General Provisions Cases

[G.R. No. L-21993. June 21, 1966.
]
ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as
Judge of the Court of FIRST Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and
ADELAIDA JACALAN, Respondents.
Lorenzo Sumulong, for Petitioners.
Torres & Torres for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. PROBATE PROCEEDINGS; EFFECT OF WILL DEPOSITED IN COURT; CASE AT BAR. The jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late
Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited the court could, motu propio, have taken steps to fix the time and place
for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section
3, Rules 76, of the revised Rules of Court (Section 3, rule 77, of the old Rules).
2. ID.; JURISDICTION. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle decedents estates is
conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and domicile of the testator only affects the venue but
not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe v.
Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
3. RULES OF COURT; SEC. 3, RULE 77 CONSTRUED. "The use of the disjunctive in the words `when a
will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed plainly indicates that the court may act
upon the mere deposit therein of a decedents testament, even if no petition for its allowance is yet filed.
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back
to the time when the will was delivered."
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4. ID.; COURT OF FIRST TAKING COGNIZANCE EXCLUDES ALL OTHERS. The estate proceedings
having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to
assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue, by express
provisions of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court.
5. ID.; ID.; INTESTACY SUBSIDIARY TO TESTACY. In our system of civil law, intestate succession is
only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy takes place only in the absence of a valid
operative will. Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al v. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to
the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established
action." The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the
purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ
ofcertiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion
to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of
without jurisdiction.
The facts and issues are succinctly narrated in the order of the respondent court dated June 12, 1963
(Petition, Annex O), in this wise:
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"It is alleged in the motion to dismiss filed by Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio Rodriguez, through
counsel, that this Court "has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of
another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled In the matter of the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case"
The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on
March 4, 1963, Anatolia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria rodriguez and Angela
Rodriguez, through counsel, filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will;
that on Mach 11, 1963, before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on
March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez
was a resident of Paraaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying That Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probate of the will delivered by them on March 4,
1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal; that he was
parish priest of the Catholic Church in Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death
in 1963; that he was buried in Paraaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City
and Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed
at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja v. Tan and De Borja,
G. R. No. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pagilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on
March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on
March 12, 1963."
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated, denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a
difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as early as
March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported will of the Father Rodriguez, deposited in
the Court of Bulacan, since they filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants clearly filed the
intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan) from
exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings." Reconsideration having been denied, movants,
now petitioners, came to this Court, relying principally on Rule 73, section 1, of the Rules of Court, and
invoking our ruling in Ongsingco v. Tan and De Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
"SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the state of the decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."
We find this recourse to be untenable. the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became
vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the Court could,
motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of
Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):
"SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. When a will is delivered
to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a
time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively, previous to the
time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has been filed by the testator
himself."
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of a
will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedents
statement, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made
after the deposits of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was
delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on
March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on March
12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusively jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable.
But, Petitioners, object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to the
"Court having jurisdiction", and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not have it because the
decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguezs 33 years of residence as
parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider that he retained
throughout some animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail would not
imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle
decedents estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator
only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; reyes v.
Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe v. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is
deceased, or that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n., p. 46, hearing of
June 11, 1963, Annex "H", Petition, rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.
In the Kaw Singco case (ante) this court ruled that:
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". . . If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all decisions on the different
incidents which have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will have to be
commenced anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is of mischievous
effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan v. Dy
Buncio & Co., G. R. No. 48206, December 31, 1942). Furthermore section 600 of Act No. 190, providing
that the estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not
have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject- matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as
we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject-matter is another.
(Attorney-General v. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136,
Section 56, No. 5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently
of the place of residence of the deceased. 1 Since, however, there are many courts of First Instance in
the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act no. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each
case shall be brought. thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over
the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called "venue" (Rule 75,
section 1.) Motion for reconsideration is denied."
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other,
that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of
wrong venue, by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same
enjoins that:
"The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts." (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to
that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.
There are two reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing
intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they had learned of the delivery of the decedents will to the Court of
Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence
awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not
designed to convert the settlement of decedents estates into a race between applicants, with the
administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate
to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Says Article 960
of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
"ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
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(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In
such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has
not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if
the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right
of accretion takes place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this Code."
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, Et. Al. v. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity
of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre- established action."
The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported
will of Father Rodriguez is pending.
We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in
question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate proceedings, said Court did not commit any abuse
of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-29192. February 22, 1971.]

GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, DefendantAppellant.
Benjamin Pineda for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros, for Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los
Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others,
that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial
partition agreement (a copy of which was attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with
an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the
defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would undertake the
development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses
in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three (3)
lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by the other co-heirs, and by the residents of the
subdivision, the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the
aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation under
the extra-judicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition agreement, but set
up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the said
agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la
Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by
mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the
proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The
answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold her
share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as
the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by way of
reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition
agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be
ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.
On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965, declaring the plaintiff in
default for not having answered the counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of facts:
"1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement dated
August 24, 1963, which we marked as Exhibit A for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "1" for the defendant,
which partition agreement was marked as Annex A in the complaint;
"2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition
Agreement was for the distribution of the lard in question for the heirs of Pelagia de al Cruz; however
the parties further agree that several lots in the said land have been sold by some of the co-heirs, and
there are now several houses constructed therein and residents therein;
"3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed Administrator and In-charge of the
development and subdivision of the land in question, as provided for in the aforementioned extrajudicial
partition agreement;
"4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd paragraph to the last of said
partition agreement have been sold by the defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no
properly constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;
"5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceased Pelagia de la Cruz
aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor in interest of the land which was the subject
matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement;
"6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz;
"7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16, 1962, as evidenced by a
death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit 2 for the defendant; and
"8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz,
and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit 3 for the
defendant."
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a party to the
extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit
from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. The court
ordered the defendant "to perform his obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as
described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant
should develop the subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose),
and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00 as attorneys fees,
and the costs. No disposition was made of defendants counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for
New Trial but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition agreement is null and void with
respect to plaintiff-appellee, and, consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped from questioning plaintiffappellees right to have the agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual damages to plaintiff-appellee,
and, on the other hand, in not granting the relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the owner of the
estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died
intestate on October 16, 1962 that defendant-appellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiffappellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellees mother died on September 22, 1935, thus pre-deceasing
Pelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and
distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is an heir of the decedent. We are
convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not
inherit from the latter by right of representation.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the
ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be
of the full or half blood."
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving
the right of representation when it properly takes place . . ."
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia v. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905),
said:
". . . [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not participate with a niece in the
inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the
collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and
sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his
deceased uncle."
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces,
one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece, is excluded by law
from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellees inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial partition
agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is concerned? They did not confer upon her
the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as
admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de
la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in
representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the agreement is herein quoted,
thus:
"NOW, THEREFORE, we . . . and Diego delos Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz, Mariano delos
Santos married to Andrea Ramoy: Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos
Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to Narciso Ramota; all in
representation of our mother, MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, . . ., do hereby by these presents, mutually,
voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the property left by the deceased
PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves definite and independent portions of the estate in
the following manner . . ."
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were laboring under
the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiffappellee not being such an heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
"ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person."
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and
another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice
of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres v.
De Torres, Et Al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the
right to have its terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not be
heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract
(17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar v.
Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Et Al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 522]). In Ramiro
v. Grao, Et Al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
"No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon a mistake. And while there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority
is that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not
estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact known to the party sought to be estopped is
equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)"
And in Capili, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this
Court said:
"Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of
the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an
extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants
require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be apprised of his
rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works
no estoppel . . ."
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained in view of the
conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or compensatory damages must be duly
proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such damages was presented inasmuch as the case
was decided on a stipulation of facts and no evidence was adduced before the trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellants counterclaim, in which he alleged that plaintiff-appellee sold her
share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00, and claims that he is entitled to one-fourth (1/4)
of the proceeds by right of reversion. It will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default
on defendant-appellants counterclaim; but the latter did not present any evidence to prove the material
allegation therein more specifically, the alleged sale of the formers share for the sum of P10,000.00.
That no such evidence had been adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted the case
for the resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately, did not make any
mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer or move to introduce the
necessary evidence to that effect for the consideration and evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellees having been declared in
default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the allegations in his counterclaim, so that the
court a quo should have granted the relief prayed for by him. We find no merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
"SECTION 1. Judgment by default. If the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these
rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in
default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiffs evidence and render judgment
granting him such relief as the complaint and the fact proven may warrant. This provision applies where
no answer is made to a counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party complaint within the period provided in
this rule."
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In
Macondray & Co. v. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court said:
"Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by default against a defendant who has
neither appeared nor filed his answer does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and of
presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the defendant of the facts and causes of
action of the plaintiff, because the codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support of
his allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment could be given in his favor. Nor could
it be interpreted as an admission by the defendant that the plaintiffs causes of action find support in the
law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for . . ."
Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties that said plaintiffappellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by virtue of the extrajudicial partition
agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:
"(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-2956l, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as described in the Technical
Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos
Santos, married to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea Ramoy; Gertrudes delos
Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos
Santos, married to Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and share alike."
Such being the case, Defendant-Appellant is apparently correct in his contention that the lower court
erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently, in not sentencing appellee to turn over to
him his corresponding share of said portion received by appellee under the void partition. Remote
relatives or unrelated persons who unduly received and took possession of the property of a deceased
person without any right, by virtue of a null and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate
successor in the inheritance (De Torres v. De Torres, Et Al., supra). Of course, if such share has already
been disposed of by appellee to a bona fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven
allegations of the counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount to defendantappellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such sale for the reason that, as already stated
above, this aspect of the counterclaim has not been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it
been supported by evidence which appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any liability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and,
on appellants counterclaim, appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his
corresponding share of the property she has received under the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore
mentioned if the same has not already been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance
against Plaintiff-Appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23, 1992.]

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS
SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND
DORIBEL SAYSON, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; FINAL AND EXECUTORY; PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE SEASONABLY
APPEALED THE DECREE OF ADOPTION. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years
after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. Assuming that the petitioners were
proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to
the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not.
In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not,
although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
2. ID.; ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS; CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF ADOPTION CANNOT BE MADE
COLLATERALLY. A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the
validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite
jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for
a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the
necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
3. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; BIRTH CERTIFICATE; ONE OF THE PRESCRIBED MEANS OF
RECOGNITION. On the question of Doribels legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribels birth certificate is a formidable piece of
evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article
172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in
the case at bar.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENTIARY NATURE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS TO BE SUSTAINED ABSENT STRONG,
COMPLETE AND CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF ITS FALSITY OR NULLITY. Mauricios testimony that he was
present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an
interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship
of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
5. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMACY OF CHILD CAN BE QUESTIONED ONLY IN A DIRECT ACTION. Another reason
why the petitioners challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose.
Doribels legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not
have this purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy
of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and
within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as
a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. I,
p. 559.)
6. ID.; SUCCESSION; LEGITIMATE AND ADOPTED CHILDREN SUCCEED THE PARENTS AND
ASCENDANTS; RATIONALE. The philosophy underlying this article is that a persons love descends
first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even
after he is gone from this earth.
7. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; GRANDDAUGHTER HAS A RIGHT TO REPRESENT HER
DECEASED FATHER. There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled
to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares
of her grandparents other children.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP CREATED BY ADOPTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE BLOOD RELATIVES
OF EITHER PARTIES. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child
and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and
does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their
alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting it for themselves to
the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and
Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married
Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim
to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabels
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The
action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and
partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couples four surviving children.
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The
complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo
were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they
were entitled to inherit Teodoros share in his parents estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same
evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were
the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated
March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated
February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding
that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision
dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In
Civil Case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and Edmundo
Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela
Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court
is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent
law and jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel
had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9,
1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335
of the Civil Code, naming among those who cannot adopt" (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship
of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of
Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time
but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of
adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming that the
petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of
adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and
Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was
issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the Order
of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for the revocation or rescission of
the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or
rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA
and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribels birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be
faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not
disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the
adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition but in a direct proceeding frontally
addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not,
cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the
validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on
Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75,
p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the party
attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance
is obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next
of kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this
does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be determined upon
proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction,
and the determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be collaterally attacked. If
this were not the rule, the status of adopted children would always be uncertain, since the evidence
might not be the same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid, while another court would
hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribels legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribels birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of
filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricios testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably
suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier
statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it
was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be
upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, 11 where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for
that purpose. Doribels legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that
civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The
legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action
for a different purpose . . . . 12
(Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the
intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:.
ARTICLE 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a persons love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this
earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil
Code:
ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded.
ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive,
the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and
Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of
her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have
directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents other children.
13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents
were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and
have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship
created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend
to the blood relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under
no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct
however, in holding that only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her
grandparents intestate estate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the
deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the petitioners.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000.]

SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUE ZARAGOZA, Petitioners, v. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks (1) the reversal of the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, which affirmed the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 14178, except the dismissal of private
respondents claim over lot 943; (2) the dismissal of the complaint filed by private respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo; and (3) the declaration of the deed of sale executed by Flavio Zaragoza
covering Lot 943 as valid.
The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals and on record are as follows:
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land situated at the Municipalities of
Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara, Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz,
Florentino and Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a will and was
survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her
inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She claims that she is a
natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father,
in his lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her brothers
and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while
her share, which consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She
averred that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire
lands in the Philippines except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance
was executed in her favor covering these lots during her fathers lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent and the allegations on the
properties of their father. They, however, denied knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of
sale to them by their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their fathers name, while lot 943
was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They denied knowledge of the alleged intention of
their father to convey the cited lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because
she became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the estate of their father
during his lifetime.
On November 23, 1983, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the complaint did not
state a cause of action and it failed to implead indispensable parties. The resolution of said Motion was
deferred by the lower court until the case was tried on the merits.
On October 7, 1986, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo promulgated its decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the above findings, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating Lot 871 in the
name of Flavio Zaragoza Cano to plaintiff Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan as appertaining her share in his
estate and ordering defendants to vacate its premises and deliver immediately the portion occupied by
them to herein plaintiff. Plaintiffs claim against defendants over Lot 943 is dismissed as well as claims
for damages interposed against each other. 3
In the above decision, the RTC found that Flavio partitioned his properties during his lifetime among his
three children by deeds of sales; that the conveyance of Lot 943 to petitioners was part of his plan to
distribute his properties among his children during his lifetime; and that he intended Lot 871 to be the
share of private Respondent. 4
Not satisfied with the above decision, both parties interposed an appeal in the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-GR CV No. 12587.
On March 27, 1992, respondent court rendered the assailed decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-appellants, spouses

Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda E. Zaragoza, were adjudged owner of Lot 943. In all other respects, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. 5
The appellate court gave weight to the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by private
respondent to support its finding that Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance share of private Respondent.
Specifically, it noted the admission by petitioner in his letter in 1981 to private respondents counsel,
that their father had given them their inheritance. 6 Further, public respondent found that the alleged
sale of lot 943 in favor of petitioner Florentino was fictitious and void. The signature of Don Flavio in the
said document was markedly different from his other signatures appearing in other documents he signed
from January to February 1957. 7
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 8 dated June 26, 1992.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, 9 with a supplemental petition, raising the following
assigned errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE SHARE
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECEDENT FLAVIO ZARAGOZA
HAS NOT EXECUTED ANY WILL NOR ANY DOCUMENT GIVING THESE TWO PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING AND GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT LOTS 871 AND 943 ARE THE INHERITANCE
SHARE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS TOLD TO THEM BY FLAVIO ZARAGOZA DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THESE TESTIMONIES ARE HEARSAY;
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY FLAVIO
ZARAGOZA IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER OVER LOT 943 IS A FORGERY, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT:
1. THE THEORY THAT THE AFORESAID DEED OF SALE WAS A FORGERY WAS NEVER RAISED IN THE
COMPLAINT NOR ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE.
2. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS IN A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.
3. NO WITNESSES WAS EVER PRESENTED TO ASSAIL THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF
FLAVIO ZARAGOZA.
4. THE SAID DEED OF SALE WAS EVEN WITNESSED BY HIS OTHER DAUGHTER GLORIA ZARAGOZA
NUEZ AND NOTARIZED BY NOTARY PUBLIC ATTY. EDURESE.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
WITH RESPECT TO LOT 943 WHEN THE LATTER SUSTAINED THE GENUINENESS OF THE SIGNATURE OF
PETITIONERS FATHER FOUND IN EXH. I.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, IGNORING THE FACT
THAT IT IS THE LAW ON INTESTATE SUCCESSION, AND THE CORRESPONDING RULES OF COURT ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE THAT IS APPLICABLE ON THIS CASE. 10
In their Supplemental Petition for Review dated October 29, 1992, petitioners additionally raised:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION,
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT LOTS TRANSFERRED INTER VIVOS
TO THE OTHER HEIRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN COLLATED TO THE MASS OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING AS LAWFUL AND VALID ALL THE
DISPOSITIONS MADE BY THE DECEASED FLAVIO ZARAGOZA (y) CANO EXCEPT LOT # 943 DESPITE
UTTER LACK OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDING THAT THE SIGNATURE OF THE LATE FLAVIO
ZARAGOZA (y) CANO IN EXH. "M-11-A" APPEARING IN THE DEED OF SALE DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1957
(EXH. "1", FLORENTINO) WAS A FORGERY.
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-35946
(EXHIBIT - 2) COVERING LOT 943 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER CONCLUSIVELY EVIDENCES THE
LATTERS OWNERSHIP THEREOF. 11
Essentially, we are asked to resolve two issues: (1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza
Cano of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed
of Sale and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the
petitioners, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share.
chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
On the first issue. It is the main contention of the petitioner that the adjudication of Lots 943 and 871 in
favor of private respondent, as her inheritance share, has no legal basis since there is no will nor any
document that will support the transfer.
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime of Flavio, he already
partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting private respondent,
through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had
become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted Lots
871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private Respondent. These are factual determinations of the
Court of Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals. 12
Was the partition done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is basic in the
law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced.
Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. 13 The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after
collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance
share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed
without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present
for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the
partitioning inter vivos.
We now come to the second issue. Private respondent, in submitting her petition for the delivery of
inheritance share, was in effect questioning the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of
petitioner and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latters name. Although the
trial court, as an obiter, made a finding of validity of the conveyance of Lot 943 in favor of petitioners,
since according to it, private respondent did not question the genuineness of the signature of the
deceased, nevertheless, when the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, the latter declared the sale
to be fictitious because of finding of marked differences in the signature of Flavio in the Deed of Sale visa-vis signatures found in earlier documents. Could this be done? The petition is a collateral attack. It is
not allowed by Sec. 48 of the Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It can not be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
We have reiterated this rule in the case of Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 citing the earlier
cases of Constantino v. Espiritu, 15 and Co v. Court of Appeals, 16 In Halili, we held that a certificate of
title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by
its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise, all security in registered titles would be lost. In Constantino, the Court
decided that the certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real
interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be
impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except in some direct proceeding
permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. And in Co, we stated that a
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was
fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition for review. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 27, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 12587, entitled Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan
v. Spouses Florentino Zaragoza and Erlinda Enriquez-Zaragoza is VACATED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint for delivery of inheritance share in the Regional Trial Court, for failure to implead
indispensable parties, is also DISMISSED without prejudice to the institution of the proper proceedings.
chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001.]

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, Petitioner, v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE,
CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN
LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY, LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME
DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M.
PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO
TUAN,Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings before
the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. On
August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of Miguel
and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before
the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ
349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the
private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar.
Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area
of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and
the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of
parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. 1 The
total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to
secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein. 2
Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to
respondents Chuan Lung Fai, 3 Mateo Tan Te, Te Eng Suy, Loreta Te and Tio Tuan. These lots are now
covered by TCT No. T-11358. Lots 504-A-5 and 504-B-1, included in Parcel 3 but not included in the
Deed of Settlement and Partition, were transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now
registered under TCT No. T-11337. Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and
Mercedes and was designated as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500
square meters was transferred to respondent Victorino Detalla 4 and was subsequently transferred to
Jerome Deiparine who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square
meters was transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla 5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert
Chiu Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and
registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to and
subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The remaining
portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent Immaculate
Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208. 6
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa
filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld
the validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not
their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January
28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest
efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."
7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its ruling was premised on the following grounds: 8
1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of the
partition, and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her successor-ininterest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;
2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened by her
inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a more equitable share;
3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it was filed
beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code; 9
4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated December 20, 1994. 10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals in
I. . . . . FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY
DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND BINDING UPON
THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID TRANSACTION
II. . . . . CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY PRESCRIBED TWO
(2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION IN THE
NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION
III. . . . . CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR ESTOPPED IN FILING
THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED
BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC[C]-G.R. NO. SP00208
IV. . . . . SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS YET
RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT
NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S"
AND "I"
V. . . . . CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN THAT MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS
VI. . . . . FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER DEFENDANTSAPPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID
VII. . . . . FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO TESTIFY OR
REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS THAT THERE WAS A VALID PARTITION
VIII. . . . . AWARDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION 11
In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the
"Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said deed is
valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already been
transferred to the respondent buyers.
Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed
since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran v. Ayson,
4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year prescriptive period
needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been given notice, and two,
the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner insists these requirements are
not present in her case, 12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition." She cites Villaluz v. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we held that a deed of extrajudicial
partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge and consent to the same,
is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and thus an heir of Miguel. 13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to exercise
the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question. 14 In the alternative,
petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under the provisions
of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. 15
Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the
rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code. 16
Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition, they
argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of Miguel
Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent Rodriguezes in
AC-G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria Elena in the extrajudicial
partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then under litigation. In any case,
they assert that the shares of Miguels heirs were adequately protected in the said partition. 17
Section 4, Rule 74 18 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or
taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section
1 19 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. 20
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the
two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona v. De Guzman, 11 SCRA
153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud . . . may be filed
within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when
said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name
of respondents exclusively. 21
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten
months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that
her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial settlement.
It states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof . 22
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must
be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling
all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after,
which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran v.
Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought
to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some
of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. 23 Maria
Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the
provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. 24 The private respondent Rodriguezes cannot claim that
they were not aware of Maria Elenas adoption since they even filed an action to annul the decree of
adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since the adoption of Maria Elena was still
being questioned at the time they executed the deed of partition. The complaint seeking to annul the
adoption was filed only twenty-six (26) years after the decree of adoption, patently a much delayed
response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was
valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is patent that private respondents executed the deed of
partition in bad faith with intent to defraud Maria Elena.
In the case of Segura v. Segura, the Court held:
This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his
lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim
within two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2
respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right will have
prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as
far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present
case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the
partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not
affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the
partition had prescribed after two years from its execution in 1941.25
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To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the
adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own
interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically
vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did not include
Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are
constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be
recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the
doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for such purpose. 26
Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary evidence
was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must be proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork
in determining the fact and amount of damages. 27 The same is true for moral damages. These cannot
be awarded in the absence of any factual basis. 28 The unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn
Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative value. It is settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be
awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. 29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate
her claims for damages does not mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law,
nominal damages are awarded, so that a plaintiffs right, which has been invaded or violated by
defendants may be vindicated and recognized. 30
Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately
and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in the partition of
the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of the properties
involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we find it reasonable
to grant in petitioners favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. 31
The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the injury sustained by
the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages. 32 Such award is given in view of
the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this case. 33 Thus, the grant of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as damages is proper in view of the technical
injury she has suffered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private
respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to
petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.]

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS, minors, represented by their
mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, Petitioners, v. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA
DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN
DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS:
PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim
to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latters
estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this
marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the
former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus
as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12
March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and
some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a
complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial
court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration
on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said
motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions
should be threshed out at the trial considering that the certificates presented by respondents appeared
to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions,
respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the
illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief
once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine,
that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity
and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of
petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. 1 It decreed that the declaration of
heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Basically, petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent,
embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not
require a separate action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia v.
Bellosillo. 2
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is
inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia.
In praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson v.
Court of Appeals, 3 which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally addressing the
issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter
draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 4 The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. 5 In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in
itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 6 Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e.,
outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial
action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the childs
acknowledgment. 7
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.
The certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. 8 This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the
birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. 9 Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, 10 and in proper cases Article
171, 11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy
of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed
and unassailable. 12
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, Petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status
for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, 13 or in exceptional instances the latters heirs, 14 can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the
Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an
illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document,
signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate
children asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it
was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have
been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo
and Carolina de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this
instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the
decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn
their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, 15 one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought
for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress. 17
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

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[G.R. No. L-21993. June 21, 1966.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

"ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

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of accretion takes place;

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[G.R. No. L-29192. February 22, 1971.]

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Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

[G.R. Nos. 89224-25. January 23, 1992.]

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[G.R. No. 106401. September 29, 2000.]

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WHEREFORE, WE reverse the decision appealed from, insofar as defendant-appellants, spouses

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virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

[G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001.]

The facts of this case are as follows:

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4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.

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[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.]

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