libelous
statements, to wit: "(This party) appears to belong to the class of
individuals who have no compunction to resort to falsehood or
falsehoods, . . . as part of their systematic campaign of falsehoods,
and slanders directed against us, is an imposture that only
ignorants, black hands and others mental pachyderms (like him)
can swallow."
. . . Defendant was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's reputation,
the malefactor who concocted the preposterous and malicious
insinuations against the plaintiff, so that, defendant has no feelings,
if at all, to be wounded."
8
 knowing fully well that the aforesaid words and phrases to be inapplicable to
and inappropriate for the pleading of which they are made integral parts, and
knowing likewise the same to be immaterial, impertinent and irrelevant to the
issues involved in the aforementioned civil case, thus publicly and
maliciously exposing the complaining witness Thomas M. Gonzales to public
ridicule, derision, mockery, scorn and contempt to the irrepable damage and
prejudice of the said complaining witness Thomas M. Gonzales whom the
aforequoted words and phrases were applied and referred to.
Aquino filed a motion to quash or amend the information, upon the ground that it was
not sufficiently intelligible. Said motion was denied by the court.
Subsequently, however, on September 28, 1963, Aquino filed a second motion to
quash, claiming that (1) the statements referred to are not defamatory; and (2) the
statements, even if defamatory, are absolutely privileged. Annexed thereto were
copies of the Complaint, Answer with Counterclaim, and the Reply and Answer to the
Counterclaim, in Civil Case No. N-151 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite.
After the Assistant Fiscal filed an answer to the motion, the court a quo, on October
15, 1963, dismissed the case, upon the second ground of the motion to quash. Thus
it ruled that statements of the accused in the "Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim"
filed in Civil Case No. N-151 constituted absolutely privileged matters, having been
made in the course of judicial proceedings and being relevant to the issues that arose
in that aforestated case.
From the order of dismissal there was yet no arraignment and plea the
prosecution has appealed.
Appellant, through the Solicitor General, recognized the rule, as laid down in several
decisions of this Court, that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings
are absolutely privileged that is, privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of
the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause
in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes them
such as a judge, lawyer or witness does not thereby incur the risk of being
found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages.1 At issue here is the application of said rule, or whether the statements of
Aquino, quoted in the information, fall within the scope of this privilege.
As shown in the records before Us, the suit known as Civil Case No. N-151 was filed
by Ex-Judge Demetrio Encarnacion against Thomas Gonzales, to recover damages
for allegedly false, malicious and libelous statements contained in the defendant's
letter to his (defendant's) sister, dated September 3, 1958, shown and given to
plaintiff in July of 1959, imputing that plaintiff had been "separated from the position of
Judge of the Court of First Instance by reason of his supposedly dirty and indecent
ways of dispensing human justice and of his (plaintiff's) having been leading an
immoral life." (Plaintiff's Complaint, par. 3, Annex A to Second Motion to Quash.)
To plaintiff's Complaint alleging the above matters, Thomas Gonzales filed an Answer
with Counterclaim, putting up the defense that the letter referred to "was addressed to
defendant's sister, Mrs. Magdalena G. Manikan, mailed in a sealed envelope to her,
and written with the sincere desire to comply with an obligation, social and moral, and
with the honest belief in the truthfulness of the statements contained there"; and that
"reference to the complainant, if any, was merely incidental, devoid of any intent to
libel". Thus, defendant further asked for P25,00,0 in moral damages, alleging that "by
the unwarranted filing by the plaintiff, in bad faith, of the aforesaid malicious and
unfounded charges against the defendant, the latter suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock". (Defendant's Answer with Counterclaim,
pp. 1-2, Annex B to Second Motion to Quash.)
Then followed plaintiff's Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim, filed through counsel
Venancio H. Aquino, containing among others, the allegations subject matter of the
present criminal action. For convenience, said allegations are hereunder again
quoted:
To this, our applicable Reply are the very words of our Honorable Supreme
Court to a party for shamelessly making untrue, libelous statements, to wit:
"(This party) appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no
compunction to resort to falsehood or falsehoods . . . as part of their
systematic campaign of falsehood, and slanders directed against us, is an
imposture that only ignorants, blackhands and other mental pachyderms
(like him) can swallow."
. . . defendant was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's reputation, the
malefactor who concocted the preposterous and malicious insinuations
against the plaintiff, so that, defendant has no feelings, if at all, to be
wounded;
From the pleadings thus filed in Civil Case No. N-151, the subject of inquiry readily
discernible is whether the defendant acted out of sheer malice with intent to cast
dishonor upon the plaintiff; or in good faith, pursuing a sense of social or moral duty.
Since the plaintiff asserted the first proposition, the allegations in his Reply and
Answer to Counterclaim to the effect that defendant's posture of innocence was a
shameless pretense strongly or offensively worded though it may be are
pertinent and related to the subject of inquiry. Thus, in quoting from the opinion of
Justice Perfecto in the Sotto Case,2 said pleading may indeed have thereby called the
defendant "an imposture that only ignorants, blackhands and other mental
pachyderms (like him) can swallow." Yet this was responsive to defendant's
allegations to the contrary, and pertained to the subject of inquiry. The same is true
with the assertion that defendant "was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's
reputation, the malefactor who concocted the preposterous and malicious
insinuations against the plaintiff, so that, defendant has no feelings, if at all, to be
wounded."
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Appellant's brief would however dissect the quotation and separately analyze such
terms as "blackhands" and "pachyderms". It is argued that these are words having no
bearing to the cause; that "black hand"' according to Webster's New International
Dictionary means "a lawless secret society practising terrorism, extortion or other
crimes" and "pachyderm" means "thick-skinned"; and that appellant cannot conceive
of any situation whereby during the trial of the civil case the defendant might be
proved to be a "pachyderm" or a "blackhand" or even an "imposture" or "ignorant" as
these terms are used in the expressions in question.
First of all, in this regard it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent should be
liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not to be scrutinized with
microscopic intensity.3 Secondly, there is no such word as "blackhand"; Webter's New
International Dictionary gives "Black Hand" meaning, what the Solicitor General gave
to "blackhand," that is, a lawless secret society whose members engage in extortion,
terrorism, and other crimes. A person belonging to or associated with said society is
not called "blackhand" as stated, there is no such term but "blackhander" (See,
Webster, New International Dictionary, 2nd. Ed., p. 280; Eric Partridge, A Dictionary
of the Underworld, [1950] p. 44.)
"Now, We discussed this here because there was an obvious clerical error in the
pleading in quoting from Justice Perfecto, who used not "blackhand" but "blockhead"
in the portion quoted. Since there is no such word as "blackhand" (referring to an
individual), and since reference to the quotation from Justice Perfecto is made, the
term used must be deemed, for our purposes, "blockhead". And "blockhead" means a
person deficient in understanding" (Webster, Ibid., 290).
As to the word "pachyderm," the same was qualified by the word "mental" so that it
does not refer to thickness of the physical skin. As appellee's brief points out, "mental
pachyderm" refers to a "distorted mind, a mind that is insensible, unfeeling,
senseless, hardened, callous (Thesaurus of Words and Phrases, par. 376, p. 121,
copyright 1947)."4
It will thus be seen that whether or not the defendant is so deficient in knowledge
("ignorant") and understanding ("blockhead") and possessed of an insensible,
unfeeling and hardened mind, as to indulge in a pretense of the kind that he is alleged
to have made in his Answer with Counterclaim, is a question that reasonably pertains
to the subject of inquiry in the civil case, namely, whether his claim of good faith in
mentioning things defamatory to plaintiff is an imposture or a truth.
As such, the allegations complained of herein cannot give rise to criminal or civil
liability against the advocate who made them. As this Court observed in Sison v.
David, L-11268, January 28, 1961:
. . . The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those
engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of
law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that
members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses
may speak their minds freely and exercise their respective functions without
incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124.)
Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage of the
administration of justice. Since it appears from the information that the allegations
complained of herein are contained in an appropriate pleading, and since they pass
the test of relevancy, it was no error for the court a quo to sustain the privilege and to
quash the information upon defendant's motion (People v. Andres L-14458, April 29,
1960).
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from quashing the information in this case is
hereby affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13000 September 25, 1959
GAUDENCIO D. DEMAISIP, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Gaudencio D. Demaisip in his own behalf.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for
respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 4, 1936, Gaudencio Demaisip filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo praying that judgment be rendered (1) ordering the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to execute a contract of lease of Lots Nos. 233,
236 and 237 of the Dumangas Cadastra, for a period of 10 years, and to issue the
corresponding fishpond permit in his favor, and to order said Secretary not to
entertain the lease application of Luis e. Buenaflor pending final decision of the case;
(2) declaring null and void all actions taken by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, particularly that of October 15, 1936 with respect to the lease
application of Luis Buenaflor (3) ordering Buenaflor to vacate the lands in question
and to deliver their possession to him; (4) ordering the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo to
take the necessary steps for the criminal prosecution of Beunaflor for violation of the
Forestry Law and Regulations pertaining thereto; and (5) ordering both defendants to
pay him, jointly and severally, damages in the amount of P2,000.00.
After trial, the court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the
complaint is in reality a petition for mandamus and therefore should have been
verified as required by Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, and 92) that plaintiff
did not exhaust all available remedies before resorting to court action.
10
Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in toto the decision of the
court a quo. Plaintiff interposed the present petition for review.1wphl.nt
The facts of this case which the Court of Appeals found to be correct are quoted as
follows:
The first applicant for a fishpond permit covering Lots Nos. 233, 236 and 237
of Dumangas Cadastre, Iloilo, was the late Geronimo Destacamento who
filed his application on April 1, 1927 (p. 56, rec.). On Dec. 31, 1930, the
Fishpond Permit No. F-624-B granted to the late Geronimo Destacamento
expired, because he failed to make any improvements on the lots and to pay
the required rentals (pp. 27-28, 35, 36, 54, 76-77, rec.)
Before his death or to be more exact on December 19, 1928, Geronimo
Destacamento without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry
k, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in questions in favor of Serafin
Villanueva, an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit
granted him (pp. 55-56, rec.).
In a letter dated December 19, 1928 the District Forester of Iloilo,
notwithstanding the existence of the aforesaid deed of sale, requested
Serafin Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots. In spite
of the request, Villanueva neglected and failed to file his application for a
fishpond permit, such that no permit was ever granted to him before or after
the expiration of the permit of the late Geronimo Destacamaneto (p. 56,
rec.).
It appears that on October 15, 1935 the herein complainant Gaudencio G.
Demaisip filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit
application which was given No. 2285 for the same lots Nos. 233, 236 and
237 of Dumangas Cadastre, containing an area of 13.9859 hectares of
public mangrove forest land located in Sitios Buang and Balabag, barrio
Buang, Dumangas, Iloilo (pp. 33,54, rec.).
By March 6, 1936, the Demaisip had complied with all the prerequisites
necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual
rental of P21 and posting of a surety bond in the sum of P350 (pp. 36-38, 54,
rec.).
On March 19, 1936, when the fishpond permit in favor of Gaudencio
Demaisip was ready to be issued (p. 38, rec.), Serafin Villanueva executed a
deed of sale covering the lots in question in favor of the herein defendant
Luis E. Buenaflor (p. 55, rec.);shortly thereafter or in the same month, the
latter started to occupy the land, and introduced improvements thereon
consisting of a big dam 27 meters long, 4 meters high, across the Balabag
River, worth P1,600 (p. 57, rec.). According to the result of an investigation
conducted by a representative of the Fish and Game Administration, the
dame deprives other fishponds leased from the government of fresh or
flowing water and was illegally constructed because it violated a rule of that
Office prohibiting the introduction of any improvements on the land applied
for before the issuance of a permit (pp. 57-58, rec.).
It was only on May 21, 1936, or 7 months after Demaisip had filed an
application, that Luis Beunaflor also filed his application for the area in
question with the Iloilo branch of the Fish and Game Administration (pp. 33,
57, rec.).
Under the above set of facts, the Director of Fish and Game Administration
was called upon to decide who of the conflicting claimants Luis Buenaflor
or Gaudencio G. Demaisip had a better right to be regard as the lessee of
the land in question pursuant to Section 63 of Act No. 4003.
the dispositive part of the decision rendered by the Director of the
aforementioned office, dated June 26, 1936, was as follows:1wphl.nt
'In view of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Office and it is
hereby decided that: the application of the applicant-contestant Luis
E. Buenaflor be rejected; the dam constracted across Balabag
River be opened; all improvements on the area be forfeited in favor
of the Government; and the application of the applicant respondent
Gaudencio E. Demaisip be given due course upon payment of an
additional rental of P16 which is one per centum of the value of
improvements assessed at P1,600,' (p. 58, Rec. On Appeal)
From such decision, Luis e. Buenaflor appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (p. 43, rec.). On October 15, 1936, the
latter official reversed the decision of the Director of Fish and Game
Administration and awarded the right of lease to the lots in question to Luis
E. Buenaflor and also ordered the return to Demaisip of the amount paid by
him as annual rental (pp. 42-43, 47, rec.). It is not known on what ground the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources based his decision, because
a copy of said decision was not presented in the reconstitution of the records
of this case. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
It is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the present action
partakes of the nature of a petition for mandamus which should be verified as
required by Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, and not having been so verified
it suffers from a fatal defect which cannot confer jurisdiction on the court a quo. It is
contended that the complaint which initiated this proceeding is not one of mandamus
but an action to obtain relief in connection with the lease of certain lots for the
purpose of converting them into fishponds as well as to annul certain actions taken by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and that even if it be considered
as a special civil action for mandamus the one that should govern the same is not the
Rules of Court but Section 200 of the Court of Civil Procedures (Act 190).
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This claim is meritorious for it appears that the instant case was filed on December 4,
1936 and at that time the procedural law that was in force was Act 190 because the
present Rules of Court took effect only on July 1, 1940, and it is well-settled that the
formal as well as substantial requisites of a pleading are governed by the law
prevailing at the time of its filing. We also find correct the claim that the present action
is not one for mandamus but an ordinary action wherein several reliefs are prayed for
concerning the lease of certain lots which plaintiff desires to be granted, to him, and
since the action is not one for mandamus, it is unnecessary to state in the compliant
that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law to entitle him to relief as required in special civil actions.
It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines when he reversed the
decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration, and ruled that the lease
application of Demaisip should be denied and that of defendant Beunaflor be given
due course upon compliance with certain requirements, but such failure cannot
preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary
of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President. The presumption is that the
action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President unless the same is
disapproved by the latter (Villena vs. The Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil., 451). It is
therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff's action should not be entertained because he
has failed the exhaust first all the administrative remedies available to him.
Explaining his petition for review, Nicolas Diego called attention to the
circumstance that no appeal had been taken to the President from the
Secretary's administrative determination n issuing the permit And then he
argued for non-interference by the courts with the acts of executive officers,
unless all administrative remedies have been previously exhausted.
Upon examination of the Record on Appeal, however, we note that this
defense was not interposed in the court of first instance. Perhaps because
the pleader knew courts had entertained civil action of this nature against the
Secretary of Agriculture and/or subordinate officers, even if complainants
had not previously taken the matter up to the Chief Executive; and perhaps
because such defense might only be valid in special civil actions this is
not one wherein the petitioner must allege and prove that the has no
other speedy and adequate remedy. (Diego vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.,
54 Off. Gaz., No. 4, 956; Emphasis supplied)
With regards to the question whether the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources has not acted properly or has abused his discretion in reversing the
decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration awarding the right to lease
the lots in questions to Buenaflor as now contended by petitioner, we are not now in a
position to pas judgement on the actuation of such official for we do not have before
us a copy of his decision. As the Solicitor General observes in his brief: "This
Honorable Court is not in a position to make an accurate finding as to whether or not
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had grossly or gravely abused his
discretion in the instant case because the decision of the said Secretary reversing the
decision of the Director of Fish and Game Administration had not been reconstituted
and appended to the record of the case as indicated in our statement of facts. To rule
that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had gravely abused his
discretion, without knowing his reasons for reversing the decision of the Director of
Fish and Game Administration would be tantamount to deciding this case against said
official without giving him his day in court." We concur in this observation.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.1wphl.nt
G.R. No. 88383 February 19, 1992
HARRIS SY CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., respondents.
Pepino Law Offices for petitioner.
Escober Alon & Associates for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate
court in CA G.R. No. CV-08546, entitled "State Financing Center, Inc. v. AsiaPhil
Timber Corporation, et al.," promulgated on February 22, 1989 reversing the
judgment of the trial court which dismissed the complaint for sum of money against
petitioner.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
On September 1, 1983, respondent State Financing Center, Inc. (State Inc. for
brevity) filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against AsiaPhil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee, Philip
Escolin, Lee Chi Uan and petitioner Harris Sy Chua based upon documents attached
to the complaint. These documents are the following:
1) Term Loan Agreement, 2) Promissory note, 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement
dated January 25 and June 19, 1979, 4) Demand letters, and 5) Statement of
outstanding past due account as of August 15, 1983.
On November 24, 1983, the trial court issued an order upon motion of the respondent
State Inc. as plaintiff in the case, declaring in default all the defendants including
petitioner Harris Sy Chua.
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On December 12, 1983, petitioner Chua filed a motion for extension of time within
which to file his responsive pleading to the complaint, which the trial court granted.
On December 21, 1983, petitioner filed his answer to the complaint with a
counterclaim against private respondent and cross-claim against his co-defendant
AsiaPhil Timber Corporation.
On December 23, 1983, respondent State Inc. filed a reply to petitioner Chua's
answer and an answer to the latter's counterclaim.
On February 2, 1984, after respondent State Inc. had presented its evidence ex
parte against all the defendants including petitioner, the trial court issued an order
declaring that with the admission of the evidence adduced by respondent, the case
against all the defendants is considered submitted for decision.
On February 23, 1984, petitioner Chua filed an omnibus motion praying that the order
declaring him in default as well as the ex parte proceeding insofar as he is concerned
be set aside on the ground that the he filed his answer within the extended period of
time granted by the court.
On March 23, 1984, the trial court, upon petitioner's motion issued an order
reconsidering and setting aside both its order of November 24, 1983 which declared
him in default and the ex parte proceeding against him.
On May 4, 1984, the trial court set the case for pre-trial on June 1, 1984. The pre-trial
order issued by the court on the said date reads as follows:
Upon agreement, and as there is no other matters that could be
agreed upon aside from those admitted in the pleadings and the
personal circumstances, the above-entitled case is hereby removed
from the pre-trial calendar and set for trial on the merits on July 20,
1984 at 9:00 o'clock A.M. (p. 77 Records).
On July 20, 1984, upon motion of respondent State Inc., with the petitioner's
conformity, the hearing was reset to another date.
On September 13, 1984, the hearing was again postponed because the witness for
the plaintiff was not available.
On November 27, 1984, respondent State Inc. filed a formal offer of exhibits in
writing, attaching thereto the documents enumerated therein. Petitioner filed a written
opposition thereto alleging that the documents offered in evidence have not been
properly presented and identified by any witness during any proceeding before the
trial court and considering that the ex parte presentation of evidence against him had
already been set aside, there is no more document or testimony that could be taken
into account against him.
On March 6, 1985, for failure of petitioner Chua to appear for the presentation of his
evidence, the trial court issued an order considering petitioner as having waived his
right to present evidence. Thus, the case was deemed submitted for decision based
on the evidence on record.
On June 3, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment holding four of the defendants
liable to pay respondent State Inc. but dismissing the complaint against petitioner
Chua. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendants Asiaphil Timber
Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee and Lee Chi Uan,
as follows:
1. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
the principal amount of P722,000.00 plus 21% interest thereon per
annum and 1% penalty per month from August 16, 1983 until fully
paid;
2. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff,
the accrued interest and charges from June 1, 1981 to August 15,
1983 in the total amount of P512,559.84;
3. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff
the amount of P4,689.72 as litigation expenses and other costs of
the suit; and
4. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00, which the court
believes is the reasonable amount.
All other claims and/or counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit, including the complaint against defendants Harris Sy Chua
and Philip Escolin, against whom no evidence has been presented.
SO ORDERED. (p. 22, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the portion of the decision absolving petitioner Chua from any
liability to respondent State Inc., the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On February 22, 1989, respondent appellate court rendered a decision which
reversed the ruling of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment dismissing the complaint of the
plaintiff-appellant State Financing Center, Inc. against the
13
 defendant-appellee Harris Sy Chua and the order denying its
motion for reconsideration, both appealed from, are hereby
REVERSED. Accordingly, the said defendant-appellee is hereby
adjudged liable and ordered to pay unto the plaintiff-appellant,
jointly and severally with his co-defendants Asiaphil Timber
Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee and Lee Chi Uan,
the amounts provided for in the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila Branch III, in Civil Case No. 83-19953, quoted
earlier in this decision. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED. (p. 32, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Chua contends that the respondent appellate court erred in rendering a
decision which is not based on the issues raised in the appeal brief of respondent
State Inc. He also argues that the documentary evidence which were formally offered
by private respondent in a written offer of exhibits but which were not properly
identified by any witness during the trial cannot be considered as evidence against
petitioner in order to hold the latter liable to private respondent.
We find the petitioner's contentions devoid of merit.
From the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua,
respondent State Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging in its brief that the
lower court erred in dismissing the complaint as against petitioner Harris Sy Chua for
the reason that no evidence has been presented against him. Although the
respondent's assigned error of the trial court in its appellant's brief was couched in
broad and general terms, the meaning which respondent intends to convey by its
assignment of error is quite clear, that is, the trial court should have found petitioner
Chua liable to respondent because there was evidence which was presented to prove
said liability.
It is an established rule that pleadings should be construed liberally in order that the
litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a
possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities may be avoided
(Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 81957, May 23, 1989, 173 SCRA
544). Moreover, issues though not specifically raised in the pleadings in the appellate
court, may, in the interest of justice be properly considered by said court in deciding a
case, if they are questions raised in the trial court and are matters of record having
some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or the lower
court ignored (Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, No. L-48278, November 8, 1988, 167
SCRA 16). It is clear from the decision of the respondent appellate court that the latter
made a discussion on the respondent's assigned error which was allegedly committed
by the trial court. The appellate court made the following explanation:
The appellee's unexplained denial of the term loan agreement . . .
and promissory notes . . . for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief when as a party to them it is within his
capacity to know their due execution and authenticity or not is
evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial. Hence, it
is to be deemed as an admission. With that and the appellee's
admission of the existence and due execution of the
comprehensive surety agreements . . ., there is no need for the
appellant to adduce evidence to establish the due execution and
authenticity of the term loan agreement, promissory note and
comprehensive surety agreement . . . sued upon. . . . (p. 31, Rollo)
Anent petitioner's second contention that respondent State Inc.'s written offer of
documentary evidence should not have been considered by the respondent appellate
court in finding the former liable, We find that the same must likewise fail.
Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary
evidence before the court, as follows: firstly, the document should be authenticated
and proved in the manner provided in the rules of court; secondly, the document
should be identified and marked for identification; and thirdly, it should be formally
offered in evidence to the court and shown to the opposing party so that the latter
may have an opportunity to object thereon.
The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution
and authenticity before they can be received in evidence. This may require the
presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact. When there is no
proof as to the authenticity of the writer's signature appearing in a private document,
such private document may be excluded (General Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay
Logging Co., Inc., No. L-18487, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733). On the other hand,
public or notarial documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and
certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. There is also no need for proof of execution and
authenticity with respect to documents the genuineness and due execution of which
are admitted by the adverse party. These admissions may be found in the pleadings
of the parties or in the case of an actionable document which may arise from the
failure of the adverse party to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the document in his pleading.
After the authentication and proof of the due execution of the document, whenever
proper, the marking for identification and the formal offer of such documents as
evidence to the court follow.
With respect to offer of evidence, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, which is the applicable rule then, provides:
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 Offer of evidence The court shall consider no evidence which so on the date set for the presentation of evidence for his defense. Because of this,
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence the trial court considered him as having waived this right and deemed the case
is offered must be specified. submitted for decision.

When a party offers a particular documentary instrument as evidence during trial, he
must specify the purpose for which the document or instrument is offered. He must
also describe and identify the document, and offer the same as an exhibit so that the
other party may have an opportunity of objecting to it (Ahag v. Cabiling, 18 Phil 415).
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. Such offer may be made orally or in writing sufficient to show that
the party is ready and willing to submit the evidence to the court. (Llaban y Catalan et
al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 63226, Dec. 20, 1991; U.S. v. Solana, 33 Phil. 582;
Dayrit v. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182)
In view of the foregoing, We find no compelling reasons to reverse the conclusion of
the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with
his co-defendants in the trial court, on the basis of documentary evidence presented
and offered before the court.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated February 22, 1989 is AFFIRMED.

Applying the aforestated legal principles to the circumstances in the case at bar, We
find that the presentation or written offer of documentary exhibits by the respondent to
the court was properly made and could be considered as basis by the court for
holding petitioner liable under the contracts, set forth in the documents presented, for
the following reasons:

When respondent State Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner
Harris Chua and several others, the former attached thereto, five annexes, four of
which consist of 1) Term Loan Agreement executed between respondent State Inc.
as one of the creditors and defendant Asia Phil Timber Corporation as the borrower
2) Promissory Note executed by AsiaPhil Timber Corporation in favor of respondent
State Inc. 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement executed by petitioner Harris Chua
and other defendants in favor of State Inc., "to guarantee in joint and several capacity
the punctual payment" of the indebtedness of AsiaPhil Timber Corp. and 4) Demand
letters to petitioner Chua by respondent State Inc. (pp. 8-40 Records). In his answer
to the complaint, petitioner Chua admitted the allegations in the complaint with
respect to the existence and due execution of the Term Loan Agreement and
Comprehensive Surety Agreement to which he is one of the signatories, while
pleading certain affirmative defenses (pp. 57-60 Records). Because of this judicial
admission, the due execution of the Term Loan Agreement and Comprehensive
Surety Agreement are already admitted by the petitioner and there is no more need
for the respondent State Inc. to present witnesses to testify on the genuineness of the
documents. Further, records show that the aforementioned documents are all notarial
instruments, the due execution of which is already presumed and need not be proven.
Records show that respondent State Inc. did not present any proof or witness to
testify on the execution of the said document but it did, however, submit a written
formal offer of exhibits before the court, wherein respondent State Inc. identified and
marked each of the aforementioned documents as its exhibits. These exhibits were
similar to the documents attached to the complaint. The respondent State Inc. also
specified in its written offer the purpose for which each of the documentary exhibits
was offered in evidence (pp. 91-93, Records). Despite the fact that a copy of the
written offer of exhibits was furnished to petitioner Chua, thus giving the latter the
opportunity to object thereon and to present rebutting evidence, the latter failed to do

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