Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, New York: Vintage Books, pp. 875-876.
Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, London: Verso, p. 148.
3
Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism, p. 149.
2
by the particular way that the British economy was structured by agrarian capitalist
property relations.
and trusts which dominated these new industrial industries.8 The second major limitation
is that non-industrial forms of capitalism are reliant on accumulation by means of
increasing absolute surplus value as opposed to relative surplus value, which inevitably
leads to the increasing of domestic class struggle. Due to the dramatically heightened
productivity of fossil fueled industrial production the class antagonism between labor and
capital was checked by the possibility that when pushed by class conflict, capitalists
could increase wages in return for labor peace and heightened productivity. As Samir
Amin argues, more or less full employment and social peace can be guaranteed in the
core countries if capital and labor accept, under the aegis of the state, a social contract
which relates increases in real wage to increases in productivity. 9 The maintenance and
expansion of what Lenin termed a labor aristocracy is possible as long as cheap energy
inputs are available and as long as the biosphere can continue to absorb the waste
products of industrial society, limits that human society is rapidly approaching.
V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, New York: International Publishers, p. 123.
Samir Amin, Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model, Review of African Political
Economy 1, p. 11.
10
A Samir Amin, Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model, p. 13.
9
an energetic and environmental component which has been largely overlooked in Marxist
theorizations of imperialism. Alf Hornborg has attempted to identify a thermodynamics
of imperialism which would understand how peripheral, less industrialized countries are
at a systematic disadvantage in their exchange of energy and materials with the
industrialized core. He argues that:
The flows of energy and materials from [periphery to core] tend to reduce complexity and
power in the hinterland while augmenting complexity and power in the core. Extractive
economies generally cannot count on a cumulative development of infrastructure as can
the productive economies in the core, because economic activities in the former are
dispersed and shifting according to the location of the extracted materials. As the stocks
of natural resources become increasingly difficult to extract as they are depleted, an
intensification of extraction will tend also to increase costs per unit of extracted
resources, instead of yielding the economies of scale associated with intensification in the
industrial core.11
Andr Gunder Frank points out that, this process is replicated throughout global, national
and local structures. Each of the satellites... serves as an instrument to suck capital and
economic surplus out of its own satellites and to channel part of the surplus to the world
metropolis of which all are satellites.12 This is related to the overall dominance of
industrial over agricultural regions. As Karl Kautsky notes:
As a rule, industrial zones overmaster and dominate agrarian zones. This was true earlier
of the city vis--vis the countryside, and it is now true of the industrial state vis--vis an
agrarian state. A state which remains agrarian decays politically and usually
economically, too, and loses its autonomy in both respects.13
Alf Hornborg, The Power of the Machine: Global Inequalities of Economy, Technology, and
Environment, Oxford, Alta Mira Press, 2001, p. 28.
12
Andr Gunder Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment", Monthly Review, Sept. 1966, p. 20.
13
Karl Kautsky, Ultra Imperialism, New Left Review, p. 43.
fossil fuels to enable their initial process of industrial accumulation, but as they have
expanded they have become increasingly dependent on the extraction of low entropy
minerals and fossil fuels from the periphery. Each year from its inception to the present,
the global industrial capitalist system has drawn down more energy from fossil fuel
stocks than the year before. Economic growth which is inherently dissipative of energy
requires constant inputs of new forms of energy and minerals in order to maintain its
growth, and these resources are increasingly coming from the underdeveloped areas of
the world economy. A few statistics provide a sense of the dynamic:
the US share of world energy consumption is 25%, while 20% of the worlds people do
not have access to enough energy to successfully maintain their own body metabolism...
the richest 20% of the worlds population consume 86% of the it aluminum, 81% of the
paper, 80% of the iron, and 76% of the lumber. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions in
1990 were around 5 tons in the United States but only 0.1 tons in India. 14
1970 and the geo-political consequences of this were brought home by the 1973 Arab oil
embargo which marked the first time that the US was not able to meet market disruptions
to the global oil supply by increasing their own domestic oil production. If it is the case,
as Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver argue, that the world since 1970 has been going
through a new phase of global hegemonic transition,15 then it would appear that control
over oil, the lifeblood of the industrial system, will be of fundamental importance in
determining the emergence of any new global hegemon. The problem of the global
peaking of world oil production and the attempts to implement alternative energy regimes
(nuclear, photovoltaic, wind etc..) thus emerge as central concerns for the study of global
political economy.
15
Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 272.