Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
JUISDICTION . 1
ISSUES PRESENTED . 1
STATEMENT . . 2
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS . 2
Sentencing . 9
SUMY OF ARGUMNT
ARGUMNT
Standard Of Review
Standard of Review
The Court' s Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous
The Government Was Not Required To Prove That The
Price Fixing Conspiracy Was Successful
The Sentencing Commission Was Not Arbitrary Or
Capricious When It Established 20 Percent Of The
Defendant' s Volume Of Commerce As The Base Fine
For Per Se Antitrust Violations
CONCLUS ION
TABLE OF AUTHORIS
CASES
Arona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U. S. 332 (1982) " " 42
Crist v. Dickson Welding. Inc. 957 F. 2d 1281 (5th Cir. cert. denied 506 U. S. 864 (1992) . . 27
FTC v. Superior Court Trial La\\ers Ass n, 493 U. S. 411 (1990) ..................... 42
Huffv. United States , 192 F. 2d 911 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied , 342 U. S. 946 (1952) ..... 22
Market Force Inc. v. Wauwatosa Realty Co. 906 F. 2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1990) ............. 21
National Society of Professional Engieers v. United States , 435 U. S. 679 (1978) ......... 40
Reserve Supply COI:. v. Owens- Cornng Fiberglas COI:. , 971 F. 2d 37 (7th Cir. 1992) ..,.. 21
United States v. Alessandroni , 982 F. 2d 419 (10th Cir. 1992) " '" 36
United States v. All Star Industries , 962 F. 2d 465 (5th Cir. cert. denied
506 U. S. 940 (1992) ................. ,.............................. 23
United States v. Ballard , 779 F. 2d 287 (5th Cir. cert. denied 475 1109 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . 30
United States v. Bermea. 30 F.3d 1539 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115
S. Ct. 1113 (1995) ..................................................... 30 , 34
United States v. Bi- Co Pavers. Inc. , 741 F. 2d 730 (5th Cir. 1984) .................. 27
United States v. Branch, 850 F. 2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied , 488 U. S. 1018 (1989) . 22
United States v. Cargo Servce Stations. Inc. 657 F. 2d 676 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied , 455 U. S. 1017 (1982) ............................................ 30
United States v. Casel , 995 F. 2d 1299 (5th Cir. cert. denied , 510 U. S. 978 (1993) ........ 16
United States v. Castro , 15 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 127 (1994) ...., 31
United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio. Inc , 845 F. 2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1988) " " 42
United States v. Foley, 598 F. 2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied , 444 U. S. 1043 (1980) .. 20
United States v. Harrelso n, 705 F. 2d 733 (5th Cir. 1983) " " 25
United States v. Hayter Oil Co. , 51 F. 3d 1265 (6th Cir. 1995) .................. 38- 42
United States v. Heath, 970 F. 2d 1397 (5th Cir. 1992); cert. denied , 507 U. S. 1004 (1993) .. 16
.................................. 22
United States v. Kissel , 218 U. S. 601 (1910)
...................................... 33
United States v. Lane 474 U. S. 438 (1986)
................................. 15
United States v. Leal , 74 F. 3d 600 (5th Cir. 1996)
....................... 33
United States v. Loaiza-Vas uez, 735 F. 2d 153 (5th Cir. 1984)
United States v. Misle Bus & E ment Co. , 967 F. 2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1992) ............. 17
United States v. Morrow , 537 F. 2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied , 430 U. S. 956 (1977) .. 33
......................... 25
United States v. Natel , 812 F. 2d 937 (5th Cir. 1987)
United States v. Reed , 658 F. 2d 624 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied , 455 U. S. 1002 (1982) ..., 34
United States v. Rodri ez-Mireles 896 F. 2d 890 (5th Cir. 1990) ..................... 15
............................... 15
United States v. Salazar , 66 F. 3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995)
United States v . S cott , 678 F. 2d 606 (5th Cir. cert. denied , 459 U. S. 972 (1982)
..,...... 16
United States v. Thevis , 665 F. 2d 616 (5th Cir. cert. denied , 456 U. S. 1008 (1982)
.,..... 27
United States v. Tracy, 989 F. 2d 1279 (1st Cir. cert. denied , 508 U. S. 929 (1993) ........ 30
STATUTES AN RULES
Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990 , Pub. L. No. 101- 588 , sec. 4 , 104 Stat. 2879
2880 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
15 U. C. 1 .............,............................................ 1 , 11
18 U. C. 3231 "
18 U. C. 3282 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
18 U.S. c. 3742(a)
28 U. C. 1291
G. IB1.1 ........................................................... 43
8C3. 3 ...........................................................
MICELLOUS
Hearings Before the United States Sentencing Commssion Concerng Alternatives To
Incarceration (July 15 , 1986) (Statement of Douglas H. Gisburg, Assistant Attorney General
Antitrust Division) ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Mark A. Cohen & David T. Scheffan The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Is The Punishment
Worth The Costs? , 27 Am. Cri. L. Rev. 331 (1989) ............................ 45
STATEMNT OF JUISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 u. S. C.
judgment on May 30, 1996, and Mrs. Baird' s Bakeries, Inc. filed a
June 7, 1996.
ISSUES PRESENTED
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Baird' s on Count One. Mrs. Baird' s was acquitted on Count Two and
at 3). During this period, Mrs. Baird' s sold "Mrs. Baird' s" bread
R. at 168- 69).
some assurance that the other would follow suit, that bakery
would "be out on a limb" id. 227- 28).
To avoid leaving Mrs. Baird' s " out on a limb" , Oler began
had sent out a price increase letter, Green would call Oler
before the effective date of the change and ask if Oler had seen
the letter. If Oler had not seen the letter, he would agree to
asked how Mrs. Baird' s was going to respond to the letter was to
find out before the effective date of Flowers ' increase whether
Mrs. Baird' s was going to increase its prices too (4 R. at 177; 5
R. at 235-36). Indeed, Mrs. Baird' s knew that Flowers would
rescind its proposed increase before it went into effect if Mrs.
36) .
After Oler had Flowers ' price increase informtion, he would
give it to Carroll Baird and ask him what response he should give
65) . When Oler told Green that Mrs. Baird' s would match the
price increase, Flowers would let its price increase letter take
effect, and Carroll Baird would tell Oler to issue a Mrs. Baird'
price letter with prices identical to those proposed by Flowers
for most bread and bread products sold in East Texas, including
white and wheat bread (4 R. at 179- 81; 5 R. at 264-65, 418-19).
When the bakeries raised their wholesale prices, the retail
prices also increased (4 R. at 182).
Carroll Baird removed Oler as director of sales for East
Texas in either 1991 or 1992 (5 R. at 231- , 353-55, 422- 23,
White and wheat bread were the bakeries ' major sellers (4 R.
at 164, 180- 81).
01er testified that he and Byron Baird had stood " outside
the corporate office doorway in the hallway and (Byron) looked at
me and he said from now on Carroll and I will take care of the
competitive contacts, and I said fine" (5 R. at 357). Accord ide
at 423 (Byron Baird did not say the contacts would stop, he said
that he and his brother Carroll Baird would continue those
contacts"
(Footnote continued on next page)
contacts did continue. Oler testified that when he later met
Green at a function, Green said " something to th (e) effect" that
continuing into ' 92 and ' 93, the contacts with competitors and
thereafter because Flowers did not raise its prices too id.
225, 278- 79). Oler explained that Green told him that on that
occasion the " agreement" that Carroll Baird and Woody Rochelle
"had had on fixing prices had gone awry" id. at 232 - 33, 278,
282-83).
An audio tape recording of a November 1992 telephone
stated that the salesman "is charging 76 cents for white bread
. and I wonder if that' s something missed" (7 R. at 656)
wholesale price was low , and that he then " raised the question
and (I - - you know, I was sent the note and I said, well, ) I'
check into it" id. at 658- 59; Exhibit 1). Oler then opined: "If
it is, probably it' s nothing more than a little glitch that can
Sentencing
Under U. G. 8C2. 4(a), the base fine for Mrs. Baird'
conviction would be the " greatest of: (1) the amount from the
(guidelines ) table ., or (2) the pecuniary gain to the
organization or (3) the pecuniary loss from the offense
the pecuniary loss under subsection (a) (3) of 8C2. 4 (Base Fine),
Commission " estimated that the average gain from price- fixing is
10 percent of the selling price (and that) (b) ecause the loss
from price- fixing exceeds the gain, subsection (d) (1) provides
that 20 percent of the volume of affected commerce is to be used
in lieu of the pecuniary loss under 8C2. 4(a) (3). " U.
least implicit (ly) " set the 20 percent pecuniary loss from price
evidence that the conspiracy went beyond the sale of white and
wheat breads, Mrs. Baird' s contended that in computing the volume
1986 through 1992, the Guideline base fine still exceeded the $10
See 15 U. S. C. 1.
Mrs. Baird' s volume of commerce for all
bread products for the years 1986 through 1992 was $112 million,
and if that figure is reduced using Mrs. Baird' s 60 percent
figure for white and wheat bread, the volume of commerce is $67
million (2 Supp. R. at 74). Twenty percent of $112 million is
$22. 4 million, and 20 percent of $67 million is $13. 4 million.
At the hearing, government counsel mistakenly calculated 60
percent of $112 million to be $82 million instead of $67 million
id. at 74).However, given the $10 million statutory maimum
fine, this mathematical error does not affect the outcome in this
case. See note 27, infra
letter, unless the second agreed to match " any prices proposed by
until the time that Carroll Baird and Woody Rochelle from Flowers
screwed up" a 1993 price increase that Mrs. Baird' s had
proposed.
Mrs. Baird' s is wrong that the jury was improperly
2R1. 1(d)
(1). As the court noted, in this case if it considered
only Mrs. Baird' s sales of white and wheat bread from 1986
through 1992, the base fine exceeded the statutory maximum.
the commerce done during the time that the conspiracy was in
the fine within the Guidelines ' range. Accordingly, the district
court' s computation of the base fine in this case was a correct
3d 575, 577 (5th Cir. cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1867 (1996).
The test is whether n a rational trier of fact could have found
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U. S. 1004 (1993). Thus, the
reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or substitute its
regular and continuing basis from 1986 until 1992, Oler and
increase, Oler would relay both the proposed prices and Flowers
prices, Flowers would rescind its price letter and would not
1986 and 1992 when Carroll Baird decided that Mrs. Baird' s would
match Flowers ' increase, 14 Flowers let its proposed prices take
effect, and Carroll Baird had Oler send out a Mrs. Baird' s price
increase letter with prices matching the new Flowers prices (4 R.
"lawful" conduct does not need to try to hide that conduct from
would have called his superiors at Mrs. Baird' s rather than Green
lower price than Mrs. Baird' see 8-9, supra The jury was
rescind the increase " a short period of time" later id. at 225,
278- 79) .
with the response either rescission of the proposed increase
demonstrates that they were giving each other " mutual assurances
to use the informtion involved in (aJ particular way.
Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law , , 1422b, at 134 (1986).
other words, when either company led with a proposed price
increase letter, it was asking the other " should we raise our
That' s right.
Because if you ain t going with them, they re not
increasing their prices?
Yes.
prices, " because the actual pricing decisions either to
about the future sales upon which they were most likely to bid"
and then subsequently did not bid against each other. On these
facts, the court had no difficulty rejecting the argument "that
conclusion that Mrs. Baird' s had conspired to fix prices and had
not simply engaged in a lawful informtion exchange. As the
court in Alvord - Polk explained, it is . when those
from the Indictment (Br. 28- 30) must be rejected. Those claims
are nothing more than a variation on its erroneous theme that
only a lawful price exchange was proven. For the above s ta ted
reasons, its claims collapse with its premise.
The Jury Correctly Determined That The Conspiracy
Continued Into The Period Governed By The Statute Of
Limitations
The indictment in this case was returned on September 28,
1995 (1 R. at 1). Accordingly, under the relevant statute of
(1989); Huff v. United States , 192 F. 2d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied , 342 U. S. 946 (1952). Since the agreement itself
communicated with each other during the time that he was director
conspiracy, did not end when Oler was reassigned and, therefore,
continued at least into 1991. See Kissel , 218 U. S. at 608.
conspiracy had not ended prior to that " screw up. In sum, the
jury had more than enough evidence to conclude that the
conspiracy had not been abandoned before September 28, 1990, the
beginning of the statute s five- year limitations period.
II. THE JUY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
Based on its claim that the evidence demonstrates only price
exchanges and not price fixing, Mrs. Baird' s argues that the
district court erred by: 1) failing to give that part of its
the jury that the government did not have to prove an actual
effect on prices (Br. 31- 38). In fact, the district court' s jury
law and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to give the additional instructions requested by Mrs.
Baird'
The trial judge retains broad discretion in formulating jury
943 F. 2d 1422 , 1429 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Natel , 812
proposed instruction " warrant (s) reversal only where the charge
the law").
In this case, the court correctly instructed the jury
two or more persons" id. at 634- 35) (emphasis added), and that a
were not on trial for n any act or conduct or offense not alleged
agreement must be the jury s primary focus id. at 673 , 688), and
II
that merely exchanging price informtion between companies is
not illegal id. at 688).
enabled Mrs. Baird' s to argue to the jury that it had not agreed
to fix prices but had lawfully exchanged price informtion, it
now contends that the jury should have been instructed, among
would have told the jury, among other things, that announcing a
price increase in advance would not, without more, violate the
Shermn Act, the jury was instructed that a business can " copy
the price list of a competitor" or charge the same prices as a
the jury could not have convicted Mrs. Baird' s for engaging in
(5th Cir. (quoting Zafiro v. United States , 113 S. Ct. 933, 938
v. Rivera- Gomez , 67 F. 3d 993, 999 (1st Cir. 1995) (" jurors are not
jury to find that Mrs. Baird' s had agreed to fix prices. The
court' s emphasis on the need to find a price fixing agreement
adequate.
Finally, Mrs. Baird' s contention (Br. 35- 38) -- that " (i)n
light of the evidence adduced by the Government, the trial court
theme that only lawful price exchanges were shown. But the
Indictment charged price fixing not price exchanges, and the jury
was instructed that it had to find that Mrs. Baird' s had agreed
to fix prices. Because Mrs. Baird' s recognizes that the court'
instruction is " appropriate for per unlawful price fixing
cases" (Br. 37), its argument is frivolous. See United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. , 310 U. S. at 218- 22 ; United
States v. All Star Industries , 962 F. 2d at 474- 75 (approving per
instruction similar to that given below); United States v.
Carqo Service Stations. Inc. , 657 F. 2d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied , 455 U. S. 1017 (1982).
In short, because " the district court ' did not deprive (Mrs.
Baird' s) of (its) defensive theory ' and did not misstate the law,
its jury charge must be upheld. Natel , 812 F. 2d at 942- 43.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO SEVER COUN TWO
FROM THE INDICTMNT
making this arguent, Mrs. Baird' s correctly notes (Br. 38) that
it filed a motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8 (a) claiming improper
Standard Of Review
the trial judge. Zafiro v. United States , 113 S. Ct. at 938- 39.
Zafiro , 113 S. Ct. at 938 (emphasis added). Thus, this Court has
3d 417 , 422 (5th Cir. cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 127 (1994).
Consequently, to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, a convicted
Two, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to sever that count.
show that prices that were fixed in West Texas prior to September
1990 continued in effect past that date (5 R. at 205- 06). While
the Government believes that the evidence it presented at trial
that evidence has n spilled over from one defendant or count and
prejudiced a defendant does not constitute compelling prejudice.
United States v. Lueth , 807 F. 2d 719, 731 (8th Cir. 1986) (such a
split verdict is "' convincing evidence that the jury was able to
the error did not substantially affect the jury s verdict and,
(Amicus Br. 11- 16) (" amicus"), argue that because the government
could not prove that the loss caused by the violation was 20
A. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 18 U. C. 3742(e), a reviewing court must uphold
Ct. 1112 , 1119 (1992) (construing the " plain language" of the
Guidelines); Mathena , 23 F. 3d at 91. The Sentencing Commission'
conspiracy, and it found that for "the seven- year period" from
80- 81). Mrs. Baird' s does not dispute the accuracy of the $112
For exaple, its claim that Oler was reassigned in December 1990
ignores evidence that the reassignment in fact took place in
and Oler exchanged were " product listing (s)" that contained
prices for " each one of (their) branded item" (4 R. at 172), and
that when Carroll Baird had Oler match a Flowers price increase
it would be for " most products" ( id. 180). Thus, the court did
include all sales made by Mrs. Baird' s during the period of the
G. 2R1. 1(b) (2). The meaning of the phrase " affected by the
such usage is the first and best guide to how the Guideline
should be interpreted. Williams , 112 S. Ct. at 1119; Mathena , 23
51 F. 3d at 1273.
In this case, the violation found by the jury was fixing the
and Green discussed price informtion only in ' some cases '" (Br.
Green " would have a conversation" in " some cases, " that
would hand (him) the price letter" which Oler "in turn" gave
11\
'"- -:- '" .. -
, :c '
calculations.
In any event, Mrs. Baird' s argument has an additional
pricing decision
flaw. In order to prove whether a particular "
(Br. 45), the government
resulted from a price- fixing agreement"
would have to prove the day-to- day success of the conspiracy.
The Antitrust Guideline plainly does not require such
proof.
The Commentary to the Antitrust Guideline establishes that
bodily injury, " and noting in each case that " (a) s used in the
the conspiracy.
Both Mrs. Baird' (Br. 47-50) and amicus (Amicus Br. 12- 16)
2R1. 1(d) (1). Notwithstanding its admission that " we all agree we
(Br. 49-50). It and amicus then argue that the court should have
coupled with large fines" and, therefore, that " substantial fines
are an essential part of the sentence" id. ) (emphasis added)
This language has been part of the Commission s Commentary since
maximum fine for corporations ten- fold in 1990, from one to ten
very purpose.
24 Amicus '
reliance (Br. 14-15) on Mark A. Cohen & David T.
Scheffman, The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline: Is The Punishment
Worth The Costs? , 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 331 (1989) ("Cohen &
Scheffman" ), is misplaced. Although that article did discuss a
study of seven price fixing cases in the bread industry which
suggested " an ' average ' price fixing markup of just under one
percent, " the article itself explained that " (0) f course, these
resul ts were from settlements , not awards. The authors then
appear to vacillate on whether those settlement results " probably
understate the actual markup" or overstate
Rev. at 345 & n. 66.
it.
27 Am. Crim. L.
effect of a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Rather,
rt l he offense levels are not based directly on the damge caused
or profit made by the defendant because damges are difficult and
that the per se rule itself exists in part "to avoid a burdensome
Indeed, even Mrs. Baird' s own expert admitted that computing the
gain from price fixing is " a difficult task under the best of
Court must reject Mrs. Baird' s and amicus ' claim that it was
by the violation.
In fact, the Commission explicitly recognized that in any
base fine should equal the loss or harm caused by the violation,
the Guideline does not provide for setting the base fine at a
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOEL I. Klein
Acting Assistant Attorney General