Alvarez v. Guingona GR No.

118303
Doctrine: A municipalitys Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) is included in the calculation of its
minimum annual average income requirement for its conversion into a city
Facts: RA 7720 was assailed for, among others, providing for the conversion of the municipality
of Santiago, Isabela into a city, despite the fact that (according to the petitioners) it failed to meet
the minimum annual average income of PhP20 million required by the Local Government Code.
According to RA 7720, the annual average income of Santiago, Isabela was PhP20.9 million for
the two consecutive years immediately preceding 1991. However, the petitioners contend that
this calculation was wrong, because it included the IRA given by the national government to the
municipality of Santiago. According to them, IRA is not actually income but budgetary aid from
the national government. Without the IRA, the annual average income of Santiago would only be
about PhP13 million, falling way short of the minimum income required.
Issue: W/N a municipalitys IRA is included in the calculation of its annual income
Held: Yes. The IRA is a form of income because it forms part of the gross accretion of the funds
of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute
income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds.
Pimentel vs. Aguirre GR No. 132988 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government
units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for nonpersonal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of the AO violates the fiscal autonomy of the LGU?
HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does
not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to
ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is
merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision
over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to
undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It
does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters,
provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding
recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government,
and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less
than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of
the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to
open its private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the
same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a
TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. On
appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of
Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is
lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
MMDA said it has the authority to open Neptune St. because it is an agent of the Government
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From the premise
of police powers, it follow then that it need not for an ordinance to be enacted first.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Does MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory
and police powers?
RULING:
According to SC, Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. Police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature, which the latter can delegate to the President and
administrative boards, LGU or other lawmaking bodies.

LGU is a political subdivision for local affairs. Which has a legislative body empowered to enact
ordinances, approved resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
province/city/municipality.
The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are
administrative in nature. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No.
7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the
LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and
police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering
the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
CHIONGBIAN vs. ORBOS
This is a case that questions the validity of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (RA 6743).
Facts:
Congress passed RA 6743, pursuant to Art. 10, 18 of the Constitution, a plebiscite was called in
some provinces, only 4 provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) were
in favor of creating the ARMM.
The RA says that those provinces and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their
existing administrative regions. However, the President may merge the existing regions through
administrative determination.

President Cory then issued an EO containing the provinces/cities that will be merged,
transferring provinces from their existing region to another.

The petitioners who are members of the Congress representing legislative districts protested the
EO, saying that there is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities
within existing regions and restructure them to new administrative regions. The transfer of one
province under its current region to another is a form of reorganization, an alteration of the
existing structures of the government. The RA 6743 only holds authority of the president to
merge existing regions and cannot be construed as reorganizing them.
Issues:

1. Whether RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express standard to guide the

Presidents discretion. (undue delegation)
2. Whether the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganization
of those who did not vote or not in favor to it.
3. Whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the
Regional Center of Region IX from Zamboanga to Pagadian since it should be the acts of
Congress.
Ruling:
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the constitution,
it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments (Article X sec 4 of the Constitution).
The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contagious provinces for administrative
purposes. The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries.
1. No, a legislative standard need not be expressed, it may simply be gathered or implied.
Nor does need to be found in the law challenged because it is already embodied in other
statutes.
2. No, while RA 6724 provides that the provinces and cities which do not vote
for inclusion in the ARMM shall remain in the existing administrative regions this
provision is subject to the qualification that the President may by administrative
determination merge the existing regions. This means that while non-assenting provinces
are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the ARMM, they may
nevertheless be regrouped with continuous provinces forming other regions as the
exigency of administration may require.
3. YES, what was stated above applies. Also, the power to reorganize administrative regions
carries with it the power to determine the regional center.

Ordillo vs Comelec
Facts:
The province of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and Baguio City
cast their vote in a plebiscite held in pursuant to R.A. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. The result of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was only approved by
Ifugao. Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating
that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes
cast only in the province of Ifugao. The petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The petitioners maintain that there can be no
valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and Republic Act
No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.

Issue:
WON the province of Ifugao can validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Ruling:
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The keywords provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that region is to be made up of
more than one constituent unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two or
more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the
Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
Pelaex vs Auditor General

Facts:
On1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this
was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in
part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary of
any municipality and may change the seat of government within any subdivision
to such place therein as the public welfare may require

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that
the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed
by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress.

Pelaez argues: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality
can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC,
Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

Issue: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

Ruling: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch
of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine,
with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require
which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require
is present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In
the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which
immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require.
Only the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires
and NOT the creation of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V BAZ
FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant
to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the
technical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on an
agreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental
which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the

disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlier resolution approving the agreement
between the municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of
Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
in the RTC of Oroquieta. Jimenez argued that the power to create municipalities is essentially
legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru and
EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim.
ISSUES: WON Sinacaban has juridical personality.
RULING: YES. Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and
its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of
Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the
creation of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation
has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity
of the EO creating the municipality; and 3. the fact that the municipality was later classified as a
5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a
legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the
following factors are present:
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet the
validity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned. It was only 40 years later that its
existence was questioned.
2. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, etc. Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure
status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative
districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of
Misamis Occidental.
Mendenilla v. Onandia 5 SCRA 536
FACTS: In 1954, the mayor of the municipality of Legaspi appointed Emilio Mendenilla as
Chief of Police. Then, in1959, Congress passed R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of
Legaspi into the City of Legaspi, R.A. 2234 provides that the position of Chief of Police of the
city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President. Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was
appointed by the President as City Chief of Police, Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a
move, claiming that his position as chief of police was not abolished when Legaspi was
converted from a municipality to a city.

ISSUE: Whether Mendenilla is right in saying that the office of chief of police of the
municipality and that of the city are one and the same.
RULING: Mendenilla is incorrect. The position of Chief of Police of a municipality is totally
different from the position of the Chief of Police of a city. Therefore, R.A. 2234 abolished the
position of municipality Chief of Police and replaced it with a city Chief of police. Insupport of
this contention, the Supreme Court cited Sec. 96, Article XVII of the charter which provides that
the City Mayor the Vice Mayor, etc. are allowed to continue in office upon the effectivity of
the charter until the expiration of their terms in office. Nowhere does it mention the Chief
of Police in the said list of officials. The absolute and unconditioned repeal of a municipal
corporation without any saving clause, as to the right of officers under the former charter,
abolishes all offices thereunder. The adoption of a general law or charter abolishes all offices not
excepted.