RELIGIO AD POLITICS I IDOESIA:

ATTITUDES AD IFLUECES OF THE IDOESIA COUCIL OF

ULAMA (MUI) O THE GEERAL ELECTIOS

By
Muhammad Asad
Under the Supervision of
Prof. Kees van Dijk

MA thesis submitted to the Faculty of Humanities

for the degree of Master of Arts (MA)
in Islamic Studies

Leiden University
9th February 2010

ACKOWLEDGEMET

With the completion of this thesis, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to
people whose material and moral support have contributed to the fulfilment of this
writing. The first and the foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Prof. Kees
van Dijk who has given me important and critical remarks regarding this research. Due to
his supervision, I have found many new ideas, especially in methods to develop a good
and precise writing. I also would like to thank Hilman Latief and Lusvita Fitri
Nuzuliyanti (Mbak Cici) whose suggestions and comments on my thesis draft have
helped me in finishing this thesis.
I am also grateful to the Indonesian Young Leaders Programme, especially to Dr.
N. J.G. Kaptein and Marise R. van Amersfoort M.Sc. who have given me the chance to
pursue a master degree in Leiden University. Their advice during my 18 months study
period is very valuable, particularly regarding my adjustment with the Netherlands
academic milieu. I would also like to express my gratitude to several Leiden University
lectures, i.e. Prof. L.P.M.H. Buskens, Prof. M.S. Berger, Prof. Nasr Abu Zayd and Dr. N.
J.G. Kaptein who have inspired me with invaluable knowledge.
In addition, I would also like to thank fellow Indonesian Young Leaders
programme Batch III, i.e Novelia Musda, Tholib Rohmatillah, Munirul Ikhwan, Ali
Tantowi, Reza Indria, Nuril Huda, Laily Hafidzah, Istiqomah, Noblana Adib and Hijrotul
Magfiroh. In particular, I would like to thank my roommate Hilaly Basya who has been
my good friend in discussions related to my thesis and other intellectual subjects.
Discussing with him is always a nice experience and often ends with a good piece of
writing. I am also grateful to the staffs of the KITLV especially Mrs. Josephine and Mrs.
Rini who have provided me with valuable sources in the library. The KITLV has been my
office for the last 6 months and I am intellectually delighted with its collections.
Finally, I must acknowledge that the successful completion of my thesis and MA
program at Leiden University is largely due to the strong encouragement I have received
from my family and relatives. First of all, I would to express my gratitude to my father,
Maksum Ahmad, and my mother, Salamah, who gave me the permission to continue my
study at Leiden University. Without their agreement, I would not have tasted the

academic milieu in the Western world. I would also thank my older brothers, Ali Bashori,
Masduki, Ahmad Maimun, and my sister, Nailatul Mufidah, who always support me in
realizing my dreams. The last but not the least, I am very grateful to my beloved wife,
Lilik Mulyani, whose support and love have incessantly inspired me to do the best in
finishing this MA degree. Her patient makes me strong and her love always helps me feel
at home. However, none of the aforementioned names is responsible for any of the
inadequacies of this study. Rather, the responsibility is in my hands.

Leiden, 8th February 2010

Muhammad Asad

ii

TABLE OF CO
TE
TS

Acknowledgement .........................................................................................
Table of Contents...........................................................................................
Introduction ...................................................................................................

i
ii
1

Chapter I: THE MUI AND THE GENERAL ELECTIONS IN THE NEW ORDER
ERA
A. The Establishment....................................................................
9
B. The Relations Between the MUI and the New Order regime..... 17
C. MUIs Attitudes in the General Elections during the New Order
era...........................................................................................
24

Chapter II: THE MUI AND THE 1999 GENERAL ELECTIONS

A. Islam and Politics in the Late New Order Era..........................
B. The MUI and the Reformation Era........................................
C. The MUI and the 1999 General Elections................................

35
43
48

Chapter III: MUIS ATTITUDES IN THE 2004 AND 2009 GENERAL ELECTIONS
A. MUIs Attitude in Post-Soeharto Era........................................
B. The MUI and the 2004 General Elections.................................
C. The MUI and the 2009 General Elections.................................

58
69
75

Conclusion.....................................................................................................

83

Bibliography...................................................................................................

86

iii

ITRODUCTIO

General Description
The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) is a semi-governmental organization in
Indonesia one of whose aims is to give advice and fatwas regarding religious problems in
particular, and the nations problem in general, to the government and society. In addition,
the MUI is also expected to promote unity among Muslims, and to act as a mediator
between the government and the ulama.1 Since its establishment on 26 July 1975, the
MUI has played its role in the society as an interpreter and guide for the religious
teachings of Islam. According to Hasan Basri, the third general chairman, the MUI
should function as a watchdog ensuring that no law that is passed in Indonesia is
contradictory to the teachings of Islam.2 In performing this function, the MUI has certain
tools for giving guidance to the society. There are at least two kinds of media which are
used by the MUI regarding its function of giving guidance to society. These media are a
fatwa discourses and non-fatwa discourses. The non-fatwa discourses consist of
Recommendation (Tausiyah), Admonition (Tadzkirah), Instruction/Mandate (Amanah),
Position Statement (Pernyataan Sikap), Appeal (Himbauan), and Thought Contribution
(Sumbangan Pemikiran).3
Among others, fatwas have definitely played a significant role in the society. As
stated by Wael Hallaq, fatwas played a considerable role in the growth and gradual
change of Islamic substantive law. 4 In terms of religious authority, fatwas are also
important because through this media ulama can express their ideas and opinions
concerning Islamic law.5 By using fatwas produced by ulama, people may know what is

Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama
Indonesia, 1990), p. 101.
2
Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in
Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p 54.
3
Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),
p. 51.
4
See Wael B. Hallaq, From Fatwas to Furu: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law, Islamic
Law and Society, 1 (1994), pp. 2965.
5
Nico Kaptein, The Voice of the Ulama: Fatwas and Religious Authority in Indonesia, Arch. de
Sc. soc. des Rel., 2004, 125, (janvier-mars 2004), p. 116.

forbidden for them and what is not. In this sense, fatwas function as evidence that ulama
(or the religious authority) have the ability to give people directions.6
However, even though fatwas play an important role, this does not mean that the
other media do not play a pivotal role. In terms of MUIs position, the other media such
as Tausiyah, Tadzkirah, Amanah, Pernyataan Sikap and others played an important
function, especially in expressing MUIs opinion on political matters. These attitudes can
be seen in several statements and recommendations issued by the MUI in to express its
support for the government. These statements were usually given before the election
during the New Order era. Most of them were in favour of Suharto to become the next
Indonesian president or to support the New Order government.7
The fact that the MUI supported the government was probably caused by pressure
from the government. We can see this from the objective of the government to establish
the MUI. From the time it was established, the New Order regime wanted the MUI to be
the interpreter, to bridge the gap between the government programmes and the
Indonesian people. In order to keep this objective, Suharto, the President of Indonesia at
the time, restricted MUI activities different from other Islamic organisations as well as
forbade the MUI from getting involved in political matters.8 For that reason it makes
sense that the MUI was in favour of Suharto maintaining his presidency during the New
Order era. This idea is supported by several scholars such as Atho Mudzhar, 9 M.B.
Hooker,10 Nur Ichwan11 and Kees van Dijk,12 who argue that the MUI was mostly under
government control in the New Order era.
6

Ibid, p. 116.
For instance, in 1982 after the MUI national Meeting, the MUI issued a statement which advised
the members of the House of Representatives (DPR) to vote for Suharto in the presidential elections. See
Keputusan Rapat Kerja 0asional Majelis Ulama se-Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 57, April 1982, pp. 2531. This kind of statements was repeated each time Indonesia prepared for elections, such as in 1987
(Seruan Bersama Berkenaan dengan Pemilu, Mimbar Ulama, no. 115, Maret 1987), 1992 (Keputusan
Rapat Kerja 0asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia Tahun 1413/1992, Mimbar Ulama, no. 178, December
1992) and 1997 (Tausyiah Majelis Ulama Indonesia Hasil Rakernas Tahun 1997, Mimbar Ulama, no. 224,
April 1997).
8
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia,
1976), pp. 15-19.
9
Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in
Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993).
10
M. B. Hooker, Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian Fatwas,
Studia Islamika, Vol 4, No 4 (1997), pp. 1-31.
11
Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),
4572.
7

Moreover, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, it seemed that the MUI shifted its
attitudes. It can be said that the MUI was no longer in support of the government. This is
evident from the 1999 general elections, when the MUI began to distance itself from the
government and speak out in the interests of Islamic parties. At that moment, the MUI
issued three taushiah which clearly endorsed Islamic parties by stating that Muslims
should vote for Muslim candidates. 13 Atho Mudzhar noted that in the post-New Order era
the MUI touched on political issues of high sensitivity and, therefore triggered
controversies.14 What stimulated this choice were probably the decrease of state pressure
and the increased power of civil society. On the other hand, as the New Order regime
ended, the MUI intended to revise its position and change the stigma of being a supporter
of the New Order policies. 15
The MUI kept this attitude in the 2004 general elections when they issued a
taushiah regarding the elections. Compared to the previous taushiah in 1999, this
taushiah was not as strong as the previous one because it did not endorse Islamic parties.
However, at one point it mentioned that people should vote for the candidates who are
faithful, display good behaviour and are committed. 16 This taushiah indicated the
preference of the MUI for Islamic parties as it was during the 1999 general elections.
Furthermore, in 2009 the MUI issued a controversial fatwa regarding vote
abstention. This fatwa was issued in January, three months before the general elections
which were held on 9 April 2009. This fatwa was considered to be controversial because
until this time, the MUI never issued a fatwa regarding the general elections. The MUI
issued mostly statements (Pernyataan Sikap) and (taushiah) recommendations. In
12

Kees van Dijk, Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas, in R. Michael Feener & Mark E.
Cammack, Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia, Ideas and Institutions (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 2007), pp. 44-65.
13
Mimbar Ulama, No.250, June 1999, p. 27.
14
Atho Mudzhar, the Ulama, the Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of
Indonesian Ulama Revisited, in Johan Meuleman (Editor), Islam in the Era of Globalization; Muslim
Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity, (Jakarta: INIS, 2001), pp.315-326. A fact also mentioned by Van
Dijk was that after the New Order regime collapsed, the MUI entered the field of practical politics, and
became an active player in the political game. Kees van Dijk, Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas, p.
52.
15
There were several actions of the MUI which represented this image such as the issuance of
eleven fatwas in 2009, among others a fatwa regarding the Ahmadiah sect in Indonesia and a fatwa
forbidding pluralism, liberalism and secularism. See Piers Gillespie, Current Issues in Indonesian Islam:
Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatw no. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and
Secularism, Journal of Islamic Studies, 18:2 (2007) pp. 202240.
16
Mimbar Ulama, No. 310, June 2004, p. 31.

addition, some national figures such as the vice-president at the time Jusuf Kalla
criticised this fatwa by saying that this fatwa was unnecessary because it would mean
most of the Indonesian people will go to hell. 17 Besides that, it is also questionable
whether this fatwa was officially issued by the MUI or not. The reason for this doubt is
that the fatwa cannot be accessed on the MUI website, as well as the existence of the
statement of the vice-chairman of the MUI, Din Syamsuddin, who stated that the fatwa
was cancelled.
Based on these facts, it is important to look at the development of the MUI over
time. What was MUIs position in the New Order era and its transformation during the
post-New Order era? Several scholars who previously studied the MUI used MUI fatwas
to determine relations between the MUI and the government, but none of them looked at
the MUI attitudes during the general elections. Therefore, this thesis will analyse the
MUI stances in the general elections from the New Order era until recent days.

Research Questions
1. What are the attitudes of the MUI regarding the general elections during the New
Order era and how does my analysis differ from the theses made by scholars who
previously studied the MUI?
2. What are the differences between the MUI attitudes in the New Order era and in
the post-New Order era? Why did these differences emerge?
3. What were the reactions of Indonesian Muslims to these attitudes? Were they
effective in influencing Indonesian Muslims or did they stimulate pro and contra
discourses within society?

Methods of Analysis
This research consists mainly of library research; I analysed data about the MUI
both in the Leiden University library and the library of the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-,
Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV). To capture the attitude of the MUI in the Indonesian
general elections, I analysed the official magazine of the MUI, Mimbar Ulama. This

17

Bahtiar Effendy, MUI Fatwa is neither Necessary nor a Priority, The Jakarta Post, 06 February

2009.

magazine is used by the MUI in disseminating every decision made by its board, both
fatwas and non-fatwa discourses. The magazine also gives information regarding the
background of the fatwa or taushiah. This information is valuable to determine the
conditions surrounding the fatwa, especially related to the general elections.
To analyse the data, this thesis will use the comparative approach, specifically
when searching for the difference in attitude of the MUI in the New Order era and the
MUI post-New Order. This method is necessary to discover the reason why the MUI took
a particular stance at one period and changed it in another.18 The second analysis is the
theory of religion and political behaviour. This theory explains that membership of a
religious group helps create an identity, which differentiates it from other groups since
such involvement can provide members with particular norms and values that form a
particular group culture.19
In particular, this theory refers to the role of religious organisations such as the
MUI in the political sphere. It is clear that fatwas, taushiah, statements and others cover
several issues such as rituals, charity, pilgrimage, economy and also politics. According
to Nadirsyah Hosen, the stances of Islamic organisations in the political arena,
particularly on the issue of politics and government policies in Indonesia, can be found
since 1926.20 More specifically, the implementation of religion and politics in this thesis
is related to the official ulama (the MUI), which provided a certain religious legitimacy
either to the government or other stakeholders in society. This framework comes from
Abdullah Saeed who thinks that ulama as a group provide religious legitimacy for many
Muslims today. The meaning of ulama here is the official ulama that often have been
dependent on, and sought their legitimacy from, the rulers.21

18

Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005), p. 21.
Endang Turmudi, Religion and Politics: A Study on Political Attitudes of Devout Muslims and
the Role of the Kyai in Contemporary Java, Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 23:2 (1995), p. 18.
20
See Nadirsyah Hosen, Fatwa and Politics in Indonesia, in Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra,
Sharia and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 168-180.
21
Abdullah Saeed, The Official Ulema and Religious Legitimacy of the Modern Nation State, in
Shahram Akbarzadeh and Abdullah Saeed, Islam and Political Legitimacy (New York, RoutledgeCurzon,
2003), p. 2.
19

Previous Studies
There are several studies which discuss the MUI. The first study is from Atho
Mudzhar entitled Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal
Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988. This is his dissertation written at Columbia University
and published by INIS in 1993. The study is an analysis of the fatwas issued by the MUI
from 1975 to 1988 (Mudzhar: 1993).
The second study was written by M.B. Hooker in Studia Islamika, a journal of
Islamic Studies published by the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Syarif
Hidayatullah. In this particular article Hooker analyses the fatwas issued in Indonesia and
Malaysia related to the issue of modern medical science. Even though this study does not
solely focus on MUI fatwas, it provides some discussions about the reaction of the MUI
to this issue. In his conclusion Hooker states that in the period from 1975 to the early
1990s it is quite clear that the main function of the MUI is to support and, in some cases,
to justify government policy on government programs.22
The third study was written by Nadirsyah Hosen in 2004. It is an article published
by the Journal of Islamic Studies, entitled Behind the Scenes: Fatws of Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (19751998). The objective of this writing is to analyse the method of issuing
fatwas, the sources of fatwas, and the relationship between fatwas at national and local
levels. In this article Hosen argues that most of the fatwas used the method of collective
ijtihad, and that since 1975 the MUIs position in terms of its social and political function
was to be a bridge between Islamic organisations, ordinary Muslims and the
government.23
The fourth study is written by Nur Ichwan in 2005. His study can be seen as
further research continuing from Mudzhar and Hooker. Both of them focused their
research on MUIs role in the New Order era, while Nur Ichwan focused his research on
MUIs position after the Reformation era, especially during B.J. Habibie and
Abdurrahman Wahids presidencies. One central point of his article is the taushiah in the
1999s general elections. His remarkable finding is that the attitudes of the MUI in the
22
See M. B. Hooker, Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian
Fatwas, Studia Islamika, Vol 4, No 4 (1997), pp. 1-31.
23
Nadirsyah Hosen, Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (19751998),
Journal of Islamic Studies, 15:2 (2004) pp. 147179.

New Order era cannot be determined only from MUI fatwas but also from its silence
toward the governmental policies.24
The fifth study is Piers Gilespies article from 2007. His article mainly discusses
and analyzes MUI fatwas regarding pluralism, liberalism and secularism. His arguments
are mainly about the changing role of the MUI after the Reformation era; he states that
after the New Order era, the MUI sought to reposition itself as intrinsic to the wider
movement for change to avoid the stigma of being seen simply as a New Order
supporter.25
The sixth is an article written by Kees van Dijk entitled Religious Authority,
Politics and Fatwa in Contemporary Southeast Asia. In this article, Van Dijk scrutinizes
the role of the MUI in the political arena from the New Order era to the Reformation era.
Van Dijk states that since the time it was established, the MUI cannot be separated from
political interest. He mentions that the governments subordination of the MUI can be
seen from the mechanism of MUI fatwa issuance: most of them were results of
governmental requests.26

The Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the position
of the MUI during the New Order era. Thus, it will discuss the establishment of the MUI
and its social and political background. It is important to discuss the relation between the
MUI and the government. Another important focus is the attitudes of the MUI regarding
the general elections under the New Order regime. If many scholars define the MUI as
controlled by the government based on its fatwas, how about the general elections? Is it
the same or different?
The second chapter is devoted to an analysis of MUIs role in the 1999 general
elections. Before analysing these elections, I will first discuss the position of Islam in
general and the MUI in particular during the late New Order era. This theme needs to be
24

Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),

4572.
25
See Piers Gillespie, Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of
Indonesian Ulama Fatw no. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism, Journal of Islamic Studies
18:2 (2007), p. 211.
26
Kees van Dijk, Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas, pp. 44-65.

discussed in order to understand the socio-political landscape of Indonesia in the late

New Order era and how the situation affected the political position of the MUI. Apart
from that, it is also important to look at the position of the MUI after the fall of Suharto
and how MUI shifted its attitudes during the Reformation era.
The third chapter will discuss the general elections of 2004 and 2009. Similar to
the previous chapter, the third chapter will discuss first the political landscape in the post
New Order era, particularly the position of Muslim politics. This situation needs to be
explained in further detail to find the map of political Islam and how it influences the
position of the MUI. The chapter then continues with a discussion regarding the MUI
attitudes in the 2004 and 2009 general elections and how they differ from MUIs attitudes
in the previous elections. All evidence in these three chapters will be summed up in the
conclusion.

CHAPTER O
E
THE MUI A
D THE GE
ERAL ELECTIO
S I
THE
EW ORDER ERA

This chapter will discuss the attitudes of the MUI toward the general elections in
the New Order era, particularly the attempts of the MUI to issue fatwas or non-fatwa
discourses regarding these events. After exploring both discourses, we will scrutinize
whether the MUI gave strong support to the government in every election or not.
Before analysing the positions of the MUI toward the general elections in the
New Order era, it is worth giving a historical account of the MUI, the background of its
establishment, and the process leading up to the decision of its establishment. In addition,
it is also important to look at the relations between the MUI and the government,
especially with the New Order regime, through the eyes of scholars who previously
studied the MUI. By knowing its establishment process and its function in the New Order
era, we can determine its role in society, especially vis--vis the government.

A. The Establishment
The idea of the establishment of the Indonesian Council of Ulama first emerged at a
conference of ulama in Jakarta held from 30 September to 4 October 1970. The
conference was called Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia or the Congress of all
Indonesian Ulama, and it was held by Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia (the Centre for
Islamic Preaching).1 It was really conspicuous that the idea of such a meeting came from
the government.2 The presence of K.H Muhammad Dahlan, the Minister of Religious
Affairs at the time, confirmed the theories of governmental influence. In addition, he
gave a speech on behalf of the government. In that speech he stated that the establishment
of a council of ulama was very important in order to give explanations about what was

Pusat Dakwah Islam Indonesia (the Centre for Islamic Preaching) was created by Minister of
Religious Affairs in 1969. Departemen Penerangan RI, 10 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, 1985),
p. 15.
2
Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in
Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993), p. 46.

wrong with deviant sects in Indonesia. He also argued that the state had a good reason to
create a partnership with the ulama, not to control them but to be their equal partners.3
In particular, the idea of a fatwa institution was proposed by Ibrahim Hosen, one of
the speakers at the conference. In his paper he mentioned that a fatwa institution was
needed to maintain the unity of Indonesian Muslims. Hosen also emphasized that in
Indonesia, this kind of institution was the best choice instead of one grand mufti
appointed by the government. Similar to what the Minister mentioned, Ibrahim Hosen
stated that one of the functions of the ulama in that council was to have good relations
with the government.4
However, this proposal was rejected by Hamka. In his paper, which was also
presented at the conference, Hamka gave several reasons for his refusal. The first reason
was that the establishment of a fatwa institution would be counterproductive; his
argumentation was based on the existence of similar institutions such as Muhammadiyah,
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and Persatuan Islam (Persis). In his opinion, building another
institution would only create confusion and conflict. The second reason for refusal was
considered to be political; he said that this fatwa institution would only be used for
political interests. If the council would be established, it would be influenced by one
Islamic party which was controlling the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the time. Surely
this political party would use the institution merely for the interests of the party, not for
all Muslims.5
The political party mentioned by Hamka was Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). During the Old
Order era and until the first period of the New Order era, NU dominated the appointment
of the Minister of Religious Affairs, and for this reason this ministry became an NUbastion. Not only had the ministry become the centre for spreading NUs traditionalist
ideas, but also for giving NU many benefits to dispense in the form of employment and
3

K.H M. Dahlan, Amanat/Sumbangan Fikiran Menteri Agama RI K.H.M. Dahlan Pada

Musjawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, in Materi Musjawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, Sekretariat
Panitya Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, pp. 19-33.
4
Prof. K.H Ibrahim Hosen, Pembentukan Lembaga Fatwa, in Materi Musjawarah Alim Ulama seIndonesia, Sekretariat Panitya Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, pp. 110-128.
5
Different from Hosen, who preferred a council of ulama over a grand mufti, Hamka suggested that
the government appoint one ulama who has the task to give the government recommendations regarding
religious issues. He did not agree with establishing such an institution as was proposed by Ibrahim Hosen.
See Hamka, Lembaga Fatwa, Bandingan atas Prasaran Prof. Ibrahim Hosen, in Materi Musjawarah Alim
Ulama se-Indonesia, Sekretariat Panitya Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia, pp. 129-133.

10

other facilities. That is why from 1953 to 1971 all Ministers of Religious Affairs were
prominent figures of the NU.6 As a result, Hamka rejected the establishment of the MUI
because he was afraid that the MUI would only be used for legitimating NU political
activism.7
After failing to reach a consensus at the Congress of all Indonesian Ulama
(Musyawarah Alim Ulama se-Indonesia) in 1970, the establishment of the MUI was
postponed. The idea came up again four years later, in 1974, when Pusat Dakwah Islam
Indonesia (the Centre for Islamic Preaching) organized a workshop on 26-29 November.
In this forum the idea of such an institution emerged once again. Moreover, unlike at the
first conference, the government was actively involved in the process and encouraged
ulama to support the idea. The meaning of actively involved in this situation was that
President Suharto was present at the conference and gave the opening speech. In his
speech, Suharto stressed the necessity of the council of ulama. One of the reasons was
that this body would represent Muslims for an inter-religious project designed by the
government. This project itself was initially started in 1967 when the government invited
the five recognized religions to meet in order to create a body for inter-religious
dialogue. 8 Unfortunately, the Muslim representative rejected the idea. By creating a
council of Indonesian ulama, Suharto wanted to have an alternative way to persuade
Muslims to join the body.9 This time, the conference agreed that in order to participate in
the national development it was necessary to create the council of ulama, especially on a

For a more detailed account on the relation between Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and politics see Martin
van Bruinessen, Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status Quo and
Searching for Alternatives, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), pp. 52-69.
7
Nadirsyah Hosen, Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (19751998), p. 150.
8
According to Donald J.Porter, the establishment of the inter-religious body was very political. As
any other social organisation that was established during the New Order era, the purpose of this
organisation was merely to incorporate the interests of the government. By creating such an institution, the
government would be able to control any movement from religions which can be defined as political or any
splinter groups and sects that threaten to disrupt economic development and cause instability. By
harmonising five recognized religions in Indonesia into one body, the government ensured that religions
would be not used for politics especially not for opposing the government, See Donald J.Porter, Managing
Politics and Islam in Indonesia (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), p. 38.
9
It looks like what Suharto wanted from this council succeeded when the MUI accepted the creation
of an inter-religious body in 1976, a year after the MUI was established. Even though in reality, the body of
inter-religious dialogue was not reached until 1980. See Atho Mudzhar, the Council of Indonesia Ulama
on Muslims attendance at Christmas Celebrations, in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick and
David S. Powers (Eds), Islamic Legal Interpretation, Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1996), p. 231.

11

district and provincial level. The mechanism for such a creation in the provinces or
districts was based upon an agreement between each ulama and the government.10
The consensus was continued by President Suharto by instructing Amir Machmud,
the Minister for Internal Affairs at the time, to establish the council of ulama in several
provinces and districts.11 After successfully creating the council at district and provincial
levels, Suharto wished for further progress by instructing the Minister of Religious
Affairs to create a committee responsible for composing a council of ulama at the
national level. The committee consisted of several people, including H. Sudirman, a
retired Army general. This person was a representative of the government; therefore he
became the chairperson of the committee. The other people were ulama; Hamka, K.H
Abdullah Syafii, and K.H Syukri Ghazali.12
This committee decided to organize a conference which would be attended by each
district and provincial board of the council of ulama. The conference was held from 21 to
27 July 1975. Aside from the council of ulama from districts and provincial levels, it also
invited representatives from Islamic organisations at the national level and also the
representative of Muslim servicemen in the armed forces.13 At the end of the conference,
it was agreed upon by all participants that the first chairperson for this council would be
Hamka.
It is interesting to see how Hamka, who at first rejected the establishment of the MUI
when it was proposed in 1970, but finally changed his mind, accepted the idea and
became the first chairperson in 1975. In this situation, there are at least two possible
scenarios: the first is that the reason behind Hamkas rejection of this council, as stated in
his paper in 1974, was based on his fear that if it were established in 1974, the council
would only be used for the benefits of the NU. It is known that the Minister of Religious
Affairs at the time, K.H M. Dahlan, belonged to the NU. It is known that Hamka
belonged to the Muhammadiyah and was one of the chairpersons on the national board.
Considering the contestation between these two organisations, it is understandable that
Hamka was against the establishment of the MUI.
10

Departemen Penerangan RI, 10 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia, p. 15.

See Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, p. 48.
12
Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in
Indonesia 1975-1988, pp. 47-48.
13
Ibid, p. 48.
11

12

However, after Mukti Ali replaced K.H. M. Dahlan as the Minister of Religious
Affairs in 1971, it seemed that Hamka changed his mind. Mukti Ali can be seen as a
modernist thinker. Even though he was born in an NU family, in later periods he was
much closer to the Muhammadiyah.14 This replacement influenced Hamkas stance and
he accepted the creation of the MUI. Not only did he accept the establishment of the MUI,
but he also accepted the appointment as the first chairman in 1975.15 He felt that because
Mukti Ali and Hamka belonged to the same organisation, the MUI could be relatively
free from political interest and focus more on the improvement of the relation between
the government and the Muslim population.16
Nevertheless, according to Atho Mudzhar, Hamkas rejection was not the only
reason for the postponement of the establishment of the MUI. The second scenario is
related to the political situation that Hamka and also many Muslims activists who
rejected the MUI in 1970 found themselves in. What Mudzhar means with this argument
is that after Suharto became president in 1967, there were many attempts to eliminate
prominent political stakeholders from the Old Order regime, especially politicians and
activists from Islamic parties. This policy was beyond the expectation of Islamic activists.
After being marginalized by Sukarno in his last term when he preferred to have close
relationship with the leftists, Muslims political activists presumed that the New Order
regime under Suharto would have another approach towards Muslims. One of them was
to restore political Islam to its rightful position in public life. 17 This aspiration was
expressed in their hopes to rehabilitate the Masyumi party which was banned by the Old
Order regime in 1960.
However, what was expected differed from reality. Suhartos policy toward Islamic
political activism was not better than the Old Order regimes policies. According to

14

For more detailed remarks about Mukti Ali see Ali Munhanif, Islam and the Struggle for
Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: a Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali, in Studia
Islamika, vol. 3 (1996), pp. 79-126.
15
It is mentioned by Rusdi Hamka that before the conference from 21-27 July 1975, Hamka was
invited by Mukti Ali to talk about the establishment of the MUI. At that time Mukti Ali urged Hamka to
become the first chairperson of the MUI. See Rusydi Hamka, Pribadi dan Martabat Buya Prof. Dr. Hamka
(Jakarta, Pustaka Panjimas, 1981), p. 190.
16
Nadirsyah Hosen, Behind the Scenes: Fatwas of Majelis Ulama Indonesia (19751998), pp.
150-151.
17
Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New Jersey,
Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 58.

13

William Liddle, at the beginning of the New Order regime Suharto started to implement a
two-pronged Islamic policy; this means that on the one hand, Suharto approached and
accepted Muslims promotion of personal piety, but on the other hand he opposed to the
politicisation of religion. Liddle states that this political policy was adopted from the
Dutch colonial order.18
Expressions of this policy can be seen in the 1971 general elections. In these
elections, Islamic political activism and participation was accommodated and allowed in
more restricted forms. There were only four Islamic parties with highly supervised and
even controlled organisational and leadership compositions. 19 They were Nahdlatul
Ulama, which had received 18.4 percent in the 1955 general elections; Parmusi, which
was the inheritor of Masyumi; Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII); and Partai Tarbiyah
Islamiyah (Perti). Among the four Islamic parties only Nahdlatul Ulama was successful
and received 18.7 percent of the votes in the 1971 general elections.20
These political conditions were considered by Hamka and many other Islamic
leaders as being in the interest of the government instead of the Muslims. Therefore they
had to think twice before agreeing on the establishment of the MUI in 1970. In addition,
as mentioned earlier, the first general election under the New Order regime was held in
1971, and Hamka was afraid that this institution would only be used by the government
for political interests and not for the benefit of the Muslims. Many of them thought that if
it would be established in 1970, a year before the elections, the MUI would be used by
Suharto as a medium to win the votes of Muslims in the general elections of 1971.21
The worries of Muslim activists regarding the New Order regime controlling
political Islam proved to be true. In 1973, the New Order regime decided to amalgamate
the four Islamic parties that participated in the 1971 general elections to be one party. The
name of this fusion party was Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) or the United

18
For further explanations of Suhartos policy toward Islam see R. William Liddle, The Islamic
Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 55, 4o. 3 (Aug., 1996),
pp. 613-634; See also R. William Liddle, Islam and Politics in Late 4ew Order, Paper presented at the
conference on Islam and society in Southeast Asia, Jakarta, 29-31 May 2005, p. 7.
19
Ibid, p. 621.
20
For a complete analysis of the 1971 general elections see Donald Hindley, Indonesia 1971:
Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections, Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 1, A Survey of
Asia in 1971: Part I (Jan., 1972), pp. 56-68.
21
Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama, pp. 50-51.

14

Development Party. The fusion of this Islamic party can be considered as a successful
step to weaken political Islam. Because it consisted of several parties that each had their
own ideology, much of its time was wasted in terms of conflict and rivalries, especially
between the traditional and modernist side.22
The interests of the New Order regime in trying to suppress Islamic political
activism and also the attempts use the MUI as a government tool to accomplish its
interests were the main reason why Hamka and many other Islamic activists rejected the
idea of the MUI in 1970. Furthermore, at the second attempt to establish it in 1975,
Hamka actually did not change his mind and refused to be the chairperson. Only because
Mukti Ali persuaded Hamka he was finally convinced that the MUI could be a good
institution for bridging the gap between the government and Muslim activists and also for
protecting Indonesia from communist ideas.23
Looking at this situation we can analyse the different objectives of the
establishment of the MUI. The first came from the government; the second was from the
Muslim activists. The governments objective (or interest) in the MUI was visible in
Suhartos speech at the first congress of ulama in 1975. He delivered a speech entitled
The role and function of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia; liaison between government and
ulama.24 In his speech it was really obvious what the government wanted this institution
to be like in the future, what would be allowed and what not. It was stated that the
government wanted the MUI to be the interpreter of the governmental development
programs both nationally and regionally. For that reason, Suharto wanted the MUI to
restrict its activities; these should not be the same as those of other Islamic organisations
such as recruiting members etc. He also suggested that the MUI not create its own
madrasah (Islamic school) and mosque. What is really important about Suhartos
statement is that he forbade the MUI to get involved in politics. He said that Islamic

22

See Martin van Bruinessen, Islamic State or State Islam? Fifty Years of State-Islam Relations in
Indonesia, in C. van. Dijk and A. H. de Groot (eds.), State and Islam (Leiden, Research School CNWS,
1995), pp. 96-114.
23
Rusydi Hamka, Pribadi dan Martabat Buya Prof. Dr. Hamka (Jakarta, Pustaka Panjimas, 1981),
pp. 189-191.
24
See Amanat Presiden Soeharto, Fungsi dan Peranan Majelis Ulama, Penghubung Pemerintah
dan Ulama, Mimbar Ulama, No.1, Mei 1976, pp. 4-9.

15

political activities were already facilitated by three political parties, the PPP (the
Development Unity Party), PDI (the Indonesian Democratic Party) and Golkar.25
In that speech it became really clear how the government saw the MUI. It seemed
that Suharto was afraid of potential political activism of the MUI. Therefore he reminded
the members of the MUI not to use the organisation to further political agendas. In the
next meeting of the MUI in August 1976, Suharto also presented a speech which
emphasized the importance of the 1977 general elections and expressed hope for the
participation of the Indonesian people in the development of the New Order regime.26 We
can see this speech as part of the pragmatic way of Suharto to use the MUI to approach
Muslims so that they would support every programme of the government.
The other objective came from Islamic activists. At first, they had big expectations
that this institution would be an entry point for Muslims to get actively involved in
politics, or at least to develop good relations with the government. Muslim activists
assumed that the establishment of the MUI would create a different way of
communicating with the government. Some even thought that this institution could be
used as a media for Islamic political expression after Suhartos policy to amalgamate the
Islamic political parties into one (the fusion).27 This objective can be seen in the MUI
statutes which mention that one of MUIs objectives is to make and maintain good
relations between ulama and umara (government). 28 Unfortunately, it looks like the
Muslim activists assumption about the establishment of the MUI overestimated its
benefits or can even be judged wrong. Between these two objectives it seems that only
the objective of the government was worked out. This situation can be seen as a result of
the political policy of Suharto, especially during the 1970s until the early 1990s when
Islamic political activism was restricted.

25
The speech also can be found in the book published by MUI. See Majelis Ulama Indonesia,
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1976), pp. 15-19.
26
Amanat Presiden Soeharto di Depan Peserta Raker Majelis Ulama, Mimbar Ulama, No.3,
Agustus 1976, pp. 3-6.
27
Atho Mudzhar, the Ulama, the Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of
Indonesian Ulama Revisited, in Johan Meuleman (Editor), Islam in the Era of Globalization; Muslim
Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity (Jakarta: INIS, 2001), pp. 315-317.
28
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 20 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Majelis Ulama Indonesia,
1996), p. 38.

16

B. The Relations Between the MUI and the

ew Order Regime.
Before discussing the relations between the MUI and the New Order regime, let
us first go to the background of the relations between Islam and the New Order regime.
As one of several Islamic institutions, the MUI is treated in the same way as other
Islamic organisations in Indonesia especially regarding the New Order policies toward
Islamic political activism. Understanding the general policy of the New Order regime
concerning Islam means understanding the government policy toward the MUI.
In the Old Order era or early after the independence, it can be said that Islamic
political activism was mostly channelled through Masyumi, which was established by
four Islamic organisations (Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Perikatan Umat Islam
and Persatuan Umat Islam).29 This situation changed when Nahdlatul Ulama decided to
create its own party in April 1952 through its congress in Palembang. Surely, this
situation divided the Muslim votes in the 1955 general elections. In those elections, NU
received 18.4 percent of the votes and Masyumi 20.9 percent.30
The relation between Islam political activism and the State worsened when
Masyumi supported the PRRRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
Indonesia) revolt in 1958-1959. Not only had Masyumi supported this rebellion, but
several of its leaders such as former Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir had joined the
revolt. Based on this fact, Sukarno banned and dismissed Masyumi as political party in
Indonesia in August 1960.31 The banning of Masyumi left Nahdlatul Ulama the biggest
Islamic party. However, with its traditional image NU cannot play a big enough role to
grasp all the Muslim votes, especially those of modernist Muslims as they are
represented in Muhammadiyah.

29

Masyumi was created from MIAI (Madjlisul Islamil Alaa Indonesia) or the Supreme Indonesian
Council of Islam. This organisation was established in 1937. In November 1943, the organisation evolved
to be a political party named Masyumi (Madjlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia). See B.J Boland, The Struggle
of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), pp. 10-12; Beside Masyumi there were
several small Islamic parties such as Perti and Partai Sarikat Islam Indoenesia, see Nasir Tamara, Islam
Under the New Order: a Political History, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), pp.
6-30.
30
With these votes, the NU and Masyumi are regarded as the big four together with PNI and PKI,
Ibid, pp. 6-30.
31
See Allan Samson, Islam and Politics in Indonesia, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of
California, Berkeley, 1972, pp. 1-41; See also Allan A. Samson, Islam in Indonesian Politics, Asian
Survey, Vol. 8, No. 12 (Dec., 1968), pp. 1001-1017.

17

After Suharto became president in 1966 there was hope among former Masyumi
leaders that Suharto would rehabilitate Masyumi. However, based on military
objections to the rehabilitation of Masyumi, Suharto refused the request and preferred
the creation of a new Islamic party. This decision was followed by the creation of
Committee Seven, which was given the task to arrange a new Islamic party named
Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi).32 The committee achieved success in organising
a congress and elected former foreign Minister Muhammad Roem as the general
chairman. However, the government expressed its disapproval of this decision by saying
that no former Masyumi figures were allowed in the Parmusi. After several internal
conflicts, the government intervened and appointed State Minister M.S Mintaredja as
the general chairman. By eliminating many elements of the Masyumi and appointing a
leader who was loyal to the government, Suharto was successful in managing and
imposing its policy on Parmusi. Therefore, his government was free from any disruption
from opponents. This policy was proven in the 1971 general elections; Parmusi did not
get many votes, only 7.4 percent. This number was much lower than Masyumi, which
had received 20.9 percent in the 1955 general elections. The election itself was won by
Golkar with 62.8 percent of the votes. 33
During this period, from 1966 when Suharto became president until the 1971
general elections, Suharto consolidated his regime, surrounded himself with people who
were loyal to him and dissolved every unit which was defined as an enemy or a threat. It
can be said that there were many restrictions for someone who wanted to be active in
the political arena.34 We can see this from the establishment of Parmusi. By rejecting
any person related to Masyumi, the New Order regime did not have to worry that
Parmusi would disturb its power. Instead of opposing the government, Parmusi became
an instrument for the government to splitting the voice of Islamic activists. We can see

32
Muhammad Kamal B. Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to 4ew Order Modernization in
Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur, Dewan bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982), p 80.
33
Donald Hindley, Indonesia 1971: Pantjasila Democracy and the Second Parliamentary Elections,
Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1971: Part I (Jan., 1972), pp. 56-68.
34
Those restrictions were: 1). they were not to include communist ideas, 2). they would not restore
Sukarno to prominence, 3). they would not lead to disruptions and debates that could undermine the basic
economic policy, 4). they would not threaten the dual function of the armed forces. See Donald Hindley,
Indonesia 1970: The Workings of Pantjasila Democracy, Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 2, A Survey of Asia
in 1970: Part II (Feb., 1971), pp. 111-120.

18

this happening in the 1971 election campaign; Parmusi was allied with Golkar and the
Army against NU and PNI. 35 According to Syamsuddin Haris, this process was
politically logical; from refusing Masyumi rehabilitation to accepting the idea of the
establishment of Parmusi. Suharto considered the New Order as a new era with a new
government. That is why he tried to eliminate any ideological rivalries from the Old
Order. Overall, in the early years of his administration, Suharto attempted to create a
stable government.36
Another step of the New Order regime to incorporate Islamic political activists
was to remove NUs influence from the Ministry of Religious Affairs. As stated before,
the Ministry of Religious Affairs can be considered the centre of Nahdlatul Ulama for
spreading its traditional ideas and politics. This can be concluded from the fact that
from 1953 to 1971 all Ministers of Religious Affairs were prominent figures of the
NU. 37 Furthermore, after the ban of Masyumi, the NU became the biggest Islamic
political party and the biggest challenge to the government. Based on this situation, the
New Order regime decided that the NU must be controlled by eradicating its basis in the
Ministry of Religious Affairs. This effort started before the elections of 1971 when Ali
Murtopo, a military officer and a close counsellor to Suharto, persuaded the staff of this
ministry to become Golkar supporters. By doing so, he hoped to separate their loyalties
from the NU so they would leave the party. This policy was in line with the idea of
mono-loyalties of civil servants on the behalf of KORPRI to support the government.
However, this policy was rejected by K.H Muhammad Dahlan, the Minister of
Religious Affairs at the time, from the NU. This rejection led to a plan to remove
Muhammad Dahlan from his position. Some staff of the Ministry of Religious Affairs
who graduated in western countries went to Ali Murtopo and proposed this strategy.
Subsequently, Ali Murtopo agreed and chose Mukti Ali as the replacement of
Muhammad Dahlan for the post of Minister of Religious Affairs.38
35

Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 41.

Syamsuddin Haris, PPP and Politics under the New Order, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator
(Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), p. 35.
37
Martin van Bruinessen, Indonesia's Ulama and Politics: Caught Between Legitimising the Status
Quo and Searching for Alternatives, Prisma -The Indonesian Indicator (Jakarta), No. 49 (1990), pp. 52-69.
38
Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 54. Further reading of Mukti Ali
see Ali Munhanif, Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: a Political Reading of the
Religious Thought of Mukti Ali, in Studia Islamika, vol. 3 (1996), pp. 79-126.
36

19

The next move of the government regarding Islamic political activism was to
simplify the number of parties into one party in 1973. Therefore, the four Islamic parties
(Nahdlatul Ulama, Parmusi, PSII and Perti) which participated in the 1971 general
elections amalgamated into PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) or United
Development Party. According to the government, the reason for this fusion was to
prevent political instability. With the experience of the multi-party system in the Old
Order era, the New Order regime wanted to make the system simpler without frequent
changes in the cabinet, political rupture, economic instability, protests and
demonstrations which caused trouble.39
At first, the establishment of the PPP was considered by Islamic activists to be a
good sign for uniting Islamic politics. During the election campaign in 1977, there were
several Islamic leaders who conspicuously supported its programme such as
Muhammad Natsir and Nurcholish Majid. The result of the elections was surprising:
Golkar received less votes than in the 1971 elections with 62.1 percent, PDI gained 8.6
percent and PPP received 29.2 percent of the votes. 40 This increase worried the
government, especially because of the possibility for a bigger increase in the future.
Furthermore, Suharto did not want the existence of an opposition which could disturb
legislation proposed by the government. Therefore, Suharto replaced Mintaredja with
Jealani Naro. This person was considered to be the governments man. He was behind
the conflict with Parmusi which ended with the subjugation of Parmusi to the
government.41 After being assigned to the post, Naro excluded most of the NU members
who were considered to be critics of the government, specifically Yusuf Hasyim and
Saifuddin Zuhri. Not only had he excluded key members of the NU in the party, but he
also reallocated seats so that the NU no longer formed an absolute majority in the
parliament.42 All of these circumstances were a disappointment for the NU. In its 27th
39

Beside the PPP, the government also merged five parties such as PNI, IPKI, MURBA, Parkindo
and Partai Katolik into Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party. See Dony S. Truna,
Islam and Politics under the 4ew Order Government in Indonesia 1966-1999, unpublished M.A Thesis,
Mcgill University, Montreal, 1995, p. 58.
40
Nasir Tamara, Islam under the New Order: a Political History, pp. 13-19.
41
Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 44.
42
It was reported that NU which had the majority of the seats in the PPP, rejected the two decrees
which were proposed by the government. The first decree was to give religious status to mystical belief
systems (aliran kepercayaan). The other was to introduce Pancasila as moral instruction which was called
P4 (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila). This rejection convinced Suharto to intervene in

20

congress in 1984, NU decided to withdraw from politics, especially regarding its

support for the PPP.43
The withdrawal of NU from politics worsened in 1983 when the MPR held its
session, and the New Order regime imposed Pancasila as the sole foundation for all
social and political organisations. To a certain extent this policy was directed to Islamic
organisations especially those related to Islamic political activism. Even though the
government rejected such a claim, it was really clear that this was a major blow for
Islamic political activism.44 Actually, this was not the first attempt of the government to
disallow any ideological principle besides Pancasila. With the establishment of the PPP,
the government had underlined that political parties must use Pancasila as their only
principle. However, with the rejection of the PPP by many NU leaders, the government
accepted Islam as the basis for the PPP with the addition of Pancasila. Thus, PPP had
both Pancasila and Islam as its guiding principles. Inevitably, the imposition of
Pancasila as the sole foundation for political organisations had a big impact on political
Islam in general and the PPP in particular. Overall, the 1980s can be regarded as the
decade that the relations between the government and political Islam worsened. Van
Dijk mentions that in this decade, certain Muslim groups became enemies of the state.45
Even though Van Dijks writing was related to radical Muslims in particular, it showed
the governments stance towards Muslims in general.
During this period when Islamic political activism was gradually brought under
the governments control, the MUI was established. In 1966, after Suharto was assigned
as president, he tried to develop his administration by stabilizing politics, without any
opposition, especially from political Islam. Consequently, he rejected the Masyumi
rehabilitation. Moreover, the approval of Parmusi as the successor of Masyumi was
really political. What really happened was that Parmusi was not similar to Masyumi at
the PPP board. See Sidney Jones, The Contraction and Expansion of the "Umat" and the Role of the
Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia, Indonesia, Vol. 38 (Oct., 1984), pp. 1-20. Further reading regarding the
relation between Nahdlatul Ulama and PPP in the New Order era see C. van Dijk, "Ulama and Politics",
Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 152 (1996), no: 1, Leiden, pp. 109-110.
43
Even though NU did not support one specific party; NU declared its members free to vote for any
political party: PPP, Golkar or PDI. See C. van Dijk, Ulama and Politics, p.110.
44
Donald E. Weatherbee, Indonesia in 1984: Pancasila, Politics, and Power, Asian Survey, Vol.
25, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1984: Part II (Feb., 1985), pp. 187-197.
45
C. van Dijk, Political Development, Stability and Democracy: Indonesia in the 1980s (Centre for
South-East Asian Studies, 1989), pp. 19-24.

21

all; instead it was backing up the New Order policy. In the words of Donald J. Porter, it
was Suhartos policy to incorporate Islamic politics so that he could restrict its
movement and prevent any attempt to disturb his power.46 In an attempt to reduce the
Islamic influence in education, the New Order regime succeeded in changing the
position of NU in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The replacement of Muhammad
Dahlan from the NU by Mukti Ali was proof that this policy was successful.47
The next attempt was to manage Islamic politics through a centralist and
controlled organisation. The MUI was a really good instrument to implement this
strategy. By cornering Muslim activist into this box, the government could easily
control any decision, as they were produced by the MUI. The guidelines from the
government were very clear that the MUI members were forbidden from getting
involved in political matters. Another pattern can be seen from the establishment of
another Islamic organisation such as the Indonesian Dakwah Council (MDI), which
affiliates with Golkar and the Indonesian Mosque Council (DMI). All these
organisations were established with the purpose that the government could interfere in
accordance with its own interests.48
The works of previous scholars on the MUI show how the MUI, overall, can be
judged as a central instrument of the government in conveying its policy to Indonesian
Muslims. If the MUI could be influenced so could the people. It meant the government
did not need more efforts or other instruments to subdue peoples refusal. The first is
the study of Atho Mudzar, who mainly argues that the position of the MUI during the
New Order era was very supportive of governmental policies. 49 His conclusion was
based on twenty-two fatwas issued from 1975-1980. Another one is the work of M.B
46

Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, pp, 75-82.

As mentioned before, Muhammad Dahlan was affiliated to the NU. With the aim of the New
Order to eliminate any opposition, the government had the plan to put more loyal people in its ministries so
that its policies would be more successful. This was the background of the replacement of the Minister of
Religious Affairs, Muhammad Dahlan, by Mukti Ali. As a scholar who graduated from McGill University,
Canada, the government hoped that Mukti Ali could support the governments design especially in
reducing the influence of political Islam. See Ali Munhanif, Islam and the Struggle for Religious
Pluralism in Indonesia: a Political Reading of the Religious Thought of Mukti Ali, in Studia Islamika, vol.
3 (1996), pp. 79-126.
48
Ibid, p. 76.
49
See Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal
Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993); See also Atho Mudzhar, the Ulama, the
Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of Indonesian Ulama Revisited, p. 317.
47

22

Hooker, who stated that the main function of the MUI especially from 1975 to the
1990s was to support and to justify governmental policies.50
Apart from the two opinions given by Hooker and Mudzhar, it is interesting to
read the argument of Nur Ichwan concerning MUIs position during the New Order era.
If both Hooker and Mudzhar determine MUIs position by looking at the fatwas issued by
the MUI, Ichwans analysis is not solely based on the MUI fatwas; Nur Ichwan assesses
the MUI position as follows:
MUIs relationship with the government was articulated not only through the fatwas it issued, but
also by its silence on certain state policies and programmes. Such silence often reflected the
powerlessness felt by many Muslims in relation to the state, as with the question of a governmentsupported sport lottery and the Tanjung Priok massacre of 1984.51

What can be concluded from Nur Ichwans statement is that in its political
expressions, the MUI can be regarded as suppressed by the New Order government. It is
a fact that on several occasions the MUI resisted the governments policies, but overall
MUIs positions, judged from its fatwas and its silence in accordance with the
governmental treatment of Muslims political expression, can be seen as oppressed by
the regime.
This opinion is strengthened by Kees van Dijk who said that since it was first
established, the MUI was used by the government to persuade Muslim activists of
giving their support to the government, especially those who rejected joining the
governments party. Furthermore, the political position of the MUI at the end of the
New Order era in the 1990s, when the MUI along with other Islamic organisations
conspicuously supported the government to make an attempt for the sake of national
union and unity, illustrates how the MUI was really powerless and under the influence
of the government.52
These four opinions demonstrate the position of the MUI during the New Order
era when it was mostly suppressed by governmental control. From the early 1970s it is
50

M. B. Hooker, Islam and Medical Science: Evidence from Malaysian and Indonesian Fatwas,
Studia Islamika, Vol 4, No 4 (1997), pp. 1-31.
51
Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, Islamic Law and Society, 12.1 (2005),
4572.
52
C. van Dijk, Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas, pp 44-65.

23

visible that the government intended to subdue political Islam. With the existence of
MUI, the government had an effective device to implement the idea of incorporating the
power of Islam for the benefit of the government.

C. MUIs Attitudes in the General Elections in the

ew Order era
It is mentioned before that the MUI under the New Order regime was generally
controlled by the government. This opinion is supported by several scholars who
previously studied the MUI. In this part I will discuss MUIs attitudes toward the general
elections under the New Order regime. I will scrutinize whether these attitudes were the
same as other MUI fatwas. Was this also under governmental control or did the MUI
have a different idea concerning these events? The MUI was established in 1975, and the
elections which will be analysed are the ones from 1977 to 1997.
First to be analysed are the 1977 general elections. In these elections, the MUI
brought out a statement (pernyataan) regarding its position in the general elections. It
was published in Mimbar Ulama in April 1977, a month before the elections in May. The
statement was entitled Pernyataan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Menghadapi Pemilu (the
Statement of the Indonesian Council of Ulama concerning the General Elections). It
started with an introduction stating that after observing the explanations from the
government, two parties and Golkar, the MUI decided to issue a statement consisting of
five points. The first point was that the election was important for the success of national
development, and referred to the Presidents speech in front of the ulama last year; it
emphasised the participation of the ulama in the elections. The second declared that every
member of the MUI who actively participated in the elections should not use the name of
the MUI. The third asserted that all parties and Golkar must campaign peacefully as was
mentioned in the law. The fourth point was to recommend people to choose the best
candidate for the House of Representatives, and to urge Muslims not to preach
provocatively which would hamper the elections. The statement ended with a call for
Muslims to pray for successful elections.53

53

Pernyataan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Menghadapi Pemilu, Mimbar Ulama, no. 09, April 1977, p.

70.

24

This statement can be regarded as general. It can be seen from the content that it
did not give any specific endorsement either to the government or to the parties and
Golkar. It just gave a general preposition for Muslims as well as for the ulama to
participate in the general elections for the countrys development. The only political
statement was the necessity for the ulama not to speak of politics during their preaching
because it would endanger the coming elections.54
However, this statement was made after pressure coming from the government.
The meaning of pressure here is the presence of the government in several MUI activities
asking the MUI to participate in the general elections. The most conspicuous one was the
speech of President Suharto in front of the ulama during the training of ulama on 13
December 1976 in Jakarta. The speech mainly covered the importance of the elections. It
asserted that because of its importance, everyone had the obligation to try to achieve
orderly, peaceful and secure elections. For that reason it was the duty of the ulama to
contribute to successful elections.55
From this fact, it can be seen that the MUI statement regarding the general
elections was a reaction to the governments demand of the ulama to support the 1977
general elections. The speech of President Suharto during the training of the ulama
showed that Suharto tried to get the support of the ulama for his administration. His
words emphasizing orderly, peaceful and secure elections can be interpreted in terms of
the unwillingness of the government to accept any criticism from the opposition. Another
indication was the Mimbar Ulama magazine published in May which also included
Suhartos speech at the House of Representatives in August 1976. In that speech, he said
he hoped that in the 1977 general elections there would be no clash of powers that would
endanger the recent stability.56
According to Liddle, in 1971 Suharto tried to create a system of politics
controlled by the bureaucracy. Ruling this system would be President Suharto and the
54

The statement is agar selama kegiatan kampanye dalam rangka pemilu, segala kegiatan-kegiatan
agama terutama pengajian-pengajian dan dakwah dapat berjalan terus, tidak terpengaruh dan
dipengaruhi oleh situasi pemilu, dan ummat Islam tetap menjaga dan memelihara isi pengajian dan
ceramah yang tidak merusak pemilu, Ibid, p. 70.
55
Sambutan Presiden Soeharto Kepada para Peserta Pekan Orientasi Ulama/Khatib Seluruh
Indonesia tanggal 13 December 1976. Ibid, pp.67-69.
56
Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden R.I di Depan Sidang DPR Tanggal 16 Agustus 1976 Mengenai
Pemilu. Ibid, pp. 65-67.

25

armed forces. In order to achieve this objective, Suharto used Golkar to gather the
support of bureaucrats and civil servants. With this kind of policy, the government had
created a mono-loyalty for the bureaucracy to vote for Golkar. The 1977 general elections
were used by the government to strengthen the system.57 For that reason the government
needed a lot of support, especially from the ulama. However, as can be seen in the
statement, it does not look like the MUI gave a clear endorsement of the government,
instead giving a general statement saying that every person can choose any candidates
from any party including Golkar as long as they are good. The elections itself were won
by Golkar with 62.11% of the votes, the second was the PPP with 29.29% and third the
PDI with 10%.
In 1977 MUIs stance regarding support for the government can be considered
relatively neutral; if not contra. In 1982, MUIs attitude in the general elections went
further. At that time, the MUI board had a new chairman after the resignation of Hamka
in 1981. His resignation was a reaction to the refusal of the government regarding the
MUI fatwa that prohibited Muslims from participating in Christmas celebrations. The
government had asked for its withdrawal, but Hamka refused to do so. Because of this
conflict, Hamka decided to resign on 19 May 1981. Two months later, on 24 July 1981,
Hamka died at the age of 75.58
Hamka was replaced by K.H Syukri Ghozali. Different from Hamka who
affiliated with Muhammadiyah, K.H Syukri Ghozali belonged to Nahdlatul Ulama. In
terms of the MUI policy concerning the general elections, the MUI under the leadership
of Syukri Ghozali was very different from Hamkas time. As was explained, Hamka did
not give a strong indication the MUI would support the government. It just issued a
general statement urging Muslims to use their vote for the best candidate. In Syukri

57

See William Liddle, Indonesia 1977: The New Orders Second Parliamentary Election, Asian
Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Feb., 1978), pp. 175-185.
58
Hamka can be considered an independent ulama. He did not want to be co-opted by the
government. That is why many of his decisions were against the governments interests. He is the one who
rejected the idea of the MUIs establishment in 1971 because he was afraid it would be used for the
governments political interests. During his period as MUI chairman, the MUI never issued decisions
which were co-opted by the government. Most of them can be regarded as neutral or even against. The
MUI statements concerning the 1977 general election was a neutral one. The Christmas fatwa was against
and even though the government demanded its withdrawal, Hamka insisted on its effectuation. For further
reading regarding Hamkas biography see Karel Seenbrink, Hamka (1908-1981) and the integration of the
Islamic Ummah of Indonesia, Studia Islamika, Vol.1, No.3, 1994, pp. 121-147.

26

Ghozalis time, the MUI gave a direct endorsement of Suharto for the next period. The
first endorsement can be seen in the statement of the MUI board after it held a board
meeting on 20 August 1981, which was continued by the MUI national meeting on 21-22
August

in

Jakarta.

These

two

meetings

enacted

several

programmes

and

recommendations. One of the recommendations was to thank President Suharto and his
state apparatus for the development of Indonesia and to express hope that the President
would continue working and developing Indonesia. It was also to urge people to
participate in the next years elections.59
This recommendation was strengthened by another national meeting in March
1982, two months before the elections which were held in May 1982. Like the previous
national meeting, this meeting passed several recommendations, one of them regarding
the general elections. These recommendations were published in Mimbar Ulama as
Keputusan Rapat Kerja 4asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia (the decision of the national
meeting of the MUI). Regarding the elections, this decision had two items; the first
regarding kepemimpinan nasional (national leadership) and the second concerning the
1982 general elections.
In terms of its recommendation regarding the national leadership, MUIs opinion
conspicuously supported Suharto as the next president. First, it announced that the MUI
expected the president to continue his leadership. Second, it advised the members of the
House of Representatives of the 1982 general elections to elect Suharto president of
Indonesia. His assignation would guarantee the stability of Indonesian development.
Third, the MUI prayed to God hoping he would give Suharto His blessing and protection.
In the item about the general elections, the MUI urged the people to participate on 4 May
1982 for the continuity of national development.60
These two recommendations show clearly that the MUI under K.H Syukri
Ghozali was really a supporter of the government. With many recommendations saying
that re-election of Suharto as the next president would be good for the stability of
national development, it shows that MUI was in the shadow of the government. The term
59
Hasil Rapat Pengurus Paripurna Lengkap dan Rapat Kerja 4asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia,
Mimbar Ulama, no. 51, April 1981, pp. 4-46.
60
Keputusan Rapat Kerja 4asional Majelis Ulama se-Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 57, April 1982,
pp. 25-31.

27

national development or pembangunan nasional itself was a really a term which was
created by the government. Using this term means the MUI was driven by the interests of
the regime.
Interestingly, this recommendation was not the only one that was composed by
ulama regarding the re-election of Suharto. Another one came from Nahdlatul Ulama.
However, this recommendation was the complete opposite of MUIs recommendation. It
was issued at the national conference of Nahdlatul Ulama in 1981, stating that Nahdlatul
Ulama refused to endorse Suharto and did not support him becoming president for a third
time. This conference also disapproved of giving Suharto the title of Bapak
Pembangunan (Father of Development). 61 It is probable that the results of the 1982
elections were influenced by this constellation. The support of the MUI for Suharto and
his regime strengthened the solidity of Golkar, whereas the conflict within the PPP
(including the weakening by the government) and the refusal of NU to endorse Suharto
affected the PPP vote in the general elections. In these elections, Golkar won with 64% of
the votes, PPP finished second with 28% and PDI third with 8%.62
In the 1987 general elections, MUIs attitude was different from 1977 and 1982.
What made it different was that the recommendation concerning the elections was not
issued by the MUI only, but also by other religious organisations such as Persekutuan
Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia or the Fellowship of Christian Churches in Indonesia (PGI),
Konferensi Waligereja Indonesia or the Bishops Conference in Indonesia (KWI),
Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia or the Hindu Council of Religious Affairs (PHDI),
and the Trusteeship of Indonesian Buddhists (WALUBI). All of these organisations

61
As is shown by many scholars, 1970 was the year when the government tried to reduce the power
of political Islam. This intention was discovered by NU activists in the PPP. That is why many of
government policies were opposed by the NU faction in the PPP. One of the conspicuous ones was the
walk out of NU activists as a rejection of the governments proposal concerning Pancasila education. The
New Order regime considered this act as endangering the national development. The replacement of H.M
Mintaredja by Jaelani Naro as the leader of the PPP was a sign of the government to eliminate NUs
influence. The exclusion of NU members in the PPP national board was one of the decisions of Naro which
stimulated to the conflict and the withdrawal of NU from politics. This recommendation can be considered
to be NUs reaction to all of those events. See Sidney Jones, The Contraction and Expansion, p.11.
62
It looks like the political stability and national development programmes from the government
were working perfectly. In this year Suharto also received title of Father of Development from the People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March 1983. See Gordon R. Hein, Indonesia in 1982: Electoral Victory
and Economic Adjustment for the New Order, Asian Survey, Vol. 23, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1982:
Part II (Feb., 1983), pp. 178-190.

28

signed a statement entitled Seruan Bersama Berkenaan Dengan Pemilu (Joint Statement
Regarding the General Elections).
This joint statement stated that the general elections were a means for Demokrasi
Pancasila. As a result, it was important for the people to use their votes. Furthermore, the
statement also urged people to become actively involved in the elections for the sake of
national development, because people have the responsibility to participate as Indonesian
citizens.63 This statement was made in March 1987, a month before the elections which
were held in April 1987.
This joint statement from different religious organisations can be interpreted as
the victory of the state over religions in Indonesia. It means that at the end of this time,
from the 1970s when the New Order regime tried to establish a strong state vis--vis
political parties whether they be Islamic, Christian and Catholic or nationalist, until the
1980s when this system worked, the regime was successful in planting its system. Liddle
argues that in this year the New Order regime was at the height of its power. There was
no more opposition of the parties as there was in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the
NU faction of the PPP opposed several policies of the regime. In addition, the return of
NU to Khittah 1926, which forced them to withdraw from any and all political activities,
created instability within the PPP. Its number of votes decreased remarkably from 27.8%
in 1982 to 16.0% in 1987.64 On the other hand, there was a fatwa from K.H Ahmad
Siddiq, the Rais Aam of the Nahdatul Ulama at the time, stating that members of NU
were not obliged to vote for the PPP and it was not forbidden to vote either for Golkar or
PDI. This fatwa surely affected the results of the elections.65 This can be seen in the
election results: Golkar saw a significant raise, from 64.3% of the votes in 1982 to 73.2%
in 1987, whereas the PDI increased by 3%, from 7.9% in 1982 to 10.9% in 1987.
In 1992, the MUI statement regarding the general elections was started in East
Java. In this province, the MUI initiated an agreement between the ulama and the
63

Seruan Bersama Berkenaan dengan Pemilu, Mimbar Ulama, no. 115, Maret 1987, pp. 55-56.
See R. William Liddle, Indonesia in 1987: The New Order at the Height of Its Power, Asian
Survey, Vol. 28, No. 2, A Survey of Asia in 1987: Part II (Feb., 1988), pp. 180-191.
65
This fatwa contradicted the Rais Aam of PBNU (also the chairman of the PPP advisory council)
K.H. Bisri Syamsuri in 1977. Before the elections he stated that every Muslim who participated in the 1977
general elections (especially PPP members), was legally obliged to vote PPP when the time came. Any
Muslim who did not choose the PPP symbol, whether because of fear of losing income, status, or for any
other reason, has deserted God. See Syamsuddin Haris, PPP and Politics under the New Order, p. 31.
64

29

government of East Java (Kesepakatan ulama dan Umara se-Jawa Timur). The
agreement was not only made by the ulama within the MUI board, but also by the leaders
of Islamic organisations and the leaders of a traditional Islamic boarding school (Pondok
Pesantren) in East Java. On that occasion, the agreement was attended by the Governor
of East Java, the chairman of the East Java House of Representatives, and also the
chairmen of several political parties and Golkar. It comprised of several points but only
two items were related to the general elections. The first was the declaration of the ulama
in East Java to support the New Order regime under President Suharto, and an expression
of their hope for better relations between the ulama and the government. The second was
the assertion of the ulama in East Java to participate in the general elections of 1992 and
the plenary session of Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1993. The ulama also
urged Muslims in East Java in particular and in Indonesia in general to actively
participate for the success of the 1992 general elections, and people would not be
provoked by vote abstention issue.66 The agreement itself was released in January 1992,
four months before the elections which were held in June 1992.
In addition to the agreement, the national board of the MUI also announced a
decision after a national meeting in Jakarta. Different from the agreement which was
issued before the elections, the decision of the national board was issued in December
1992, five months after the elections and two months before the presidential elections in
March 1993. It looks like this decision was issued particularly to endorse Suharto as the
president for another term. This endorsement can clearly be seen in the decision. One of
the points of the general decision, point three, stated that the national meeting of the MUI
agreed that Muhammad Suharto was the exact figure to be the next leader for this nation.
Based on that rationale, the national meeting encouraged parliament factions from all

66

Kesepakatan Ulama dan Umara se-Jawa Timur, Mimbar Ulama, no. 171, April 1992, pp. 55-56.
It is interesting also to see another agreement which was enacted in 1989. This agreement was signed by 21
leading figures in Indonesian Islam from various backgrounds. The content of the agreement concerned the
invocation of these figures urging Majelis Permusyawaran Rakyat (MPR) to re-elect Suharto as the next
president. The man behind this agreement was the former Minister of Religious Affairs and Co-ordinating
Minister for Public Affairs, H. Alamsjah Ratu Prawiranegara. Several figures who signed this agreement
were from the national board of MUI, they are K.H. Hasan Basri, K.H. Ali Yafie and K.H Ibrahim Hosen.
The agreement itself was entitled: Sikap Bersama Umat Islam Indonesia (Joint Statement of the Indonesian
Muslim Community. For further reading see Darul Aqsha, Dick van Der Meij, Johan Hendrik Meuleman
(Eds.), Islam in Indonesia: A Survey Events and Development from 1988 to March 1993 (Jakarta, INIS,
1995), pp. 7-8.

30

political parties in the MPR to unanimously nominate Suharto as the next Indonesian
president.67
Both agreements are undisputable signs of real support of the MUI for the
government, first by the MUI in East Java and second from its national board. This
unanimous support of the MUI to some extent can be related to the condition of political
Islam in this decade, as can be seen from the analyses of several scholars. Liddle, for
example, argues that in the 1990s Suhartos policy toward political Islam had changed,
and he uses ICMI as the example of the shift,68 while Hefner called the situation in the
1990s the shifting opportunism of the presidents religious policies; he does so because
Suharto used Islamic issues, especially through the establishment of the ICMI for his own
interests.69
Surely this change affected the political position of the MUI.70 It can be said that
its support for the government was getting stronger. This situation can be analysed to
show that the concern of President Suharto regarding Muslim politics had changed. If in
the 1970s up to the 1980s Muslims were under control, in the 1990s Muslims in politics
were vindicated, referring to the ICMI establishment. Even though Muslim politics were
acquitted, this did not give much influence to the PPP as a representative of Islam. Golkar
still won the general elections with 68.1% of the votes, second was the PPP with 17.0%
and third PDI with 14.9%.
In 1997, the MUI once again gave a statement regarding to the general elections.
However, this statement was different from previous statements of the MUI regarding the
elections. The previous statements usually used the title pernyataan or statement for
67

Keputusan Rapat Kerja 4asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia Tahun 1413/1992, Mimbar Ulama, no.
178, December 1992, pp. 16-21.
68
R. William Liddle, The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, pp. 625-626.
69
See Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 128-165. For the complete remarks of Hefners work about
ICMI see Robert W. Hefner, Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian
Middle class, in Indonesia, No. 56 (October, 1993), pp. 1-35.
70
There were several signs of this change. Since the beginning, MUIs programme was limited as
only to provide advice to the government; it never developed its own program. Since 1990 this situation has
changed, the MUI was capable and allowed by the government to launch its own programme. There have
been several programmes launched by the MUI, for instance the creation of Bank Muamalat, the
establishment of the Indonesian Board of Arbitration of Muamalah (Badan Arbitrase Muamalat Indonesia)
and the establishment of the Assesment Institute for Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics (Lembaga Pengkajian
Pangan, Obat-obatan dan Kosmetika Majelis Ulam Indonesia. See Atho Mudzhar, the Ulama, the
Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of Indonesian Ulama Revisited, p. 317.

31

example in 1977, Keputusan Rapat Kerja 4asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia or the
decision of Majelis Ulama Indonesia national meeting in 1982 and 1992, and in 1987 it
used the title of seruan or exclamation. In 1997, a new title was used; taushiah, an
Arabic word which means recommendation. This was the first time for the MUI to use
the name taushiah for its opinion regarding the general elections. In content, the taushiah
was similar to the Seruan Bersama Berkenaan Dengan Pemilu of 1987. What makes it
similar is that it did not give any specific support to the president like it did in 1982 and
1992, but it tended to give the assertion that the general elections were the instrument of
Demokrasi Pancasila. For that reason, the taushiah concluded and urged Muslims to be
good citizens, stating that they have a moral responsibility for the success of national
development under the New Order regime. Therefore they should participate and use
their votes in the general elections. The taushiah also emphasized the importance of the
1997 general elections and the plenary session of the Peoples Consultative Assembly
(MPR) in 1998.71
The endorsement of the MUI only emerged a year later after the results of the
general elections were known and Golkar had won the election. This statement was
issued after a national meeting in Jakarta. In general, the statement was a reaction to the
economic crisis in 1997. It urged people to love their country and stick together to solve
the crisis. While urging people to do so, the MUI also thanked President Suharto because
he accepted to be a candidate for the next presidential elections. The MUI assumed that
Suhartos experience was needed to solve the crisis. 72 Another indication was the
participation of the general chairman of the MUI at that time, K.H Hasan Basri, as the
candidate for the House of Representatives (DPR) who campaigned for Golkar. This
situation was clearly understood as the favour of the MUI for the New Order regime.
All those indications above give us a clear idea of the position of the MUI in the
general elections during the New Order era. The MUI was established in 1976. Thus, the
involvement of the MUI in the general elections started in 1977, and continued in 1982,
1987, 1992, and 1997. Overall there were five general elections, and in each round of
71
Tausyiah Majelis Ulama Indonesia Hasil Rakernas Tahun 1997, Mimbar Ulama, no. 224, April
1997, pp. 49-53.
72
Keputusan Rapat Kerja 4asional Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 234,
February1998, pp. 25-26.

32

elections the MUI issued a statement, decision or taushiah/recommendation. Analysing

those five statements reveals that only in 1977 the MUI did not give any conspicuous
support. All other times, from 1982 to 1997, the MUI gave real support the government.
Three of the issued statements (1982, 1992 and 1997) mentioned the name of Suharto and
the fact that MUI endorsed him to continue his position of President of Indonesia,
whereas in 1987, they did not mention Suharto but they did mention the need to continue
the New Order government and that Muslims were obliged to participate to make the
election succeed.
It is interesting to see why in 1977 the MUI did not give unanimous support to the
government. It is plausible that this decision was influenced by Hamka. It is known that
Hamka was a strong and independent person, especially regarding his relation to the
government. The rejection of Hamka of the establishment of the MUI in 1970 was a
strong indication of his stance. The second indication is his courage to support the
issuance of the MUI fatwa regarding Christmas celebrations. Even though the
government demanded its annulment, Hamka insisted and in the end he resigned from his
position as general chairman over the issue. It is an indisputable fact that Hamka had a
strong independent standpoint towards the government.73
Another reason is the strong position of political Islam at the time. In the 1970s,
the New Order regime was still getting established. The governments influence on
political Islam was not as strong as it was in the 1980s. The increasing number of PPP
votes in 1977 (29.3%, from 1971 when it was 27.2%) was evidence that political Islam
had a strong position and was in a good bargaining position toward the New Order
regime. It is reasonable that the MUI did not give a strong statement to support Suharto,
but instead a general statement to encourage Muslims to choose the best candidate from
73

The independent position of Hamka can also be seen in the work of Atho Mudzhar. He compares
the first three general chairmen of the MUI; Hamka, K.H Syukri Ghozali and K.H Hasan Basri. In this
comparison he found that under the leadership of Hamka, the MUI was more vigorous in issuing fatwas
than under Syukri Ghozali. Under the leadership of Hasan Basri the MUI had become ever more reluctant
to issue fatwas, even badly-needed ones. The long awaited fatwa on the porkas lottery was an indication of
his position. This leadership difference reflects the relation of the MUI and the New Order regime.
Furthermore, these differences also reflect MUIs position during the general elections. The MUI under
Hamka was vigorous in issuing fatwas and also determined not to give its support to the New Order in the
1977 general elections. The two others who were not as vigorous as Hamka in issuing fatwas were also not
as vigorous in relation to MUIs position in the general elections. See Atho Mudzhar, Fatwas of the
Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-1988 (Jakarta: INIS,
1993).

33

any party. On the other hand, at that time there was a fatwa from K.H. Bisri Syamsuri,
who stated that every Muslim, especially PPP members, was obliged to vote for PPP.74
This fatwa was proof that Muslims, especially ulama, have a tendency to fight for
political Islam vis--vis the governments interests. These facts show clearly that the
reason why the MUI did not give an endorsement to the regime in 1977 was because of
the strong position of political Islam.
The facts given above concerning MUIs attitudes in general elections disapprove
the theses from scholars such as Mudzhar, Hooker, Ichwan and Van Dijk, who argue that
the MUI under the New Order regime was completely controlled by the government. The
above facts give us a different thesis, saying that only after 1981 MUIs position was
weakened and was subdued to the governments interests. From 1976 until 1981, when
Hamka was the general chairman, the MUI was strong and not easily submitted to state
authority. The statement concerning the general elections was a strong signal that the
MUI in Hamkas period was powerful and brave enough to challenge the regimes
control.

74

Syamsuddin Haris, PPP and Politics under the New Order, p. 31.

34

CHAPTER TWO
THE MUI AD THE 1999 GEERAL ELECTIOS

The previous chapter described the positions of the MUI related to the general
elections under the New Order regime. I concluded that the MUI was under governmental
control only after the 1982 general elections. In the 1977 general elections, the MUI was
generally independent and did not endorse the regime. In this chapter I will further
discuss the influence of the MUI during the 1999 general elections. In particular, I will
elaborate on the following issues: What was the MUI reaction related to the 1999 general
elections, and how did it differ from MUIs statement regarding the elections during the
New Order era? Another question deals with the effectiveness of the MUI statement in
the 1999 general elections regarding Indonesian Muslims.
Before discussing the influence of the MUI on the 1999 general elections and
analysing the shift of MUIs attitudes toward the government, it is necessary to discuss
the socio-political landscape of Indonesia in the late New Order era, and how this
situation affected the political position of the MUI, as well as to give an overview of
MUIs political stances during the Reformation era.

A. Islam and Politics in the Late ew Order Era

The relation between the New Order regime and Muslim political activists in the
1990s can be considered as better than what happened to political Islam during the 1970s
and 1980s. What makes it different was the opportunity given by the government to
Muslims to take up more roles in the public sphere, particularly if we analyse the
emergence of the ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) in the 1990s. It
can be said that the government took a more accommodative approach toward political
Islam.
The establishment of the ICMI is evidence that the government, and in particular
President Suharto, had altered their view concerning Islam as a threat to the government,
even though when the ICMI idea came up, they had to consult President Suharto first and
only after receiving his approval it was possible to establish the ICMI. According to
Hefner, Habibie did not agree with the ICMI idea in the beginning, but after Suharto

35

authorized it, Habibie consolidated his loyalties in the cabinet and other independent
Muslim groups to prepare its creation.1
The formation of the ICMI, a government-sponsored Muslim association, was
perceived differently given that in the 1970s and 1980s the government showed
unsympathetic attitudes toward Muslim groups. However, it should be noted that the rise
of the ICMI was perceived differently by scholars; Hefner stated that no organisation
other than the ICMI was capable of making a fundamental change in the Suharto era,2
while Liddle said that the ICMI was a key alteration in terms of the New Order policy
toward political Islam. In addition, Liddle mentioned that this movement did not come
originally from Muslim politics but was merely a corporatist organisation for the
governments benefit. 3 This fact can be seen when two prominent Muslims figures,
Abdurrahman Wahid and Deliar Noer, rejected the establishment of the ICMI and
criticized it as politically engineered by the government.4
However, the support of Suharto for the establishment of the ICMI in many ways
reflected the change in Suhartos strategy, especially towards the recruitment of his
cabinet. There is no doubt that in the 1970s and 1980s many ministers in Suhartos
cabinet were non-Muslims. This policy was criticized by saying that Indonesia is a
country with a Muslim majority, so it is reasonable for members of the cabinet to be
Muslim. With the establishment of the ICMI, it was hoped that Suharto would change his
mind and turn to choose his cabinet members from Muslim side. That the composition
changed can be seen in his cabinet in 1993 of which several were prominent ICMI figures,
such as Azwar Anas, Harmoko, Saleh Afif, Habibie (the chairman of the ICMI), also his
assistant Wardiman Djojonegoro, and Haryanto Dhanutirto.5 The appointment of ICMI
figures can be interpreted as a sign of change in Suhartos attitude toward political Islam.

Robert W. Hefner, Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian
Middle Class, Indonesia, Vol. 56 (Oct., 1993), p. 18.
2
Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New Jersey, Princeton
University Press, 2000), p. 128.
3
R. William Liddle, The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, in the Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol. 55, o. 3 (Aug., 1996), p. 625.
4
Douglas Edward Ramage, Ideological Discourse in the Indonesian ew Order: State Ideology and
the Beliefs of an Elite, 1985-1993, unpublished PhD, University of South Carolina, 1993, pp. 184-251.
5
Adam Schwarz, A ation in Waiting; Indonesia in the 1990s (San Francisco, Westview Press,
1994), p. 177.

36

Besides this progress, there were several other conspicuous policies of the New
Order era which can be defined as advantageous for Muslim politics. We can mention
several of them such as the policy of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of establishing
many mosques and Islamic schools. It also supported Islamic proselytising, especially
with the aim to convert Hindus and Buddhists. We can also observe how provincial and
regional public officials started to use Islamic greetings in their speech.6 Another change
was in the policy of allowing female Muslim students to use a jilbab or religious
headscarf during their time in school and the creation of an Islamic bank in 1991 which
was fully sponsored by the government.7
The governments party, Golkar, followed the same pattern as the government
towards Muslims. In the 1990s, Golkar started to approach and accommodate Muslim
figures and also to prioritise their programmes such as renovating and building mosques
and Islamic schools. One of the figures who joined Golkar was the chairman of the MUI,
Hasan Basri, who campaigned for Golkar in the 1997 general elections. 8 Suhartos
daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana or Mbak Tutut, who also served as official in Golkar
party, changed her style of dress and started to use a headscarf after returning from
pilgrimage. With this new image, she travelled to several provinces and districts
especially in East Java which traditionally voted for the PPP. In addition, Golkar also
worked with other governmental institutions to facilitate several Islamic activities such as
conferences and festivals.

All these policies illustrate a major change in the

governments attitude concerning Islam. It is very different from the policies of the New
Order regime in the 1970s and 1980s, when many of the Muslims political rights and
activities were restricted and suppressed for the sake of stability (no opposition to the
New Order regime).
Another sign was the Monitor-incident. Monitor was a magazine published by a
Catholic group, Gramedia, which also published a daily newspaper, Kompas. The editor
of Monitor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, was also Catholic. In 1990, Monitor published a poll
6

Robert W. Hefner, Islamization and Democratization, in Robert W. Hefner and Patricia

Horvatich (Eds), Islam in an Era of Nation-States (Honolulu, University of Hawai Press, 1997), p. 111.
7
R. William Liddle, Indonesia's Threefold Crisis, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 4 October
1992, p. 62.
8
C. van Dijk, Religious Authority, Politics, and Fatwas, p. 50.
9
Adam Schwarz, A ation in Waiting, Indonesia in the 1990s, p. 175.

37

which ranked President Suharto as the most admired person in Indonesia. What made this
poll controversial was the placement of the prophet Muhammad on number 11, way
below Suharto at number one and also lower than Monitors editor, Arswendo, who was
put at number 10. This poll elicited massive reactions of Muslims, especially from the
ICMI. Most of them said that this poll insulted Muslims and endangered the relations
between religions in Indonesia. To end this controversy, the government banned Monitor
and sentenced its editor to five year in prison.10
It is interesting to see what sort of reason lies beneath the shift in the New Orders
political approach to Islam. Why did the government directly change its view concerning
Islam, which had been conceived for the last two decades as the main threat to the
government? There are several plausible explanations. The first reason refers to the
relationship between Suharto and the military leaders. It was widely known that the
backbone of the New Order regime was the military. Suharto himself was a General; this
is why he established his regime with many military leaders. Many policies of the New
Order regime relied on this backbone. Take for example the objection of the military
leaders to the rehabilitation of the Masyumi party in the 1960s. The military refusal was
related to the involvement of several Masyumi leaders in the PRRI revolt. In the Armys
opinion, Masyumi was disloyal, especially in defending Indonesia as a nation.11
However, the relationship between the military and Suharto became delicate in
the late 1980s when L.B General Murdani, one of the prominent military leaders, was
seen as a threat to Suhartos regime. The striking act of Murdani which offended Suharto
was his criticism of the business activities of Suhartos children. This act, Suharto
believed, was an expression of the political ambitions of Murdani. Therefore, Suharto
fired Murdani from the command of the military and put him in a less important position
as Minister of Defence. 12 From this point onwards, Suharto moved his political view
from the military to Islam. Indications of this shift are several policies issued by the
government which gave many benefits to political Islam. Even in the military, there was
10

Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance
(London and New York, Routledge, 1995), pp. 87-89.
11
Allan A. Samson, Islam in Indonesian Politics, Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 12 (Dec., 1968), p.
1005.
12
For further reading regarding the role of the military in the late Suharto era see Damien Kingsbury,
Power Politics and the Indonesian Military (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 150-160.

38

action by Suharto, changing military leaders who had a relation to Murdani for military
leaders with Islamic backgrounds.13 All of these actions made clear that Suharto now
turned his support-base from the military to the Muslims.
The second reason was a step further after Suharto had made Islam into his
backbone. The reason was considered to be pragmatic. Suharto needed the support of the
Muslims in the 1997 general elections. He changed his policies towards Muslims by
giving them many political advantages, particularly with the establishment of the ICMI.
In return, he hoped that the ICMI would give him massive support in order for the
governments political party, Golkar, to win in the 1997 general elections and he himself
in the presidential elections in 1998. 14 Another indication was the reconciliation of
Suharto with Abdurrahman Wahid, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1996.
Abdurrahman Wahid was known as a prominent critic of Suharto in the 1990s, especially
regarding Suhartos support for the establishment of the ICMI. Abdurrahman Wahid
initiated the establishment of the Democracy Forum in 1991, of which one of its aims
was to promote the democratisation of Indonesia. This manoeuvre irritated Suharto, and
in return Suharto planned to remove Abdurrahman Wahid as the chairman of Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) at its congress in 1994. However, this plan failed and Abdurrahman Wahid
was re-elected as NU chairman. This bad relationship ended in 1996 when RMI
(Rabithah Maahid Islamiyah), a pesantren organisation affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama,
organised a national meeting. This meeting demonstrated the reconciliation between the
two figures when they shook hands and sat together in the same place.15 A year later,
Abdurrahman Wahid facilitated Mbak Tutut in a tour to several pesantrens in Central
Java and East Java. Apparently this tour boosted the votes of Golkar in the 1997 general
elections. Central Java and East Java were known as the traditional basis of Nahdlatul
Ulama.16

13

Regarding the change see Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: September 1, 1993September 30, 1995, Indonesia, Vol. 60 (Oct., 1995), pp. 101-146.
14
R. William Liddle, The Islamic Turn in Indonesia: A Political Explanation, p. 615.
15
Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, p. 118; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam,
p. 194.
16
Marcus Mitzner, Between Pesantren and Palace: Nahdlatul Ulama and its Role in the Transition,
in Geoff Forrester and R.J. May (eds.), the Fall of Soeharto (Bathurst, Crawford House Publishing, 1998),
pp. 179-199.

39

The third reason which can be defined as a personal reason was related to
Suhartos turn to spirituality, especially after his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca in
1991. This pilgrimage was a sign that Suharto became a more pious Muslim and started
to perform religious tasks seriously. Even though many analysts thought that this
pilgrimage was part of Suhartos strategy to get the support of the Muslims, several
Indonesian scholars such as Nurcholish Majid think that it was really Suhartos
commitment to Islam.17
All of these facts show us clearly that there was a change in the New Order policy
in the 1990s, particularly regarding the acceptance of the government of the involvement
of political Islam in the public sphere. Despite many reasons for the change, whether it
was influenced by the piety of the president or the need to incorporate political Islam to
win the elections, it was really beneficial for the Muslim population to be involved again
in the political arena after two decades of suppression and restriction by the government.
Indisputably, the change of the New Order regime concerning Islam affected the
MUI. As an Islamic organisation it was plausible for the MUI to get more opportunities
than in its role in the 1970s and 1980s. The most conspicuous one was related to its
function of launching its own programme. Before the 1990s, the MUI did not have the
authority to create its own programme; instead it only gave advice to the government and
acted as point of contact and as a coordinator of Islamic activities. 18 Since 1990, the
situation had changed; the MUI was given more authority to initiate its own programmes.
This policy was started in 1989 after its national meeting (Rapat Kerja ational). Many
new policies were issued in this meeting, such as that the MUI would make a pilot project
for an institute to implement the curriculum of religious education. It also encouraged
Islamic organisations and schools to strengthen the Islamic curriculum in public schools
as well as in private Islamic boarding schools or Pondok Pesantren.19
Besides that, the MUI was prolific in launching programmes; for example the
organisation initiated the creation of an Islamic bank or Bank Muamalat, sent preachers
17

Douglas Edward Ramage, Ideological Discourse in the Indonesian ew Order: State Ideology
and the Beliefs of an Elite, 1985-1993, pp. 184-251.
18
Atho Mudzhar, the Ulama, the Government, and Society in Modern Indonesia; the Council of
Indonesian Ulama Revisited, p. 319.
19
Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 15 Tahun Majelis Ulama (Jakarta, Sekretariat Majelis
Ulama Indonesia, 1990), p 215.

40

or dai to several provinces of transmigration areas, organised a workshop for future

ulama (Pendidikan Kader Ulama), organised a donation for renovating and creating
mosques especially outside the island of Java such as on Flores, advocated several cases
concerning the issue of wearing the headscarf in public schools, was involved in the
establishment of the Indonesian Board of Arbitration of Muamalah (Badan Arbitrase
Muamalat Indonesia), and in the establishment of the Assessment Institute for Food,
Drugs, and Cosmetics (Lembaga Pengkajian Pangan, Obat-obatan dan Kosmetika
Majelis Ulama Indonesia/LPPOM MUI).20 The LPPOM MUI was established after the
issue of pork fat in 1989. This institution aims to make guidelines, rules and
recommendations for food, drugs, and cosmetics which are consumed by Muslims.
LPPOM MUI has the authority to issue halal certificates for the products registered in the
institution.21
Without a doubt, the change of Suhartos policy toward political Islam and the
bigger function of the MUI in creating its own programme affected to the unconditional
support of the MUI to the government. MUIs endorsement of Suharto in the 1992
general elections and also in the 1997 general elections made it an unquestionable fact
that the MUI absolutely authenticated the government. Not only had the MUI endorsed
the government regarding the general elections, but it also supported any action of the
government to eliminate any substantial threat which imperilled the New Order regime.
One example was the endorsement by the MUI of the government when dealing with the
incident of 27 July 1996. This incident took place one year before the election. The
incident itself was a clash between two factions in the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI)
who each wanted to take charge of PDI headquarters in Jakarta. The first faction was
under the leadership of Megawati Sukarno Putri, daughter of the first Indonesian
President, Sukarno. She was elected in congress in 1994 in Jakarta. The government
opposed the Megawati leadership and created another congress in 1996 in Medan, North
Sumatra. This congress elected Surjadi as the PDI chairman. This election stimulated
20

Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 20 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Majelis Ulama Indonesia,
1995), pp. 242-249, pp. 32-34. Also can be read in Atho Mudzhar, the Ulama, the Government, and
Society in Modern Indonesia, p. 319.
21
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 20 Tahun Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, Majelis Ulama Indonesia,
1995), pp. 242-249.

41

more conflict between the two factions in the PDI. On 27 July 1996, the Surjadi faction
attacked the PDI headquarters which were dominated by Megawati supporters. It was
reported that the army was behind the attack. In the aftermath of the incident, the
government accused the Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) or Peoples Democratic Party
of being behind the violence against the PDI.22
The MUI reacted to this incident by issuing a statement together with several
Islamic organisations in Jakarta. The statement contained five points. The first was to
condemn any turmoil which could destroy public facilities and disturb the order in
society. The second was to express the belief that the chaos was a subversive action with
the aim to replace the New Order regime with a communist ideology. The third was to
support any action from the government and the Army against the people who were
involved in the chaos and also to urge the government and the Army to take legal action
against the suspects, who propagated, agitated and provoked through the freedom forum
(mimbar bebas) that took place before the incident. The fourth was to call on all Muslims,
especially the young generation, to stay calm and not be affected by any deviant issues,
and to guard themselves against communist ideas. The fifth was that as a country with the
Pancasila philosophy, Indonesia refused the communist ideology.23
The statement of the MUI condemning the incident of July 27th, as well as their
support for any government response including by the army, clearly showed how strong
the backing of the MUI for the government was. This statement is also in line with the
evidence in the previous chapter which shows that the statement of the MUI in the
general elections mostly provided legitimacy to the government.

22

Ikrar Nusa Bakti (ed.), Militer dan Politik Kekerasan Orde Baru; Soeharto di Belakang Peristiwa
27 Juli? (Jakarta, LIPI and Mizan Pustaka, 2001) pp.151-158; See also Greg Fealy, Indonesian Politics
1995-1996: the Making of a Crisis, in Gavin W. Jones and Terrence H. Hull (eds.), Indonesia Assessment,
Population and Human Resources (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), pp. 19-38.
23
Pernyataan Bersama Majelis Ulama Indonesia dan Organisasi-Organisasi Kemasyarakatan
Islam Tentang Rangkaian Peristiwa 27 Juli 1996 di Jakarta. Mimbar Ulama, No.216, Agustus 1996, pp. 89. Besides this, the MUI also issued a statement named Sikap Umat Islam or the Position of Muslims. In
this statement, the MUI further explained its position and statement regarding the 27 July incident. Like the
first statement, it contains mostly a condemnation of the incident, urging the government and the Army to
react, asking Muslims and particularly the young generation to guard themselves against the communist
ideology and ideas, urging any religious people in Indonesia to comfort each other and guard themselves
against any people involved in the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and the PRD (Peoples Democratic
Party). See Sikap Umat Islam, Mimbar Ulama, No.216, Agustus 1996, pp. 11-12.

42

B. The MUI and the Reformation Era

In the early 1990s, Indonesia was known as one of the best countries in Asia in
terms of economy. These countries were called Asian Tigers. However, in 1997 this
situation changed when Indonesia was struck by a financial crisis and its economic
foundation collapsed. Not only did this influence the economy, it also changed the
political situation. The economic crisis in Indonesia started when the exchange rate of the
rupiah to the dollar slipped further. It started in July 1997 when the rupiah collapsed and
became worth 2700 per one dollar.24 This situation deteriorated and forced Indonesia to
consult the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and ask for help. By the end of October
1997, Suharto bowed to the IMF and signed an agreement which would give him
financial support.25
This crisis happened after the general elections which were held in May 1997.
Practically, the crisis influenced the political situation, especially regarding the question
whether Suharto would continue his presidency or not. With the economic breakdown,
this enquiry turned out to be very popular, especially among the political leaders. On the
Muslim side, with the change of Suhartos policies to become more accommodative
towards Muslims, there was no other choice besides securing their positions by
supporting Suhartos legitimacy to act properly and solve the economic crisis. This
endorsement came especially from ICMI members such as Adi Sasono and Habibie. Only
Abdurrahman Wahid, who was known as the opposition of Suharto since the early 1990s,
demanded that Suharto resign because of the economic turmoil.26
The position of the MUI was the same as the ICMI, which meant it gave full
support to the government to overcome the economic crisis. One conspicuous action of
the MUI was the taushiah or recommendation regarding the love motherland
movement. This taushiah was issued after a meeting of ulama from several Islamic
organisations in Jakarta on 18 January 1998. In this recommendation, the MUI expressed
its appreciation for the governments efforts to solve the economic crisis. It also stated
that the agreement between the government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
24

Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair, Indonesia between 1997 and 2000 (Leiden, KITLV Press,
2001), p. 71.
25
Judith Bird, Indonesia in 1998: The Pot Boils Over, Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 1, A Survey of
Asia in 1998 (Jan. - Feb., 1999), pp. 27-37.
26
Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam, p. 199.

43

was strong evidence of the seriousness of the government to resolve the crisis. To
endorse the states programmes, the MUI issued a recommendation regarding the love
motherland movement. According to the MUI, this movement would enhance the
governments attempts because this movement would gather Indonesian people to work
together, hand in hand, to solve the economic crisis. In order to achieve this goal, the
MUI stated five points which must be avoided by the government as well as by the
people. First, collecting money or hoarding (maisr) for private benefit and not for public
interest is not allowed in Islam. Second, storing foodstuff in order to sell it again some
other time with higher prices is damaging public interest. Third, economic speculation
which hampers economic stability such as bribery, corruption, and collusion must be
ended, because these activities are forbidden in Islam. Fourth, inefficiency in spending
money is not good for the countrys development, and aside from that, inefficiency is a
friend of Satan, and God does not like people who are wasteful. And the fifth stated that
spreading false news which triggers fright and panic is considered haram. The taushiah
stated that Indonesian people must avoid those five activities in order to solve the crisis.
The taushiah was ended by a prayer for President Suhartos health so he could manage
the government and disentangle the economic crisis.27
This taushiah was strengthened a month later, after the MUI held its national
meeting in Jakarta. As at any other MUI national meetings, the MUI issued a statement or
Surat Pernyataan emphasising several points; the first two points dealt with the love
motherland movement and how it would help the economic situation. The second
supported the governments efforts and policies to remedy the crisis. Another one urged
the MUI at provincial and district levels to cooperate with the army to protect national
security. The most important point in this statement was the support of the MUI for the
Suharto candidacy for the next term. In MUIs opinion, Suhartos experiments were
useful for the country in facing the economic crisis.28
In addition to this statement, the MUI also issued a Pledge of Islamic Community
(Ikrar Umat Islam Indonesia). This declaration was mainly a way for the MUI to support
the attempts of the government concerning the crisis. Interestingly, apart from the
27

Taushiah Majelis Ulama Indonesia Tentang Hubbul Wathon, Mimbar Ulama, No.232, Januari
1998, pp. 27-28.
28
Mimbar Ulama, No.234, February 1998, pp. 25-26.

44

endorsement of the government in dealing with the economic crisis, the declaration also
asserted that Indonesian Muslims were determined to succeed in the general session of
the Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR) in March 1998. The declaration itself was
ended by an expression of support for Suharto to finish his presidency and of hope for his
good health so that he could manage his administration and work out the crisis for the
benefit of national development (pembangunan nasional)29
These two statements show how strong the support of the MUI to the New Order
regime was. Despite much criticism toward the governments treatment of the crisis, the
MUI was not tempted to follow the critics and blindly gave its approval to the regime,
and specifically to Suharto to continue his presidency. Another problem was Suhartos
health, during this time there were many rumours regarding his health. It was noticed that
in December 1997 Suharto was unable to attend several international conferences due to
his health problems. Assuredly, Suhartos physical condition became a public concern.30
However, if we read the statement above it seems that the MUI did not think that
Suhartos health problem was serious. It only prays for Suharto to be better and
repeatedly encourages Suharto to continue his presidency. Overall, the support of the
MUI can be seen as a representation of the leading Muslim figures endorsing Suharto. As
mentioned before, the ICMI fully supported the candidacy of Suharto for the next term.
There was a chance for its chairman, Habibie, to become the vice-president, and Muslim
activists including the MUI did not want to lose this chance and let the military once
again to get the vice-presidency.
It is worth mentioning that in the early 1990s there was competition between the
military and the Muslims, especially after the establishment of the ICMI. The harmonious
relationship between Muslims and the president surely affected the previously strong
position of the military, which had been the key player in Suhartos administration in the
1970s and 1980s. However, this situation had changed after the establishment of the
ICMI. The position of vice-president which was usually given to the military could be in
danger. With the support of Muslims for Suharto, it was possible for a Muslim candidate
29

This declaration was signed by many Islamic organisations; among others Nadhlatul Ulama,
Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, HMI, PMII, Anshor and Pemuda Muhammadiyah. For a complete list see Ikrar
Umat Islam Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, No.234, February 1998, pp. 27-28.
30
Harold Crouch, Indonesia Stagnates from the Top, in Edward Aspinal, Herb Feith and Gerry
Van Klinken (Eds.), The Last Days of President Suharto (Clayton, Monash Asia Institute, 1999), p. 23.

45

to become the vice president. And it did happen, in a general session in March 1998 when
the MPR elected Habibie as Suhartos Vice President.31
The support of the MUI for the government continued, as can be seen in the
Mimbar Ulama after Suharto announced his cabinet members in March 1998. It stated
that the Kabinet Pembangunan VII (the last cabinet of Suharto) was full of morality
(Akhlakul Karimah). One of the reasons for this statement was the appointment of several
ministers who had strong relations with Muslims, especially with the MUI. Mimbar
Ulama referred to Quraish Shihab, the Minister of Religious Affairs, who served as a
MUI chairman, and Tutty Alawiyah, the Minister of Womens Affairs who was an MUI
member. Mimbar Ulama also mentioned other ministers who had connections with the
MUI, such as Alwi Dahlan, the Minister of Information, and also Wiranto Arismunandar,
the Minister of Education and Culture, because both of them were members of the
advisory board of the MUI.32
The endorsement by the MUI of the cabinet appointment seemed to ignore the
public opinion which stated that most of the cabinet members were Suharto loyalists. It
did not represent the seriousness of Suharto to resolve the economic crisis. The
appointments of Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana or Tutut, the eldest daughter of Suharto, as the
Minister of Social Welfare, and of Bob Hasan, an ethnic Chinese businessman and crony
of the President, as the Minister of Trade and Industry, were an indication that Suharto
preferred to put his family and his business associates in power rather than a professional
which would have a significant impact on the Indonesian economy.33 The public also

31
Strategic Comments, The Role of the Army in Indonesia's Political Future, How Green Are the
Armed Forces, Accessed from http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t724921302 (24 August
2009). It was also mentioned that the late New Order era was the era of the demilitarisation of the Suharto
regime and the rise of political Islam. Even though there was a rejection of the military regarding Suhartos
strategy towards Islam, for example in 1988, the military did not support an Islamic court bill while Golkar
did. It can be said that the contestation between the military and Islam started at this point. The 1993
presidential elections were the triumph of the military over Muslims when they were successful in securing
Try Sutrisno as vice-president. However, in the 1998 presidential elections it looks like the Muslims
defeated the military when Habibie became the vice-president. See Leo Suryadinata, Democratization and
Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Mar., 1997), pp. 269-280.
32
Mimbar Ulama, No.235, March 1998, pp. 3-8.
33
David Jenkins, Suharto Digs in with His all-crony Cabinet, in Edward Aspinal, Herb Feith and
Gerry van Klinken (Eds.), The Last Days of President Suharto (Clayton, Monash Asia Institute, 1999), pp.
31-33.

46

reacted with several demonstrations protesting the appointment of the cabinet members,
saying that most of them were anti reformasi.34
However, the MUI paid no attention to this fact and kept supporting the cabinet.
The accommodation of Muslim politics, especially the people who were close to the MUI,
was a plausible reason why the MUI endorsed the cabinet despite the public criticism.
This position was also taken by the ICMI when many of its members preferred the status
quo, keeping Suharto as President and simply ignoring the demands of the students for
Suharto to step down. The reason behind the stance of the ICMI was almost the same as
the rationale of the MUI for supporting the new cabinet; that Habibie, the ICMI chairman,
was taken by Suharto to be his vice president. By doing so, the ICMI hoped for better
access to the government, especially to get involved in policy making.35 These two things
can be seen as aspects of the patronage system used by Suharto to gain support from
Muslims. By appointing people who were loyal to him, such as several officials of the
MUI to be his ministers and also Habibie as his vice President, Suharto received
unanimous support from the institutions, both from the MUI and the ICMI.
The support of the MUI for the government was still strong until May 1998,
despite many student demonstrations insisting that Suharto resign. The support is visible
in the statement issued by the MUI on 13 May 1998, with the title for the safety of the
nation and the country (Untuk Keselamatan Bangsa Dan egara). This statement was
released as a reaction to the riot between the students and the security forces in front of
Trisakti University, Jakarta, which had occurred the day before. In this incident four
students and two people were killed because they were shot by the security forces.36 On
the whole, the statement expressed the MUIs concern about the crisis and their
condolences for the victims of the clash between the students and the security forces. The
MUI then urged all sides to avoid violence. What was important in this statement was the
point which suggested that the people, including the students, should act peacefully when
expressing their ideas.37 This point can be defined as an inclination of the MUI towards

34

Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair, Indonesia between 1997 and 2000, p. 151.
Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, pp. 203-204.
36
Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair, Indonesia between 1997 and 2000, p. 187.
37
Pernyataan dan Seruan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Untuk Keselamatan Bangsa dan egara,
Mimbar Ulama, No.237, May 1998, pp. 27-28.
35

47

the government and a refusal to follow the student movements which demanded that
Suharto step down.
Interestingly, after a massive demonstration from the students which was
followed by Suhartos resignation on 21 May 2008, the MUI altered its position and
support the Reformation. We can see this change in the Mimbar Ulama in June, which
stated that the reformation must use a moral and religious paradigm (Reformasi Dengan
Paradigma Moral dan Agama). This change was a big difference compared to what had
happened before, when the MUI supported the new cabinet by saying that the cabinet was
full of morality, and also compared to the refusal of the MUI to support the student
movements by suggesting they should act peacefully. This changing position plausibly
happened because of two factors. The first was the massive demand of the people that
Suharto steps down. With the enormous student movements, no one can prevent the
change from happening. Naturally, the MUI could not reject it and turn to support the
movement. The second was the political situation in which many Muslim activists also
turned against Suharto. This becomes clear from the fact that many ICMI members, such
as Adi Sasono and Achmad Tirtosudiro, supported the students demands.38 The change
of the ICMI regarding the Suharto presidency was influenced by the lower number of
prominent ICMI figures chosen to be in the last cabinet of Suharto. The ICMI was
disappointed with this situation, so it turned against Suharto and followed the demands of
the students. With the appointment of Habibie as President, the ICMI thought it was in a
better position especially for Muslims to defend their political interests. Confidently, the
MUI had the same position as the ICMI, and it turned against Suharto and agreed with
the Reformation by supporting Habibie as the President.

C. The MUI and the 1999 General Elections

The appointment of Habibie as President after the resignation of Suharto turned
out to be a pro-contra issue, especially among Indonesian elites. The military, such as
former vice president Try Sutrisno and Edi Sudrajat, were among the military leaders
who were disappointed with the situation and organised a movement to replace Habibie.

38

Donald J.Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia, pp. 206-209.

48

On the other hand, Muslim activists including the ICMI and the MUI were behind
Habibie and supported his assignment.39
MUIs approval of Habibie was shown six days after his appointment. The
support was expressed in MUIs taushiah entitled Amanah Kepada Presiden Republik
Indonesia Bapak Prof. Dr. Ing. B.J. Habibie or Message for the President of the
Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Prof. Dr. Ing. B.J. Habibie. This taushiah was issued after
the meeting of the MUI with several chairmen of Islamic organisations such NU and
Muhammadiyah. First the taushiah congratulated Habibie for the mandate given by God
and the Indonesian people for him to become the third President of the Republic of
Indonesia. It also stated that he was given a mandate for development which was a
particular reformation mandate (amanah reformasi) in a constitutional manner. It then
cited several surahs or passages from the Quran such as surah 3: 104 regarding amar
maruf nahi munkar or commanding right and forbidding wrong; and surah 4: 59
regarding obedience to God, Prophet and the government. Another one is Surah 4: 135
concerning justice and surah 8:46 concerning useless disputes.
The taushiah then recommended four points. The first, encourage people to
return to religious teaching, moral and ethic in line with national character and the
constitution in solving the state and nations problem. Avoid polemics regarding the
position of the president and cabinet. The second, prioritise the availability of the nine
basic material needs and provide job opportunities for the people. The third, political
reform should be performed in a constitutional procedure by the government along with
the legislative body, and with the support of all Indonesian people on the basis of national
unity and integrity. The fourth, support the statement of the Ministry of Defence and the
Armed Forces Commander for the support of the leadership of the President of the
Republic of Indonesia. The MUI then hopes the solidity between the Armed Forces and
the people for the safety and prosperity in the context of national unity and integrity.40
This taushiah was followed by another one entitled Sumbangan Pemikiran or
Thought Contribution. This taushiah was issued after the meeting of the MUI with the
39

Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair, Indonesia between 1997 and 2000, pp. 323-357
Amanah Kepada Presiden Republik Indonesia Bapak Prof. Dr. Ing. B.J. Habibie, Mimbar Ulama,
No.238, June 1998, pp. 29-31. The translation is taken from Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI
after Suharto, p. 54.
40

49

chairmen of several Islamic organisations and with the Coordinating Minister of Politics,
Social Affairs and Security at the time, Feisal Tanjung. There were nine points of
recommendation in this taushiah, the most important one was regarding the support of
the MUI to the government. It was mentioned in point three regarding the polemics and
controversy occurring in society over political problems. The MUI argued that this
polemic must be stopped. It also pointed out that the emergence of an unreliable public
opinion within society was caused by one-sided information from the media and the
influence of abroad which aimed to disintegrate the union of Indonesia. It emphasized the
need for cooperation between the ulama and the Armed Forces to fight against the evil
which contributes to the degradation of moral values in Indonesia.41
These two taushiah can be described as expressions of support of the MUI for
Habibie as the new President. With the groups pro and contra the Reformation and the
attempt of some factions within the military to replace Habibie, the MUI felt that it was
important to issue a taushiah with the purpose of defending the appointment of Habibie
as being constitutional. Not only did the MUI endorse Habibie based on the constitution,
but it also supported him with on the basis of religion. The statement that his presidency
was a mandate from the God was obviously used to legitimate Habibie from a religious
perspective.
Besides those two taushiah, the MUI also organized another activity to defend
Habibie in September 2008. This action was conducted by FURKON (Forum Umat Islam
Penegak dan Konstitusi or Muslim Forum of the Upholders of Justice and the
Constitution). FURKON was initially established after the meeting between the MUI and
several Islamic organisations on 10 September 1998. According to the MUI, the
background of FURKONs establishment was the appearance of an anarchistic
demonstration, which was a deviation from the constitution and against which it was a
reaction.42
On 30 September 2008, FURKON gathered 20.000 people in front of the Istiqlal
Mosque in Jakarta. This mass-gathering was initiated with the plan to remind Muslims
about the danger of Communism. Several Muslim figures attended the meeting, such as
41

Sumbangan Pemikiran Majelis Ulama Indonesia dan Pimpinan Ormas Islam Tingkat Pusat
dalam Pertemuan dengan Menko Polkam, Mimbar Ulama, No.238, June 1998, pp. 32-33.
42
See Mimbar Ulama, No.242, October 1998, p. 6.

50

the famous preacher K.H Zainuddin M.Z, Emha Ainun Najib and the MUI chairman at
the time, K.H. Ali Yafie. Obviously, this occasion was not only used for reminding
Muslims of the danger of Communism but also for supporting Habibie as the President.
This objective can be seen in the statement of FURKON which consisted of eight points.
Most of them were related to political issues such as point one, which stated that the
transfer of power from Suharto to Habibie was legal and constitutional; therefore no
polemics or doubt should follow from this process. Point two emphasized that FURKON
would not back down for any movements that would attempt to replace the system
(meaning Habibie) unconstitutionally. Point four rejected any presidium or Indonesian
peoples committee (Komite Rakyat Indonesia) contradictory to the constitution. 43
According to Van Dijk, this movement emerged as a reaction to the report which stated
that there would be demonstrations demanding Habibie to step down. 44 One of the
demonstrations was organized by Barnas (Barisan asional or National Front). Barnas
was a moral force or forum established by several retired military officers on 6 August
1998. Habibie mentioned that Barnas had expressed negative criticism regarding his
administration. One of Barnas arguments pictured Habibie as a direct continuation of
Suharto.45 It looks like the establishment of FURKON was in response to the existence of
Barnas which intentionally tried to de-legitimate Habibies presidency.
Regarding the 1999 general elections, the MUI issued three taushiah or
recommendations. The first was issued on 29 April 1999, two months before the elections
which were held on 7 June 1999. It is remarkable, the habit of the MUI to issue
statements or taushiah in every round of elections. It started in 1977 when the MUI gave
a statement concerning the general elections, and it continued in every election held by
the New Order regime. Comparing all statements of the MUI in the general elections
under the New Order, it can be said that those statements were issued because of pressure
of the government in order to get the legitimacy from the ulama. However, after the
collapse of Suhartos regime in 1998 it remains the question why the MUI still issues
statements. The government was not as powerful as it used to be in the Suharto era and
43

For complete content see Pernyataan Sikap Furkon, Mimbar Ulama, No.242, October 1998, p. 13;
see also Kees van Dijk, A Country in Despair, Indonesia between 1997 and 2000, p. 335.
44
Ibid, pp. 334-335.
45
B.J. Habibie, Detik-Detik Yang Menentukan, Jalan Panjang Indonesia Menuju Demokrasi
(Jakarta, THC Mandiri, 2006), p. 153-154.

51

with the guarantee of freedom of the speech the MUI can take a more independent
position than before.
To answer that question, let us take a look at the three taushiah. The first, which
was issued on 29 April, was entitled Himbauan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Untuk
Suksesnya Pemilihan Umum 1999 or MUIs Appeal for the Success of the 1999 General
Elections. This appeal consisted of several items, such as stating the importance of the
1999 general elections and how it would contribute to the solution of the crisis. It also
emphasized that by participating in the 1999 general elections, the voters decide the
future of the nation and the struggle of the ummah (perjuangan umat). The appeal also
suggested to the people, especially to Muslims, to think and select the best party
competent to lead the nation. The next appeal concerned the security matters that
Muslims should be aware of; the possible negative effects of the election and that they
should restrain themselves from participating in any activities endangering the interest of
the ummah and the nation. The taushiah ended with an invitation to pray to God in the
hope that the elections would be peaceful and successful, voting in a national leader who
can bring respect to the ummah.46
From the content, we can describe this taushiah as general, because it does not
give an endorsement to any one party or candidate. We can compare this taushiah to the
one issued in 1977. As was mentioned in chapter one, the MUI statement regarding the
1977 general elections was written in a general way, it did not give any specific
endorsement either to the government or to the parties. The reason why the MUI did not
give any specific support in 1977 was the strong position of political Islam. Assuredly,
the situation was different afterwards when the MUI gave unanimous support to the
government from the 1982 general elections to the 1997 general elections. Furthermore,
the political situation of Indonesia in 1999, when the power of the government was
weaker, plausibly stimulated the MUI to issue a taushiah regarding general elections in
April with a general tone, not in favour of any specific parties or the government as was
the case from 1982 to 1997.

46

Himbauan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Untuk Suksesnya Pemilihan Umum 1999, Mimbar Ulama,
No.248, April 1999, p. 30.

52

The next taushiah was issued on 20 May 1999, with the title Taushiah Dewan
Pimpinan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Menyongsong Pemilu 1999 or Advice of the MUI
Central Board Leading up to the 1999 Elections. This taushiah was signed by the MUI
chairman, Ali Yafie, on 20 May 1999; however, the publication was not in May but in
June together with the third taushiah. The taushiah itself contains six points: First,
proclaim all elements of the nation to support a democratic, trustworthy, fair and peaceful
election and prevent any attempt of disturbance in order to create chaos. Second, insist
that all elements of the nation, particularly Muslims, use their votes as responsible
citizens by choosing a party which is believed to be capable of struggling for the
aspiration and betterment of all. Third, insist that Muslims prioritize Islamic brotherhood
as well as avoid any conflicts and friction. Fourth, insist that the leaders of Islamic parties
and Muslim-based parties should prioritise the spirit of competition for the good and
prevent sectarian egotism. Fifth, insist that the entire nation, especially the Ummah,
should be cautious of the latent danger of Communism and the PKI; and sixth, the
Ummah should pray that Indonesia will be safe from disaster and calamities.47
The tone of the second taushiah looks the same as the first one in terms of not
giving an endorsement to any party; it just encouraged Muslims to participate in the
elections and vote for the best party that can fight for their interests. The other points also
did not give any explicit words endorsing the government or such. However, we can
differentiate this taushiah from the taushiah or statements of the MUI in the New Orders
general elections. In the 1999 general elections, the MUI started to mention Islamic
parties, not parties in general. In the New Order era, the MUI never mentioned any
Islamic party in particular; it just mentioned parties and Golkar (Partai peserta pemilu
dan Golkar) such as in the statement of the MUI regarding the 1977 general elections.
This also happened in the other general elections (from 1982 to 1997) when there were
no specific statements regarding Islamic parties. Possibly, why the MUI never mentioned
Islamic parties in the New Order era was because of the governments policy, especially
since 1983 when the New Order imposed Pancasila as the sole foundation for all social
and political organisations. In the Reformation era, this situation changed after many
47

Taushiah Dewan Pimpinan Majelis Ulama Indonesia Menyongsong Pemilu 1999, Mimbar Ulama,
No.250, June 1999. Most of the translations were taken from Nur Ichwan, Ulama State and Politics: MUI
after Suharto, p. 58.

53

Islamic parties were reborn such as the PBB (Crescent Moon and Star Party), PK (Justice
Party), PKB (National Awakening Part), and PAN (National Mandate Party).48 Probably,
based on this political constellation, the MUI started to speak to Islamic parties with a
religious approach.
This taushiah was strengthened by the next one which was issued on 1 June 1999,
exactly six days before the elections. The taushiah was entitled Amanat Umat Islam
Menyongsong Pemilu 7 Juni 1999 or An Instruction to the Ummah Leading up to the
Elections of 7 June 1999. Compared to other MUI taushiah or statements regarding the
elections, the 1 June taushiah can be defined as the most controversial one. The taushiah
began by expressing gratefulness to God by the MUI board and the chairmen of the
central boards of Islamic organisations for the blessing and for the peacefulness of the
most important process of democratisation, the elections. The statement also asserted that
the MUI board, along with the other Islamic organisations, considered voting a mandate
from the voters given to a reliable person who can be trusted to carry out their aspirations.
For that reason and referring to the Koran 3: 28:
Let not the believers take those who deny the truth for the allies in preference to the
believers since he who does this cuts himself off from God in everything unless it is
to protect yourselves against them in this way. But God warns you to be aware of Him:
for with God is all journeys end,

the MUI board issued a mandate stating: First, to suggest that the Indonesian nation,
especially Muslims, should use their voting rights in a correct and responsible manner
according to their innermost heart by voting for the political party that is believed to be
able to struggle for the aspirations and interests of the Muslims, nation and state. Second,
to suggest that Muslims should vote in a sincere manner, and with the intention of
obeying God, for one of the political parties that puts forward serious Muslim candidates,
48

There was also PPP or United Development Party which also participated in the general elections
in the New Order era. Besides those parties mentioned, there were also several small parties which can be
defined as Islamic parties. Most of them were using Islam as their foundation except PKB and PAN.
However, these two parties (PKB and PKB) have a strong connection to the Islamic community, PKB with
Nahdlatul Ulama and PAN with Muhammadiyah. For that reason, I categorized PKB and PAN as Islamic
parties. See Anies Rasyid Baswedan, Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory, Asian
Survey, Vol. 44, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2004), pp. 669-690.

54

and those who possess good moral character. Third, to suggest that Muslims should be on
guard against the return of Communism, authoritarianism and a secularist government by
means of political parties that have an incipient hatred of Islam and the glory of the
Republic of Indonesia, and fourth, to suggest that Muslims surrender to God and pray that
the election will be conducted in a peaceful, democratic, just and honest manner, so that
the Indonesian nation can rid itself of various crises and place the new Indonesian society
in the shelter of Gods blessing.49
From the tauhiah above, we can see how conspicuous the preference of the MUI
for Islamic parties was. First, it suggests that Muslims vote for political parties that are
believed to be able to fight for Muslim interests. This statement was explained by the
second point, that the parties which represented the interests of the Muslims and their
struggle were the political parties that had Muslim candidates. Assuredly, this was an
indication that the MUI recommended Muslims to vote for Islamic parties and not for
other parties, and especially not to vote for the PDI-P (the Indonesian Democratic Party
of Struggle). As stated by Nur Ichwan, this taushiah was meant to block the PDI-P,
which was led by Megawati Sukarno Putri, from winning the election. According to the
MUI, most of the PDI-P candidates were non Muslims. That is why the MUI used the
dichotomy of Non-Muslim Muslim in its taushiah in order to win the Muslim vote for
the Islamic parties.50
On the other hand, this taushiah can be used to explain the return of politik aliran
or political stream in the 1999 general elections. The term politik aliran was originally
used by Clifford Geertz in his book The Social History of an Indonesian Town. He
explained this term as a social movement, an ideologically defined political faction
animated by rather far-reaching moral ambitions.51 The manifestation of politik aliran
was shown in the 1955 general election when santri (Muslims) preferred to choose
Masyumi or Nahdlatul Ulama and abangan favoured PNI or PKI.52 The taushiah of the
49

Mimbar Ulama, No.250, June 1999, p. 27. The translation was taken from Nur Ichwan, Ulama
State and Politics: MUI after Suharto, p. 57.
50
Ibid, p. 57.
51
Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge, the MIT Press, 1965), p.
127.
52
Ibid, p. 128; the term abangan refers to Muslims but more inclined to the animistic aspect in
Javanese tradition, while santri refers to more devout Muslims who apply Islamic teachings in a strict way.
See Clifford Geertz, Religion of Java (Illinois, Free Press, 1960), p. 1-7. Regarding Politik Aliran in the

55

MUI which advised Muslims only to vote for Muslim candidates was clearly seen as an
instance of Geertzs term politik aliran. With the use of a Quranic verse which explicitly
states that Muslims must only work with other Muslims, the MUI tried to persuade
Muslims to vote for Islamic parties using their religious background. If we scrutinize the
statements of the MUI in the general elections during the New Order era, this kind of
preference that Muslims should vote for Muslim candidates was never mentioned before.
Not even in the 1977 general elections when the political Islam could be defined as
strong. The 1999 general elections were the first time the MUI used the word Islamic
parties and obviously supported their struggle in the general elections.
With these facts we can compare and differentiate the statements of the MUI
regarding the general elections in the New Order era and the one from the Reformation
era. In the first chapter we have seen that most of MUIs statements regarding the general
elections in the New Order era were supporting the government, mostly by mentioning
MUIs endorsement of President Suharto. Only in the statement regarding the 1977
general elections did the MUI not give its unanimous support but only a general
explanation with reference to the importance of the general elections. However, in the
Reformation era, after Suharto fell from power, the MUI taushiah regarding the general
elections was in support of Islamic parties. This is shown in the three taushiah
concerning the 1999 general elections. The first was defined as general, but the two
others clearly referred to Islamic parties and recommended that Muslims only vote for
them.
Furthermore, the inclination of the MUI toward Islam can actually be seen once
Habibie replaced Suharto as president. This can be seen in MUIs taushiah defending
Habibie saying that his presidency was a mandate from the God. Another indication can
be seen in the FURKON movement which was organised by the MUI. FURKON was
mainly used to defend Habibies presidency, especially from the movement that
demanded Habibie steps down.

1999 general election see among others Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002; Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (eds.), Election in Indonesia,
The ew Order and Beyond (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Dwight Y. King, Electoral Institutions and
the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (London, Praeger, 2003).

56

In addition, we can notice the effectiveness of the MUI taushiah regarding the
1999 general elections by looking at the results of the elections, especially in terms of
which party won the elections and how the position of Islamic parties is. According to the
election results, the 1999 general elections were won by PDI-P, a party of which the MUI
claimed that most of its candidates were non-Muslims. As mentioned before, one of
MUIs aims of issuing the taushiah in the 1999 general elections was to hamper the
chance of PDI-P to win. However, it looks like this purpose was never achieved; PDI-P
successfully won the elections despite the taushiah recommending that Muslims only
vote for Muslim candidates.
Another factor which possibly contributed to the victory of the PDI-P in the 1999
general elections was the issue of women as president which was never touched by the
MUI. It is well known that the PDI-P was led by a woman, Megawati Sukarno Putri. At
that moment there was a debate, mostly within the Islamic community, whether women
were allowed to become president. Some Islamic hardliners such as MMI (Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia) and FPI (Front Pembela Islam) publicly refused female leadership.
The MUI seemed to ignore this important issue and kept silent.53
The MUI taushiah in the 1999 general elections was ineffective and the election
was won by secular parties. The election result also indicated that Islamic parties were
not the favourites compared to the secular ones. This can be seen in the election results,
where the top two positions were occupied by secular parties, the first by the PDI-P with
34% of the votes, and the second by the Golkar party with 22%. Islamic parties were on
number four, represented by PKB with 12%, number five by the PPP with 10% and
below that PAN with 7%.54

53

For more detailed information on the debate see Sonja van Wichelen, Contesting Megawati: The
Mediation of Islam and Nation in Times of Political Transition, Westminster Papers in Communication
and Culture, 2006 (University of Westminster, London), Vol. 3(2): 41-59.
54
William Liddle, Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored, Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 1, A
Survey of Asia in 1999 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 32-42.

57

CHAPTER THREE
MUIS ATTITUDES I THE 2004 AD 2009 GEERAL ELECTIOS

The previous chapter dealt with the attitudes of the MUI in the Reformation era as
well as in the 1999 general elections. In comparison to the attitudes of the MUI in the
general elections during the New Order era, which were described in the first chapter, we
learned that the 1999 general elections were different in the sense that MUI did not give
full support to the government. In the 1999 general elections, the MUI started to endorse
Islamic parties.
This chapter specifically deals with the attitudes of the MUI in the 2004 and 2009
general elections. The aim of this chapter is to find the trajectories of the MUI toward
these two recent elections. What are the similarities and the differences between the
attitudes of the MUI in the general elections during the New Order regime and the 1999
general elections? Before exploring those issues, it is worth noting that we must have an
understanding of the position of the MUI in the post-New Order era. By giving this
background we can estimate the factors which influence the position of the MUI in the
general elections.

A. MUIs Attitude in the Post-Suharto Era

The position of Islam in general and the MUI in particular in the post-Suharto era
was determined by the political shift in the Reformation era in 1998. As we know, on 21
May 1998 there were massive student demonstrations which demanded President Suharto
to resign, which was followed by destruction to many business centres. This condition
forced Suharto to step down from his presidency and eventually appoint his vice
president, B.J Habibie, as the next Indonesian president. Surely, considering the political
landscape at that time, Habibie had to compromise and he changed the system of
authoritarian politics which was used for about 32 years by Suharto and his New Order
regime to be a country with a real democratic system. In order to be a democratic country,
Habibie made major political shifts, such as the use of a multi-party system, the
withdrawal of Pancasila as its sole foundation, the removal of the restriction of the
freedom of expression (including the right of the government to allow and forbid mass

58

media from publishing), changing the parliamentary system, limiting the period of
presidential term to two periods, and so on.1
Moreover, Habibies decision to implement a multi-party system stimulated the
founding of many new parties, including Islamic parties. It was reported that initially
there were more than 200 new parties, a number which was narrowed down with the
announcement that only 48 parties were eligible to participate in the 1999 general
elections.
The establishment or the rebirth of Islamic parties can be interpreted as the
opening of Pandoras box. The last time real Islamic parties were allowed to act freely
was during Sukarnos time in office. The 1955 general elections were evidence of the
emergence of Islamic parties. The elections itself were won by a secular party, PNI, with
22.3% of the votes, followed by Masyumi in the second place with 20.9%, the NU party
in the third place with 18.4%, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) with 16.4% in
the fourth place.2
After Soeharto became president in 1968, he started to limit the existence of
Islamic parties and only allowed a few of them to participate in the 1971 general
elections.3 Eventually, in 1973, he decided to amalgamate all Islamic parties into one
party that is called United Development Party (PPP). From this point onward, Suharto
restricted Islamic political activism and only allowed it in more organisational activities
without a political agenda (this can be seen in the establishment of the MUI). The
situation worsened when Suharto banned the use of Kabah as the symbol of the PPP and
forced all organisations, including political parties, to use Pancasila as their only
ideology. From this standpoint it becomes clear that Islamic political activism (Islamic
parties) was not allowed to exist during the New Order period.
However, this political situation ultimately changed after Habibie decided to
apply a multi-party system in the 1999 general elections. Many parties emerged, and
from the 48 parties that participated in the elections, fourteen were considered to be
1

For detailed reading see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, The Habibie Presidency in Geoff Forrester (Ed.),
Post Suharto?, Renewal or Chaos (Singapore, KITLV and ISEAS, 1999), pp. 33-47.
2
For a more complete analysis see Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia's First National Election: A
Sociological Analysis, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Apr., 1957), pp.
237-249.
3
See chapter one.

59

Islamic parties. Among them were Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB, Crescent Moon and Star
Party), a party which was claimed to be the descendant of Masyumi from 1955, Partai
Keadilan (PK, Justice Party), Partai Kebangkitan Umat (PKU, Community Awakening
Party) and PPP (which changed its foundation from Pancasila to Islam).4
Besides these parties which were open about the fact that their ideology was Islam,
there were also two parties which were officially based on Pancasila but had a very
strong association with the Muslim community. These parties were Partai Amanat
$asional (National Mandate Party) led by Amien Rais, the former chairman of
Muhammadiyah, and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) which was
led by Abdurrahman Wahid, the former chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. These two parties
were declared open parties and did not engage exclusively with the Muslim community,
however, in reality, they were strongly connected to and had their roots in
Muhammadiyah (PAN) and Nahdlatul Ulama (PKB). The emergence of Islamic parties
and parties with strong Islamic values can be seen as the awakening of the underground
power of Islamic political activism which was suppressed for 32 years under Suhartos
rule. With the dawn of the new era called the Reformation era, when freedom of
expression was guaranteed and with less (or no more) restrictions than during the New
Order, political Islam got its freedom which was channelled through the establishment of
Islamic parties. To some extent the 1999 general elections were similar to the 1955
general elections in terms of the participation of the Islamic parties. Several scholars
concluded that politik aliran had re-emerged and determined the voting behaviour in the
1999 general elections. This situation was certainly the same as the political landscape in
the 1955 general elections when politik aliran was obvious.5

. See among others Charles U. Zenzie, Indonesia's New Political Spectrum, Asian Survey, Vol. 39,
No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1999), pp. 243-264; R. William Liddle, Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored,
Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1999 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 32-42.
5
Regarding the comparison of the 1999 general elections and the 1955 general elections see among
others Leo Suryadinata, Elections and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2002; Anies Rasyid Baswedan, Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory, Asian Survey,
Vol. 44, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2004), pp. 669-690; Hans Antlov and Sven Cederroth (eds.), Election in
Indonesia, The $ew Order and Beyond (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Dwight Y. King, Electoral
Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (London, Praeger, 2003); Marcus Mietzner,
Comparing Indonesias party system of the 1950s and the post-Suharto era: From centrifugal to centripetal
inter-party competition, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 39(3), pp. 431-453.

60

The power of Islamic parties in this period was clearly visible in the presidential
elections held by People Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1999. An alliance of the
Islamic parties (including the parties with strong relations to the Muslim community,
PAN and PKB) and a Golkar party named Poros Tengah (Central Axis) was successful in
getting Abdurrahman Wahid elected as the fourth president. This success was interesting
because it happened despite the fact that none of these Islamic parties won the 1999
general elections; and that it was the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P,
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan) lead by the daughter of Sukarno, Megawati
Sukarno Putri, that won the election.
The emergence of Islamic parties in this period brought up the idea of Indonesia
as Islamic state again, which had been hampered during the independence period and in
the Constitutional Assembly in 1955. This idea had never come out throughout the New
Order era as a result of Suhartos policy to restrict any movement related to Islamic
political activism. This revival movement of inserting the Jakarta Charter in the
Indonesian constitution was proposed by the PPP and PBB.6 However, with the limited
number of seats they had in the parliament, and also without support from the two biggest
Islamic organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, they failed to
pass the idea of the Islamic state.7
In addition to the above events, the post-New Order period was also noted as the
revival of Islamic radicalism.8 Several Islamic groups which can be categorised as radical
or militant were established during this period. Some of the most prominent ones are
6

This debate can be traced back to the dispute among the Indonesian founding fathers in the
independence period. Mostly there were two different interests at that time. The first came from the Islamic
groups such as those who supported the establishment of Indonesia as an Islamic State, and the second
came from nationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta who supported the idea of Indonesia
as a secular state. The dispute was settled with the formation of the Jakarta Charter. The charter itself
consisted of five principles, the same as the five principles of Pancasila we read about earlier, with the
difference on the first principle, it says that (Indonesia is founded on) The Belief in God, with the
obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law. However, after seeing the diversity of Indonesia,
the founding fathers compromised and decided to delete those words which stipulated Indonesia as
anIslamic state. For more complete information see B.J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern
Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 7-39.
7
For further reading concerning the debate see Nadirsyah Hosen, Religion and the Indonesian
Constitution: A Recent Debate , Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 36 (3), October 2005, pp. 419440.
8
Regarding the development of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia see Martin van Bruinessen,
Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia, South East Asia Research, 10, 2, pp. 117
154; Greg Fealy, Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?, Southeast Asian Affairs 2004
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), pp. 104-121.

61

Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defenders Front)9 which was established on August
1998 in Jakarta, and Laskar Jihad, a paramilitary group which was a division of the
Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (Communication Forum of the Followers
of the Sunna and the Community of the Prophet), established in Solo, Central Java on
February 14, 1999.10 Both of them were notorious because of their paramilitary actions
such as sweeping bars, discotheques and cafes during Ramadan. According to Van
Bruinessen, the emergence of these radical groups in the post-New Order cannot be
separated from the Habibies effort in gathering Islamic support during his presidency.11
As mentioned in the second chapter, in the era of Habibie as president we can find
several Islamic groups including FURKON which was initiated by the MUI to give
support and legitimacy to Habibies presidency. The creation of such radical groups was
part of Habibies strategy to guard his government against attacks from those who
disagreed with the presidency. There was even information reporting that high-ranking
military officers, most notably General Wiranto, were behind the establishment of the
FPI.12
Another conspicuous indication of the development of radical Islam during this
period were the bomb-attacks in several important places in Indonesia. One of the first
bomb-attacks occurred in the embassy of the Philippines, which killed the ambassador,
Leonides T Caday, in 2000. This incident was followed by many other attacks, they
happened almost every year. The worst one was the bomb attack that happened on 12
October 2002 on the island of Bali, which killed more than 200 people, mostly tourists

Regarding Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defenders Front) see Jajang Jahroni, Defending the
Majesty, Indonesias Front Pembela Islam, 1998-2003 (Chiang Mai, Asian Muslim Action Network, 2008).
10
For detailed information on Laskar Jihad see Noorhaidi Hasan, Faith and Politics: The Rise of
the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia , Indonesia, Vol. 73 (Apr., 2002), pp. 145-169;
Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad; Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-$ew Order Indonesia
(New York, Cornell University, 2006); Michael Davis, Laskar Jihad and the Political Position of
Conservative Islam in Indonesia, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 24, Number 1, April 2002, pp.
12-32.
11
Martin Van Bruinessen, Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia, p. 150.
12
Robert W. Hefner, Muslims Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto Indonesia in
Robert W. Hefner (Ed.), Remaking Muslims Politics; Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization (Princeton
and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 285.

62

from Australia. This attack was believed to be conducted by Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), a
violent Islamist group in Southeast Asia.13
All above facts give us the impression that there was a shift in Indonesian Islam
after the New Order era. From previous chapters we can see that during the first decade
of the New Order era until the late 1980s, Islamic political activism was severely
restrained by the government. Only a few Islamic organisations, among which the MUI
(which was mainly established to support the governments programmes), were allowed
to exist, but they were forbidden to be active in political matters. This situation changed
in the early 1990s, when Suharto turned to use Islam as his central backbone in order to
support his presidency. This effect can be seen through the establishment of Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals).
This shift took place as a result of the conflict between Suharto and the military, which
had been his main supporter during his presidency in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, the political shift of Suharto in the 1990s which accommodated Islamic
political activism stimulated the emergence of radical Islam in the post New Order period.
With the chance of more political freedom during 1990s, Islamic political activism
gathered its supporters and showed its strength once again. The rebirth of Islamic parties
as well as the proposal to reinsert the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian constitution was
an undeniable aspect of this shift. In addition to that, the establishment of several Islamic
radical groups and the terrorist attacks was also important evidence which showed that
Indonesian Islam in post-New Order times had changed and become more militant and
radical.
Assuredly, the change of Indonesian Islam influenced the attitude of the MUI in
the post-New Order period. In the following paragraphs, I propose two different
arguments for the changes within the MUI after Suharto resigned from his presidency.
The first one is that the attitude of the MUI in the post-New Order period was more
inclined to the Islam-based movements, either for the interest of the Islamic community
or for Islamic radical groups. We can see this shift in the 1999 general elections. As
13

For further information on Jamaah Islamiyah see International Crisis Group report, Indonesia
Backgrounder:
How
The
Jemaah
Islamiyah
Terrorist
$etwork
Operates,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400845_11122002.pdf
[Accessed:
5
December 2009]; See also Greg Barton, Indonesias Struggle, Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam (Sydney,
UNSW Press, 2004).

63

explained in the second chapter, the position of the MUI in the 1999 general elections
was to support Islamic parties by issuing a taushiah advising Muslims in Indonesia to
vote for Muslim candidates. This position was different from MUIs position in the New
Order era when most of its statements were geared towards endorsing the government.
Another indication are several occasions such as in the aftermath of the US
military invasion of Afghanistan. The MUI, along with several Islamic organisations,
called for a boycott on all American products and for jihad. This movement was mainly
voiced by the Secretary General of the MUI at the time, Din Syamsuddin. 14 This
demonstration was given extra emphasis by a statement (Pernyataan Sikap) of the MUI
and several other Islamic organisations concerning the US invasion of Afghanistan. This
statement contained five points: the first condemned the invasion. The second urged the
United Nations to stop the invasion and sanction the US for its actions. The third urged
the Indonesian government to condemn the invasion and cut off diplomatic relations
between Indonesia and the United States. The fourth, as the call for jihad was issued by
the MUI and the other Islamic organisations before, encouraged Muslims all over the
world and the Islamic community in Indonesia to act accordingly in condemning the US
invasion and other necessary actions to help the suffering of the Afghan people. And the
fifth and last encouraged Muslims in the world to pray to God for the sake of Muslims in
general and the Afghan people in particular.15
In addition to the call for jihad related to the foreign issue, the MUI also issued a
statement concerning jihad in a local context, particularly regarding the conflict in the
14

Kees van Dijk, Labelling Indonesian and Malaysian Islam, in Eva Strifeneder and Antje
Missbach, Indonesia-the Presence of the Past, A festschrift in honour of Ingris Wessel (Berlin,
Regiospectra, 2007), p. 234; However, according to Din Syamsuddin, his decision to have a close
relationship with the radical group did not represent his support for that radical movement. Din emphasised
that he is a proponent of Indonesia as a secular state not as an Islamic one. He gave an example of his
decision to follow the international conference on khilafah organised by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in
August 2007 in Jakarta. He mentioned that his participation did not mean he agrees with the HTIs
objective to establish Indonesia as a caliphate state, but as an effort to accommodate this kind of thought in
Indonesia, and make them aware that this system is not appropriate for use in Indonesia. Interview with Din
Syamsuddin, Leiden, 7 November 2009. This contradiction was probably caused by Din Syamsuddins
pragmatic approach to accommodate both hardliners and moderate Islam.
15
Some representatives of radical Islamic groups for instance KISDI and Laskar Jihad, signed the
statement, while NU and Muhammadiyah did not sign. However, it is interesting to see the fact that
Muslimat, an umbrella organisation of NU, signed the statement. This case shows how fragmented the
Muslim community is in dealing with the issue of the US invasion of Afghanistan. See Pernyataan Sikap
Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) dan Organisasi Islam di Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 278, October
2001, pp. 28-29.

64

Moluccas between the Muslims and the Christians. As we know that in 2000, thousands
of members of Laskar Jihad flew to the Moluccas in order to assist Moluccan Muslims in
fighting their Christian counterparts. This jihad itself created a debate among Indonesian
Muslims; most of them. Including the two biggest Islamic organisations in Indonesia,
Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, rejected such action.16 The statement of the MUI
was issued when the Indonesian army attacked the medical clinic of Laskar Jihad in
Kebun Cengkeh, a place where the Laskar Jihad fighters concentrated, on 24 June 2001.
The attack killed twenty four Laskar Jihad fighters and wounded thirty-four others.17
Based on this incident, the MUI issued a statement condemning the attack and blaming
the commander of the Komando Daerah (Kodam, Regional Military Command)
Pattimura, I Made Yasa, of being fully responsible for the attack. The MUI then urged the
central military command to bring I Made Yasa in front of a military court. The MUI
further used this statement to threaten the government that if the government did not react
to the statement, then the MUI would proclaim I Made Yasa the slaughterer of the
Islamic community.18
Another sign of the shift of the MUI towards radical Islam is related to the MUI
fatwa regarding pluralism, liberalism and secularism. This fatwa was the result of the
national conference of the MUI on 26-29 July 2005. Along with this fatwa, the MUI also
issued 10 other fatwas on issues such as interreligious marriage, women as imam of ritual
prayers, the position of the Ahmadiyah sect, and so on. 19 In particular, the fatwa on
pluralism, liberalism and secularism determined that these three concepts were against
Islamic teachings. Therefore, the MUI decided that Muslims are forbidden to
acknowledge the concepts of pluralism, liberalism and secularism. 20 This fatwa was

16

See Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad; Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-$ew
Order Indonesia, p.185-193.
17
Ibid, p. 203.
18
Pernyataan Sikap Pimpinan Organisasi/Lembaga Islam Tingkat Pusat, Mimbar Ulama, no. 274,
Juni 2001, pp. 24-25.
19
See Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Fatwa Munas VII Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Jakarta, MUI, 2005);
See also MUI website http://www.mui.or.id/files/07-Fat%20Munas-Pluralisme.pdf [Accessed: 5 December
2009].

20

According to Din Syamsuddin, the vice chairman of the MUI, there was a debate within the MUI
whether it was necessary or not to issue a fatwa regarding pluralism, liberalism and secularism. Some
members of the MUI who only received traditional education from pesantren urged that it was needed to
issue the fatwa, and others who had received secular education like himself felt that it was unnecessary for
the MUI to issue a fatwa on the controversial issue. However, because most of the fatwa commission

65

considered to be controversial, and many Muslim activists including several Muslim

scholars and also the chairman of PBNU, Hasyim Muzadi, reacted strongly to this fatwa.
Through official website of the PBNU, Hasyim Muzadi stated that the MUI fatwa
regarding pluralism, liberalism and secularism was unclear and confused Muslim
society.21 However, even though much criticism emerged insisting on the withdrawal of
the fatwa, the MUI still persisted in its opinion and determined pluralism, liberalism and
secularism to be forbidden.22
All the information above provides us with a clear picture of the shift in the
attitude of the MUI in the post-New Order period. The new MUI was now strongly
inclined towards the interests of the Muslim community, particularly on the political
agenda of militant Islam. The call for jihad which was continued in the statement
condemning the US invasion and urging the Indonesian government to cut off all
diplomatic relations with the US indicated that the MUI accommodated the interests of
the radical Islamic group. Moreover, the MUI statement that supported the Laskar Jihad
movement in the Moluccas was also indisputable evidence of the fact that the MUI was
sympathetic towards radical groups, especially Laskar Jihad. These attitudes were
affirmed by the fatwa on pluralism, secularism and liberalism, which positioned the MUI
among the hard-liners vis--vis moderate Islam represented by organisations such as
Nahdlatul Ulama which refused to acknowledge the fatwa on pluralism, secularism and
liberalism.
The second change of the MUI is that after the New Order era the MUI started to
distance itself from the government. There were several taushiah and fatwas of the MUI
members were from pesantren, they were successful in formulating the fatwa that pluralism, secularism
and liberalism are forbidden. Interview with Din Syamsuddin, Leiden, 7 November 2009.
21
There were at least three fatwas of the MUI which were opposed by NU. The first was the fatwa
on pluralism, liberalism and secularism. NU thought that these three concepts are debatable. Many
differences on the semantic definition led to disagreement among people. NU then urged the MUI to revise
and define it more clearly than before. Secondly, NU objected on the fatwa regarding the interfaith prayer
(doa lintas agama). According to PBNU, it is acceptable for Muslims to join interfaith prayer even if the
leader (imam) is not Muslim. The Muslim can respect the prayer and using al fatihah to follow it. The third
was on interfaith marriage, the NU insisted that this issue was no longer debatable since the Indonesian law
has managed it through civil marriage. See Tanggapan PBNU atas fatwa MUI, Sinergi Indonesia, 32/III,
November 2005, p. 57; http://www.nu.or.id/page.php?lang=id&menu=news_view&news_id=3591
[Accessed: 5 December 2009].

22
Walau Sebagian Kecil Mengecam, MUI Tetap Pilih Cara-Cara Bijak Dan Terpuji, Mimbar
Ulama, no. 323, Juli 2005, p. 6; For a detailed account on the debate see Piers Gillespie, Current Issues in
Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama Fatwa no. 7 Opposing Pluralism,
Liberalism and Secularism, Journal of Islamic Studies 18:2 (2007) pp. 202240.

66

which showed this shift. Among others was the MUI taushiah which focused on the
position of the MUI regarding the existence of communist/Marxist thought in Indonesia
which was issued in March 2000. This taushiah was issued after the Indonesian president
at the time, Abdurrahman Wahid, suggested that the Peoples Consultative Assembly
(MPR) would annul the decision of the MPR from 1966 which banned Marxism in
Indonesia. This suggestion was reacted to by the MUI saying that communism was
against Pancasila and its followers had threatened the Muslim community. Based on this
notion, the MUI issued a taushiah which mainly advised the House of Representatives
(DPR) to reject any proposal that would threaten Indonesia as a nation. This statement
refers to the idea of Communism which was assumed by the MUI to endanger
Indonesia.23 The opinion of the MUI on this issue can be seen in the Mimbar Ulama,
April edition, which dedicated a lot of its space to the discussion of the threat of
Communism to Indonesian society. In fact, we can know this opinion before we read the
whole article, because it was written on the front page with bold letters that the Islamic
society refuses Communism (Umat Islam Menolak Komunisme).
Other evidence is the MUI fatwa about the issue of monosodium glutamate
(MSG), a popular seasoning product manufactured by a Japanese company, Ajinomoto.
In this fatwa, the MUI claimed that after the examination made by the LPPOM MUI
(Institute of Food, Medication and Cosmetics Research), it was found that from June
1999 up to November 2000 Ajinomoto had used bacto soytone, which has a pig enzyme,
in its product (MSG). Based on this assessment, the MUI decided that the seasoning
products of Ajinonoto are haram (forbidden) to consume. 24 However, this fatwa was
opposed by the Indonesian President of that time, Abdurrahman Wahid. He stated that
according to another research made by several universities and the department of health,
the seasoning product did not have pig enzyme, therefore he rejected the claim of the
MUI fatwa that Ajinomoto seasoning is forbidden. On the other hand, Wahid insisted that
the fatwa would ruin the economy because Ajinomoto investments were worth more than

23

Sikap Majelis Ulama Indonesian Tentang Keberadaan Ajaran Komunisme/Marxisme-Leninisme

di Wilayah $egara Republik Indonesia, Mimbar Ulama, no. 260, April 2000, pp. 28-29.
24
Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Tentang Produk Penyedap Rasa Monosodium
Glutamate (MSG) dari PT. Ajinomoto Indonesia yang Menggunakan Bacto Soytone, Mimbar Ulama, no.
269, Januari 2001, pp. 18-19.

67

$ 1.3 Billion. 25 The objection of President Wahid did not change MUIs view about
annulling the fatwa, because after this statement the MUI made a press conference and
persisted that its fatwa was based on a correct assessment and that the MUI had issued a
correct decision.26
The most conspicuous indication that the MUI had distanced itself from the
government happened during the national conference in Jakarta on 25-29 July 2000. At
that conference it was decided that the MUI would change several of its statutes. The first
one was related to its foundation; the MUI changed it from Pancasila to Islam. The
second was concerned the function of the MUI, it emphasized the independence of the
MUI by saying that the MUI is a religious, social and independent organisation. This
means the MUI is not part of the government or any other organisation. Another essential
change was related to the structural board of the MUI. From the time the MUI was
established, there was a board called Dewan Pelindung (Protectors Council). One of the
tasks of the Dewan Pelindung was to give protection and guidance to the MUI. It was
stated that the Dewan Pelindung of the MUI central board was the president, the Dewan
Pelindung of the MUI provincial board was the governor and the Dewan Pelindung on
the district level was the Bupati (regency governor) or Walikota (mayor). The conference
then decided that the Protectors Council was no longer needed. The second change was
about the Dewan Pertimbangan (Consideration Council). Before, this position was
chaired ex officio by the Minister of Religious Affairs. This council was also eliminated.
As a change from these two councils, the congress decided to make a new board named
Dewan Penasihat (Advisory Council). The difference between the new boards and the
old one is the absence of government representatives. The advisory council would be
made up of independent people or ulama.27
The above evidence provides us with the understanding that the MUI has shifted
its attitudes from supporting the governmental programmes in the New Order era to a
more distant and independent stance. This can be seen in the attitudes of the MUI
25

Produk Ajinomoto Haram, http://www.tempo.co.id/fokus56/2,1,21,id.html [Accessed: 9 December

2009].

26
Tetap
Haram
meski
tak
Ditemukan
Pada
http://www.tempo.co.id/fokus56/2,1,34,id.html [Accessed: 9 December 2009].
27
Mimbar Ulama, no. 264, Agustus 2000, pp. 6-8.

Produk

Akhir,

68

throughout the Wahid presidency, when most of its positions were far from supportive of
the governments programmes. The changes in several of the MUI statutes at its national
conference in 2000 also gives us undeniable proof that the MUI started to become more
independent by eliminating several elements of the government which were usually
attached to the MUI board. This information presents us with the important
understanding that the MUI attitudes in the post-New Order era were quite distant from
the government, instead leaning towards the Muslim hardliners in Indonesia.

B. The MUI and the 2004 General Elections

Indonesia in 2004 can be considered a new and truly democratic country. This
statement is based on the new system of general elections which were organised
differently from the previous elections held throughout Indonesian history. Not only did
the 2004 general elections not consist of one election, it instead consisted of three rounds
of elections. The first was the election which was held on 5 April 2004, which was meant
for choosing the members of the House of Representatives (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat). The second, also held on 5 April, was meant for choosing the members of the
Regional Representative Council (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah). The DPD is a new
council which did not exist before. It comprises of senate-like members, representatives
from all provinces in Indonesia. Each province has four representatives. One of the
functions of the DPD is to be the consultative body to the DPR by giving
recommendations concerning the creation of new laws (Undang-Undang) involving the
interests of the regions or provinces.28 The third round of elections was the presidential
election which was held on 5 July 2004. Assuredly, this presidential election was the first
time the Indonesian people were to vote for their President directly. Before, since the Old
Order and mostly under the New Order, the Indonesian president was elected by the
Peoples Consultative Assembly (MPR). After Suharto resigned from his presidency in
1998, the political situation changed and the 1945 Constitution was amended. This
affected the political system in Indonesia; one of the results of the amendment was the
direct presidential elections.

28

Leonard C. Sebastian, The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy, Contemporary Southeast Asia 26,
no. 2 (2004): 25679.

69

The 2004 general elections were the same as the 1999 general elections in the
sense that both of them used the multi-party system. However, not all parties that
participated in the 1999 general elections were eligible to participate in 2004; only parties
with a minimum of 2% of the seats in the House of Representatives were qualified to
participate. Therefore, only six parties were accepted: the Democratic Party of Struggle
(PDI-P, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), the Golkar party, the United
Development Party (PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), the National Awakening
Party (PKB, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), the National Mandate Party (PA$, Partai
Amanat $asional) and the Crescent and Star Party (PBB, Partai Bulan Bintang).29 Some
of them, such as the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) had to change their name (in this
case to Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera)) in order to be allowed
to participate in the 2004 general elections.
The elections themselves, which were held on 5 July 2004, were won by Golkar
with 21.6% of the votes, followed by PDIP with 18.5% of the votes in the second place.
In the third place was PKB with 10.6% followed by PPP in the fourth place with 8.2% of
the votes. In the fifth place was the party which never participated in an election before,
the Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat). The Democrat Party was a new party established
in 2001 by the retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, famously as SBY, former
coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs in the last Megawati cabinet.
Surprisingly, even though it was a new party, the Democrat Party was able to win a high
number of votes, 7.5%.30 Behind the Democrat Party were PKS with 7.3%, PAN with
6.4%, and PBB with 2.6% of the votes.31
Overall, the 2004 general elections showed a remarkable smooth transition to
democracy in Indonesia. This situation was very different from the New Order era when
most of the elections were engineered by the government. Step by step the political
landscape shifted after the resignation of Suharto in 1998. The 1999 general elections can
be regarded as the first free and fair elections since 1955. Furthermore, the 2004 general
29

Kompas Cybermedia, http://202.146.5.33/utama/news/0307/21/ 155909.html

[Accessed: 15

December 2009].

30
For more detailed information see International Observer Resource Center, General Elections
2004 Results and Voters Opinion, Jakarta, 2004.
31
See R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2005), p.120.

70

elections were an improvement from the 1999 general elections. The most obvious were
the presidential elections in which the president was elected directly by the people, while
in the 1999 elections he was elected by the members of the DPR.
Regarding the Islamic parties there was also improvement. The meaning of this is
that in the 2004 elections there were no more demands from Islamic parties to force
Indonesia to be an Islamic state. This is unlike 1999 when at least two Islamic parties,
PBB and PPP, proposed to re-insert the Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian constitution.
According to Azyumardi Azra, in the 2004 general elections Islamic issues such as the
implementation of shariah were not a central part of the campaigns of the Islamic parties.
The best illustration is the way the PKS used the issue of fighting corruption rather than
the issue of the transformation of Indonesia to be Islamic state.32 This change proved to
be effective in boosting the vote for PKS. In the 1999 general elections, PK (the previous
name of PKS) gained only 1.4% of the votes, while in the 2004 general elections it
increased to 7.3% of the votes.
The decline of Islamic issues (particularly in emphasising the importance of reinserting the Jakarta Charter) probably was influenced by the diverse voices and interests
within the Islamic parties. Marcus Mietzner noted that the situation of the Islamic parties
in the 2004 general elections was worse than its solid coalition in the 1999 general
elections. At the time they were successful in excluding their differences (especially
between the modernist based Islamic parties such as PAN and traditional ones like PKB)
and created a coalition (the Central axis) which was successful in bringing Abdurrahman
Wahid to presidency. However, after the impeachment of President Wahid in 2001 the
fragmentation among Islamic parties was growing. Particularly Wahids party, the PKB,
which considered Wahids impeachment a betrayal by the Islamic parties that proposed
Wahid to be the president in the first place. This rift remained until the 2004 general
elections. According to Mietzner, this political landscape excluded the possibility of
further coalitions between traditionalist and modernist Muslim parties in the coming
years.33
32

p. 13.

Azyumardi Azra, Indonesian Islam, Election Politics and Beyond, $IASnytt Insight no 4, 2004,

33

Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia; From Turbulent Transition
to Democratic Consolidation (Singapore, ISEAS and KITLV Press, 2009), p. 271.

71

Regarding the presidential elections, only several parties were qualified to

propose a presidential candidate. The qualification was a minimum requirement of 3% of
the seats received by the parties in the legislative elections. The presidential elections
were held on 5 July 2004 and participated in by five pairs of candidates. The first pair
was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono with his vice-presidential candidate Jusuf Kalla. The
second was Megawati Sukarno Putri with Hasyim Muzadi, the chairman of Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) at the time. The third was Wiranto with Sholahuddin Wahid. The fourth and
the fifth were Hamzah Haz with Agum Gumelar, and Amien Rais with Siswono Yudo
Husodo.
The 5 July presidential elections did not result in an absolute victory for one of
the candidates. Therefore, the two pairs that had received the highest number of votes had
to compete once again in the next round. The two tickets were Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono with Jusuf Kalla, which had received 33.6%, and Megawati with Hasyim
Muzadi which had gained 26.6% of the votes. The second round of presidential elections
was held on 20 September 2004. On that particular day, the presidential candidate Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla won the election with an absolute victory, 60.6%
of the votes. Yudhoyonos performance in these elections was praised by many observers;
he was someone who was barely known at least in the 1999 general elections and became
someone who won the 2004 general elections. Therefore, the 2004 elections were
claimed as the rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.34
It is interesting to look at the tickets of the 2004 presidential elections. From the
profile of each ticket, we can see that all of them (either the president or the vice
president) have a Muslim background. For instance SBY and Jusuf Kalla; SBY is a
retired General while Jusuf Kalla is a businessman with a background of activism for
Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI, the Association of Islamic University Students). In
the case of Megawati, it is interesting to see that Megawati (the chairperson of the PDI-P
which was strongly linked with abangan people) decided to choose the chairman of
Nadhlatul Ulama (NU, known as the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia) Hasyim
Muzadi as her vice president. Probably this decision was based on her failure to

34

See R. William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono, p. 121.

72

accommodate Islamic parties in the 1999 general elections when she failed to convince
Islamic parties to support her presidential candidature. In addition to that, the MUI
taushiah which recommended that Muslims not vote for non-Muslims and also the
decisions of several Islamic organisations such as the FPI and the MMI to refuse a
woman as Indonesian president affected Megawatis decision to reach out to the Muslims
population. By doing so, it looks like Megawati hoped that Muslims, especially members
of the NU, would vote for her in the 2004 presidential elections.
On the third ticket was retired General Wiranto, who had asked the brother of
former Indonesian President as well as NU chairman Gus Dur, Sholahuddin Wahid, as
his vice president. Similar to Megawati, it looks like Wiranto also wanted to use
Sholahuddin Wahid (the chairman of NU) to get the vote from its members. On another
ticket were Amin Rais and Siswono Yudohusodo. As the former chairman of
Muhammadiyah, it is undisputable that he is a pious Muslim and plausibly used his
organisation to attract Muhammadiyah members to vote for him.35 The last ticket was for
Hamzah Haz, who was the Chairman of the Islamic party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
(PPP, United Development Party), at the time, along with retired general Agum
Gumelar.36
These political conditions, when the Islamic parties no longer used the issue of
transforming Indonesia into an Islamic state as well as the presence of Muslim figures
among the presidential candidates, plausibly influenced the MUI taushiah regarding the
2004 general elections. The taushiah itself was issued in March 2004. Its title is Taushiah
Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah MUI, Pemilu; Mewujudkan Baldatul Thoyyibatun wa Rabbun
Ghafur (Recommendation of the MUI forum of Islamic brotherhood, General Elections;
establishing a prosperous and fair country receiving mercy from God). The taushiah had
six points. The first emphasised that the 2004 general elections were the implementation
of the peoples sovereignty. The second asserted that Indonesian people, especially
Muslims, should use their votes in order to be good and responsible citizens. The third
suggested that Indonesian people should cast their votes based on their conscience and
35

This assumption is supported by the fact that Muhammadiyah endorsed Amien Rais in the 2004
presidential elections. See Tempo Interaktif, http://www.arsip.net/id/link.php?lhUVUPAVAEUFID
[Accessed: 5 December 2009].
36

International Observer Resource Center, General Elections 2004 Results and Voters Opinion,
Jakarta, 2004.

73

preferences, by choosing candidates for the legislative branch (House of Representatives

(DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (DPD)), and candidates for President
and vice President who have good faith and behaviour, are reliable and have a strong
national commitment. The fourth advised that every party participating in the elections
and also the people who have the right to vote, should show good conduct by maintaining
Indonesian unity and preventing any chaos and conflict. The fifth recommended to the
political parties and all the candidates, both the candidates for the legislative body and the
presidential candidates, to preserve good political ethics and morality and to avoid bad
attitudes such as bribery. The last invited all Indonesian people, especially Muslims, to
pray together for the success of the general elections.37
As we read above, this taushiah was general in the sense that it did not give any
endorsement to any party or the government. Assuredly we can differentiate this taushiah
from the statements or taushiah of the MUI regarding the general elections in the New
Order era, which mostly endorsed Suharto for the presidency. It was also different from
the MUI taushiah in the 1999 general elections, which specifically endorsed Islamic
parties by suggesting that Indonesian Muslims not vote for non-Muslim candidates.
Reasonably, as stated above, the decision of the MUI to issue a general taushiah was
influenced by two political conditions at the time. The first was that the Islamic parties no
longer used Islamic issues in their campaigns, and the second was the candidacy of
Muslim figures in the presidential election.38 Therefore, the MUI determined to be neutral
and only gave the general remark that Muslims should vote based on their conscience and
preferences.
However, this neutrality did not mean the MUI suggested that Muslims vote for
secular parties, because in above statement we can see that the MUI recommended that
Muslims vote for candidates who are a faithful and display good behaviour (beriman and
berakhlaqul karimah). It means that the MUI still suggests that the people vote for
Islamic parties because they have the same faith. Nonetheless, this statement can be
regarded as better than the 1999 taushiah on general elections which clearly
37

Taushiah Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah MUI, Pemilu; Mewujudkan Baldatul Thoyyibatun wa

Rabbun Ghafur, Mimbar Ulama, no. 307, March 2004, p.31.
38
This situation can be seen in the Mimbar Ulama June edition which showed a picture of all
presidential candidates on the front page. It was written in the headline that this election is full of Islamic
faces (Wajah Islam dalam Pemilu), see Mimbar Ulama, no. 310, June 2004.

74

recommended that Muslims should not vote for non-Muslims. The general tone of this
taushiah is comparable to the MUI statement regarding the general elections in 1977,
which did not give a specific endorsement.

C. The MUI and the 2009 General Elections

The successful and democratic elections in 2004 were very different from other
general elections in Indonesian history because its first presidential election continued in
2009. It can be said that this election proved the stability of Indonesian democracy.
According to Marcus Mietzner, in the Reformation era from 1998 to 2004 Indonesia
faced its transitional period, while in 2004 the transitional period was over and Indonesia
could be judged as a stable democratic country. He marked the election of Yudhoyono as
the first president elected directly by the people as an indication of the end of Indonesias
democratic transition. He argues that after 2004, Indonesia entered into the phase of
democratic consolidation.39
The argument made by Mietzner was plausible, because after 2004, Indonesia has
become a more stable country without any political collapse or turmoil. We can compare
it to the political situation after the 1999 general elections. Abdurrahman Wahid was
elected by the parliament to be the fourth president of Indonesia; however, in 2001 he
was impeached by the MPR because of the bullogate affair. This affair was related to
the accusation of the DPR that Wahid was involved in the transfer of Badan Urusan
Logistik (the National Rice Stock Authority) fund. After the impeachment, the MPR
swore Wahids vice president, Megawati Sukarno Putri, into office.40 This incident was
an obvious indication of the instability of the Indonesian democracy at that time.
Furthermore, the Indonesian progress in democracy under President Yudhonoyo shows a
remarkable and organized system with which he can manage his power and with his new
party, Democratic Party (PD) together with Golkar, of which the chairman became his
vice president, Jusuf Kalla, he is able to manage the situation within the parliament.

39
Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia; From Turbulent Transition
to Democratic Consolidation, p. 291.
40
Michael S. Malley, Indonesia in 2001: Restoring Stability in Jakarta, Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No.
1, A Survey of Asia in 2001 (Jan. - Feb., 2002), pp. 124-132.

75

Regarding the elections, the 2009 general elections can be regarded as the victory of
secular parties, as the incumbent Democratic Party got the most votes; it received 20.9%
of the votes. This number surely was higher than the number of votes received by the
winner in the 2004 general elections, the Golkar party, which had gotten 14.5%, and the
winner of the 1999 general elections, PDI-P which had gotten 14.0% of the votes. The
success of the Democratic Party was remarkable considering its image as a new party
which was just established in 2001.41 The important factor which boosted the votes of the
Democrat Party is plausibly the performance of Yudhoyono, the president as well as the
chairman of the PD advisory council. Many of his programmes as president of Indonesia,
such as the massive cash programme (BLT, Bantuan Langsung Tunai) and also the
reduction of the oil price, affected to his popularity among the people. In 2008 his
popularity was only 25 percent, but after he decided on those two policies, his popularity
rose up to 50 percent in February 2009.42
Another factor which contributes to the rising votes for PD and the decline of Golkar
and PDI-P is the emergence of two new parties which have the same roots as Golkar and
PDI-P. Those parties are Partai Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia Raya (Gerindra, Greater
Indonesian Movement Party) and Partai Hati $urani Rakyat (Hanura, Peoples
Conscience Party). Both these parties were established by retired generals, General
Prabowo Subianto (Gerindra) and General Wiranto (Hanura). It is known that Wiranto
has a close relationship with the Golkar party. His candidacy in the 2004 presidential
elections through the Golkar party was evidence that Wiranto was attached to Golkar.
Therefore, his initiative to build a new party probably affected the number of votes
received by Golkar. In some provinces, such as East Java, the district chairman of Hanura
is a former member of the Golkar party. In Gerindras case, much of its campaign jargon
is the same as that of the PDI-P, such as Partai Gerindra Partai Wong Cilik (Gerindra;
the party for poor people). This jargon naturally belonged to the PDI-P in the 1999

41

Rizal Sukma, Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Election, Resilient Democracy, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, 45:3, p. 319.
42
Marcus Mietzner, Indonesias 2009 Elections: Populism, Dynasties and the Consolidation of the
Party System, Lowly Institute for International Policy, p. 5. http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publi
cation.asp?pid= 1039 [Accessed: 22 December 2009].

76

general elections as well as the 2004 general elections.43 It looks like this strategy was
able to reduce the number of votes received by PDI-P in the 2009 general elections with
14.0% of the votes, which was very different from its number of votes in 2004 (18.5%).
In the 2009 general elections, Gerindra received 4.5% of the votes while Hanura received
3.8%.
The situation for secular parties, especially the Democrat Party, in the 2009 general
elections was different from the political conditions within the Islamic parties. The
number of votes received by Islamic parties was much less than the secular ones. It can
be said that the 2009 general elections marked the decline of the Islamic parties. PKS was
the only Islamic party which received a stable number of votes with 7.9% compared to its
result in 2004 with 7.3%. Other parties, such as PAN, PPP and PKB, failed to increase
their number of votes. PAN received 6.0% while in 2004 it had gotten 6.4%. PPP gained
5.3% which had decreased since 2004 when it was 8.2%. The worst one was PKB which
lost more than 5 percent. PKB received 10.6% in 2004 and in 2009 only collected 4.9%
of the votes. Aside from that, the two other Islamic parties, PBB and PBR (Reform Star
Party), were excluded from the parliament because they could not pass the electoral
threshold of 2.5%.44
There are several factors which contributed to the decline of the Islamic parties in
2009. First and foremost is the conflict within the Islamic parties. The most obvious one
is the conflict within PKB. Since 1998, PKB has changed its leaders several times.
Mostly, this was the result of a disagreement between the chairman of the PKB advisory
council, Abdurrahman Wahid, and the PKB chairman, from Matori Abdul Djalil to Alwi
Shihab until the current chairman Muhaimin Iskandar. The two previous chairmen lost in
the court while the current chairman was able to maintain his power and fired Wahid as
the chairman of the PKB advisory council. This situation is the same for PAN; after
Amien Rais resigned from his leadership position there was a conflict among its leaders
which created disappointment among the leaders and members. This conflict expressed
itself in the creation of another party which has the same roots as PAN, which is the
43

See
Gerindra
Kalahkan
PDIP
sebagai
Partai
Wong
Cilik,
http://www.partaigerindra.or.id/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1191&itemid=37
[Accessed: 22 December 2009].
44
See Bachtiar Effendy, Insight: Islamic Parties Have Long Been at an Impasse, The Jakarta Post,
17 April 2009.

77

Muhammadiyah. This party is called Partai Matahari Bangsa (PMB, National Sun
Party).45
Another factor which contributes to the decline of the Islamic parties was the
leadership crisis. For example, PKBs performance was impacted after Abdurrahman
Wahid was no longer involved in the executive board, which decreased the number of
votes the party received in the general elections.46 PAN has the same problem; the figure
of Amien Rais was apparently determining for the number of votes for PAN. His
successor, Sutrisno Bachir, failed to maintain his relationship with the Muhammadiyah,
instead he concentrated on the recruitment of film and music celebrities to be PANs
members. This strategy seemed to prevent Muhammadiyah members from voting for
PAN. The establishment of the PMB was evidence of the disappointment of the
Muhammadiyah element within PAN. The PPP was in a more or less similar situation.
Since its establishment in 1973 there was always a contestation between Muhammadiyah
and NU elements within the party to obtain the top position in the PPP. This affected the
PPP candidates in the 2009 elections when the differences in the interests between them
produced tensions which influenced the number of votes for the PPP.47
This political landscape was the backdrop for the presidential elections which were
held on 8 July 2009. As happened in the legislative election, the results of the Islamic
parties were the worst. This can be seen in the list of presidential candidates: no Islamic
figures were present. There were three tickets in the election; all of the tickets had a
military background, either in the one running for president or for vice president. The
first was the incumbent president, Yudhoyono, along with the governor of the Central
Bank, Boediono, as his vice president. These candidates were proposed by the Democrat
Party. The second was Megawati Sukarno Putri together with the retired general Prabowo
Subianto. They were introduced by the PDI-P and Gerindra. The last candidate was Jusuf
Kalla, the former vice president under Yudhoyono, together with retired general Wiranto
who were nominated by Golkar and Hanura. We can see that none of these figures was
45

Marcus Mietzner, Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia; From Turbulent Transition
to Democratic Consolidation, p. 340.
46
Because of this conflict, Wahid suggested that his follower do not vote for PKB but instead for
Gerindra or PDI-P. Rizal Sukma, Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Election, Resilient Democracy,
p. 321.
47
See Greg Fealy, Indonesias Islamic Parties in Decline, Inside Story, http://www.insided.org.au/
indonesia% E2%80%99s-islamic-parties-in-decline [Accessed: 19 December 2009].

78

proposed by the Islamic parties. According to Bachtiar Effendy, this situation shows the
degradation of the role of Islam in Indonesian politics. He said that this tendency has
been apparent since the 2004 general elections. He deduced this from the fact that despite
the number of Muslim figures running on the tickets for the presidential elections, i.e.
Hasyim Muzadi, Amien Rais and Hamzah Haz, the winner of the 2004 general elections
was Yudhoyono. This is evidence that Indonesian Muslims prefer to vote for Yudhoyono
despite the presence of Muslim candidates. From his analysis, Effendy argues that the
fluidity of Islam was the cause of this condition. This fluidity was repeated again when
most of the Islamic parties such as PKS, PAN, PPP and PKB supported Yudhoyono in
the 2009 presidential elections. While on the contrary, the two biggest Islamic
organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, had different opinions. They preferred to support
Jusuf Kalla rather than Yudhoyono.48
Regarding the MUI attitude in this election, we can find a fatwa of the MUI which
forbade vote abstention. It is interesting to see how this fatwa was issued. This fatwa
came after a conference of the fatwa commission of the MUI (Musyawarah ijtima' fatwa
Majelis Ulama Indonesia), which was held in Padang, West Sumatra on 25 January 2009.
It was unknown whether this conference was an official activity of the MUI. Plausibly,
the conference was a program of the fatwa commission in particular, not the MUI in
general.
The fatwa consisted of five points. First, general elections in Islam can be regarded
as an effort to vote for a leader and his deputy who fulfil the ideal requirements for
materializing common goals in accordance with the aspirations of Muslims as well as the
interests of the nation. Second, electing a leader in Islam is obligatory for upholding the
leadership and government in our everyday life. Third, leadership and government in
Islam mean fulfilling all requirements compatible with the religious terms for the benefit
of the people. Fourth, voting for a faithful, honest, trustworthy, active and aspiring leader,
eligible as well as struggling for Islamic interests is compulsory. Fifth, voting for a leader
who is not eligible as mentioned in point one or being absent for voting while there are
qualified candidates is forbidden. In addition to these five points, the fatwa also consisted

48

Bachtiar Effendy, Insight: Fluidity of Islam and Yudhoyonos Presidential Triumph, The
Jakarta Post, 07 November 2009.

79

of two recommendations. First, Muslims were advised to vote for a leader and his deputy
who struggle to command right and forbid wrong (amar maruf nahi munkar). Second,
the government and the election commission need to raise awareness regarding the
general elections so that peoples participation increases and the rights of the people are
fulfilled.49
This fatwa can be regarded as the most controversial one compared to the other
stances of the MUI concerning the general elections. In previous elections, from 1977 to
2004, the MUI only issued a statement of taushiyah, but in 2009 the MUI issued a fatwa.
It is probably that this fatwa was issued after a request from the chairman of the Peoples
Consultative Assembly (MPR) at the time, Hidayat Nur Wahid, who coincidently was
one of the prominent figures of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).50
Moreover, this fatwa was not received well by the people. Most of them argued that
it was inappropriate for the MUI to issue such a fatwa. One of the arguments made by the
vice President Jusuf Kalla was that "if they deem the act of not voting to be haram, this
means that all those who abstain from casting ballots will go to hell. He then added that
the MUI should not have issued an extreme fatwa like vote abstention.51 A lot of other
criticism came to the conclusion that the fatwa was improper conduct of the MUI, which
showed that the MUI was not wise and was unable to observe which issues needed to be
prioritised.52
On the other hand, this fatwa can be considered controversial because it is unclear
whether this fatwa is issued officially by the MUI or not. If it is official, it should be
issued by the main board and not by the fatwa commission. Furthermore, this fatwa
cannot be accessed on the MUI website where new fatwas are usually uploaded after they
are issued. Instead, the fatwa can be accessed freely through another website which is
called era Muslim. This fact emphasised that this fatwa was not official but only a
movement from some figures within the fatwa commission, who felt that issuing this
fatwa was necessary. In addition to this fact, Din Syamsuddin, deputy chairman of the
49

For detailed text see http://www.eramuslim.com/dialog/pengharaman-golput-oleh-mui.htm

[Accessed: 5 August 2009].

50

Bahtiar Effendy , MUI Fatwa is neither Necessary nor a Priority, The Jakarta Post, 06 February

51

Kalla, Din criticize election edict, The Jakarta Post, 06 February 2009.
Bahtiar Effendy , MUI Fatwa is neither Necessary nor a Priority, The Jakarta Post, 06 February

2009
52

2009.

80

MUI, stated that this fatwa was not official. He attended the conference and stressed
afterwards that the fatwa was not yet to be issued.53
However, even though the fatwa was not yet to be issued by the MUI, many people
were able to access it on the internet. Surprisingly, the reactions from the people were
negative; they determined this fatwas issuance to be improper. Probably, the response
from the people had an unproductive effect on the performance of Islamic parties in the
2009 general elections. According to Rizal Sukma, the influence of the clerics in
shaping peoples election preferences is fast eroding.54 This statement is suitable for
analysis of the condition of the MUI fatwa about vote abstention and its effect. The
people seem to be disappointed by the attitudes of the MUI concerning this issue. Instead
of gaining respect from the people by issuing the fatwa, the MUI was criticised, stating
that its conduct of issuing a fatwa to forbid vote abstention is inaccurate. Perhaps the
dissatisfaction of the people regarding this issue contributed to the peoples decision not
to vote for Islamic parties.
Seeing this fatwa and comparing its circumstances to the previous attitudes of the
MUI in general elections, it looks like the MUI in post-New Order times tried to be a
player in the political context. As we have seen in the first chapter, the MUI attitudes
under the New Order regime appeared to be more conservative in terms of giving
legitimacy to the state. It can be said that the MUI under the New Order took a safer
stance. These conservative attitudes were actually decided upon in 1981, the year in
which the MUI organised a national meeting, to, among other things, decide on the
guidelines for the MUI. One of the guidelines stated that the religious harmony in
Indonesia relied upon the relation between the MUI and the government.
Misunderstandings between the MUI and the government, either in a local, provincial or
national context would disturb national stability and security.55 Therefore, as we can see
in most of the MUI taushiah or statements on general elections, most of them were
supportive of the government.

53

Interview with Din Syamsuddin, Leiden, 7 November 2009.

Rizal Sukma, Indonesian Politics in 2009: Defective Election, Resilient Democracy, p. 334.
55
Pembangunan, Keseimbangan Amar Maruf dan $ahi Munkar, Mimbar Ulama, no. 51,
September-October 2001, p. 8.
54

81

However, since the Reformation era, especially in the 1999 general elections, the
MUI changed its stances based on the political developments and recommended that
Muslims only vote for Muslims. This attitude was repeated once again in 2009 when the
MUI issued a controversial fatwa regarding vote abstention. Only in the 2004 general
elections did the MUI not take a controversial stance because most of the presidential
candidates from Islamic figures. In addition, the MUI national conference in July 2000
emphasised the independent position of the MUI. Different from the 1981 national
meeting which stressed that the MUI must create good relations with the government, in
2000 the MUI decided to distance itself from the government by saying that the MUI is
not part of the government or any other organisation.
Furthermore, the stances taken by the MUI regarding a controversial issue did not
happen solely in a political context, but also in other fields such as the eleven fatwas
which were issued in 2005. As stated above, the MUI issued some fatwas, i.e. a fatwa on
Ahmadiyah, and one regarding the issue of pluralism, liberalism and secularism, which
provoked many reactions from the people especially some Islamic organisations such as
Nahdlatul Ulama. Probably these attitudes emerged because the MUI needed to be heard
by the people. In the post-New Order era MUIs power was not as strong as it had been in
the New Order. This condition influenced its image within society, particularly
concerning its religious authority. Therefore, in order to maintain its authority, it looks
like the MUI started to issue fatwas on controversial issues so that people would respect
it and return to the MUI for its religious authority.

82

COCLUSIO

The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) is a semi-governmental organisation of

which one of its objectives is to give advice to the government as well as to society. Its
advice may take the form of fatwa or non fatwa discourses. Several scholars who
previously studied the MUI such as Atho Mudzhar, M.B. Hooker, Nur Ichwan and Kees
van Dijk argue that this organisation was heavily controlled by the government during the
New Order era. However, from this thesis becomes clear that the MUI attitudes in the
New Order era were not always in the hand of the government; it was after 1982 that the
MUI was under the governments control.
This thesis used statements (surat pernyataan) as well as recommendations
(taushiah) concerning the general elections issued by the MUI during that period. The
MUIs issuance of statements in the general elections began in 1977 and then continued
in 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. Examining the five statements shows that only in 1977
did the MUI not give conspicuous support to the government. In the following years,
from 1982 to 1997, the MUI clearly supported the government. Three of the statements
(1982, 1992 and 1997) mentioned the name of Suharto to endorse him to continue his
position as president of Indonesia. In 1987, though the MUI did not mention Suharto, it
expressed the need to continue the New Order government and the importance of
Indonesian Muslims participation in the elections. The reason why the MUI was not
under governmental control in the 1977 general elections was due to two factors. The
first is the Hamka factor. Hamka was famous for his independent position towards the
government. His rejection of the establishment of the MUI in 1970 along with his
courage to support the issuance of a MUI fatwa regarding Christmas celebrations in 1980
was a strong indication of his independent position. The second factor was the strong
position of the political Islam at that time. It can be said that the governments influence
on political Islam was not as strong as it was in 1980 and onwards. The increasing
number of PPP votes in 1977 compared to those in 1971 (from 27.2 to 29.3%) was strong
evidence that political Islam had a solid position and good bargaining position vis--vis
the New Order regime.

83

Nevertheless, the situation changed during the Reformation era. The MUI shifted
its position from supporting the government to supporting Islamic parties. This attitude
was perhaps stimulated by the weakening power of the government. Different from the
New Order era, when the governments political power was very strong, the Reformation
era was noted as the starting point of an open debate in which the freedom of speech was
highly respected. This change, in turn, also influenced the attitude of the MUI which
immediately supported Islamic parties by stating that Muslims should vote only for
Muslim candidates. In addition, this recommendation showed the return to the political
stream (politik aliran) which happened only in the 1955 general elections. During the
New Order era, the political stream did not come up because of the pressure of the
government which applied Pancasila as the sole foundation principle.
This recommendation also demonstrated the weakening of the power of the MUI
of their influence on the voting behaviour of the Indonesian people. The victory of the
PDI-P in the 1999 general elections indicated that the MUI did not succeed in convincing
many Muslims to vote for Islamic parties. This fact definitely defeated one of MUIs
aims behind issuing the taushiah in the 1999 general elections, which was to hamper the
chance of the PDI-P to win the elections.
The attitude of the MUI in the 2004 general elections was the same as the 1999
general elections in the sense that it did not give the government real support as had
happened in the New Order era. However, it was also different from the MUI taushiah in
the 1999 general elections, which specifically endorsed Islamic parties by suggesting that
Indonesian Muslims should not vote for non-Muslim candidates. It can be interpreted that
the MUI attitude in the 2004 general elections was neutral. This position was adopted
because of two political conditions. Firstly, the Islamic parties no longer used religious
(Islamic) issues in their campaigns; and secondly, all the tickets in presidential election
had a candidate (either for the president or the vice-presidency) from a Muslim
background.
Compared to its attitudes in previous general elections, the MUI fatwa in 2009
concerning vote abstention can be considered the most different and controversial one.
This attitude is different because the MUI previously never issued a fatwa regarding the
general elections but only gave out a statement or a recommendation. It is also

84

controversial not only because of the reaction of many Indonesian people who criticised
the fatwa, but also because of the issuance itself - it was unclear whether this fatwa was
officially issued by the MUI or not. It seemed that this fatwa was not officially issued by
the MUI because it could not be found on the MUI website. Moreover, Din Syamsuddin,
the deputy chairman of the MUI, stated that it was not issued at all.
Anyhow, this fatwa has influenced the image of the MUI in the eyes of the
Indonesian people. Most of them argue that the organizations attitude was impetuous.
The issuing of the fatwa concerning vote abstention was considered inappropriate. Some
public figures, including the vice president at the time, Jusuf Kalla, criticised the MUI
and felt unhappy with its stance.
Thus, there are differences in the stances of the MUI regarding the general
elections in the New Order era and the post-New Order era. Under the New Order regime,
the MUI could be regarded as playing safely by supporting the government. During that
era, only in the 1977 general elections did the MUI adopt a neutral attitude. This
approach was taken because of the pressure of the government which restricted the
political movement of the MUI. In the post-New Order era, on the contrary, the MUI
attitudes in the general elections are determined by political developments. The MUI
changed its attitude both by distancing itself from the government and it improvised its
decisions in accordance with the political context. The MUIs recommendation in the
1999 general elections, which invited Muslims to vote only for Muslim candidates, and
its fatwa which prohibited vote abstention were an indication of this attitude. The attitude
apparently emerged because the MUI want to be heard by the people. This position is
chosen because the MUI has perceived that its influence in the Reformation era is not as
strong as it was in the times of the New Order.

85

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