D Equipment Failure

How does equipment

fail?

How Can Equipment Fail?

Internal Upset e.g.
High pressure
High temperature
Structural Failure
Material Failure
Specific Equipment
(Component) Failure
Human Error !

Some common immediate causes

Non Return Valve doesnt hold

Closed valve passes fluid
Level float sticks
Freeze up in dead leg
Deposit builds up on thermowell
- false temperature indication.
Wear and tear
Low point drain plugs when needed.
Poor link between sensing element and control
point.

Causes of Equipment Failure

OTHER

INADEQUATE
INSPECTION

OPERATING
ERRORS
POOR DESIGN
IMPROPER
MAINTENANCE

IMPROPER
PROCEDURES

Internal Upset - Pressure

Can you get hurt with low pressure?
Lets review the details.
Force = Pressure multiplied times Area

Its like many small weights

sitting on a surface which add
up to a big weight.
So at a given pressure,
the LARGER the area
The LARGER the force.

Example 1
Force = pressure multiplied by area so:
0.7
barg

300mm X
300mm Square
Door
650 kilogrammes of Force

0.7 bag pressure on a 300mm X 300mm square surface area (90,000mm2) is 650
kg of force!
This is equivalent to an object that weighs 650 kg or1,400 lbs.
And as the door weighs about 50 kg lbs -- if suddenly released it goes
flying!

Be Aware
Can you get hurt with low pressure?

ABSOLUTELY !
Beware of large surfaces as even 0.05 bar which
may not even register on the pressure gauge but
its enough to send a hatch flying.

Vacuum Safety
Same concepts
In vacuum systems the
pressure is pushing
inward, not outward.
The pressure comes
from the atmosphere
We dont feel it but
a tank does when you
pull a vacuum on it!

Atmospheric Pressure

Vacuum

Atmospheric Pressure (at sea level) is 1 bar g

(1 kg/cm2), therefore full vacuum is -1 kg/cm2.

Covered Vent
This tank collapsed while being pumped out!
Painters had covered the vent with plastic sheeting.

Materials of Construction Failure

Leading Contributors
Erosion / Corrosion
Pitting
Temperature gradient
Cracking
Stress fatigue
Stress impact
Stress corrosion

Materials of Construction Failure

Elbow Thinning

Case History CH6

Humber Oil Refinery - UK

Case History 6 - Humber Refinery

2001 Humber Oil Refinery, UK
Saturate Gas (C3/C4) Plant overheads pipe
Catastrophic failure at a 6 in (152 mm) diameter
elbow just downstream of water-into-gas injection
point
Refinery shut down for several weeks
Widespread damage to houses and businesses
within a 1 kilometer (1.6 mi) radius of the site

The Incident

The Incident Contd

Piping Failure

The Incident Contd

Failed Elbow

What Happened
The elbow failed due to erosion-corrosion damage.
180 te of LPG vapour escaped; ignited after c.20
secs
Fireballs 30 m (100ft) in height
Wall thickness was reduced from 7-8 mm (0.25 in)
to 0.3 mm (0.01 in)
Water injection point returned to use (from
intermittent to permanent) without full MoC
Failed elbow had not been inspected in 20 years

Damage Details

Major Lessons Learned

Management of change
procedures must be robust
and involve all functions

Ma
n

Pipework integrity must be

managed and critical points
monitored
Corrosion data must be
managed and trends
analysed

ess

Pro
c

ag
em
en
to
f

&

Ch
a

Me
ch
an
ica
l

ng
e

In
teg
rit

A typical plant has miles of Piping

Transports large inventories
Transmits pressure and temperature

Piping Design
Size Must accommodate range of flow rates
Orientation Must disengage vapor from liquid
- Low points, dead legs, under road
crossings
Support Static and dynamic stress
Material Must resist failure under range of
exposures
Wall thickness Compatible with system design
pressure

Piping System Failure Modes

Material failure / Corrosion / Erosion

Joint failure insecure assembly

Blockage
Bending / stress
Incorrect closure of valves
Freezing and Expansion
Vibration
Local Eddy currents
Metallurgical defects
Human error / Complexity

Case History CH7

Oil Refinery - Alberta

Case History 7-Oil Refinery, Alberta

1984 - Large oil refinery, Alberta, Canada

The Process
Flow Schematic
M

TO GAS COMPRESSSOR
NATURAL GAS

LGO
STRIPPER

SCRUBBER

FRACTIONATOR

FEED
SURGE
DRUM

REACTOR

LGO
M

BITUMEN

FEED
RINGS

G-1
INITIAL
FAILURE
HGO

BITUMEN FEED
G-2

RECYCLE SLURRY

BOTTOM
PUMPAROUND

G-3
M

PUMPAROUND

The Incident
Coker 8-2 was operating normally with no
apparent problems. Feed rate 82 KB/SD.
Line failed on overhead pipe rack between
reactor structure and compressor house.
Hot oil release accompanied by a large fire in
unit and explosion in compressor house.
Intense fire burned for 4 hours.
Total physical damage $120 million. Four
months to rebuild.

Damage Details

What Happened
Initiating failure was in 18 in (0.5 m) section of 6
in (150 mm) carbon steel pipe that had been
welded into 5Cr Mo line.
Operators were unable to shutoff other hot oil
pumps or isolate piping circuits to and from reactor.
As fire spread, several other lines ruptured and
this further aggravated the fire.
Abrasive solids in slurry was a contributing factor.
However improper metallurgy made failure
inevitable.
Pipe wall thinning had pre-existed prior to fire.
Initial failure attributed to hot sulphidation
corrosion.

What Happened Contd

Point of Failure

Major Lessons Learned

Piping circuits which supply large

quantities of highly hazardous
material must have remote
Pro
isolation capability.
ce

Systems must be in place to

verify the material and quality of
all materials installed in the field.

Emergency shutdown procedures

are critical to avoiding
catastrophic losses and must be
practiced regularly.

En

gin
ee
rin
gS
yst
em

ss
&
Tr
a

Me
ch
an
ica
l

In
teg
ini
rit
ng
y
/C
om
pe
ten
cy

Pipe Failures
Corrosion

Pinhole leaks

10

Pipe Failures contd

Did you know that 60% of major accidents in

plants involve piping system failures?

Pipe Failures contd

Brittle fracture

Thinning

Pipe Failures contd

Pitting

11

Pipe Failures contd

Stress crack

Fired Heaters
Provides high level heat to process
streams or incinerate waste streams.
Critical operating parameters /
hazardous conditions.
Major fuel release source in many
plants.
- high throughput
- moderate to high pressure
-high temperature
Source of major loss in many plants.

Fired Heaters Common Incidents

TUBE FAILURE
Metal creep, sustained high tube temperature.
Erosion on process side from solids or 2 phase flow.
Poor flow distribution or a blocked pass.
Direct flame impingement.
Mechanical stresses on coil assembly.
FIREBOX EXPLOSION
Procedural error or inadequate monitoring.
Inadequate purging
FURNACE TUBE FOULING
Contaminated fuel or inadequate flow in tubes.

12

Tankage

Hazards
Largest inventory of hazardous material on sites.
Significant vapor space and high confinement.
Tank defects and upsets are difficult to detect.
Tank incidents are difficult to isolate.
Remedial action is usually only partly effective.
Often regarded as low to moderate in severity/risk
and dont receive prime attention.

Case History CH8

Buncefield

Case History 8 - Buncefield

2005 Buncefield Oil Storage Depot, UK
Vapour cloud explosion caused massive damage
and additional explosions.
Resulting fire engulfed a high proportion of
the site.
No fatalities, more than 40 people injured
Significant damage to both commercial and
residential properties in the vicinity.

13

The Incident

What Happened
Tank in Bund (containment dike) A was being
filled with unleaded motor fuel at a rate of
550 m3/hr (2,422 U.S. gpm)
Level gauge recorded an unchanged reading,
the tank continued for more than 2 hours.
Continued pumping caused fuel (300tes
(661,380 lbs)) to cascade down the side of the
tank.
Escaping fuel formed a massive vapour cloud
which eventually found an ignition source.

Buncefield summarised
Graphic interpretation of 3rd investigation report

BPA

HOSL West

?
ESD Trip

SCADA

Alarm panel

SCADA: High Level Supervisory

Control and Data Acquisition system

ATG

Override
switch
for tests

E
AFT
TED
TES

C
R IN

O
NT :
ID E

ATG: Automatic Tank Gauging

system

?: data not available from report

Substation

?
LI

HLA

Static after 03:00

Overflow
after 05:20 (appx 300 t)
Tank 912 (fitted with
Internal Floating Roof)
Gasoline vapour cloud
develops

14 T/K
South pipeline

TI

Ignition at 06:01
Open

Pumping rate into tank: 550 m3/h from 19:00 to appx. 05:50
890 m3/h from 05:50 to incident
(Unleaded gasoline)

14

Notice car

(source Hertfordshire F&RS Report)

22 minutes later

(source Hertfordshire F&RS Report)

Intensity of blast still unexplained

Source: 3rd investigation report

HSE level of overpressure for planning advice:

600 millibar = 50 per cent fatalities within occupied buildings

BUNCEFIELD:
700 to 1,000 mbars

Catherine House
Fuji

Picture credit: local Police website

15

Damage Details

Damage Details Contd

Major Lessons Learned

En
Instrumentation and control of
gi n
ee
rin
transfer systems is critical.
gS
ys
Communication between remote
tem
s
Pro
locations.
ce
ss
an
Maintenance of level
dM
ec
instrumentation and high level
ha
nic
trips in tankage areas just as
al
In
teg
important as process areas.
rit
Pro
y
ce
s
The location of commercial and
sR
isk
residential developments
Ma
na
ge
around sites like Buncefield
me
nt
must be carefully analyzed.

16

Offshore Failure Mechanisms

Vessels, Piping, Machinery
Structure
Ship collisions
Sea states
Earthquakes

Transport

Helicopter

Sub Sea Operations

Wells
SimOps

Dropped Objects

Offshore Failure Mechanisms

Riser Break
This is not a drill
drill
Lower Riser
supported by
drill pipe

Riser Jt
No.1
against
BOP

Mud falling
from broken
upper riser
Top of Lower
Marine Riser
Package (BOP)

Riser Jt #1
against BOP
controls

Riser Jts
resting on
other wellhead

17