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CONTRACTS
ATTY. ALDEN FRANCIS C.
GONZALES
Article
1158;
Obligations
derived from law are not
presumed.
PELAYO vs. LAURON
According to Article 1089 of
the Old Civil Code (now 1157),
obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, by
illicit acts and omissions or by
those which any kind of fault or
negligence
occurs. Obligations
arising from law are not presumed.
Those expressly determined in the
Code or in special law, etc., are the
only demandable ones.
The rendering of medical
assistance in case of illness is
comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses
are bound by way of mutual
support as provided by the law or
the Code. Consequently, the
obligation to pay the plaintiff for
the medical assistance rendered to
NGEI
MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE
INC.
vs.
FILIPINAS
PALMOIL
PLANTATION INC.
The
petitioners,
having
freely and willingly entered into
the Addendum with FPPI, cannot
and should not now be permitted
to renege on their compliance
under it, based on the supposition
that its terms are unconscionable.
The contract must bind both
contracting parties; its validity or
compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them.
GENERAL
MILLING
CORPORATION vs. RAMOS
There are three requisites
necessary for a finding of default.
First, the obligation is demandable
and liquidated; second, the debtor
delays performance; and third, the
creditor judicially or extrajudicially
requires the debtors performance.
According to the CA, GMC
did not make a demand on
Spouses
Ramos
but
merely
requested them to go to GMCs
office to discuss the settlement of
their account. In spite of the lack
SANTOS
VENTURA
HOCORMA FOUNDATION vs.
SANTOS
Article 1169 of the New Civil
Code provides:
Those obliged to deliver or
to do something incur in delay
from the time the obligee judicially
or extrajudicially demands from
In reciprocal obligations, as
in a contract of sale, the general
rule is that the fulfillment of the
parties
respective
obligations
should be simultaneous. Hence,
no demand is generally necessary
because, once a party fulfills his
obligation and the other party
does not fulfill his, the latter
automatically incurs in delay. But
when
different
dates
for
performance of the obligations are
fixed, the
default
for
each
obligation must be determined by
the rules given in the first
paragraph of the present article,
that is, the other party would incur
in delay only from the moment the
other party demands fulfillment of
the formers obligation. Thus,
even in reciprocal obligations,
if the period for the fulfillment
of the obligation is fixed,
demand upon the obligee is
still necessary before the
obligor can be considered in
default and before a cause of
action
for
rescission
will
accrue.
Evident from the records
and even from the allegations in
the complaint was the lack of
demand
by
petitioner
upon
respondent to fulfill its obligation
to manufacture and deliver the
boxes. The Complaint only alleged
that petitioner made a follow-up
upon respondent, which, however,
would not qualify as a demand for
the fulfillment of the obligation.
Note is taken of the fact that, with
respect
to
their
claim
for
reimbursement, the Complaint
alleged and the witness testified
that a demand letter was sent to
respondent. Without a previous
demand for the fulfillment of the
obligation, petitioner would not
have a cause of action for
rescission against respondent as
the latter would not yet be
considered in breach of its
contractual obligation.
Even assuming that a
demand had been previously
made before filing the present
case,
petitioners
claim
for
reimbursement would still fail, as
the circumstances would show that
respondent was not guilty of
breach of contract.
SSS
vs.
MOONWALK
DEVELOPMENT & HOUSING
CORP.
In order that the debtor may
be in default it is necessary that
the following requisites be present:
(1)
that
the
obligation
be
demandable
and
already
liquidated; (2) that the debtor
delays performance; and (3) that
the
creditor
requires
the
performance
judicially
and
extrajudicially. Default generally
begins from the moment the
creditor demands the performance
of the obligation.
Nowhere in this case did it
appear that SSS demanded from
Moonwalk the payment of its
monthly amortizations. Neither did
it show that petitioner demanded
the payment of the stipulated
penalty upon the failure of
Moonwalk to meet its monthly
amortization. What the complaint
itself showed was that SSS tried to
enforce the obligation sometime in
September, 1977 by foreclosing
the
real
estate
mortgages
executed by Moonwalk in favor of
SSS. But this foreclosure did not
LORENZO SHIPPING
vs. BJ MARTHEL INTL
CORP
delay;
TELEFAST
COMMUNICATIONS/PHIL.
WIRELESS, INC. vs CASTRO,
SR.
RCBC vs. CA
NPC vs. CA
MINDEX
MORILLO
RESOURCES
vs.
Petitioner
fell
short
of
ordinary diligence in safe guarding
the leased truck against the
accident, which could have been
avoided in the first place.
METRO
CONCAST
CORPORATION vs.
BANK
STEEL
ALLIED
Fortuitous
events
by
definition are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable. It is
therefore, not enough that the
event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed but it must be
one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not
impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event,
the following elements must
concur: (a) the cause of the
unforeseen
and
unexpected
occurrence or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with obligations
must be independent of human
will; (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event that constitutes
the caso fortuito or, if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid; (c) the occurrence must be
such as
Art.1175;
Interests
to
imposed on obligations
MACALINAO vs. BPI
be
The
interest
rate
and
penalty
charges
are
unconscionable and iniquitous at
36% per annum. The Supreme
Court held that the interest rate
and penalty charge of 3% per
month or the 36% per annum
should be reduced to 2% per
month or 24% per annum. In a
long line of cases decided by the
Supreme Court, it considered the
36% per annum to be excessive
and
unconscionable.
Citing
Article1229, in exercising this
power to determine what is
iniquitous and unconscionable;
courts
must
consider
the
circumstances of each case since
what may be iniquitous and
unconscionable in one maybe
JAVIER vs. CA
event
which
constitutes
the
condition. Thus, when a person
donates land to another on the
condition that the latter would
build upon the land a school, the
condition imposed was not a
condition
precedent
or
a
suspensive
condition
but
a
resolutory one. It is not correct to
say that the schoolhouse had to be
constructed before the donation
became effective, otherwise, it
would be invading the property
rights of the donor. The donation
had to be valid before the
fulfillment of the condition. If there
was no fulfillment or compliance
with the condition, such as what
obtains in the instant case, the
donation may now be revoked and
all rights which the donee may
have acquired under it shall be
deemed lost and extinguished.
When the obligation does
not fix a period but from its nature
and circumstances it can be
inferred
that
a
period
was
intended,
the
general
rule
provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code applies, which provides that
the courts may fix the duration
thereof because the fulfillment of
the obligation itself cannot be
and
ROMERO vs. CA
The
parties
pose
this
question: May the vendor demand
the rescission of a contract for the
sale of a parcel of land for a cause
traceable to his own failure to
have the squatters on the subject
property
evicted
within
the
contractually-stipulated period?
SANTOS vs. CA
The agreement between the
parties is a contract to sell, it
follows that the appellate court
erred when it decreed that a
judicial
rescission
of
said
agreement was necessary. This is
because there was no rescission to
speak of in the first place. In a
contract to sell, title remains with
the vendor and does not pass on
to the vendee until the purchase
price is paid in full. Thus, in a
contract to sell, the payment of
the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition. Failure to
pay the price agreed upon is not a
mere breach, casual or serious, but
a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey
Art. 1208.
If from the law,or the
nature or the wording of the
obligation to which the preceding
article refers the contrary does not
appear, the credit or debt shall be
presumed to be divided into as
many equal shares as there are
creditors and debtors, the credits
or debts being considered distinct
from one another, subject to the
Rules of Court governing the
multiplicity of suits.
The decision of the lower
court based on the parties'
compromise agreement, provides:
1.
Plaintiff
agrees
to
reduce
its
total
claim
of
P117,498.95 to only P110,000.00
and
defendants
agree
to
acknowledge the validity of such
claim and further bind themselves
Art 1207;
obligations
Joint
and
solidary
in
case
of
Therefore,
whether
the
solidary debtor has paid the
creditor, the other solidary debtors
should indemnify the former once
his liability becomes absolute.
However, in this case, the liability
of RGC, Gervel and Qua became
absolute
simultaneously
when
Ladtek defaulted in its loan
payment. As a result, RGC, Gervel
and Qua all became directly liable
at the same time to Metrobank
and PDCP. Thus, RGC and Gervel
cannot automatically claim for
indemnity from Qua because Qua
himself is liable directly to
Metrobank and PDCP.
If we allow RGC and Gervel
to
collect
from
Qua
his
proportionate share, then Qua
would pay much more than his
stipulated
liability
under
the
Agreements.
Since Qua would surely
exceed his proportionate share, he
would then recover from RGC and
Gervel the excess payment. This
situation is absurd and circuitous.
Contrary
to
RGC
and
Gervels claim, payment of any
amount will not automatically
result in reimbursement.
If a
solidary debtor pays the obligation
in
part,
he
can
recover
reimbursement
from
the
codebtors only in so far as his
payment exceeded his share in the
obligation.[33]
This is precisely
because if a solidary debtor pays
an
amount
equal
to
his
proportionate
share
in
the
obligation, then he in effect pays
only what is due from him. If the
debtor pays less than his share in
the obligation, he cannot demand
reimbursement
because
his
payment is less than his actual
debt.
RGC, Gervel and Quas total
obligation was P14,200,854.37
RGC and Gervel paid Metrobank P7
million Considering that RGC and
Gervel paid only P7 million out of
the
total
obligation
of
P14,200,854.37, which payment
was less than RGC and Gervels
combined shares in the obligation,
[38] it was clearly partial payment.
Moreover, if it were full payment,
then the obligation would have
been
extinguished.
Metrobank
would have also released Qua from
his obligation.
RGC and Gervel also made
partial
payment
to
PDCP
P1,730,543.55.