Admin March 12

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |1
G.R. No. 147741
May 10, 2001
REP.
MA.
CATALINA
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FELIPE
ANTONI, respondents.
L.
V.
MONTEJO
GO, petitioner,
and
ARVIN
V.
PARDO, J.:
The Case
In her petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks to nullify the resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)en banc declaring her disqualified to run for
the office of governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte, because she filed
certificates of candidacy for both positions and the withdrawal of her certificate of
candidacy for mayor was filed late by twenty eight minutes from the deadline.
1
Forthwith, we issued an order2 to maintain the status quo ante, in effect allowing
petitioner's certificate of candidacy for governor in the meantime.
In its Comment,3 the COMELEC justified its resolution on the ground that
petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Baybay, Leyte was ineffectual because it was submitted twenty eight (28) minutes
late at the office of the municipal election officer at Baybay. The facsimile copy
thereof was filed with said office at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001, and the original
copy thereof was actually received by the office of the municipal election officer of
Baybay at 1:15 p.m., the same day. The provincial election supervisor of Leyte,
with office at Tacloban City, to whom petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy
for governor at 11:47 p.m., 28 February 2001, refused to accept the affidavit of
withdrawal tendered simultaneously therewith because, as he claimed, the
affidavit must be filed with the office of the municipal election officer of Baybay,
Leyte where petitioner filed certificate of candidacy for mayor.1wphi1.nt
The Facts
On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election
supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy
for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to
file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her
candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. Hiowever, the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and
suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the
municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of
candidacy for mayor.
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel
time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her
affidavit of withdrawal by fax4 to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter
submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28
a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of
Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal. 6
On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor
of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the
certificates of candidacy of petitioner.7 Respondent Antoni filed a similar petitions,
namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus,
making her ineligible for both.1wphi1.nt
On 06 March 2001, Atty. Manuel L. Villegas, the provincial election supervisor of
Leyte, by 1st indorsement, referred the cases to the Commission on Election,
Manila, Law Department, on the ground that he was inhibiting himself due to his
prior action of refusing to receive the petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal tendered
simultaneously with the filing of the certificate of candidacy for governor on 28
February 2001.9
In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P.
Balbuena, made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to
be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a
report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc10
Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte,

whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001.
The report and recommendation reads:
On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the
municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay,
Leyte.
"Submitted for due consideration is the petition filed by Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and
Atty. Arvin V. Antoni on March 5, 2001, before the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte, seeking to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Catalina L. Go for Governor of Leyte.
"Both petitions which are exactly worded in the same language allege, as follows:
"This petition is heretofore filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the
COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE and Section 15, as well, of RESOLUTION NO.
3253-A of the COMELEC EN BANC promulgated on November 20, 2000. Ditto, this
petition is filed within the reglementary period following the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy on February 28, 2001.
'Petitioner Atty. Felipe V. Montejo is of voting age, Filipino, lawyer by profession,
married, and a resident of #50 Juan Luna Street, Tacloban City, of which locality
he is a registered voter.
'Respondent re. Catalina L. Go, on the other hand, is likewise of legal age,
married, resident of Baybay, Leyte, of which locality she is a registered voter, and
the incumbent Member of the House of Representatives representing the
5th Congressional District of Leyte.
'Respondent CATALINA L. GO filed a certificate of candidacy for the office of Mayor
of the Municipality of Baybay, Leyte on February 27, 2001. Without canceling or
withdrawing the said certificate of candidacy this time for the office of Provincial
Governor of Leyte on February 28, 2001. However, before the expiration of the
period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, respondent indubitably failed to
declare under oath the office for which she desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office.
'Verily, at the time respondent filed her certificate of candidacy for Provincial
Governor, she knew fully well that she was ineligible for the said office, having
filed, a day earlier, a certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte. Hence,
respondent falsely represented in her certificate of candidacy for provincial
Governor, and under oath, that she is ELIGIBLE for the said office; a material fact
required by law to be sworn to and contained in certificates of candidacy. In fine,
respondent likewise falsely represented in her certificates of candidacy, under
oath, the she will OBEY THE LAWS, ORDERS, DECRESS, RESOLUTIONS AND
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED AND ISSUED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES; a material fact required by law to be sworn to and contained in
certificates of candidacy.'
"Petitioners' ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of
candidacy is anchored on Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted
hereunder.
'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he
shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to
be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.'
"In relation to Section (1) (b) of the Comelec Resolution No. 3253-A, to wit:
'SECTION 1. Certificate of Candidacy. xxxxxx (b) No person shall be eligible for
more than one office to be filed in the same election. If he files a certificate of
candidacy for more than one office he shall not be eligible for either. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificate of candidacy, he may
declare under oath the office for which he desire to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the office or offices.'
"Moreover, petitioners contended that CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-Go is ineligible to
run either Mayor of Baybay, Leyte or Governor of Leyte Province.
"Based on the certified list of candidate for the provincial candidates of Leyte on
March 7, 2001, the certificate of candidacy of Catalina Lopez Loreto-Go for the
position of Governor of Leyte was filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor on February 28, 2001 at 11:47 p.m., the last day for filing certificates
of candidacy.
"In support of the petitions of Atty. Montejo and Atty. Antoni, is a certified
machine copy of the affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina L. Loreto-Go, which was
filed on march 01, 2001 at the Office of the Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte,
which she filed on February 28, 2001.
"The affidavit of withdrawal of Catalina Loreto-Go, a portion of which reads:
"1. That last February 27, 2001 I filed my certificate of candidacy for mayor for
the MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, LEYTE;
"2. That due to political exigency and influence form my political leaders urging
me to run for mayor of the Municipality of baybay, leyte, I have no other recourse
but to follow desire of my political constituents;
"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for

Mayor of the Municipality of Baybay, leyte and in it stead I am formally filing my
certificate for Governor of Leyte.
"A careful scrutiny and examination of Catalina Loreto-Go certificate of candidacy
for Governor of Leyte Province although filed on the last day of February 28, 2001,
her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte, was filed only on March 1,
2001 or one (1) day after the February 28, 2001 deadline. In other word, there
are two (2) certificates of candidacy filed by Catalina Loreto-Go, one for governor
of Leyte and the other for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte.
"Clearly, on March 1, 2001 when she filed her affidavit of withdrawal for Mayor of
baybay, Leyte, both her certificates of candidacy for Mayor of Baybay, leyte and
Governor of Leyte were still subsisting and effective making her liable for filing
two certificates of candidacy on different elective positions, thus, rendering her
ineligible for both positions, in accordance with Section (1) (b) of Comelec
Resolution No. 3253-A.
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department RECOMMENDS as follows:
"1.) To give due course to the petition of Atty. Felipe V. Montejo and Atty. Arvin V.
Antonio against the certificates of candidacy of Catalina Loreto-Go for Governor of
Leyte; and
"2.) To direct the Provincial Election Suprevisor of Leyte and the Election Officer to
delete/cancel the name of CATALINA LOPEZ LORETO-GO from the certified list of
candidates for Governor of Leyte and Mayoralty candidates of Baybay, Leyte, and
to accordingly notify the parties and the above-named Comelec Officials." 11
On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the
Director, Law Department and adopted the resolution in question as set out in the
opening paragraph of this decision.12
Hence, this petition.13
The Issues
At the oral argument on 07 May 2001, at 3:00 p.m., we defined the following
issues to be addressed by the parties:
I. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of
Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions?
II. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor
of Baybay, Leyte?
(a) Must the affidavit of withdrawal be filed with the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed?
(b) May the affidavit of withdrawal be validly filed by fax?
III. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of law?
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner
disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality
of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer
of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with
the requirement of the law.14 We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate
of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and
left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor.15
Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective
public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed
herein.
"A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration
under oath.
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same
election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he
shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has file more than one
certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to
be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal
must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be
withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the
COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved

belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality.
"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

"xxxx
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted
on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election
officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, 16 such requirement
is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or
repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.17 Hence, the filing of petitioner's
affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the
COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner
ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
There is another important moiety that affects the validity of the COMELEC
resolution canceling petitioner's certificates of candidacy. It is that petitioner was
deprived of procedural due process of law.18 The petition to cancel her certificate
of candidacy or to deny due course to both were filed before the provincial
election supervisor of Leyte who inhibited himself and referred the cases to the
Law Department, COMELEC, Manila. On 11 April 2001, the COMELEC, First
Division, acting on the first indorsement of Atty. Villegas approved his inhibition
and required the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to immediately forward his
copy of the records of these cases to the Regional Election Director, Region 08, at
Tacloban, Leyte, for hearing. 19 On 18 April 2001, Regional Election Director, Region
08, Atty. Adolfo A. Ibaez issued summons/subpoena to petitioner Go to submit
her consolidated answer to the petitions and counter-affidavits including position
paper within three (3) days form notice. 20 On 23 April 2001, petitioner submitted
her consolidated position paper.21 On 25 April 2001, at 9:00 a.m., Director Ibaez
set the cases for hearing for reception of evidence of the parties.
In the meantime, however, the Law Department, COMELCE conducted an exparte study of the cases. It did not give petitioner an opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner was not required to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions for
cancellation of her certificates of candidacy and/or for disqualification. It did not
set the cases for hearing. It was not even aware of the proceedings before
Director Ibaez in Tacloban. After an ex-parte study of the cases, on 05 April
2001, the Law Department submitted its report and recommendation, approved
by Director Balbuena, to the COMELEC en banc.
During the oral argument on 07 May 2001, Director Balbuena candidly admitted
that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires that notice be given to the
respondent . Indeed, Section 3, Rule 23 of said Rules on petition to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy explicitly provides:
"Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. - The petition shall be heard summarily after due
notice. (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the COMELEC en banc in approving the report and recommendation of
the Law Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of
law.22 The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it. 23
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS COMELEC
Resolution No. 3982, adopted on 23 April 2001, and DECLARES valid petitioner's
certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte. The Chairman, Commission on
Elections, Manila, and the provincial election supervisor of Leyte shall immediately
order the inclusion of petitioner's name in the certified list of candidates for
Governor, province of Leyte, to be posted in each polling place,/voting booth in
every precinct throughout the province of Leyte, in the voters information sheet to
be given to each registered voter therein, in the election returns, statement of
votes by percents, and certificate of canvass, and all other election papers.
The status quo ante order heretofore issued is made permanent.
This decision is immediately executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be
entertained.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
Resolution 2 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1,
2005, affirming the Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated November 15,
2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for
Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four
(4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action
because he was already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case
of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The
order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated his
probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002
elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Samar for preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer
recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

URBANO
M.
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
NAZARIO, Respondents.
DECISION
and
NORMA
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for

reconsideration filed with the Comelecen banc, the Resolution of the First Division
was affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local
MORENO, Petitioner, Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
L.
MEJES,
CHICO- imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from
running for any elective local position. 5 Since Moreno was released from probation
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two
(2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the
execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an
elective local office.
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government
Code take precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the
Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth
the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local
Government Code applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to
probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The
Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government
Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay
allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office
of the Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v.
Comelec 7 definitively settled a similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an
offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted
probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his
arguments and pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre
v. Comelec which allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According to
Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the AntiFencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case,
applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after
appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been eligible for probation
under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within
the period specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result.
Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does
not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase
"within two (2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code, which reads:
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether

Arbitrary Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment,
involves moral turpitude falling under the first part of the above-quoted provision.
The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude
was never raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon
by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged
disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2) years from
his discharge from probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an
offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four
(4) Months. Besides, a determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention
involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue being
whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our
pronouncement therein that the grant of probation does not affect the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based
primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted
involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At
any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have
been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that
the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code, we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the
fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled to probation because he appealed his
conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It
has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to
prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although
already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in
his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first
glance. The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common
sense, means the confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly
clear and unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of
this Courts attention because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged
to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did not
serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified
because he did not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation
and finally discharged by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on
probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition
of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required
that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension
from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant
of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated
with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically
provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence.
During the period of probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real
issue in this case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction
attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the question of
whether his sentence had been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to
the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only
those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by
imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving
sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their
sentence by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be
equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running
for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno
fortifies his position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final
discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any
fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." Thus, when
Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him,
including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code which gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the
same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no
clue as to the intended meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether
the legislature also meant to disqualify those who have been granted probation.
The Courts function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and
harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et
concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law
for the offense of which he was convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out
rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance,
it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced
to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted
of any offense against the security of the State; those who have previously been
convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less
than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those
who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at
the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. 16
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this,
the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers from running for a local
elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the
legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered
by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was
enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided.
When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling
in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding
public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of the
provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed
as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code
is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local
elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in
its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not
affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens
the scope of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an
egregious error which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to
run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15,
2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of
his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a
fresh mandate from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July
15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice
now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that
"it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on
Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated
November 15, 2002, as well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant
thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to proceed in accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182701
July 23, 2008
EUSEBIO
EUGENIO
K.
LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, R.T., J.:
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position
in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all
foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the Rules on
Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution 1 and (2) Omnibus Order2 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner
from running as Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman
of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007.
On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition 3 before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen, hence,
ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,4 petitioner argued that
he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.5 He returned to the Philippines and resided in
Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for
Barangay Chairman.
After the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the
winner.6
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the
petition for disqualification, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Disqualification is
GRANTED and respondent Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez is DISQUALIFIED from
running as Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo.
We note, however, that the operative facts that led to this Courts ruling in Valles
are substantially different from the present case. In Valles, the candidate, Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez, was a dual citizen by accident of birth on foreign soil. 9 Lopez was
born of Filipino parents in Australia, a country which follows the principle of jus
soli.lauuphi1 As a result, she acquired Australian citizenship by operation of
Australian law, but she was also considered a Filipino citizen under Philippine law.
She did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the
Philippines.
In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American
citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual
citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.1awphi1
More importantly, the Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 922510 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the
conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public
office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling against petitioner, the COMELEC found that he was not able to regain his
Filipino citizenship in the manner provided by law. According to the poll body, to
be able to qualify as a candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. This, petitioner
failed to do.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to the
present petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
for disqualifying him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman.
We dismiss the petition.
Relying on Valles v. Commission on Elections, 8 petitioner argues that his filing of a
certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law
explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first
"make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. We quote with approval the
COMELEC observation on this point:
While respondent was able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual
Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate Generals Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |10
enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law
mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath. There is no evidence presented that will show that
respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we
cannot allow respondent to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay.
For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant must
state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship
for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopezs failure to renounce
his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove
the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the
positive mandate of law. For failure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his
allegiance to the United States, this Commission holds him disqualified from
running for an elective position in the Philippines.11 (Emphasis added)
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can not cure the defect
of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional
and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.12
In sum, the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioner as candidate for Chairman in the Barangay elections of 2007.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |11
BIENVENIDO
O.
MARQUEZ,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice as that
phrase is so used under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code (Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective
position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this
petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission
on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against
the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft
of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles
Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant
issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private
respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of
respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's
disqualification under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by
petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th
May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to
the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy.
Since the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected
Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petition below for disqualification has
ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held that a
pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should
be dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification
suit in a separate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to
the filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within
ten (10) days from notice. 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner institutedquo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against
private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02
December 1993, denied a reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected,
focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before
a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term
"fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government
Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates,
needs no further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No.
7160, is rather clear, he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes
not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds
support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by
F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C.
344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin
vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |12
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of
the Oversight Committee which, conformably with Section 533 2 of R.A. 7160, was
convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all
provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy.
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is very
important. Manny, can you come up?
MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.

Okay,. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert that
on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN,
Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).
REP. CUENCO: What does he want?
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung

kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang
gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from justice". What
"fugitive"? Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad.
MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify the
word "fugitive".
THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means a person" ba ito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...
Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of
arrest pending, unserved. . .
HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, ano what is a
fugitive? It is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong fugitive.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?

HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall mean or
means one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one who has
been convicted by final judgment.
Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a
fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for a
long time ago. So can. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |13
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted by
final judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post
bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final
judgment. 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the
possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the
disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who
merely were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator
R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral conference committee of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, made this reservation:
. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of fugitive.
Medyo bothered ako doon, a. 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) . . .
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight
(Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181).
The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and
ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written.
An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but
must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some
personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Court's en
banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive
from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not,
in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo
warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of
facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination
of this unresolved factual matter.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission
which is DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably
with the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |14
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez' quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a
resolution of February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via
petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is
whether Rodriguez, is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40 (e)
of the Local Government Code based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge
against him (as previously mentioned).
In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs.
COMELEC"' promulgated on April 18, 1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page
538 of the SCRA and hereinafter referred to as theMARQUEZ Decision, declared
that:
. . . , "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the
term. 1
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
EDUARDO
T.
RODRIGUEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr.
(Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post
of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed
duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the
COMELEC (EPC No. 92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United
States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter
before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand
theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore
a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez.
Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus
given was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the
COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith
with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez sought a
reconsideration thereof. He also filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit Additional
Argument in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration" to which was attached a
certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the
US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the
criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court. The Court
however denied a reconsideration of the MARQUEZ Decision.
In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the
same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via
petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same
allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for
disqualification (SPA No. 95-089) was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when
Rodriguez' petition forcertiorari (112889) from where the April 18,
1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending before the Court.
On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the
COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |15
warranto case) and SPA NO. 95-089 (disqualification case). In justifying a joint
resolution of these two (2) cases, the COMELEC explained that:
1. EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases
2. the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases
3. the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common
issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice"
4. on consultation with the Commission En Banc, the Commissioners unanimously
agreed that a consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally
flawed.
Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedly
having kept in mind theMARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice",
found Rodriguez to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez'
documentary evidence consisting of
1. an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by
the Los Angeles municipal court against Rodriguez, and
2. an authenticated copy of the felony complaint
which the COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out
of the hearing of the case on April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial of
Rodriguez' motion for postponement. With the walk-out, the COMELEC considered
Rodriguez as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of Marquez'
aforementioned documentary evidence. The COMELEC thus made the following
analysis:
The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the
pendency of a criminal complaint against the respondent (Rodriguez) in the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and the fact that there is an
outstanding warrant against him amply proves petitioner's contention that the
respondent is a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look with favor on
respondent's defense that long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed,
respondent was already in the Philippines and he did not know of the filing of the
same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. In a
sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed
a fugitive from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the
criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the
law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear desire to
avoid and evade the warrant. This allegation in the Answer, however, was not even
fortified with any attached document to show when he left the United States and
when he returned to this country, facts upon which the conclusion of absence of
knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived. On the contrary, the fact
of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the
Fraud Bureau investigators in an apartment paid for respondent in that country
can hardly rebut whatever presumption of knowledge there is against the
respondent. 2
And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared:
WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitive from
justice, he is hereby ordered disqualified or ineligible from assuming and
performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province. Respondent is ordered
to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is hereby disqualified from running
for Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly, his
certificate of candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections is hereby set aside.
At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8,
1995 election for the position of governor.
On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez'
proclamation which the COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board
of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez on May 12, 1995.
The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 and
the May 11, 1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to
the filing of the instant petition forcertiorari (G.R. No. 120099) on May 16, 1995.
On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation of
Rodriguez, To Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in
Contempt" before the COMELEC (in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089).
Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23,
1995, nullified Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the
Quezon Province Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be
cited in contempt for disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995 Resolution
suspending Rodriguez' proclamation. But with respect to Marquez' motion for his
proclamation, the COMELEC deferred action until after this Court has resolved the
instant petition (G.R. No. 120099).
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |16
Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid

COMELEC June 23, 1995 Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995
Resolutions (Consolidated Resolution and Order to suspend Rodriguez'
proclamation, respectively).
But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it
describes as its "persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly
the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice". So as not to miss
anything, we quote the COMELEC's observations in full:
As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant
petition (G.R. No. 120099) on July 13, 1995.
. . . The main opinion's definition of a "fugitive from justice" "include not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." It proceeded to state that:
Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order Or Preliminary Injunction" which sought to retain and enjoin Rodriguez
"from exercising the powers, functions and prerogatives of Governor of
Quezon . . . ." Acting favorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated August 8,
1995 issued a temporary restraining order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion to Lift
Temporary Restraining Order And/Or For Reconsideration" was denied by the Court
in an August 15, 1995 Resolution. Another similar urgent motion was later on filed
by Rodriguez which the Court also denied.
In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court
. . . RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to
RECEIVE AND EVALUATE such legally admissible evidence as herein petitioner
Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to present by way of refuting the evidence
heretofore submitted by private respondent Bienvenido Marquez, Sr., or that which
can tend to establish petitioner's contention that he does not fall within the legal
concept of a "fugitive from justice." Private respondent Marquez may likewise, if
he so desires, introduce additional and admissible evidence in support of his own
position. The provisions of Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of Court may be
applied in the reception of the evidence. The Chairman of the COMELEC shall have
the proceedings completed and the corresponding report submitted to this Court
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26,
1995, a report entitled "'EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S
EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after calibrating the parties' evidence,
declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main
opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its
finding in the Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the
COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ
Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because
evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985)
long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November
12, 1985).
This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary
Third Edition, p. 399 by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671;
King v. Noe, 244 SC 344; 137 SE 2d 102, 103; Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Federal
Reporter 980; Tobin v. Casaus 275 Pacific Reporter 2d p. 792), and it may be so
conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
But in the majority of the cases cited, the definition of the term "fugitive from
justice" contemplates other instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion.
Black's Law Dictionary begins the definition of the term by referring to a "fugitive
from justice" as:
(A) person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of the court
where crime was committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals
himself within the district. . . .
Then, citing King v. Noe, the definition continues and conceptualizes a "fugitive
from justice" as:
. . . a person who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state,
has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of another when it is
sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former state. (our emphasis)
In Hughes v. Pflanz, the term was defined as:
a person who, having committed within a state a crime, when sought for, to be
subjected to criminal process, is found within the territory of another state.
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. considers the term as an:
expression which refers to one having committed, or being accused, of a crime in
one jurisdiction and is absent for any reason from that jurisdiction.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |17
Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment . . . (emphasis ours)

From the above rulings, it can be gleaned that the objective facts sufficient to
constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person committed a "crime" or has been
charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of
the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode.
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label
one a "fugitive from justice". Mere commission of a "crime" without charges
having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the
definition. Attention is directed at the use of the word "crime" which is not
employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof. Justice
Davide's separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889 elucidates that the disqualification
for being a fugitive does not involve the issue of the presumption of innocence,
the reason for disqualification being that a person "was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was
brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has
successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped.
The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice."
Other rulings of the United States Supreme Court further amplify the view that
intent and purpose for departure is inconsequential to the inquiry. The texts,
which are persuasive in our jurisdiction, are more unequivocal in their
pronouncements. In King v. US (144 F. 2nd 729), citing Roberts v. Reilly(116 US
80) the United States Supreme Court held:
. . . it is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial
district where the crime is alleged to have been committed, after an indictment
found, or for the purpose of avoiding an anticipated prosecution, but that, having
committed a crime within a state or district, he has left and is found in another
jurisdiction (emphasis supplied)
Citing State v. Richter (37 Minn. 436), the Court further ruled in unmistakeable
language:
The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are
not within the state to answer its criminal process when required renders them, in
legal intendment, fugitives from justice.
THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE AUTHORITIES CITED IN G.R. NO.
112889, THE MERE FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE

PETITIONER A "FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE".
From the foregoing discussions, the determination of whether or not Rodriguez is
a fugitive from justice hinges on whether or not Rodriguez' evidence shall be
measured against the two instances mentioned in the main opinion, or is to be
expanded as to include other situations alluded to by the foreign jurisprudence
cited by the Court. In fact, the spirited legal fray between the parties in this case
focused on each camp's attempt to construe the Court's definition so as to fit or to
exclude petitioner within the definition of a "fugitive from justice". Considering,
therefore, the equally valid yet different interpretations resulting from the
Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 112889, the Commission deems it most
conformable to said decision to evaluate the evidence in light of the varied
constructions open to it and to respectfully submit the final determination of the
case to the Honorable Supreme Court as the final interpreter of the law.
The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is
a "fugitive from justice", the determination of which, as we have directed the
COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the MARQUEZ Decision and in the Court's
October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined
by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice":
. . . includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only
be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment
of conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival
in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the
Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27 3 and June 26 of 1995, 4 preceded the filing
of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the
issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the same foreign court, by almost
five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such
felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact
no complaint and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet at such
time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running
away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive
from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found
in the circumstances of Rodriguez.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |18
With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the same
analysis in its ". . . COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other
observations consistent with such analysis made by the poll body that are equally
formidable so as to merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit:
It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show
Rodriguez' intent to evade the law. This was done by offering for admission a
voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I to I-17 and J to J-87
inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of the charges
against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of establishing the fact that
it was impossible for petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its
magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion misleads because investigations of this
nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with utmost secrecy
to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those
who would be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation
would be nothing short of a well-publicized announcement to the perpetrators of
the imminent filing of charges against them. And having been forewarned, every
effort to sabotage the investigation may be resorted to by its intended objects.
But if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law at
the time he left the United States has any legal consequence at all, it will be
nothing more than proof that even private respondent accepts that intent to evade
the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive.
The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure
that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith
in his favor. The same suggests nothing more than the sequence of events which
transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred
from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate
such claim. In fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that
his compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and
participate vigorously in the political campaigns against former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country,
the upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which
occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in the Philippine history. The
EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and precipitated
changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these developments,
petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor
in 1988 and continues to be involved in politics in the same capacity as re-elected
Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether, these landmark
dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity
of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the
governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the position
entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the office.
Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against
him at the time he left the United States, it becomes immaterial under such
construction to determine the exact time when he was made aware thereof. While
the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight from
justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after
charges against him or a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the
imminent filing and issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is altogether a
different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not
his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does
not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify him
outright as a fugitive from justice.
The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he
subject himself to the jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or
else be disqualified from office, is more apparent when applied in petitioner's case.
The criminal process of the United States extends only within its territorial
jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country when the latter sought to
subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an
intent to evade the laws of the United States, petitioner had every right to depart
therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to the Philippines. Not
justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to
leave the United State and return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary
proposition would be to unduly burden and punish petitioner for exercising a right
as he cannot be faulted for the circumstances that brought him within Philippine
territory at the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for
charges filed against him.
Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the
charges only later, and under his circumstances, is there a law that requires
petitioner to travel to the United States and subject himself to the monetary
burden and tedious process of defending himself before the country's courts?
It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to
demand of political candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are
supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute that an alleged "fugitive from justice"
must perform acts in order not to be so categorized. Clearly, a person who is
aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in
connection with acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under
an obligation not to flee said place of commission. However, as in petitioner's
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |19
case, his departure from the United States may not place him under a similar
obligation. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission
to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label petitioner
automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public officer appointed and
elected immediately after his return to the country, petitioner Rodriguez had every
reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office. He could not have
gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could he have
traveled intermittently thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he
serves. The require that of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical
quandary where he is compelled to violate the very functions of his office.
However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" as
earlier quoted) seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They
espouse the broader concept of the term and culled from foreign authorities
(mainly of U.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one
becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction
where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge
has already been filed at the time of his flight.
Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an
expanded re-definition of"fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with
the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition.
The various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in People v.Pinuila,
103 Phil. 992, 999, to wit:
"Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.
More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on a general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court. (21 C.J.S. 330)
It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a
second or succeeding appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or
preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated on the prior
appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)
In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite
determination, the court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will
refuse to examine question other than those arising subsequently to such
determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its
mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the
directions of the appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second
appeal.
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be
the law of the casewhether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the
party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).
Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded
as the law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not
expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the
facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration
whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87).
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not
Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and
the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal from EPC No. 92-28
(the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is
also an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter
jointly with SPA No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of
Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we
specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main
opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to
evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded
definition, seem to trivialize.
Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our
jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification
or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective local petition under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
(Emphasis ours.)
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof
that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been
filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (Consolidated
Resolution), May 11, 1995 (Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation) and
June 23, 1995 (Resolution nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation and ordering the
Quezon Province Provincial Board and Canvassers to explain why they should not
be cited in contempt) are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 157870
November 3, 2008
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
AGENCY (PDEA),respondents.
SOCIETY
and
PHILIPPINE
(SJS), petitioner
DRUG
ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |21
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 158633
November 3, 2008
ATTY.
MANUEL
J.
vs.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
AGENCY, respondents.
LASERNA,
PHILIPPINE
DRUG
JR., petitioner
ENFORCEMENT
x-----------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 161658
November 3, 2008
AQUILINO
Q.
PIMENTEL,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
JR., petitioner
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results.
x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the
screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and

tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in
the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees
of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to
undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and
one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive
for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this
Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said
resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |22
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will
know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only
those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency
would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under
the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165
and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the
following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to
candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and
local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug
testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective
offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law
Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall
consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of
the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the
mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for
re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections, 1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of
age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R.
No.
157870 (Social
Justice
Society
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
v.
Dangerous
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS),
a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of
legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the
equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R.
No.
158633 (Atty.
Manuel
J.
Laserna,
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Jr.
v.
Dangerous
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |23
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and
(g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure,
and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid
down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they
constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of
the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA
assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of
the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions. 2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection
with a bona fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be
reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court
may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. 4 To have
standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed
for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and
candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since
he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other
preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax
the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the
paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
Pimentel
(Constitutionality
of
Sec.
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
36[g]
of
RA
9165
Petition
and
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age,
and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted
upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should
be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must
conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. 8 In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority,
the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the
four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only
exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |24
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of

legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap. 10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to
substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. 11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and other
provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications
of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.13
office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer
to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the
May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral
event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to
review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision
defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and
serve as senator.
SJS
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Petition
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC

resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a
pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as
senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that
"[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper
context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office
for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary
and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is
a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal
drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly
the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose,
per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by
the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use
of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and
projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those
found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of
RA 9165 are clear on this point:
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,

that the provision does not expressly state that non - compliance with the drug
test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception,
made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to
the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment

and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of
this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x
apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency.
Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which
shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the
examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |25
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission
Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is
finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the
young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate. 15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of
the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III 17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy
has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity
of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random
drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal
point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first
impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With
respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings
of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al.
(Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases
involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the
drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent
drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required
random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high
school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused
to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the
school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US
Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia,
considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students;
(2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school
gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports
events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected
themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring
urine samples does not invade a student's privacy since a student need not
undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing
because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme
Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth 20 and
14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma
required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular
activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th
Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical
examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are
entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug
testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a
non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place
of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the
students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing
policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a
reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to
this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually
fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their
parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty
to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |26
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll
is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the
country that threatens the well - being of the people, 21 particularly the youth and
school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of
students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To
borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as
important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact
that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to
incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that
the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state's exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as
has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government
search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness
standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on
the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy
for employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to inVernonia as "swift and
informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or
even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness
of the challenged administrative search in question.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but
random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of
public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting
almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy," 23 has failed to show how
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. 24 Petitioner
Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit
serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the
privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of
the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into
by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various
rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the
workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the
mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right
against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively
hereinbelow.25
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by
the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or
intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law
authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26 In context, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person
or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement
as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation
of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and
its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass
the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer
and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that
he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |27
36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by

providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test
as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to
the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of
Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate
chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to
the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis; 34 that the "drug test result
and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices
to protect the confidentiality of the test results." 35 Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any
information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of
test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the
country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this
through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug
test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use
is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the
premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender,
age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the
sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be
an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of
such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public
execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid
back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement
agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of
preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat
of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy
on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the
search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug
test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees
also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service. 37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the
ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to
give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary
and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be
conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case
of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained
in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules.
In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons
to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way.
And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality
of the test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in
consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among
other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be
subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what
conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |28
many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or

entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has
become imperative, as here.
Laserna
Petition
(Constitutionality
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
of
Sec.
36[c],
SO ORDERED
[d],
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no
valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the
case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional
soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds
from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the
public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and
one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing
are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a
crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against
their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be
the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
G.R. No. 142907
November 29, 2000
JOSE
EMMANUEL
L.
CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN CALOOCAN CITY
(BRANCH 125) and ANTONIO M. SERAPIO, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
declares Sec.
36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC
Resolution
No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and toPARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) ofRA 9165
CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned
agencies
are,
accordingly,
permanently
enjoined
from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
The Case
The case before the Court is an original special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to
annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |29
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the proclamation of the Protestee, Jose

Emmanuel Carlos, by the Board of Canvassers is accordingly SET ASIDE.
3. Both parties admit that the protestee has been proclaimed as the elected
mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on May 21, 1998;
"The Court hereby FINDS the Protestant, ANTONIO SERAPIO, as the DULY
ELECTED MAYOR OF VALENZUELA CITY.
4. Both parties admit that the protestee allegedly obtained 102,688 votes while
the protestant obtained 77,270 votes per canvass of election returns of the Board
of Canvassers.
"SO ORDERED."1
The Facts
Petitioner Jose Emmanuel L. Carlos and respondent Antonio M. Serapio were
candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998 elections.
On May 21, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers, Valenzuela, Metro Manila
proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela having obtained
102,688 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns.
On June 1, 1998, respondent Antonio M. Serapio who obtained 77,270 votes, the
second highest number of votes, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, an election protest challenging the results. Due to the inhibition of
all judges of the Regional Trial Court in Valenzuela, the case was ultimately
assigned to the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 125, presided over by
respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
The pre-trial was then concluded and the parties agreed to the creation of seven
(7) revision committees consisting of a chairman designated by the court and two
members representing the protestant and the protestee.
Meantime, on May 12, 1999, petitioner filed a consolidated motion that included a
prayer for authority to photocopy all the official copies of the revision reports in
the custody of the trial court. However, the trial court denied the issuance of such
authorization.3 The court likewise denied a motion for reconsideration of the
denial.4Then petitioner raised the denial to the COMELEC on petition for certiorari
and mandamus,5 which also remains unresolved until this date.
The Revision Results
The revision of the ballots showed the following results:
(1) Per physical count of the ballots:
(a) protestant Serapio - 76,246 votes.
On June 26, 1998, petitioner filed with the trial court an answer with affirmative
defenses and motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion to dismiss by order
dated January 14, 1999. Petitioner elevated the order to the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on petition for certiorari and prohibition, 2 which, however, has
remained unresolved up to this moment.
In the course of the protest, the municipal treasurer of Valenzuela, who by law
has custody of the ballot boxes, collected the ballot boxes and delivered them to
the Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City. The trial court conducted a pre-trial
conference of the parties but it did not produce a substantial result as the parties
merely paid superficial service and only agreed on the following:
1. Both parties admit their capacity to sue and be sued;
2. Both parties admit that the protestant was a candidate during the May 11, 1998
election;
(b) protestee Carlos - 103,551 votes.

(2) Per revision, the court invalidated 9,697 votes of the protestant but validated
53 stray votes in his favor.
The court invalidated 19,975 votes of the protestee and validated 33 stray votes
in his favor.
The final tally showed:
(a) protestant Serapio - 66,602 votes.
(b) protestee Carlos - 83,609 votes, giving the latter a winning margin of 17,007
votes.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |30
The Trial Court's Ruling

Nevertheless, in its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes
because of its finding of "significant badges of fraud," namely:
1. The keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the court did not fit into the
padlocks of the ballot boxes that had to be forcibly opened;
Meantime, on May 04, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the decision of
the trial court to the Commission on Elections.9
The Petition at bar
On May 8, 2000, petitioner filed the present recourse. 10
Petitioner raised the following legal basis:
2. Seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any ballot and two (2) ballot boxes out
of the seven (7) ballot boxes did not contain any election returns;
3. Some schools where various precincts were located experienced brownouts
during the counting of votes causing delay in the counting although there was no
undue commotion or violence that occurred;
4. Some of the assigned watchers of protestant were not in their posts during the
counting of votes.
On the basis of the foregoing badges of fraud, the trial court declared that there
was enough pattern of fraud in the conduct of the election for mayor in
Valenzuela. The court held that the fraud was attributable to the protestee who
had control over the election paraphernalia and the basic services in the
community such as the supply of electricity.
On April 24, 2000, the trial court rendered a judgment ruling that the
perpetuation of fraud had undoubtedly suppressed the true will of the electorate of
Valenzuela and substituted it with the will of the protestee. Notwithstanding the
plurality of valid votes in favor of the protestee, the trial court set aside the
proclamation of protestee Jose Emmanuel Carlos by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers and declared protestant Antonio M. Serapio as the duly elected mayor
of Valenzuela City.6
Hearing news that the protestant had won the election protest, the protestee
secured a copy of the decision from the trial court on May 4, 2000. On the other
hand, notice of the decision was received by the protestant on May 03, 2000.
On May 4, 2000, protestant filed with the trial court a motion for execution
pending appeal.7 On May 4, 2000, the trial court gave protestee five (5) days
within which to submit his comment or opposition to the motion. 8
Petitioner's Appeal to Comelec
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to entertain special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition;
(2) There are important reasons and compelling circumstances which justify
petitioner's direct recourse to the Supreme Court;
(3) Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she declared
respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela despite the fact that
she found that petitioner obtained 17,007 valid votes higher than the valid votes
of respondent Serapio;
(4) The assailed decision is contrary to law, based on speculations and not
supported by the evidence as shown in the decision itself.11
The Issues
The issues raised are the following:
1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review, by petition for certiorari
as a special civil action, the decision of the regional trial court in an election
protest case involving an elective municipal official considering that it has no
appellate jurisdiction over such decision.
2. Whether the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when the court set aside the proclamation of petitioner and declared
respondent Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City despite its finding
that petitioner garnered 83,609 valid votes while respondent obtained 66,602
valid votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes.
TRO Issued
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |31
On May 8, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order ordering respondent

court to cease and desist from further taking cognizance of Election Protest No.
14-V-98 more specifically from taking cognizance of and acting on the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal filed by respondent Serapio on May 4, 2000. 12
Respondent's Position
On May 15, 2000, respondent Serapio filed his comment with omnibus motion to
lift the temporary restraining order and to declare petitioner in contempt of court
for violating the rule against forum shopping. 13 He submitted that Comelec and
not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the present petition for certiorari
assailing the decision dated April 24, 2000 of the regional trial court. Assuming
that this Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction and applying the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, the Comelec has jurisdiction since petitioner has perfected
his appeal therewith before the filing of the instant petition. Certiorari cannot be a
substitute for an appeal; the present petition is violative of Revised Circular No.
28-91 on forum-shopping; issues raised are factual, not correctible by certiorari;
and that the temporary restraining order should be lifted, the petition dismissed,
and petitioner and counsel should be made to explain why they should not be
punished for contempt of court.
"SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46."
By Constitutional fiat, the Commission on Election (Comelec) has appellate
jurisdiction over election protest cases involving elective municipal officials
decided by courts of general jurisdiction, as provided for in Article IX (C), Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution:
"Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
The Court's Ruling

"(1) x x x.
We find the petition impressed with merit.14
I. The Supreme Court is vested with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the decision of the regional trial court in the
election protest case before it, regardless of whether it has appellate jurisdiction
over such decision.
Article VIII, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
"(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, andover petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus."
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 65, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides
that:
"(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction."
In like manner, the Comelec has original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.15 This point has been settled in the case of Relampagos vs.
Cumba,16 where we held:
"In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the court must, as it now does,
abandon the ruling in the Garciaand Uy and Veloria cases. We now hold that the
last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |32
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." (Emphasis ours).
Consequently, both the Supreme Court and Comelec have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial
courts of general jurisdiction (regional trial courts) in election cases involving
elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.17
Ergo, this Court has jurisdiction over the present petition of certiorari as a special
civil action expressly conferred on it and provided for in the Constitution.
Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not
bar the present action as an exception to the rule because under the
circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.18 The exception is sparingly allowed in situations where
the abuse
of
discretion is
not
only grave
and
whimsical but
also palpable and patent, and the invalidity of the assailed act is shown on its
face.
II. Certiorari lies. The trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its decision is void.
The next question that arises is whether certiorari lies because the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in deciding the way it did Election Protest Case No. 14-V-98, declaring respondent
Serapio as the duly "elected" mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority

or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election." 24 In case of protest, a revision
or recount of the ballots cast for the candidates decides the election protest case.
The candidate receiving the highest number or plurality of votes shall be
proclaimed the winner. Even if the candidate receiving the majority votes is
ineligible or disqualified, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes
or the second placer, can not be declared elected. 25 "The wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the
law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person
who has obtained a plurality of votes and does not entitle a candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected." 26 In other words, "a
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office." 27
"Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to
ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected by
the electorate. The Supreme Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or
the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results." 28
In this case, based on the revision of ballots, the trial court found that:
First, by canvass of the Municipal Board of Canvassers the results were:
Carlos - 102,668 votes
Serapio - 77,270 votes, or a winning margin of 25,418 votes
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to

public office by popular vote"19through the use of the ballot, and the elected
officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. 20"An election is
the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people."21"Specifically, the term 'election', in the context of the Constitution, may
refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." 22 The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the
election.23 "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all
republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared
Ramon Ignacio - 20 votes.

and consequently, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner Carlos the duly
elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Second, by physical count of the ballots, the results were:
Serapio - 76,246 votes, or a winning margin of 27,305 votes.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |33
Third, by revision of the ballots, the trial court found in a final tally that the "valid"
votes obtained by the candidates were as follows:
Serapio - 66,602 votes, or a winning margin of 17,007 votes.
Consequently, the final tally clearly showed petitioner Carlos as the overwhelming
winner in the May 11, 1998 elections.
However, the trial court set aside the final tally of votes because of what the trial
court perceived to be "significant badges of fraud" attributable to the
protestee.29 These are:
First: The failure of the keys turned over by the City Treasurer to the trial court to
fit the padlocks on the ballot boxes that compelled the court to forcibly open the
padlocks. The trial court concluded that the real keys were lost or the padlocks
substituted pointing to possible tampering of the contents of the ballot boxes.
Procedurally, the keys to the ballot boxes were turned over by the Board of
Election Inspectors from the precinct level to the Municipal Board of Canvassers
and finally to the municipal treasurer for safekeeping. The three-level turn-over of
the keys will not prevent the possibility of these keys being mixed up. This is an
ordinary occurrence during elections. The mere inability of the keys to fit into the
padlocks attached to the ballot boxes does not affect the integrity of the ballots.
At any rate, the trial court easily forced open the padlocks and found valid votes
cast therein;
Second: Seven (7) ballot boxes were found empty. Thus, the trial court concluded
that there were "missing ballots" and "missing election returns." This is pure
speculation without factual basis. "The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the
court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass." 30 On the other hand,
the Summary of Votes as revised does not show any unaccounted precinct or
whether there was any precinct without any ballot or election returns. It is a
standard procedure of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) to provide extra
empty ballot boxes for the use of the Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of
Canvassers, in case of necessity.
The empty ballot boxes found could be the empty reserve ballot boxes that were
not used by the Board of Election Inspectors or the Board of Canvassers since
there was neither proof nor even a claim of missing ballots or missing election
returns.
Third: Some schoolhouses experienced brownout during the counting of votes.

There was nothing extraordinary that would invite serious doubts or suspicion that
fraud was committed during the brownout that occurred. Indeed, one witness
stated that it was the first time that he observed brownout in Dalandanan
Elementary School and another stated that the brownout was localized in Coloong
Elementary School. Since counting of votes lasted until midnight, the brownouts
had caused only slight delay in the canvassing of votes because the election
officials availed themselves of candles, flashlights and emergency lights. There
were no reports of cheating or tampering of the election returns. In fact,
witnesses testified that the counting of votes proceeded smoothly and no
commotion or violence occurred. So, the brownouts had no effect on the integrity
of the canvass.
Fourth: The absence of watchers for candidate Serapio from their posts during the
counting of votes. This cannot be taken against candidate Carlos since it is the
candidate's own look-out to protect his interest during the counting of votes and
canvassing of election returns. As long as notices were duly served to the parties,
the counting and canvassing of votes may validly proceed in the absence of
watchers. Otherwise, candidates may easily delay the counting of votes or
canvassing of returns by simply not sending their watchers. There was no
incomplete canvass of returns, contrary to what the trial court declared. The
evidence showed complete canvassin Valenzuela, Metro Manila.31
"We cannot allow an election protest on such flimsy averments to prosper,
otherwise, the whole election process will deteriorate into an endless stream of
crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from the water." 32
Assuming for the nonce that the trial court was correct in holding that the final
tally of valid votes as per revision report may be set aside because of the
"significant badges of fraud", the same would be tantamount to a ruling that there
were no valid votes cast at all for the candidates, and, thus, no winner could be
declared in the election protest case. In short, there was failure of election.
In such case, the proper remedy is an action before the Commission on
Elections en banc to declare a failure of election or to annul the
election.33 However, the case below was an election protest case involving an
elective municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate regional trial court. 34
Nonetheless, the annulment of an election on the ground of fraud, irregularities
and violations of election laws may be raised as an incident to an election contest.
Such grounds for annulment of an election may be invoked in an election protest
case. However, an election must not be nullified and the voters disenfranchised
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |34
whenever it is possible to determine a winner on the basis of valid votes cast, and
discard the illegally cast ballots. In this case, the petitioner admittedly received
17,007 valid votes more than the protestee, and therefore the nullification of the
election would not lie. The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the
greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under
circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. 35
As heretofore stated, in this jurisdiction, elections are won on the basis of a
majority or plurality of votes cast and received by the candidates. "The right to
hold an elective office is rooted on electoral mandate, not perceived entitlement to
the office."36
More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of
election.37
It is the Commission (Comelec) sitting en banc that is vested with exclusive

jurisdiction to declare a failure of election.38
"In a petition to annul an election under Section 6, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, two
conditions must be averred in order to support a sufficient cause of action. These
are: (1) the illegality must affect more than 50% of the votescast and (2)
the good votes can be distinguished from the bad ones. It is only when these two
conditions are established that the annulment of the election can be justified
because the remaining votes do not constitute a valid constituency." 39
We have held that: "To declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must occur:
first, no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law
or, even if there were voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to
elect; and, second, the votes not cast would affect the result of the
election."40 Neither of these conditions was present in the case at bar.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that:

"Sec. 6. Failure of Election.If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody of canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension
of
election
would
affect
the
result
of
the
election,
the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect but not later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, RA 7166 provides that:
"Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections".-- The
postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections
as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided
by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes
for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of
votes or on the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)
More recently, we clarified that, "Under the pertinent codal provision of the
Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c)
after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes."41
Thus, the trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by
disregarding and setting aside the results of the election. Nonetheless, as hereinabove stated, the trial court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction
because the grounds for failure of election were not significant and even nonexistent. More importantly, the commission of fraud can not be attributed to the
protestee. There was no evidence on record that protestee had a hand in any of
the irregularities that protestant averred. It is wrong for the trial court to state
that the protestee had control over the "election paraphernalia" or over electric
services. The Commission on Elections has control over election paraphernalia,
through its officials and deputies. 42 The Comelec can deputize with the
concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 43 On
the other hand, electric utility services in Metro Manila, including Valenzuela are
under the control of its franchise holder, particularly the Manila Electric Company,
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |35
a public service company, certainly not owned or controlled by the protestee. In

fact, during election period, Comelec has control over such utilities as electric and
even telephone service.44 What is important, however, is that the voters of
Valenzuela were able to cast their votes freely and fairly. And in the election
protest case, the trial court was able to recount and determine the valid votes
cast.
Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the
extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of
special elections.45 The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In
such case, the court can not declare a winner.46 A permanent vacancy is thus
created. In such eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed as
provided by law.47
We find that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision proclaiming respondent
Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on the basis of its
perception of the voice of the people of Valenzuela, even without a majority or
plurality votes cast in his favor. In fact, without a single vote in his favor as the
trial court discarded all the votes. Thus, the decision is not supported by the
highest number of valid votes cast in his favor. This violated the right to due
process of law of petitioner who was not heard on the issue of failure of election,
an issue that was not raised by the protestant. "A decision is void for lack of due
process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard." 48The
trial court can not decide the election protest case outside the issues raised. If it
does, as in this case, the trial court is ousted of its jurisdiction. Likewise, it is a
basic principle that a decision with absolutely nothing to support it is void. 49 "A
void decision may be assailed or impugned at any time either directly or
collaterally, by means of a petition filed in the same case or by means of a
separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it
is invoked."50 Here, the trial court indulged in speculations on its view of the voice
of the people, and decided the case disregarding the evidence, but on its own
intuition, ipse dixit.51 How was this voice communicated to the trial court?
Certainly not by competent evidence adduced before the court as it should be, but
by extra-sensory perception. This is invalid in law. Contrary to its own finding that
petitioner obtained 83,600 valid votes against 66,602 valid votes for the
respondent as second placer, or a plurality of 17,007 votes, the trial court declared
the second placer as the winner. This is a blatant abuse of judicial discretion by
any account. It is a raw exercise of judicial function in an arbitrary or despotic
manner, amounting to evasion of the positive duty to act in accord with law. 52
In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Judge. "By grave abuse of
discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave
abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." 53 We must
emphasize that election to office is determined by the highest number of votes
obtained by a candidate in the election.
The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. The Court ANNULS and DECLARES
VOID the decision dated April 24, 2000 of the trial court in Election Protest Case
No. V-14-98.
The temporary restraining order we issued on May 8, 2000, is made permanent.
Let Election Protest Case No. V-14-98 be remanded to the trial court for decision
within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice of this decision.
The judge shall report to this Court on the decision rendered within five (5) days
from rendition submitting a copy thereof to the Office of the Clerk of Court en
banc.
This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |36
MENDOZA & IBARRA vs. COMELEC & ROMAN

EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17
DEC 2002.
G.R. No. 149736(Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, petitioners, vs.
Commission on Elections and Leonardo B. Roman, respondents.)
For resolution is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Melanio L.
Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra, seeking to set aside the resolution of the
Commission on Elections, dated August 15, 2001, in EPC No. 2001-5 and to
declare respondent Leonardo B. Roman's election as governor of Bataan on May
14, 2001 as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8 of the
Constitution, which provides that:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
After due deliberation, the Court voted 8 to 7 to DISMISS the petition:
VITUG, J., joined by YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., voted to dismiss the petition.He
contended that as revealed by the records of the Constitutional Commission, the
Constitution envisions a continuous and an uninterrupted service for three full
terms before the proscription applies.Therefore, not being a full term, a recall
term should not be counted or used as a basis for the disqualification whether
served prior (as in this case) or subsequent (as in the Socrates case) to the nineyear, full three-term limit.
[G.R. No. 149736.December 17, 2002]
MENDOZA, J., in whose opinion QUISUMBING, J. joined, voted to dismiss the

petition on the ground that, in accordance with the ruling inBorja, Jr. v.
COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Arcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133639, Oct. 6,
1998 (res.); Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602 (1999); and Adormeo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002, a term during which succession to a
local elective office takes place or a recall election is held should not be counted in
determining whether an elective local official has served more than three
consecutive terms.He argued that the Constitution does not prohibit elective local
officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms because, in fact, it
excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so
long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office
by an incumbent.Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |37
which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a

recall election held in 1993, should not be counted.Since on May 14, 2001
respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive
terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his
third term for the same position.
PANGANIBAN, J., joined by PUNO, J., also voted to dismiss the petition.He
argued that a recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a
contrary interpretation would in effect cut short the elected official's service to less
than nine years and shortchange his constituents.The desire to prevent monopoly
of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters'
obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of
the votes cast.He explained that, in Socrates, he also voted to affirm the clear
choice of the electorate, because in a democracy the people should, as much as
legally possible, be governed by leaders freely chosen by them in credible
elections.He concluded that, in election cases, when two conflicting legal positions
are of almost equal weight, the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the
people's overwhelming choice.
AZCUNA, J., joined by BELLOSILLO, J., also voted to dismiss, arguing that it is
clear from the constitutional provision that the disqualification applies only if the
terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous.Hence, service for
less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count
to disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position.This case
is different from Socrates, where the full three consecutive terms had been
continuously served so that disqualification had clearly attached.
On the other hand, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., with whom DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
and AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, and CALLEJO, SR., JJ. concurred, holds the
view that the recall term served by respondent Roman, comprising the period
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, should be considered as one term.Since he
thereafter served for two consecutive terms from 1995 to 1998 and from 1998 to
2001, his election on May 14, 2001 was actually his fourth term and contravenes
Art. X, 8 of the Constitution.For this reason, she voted to grant the petition and
to declare respondent's election on May 14, 2001 as null and void.
CARPIO, J., joined by CARPIO MORALES, J., also dissented and voted to grant
the petition.He held that a recall term constitutes one term and that to totally
ignore a recall term in determining the three-term limit would allow local officials
to serve for more than nine consecutive years contrary to the manifest intent of
the framers of the Constitution.He contended that respondent Roman's election in
2001 cannot exempt him from the three-term limit imposed by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 106164 August 17, 1993
EDWIN V. SARDEA, EDELYN C. DE LA PEA, ROBERTO P. ALQUIROS,

FRANCISCO C. ENEJOSA, PERFECTO GEQUINTO, TERESITA L. MANIPOL,
ROMMEL V. PANSACOLA, BLANQUITA M. RIVERA, JUAN M. CALDERERO,
ALEX MORALES, JOCELYN VILLAMARZO, NORMA CUARESNA, EDWIN
PERALTA, DELFIN DIAMANTE, RODOLFO C. DEVERA and such other bona
fide residents and voters of the Municipality of Mauban, Province of
Quezon, who are so numerous it is impracticable to bring them all before
the
Honorable
Court, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BELLA E. PUTONG,
DIOSCORO I. ALMOZARA and LEONCITA A. PASTRANA, in their capacity as
Members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon,
FERDINAND V. LLAMAS, ROLANDO Q. ELLA, JOSHUE B. MALUBAY, CASPAR
L. URSOLINO, REXITO P. BANTAYAN, CESAR P. PASAMBA, ROCKY A.
FERRO,
LEONCHITO
A.
CAPASANGRA
and
SERGIO
M.
VILLABROZA, respondents.
Almeda, Javier, Galandines & Associate Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The petitioners who are allegedly bona-fide residents and voters of Mauban,
Quezon, and who are "so numerous it is impractical to bring them all before the
Honorable Court" (p. 2, Rollo), assail the Resolution promulgated on June 19,
1992, by the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in Special Action
Case No. SPA 92-331, entitled: "In the Matter of the Petition to Declare a Failure
of Election in Mauban, Quezon," denying their petition against the COMELEC, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon, and the private respondents
who were proclaimed the duly elected Mayor, Vice Mayor and Members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon.
The pertinent portion of the Resolution reads as follows:
Irregularities such as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in an
election contest but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election
and to disenfranchise the greater number of the electorate through the misdeeds,
precisely, of only a relatively few. . . . . (Grand Alliance for Democracy, GAD, et al.
vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. 78302, 27 May 87, En Banc, Resolution.)
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |38
xxx xxx xxx

. . . it is very clear that as early as May 14, 1992 petitioners were already not in
consonance with the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers. Yet, from petitioner
EDWIN SARDEA'S own admission, he only formally filed on May 18, 1992, his
petition assailing the legality of the canvassing being held, contrary to the
provisions of Sec. 17 and 19 of R.A. 7166.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission hereby RESOLVES to DENY as
it hereby DENIES this petition. (pp. 36-37, Rollo.)
Petitioner allege that respondent COMELEC "acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution,
considering that it blatantly disregarded its own Rules of Procedure and, more
importantly, it perpetuated (sic) a clear violation of election laws"
(p. 85, Rollo).
The facts of the case are as follows:
On May 12, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban,
Quezon, convened at the Municipal Hall and canvassed the first batch of election
returns for the just concluded May 11, 1992 elections in that municipality.
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 13, 1992, while the canvassing of
the election returns was going on, some sympathizers of petitioner Edwin Sardea,
a defeated mayoralty candidate of LAKAS-NUCD, "stormed the municipal building"
and "destroyed . . . all election materials and paraphernalia including, among
others, the copies of election returns furnished to respondent Board . . ." (p.
86, Rollo).
On May 14, 1992, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and
assessed the extent of the damage wrought by the demonstrators. It discovered
that the election returns in the possession of the MTC Judge of Mauban were
intact, so it ordered the retrieval of said election returns for use in the canvass.
However, due to the absence of certain forms needed for the canvass, the same
was suspended and moved to May 17, 1992. Still, on said date, the canvassing
was not resumed because the Board had to determine first the number of returns
to be used in the canvass.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened on May 18, 1992, informed the
parties that it would continue the canvassing of the election returns based on the
copies from the MTC of Mauban. Atty. Romeo Devera, counsel of LAKAS-NUCD,
objected. Later, he filed a petition in behalf of petitioner Edwin Sardea to stop the
proceedings of the Board of Canvassers on the ground that it had no authority
from the COMELEC to use the copies of the election returns obtained from the
MTC of Mauban. The Municipal Board of Canvassers overruled Attorney Devera's
objection and denied Sardea's petition to stop the proceedings, citing the directive
dated May 15, 1992 of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Adolfo Ilagan. The
directive was based on the authority given by Acting Executive Director
Resurreccion Bora of the COMELEC, "to order the Municipal Trial Court Judge of
Mauban, Quezon to make available the copy of election returns, etc., in his
possession for the use of the Municipal Board of Canvassers" (p. 86, Rollo). As
Sardea manifested that he would appeal the ruling, the Board of Canvassers
suspended the proceedings in order that he may formalize his appeal. On May 19,
1992, he filed a notice of appeal.
On May 22, 1992, the COMELEC held a special meeting and resolved "to authorize
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Mauban, Quezon to reconvene and use the
copies of the election returns of the Municipal Trial Court Judge" (p. 87, Rollo).
On May 24, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers reconvened and dismissed
Sardea's appeal. The letter of Atty. Adolfo Ilagan dated May 15, 1992 and the
minutes of the special meeting of the COMELEC on May 22, 1992, were deemed
sufficient authority for it to use the MTC Judge's copies of the election returns. A
copy of the excerpts of the minutes contained a written notation of a certain
Cesario Perez addressed to the chairman of the respondent Board commanding
him to "implement this resolution" and that "this is tantamount to denying the
appeal to (sic) your ruling, which appeal was not received by this Commission" (p.
62, Rollo). The canvassing continued thereafter.
On May 26, 1992, Sardea filed a petition in the Office of the Election Registrar in
Mauban, Quezon, assailing the composition of the Board of Canvassers and its
proceedings. He also filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.
On May 27, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the private
respondents as the duly elected Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon.
On June 10, 1992, petitioners filed Special Action Case No. SPA 92-331, seeking
to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon, based on the grounds that:
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |39
I. The attendant facts and circumstance constitute substantial grounds to declare

a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.
II. Respondent Board gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in canvassing the impugned election returns without prior authority
from the Honorable Commission. (p. 14, Rollo.)
On June 19, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated the challenged resolution,
whereupon Sardea filed this petition forcertiorari alleging that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion:
1. in not annulling the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Mauban, Quezon, despite the failure of election in that municipality;
2. in considering the grounds raised by petitioners as proper for an election
contest despite the nullity of the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Mauban, Quezon; and
3. in ruling that petitioner did not appeal on time the resolution of the Municipal
Board of canvassers of Mauban, Quezon.
The respondents asked for the outright dismissal of the petition based on Section
3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that decisions in
special action cases "shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5)
days from their promulgation, unless retrained by the Supreme Court" (p.
90, Rollo).
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the finality of COMELEC decisions or
resolutions is indicated in Sec. 257 of B.P. 881, as amended (Omnibus Election
Code) which provides that the decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall
become final thirty (30) days after its promulgation.
Section 257 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 257. Decision in the Commission. The Commission shall decide all election
cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision. The decision of the Commission shall become final thirty days after
receipt of judgment. (Art. XII, C, Sec. 3, Const.; Art. XVIII, Sec. 193, 1978 EC).
(Underlining supplied.)
A perusal of our election laws shows that they do not explicitly provide for an
appeal from the COMELEC to the Supreme Court. Section 7, Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution provides that: "unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by

law, any decision, order or ruling of each [Constitutional] Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
[30] days from receipt of a copy thereof." The petition for certiorari shall be filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rivera vs. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 178; Galido
vs. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 79; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84; Pedalizo vs. Mariano,
UDK-9819, March 15, 1990).
Since no constitutional provision or law fixes a shorter period, the reglementary
period within which a petition forcertiorari may be filed in the Supreme Court
against the COMELEC is thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the COMELEC's
order, decision, or ruling.
Respondents did not correctly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure because this is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, hence, it falls under Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
and Sec. 257 of the Omnibus Election Code. This petition was therefore
seasonably filed on July 23, 1992, within thirty (30) days after the petitioner
received the COMELEC resolution on June 23, 1992.
Nevertheless, it must fail because we find the grounds of the petition to be
without merit.
The facts show that Sardea's two (2) complaints/petitions involved preproclamation controversies which are defined as:
Sec. 241. Definition. A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question
pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may
be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of
political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns. (Art. XX
Omnibus Election Code: emphasis supplied.)
Sardea's first May 18, 1992 complain questioned the use of the Municipal Trial
Court Judge's copies of the election returns as basis for the canvass.
His second complaint on May 27, 1992, filed with the Election Registrar, assailed
the composition and proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Both
complaints definitely raised pre-proclamation controversies.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |40
We have already ruled in Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion
vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468, that preproclamation controversies my no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the
winning candidates have been proclaimed and assumed office. The proper remedy
of the aggrieved party is an election contest in the Regional Trial Court as provided
in
Sec.
250
of
B.P.
881
and
Sec.
2(2),
Art. IX-C of the Constitution.
In this case, since the authenticity and completeness of the returns were never
questioned and the winning candidates had been proclaimed on May 27, 1992,
Sardea's pre-proclamation complaint in the COMELEC ceased to be viable.
The COMELEC correctly dismissed Sardea's petition on the ground that it was
proper for an election contest.
But its holding that petitioners' appeal from the resolution of the Municipal Board
of Canvassers was late, is erroneous.
Section 17, R.A. 7166 deals with the commencement of pre-proclamation
controversies while Sec. 19 provides that "parties adversely affected by a ruling of
the Board of Canvassers on questions affecting the composition or proceedings of
the board may appeal the matter to the Commission within three (3) days from a
ruling thereon."
The petitioners properly filed their objection to the use of the election returns from
the MTC during the canvassing on May 18, 1992, based on Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166.
Said section provides that persons objecting to the inclusion in the canvass of any
election returns "shall submit their oral objection to the chairman of the Board of
Canvassersat the time questioned return is presented for inclusion in the
canvass." (Emphasis ours.)
By presenting his verbal objection, and subsequently filing a formal objection, on
May 18, 1992, Sardea acted in accordance with Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166. His notice of
appeal was verbally denied on May 24, 1992 by the Board of Canvassers. He filed
a notice of appeal to the Commission on May 26, 1992, or within three (3) days
after the denial of his notice of appeal by the Board of Canvassers.
This issue on the timeliness of the petitioners' appeal to the Commission is
actually moot and academic because said appeal could not survive after the
winning candidates were proclaimed.
The lone remaining issue is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
denying the petition to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon province.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is identical to Section 2, Rule 26 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, reads as follows:
Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fruad, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been
held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or
suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due
notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect. (Sec. 7, 1978 EC).
In Usman vs. COMELEC (42 SCRA 667, 690), we held that the pre-conditions for
declaring a failure of election are: "(1) that no voting has been held in any
precinct or precincts because of force mejeure, violence or terrorism, and (2) that
the votes not cast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The
language of the law clearly requires the concurrence of the[se] two circumstances
to justify the calling of a special election."
The destruction and loss of the copies of the election returns intended for the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on account of violence committed on May 13, 1992
is not one of the causes that would warrant the declaration of a failure of election
because voting actually took place as scheduled on May 11, 1992 and other valid
election returns still existed. Moreover, the incident did not affect the result of the
election.
The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost
care and only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that
the disregard of the law had been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous
that it is impossible to distinguish and what votes are lawful and what are
unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that the great body of
the voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from
exercising their franchise (20 C.J., pars. 179-181; Capalla vs. Tabiana, 63 Phil.
95).
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |41
The election is to be set aside when it is impossible from any evidence within
reach, to ascertain the true result - when neither from the returns nor from other
proof, nor from all together can the truth be determined (Law on Public Officers
and Election Law by Hector S. De Leon, p. 381, 1990 Ed., citing A Treatise on the
Law of Public Offices and Officers, by F. MECHEM, note 1 at p. 143).
There is a failure of elections only when the will of the electorate has been muted
and cannot be ascertained. If the will of the people is determinable, the same
must as far as possible be respected.
Since in this case copies of the election returns submitted to the MTC of Mauban,
Quezon were extant, and their authenticity was not questioned, they were
properly used as basis for the canvass. This is expressly authorized by Section 233
of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881) which provides that "if said returns have
been lost or destroyed, the board of canvassers, upon prior authority of the
Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a
certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission . . . ." (Emphasis
ours.)
Thus did we rule in an earlier case:
"While it is true that in local elections, the original copy of the election returns is
to be delivered to the city or municipal board of canvassers as a body for its use in
the city or municipal canvass, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code
stating that the canvass should be based only on the original copy of the election
returns. Besides, the duplicate copy of election returns that were used in the
canvass of votes were not only authentic copies or certified copies but duplicate
originals. Moreover, petitioner failed to show or even make an allegation that the
use of the duplicate originals of the returns had in some definite manner caused
him prejudice, like uncounted votes in his favor or alteration of an election result
otherwise in his favor." (G.R. No. 82674, In Re: Protest of Atty. Alberto de la Rosa,
etc. vs. Comelec and City Board of Canvassers of Zamboanga City, Resolutionen
banc dated November 3, 1988.)
Since B.P. 881 and R.A. 7166 are statutes in pari materia, they should be so
construed as to harmonize with each other and with other laws on the same
subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system (Valera vs.
Tuason, 80 Phil. 823). Prior statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be
compared with the new provisions, and if possible by reasonable construction,
both to be construed that effect may be given to every provision of each (C&C
Commercial Corp. vs. NWSA, 21 SCRA 984, citing Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Vol. 2 pp. 530-532).
Section 233 of B.P. 881 ought to be harmonized with Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A.
7166. Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A. 7166 presupposes that other copies of the
election returns are existent and may be compared with the copies of the MTC. It
does not preclude the use of such authentic copies in the canvass when the copies
submitted to the Board of Canvassers have been lost or destroyed. The letter of
Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Adolfo Ilagan dated May 15, 1992 and the
minutes of the special meeting of respondent COMELEC held on May 22, 1992
constitute sufficient authority for the use of such returns in the canvass.
In light of all the foregoing, the use by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Mauban, Quezon of the election returns in the possession of the MTC Judge of
Mauban, was not contrary to law, and was in fact the best possible recourse under
the circumstances in order to give life to the will of the electorate. The COMELEC
did not abuse its discretion when it issued the assailed resolution denying the
petition to declare a failure of election in Mauban, Quezon.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED, with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
There is no merit in the argument of the petitioners that inasmuch as B.P. 881 has
been amended/modified by R.A. 7166, 1 the copies of the election returns in the
possession of the MTC may not be used for the canvass but merely for comparison
purposes to determine the authenticity of other copies of said election returns as
provided in Section 27, par. b(5) of R.A. 7166. 2 The repealing clause of R.A. 7166
enumerates the sections of the Omnibus Election Code which it specifically
repeals. Sec. 233 is not among them.
G.R. No. 133495 September 3, 1998
the
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |42
BENJAMIN
U.
BORJA,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.
Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for
purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution
and the Local Government Code.
MENDOZA, J.:
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558
votes against petitioner's 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers.
This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision
barring elective local officials, with the exception of barangay officials, from
serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether
a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves
the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for
the purpose of the three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on
January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he
became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years
which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for
another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. 1
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U.
Borja Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on
the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in
favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from
running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. 2 However, on motion of private
respondent the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared
Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. 3 The majority
stated in its decision:
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated My 7,
1998, of the COMELEC and to seek a declaration that private respondent is
disqualified to serve another term as mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capco's service as mayor from
September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 should be considered as service for one full
term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as
mayor, he should be considered to have served three consecutive terms within the
contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local
Government Code. Petitioner stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor
Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and
thereafter served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant
that private respondent became mayor by succession because the purpose of the
constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may
serve is to prevent a monopolization of political power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160):
Sec. 43. Term of Office. . . .
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation
refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no
reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case
before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of
Mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by
operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected. . . .
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |43
First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy
embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of
enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in
office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by
election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the
purposes of the constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Article X, 8 of the
Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a
proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three
consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and
legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running
for the same position in the of the succeeding election following the expiration of
the third consecutive term. 4 Monsod warned against "prescreening candidates
[from] whom the people will choose" as a result of the proposed absolute
disqualification, considering that the draft constitution contained provisions
"recognizing people's power." 5
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:
The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary
or a perpetual disqualification on those who have served their terms in accordance
with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional
Commission. I would be very wary about this Commission exercising a sort of
omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have served their
terms from perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its
purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as
a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service in the
case of the President, six years, in the case of the Vice-President, unlimited; and
in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of
Congress, both from the legislative districts and from the party list and sectoral
representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning
local officials will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments. The
principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations where, as
a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President
down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their
positions and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to
stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a
subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the
continuity or the unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now
decide to put these prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want to

use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we
are taking away too much from the people, whereas we should be giving as much
to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice. . . . 6
Other commissioners went on record against "perpetually disqualifying" elective
officials who have served a certain number of terms as this would deny the right
of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, "why should
we arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want?" 7
Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her
colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and
[rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself." 8
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: "Why should we not leave [perpetual
disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the premise accepted by
practically everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use
this assumption only when it is convenient for us, and not when it may also lead
to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve
them longer?" 9
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion ofservice of term, derived from
the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in
office. The second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right
of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional
Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI, 4 and 7 of the
Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he
can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will
remember was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election
which is three years or one term which is six years?
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |44
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed

the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years,
whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this
particular member of the Senate can run. So, it is not really a period of
hibernation for six years. That was the Committee's stand. 10
Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should
be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them. 11 To bar the
election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the
first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would
therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for
three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the
term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for
more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an
elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states
that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the
official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a
circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official
may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected
because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas' comment on Art. VI, 7, which
similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from serving for more
than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that "if one is elected
Representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no
matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the
number of successive terms allowed." 12
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer
to a query of Commissioner Suarez: "For example, a special election is called for a
Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion
of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is
already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct
statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is
that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam President?"
Commissioner Davide said: "Yes, because we speak of "term," and if there is a
special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that particular term
plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the
Lower House." 13
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a
member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns,
becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the
mayorship by operation of law. 14 On the other hand, the Representative is elected
to fill the vacancy. 15 In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term
for which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit
the right to be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of the unexpired term
is rightly counted as his first term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the
intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a
Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession
of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. After
stating that "The President shall not be eligible for any reelection," this provision
says that "No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time."
Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered
to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter's office and serves
for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the
Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would be
qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office for more than four
years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials
throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the
constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have
been elected for purposes of the three-term limit on local elective officials,
disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency
and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as
President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the
event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. While he
may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is entirely dependent on the
good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said
to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as VicePresident the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it
becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may
rightly be considered as service for a full term.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |45
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he
is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and
employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. 16 It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of
a vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the
mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well asthe right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This
point can be made clearer by considering the following cases or situations:
Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the
death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is
twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election?
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and
subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually
served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art.
X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one "for which he
was elected." Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the
deceased and not he was elected, A cannot be considered to have completed one
term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that,
can he run for one more term in the next election?
In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two
conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions have not concurred,
namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times
and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the
local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his
resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not
been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has been elected
three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.
Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves
a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X,
8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the
next election?
Yes, because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full
term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the
deceased mayor.
To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but
also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern
them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the
situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand,
he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to
office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for reelection) if his service of
the first term is counted as one for the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding
of the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from
the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken
that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

SO ORDERED.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |46
JUANITO
C.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
PILAR, petitioner,
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution dated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13,
1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion
for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065
(Rollo, p. 14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the
petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National
and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor,
and for Other Purposes" provides as follows:
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |47
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.

Every candidateand treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days
after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission
the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed
by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or
reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required
herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be
liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00)
to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in
writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date
of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation
to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition,
the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office
(Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and
expenditures, the COMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No.
2348 (Re: Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and
Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates to
file statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law
Department of the Commission, the regional election director of the National

Capital Region, the provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall
advise in writing by personal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their
statements of contributions and expenditures in connection with the elections.
Every election registrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction
to comply with said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or
reports in connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required
herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be
liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender
shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of
contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having
withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits
that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political
contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file
his statement of contributions and expenditures.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |48
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine
British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741 [1981]). No
distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo
Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to
whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term
"every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued
his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art.
IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the
use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and
imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of

this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule
(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and
ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such
objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions
and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the
elections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and
regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95,
Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what
expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13;
Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices
acts" of several states in the United States, as well as in federal statutes,
expenditures of candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements of
expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be spent by a candidate.
Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur
2d, Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity
with respect to matters contained in the statements and to prevent, by such

publicity, the improper use of moneys
devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d,
Elections 289). These statutes also enable voters to evaluate the influences
exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors, and to furnish evidence of
corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of Appeals
of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the
requirement of filing (State ex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d
826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted
contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign.
The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where
a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure.
Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to
file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is
provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no
contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement
shall reflect such fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881
or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or
withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred." Petitioner's
withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative
fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |49
[G.R.
No.
L-31604.
April
17,
1970.]
RUFINO S. ANTONIO, JR., Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

JORGE A. ABAD, RENEE E. AGUDO and THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS,Respondents.
RENEE AGUDO, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET
AL., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ELECTION RETURN; DUTY OF

BOARD OF CANVASSERS. It has been repeatedly held that the duty of the Board
of Canvassers is to be satisfied of the genuineness of the returns, that the papers
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |50
presented
to
them
are
not
forged
or
spurious.
6. ID.; ID.; AUTHORITY OF COMELEC, DISTINCT FROM THAT OF THE ELECTORAL
2. ID.; ID.; BOARD OF CANVASSERS CAN EXCLUDE FROM CANVASS COERCED
TRIBUNALS OF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS. The power of the COMELEC to set
RETURNS. If the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its duties under
aside return that are falsified and to order the same excluded from a canvass is
Section 3 of the Revised Election Code, can require Boards of Canvassers to
distinct and separate from the authority inherent in the Electoral Tribunals of the
consider only genuine and authentic, not falsified, returns, it can logically require
House or of the Senate, in the course of an electoral protest, to set aside such
such boards to exclude from the canvass any returns that were actually the
returns whenever the statements of votes cast contained therein do not tally with
product of coercion, even if they be clean in their face. "An election return
the valid votes enclosed within the ballot boxes themselves. No conflict of
prepared at the point of a gun is no return at all; it is not one notch above a
jurisdiction can arise since the powers of the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunals
falsified or spurious return" (citing Pacis v. Comelec, L-29026, 28 September
are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The COMELEC is
1968).
not concerned with the veracity of the returns, but with their genuineness and
regularity; and it is self-evident that a return accomplished by the election
3. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, OBJECTIVES, LATITUDE TO ADOPT
inspectors under threats and coercion by armed men is in law no return at all that
MEANS TO CARRY OUT ITS DUTIES. The Commission on Elections by
the canvassers may take into account. As a corollary, the COMELEC can set aside
constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and
an
improper
canvass,
as
well
as
the
resulting
proclamation.
honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties,
the Commission must be given considerable latitude in adopting means and
7. ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION, VALIDITY MADE, CAN ONLY BE QUESTIONED IN AN
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it
ELECTION PROTEST. The Comelec has the authority to inquire into the
was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of
proclamation, whether or not a proclamation is null and void. The rule is where a
means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or
proclamation is validly made, errors in the proclamation may only be raised in a
constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. Technicalities,
full-dress
election
protest.
which are not conducive to free, orderly and honest elections, but on the contrary
may defeat the will of the sovereign people as expressed by their votes, should
8. ID.; ID.; CANVASS PROCEEDINGS INDICATIVE OF DESIGN TO PREVENT
not be allowed to hamper the Commission on Elections in the performance if its
ATTENDANCE OF MEMBERS OF BOARD OF CANVASSERS. A reading of the
duties.
minutes of the canvass proceedings leaves no doubt that the short notices (barely
an hour) given to Vice Governor Gato and two members of the Provincial Board
4. ID.; ID.; ELECTION CONTEST, CONCEPT. As used in constitutional provisions,
were expressly designed to prevent their attendance a maneuver sufficient to
election contest relates only to statutory contests in which the contestant seeks
annul the canvass. The canvass was so precipitately conducted (starting at eight
not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself inducted into office.
oclock in the evening of the day following the election and completed at 3 oclock
of the following afternoon) that three of the de jure members of the Provincial
5. ID.; ID.; HOUSE AND SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, MEASURE OF ITS
Board of Canvassers had, likewise, no opportunity to be present, and their
JURISDICTION. Until a regular protest or contest is filed, the jurisdiction of the
substitutes were appointed without even attempting to secure from the Comelec
Electoral Tribunals does not come into play in order to exclude the authority of the
an order for their substitution, as required by Section 159 of the Election Code.
COMELEC.
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |51
9. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE PATENT IRREGULARITIES AUTHORIZES
board has failed to do may be done by Comelec, under its broad powers of "direct
COMELEC TO ANNUL CANVASS. Failure of the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
and immediate supervision" over the provincial canvassing board (Section 3,
investigate and to disregard patent irregularities, authorizes the COMELEC to
Revised Election Code). As we said in the analogous case of Cauton v. Comelec,"
annul
(O)nce the Commission on Elections is convinced that the election returns in the
the
canvass
and
its
resulting
proclamation.
hands of the board of canvassers do not constitute the proper basis in ascertaining
10. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO OBJECT SEASONABLY NOT CONSIDERED ESTOPPEL OR
the true result of the elections, it should be its concern, nay its duty, to order the
WAIVER. The failure of respondents to interpose seasonable objection at the
taking of such steps as may be necessary in order that the proper basis for the
canvassing aforesaid could not have amounted to either estoppel or waiver of their
canvass is obtained or made available." That Comelec, rather than the House
rights to object to the questioned returns for granting that they were given the
Electoral Tribunal is the proper agency vested with jurisdiction to ascertain that
opportunity
only genuine returns, as against forged, spurious or manufactured or gun-point
to
object,
said
objection
would
have
been
useless.
returns, are used for the canvass and proclamation is borne out by the fact that it
11. ID.; ID.; INTERWOVEN CIRCUMSTANCES PROVING IMPROPER DESIGN. The
is Comelec that is vested by the Constitution with the authority for deputizing all
circumstances of precipitate canvassing, terrorism, lack of sufficient notice to
law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the
members of the Board, and disregard of manifest irregularities on the face of the
purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections. The House Tribunal aside
questioned returns build up to prove that the alleged canvassing was mere
from not being vested with jurisdiction, simply does not have the resources and
ceremony that was predetermined and manipulated to result in nothing but the
facilities, not to mention that after the elections, the six House members thereof
hurried
are simply in no position to attend to and decide such urgent administrative
proclamation
of
petitioner
Antonio
as
Congressman-elect.
questions affecting the elections and there is a hiatus with the cessation in office
TEEHANKEE, J.,
concurring
and
dissenting:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
of non-reelected members, which has to await the Tribunals reorganization after

the new Congress is convened in the following year on the fourth Monday of
1. POLITICAL LAW; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ELECTION RETURNS; FAILURE
January.
TO DENOUNCE RETURNS DOES NOT CURE THEIR BEING VOID AB INITIO. The
fact that the twenty-one (21) gun-point returns were not denounced as such at
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COMELEC WHEN THERE IS FAILURE OF ELECTION;
the canvassing of November 13, 1969, prescinding from the other circumstances
CASE AT BAR. Comelec has properly resolved the matter of the nullity of the
of "precipitate canvassing, terrorism, lack of sufficient notice to members of the
proclamation of Antonio on November 13, 1969, but since it found that there was
Board, and disregard of manifest irregularities on the face of the questioned
a failure of election in the province as the less than one-third of the electorate that
returns" cited by Mr. Justice Reyes in the main opinion, does not in any way cure
was able to record its votes per the remaining valid returns in the lone town of
their
Basco did not constitute a valid constituency, it should refrain from any resolution
being
void
returns
ab
initio.
of the equally important matter of non-election through the sham proclamation

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMELEC, NOT THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, HAS
ordered by it from the votes of the admittedly non-valid constituency, but certify
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE GENUINE RETURNS USED FOR THE CANVASS.
the plain fact of failure of election and forward its records to the House Electoral
Under the circumstances, what the board of canvassers has done improperly in
Tribunal. Proclamation of a winner, under the peculiar circumstances of the case at
the matter of the precipitate and illegal proclamation of Antonio may be undone
bar where factually there has been a failure of election and no winner, is not a
by Comelec upon timely application or on its own initiative, and similarly, what the
condition sine qua non for the Electoral Tribunal to take cognizance of the Comelec
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |52
certification and hear all the interested candidates, particularly, Antonio, Abad and
there remained an election for which a winner may be proclaimed or whether
Agudo. In effect, the Electoral Tribunal will have before it a three-pronged contest,
there was a failure of election since the remaining returns do not represent a valid
with Antonio claiming that there was a valid election in the entire province and he
constituency under the prevailing doctrine of the House Electoral Tribunal is one
was the winner, Abad claiming in turn there was a valid election only in the town
that pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of said Tribunal and should be certified
of Basco and one precinct in the town of Sabtang and that the remaining votes
thereto
as
indicated
in
the
body
of
this
opinion
for
resolution.
recorded therein constituted a valid constituency with himself as the winner, and
Agudo claiming against both that there was no winner due to the failure of the
FERNANDO, J.,
concurring
and
dissenting:chanrob1es
virtual
1aw
library
election.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTIONS; GOVERNMENT MUST REST ON THE
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WAS AN ELECTION OR FAILURE
PEOPLE; ELECTION LAWS ARE MEANS TO ASSURE A FREE, HONEST AND
OF ELECTION IS VESTED WITH HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL. The House
ORDERLY EXPRESSION OF THE PEOPLES CHOICE. It would then be, to my way
Electoral Tribunal, not the Comelec, under the division of powers between the two
of thinking, to disregard the republican character of our polity as enjoined by the
agencies made by the Constitution, is the constitutional agency vested with
Constitution to predicate a choice on the part of the people of Batanes as to who
exclusive jurisdiction to decide the conflicting claims which present as real an
their Congressman shall be considering what did transpire. As we pointed out in
electoral contest as any it has passed upon. The House Electoral Tribunal, then, as
the recent case: "A republic then to be true to its name requires that the
the constitutional agency entrusted with the function of "sole judge of all contests
government rests on the consent of the people, consent freely given, intelligently
relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of members of the House of
arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really
Representatives may make the formal declaration of nullity of the election per the
looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their undeniable
"sufficient cue" given by the Comelec. Or it may choose to disregard its doctrine
right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no
that where more than half of the votes cast in an election have been annulled, the
justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression
remainder
Abad
of their views." If on the undisputed facts, the wishes of more than a majority of
nevertheless as the winner by a plurality of the remaining votes, insignificant
the enfranchised citizens of Batanes, would not even be taken into account, then
though they may be and non-expressive of the will of the electorate of the entire
for me less than full respect is accorded to one of the most fundamental principles
province. Or it may check the veracity of all the returns themselves in accordance
of
does
not
constitute
valid
constituency
and
proclaim
our
Constitution.
with its exclusive prerogative by going into the primary evidence of the ballot
boxes and examining the ballots themselves, and verifying whether it could
2. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; WHERE RIGHT TO VOTE HAS BEEN
retrieve a sufficient number of valid ballots to constitute a valid constituency. I
FRUSTRATED, SUCH FACT MUST BE CERTIFIED TO CONGRESS FOR APPROPRIATE
vote, therefore, for the affirmance of the Comelec Resolution insofar as it annuls
LEGISLATION. Considering that under the view I take of the case, in the light of
the proclamation of Rufino Antonio, Jr. with the rejection of the election returns
the incontrovertible facts so meticulously and vividly spelled out by the
from the twenty-one precincts enumerated therein, but vote for the reversal of the
respondent Commission, it should certify to Congress that unfortunately the right
Resolution insofar as it directs the board of canvassers to recanvass the results of
to vote was frustrated and nullified so that the appropriate remedial measure in
the election for the lone congressional district of Batanes on the basis of the
the form of a new election could be provided for by appropriate legislation. Vast
remaining returns for nine precincts of Basco and Precinct 4 of Sabtang and
and extensive are indeed the implications flowing from the generous grant under
proclaim Jorge Abad as the winner on the basis thereof. The question of whether
the Constitution to respondent Commission to" have exclusive charge of the
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |53
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections"
and recanvass the results of the election for the lone congressional district of the
and to "exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law."
province of Batanes, on the basis of the remaining returns for Precincts 1, 1A, 2,
Thereby the totality of the executive power heretofore exercised by the President
3, 3A, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Basco and Precinct No. 4 of Sabtang, and to proclaim the
insofar as the execution of such statutes is concerned is transferred to an
winner on 10 February 1970, unless, restrained by the Supreme Court; and
independent constitutional agency to assure that there be neutrality and
directing the Recording Secretary to furnish copies of said Resolution to the
impartiality and thus safeguard the right of suffrage from being reduced to a farce
President, the Speaker and Secretary, House of Representatives, and the House
or
Electoral
mockery.
Tribunal.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE POWER TO CALL FOR A SPECIAL ELECTION AND WHEN
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC for short) found, among other things,
IT SHALL BE HELD IS LEGISLATIVE IN CHARACTER. Such being the case,
that after the national elections held on 11 November 1969 the Provincial Board of
Congress can be trusted to act. It is the sole agency that under the Constitution
Canvassers of the Province of Batanes was convened for 12 November 1969 at
can provide for the holding of an election that would thus give the opportunity for
8:30 oclock p.m. Three members failed to attend: the Vice-Governor and two
all qualified electors of Batanes so-minded to make full use of their basic right to
members of the Provincial Board. In view of their absence, the Provincial Fiscal, as
vote. The power to call for a special election and when it shall be held is legislative
Chairman of the Board of Canvassers, asked the Officer-in-charge, COMELEC,
in character. It appears clear to me that upon Congress being officially informed in
Batanes, to appoint substitutes for the absent members, which was done. There
accordance with the above constitutional provision of what occurred in Batanes,
after, the Board immediately proceeded with the canvass. recessed at two oclock,
tragic in its implications for the rule of law, it can be expected in turn to remedy
past midnight, to resume at 10:0 oclock a.m., 13 November 1969, and completed
matters in the only way that the situation calls for, the enactment of a measure as
the canvass at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon. Immediately thereafter, the
to when the voters of that province will have their right of suffrage truly respected
canvassers proclaimed independent candidate Rufino Antonio, Jr. Congressman-
and given force and effectivity. That, for me at least, is the appropriate response
elect for the lone congressional district of Batanes and, some time later, he took
to the unique situation that, it is to be hoped, will not be repeated.
his
DECISION
oath
of
office.
On 26 November and 3 December 1969, Jorge A. Abad, Liberal Party official

candidate, and Mrs. Renee Agudo, Nacionalista Party official candidate, filed
independent petitions with COMELEC, contesting the proclamation of Rufino
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Antonio, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of terrorism

practiced by armed men brought to Batanes by candidate Antonio and
Petitions for writs of certiorari and prohibition to review and set aside a Resolution
of the Commission on Elections in its Case No. RR-698, dated 2 February 1970,
whereby the Commission unanimously rejected the returns for 21 precincts of
Itbayat, Ivana, Mahatao, Uyugan, and Sabtang, all of the province of Batanes, for
having been "prepared at gunpoint" ; annulled and set aside the proclamation of
Rufino Antonio, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on 13 November 1969;
and by majority vote ordered said Board of Canvassers to convene immediately
strategically distributed in all towns, who destroyed communication facilities and

blocked airport landings, thereby effectively isolating the province; and that on
election day these armed men had attacked the precincts of Itbayat, Uyugan,
Ivana, Mahatao and Sabtang (except Precinct 4 of the latter), driven away the
voters, filled in the unused ballots with the name of Antonio, destroyed the ballots
of those voters who had previously managed to vote, prepared the election
returns without counting the votes, and thereafter coerced and intimidated the
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |54
boards of inspectors of the precincts to sign the same at gunpoint. Both
substantiated by proof. Overruling Antonios special defenses, the COMELEC
petitioners prayed that the proclamation of Rufino Antonio, Jr. by the Board of
voided the returns of the questioned precincts and set aside his proclamation
Canvassers be annulled and set aside, and that the election returns in all precincts
based thereon. The majority of the Commission (Chairman Ferrer and member
in the towns of Batanes, except Basco and Precinct No. 4 of Sabtang, be declared
Patajo) further resolved to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to reconvene
null and void. But while candidate Abad also prayed that the canvassing board be
and recanvass the uncontested returns of Basco and Precinct 4 of Sabtang, and
directed to make another canvass on the basis of election returns from Precinct 4
proclaim the winner. Commissioner Miraflor, however, was of the opinion that (as
of Sabtang and the nine (9) precincts of Basco and thereafter proclaim the winner,
contended by candidate Agudo) there was a failure of election that, should be
candidate Agudo, in her turn, asked that the returns from Sabtang, Precinct 4,
certified
to
the
House
of
Representatives.
and Basco be declared not expressive of the will of the majority, since they
represent only 28% of the registered voters of Batanes, and that the holding of a
Rufino Antonio, Jr. then resorted to this Court, as stated heretofore, urging
special
practically the same special defenses pleaded by him before the COMELEC and
election
be
recommended
to
the
President
of
the
Philippines.
praying that the COMELEC resolution be set aside, and that the House Electoral
Respondent (petitioner herein) Rufino Antonio, Jr. answered both petitions
Tribunal be declared with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the issues
traversing the allegations thereof, and pleading the regularity and freedom of the
raised
by
petitioners
below.
election held, and, by way of special defenses, urged (1) lack of jurisdiction of
COMELEC to determine question involving election returns regarding members of
WE gave the petition due course and required respondents Commission on
the House of Representatives; (2) estoppel of Jorge Abad to maintain the
Elections, Jorge Abad, Renee Agudo and the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proceedings because he had filed a protest against Antonio in the House Electoral
answer Antonios petition. And upon his motion, a writ of preliminary injunction
Tribunal; (3) that COMELEC had no power to annul the proclamation or suspend
was issued to stop the proclamation during the pendency of these proceedings.
its effects; (4) that both Abad and Agudo waived their rights to contest the
Thereafter,
the
case
was
heard,
argued
and
submitted
for
decision.
proclamation, or are estopped from asserting it, in view of their failure to attend
the canvass and impugn therein the validity of the questioned returns; and (5)
The petitioner, Rufino Antonio, Jr., makes no attempt to question the findings of
lack of power of the COMELEC to annul the election or declare a failure to elect.
the COMELEC to the effect that the returns from the 21 questioned precincts were
prepared under systematic threats and intimidation practiced by heavily armed
At the initial hearing on 5 December 1969, the COMELEC issued a resolution
men upon the members of the respective boards of inspectors. Said the
suspending the effects of the proclamation of Antonio pending final termination of
Commission
in
its
resolution:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the case and rejected the motions to dismiss filed by Antonio and the Provincial
Board of Canvassers based on grounds substantially identical to the special
"It would appear quite clear to the Commission that what transpired inside the
defenses
polling place in Itbayat, Uyugan, Ivana, Mahatao and Sabtang, except Precinct 4
pleaded
in
Antonios
answers.
on election day, particularly in regard to the preparation of the returns in these

Thereafter, COMELEC proceeded to take evidence, summoning and hearing inter
precincts through the intervention or upon the dictation of armed goons, was the
alia the chairmen of the boards of inspectors in the questioned precincts.
culmination of an operation which had for its objective the election of one of the
Thereafter, it rendered a unanimous Resolution finding the factual claims of
congressional candidates. The destruction of the communication facilities of RCPI
terrorism made by petitioners (respondents herein) Abad and Agudo to have been
and the Bureau of Telecommunications in Basco, as well as of the radio phone of
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |55
the Weather Bureau Station; the immobilization of practically all government and
genuineness of the returns, that the papers presented to them are not forged or
private motor vehicles including those belonging to the Bureau of Public Highways
spurious. 1 If the COMELEC, in the exercise of its duties under Section 3 of the
and Bureau of Public Works, the Provincial Governor, the Superintendent of
Revised Election Code, can require Boards of Canvassers to consider only genuine
Schools and the Provincial Hospital ambulance; the presence of a private plane
and authentic, not falsified, returns, it can logically require such boards to exclude
squatting across the runaway of the Basco Airport since November 8, 1969; the
from the canvass any returns that were actually the product of coercion, even if
unexplained presence of unidentified ships in the waters of Batanes; the
they be clean in their face. Direct authority to this effect is our decision in Pacis v.
mysterious trips of a helicopter; the frisking of all arrivals by PAL in search of
COMELEC, L-29026, 28 September 1968, 25 SCRA, page 377, where we
arms; the checkpoints manned by PC Special Forces whose presence in Batanes
specifically
ruled
as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
had not been reported to the Commission on Elections in Manila, and as a matter
of fact, the Commission had grounded the use of these PC Special Forces in
"We must now say that an election return prepared at the point of a gun is no
Cagayan and Marinduque and in all other places where their presence had been
return at all; it is not one notch above a falsified or spurious return. Comelec was
reported to the Commission before election and on election day; checkpoints
correct in ruling that there was no valid returns for the office of Mayor at Precinct
which prevented the free movement of not only the government officials including
22 and that no vote should be counted for said precinct in the canvass of votes for
the Governor but also of the Bishop of Batanes who headed the CNEA in said
Mayor."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
province; the precision in movements of these armed goons who swooped down
upon the helpless members of the board of inspectors, and drove away the voters
On the strength of Angara v. Electoral Commission (1936) 63 Phil. 139, petitioner
awaiting for their turn to vote, destroying or burning the ballots validly cast and
Antonio urges that the Electoral Tribunal of the House has, under the Constitution,
filling in the unused ballots with the name of their candidate all of these
exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon and determine the election, returns and
occurrences and happenings formed part of a common pattern joined together like
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, and that such
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which when seen separately are meaningless and
grant of power is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained
incomprehensible but put together reveal a picture so awesome and appalling,
originally in the legislature; "and this is as effective a restriction upon the
clearly pointing to the rape of democracy in Batanes on November 11, 1969,
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution" (cas. cit., page
(Appendix
176). But the Angara case did not involve any conflict between the Commission on
"Y"
of
Antonios
Petition,
pp.
31-33)."cralaw
virtua1aw
library
Elections and the Electoral Tribunals, neither of which existed when that decision
Petitioner Antonio actually rests his case on the arguments that all the questioned
was rendered; and the fact that the powers of the Electoral Commission (now
returns appear clean and regular on their face; that the Board of Provincial
replaced by the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals) restrict and exclude the
Canvassers was regularly constituted: that the validity of the questioned returns
legislative power in matters concerning the election, returns and qualifications of
was not raised at any time during the canvass, which resulted in petitioners
the members of the House in election contests, does not mean that the COMELEC
proclamation. From these premises, he avers first of all that only the House
may not now exercise its constitutional power to "enforce and administer all laws
Electoral Tribunal, and not the COMELEC, can review and set aside such canvass
relative to the conduct of elections," and, in the course thereof, to require that
and proclamation. Yet he admits that under the repeated rulings of this Court the
canvassers base their proclamations only on genuine, authentic and untampered
COMELEC can set aside an illegal proclamation such as one based on incomplete
returns,
and
annul
any
proclamations
departing
from
this
rule.
or tampered returns (Petitioners memorandum, page 3). Over and over, in fact,
has this Court held that it is the duty of canvassers to be satisfied of the
"The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of the
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |56
elections and to suppress all evils that may vitiate its purity and defeat the will of
Tribunals does not come into play in order to exclude the authority of the
the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of
COMELEC.
popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate,

must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes
Thus, the power of the COMELEC to set aside returns that are falsified or are not
cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be
authentic and genuine and to order the same excluded from a canvass is distinct
given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the
and separate from the authority inherent in the Electoral Tribunals of the House or
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free,
the Senate, in the course of an electoral protest, to set aside such returns
orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on
whenever the statements of votes cast contained therein do not tally with the
Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion,
valid votes enclosed within the ballot boxes themselves. No conflict of jurisdiction
should not be interfered with. Technicalities, which ace not conducive to free,
can arise since the powers of the COMELEC and the Electoral Tribunals are
orderly and honest elections, but on the contrary may defeat the will of the
exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The COMELEC is not
sovereign people as expressed by their votes, should not be allowed to hamper
concerned with the veracity of the returns, but with their genuineness and
the
regularity; and it is self-evident that a return accomplished by the election
Commission
on
Elections
in
the
performance
of
its
duties."
inspectors under threats and coercion by armed men is in law no return at all that
CAUTON
V.
COMELEC,
L-25467,
April
27,
1967,
19
SCRA
911.
the canvassers may take into account. 2 As a corollary, the COMELEC can set
aside an improper canvass, as well as the resulting proclamation, and this Court
The true measure of the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Electoral Tribunals
has
repeatedly
so
ruled.
was set in our decision in Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 209, to the effect
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"These cases, however, are not to be read as throwing overboard Comelecs

authority to inquire into whether or not a proclamation is null and void. For, these
"The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the latters authority to
cases merely emphasize the rule that where a proclamation is validly made,
contests relating to the election, etc. altered the draft. The Convention did not
ERRORS in the proclamation may only be raised in a full-dress election protest.
intend to give it all the functions of the Assembly on the subject of election and
qualifications of its members. The distinction is not without a difference.As used in
"The ratiocination advanced by petitioner fails to take stock of the fact that where
constitutional provisions, election contest relates only to statutory contests in
a proclamation is null and void, that proclamation is no proclamation at all. This is
which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have himself
axiomatic. To be remembered is Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, supra, citing
inducted into office. (Laurel on Elections, Second Edition, p. 250; 20 C.J. 58.)"
Demafiles v. Commission on Elections, supra. Our ruling there is this: It is indeed

true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an
In harmony with this principle, Section 182 of the Election Code provides that "in
election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only or the assumption
contests under their respective jurisdictions the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate
that there has been a valid proclamation. Where as in this case at bar the
and the House of Representatives shall have and exercise the same powers which
proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in any way affect the
the law confers upon the Courts . . .", it being well-known that the exercise of
basic
issues.
(Ibid.)"
judicial powers are called for only upon the filing of the corresponding petition.
Until a regular protest or contest is filed, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Electoral
It may be that the canvassers were not, at the time of the canvass, aware that
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |57
the returns were coerced; that may relieve them from liability but does not
20 May 1969, 28 SCRA 200; Purisima v. Salanga, L-22335, 31 December 1965.
validate such returns, nor prevent the COMELEC from subsequently voiding them
1965, 15 SCRA 704, and Javier v. Comelec, L-22248, 30 January 1965, 13 SCRA
and ordering a new canvass whenever said body is satisfied of the compulsive
156, we have ruled that failure to investigate and to disregard patent
character
irregularities, such as these, authorizes the COMELEC to annul the canvass and
of
the
returns.
resulting
proclamation.
It is urged that the respondents Abad and Agudo are in estoppel from questioning
these coerced returns because of their failure to attend the canvassing and there
To cap it all, there is the testimony of Governor Agudo, himself a member of the
to object to them. We find this contention untenable in view of the circumstances
Board of Canvassers, that in Batanes "there was terrorism before, during and after
then prevailing. Not only was Abad sick at the time, but no adequate term was
the
elections."
given for him to attend. In truth, the canvass was so precipitately conducted
[starting at eight oclock in the evening of the day following the election (12
All these circumstances, precipitate canvassing, terrorism, lack of sufficient notice
November 1969) and completed at 3 oclock of the following afternoon] that three
to members of the Board, and disregard of manifest irregularities on the face of
of the de jure members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers had, likewise, no
the questioned returns, build up to prove that the alleged canvassing was mere
opportunity to be present, and their substitutes were appointed without even
ceremony that was predetermined and manipulated to result in nothing but the
attempting to secure from the COMELEC an order for their substitution, as
hurried proclamation of petitioner Antonio as Congressman-elect. They also
required by section 159 of the Election Code. A reading of the minutes of the
establish convincingly that whatever objections to the returns could have been
canvass proceedings leaves no doubt that the short notices (barely an hour) given
interposed by the respondent candidates, had they been given opportunity to do
to Vice-Governor Gato and two members of the Provincial Board were expressly
so, would have been considered nor varied the result. Wherefore, the failure of
designed to prevent their attendance, and this maneuver would suffice to annul
respondents to interpose seasonable objection at the canvassing aforesaid could
the
not have amounted to either estoppel or waiver of their rights to object to the
canvass
(Pacis
v.
COMELEC,
ante).
questioned
returns.
In addition, some of the returns considered by the canvassers were plainly

irregular on their face. Thus, for example, the returns for Precinct 1 of Sabtang
Finally, Antonios argument that Abad waived the remedy sought from the
showed only the signatures of two inspectors (See the photograph, Abads Answer,
COMELEC by filing an unconditional protest with the House Electoral Tribunal on
Annex "D"); that of Precinct 2 of Sabtang (do., Annex "E") showed no count of the
28 November need not give pause: for the Electoral Tribunal itself admitted Abads
valid and spoiled ballots, nor did it show any votes for Senators: that of Precinct
amended protest, recognized that the protest was filed ex abundante cautela and,
II-A of Itbayat contained an erasure by cancellation and a correction without
upon Abads motion, held further proceedings in abeyance "until after the
initials (Annex "F"), and the same is true of the return for Precinct I of Ivana,
Commission on Elections has resolved the matter or matters now pending before
where the votes of Jose W. Diokno for senator (224) appear cancelled without
it." The House Electoral Tribunal, in other words, recognized the jurisdiction of the
initials or explanation (Annex "J"). In the return for Precinct 2 of Mahatao (Annex
COMELEC, and beyond that this Tribunal is not called up to go. Anyway, a
"H"), an equally patent anomaly appears: the votes for candidates Abad (Jorge),
cautelary
protest
does
not
deprive
the
COMELEC
of
its
jurisdiction.
Abad (Senen), Agudo and Villalva are set down as "One" in letters and eleven (11)
in figures. Yet, despite such blatant anomalies, ail these returns were improperly
Nor is petitioners case bolstered by his taking an oath of office on 30 November
considered regular by the canvassers. Hitherto, in Solidum v. Macalalag, L-28666,
1969. "Where the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot in
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |58
any way affect the basic issues" (Mutuc v. COMELEC, G.R. L-28517, 21 February
all with a view to ensuring "free, orderly and honest elections." We seriously doubt
1958,
that a declaration of a failure to elect, notwithstanding the fact that 1,363 valid
22
SCRA
662).
votes have been cast and counted, can be considered an "administrative question"
In case G.R. No. L-31609, candidate Renee Agudo appealed from the COMELEC
that the COMELEC has power to decide. Such a certification has no bearing on the
resolution in so far as the same ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
conduct of the elections or the electoral process, but concerns the results thereof.
reconvene and canvass the return from those precincts not affected by terrorism
It would bring about the invalidation or nullification of the votes validly cast in the
and to proclaim the winner on the basis of such returns. Appellant Agudo take the
uncontested precincts, effectively disenfranchising the voters who cast them; and
position that, since the votes recorded (1,363) for all the precincts of Basco and
this Court has already ruled that "the power to decide election contests" (which is
precinct 4 of Sabtang, and reported for the only precincts not questioned,
avowedly not lodged in the COMELEC) "includes the power to determine the
represent only 28% of the total registered voters, the proper course of the
validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." 5
COMELEC is to certify to a failure of election in order that a special election may

be
called.
Be that as it may, all doubts on the question can be set at rest by resorting to the
provisions of Section 177 of the Election Code. It prescribes that it is for the Court
Implicit in the stand taken by respondent Agudo is the assumption that for a
taking cognizance of an election protest to "declare who among the parties had
candidate to be elected, he should receive the votes of a majority of the
been elected, or, in the proper case, that none of them has been legally elected."
registered electors. This thesis finds no support in our election laws. There is no
Since the Electoral Tribunals of Congress, pursuant to Section 182 of the Election
provision in our election statutes declaring that a majority of the registered voters
Code, "shall have and exercise the same powers which the law confers upon the
must cast their votes, or that a winning candidate must receive a majority of the
Court," it becomes plain that the declaration of a failure to elect must, in the case,
votes of the registered electors, or a majority of the votes cast. The only mention
be sought from the Electoral Tribunal of the House and in the appropriate election
in the Election Code of the number of votes required of a congressional candidate
contest, because such failure can only mean that none of the competing
is in section 165, providing that if from the canvass "it should appear that two or
candidates has been legally elected. To give way to a protest wherein such
more have received the largest number of votes," then the canvassers shall draw
declaration
can
be
made,
winner
must
be
proclaimed.
lots and "shall proclaim as elected that candidate who may be favored by luck,
and the candidate so proclaimed shall have the right to assume office in the same
The Justices are unanimous in the conclusion that the proclamation of petitioner
manner as if he had been elected by plurality vote." A plurality of valid votes,
Rufino S. Antonio, Jr. was correctly and properly annulled and set aside by the
therefore, is all that is required in order that a candidate may win the election,
Commission on Elections in view of the large scale and unprecedented terrorism
even
practiced by armed goons in favor of said candidate, and, therefore, the action of
if
he
obtains
less
than
an
actual
majority.
the Commission must be, and is, affirmed in this respect. The Justices are
It is, likewise, our view that the certification prayed for by respondent Agudo is
however, evenly divided on the issue whether the COMELEC should have ordered,
not within the powers of the COMELEC to make. It is well to recall here that the
as it did, a recanvass and proclamation on the basis of the returns for Precincts 1,
Commission is constitutionally charged with the "enforcement and administration
1A, 2, 3, 3A, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Basco and No. 4 of Sabtang. Five Justices, including
of all laws relative to the conduct of the elections" (Article X, section 2,
the writer of this opinion, believe that such a proclamation is a necessary
Constitution). The Constitution also empowers the COMELEC to "decide, save
precedent to a protest in the Electoral Tribunal of the House, wherein the question
those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions affecting elections",
of failure to elect may be resolved. Five other Justices dissent, believing that the
ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |59
proclamation ordered by COMELEC is improper under the circumstances, and that
WHEREFORE, the petition of candidate Rufino S. Antonio is hereby dismissed, and
the COMELEC should confine itself to declaring a failure of election and to
the order of COMELEC invalidating his proclamation is affirmed. But the petition of
certifying the matter to the House Electoral Tribunal or, as proposed by Mr. Justice
candidate Agudo that COMELEC certify a failure of election and recommend the
Enrique Fernando, to the House of Representatives direct. Under the Rules of
ho]ding of a special election, as well as the petition of candidate Abad that a
Court (Section 11, Rule 56), a rehearing on this second point must be had.
proclamation be ordered made on the basis of the valid returns, are order set for
reargument and new hearing as soon as practicable. So ordered.

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ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |1

G.R. No. 147741

May 10, 2001

Petitioner is the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte,

The report and recommendation reads:

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |2

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |3

"3. That therefore, I am formally withdrawing my certificate of candidacy for

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |4

provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved

"Rule 23 - Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |5

G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006

The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |6

We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |7

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |8

G.R. No. 182701

July 23, 2008

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |9

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |10

G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |11

ADMIN | MARCH 12, 2016 |12

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.

THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.

REP. CUENCO: What does he want?

xxx xxx xxx

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung

REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?

THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?

Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.

THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.

MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .

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Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid

Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining

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Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment . . . (emphasis ours)

STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE

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G.R. No. 157870

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(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and

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The Issue on Locus Standi

The Consolidated Issues

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Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment

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36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by