Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Bob Sutcliffe
Imperialism Old and New: A Comment on
David Harvey’s The New Imperialism and
Ellen Meiksins Wood’s Empire of Capital
1 I am grateful to Andrew Glyn and Sam Ashman for comments on a draft of this
article.
2 Patnaik 1990.
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3 Harvey 2003.
4 Wood 2003.
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The policies of major capitalist powers are partly dominated by the attempt
to expand the productive régime of capital as much as possible. But imperialist
actions are not all designed to do this; often, they will have precisely the
opposite effect at least in the short term and in particular places. This is
because a worldwide system, Harvey argues (taking the terms from Giovanni
Arrighi), has two logics: the capitalist logic (the actions necessary to support
capitalist exploitation and the market) and the territorial logic (those actions
necessary to support the hierarchy of nation-states). These are relatively new
terms, but the ideas are quite old. They have been proposed by a number of
historians of imperialism to explain why the actions of imperialist powers in
the nineteenth century, for example, were apparently so perverse in relation
to any possible economic gain. Harvey’s distinction between the capitalist
logic and the territorial logic parallels Wood’s distinction between the increasing
role of capitalist imperatives throughout the world and the maintenance
in the importance of the state as a coercive institution. She, too, argues that
the USA, like the British when they conquered India, ‘may be finding that
empire creates its own territorial imperative’.9 In both cases, these are ways
of describing the combined picture produced by superimposing the
international and economic systems which, I argued above, is the essence of
Marxist theories of imperialism.
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history. For the first time, there are ‘economic imperatives comprehensive
and powerful enough to be reliable instruments of imperial domination’.10
But the globalisation of the capitalist economy requires a parallel globalisation
of state and military power to protect it and, in particular, a greater amount
of US hegemonic military force. Hence the continuous growth of US military
power and imperialist activities over this period, culminating in the Bush
administration, the power of the neoconservatives and the prospect of endless
war. She tends to accept too much, however, the idea that what is actually
happening is exactly what leading neoconservatives (especially Richard Perle)
have argued should happen; it is surely more haphazard and pragmatic
than that.
For Harvey, the post-World-War-II moment is also an inflection point in
the history of imperialism. He calls it the beginning of the second phase of
bourgeois rule. The US is dominant and confident. It spreads both economic
growth and its own version of freedom (particularly anticolonialism) on a
world scale. Its imperial nature is hidden behind a democratic façade. But,
for a time, it creates real consent and a growing capitalist economy on an
international scale. It is only around 1970 that the new imperialism begins.
This is associated with the outbreak of a major world crisis of overaccumulation
around that time, something to which Wood attaches no special importance.
This crisis has become chronic and continues to this day. It is associated with
greater economic competition between the main capitalist powers, neoliberal
economic policies, a decline in the welfare activities of states and a decisive
shift in the nature of capital accumulation from accumulation out of produced
and realised surplus-value to ‘accumulation by dispossession’, the original
and useful name he gives to the series of processes which Marx called primitive
or primary accumulation, and Rosa Luxemburg called the absorption of non-
capitalist activities and regions into capitalism. Accumulation by dispossession
includes the forcible opening up of markets, the forced sale of publicly owned
capital (privatisation), the separation of workers from non-market rights –
for instance, from the land which they own or control or from their welfare
rights (the right to work, pensions, health care, education and so on). I would
add the commodification of numerous activities and exchanges which people
participate in outside of capitalist relations, a recent example being swapping
music files and many other activities on the internet.
The double dialectic of the capitalist and territorial logics and the inside
and outside forms of capitalist accumulation (accumulation of surplus-value
and accumulation by dispossession) become a centrepiece of Harvey’s analysis.
‘Accumulation by dispossession’, he argues has been the major form through
which capitalism in a chronic crisis of overaccumulation has sought to ‘fix’
its plight. And a big part of this fix has involved the geographical spread of
capitalism. In other words the new imperialism is particularly characterised
by accumulation by dispossession and, since much of it involves attacks on
existing rights of states or workers, tends increasingly to favour coercive over
consensual policies.
Is this a convincing account of the last thirty years of world history? In
fairness to Harvey, it should be noted that he does not claim it to be a definitive
conceptualisation and he makes appropriate caveats that not everything will
fit into this pattern and that some things are fortuitous and unpredictable.
Nonetheless, he does try to fit the most salient things into this format. It
certainly has quite a lot going for it. Nearly everyone, especially on the Left,
agrees that capitalism entered a major crisis around 1970 and others have
analysed this in terms of general overaccumulation, which is, after all, what
Marx regarded as ‘the essential phenomenon in crises’. Harvey is not the first
to emphasise the role of accumulation by dispossession, though he has given
it a new name and has drawn attention to the profoundly important ideas
on this subject of Rosa Luxemburg, largely neglected on the Left, partly
because of a fault in the reasoning which led her nevertheless to the correct
emphasis on the continuing importance at all stages of capitalism of preying
on the non-capitalist sector of the world (not, as she tended to think a
fixed quantity but something which human creativity and political change
are constantly renewing). For these reasons, Harvey’s hypothesis is an
important one.
Chronic crisis?
For nearly forty years, economic studies have concluded that there was a
major fall in the overall profit rate starting in the late 1960s, a strong indication
of a crisis of overaccumulation.11 The rate of growth of production (world
GDP) also fell sharply around 1973 and has never returned to its previous
level. World GDP, as estimated by Angus Maddison rose at an annual average
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rate of 4.9 per cent (2.9 per cent per head) between 1950 and 1973 and then
by an average of 3.2 per cent (1.4 per cent per head) between 1973 and 2002.12
It is also true that during the post-1973 period there have been a number of
spectacular financial collapses such as those in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,
Russia, South-East and East Asia. Harvey sees these as evidence of the
continuation of the chronic crisis. But his story of these years seems to me
too contrived so that everything fits together too nicely with the hypothesis
of a chronic crisis for which capital is seeking temporary fixes. In the analysis
of crises (one of the most overused words, surely, in the political and economic
analyst’s lexicon) it is nearly always a matter of fine judgement whether a
particular situation represents crisis or not. In the social and the physical
world, equilibrium is never stable for long. Everything is subject to simultaneous
contradictory forces. Economies are, in some ways, like aeroplanes: you could
see them as always about to fall to earth unless they receive the necessary
fix of fuel and engine thrust; or you could see them as proceeding normally
because lift is balancing gravity.
For over three decades, almost everyone on the Left has agreed with Harvey
that capitalism entered a crisis around 1970, the details of which have been
almost endlessly debated, but there has hardly been any discussion about
whether it ever emerged from the crisis; in much writing, there seems to be
an unspoken assumption that it is still here. To parallel Patnaik’s question
‘Whatever happened to imperialism?’13 we should also ask ‘Whatever happened
to the crisis?’. Harvey answers that it is still with us and that the history of
the world economy, and to some extent politics, during the last three decades
consists of a continuous series of ‘spatio-temporal fixes’ designed to absorb
excess capital and so stop the falling rate of profit from leading to total
depression. But it is hard to assess this hypothesis without ever being told
what would constitute the end of a crisis. Marx, after all, stressed that capitalism
was a system walking forever on a knife-edge, but only on occasions falling
into crisis. As he vividly said, as soon as there is a market ‘the crisis is there’,
meaning not that crisis necessarily existed but that it was always immanent
as a possibility.
The events of the last thirty-five years of world capitalism – the opening
of markets, globalisation, neoliberalism, privatisation, the transition from
12 Maddison 2003.
13 Patnaik 1990.
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Borrowed hegemony
The continuing hegemony of the USA is a central element in both Wood’s
and Harvey’s definition of the new imperialism. Both of them see it as a
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Marx. Both are thus a continuation of old and new Marxist debates. But they
are also both implicitly polemical responses to Hardt and Negri’s Empire.18
Harvey and Wood both insist that capitalist imperialism remains a reality
and that the USA remains the dominant power. For Harvey, imperialism in
the last thirty years reflects a desperate search for surplus-value in prolonged
crisis of overaccumulation, while Wood insists that, as capitalism has become
more global than it has ever been, the state as a protector and manager of
the system has become more rather than less important. All of these things
had been explicitly denied by Hardt and Negri, who see a world where
imperialism has ended, the USA has only relative privileges and where the
capitalist economy is thriving (this despite their crude underconsumptionism).
Even points of partial agreement are given radically different interpretations.
For instance, like Hardt and Negri, Wood attaches great importance to the
issue of migration control. But it is interpreted in two almost contradictory
ways. Hardt and Negri put the freedom of movement (‘endless paths’) as the
first of their three summary demands (the others being a social wage for all
and the more mysterious ‘right of reappropriation’) but they also believe that
a great measure of the freedom of movement which they seek has in fact
already been gained by the recent migrations of millions of people from all
over the world into the USA and Western Europe; migration is one way in
which the multitude has already begun to shape the world. Wood, however,
sees it in almost an opposite light:
Take another example: where Hardt and Negri argue that there has also been
immense progress in recent years in the achievement of a social wage, and
believe this also is evidence of the existing power of the multitude (especially
in the USA), Harvey by contrast sees the erosion of the social wage (the
welfare state and other things) as being a characteristic feature of the new
imperialism which seeks to respond to its chronic crisis by increasing surplus-
value, in part by cheapening the social cost of labour so that room can be
made for tax cuts for the rich.
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In these two examples, the style of the disagreement is the same: something
which, Hardt and Negri on the one hand, and Wood and/or Harvey on the
other, all regard as desirable according to the former has been partly achieved
or, according to the latter, has not been achieved or has even been clawed
back. Once again, in deciding who is right, surely it is necessary to refer to
some empirical evidence. I venture to suggest that it would show that neither
side is wholly right or wholly wrong. Neither Harvey nor Wood are anything
like as empirico-phobic as Hardt and Negri, who shun concrete facts like the
plague. Yet both these new books, like so much Marxist writing, would, to
my mind, have benefited greatly from taking a more serious approach to the
existing evidence about the many empirical questions which they discuss.
Unhappy ending?
Neither Wood nor Harvey has very much to say about how the story they
tell will end, or can be ended. They do not aim to put forward a political
programme. Wood’s main, and very briefly expressed hope, is that the limits
placed on democracy in the various countries of the USA-dominated world
will produce ‘truly democratic struggles’ for which ‘there is surely an expanding
space’,20 citing the election of Lula as a positive sign. Harvey foresees more
the possibility of change within the USA, with an increasing reaction against
coercive methods as their perverse consequences become apparent. He warns
against anti-Americanism and urges opponents of imperialism outside the
USA to make common cause with those inside. Both of them briefly speculate
on whether the USA could be replaced as the dominant power. Wood mentions
‘possible future competitors like China or Russia’ but says that ‘the European
Union . . . is potentially a stronger economic power than the US’.21
Harvey, too, makes brief mention of the possible challenge of Europe or
the rise of East Asia. China hardly appears in his argument except as the
most effective location at the present time for the investment of surplus capital.
Internationally, his hope is that there will be ‘a return to a more benevolent
“New Deal” imperialism, preferably arrived at through the sort of coalition
of capitalist power that Kautsky long ago envisaged’ (though he does not
mention that Kautsky argued that this ultra-imperialism would be worse than
the imperialism of 1914). Harvey goes on:
. . . the construction of a new ‘New Deal’ led by the United States and
Europe, both domestically and internationally, in the face of the overwhelming
class forces and special interests ranged against it, is surely enough to fight
for at the present juncture.22
Harvey seems more optimistic that the USA can move back from coercive
neoconservatism; Wood seems more optimistic that effective struggles can
emerge elsewhere. But, in general, the political conclusions of both are bleak
to say the least.
In place of Hardt and Negri’s magical optimism, we have Wood’s and
Harvey’s pessimistic realism. A realistic anti-imperialism, however, surely
needs a more penetrating analysis of the sources of resistance, which in turn
requires a detailed analysis of the beneficiaries and victims of globalisation.
Hardt and Negri have been strongly criticised by numerous writers on the
Left for their failure to define their revolutionary agent, the multitude. It has
become almost obligatory among their critics to dismiss the idea of the
multitude as amorphous. Both of these authors make this criticism. But, for
all their real interest and insight, neither of these books offer a detailed analysis
of the class forces which are ranged against each other in Wood’s world of
‘universal capitalism’ or Harvey’s ‘chronic crisis’. Without an answer to such
important questions we do not really have a complete vision of the two
superimposed hierarchies of countries and of classes which constitutes an
effective theory of imperialism.
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The debunking of the ‘indispensable nation’ myth does not mean that the
United States may not engage in acts of provocation that could spark a
conflict with China on a regional and possibly global scale, as envisaged in
Harvey’s worst-case scenario. Nor does it mean that at some point the United
States and Europe might not join forces in the kind of ‘ultraimperialistic’
project that Harvey considers the only realistic alternative to ‘the raw
militaristic imperialism’ of us neo-conservatives. It does mean, however,
that both alternatives look less likely today than they did two years ago.
And, to more optimistic minds, it may also indicate that less violent and
more benevolent alternatives than those envisaged by Harvey are emerging
as real historical possibilities.25
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change in the international power structure, we need more than ever the dual
vision to superimpose the hierarchies of class onto those of countries.
And, incidentally, a search of the website of the aforementioned anti-union
bookstore for ‘China working class’ produces a meagre 198 results.
References
Armstrong Philip, Andrew Glyn and John Harrison 1991, Capitalism Since World
War II, Oxford: Blackwell.
Arrighi, Giovanni 2005a, ‘Hegemony Unravelling – 1’, New Left Review, II, 32: 23–80.
Arrighi, Giovanni 2005b, ‘Hegemony Unravelling – 2’, New Left Review, II, 33: 83–116.
Broad, William T. 2004, ‘U.S. Is Losing Its Dominance in the Sciences’, New York Times,
3 May.
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri 2000, Empire, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University
Press.
Harvey, David 2003, The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maddison, Angus 2003, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, CDROM, Paris: OECD.
Patnaik, Prabhat 1990, ‘Whatever Happened to Imperialism?’, Monthly Review, 42: 1–6.
SIPRI 2004, SIPRI Yearbook, Tables, Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute.
Wood, Ellen Meiksins 2003, Empire of Capital, London: Verso.