PASHTUNISTAN MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW

AND CECRET DOCUMENTS

Documents from the U.S. National Archives

PASHTUNISTAN

Pre-Colonial Roots
Pashtunistan Politics
National Awami Party
Radio Kabul Propaganda
Pashtun Leaders Dying in Prisons
Indian Influence
Soviet Position

PASHTUNISTAN

Pre-Colonial Roots

Long before the British or the Sikhs appeared on the scene, the Eastern Afghans, whom we know
broadly as Pathans, had developed separately from the Western Afghans. The former had their
political and economic ties with the State ruling in the Indus Valley, namely the Mughals; the latter
with the Safavis of Iran. So much were the Western Afghans - the Abdalis (Durranis) especially-
turned towards Iran that they adopted the Persian language in place of their 'native' Pashto. This is
still so today. The British were thus not only 'colonialists' in bringing the Eastern Afghans within
the sub-continent; it was those people's historic and natural place. ... What about the extent of this
Pakhtunistan? It is shown on Afghan maps as embracing not only the territory inhabited by
Pathans between the Indus and the Durand Line but also the whole great square of Baluchistan
south of Quetta, and no one of the territories named in the north, is Pathan at all. The Pathans at the
Crossroads, by Olaf Caroe, Dec. 1961

Before betraying the trust and hopes of their brothers in Pakistan, the Afghan people will go
hungry. It should be clear that Afghans always put pride in their nation ("mellat") before their
wealth and well being since they have sacrificed so much for it before. Proof of the strength of this
spirit is in the Afghan's history of paying the high price of independence in the era of imperialism
by fighting three wars against the British, thereby remaining isolated and undeveloped, while the
peoples of India gained important material advantages (e.g. railroads), but sacrificed their pride
and national identity to the Raj. RGA Chief of Pushtunistan Affairs Discusses Pushtunistan, Nov. 6, 1962

On Pushtunistan, Professor Tucci commented that in the tribal areas the issue was not important.
The people considered themselves as Yusufzai, Mamund, Afridi, etc. not Pushtoons. It was in the
settled areas where the tribal affiliations have broken down that the concept of a Pushtu nationality
had taken root and under the influence of Afghan propaganda could become a major political
force. For this reason, said Tucci, the Government of Pakistan could not allow Afghan activity in
the settled areas. The Afghan consulate at Peshawar could not be allowed to resume its functions.
Memorandum of Conversation with Professor G. Tucci, Director of the Italian Archaeological Expeditions to
Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Dec. 2, 1962

Pashtunistan Politics

Editorial Observations of Pushtoonistan Propaganda in India, Jan. 27, 1951

The Government of Pushtoonistan, Jan. 27, 1951

NAME, Dec. 24, 1952

NAME, April 23, 1953

The report that Vice President Nixon had made statements in Afghanistan to the effect that he
hoped the Pukhtoonistan issue could be solved was reported and commented upon in unfavorable
terms here. The burden of most complaints was that Nixon should not have even taken note of
such a "dead issue" and that his statement in effect adds fuel to the "ashes of a problem which
since the establishment of Pakistan has ceased to exist." Weekly Summary, Political Events, 3 through
9 December, 1953, Dec. 10, 1953

Memorandum of Conversation Concerning Pushtoonistan, Feb. 19, 1954

Effects of Pushtunistan Agitation in NWFP, Feb. 24, 1954

Radio Quetta of February 5, 1963, reported that Mr. Wali Khan, the son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar
Khan, the well known former leader of the Khodaye Khedmatgaran (Servants of God), made a
statement denouncing the RGA's Pushtunistan campaign as "nonsense" which, if not halted, will
elicit a "strong blow" from the Pushtuns of Pakistan. Son of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Reportedly
Condemns RGA Pushtunistan Policy, Feb. 18, 1963

Aziz frankly admitted that Afghan agents operating out of Kandahar continue to spread
Pushtunistan literature throughout the region, particularly the Quetta Division. Afghan Consul in
Quetta Comments on GOP Surveillance and Harrassment and on Constitutional Reform in Afghanistan, Jan.
25, 1964

Jirga then adopted resolution on Pushtunistan, substance of which follows" "At this opportunity
when Afghan nation reorganizing its national life on firm bases of democracy, freedom and justice,
our religious, national and historical duty of supporting rights of people of Pushtunistan, who
unfortunately still deprived of their natural right of self-determination and individual and social
rights, stands before us vividly. We representatives of nation in supporting and approving Govt's
policy proclaim once again support of whole nation for Afghanistan's unchangeable policy in this
regard and await day when Pushtunistan issue would be settled in accordance with real wishes its
people and leaders and our brethren in Pushtunistan would attain their rights." Telegram from Kabul
Embassy to Secretary of State, Sept 21, 1964

Coming to the present, the Prime Minister stated that his most serious current problem was trying
to cope with the "unmerciful pressure" being exerted on him by the protagonists of "Pushtunistan."
Delegations from the tribal areas had been calling on him to urge direct action in achieving
"Pushtunistan." They had been criticizing his Government for failing to encourage the tribes to
effect a forceful solution of the issue. The Prime Minister asked me what I though he should do
about such pressures. I replied that, in my personal view, he would be well advised to resist such
pressures. ... The Prime Minister replied that he was having an exceedingly hard time, indeed,
"holding off these firebrands." In response to my question, he asserted that the pressures being
exerted by those desiring forceful action on "Pushtunistan" now were far greater than the
countervailing counsels of those advocating cooperation with Pakistan in her hour of crisis.
Conversation with Prime Minister Mohammad Yusuf Regarding Current Regional Affairs, September 22,
1965

[Abdul Ghaffar Khan] restated his interest in "self determination" for the Pathans, but also said
that he did not wish to embarrass Pakistan, particularly at this time when Pakistan was at war with
India. Askar Ali interpreted this to mean that AGK was no longer pushing for an independent or
autonomous Pushtoonistan, but admitted that he could only draw this inference from the moderate
tone of AGK's statements. Pushtoonistan, Oct. 8, 1965

Etemadi pointed out that quiet RGA assurances to GOP that it would not put any pressure on Pak
western border during hostilities had enabled Pak army concentrate its full strength against the
Indians. In return RGA had expected as minimum a benign GOP policy in Pushtun areas. ...
Afganistan did not have any territorial claims against Pakistan: Afghanistan demanded only full
respect for the apartness and special character of the frontier regions and non-interference with the
traditional way of life of the Pushtuns. Pak-Afghan Relations, Nov. 11, 1965

A usually reliable source with extensive contacts on the Frontier tells us that "Pushtunistan"
activity has been revived in South Waziristan near the Afghan border. The son of the Faqir of Ipi
and his followers have been provided with a modern offset printing press, which is installed in
their mountain cave hideouts and is producing some well-printed pamplets pushing Pushtunistan.
Also bribes are again being passed out for the flying of Pushtunistan flags along the Waziristan
border. Our source coupled this report with news of Soviet arms deliveries to India and speculates
that it is Russian rather than Indian money which is supporting the current revival. His
rationalization is that the Soviets are concerned over recent deliveries of Chinese arms to Pakistan
and possible further ChiCom inroads here, so hey are reinforcing their influence and activities in
the flanks. Reported Revival of Pushtunistan Activity, June 6, 1966

There are no longer garrisons in the tribal areas, and punitive expeditions are an extreme rarity
these days. Even when government officials have been kidnapped recently, the Government had
reportedly anted up the ransom quietly rather than stir up trouble by punishing the tribe
collectively as done by the British. When in doubt, officials placate the tribesmen, or resort to
persuasion, bribery, and "divide and rule" tactics rather than force. ... The Consulate finds no
evidence that "Pushtoonistan" is a viable movement in Pakistan, nor any current threat to the
integrity of the nation. The Pathans have never been able to work together, and there is nothing but
a vague emotional attachment to the Pushto language and culture to unite tribes which have been
feuding with one another for centuries. Report From Occupied Pushtunistan, June 16, 1966

Right-wing nationalist Afghan Mellat held pro-Pushtunistan demonstration December 2, attracting

crowd of about 500. Riot police much in evidence but no violence occurred. ... The general theme
of demonstration was that RGA has let Pushtunistan slip through its fingers three times, the
current Subcontinent situation being the third. Afghan Mellat demonstration on Pushtunistan, Dec. 4,
1971

We are concerned that domestic political pressures in Pakistan and Afghanistan may be pushing
both countries contrary to their own interests and desires -- toward a confrontation over terrain and
loyalties of Pushtun people. Pak-Afghan Relations, March 28, 1972

Afghan Amb voiced serious concern over impact on Afghanistan of current poor relations between
GOP and Pathans of Pakistan as led by Wali Khan and NAP. He fears that continued pressure on
Pathan leadership in NWFP could lead to war between Afghanistan and Pakistan in which USSR
might very well be drawn in. Afghanistan Concern Over Events in Pakistan, March 28, 1973

Pashtunistan Revived. With the coup-makers themselves having demonstrated the ease with which
a few junior officers can take control, Kabul abounds with coup rumors. An already tense situation
has been exacerbated by the mass arrests. The "Pushtunistan" dispute with Pakistan may be the
only major political issue on which the Afghans are in general agreement. If they are not able to
take any concrete action on it, at least it can be exploited to divert attention from domestic
grievances. Afghanistan: Cracks in the Facade, Sept. 26, 1973

The Government of Pakistan cannot but express its deep regret over the fact that Afghanistan
should continue to persist in its demands on "Pakhtoonistan". This demand is aimed against the
territorial integrity of Pakistan and questions a frontier which was delimited and demarcated
through an international treaty and which has been in existence and respected as such for over
three quarters of a century. Aide Memoire, Sept. 28, 1973

National Awami Party

The news that the NAP has been formally reactivated was preceded by reports in the press of
many meetings of the NAP in villages in the Peshawar-Charsadda-Mardan area, long the heartland
of the Red Shirt-NAP organizations. At one such meeting in Shaidan, a small village in the Red
Shirt area south of Peshawar, resolutions were passed opposing One Unit, demanding the release
of political detenus, and supporting the formation of a "national front" organization. The press
reported that ABDUL WALI Khan, son of AGK, had been given the responsibility and power to
contact and negotiate with other groups throughout Pakistan for the formation of the national
front. ... In Askar's opinion, Ghaffar Khan and the other "graybeards" of the old Red Shirt
movement are actually far more cautious and conservative in their approach than the younger
element. These younger men are now conducting NAP affairs in accordance with instructions from
those who are in prison, but their personal inclination is to enter into an alignment with the
Afghans. Frontier National Awami Party: Report on Renewed Activities and on Present and Future
Leadership, Sept. 3, 1962

ABDUL HANAN, a veteran Consulate driver who is a Kuz Mohmand from a small village
southwest of Peshawar, recently reported for work with a discernible pain in his side. On being
queried as to the trouble and cause, Hanan replied with much embarrassment that he had been
struck by his village mullah because he, Hanan, had refused to join the National Awami Party
(NAP). Hanan said that, in common with many villages, the mullah in his village is the leading
organizer of the NAP, or, as the organization is still called in the villages, the "Surkh Posh" -- "Red
Shirts" in Pukhtu. Coercive National Awami Party Recruitment Methods as Experienced by a Consulate
Employee, April 24, 1963

Much as he would like to speed the demise of the NAP, Bhutto is inhibited by political realities.
Any central-government intervention in the NAP-dominated administration of Baluchistan, or for
that matter any action against the NAP, would at least complicate Bhutto's constitutional
negotiations with the NAP, and might jeopardize the fragile unity of residual Pakistan. Pakistan:
What's Up in Baluchistan? Feb 8, 1973

Several hours after dismissing National Awami Party governors in Baluchistan and North West
Frontier Province, Bhutto announced appointment of Akbar Bugti. Tribal Chief Bugti Baluch tribe
and bitter foe of present NAP government in Baluchistan, as Governor of that province and
appointment of Aslam Khattak, current speaker provincial assemply and leader of Independent
United Front (which has been supporting NAP coalition provincial government), as Governor of
Frontier. Bhutto Names New Governors and Dismisses Baluchistan Government, Feb. 15, 1973

Army Chief of Staff, General Tikka Khan, told me February 20 that both Baluchistan and North
West Frontier Provinces are quiet militarily. Describing background of recent disturbances in
Lasbela District of Baluchistan, he said problem had arisen from combination of local tribal and
political factors. NAP govt under Baluchistan Governor Bizenjo had taken number of steps to
bring armed forces to bear. These had included activation of tribal Lashkars who had been armed
by provincial govt, deployment of rural guard and arming of tribal "levies". Eventually Bizenjo
agreed to dispatch of federal forces. Internal Developments: Pakistan Army Activities in Baluchistan and
Frontier Provinces, Feb. 22, 1973

GOP-controlled press April 8 carried story linking opposition National Awami Party (NAP) with
Baghdad-based Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF). Most allegations in story were ancient history
culled from old BLF publications, and emphasized alleged Soviet support for Baluch irredentist
claims. Presumably because of current GOP efforts to repair relations with USSR, Foreign
Ministry felt constrained next day to issue vague denial of Soviet involvement. "Free" Baluchistan:
Cartographic Aggression, April 11, 1973

Law and order situation in Baluchistan has worsened as provincial assembly session nears. Eight
members of security forces reportedly killed by Marri tribesmen and Mengal tribesmen allegedly
attacked Kalat official and party. Bugti government, citing above incidents, has stepped up its
vigorous attacks on NAP aims, leaders, associates. NAP counterattack appears to be growing a bit
hysterical. ... Bizenjo said Baluchistan government had suspended food supplies to sections of
province and was using federal forces in attempt achieve political aims that minority government
could not accomplish otherwise. Baluchistan Continues to Bubble, May 22, 1973

According local press accounts, several leading Marri tribesmen, including younger brother of
Baluchisan NAP President Khair Bukshmphan Marrin "surrendered" to GOB authorities June 2
and declared themselves loyal citizens of Pakistan. Tribal elders told Governor Bugti, with whom
they appeared in hastily called press conference at Government House, Quetta, that they
represented 40,000 of the 60,000 Marri tribesmen. Marri Tribesmen Reportedly Declare Loyalty to
Pakistan, June 4, 1973

The long dormant "Pahstunistan" issue, revived following the July 17 coup in Afghanistan, has
been exacerbated by the arrest last week of the leaders of the National Awami Party (NAP) in
Pakistan's turbulent province of Baluchistan. ... The new government of Afghanistan has also
taken a very serious view of events in Baluchistan, and is supporting the NAP leaders. President
Daud has long contended that Pakistan should allow the people of the two border provinces, which
the Afghans label Pashtunistan, the freedom to establish either an autonomous or independent
state. Pakistan: Internal Dissidence and Regional Conflict, Aug. 23, 1973

Radio Kabul Propaganda

Characteristic Samplings from Radio Kabul's Broadcasts Beamed to Pakistan, Sept. 28, 1950

The contact with the Pushtun leaders is particularly interesting because of its possible significance
for the Pushtunistan issue. Both the source and Mr. Majruh speculated that the Prime Minister
might be trying to "soften the blow" of what many people in Kabul consider the inevitable
decision to further downgrade the Pushtunistan campaign. Prime Minister Yusuf Active in Personal
Contact with Former Opposition and Tribal Leaders, April 14, 1963

The source said that he believed that it was probable that the Pushtun racist ideas had found a
ready audience among the many Pushtuns in Kabul. He said these people were quite aware that
Pushtunistan propaganda output has been decreased and that, even more significant, that the RGA
had done almost nothing concrete and direct to further the cause of Pushtun nationalism since the
Bajaur debacle in the fall of 1960. In this context, according to the source, the appointment of a
Tajik Prime Minister (Yusuf) accompanied by a noticeable softening of the Pushtunistan campaign
was felt ot foreshadow a government policy of shifting the emphasis from exalting the uniqueness
and primacy of Pushtun language and culture to one of subordinating it to a policy of national
unity, which in Afghanistan necessarily means the fostering of a multi-ethnic, and thus
predominantly Persianized culture. Anti-Daud Pushtun Notes Increase in Expression of Pushtun Racist
Ideas, June 16, 1963

The following is Radio Pakistan's summary of their monitoring of Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan
propaganda September 22 to September 29: "Radio Kabul reverted to broadcasting reports of
clashes between Milli Mujahideen and Pakistan forces in Bajaur, and commenting upon them. No
less than four incidents were reported during the week and each was made the subject of highly
inflammatory talk on the Pukhtunistan Special Program. All spoke of the tremendous awakening
sweeping 'from one end of Pukhtunistan to the other' and requiring only a spark to set the whole
place ablaze." Radio Kabul Pukhtunistan Propaganda, Oct. 5, 1963

Radio Kabul on Dec. 28 launched a propaganda campaign against Pakistan, asserting and
implying that the National Assembly had enacted legislation "imposing" the courts and laws of
Pakistan on the Tribal Areas of West Pakistan, identified by the RGA as "Azad Pukhtunistan." The
broadcasts correctly stated that certain members of the National Assembly had suggested during
the debate on the Fundamental Rights Bill that the Tribal Areas should be brought within the scope
of the Bill. The broadcasts did not state that the suggestions were quickly brushed aside in the
Assembly, but as noted they regularly implied and at times stated that such legislation had in fact
been passed. Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan Campaign, Jan. 30, 1964

Radio Kabul stepped up propaganda about "the worsening of the situation" in the whole of
Pukhtunistan and reported new clashes between "the Milli Mujahideen" and Pak forces in Jhalwan
and Kalat in which Pak jets were used. Reports of tribal jirgas and arrests of "nationalists" were
also stepped up. There were reports of "pressure" on various persons, arrests of an Imam of a
mosque and some people for distributing posters, and police surveillance of political prisoners
brought to Peshawar hospital. Radio Pakistan's Weekly Analysis of Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan
Propaganda, March 8-15, 1964

In addition to the normal reporting on jirgas in tribal areas and gatherings in Peshawar being held
by "Pashtunistan nationalists" to press their demand for self-determination and to protest the arrest
and detention of nationalists, the Afghan press and radio continue to report the occurrence of
clashes in "Pashtunistan" between "nationalists" and the Pakistani police and military. ...
According to these allegations, 6 clashes occurred in Baluchistan (February through April), 7 in
Bajaur (April and May), and 1 near Jandola in "Central Pashtunistan" (May). These reports
claimed that Pakistani convoys have been ambushed and that police and troops were wounded and
killed; "heavy losses" were sustained by the Pakistanis although they used Air Force planes for
reconnaisance and, as Abdul Haq, an opposition member of the Pakistani National Assembly
reportedly stated in the Assembly on March 31, even bombed a village in Kalat on February 15.
RGA Continues to Report Clashes in "Pashtunistan," June 6, 1964

FYI We have in mind further toning down Pushtunistan propaganda which seems to have
increased in recent months. END FYI Telegram from Department of State, June 26, 1964

Afghan propaganda on "Pushtunistan", as suggested in Karachi's telegram cited above, has been
stepped up since October of this year, the new element being a tendency toward incitement. Thus
on November 26 the Pushtunistan program of Radio Kabul called for "action" by the
Pushtunistanis to fulfill their aspirations. On December 3 the program commented that after taking
up the sword the people should continue fighting until they achieved their freedom. This
incitement follows the broadcast of November 12 which pointed out that the "war of nerves" is as
significant in the conduct of combat as the fighting itself, and that this is the way ahead for the
"Pushtunistani nation." This new trend appears in the midst of continued reports of clashes
between "nationalists" and Pakistani police and troops. Afghan Propaganda on "Pushtunistan," Dec. 12,
1964

Propaganda has described the recent disturbances at the University of Peshawar and elsewhere
(Kohat, Mardan) as stemming from the "nationalist struggle," and has noted that the grievances
and sufferings of the students (arrests, rustications, use of tear gas to break up demonstrations) had
mass support among the "Pushtunistanis". ... The Afghan press and radio continued to report that a
large number of jirgas were held in "Pushtunistan" to condemn Pakistani "intervention", to pass
resolutions imposing sanctions on any tribal member who cooperated with Pakistani authorities,
and to demand the release of political prisoners. The Bajaur region was most frequently reported
to be the scene of such jirgas, with the Tirrah and Central Pushtunistan (the Masud tribe) also
frequently cited. Reports of clashes were more frequent, particularly in Baluchistan. ... Afghan
propaganda continued to contain an element of incitement and to claim that a general revolt was
underway. Afghan Propaganda on "Pushtunistan," March 2, 1965

According to [Radio Pakistan's] monitoring reports, the broadcasts continued to stress alleged
battles between tribal nationalists and Pakistan security forces, reported on tribal demands for
Pukhtunistan, and, primarily through poems or songs, incited the tribes to revolt. Radio Kabul's
Pukhtunstan Propaganda, March 10, 1965

Kabul Radio reported in Pushtu May 27 that "nationalists" from "Central Pushtunistan" attacked
Pakistani military establishments at Jandola, Siroki and Razmak. In another report June 17 from
Central Pushtunistan, Kabul Radio reported that Baholzai "nationalists" under the command of
Mohammed Zaman Khan and Lambai Khan attacked Pakistani military establishments at
Manizayee. On the same date an attack on the Pakistani military camp at Gomal by Mahsuds
under the leadership of Niamatullah Khan and Ghulam Habib Khan was reported. Developments in
Afghan-Pakistani Relations, July 3, 1965

On june 26 Kaubl Radio reported a series of alleged events in Waziristan beginning with the
blocking of the Miran Shah road, followed by an attack on the Pakistan Army post at Watakhel, by
"Mujahiddin" tribesmen. These events reportedly served as the prelude to a massive jirga near
Watakhel, affter which attacks were renewed on the military post. A group of Wazirs and Masuds
also reportedly ambushed a Pakistan military truck, injured a Pakistani officer travelling therein
and took over some military equipment. Another report on June 27 said that the Wazirs, in cutting
the road between Datta Khel and Miran Shaha, had been able to capture 10 Pakistani military
vehicles. On June 30, Kabul Radio reported that Wazirs had attacked the Pakistani military post
near Boya and demolished it. Reportedly four Pakistani soldiers were killed in this action. On July
3 the Pakistanis perhaps in retaliation attacked a jirga held by members of the Dawar tribe near
Miran Shah; three "nationalists" were killed and nine wounded. The Dawars immediately then
began an attack on the Pakistani military installation at Miran Shah. Pakistan-Afghan Relations, June
25 - July 14, 1965

The theme of the programs during this period was that of describing "Pakistani repression" of the
Pukhtoons as a virtual continuation of British suppression. At times, the broadcasts advocated
revolt by alleging that "all Pukhtunistan" was up in arms and proclaiming that the time had come
for all true Pukhtoons to take up arms. Actual incidents such as the Salarzai clashes in the north
and the Mari-Bugti trouble in Baluchistan were embellished and reported and some pro-
Government Jirgas were reported as though they had made anti-government decisions. Radio
Pakistan's reporting on Radio Kabul's Pukhtunistan Propaganda, July 14, 1965

These revealing observations by responsible senior Afghan officials confirm recent CAS [CIA]
reports and Embassy assessments of other indications (diminution of "Pushtunistan" propaganda,
official public statements partial toward Pakistan, significant private comment) suggesting that
Afghanistan has been deliberately pursuing a conciliatory policy toward Pakistan, possibly in the
hope of obtaining concessions later on the "Pushtunistan" issue. More specifically, they confirm
CAS reports to the effect that the RGA has initiated negotiations with the GOP aimed at resolving
the "Pushtunistan" dispute. Senior MFA Official Reveals RGA Seeking Negotiated Settlement of
"Pushtunistan" with GOP; Minister Confirms, Oct. 9, 1965

The issue of "Pakhtoonistan" does not seem to excite the tribesmen very much. On the strength of
some soundings among the tribal maliks one gets the impression that an "independent
Pakhtoonistan" would not serve the interests of the tribes. A current view is that "Pakhtoonistan"
may end up as an appendage of Afghanistan to the detriment of tribal independence. Neither are
the advocates of Pakhtoonistan, the NAP leaders, held in high regard. The simple tribal mind is
suspicious of both Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his son Wali who, some people think have aspirations
of becoming "kings of Pakhtoonistan." And suspicion is strengthened by the fact that NAP has
advocated the merger of tribal territory with the settled districts. Politics and Elections in Tribal
Territory, Nov. 13, 1970

GOI sources acknowledge that during last year's Indo-Pak crisis, All India Radio (AIR) introduced
Sindhi program, and expanded programs in Bengali, Urdu, Punjabi, Pushtu, and Baluchi, though
AIR had and continues to have problem retaining services of reliable Baluchi speaker. MEA
sources aver that until outbreak of war, these programs (except for Bengali) were largely cultural
and informational, and did not even indirectly question allegiance to Islamabad of West Pakistan's
constituent units. Though sources not specific, they suggest that during hear of war, program
content obviously changed, with harsh attacks on Yahya regime. They claim that presently,
however, programs have reverted to pre-war tone, and that India's sole reasons for making
broadcasts are to show "all peoples of countries in region that India is friendly," and to ensure that
people of Pakistan not forced to rely on Radio Pakistan alone for news of India and of world.
Indian Intentions Re Baluchistan and Pashtunistan, Jan. 17. 1972

As reported in Kabul's 1545, the RGA announced March 14 that on the instructions of Prime
Minister Zahir the publicity organs of the government were henceforth to expand their coverage of
Pashtunistan subjects. The Prime Minister's order established guidelines for the Ministry of
Information and Culture to set up committees to supervise editorial policy, radio publicity, and
administrative and financial aspects of the campaign. Afghanistan Steps Up Rhetoric on Pashtunistan,
March 20, 1972

[T]he RGA announced on March 14 that henceforth the government's publicity organs would
expand coverage given to Pashtunistan subjects. The three committees established to supervise the
campaign (a central supervising committee, radio subcommittee and administrative committee)
have so far functioned sporadically or only in name; and the central policymaking committee has
held no meetings at all in recent weeks. Pashtunistan: Publicity Campaign Still Under Wraps, May 13,
1972

Since onset of latest domestic crisis between Bhutto government and opposition parties, according
to Shaukat, Radio Kabul especially has been beaming inflammatory propaganda (presumably in
Pushtu) at Pathan population of North West Frontier Province. All India Radio has also been
broadcasting propaganda material drawing comparison between current situation in Pakistan and
1971 East Pakistan civil war, Shaukat said. Afghan and Indian Propaganda Broadcasts, March 30, 1973

Pashtun Leaders Dying in Prisons

Sarfaraz said when he took over as Political Agent of the Mohmand Agency in October, 1959,
Hassan Khan and over 400 members of his family, including women and children, had already
been in jail for many months. The Political Agent said that at the first big Mohmand jirga over
which he presided, scores of Afghan Mohmands who had known him in Jalalabad attended the
jirga to seek his help in obtaining Hassan Khan's release. Mohmand Malik's Death in Kabul Jail Stirs
Local Interest, Dec. 5, 1962

Hassan Khan, a Mohmand Malik and former President of the Northern Pushtunistan Assembly, did
die of mistreatment in a Kabul jail about six weeks ago. Death of Mohmand Malik in a Kabul Jail, Jan.
7, 1963
Kabul press and radio reported on January 15 that Namdar Khan, an important leader of the
outlawed Khodaye Khedmatgar political party, died of mistreatment in a Peshawar jail. ... Before
its suppression the Khodaye Khedmatgar (Servants of God) was reportedly a very influential pro-
Pushtunistan force in Pakistan's NWFP area. Its President was Abdul Gaffar Khan, virtually the
patron saint of Pushtunistan to many Pushtuns, who has spent a number of years in Pakistani
prisons. Alleged Death of Pushtun Leader in a Peshawar Jail, Jan. 28, 1963

Indian Influence

On October 10, 1962 two Indian Embassy officers gave the reporting officer their views on the
Afghan political situation. They both showed deep concern over the tightening Soviet grip on
Afghanistan and considered that unless the present drift is soon halted, Afghanistan will be drawn
into the Soviet orbit. They regarded the dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the latter
country's "Pushtunistan" policies as the major factor in increasing Soviet influence here and
considered resolution of this dispute unlikely becuase of the rigid positions of both countries.
Indian Embassy Officers on Afghan Political Situation, Oct. 28, 1962

An All-India Radio (AIR) program August 10 mentioned Afghanistan specifically as "a victim" of
Pakistan's religious "defamation". The commentator observed, "Afghans support their Pushtun
brothers who are oppressed by their Pakistani rulers." AIR on August 16 referred to a Kabul Radio
broadcast in reporting alleged Pakistan suppression of the "Pushtunistan freedom movement." ...
as tensions increased between India and Pakistan All-India Radio utilized more and more Kabul
Radio "Pushtunistan" broadcasts, some over a month old. Afghan-Pakistan Relations, August 4 -
September 6, 1965

According to press reports the United Pakhtoonistan Front (UPF) was formed in New Delhi in
June 1967 under the Chairmanship of Mehr Chand Khanna, former Minister of Finance in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and sometime Minister of Works, Housing and
Rehabilitation in the Government of India. The political purpose of the front was made clear in a
resolution passed on July 16, 1967, which endorsed the demand for Pakhtoonistan as a homeland
for the Pathans. India, it said, owed a debt of gratitude to the people of the Frontier who had been
among the leaders in the battle for freedom, which for the Pathans had only resulted in their being
"thrown to the wolves" in Pakistan. ... Morarji Desai reportedly assured the delegation he would
do whatever he could in this cause. Formation of the United Pakhtoonistan Front, August 17, 1967

In a recent session with the reporting officer, the Acting Director of MEA's East Asia division C.
V. RANGANATHAN stated that lively triangular correspondence had been going on between
MEA and the Indian missions in Kabul and Islamabad regarding possible Chicom involvement in
and support of the Pakhtoonistan independence movement. Reading from several top secret files,
Ranganathan said that it had been established that Ayub Khan Achakzai, a radical Pathan advocate
of an independent Pakhtoonistan was maintaining close frequent contact with the Chicom embassy
in Kabul, where he is based. Peking and the Pakhtoonistan Issue, Dec. 30, 1969

Soviet Position

Mr. Anatoly I. Andreev, one of the three Counselors in the Soviet Embassy, told the reporting
officer on February 6, 1963, that the Soviet Union's policy toward RGA's Pushtunistan campaign
remains one of firm support coupled with the desire for a peaceful solution. In response to a
question about the Soviet Union's view of the unfolding of a more active Pushtunistan policy by
the Afghan Government, along the lines of the paramilitary intervention by Afghan tribes and
Afghan troops in tribal dress in a dispute in Pakistan's NWFP in the fall of 1960, Andreev said that
this move was clearly "aggression", and that whatever the rights of the case, the Soviet Union is
firmly opposed to such developments. The Soviet diplomat added that the Pushtuns in Pakistan
have an irrefutable right to self-determination, but that the dreadful spectre of nuclear war dictated
that "the two nations which determine world policy," i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union,
could not tolerate aggression for any purpose. Soviet Diplomat Comments of USSR's Policy Toward
RGA's Pushtunistan Campaign, Feb. 18, 1963

[O]ne day prior to his departure for Moscow, Afghan Prime Minister Abdul Zahir signs an order
giving instructions to beef up and provide more money for Department of Pushtunistan Affairs. He
ordered department to launch a propaganda campaign calling for establishment of Pushtunistan.
Although Paks certain that Soviets very active in border areas in Afghanistan, and convinced that
Soviets put pressure on Zahir to sign above order, they do not have hard proof that Soviets are
providing arms to tribes or even funds. Afghan Intentions to heat up Pushtunistan Issue, March 15, 1972

[W]e believe PM mentioned subject in Moscow for domestic purposes ... We would not interpret
statements quoted as indication either side pushing other on this or broader question. We tend
believe PM would push issue, if he were going to, in private rather than public forum. Pushtunistan:
Afghan Decision to Publicize Issue, March 17, 1972