Fleming 1

Alistair Fleming

Mr. Pate

AP US History 4

13 April 2010

America and Somalia

"Because things get difficult, you don't cut and run. You work out the problem and try to find a

correct solution" - General Colin Powell

Somalia is conceivably the world's best-known example of a failed state. Although

efforts have been made throughout the course of its history to establish sustainable order, its

governments have always fractured due to ineffectiveness, corruption, and the dilapidating

effects of incompliance. Somalia was set up as a parliamentary democracy based on the

separation of powers in 1961, but in 1970, President Siad Barre, a man who seized the power of

government by force, proclaimed "scientific socialism" as the Somalia's core ideology. This

Soviet-influenced ideal was regarded as fully compatible with Islam and widely accepted, but it

eventually led to political instability and collapse. Perpetual and large-scale fighting between

warring clan factions brought the collapse of the fairly viable but totalitarian Barre regime in

1991 and Somalia was plunged into bloody civil war. Since 1991, there has been no recognized

permanent central government and armed factions fight savagely against each other, each

controlled by a warlord interested in his clan's dominance over Somalia (Thomson Gale). United

States involvement in and foreign policy towards Somalia has changed drastically over the past

two decades: originally, the US focused on the rehabilitation of the populace and the introduction

of stable government, but after Operation Restore Hope, UNITAF, UNOSOM II, and the Battle

of Mogadishu, policy shifted to one of containment, as the Clinton Administration focused on

 Fleming 2

containing Somalia’s problems within the country’s borders so the instability did not further

destabilize the region. Today, the United States works to achieve political and economic

stability, eliminate the terrorist threat, and address the dire humanitarian situation.

Lt. Col. Danny McKnight described Mogadishu and Somalia as "the wild west"

(Eversmann 50), a place where everyone carried a gun and the ability to kill meant the ability to

negotiate. After the removal of the government of Barre, Somalia was divided into at least

sixteen warring factions based on clan alliances. These clan alliances frequently change, so the

warlords in Somalia were never at ease. In 1991, the coalition of clans that joined to remove

Siad Barre, called the United Somalia Congress, was separated into two groups. One was led by

Ali Mahdi and the other by Mohammed Farah Aidid, the strongest of the lot (Thomson Gale).

Each made alliances with other clans, but Aidid gained power; however, after the inter-clan

warfare, the agriculture of Somalia was destroyed. In turn, many people began to suffer and die

from starvation (Snyder). Aidid used this to his advantage: one of Aidid's main sources of power

in Somalia was the control of food supplies brought in from foreign nations. He hijacked food

and used it to secure the loyalty of other clan leaders, and he also utilized food as an exchange

for weapons when trading with other countries. Between 1991 and 1992, it is estimated that well

over 300,000 Somalis died of starvation due to Aidid's policy (Bowden 3). Disease also ran

rampant amongst the malnutritioned populace, and images of decrepit human beings permeated

into the west. Recognized by the rest of the world as a situation of genocide, the UN was urged

to send relief. It responded with Operation Provide Relief in 1992. Operation Provide Relief

was centered around the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Its main goal was

to administer humanitarian aid to people trapped by the civil war and famine. UNOSOM

observers were sent to Somalia to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu agreed to by opposing
 Fleming 3

clan factions. UNOSOM eventually expanded to provide protection and security for UN

personnel, equipment, and supplies at ports and escorts for humanitarian convoys delivering

supplies to relief centers. These relief missions were mainly unsuccessful due to the UN's

inability to deliver the supplies because the convoys and flights were looted as they arrived.

UNOSOM eventually experienced heavy resistance from Aidid, as it was interfering with his

pursuits (UN). He declared that the Pakistani UNOSOM battalion would no longer be tolerated

in Mogadishu and he gave the UN 48 hours to expel the UNOSOM Coordinator of Humanitarian

Assistance. Aidid's men began attacking UNOSOM forces in Mogadishu and ships carrying

food as they attempted to enter the Mogadishu port (UN).

Frustrated with UNOSOM I's ineffectiveness, the UN pleaded its member nations for

assistance in security for the relief missions in the Security Council's resolution 794 (Parker).

On December 4th, 1992, President George H.W. Bush proposed to the United Nations that the

United States combat troops lead the intervention force in the new relief operation. President

Bush's foreign policy was both conservative and pragmatic in approach, but he believed the

United States should be the policeman of the world as far as humanitarianism goes. Somalia,

then, is a prime example of Bush's foreign policy. The strong response to resolution 794 was one

of his last acts as Commander-in-Chief of the United States as he had lost the 1992 election to

Bill Clinton who would assume the role of President in two months (Oakley 46). Bush's

proposition was given the name Operation Restore Hope. In this, the United states would

assume command of the operations in Somalia proposed by resolution 794 (provide military

forces and make contributions in cash, etc, for the operation). The US troops were in charge of

creating "the secure environment which [was] an inescapable condition for the United Nations to

provide humanitarian relief and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction" (UN).
 Fleming 4

Resolution 794 also created the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). The I Marine Expeditionary

Force from Camp Pendleton, California formed the bulk of the force. Commanded by Marine

Lt. Gen. Robert B. Johnston, UNITAF included U.S. and allied troops working together in one

task force, but under US and not UN jurisdiction. The number of United States forces were was

approximately 28,000 personnel, augmented by some 17,000 UNITAF troops from over 20

countries (Britannica). The first constituents of UNITAF came ashore on the beaches of

Mogadishu without opposition on December 9th, 1992. The United States Central Command

followed a four-phase program to complete the objectives of securing major airports and

seaports, key installations and food distribution points, and to provide open and free passage of

relief supplies, with security for convoys and relief organizations and those supplying

humanitarian relief. The UNITAF succeeded in temporarily subduing the clans and restoring a

semblance of order when Aideed and Ali Mahdi had pledged to stop fighting. Backed by

overwhelming US and allied power, the US soldiers and diplomats effectively established a

cease-fire between the two forces as a precondition to establishing a military and relief presence

in the interior of the country. However, it was not in mission plan to disarm or attack either

faction. Allegedly, the UNITAF forces were neutral and there only to ensure that relief supplies

flowed. Restricting weapons would have generated more resentment among the clans (Oakley

88). On the whole, the relief mission proceeded well, with few incidents of violence from

February to May 1993. It seemed that life was assuming some measure of normalcy. Markets

reopened, travel became more common, and there was even some hope of restarting a Somali

national police force with promising initial results. Operation Restore Hope succeeded in its

goal of bringing an end to mass starvation. The heavily armed UNITAF units quickly

established security in their sectors, and an uneasy truce kept the peace between the factions.
 Fleming 5

There were some warning signs on the horizon, however, as UN diplomats began to press for a

more active role of the military in confiscating weapons and in forcing some kind of political

settlement.

Bill Clinton was inaugurated as the President of the United States in January 1993.

Clinton's motives were different compared to Bush's. Upon his inauguration, he made clear his

intentions to scale down the United States presence in Somalia and to let the UN take control of

the situation. The UNITAF was a fairly successful coalition as it maintained sufficient order so

that relief supplies could be delivered. Clinton did not believe that the rehabilitation of Somalia

was unnecessary: he fully supported it; but he believed that America had too much of a presence

in Somalia and that the UN was now better suited to handle it. He welcomed the proposed

second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). UNOSOM II began in March 1993, and on

May 4th, 1993, the relief effort, Operation Restore Hope, was declared successful and US force

levels were sharply reduced and UN activity was augmented. UNOSOM II's focuses were

completely different from the first UNOSOM due to a sense of security the American forces had

created in Somalia. The UN took on the task of nation building and included in its objectives

disarming the warring factions, restoring law and order, rebuilding an infrastructure crippled by

years of war, and establishing a representative government (Parker). There was much American-

conservative antipathy towards this audacious new undertaking. Former Assistant Secretary of

State for African Affairs Chester Crocker argued that the UN Security Council adopted a

"sweepingly ambitious new 'nation-building' resolution" that marked a major break between the

U.S. and U.N. missions in Somalia. Even the New York Times lamented that "the nature of the

mission changed dramatically in June [1993], right after Washington turned control over to the

U.N." Many Americans called for a strict division between humanitarian interventions and
 Fleming 6

nation-building, mainly because many believed that the United Nations was biting off more that

it could chew (Herbst). Richard Haass, previously an advisor for national security affairs to

President Bush, proposed that the Somalia mission widened to include nation-building because

"policymakers got ambitious." Overly ambitious and audacious (Clarke). Clinton publicly

supported UNOSOM II's pursuits, but he dealt the operation a fatal blow by reducing the

American forces in Somalia to only 1200 combat soldiers and 3000 support troops. Tensions

had been steadily rising between Somalis and UNITAF forces. The only thing keeping the

Somali clans from fighting was the US presence: the 28,000 marines and other soldiers were too

much to take on by the clan militias, so they patiently waited for their withdrawal. The fact that

the Somalis saw UNOSOM II as incredibly patronizing did not help the UN's case, either. All

the Somalis knew was warfare, and that is all their leaders wanted them to know: war and hunger

were General Aidid's main tools of persuasion. So in May, when Operation Restore Hope came

to an end, the situation began to unravel. Once the US troops left, Aidid declared war on the

remaining UN peacekeepers.

On June 5th, 1993, Aidid's forces ambushed a contingent of Pakistani soldiers

assigned to UNOSOM II, killing 24 and wounding 44. The attack was unprovoked and shocking

to the UN forces, as it was assumed that because the Pakistanis were Muslims like most the

Somali people, their presence would be tolerated. After the ambush, the UN invoked UN

Chapter VII, an article rarely used, but one that allowed for military action and enabled

UNOSOM II forces to engage in armed conflicts with Somali militants, specifically Aidid's

militia. Admiral Howe, a former US Admiral of the Navy and then the current envoy to Somalia

with UNOSOM II, issued a $25,000 bounty on Aidid and authorized the use of four US Air

Force AC-130 gunships and special C-130 Hercules cargo planes modified for direct ground
 Fleming 7

support to carry out air strikes against the Somalis. The gunships deployed were deployed for

over a month, flying a total of thirty-two missions in support of UNOSOM II. A number of the

missions were combat-oriented as part of the initial strike against Aideed in which the air support

destroyed weapon caches and Aidid's means of communication. Efforts to intercept Aidid

continued through 1993, stirring up even more unrest in the Somali population. On the 12th of

July, a U.S. military helicopter targeted a building in which intel reported a meeting of clan

leaders. It fired into the building and killed 54 Somalis, including highly respected clan elder

Sheik Mohammed Iman. The casualties also included women who were serving the elders

during the meeting. In the riotous aftermath, Somali crowds turned on western journalists who

had arrived on the scene to report on the attack and beat four of them to death. The situation in

Somalia was deteriorating faster than ever, and crowds were forming mobs to demonstrate

against the continued air bombardments and UN attacks. The use of air power supplied by the

U.S., in particular Cobra helicopter gunships, resulted in the deaths of many Somali civilians

from ill-directed rocket and cannon fire. Helicopters were used as a threat, hovering over

buildings and houses, singly or in a mass, and homes were destroyed and civilians knocked over

by the draught from their rotors. Pakistani troops fired on demonstrators protesting the air strikes

and later, in September, the crowds violently engaged UN forces, and a U.S. helicopter

subsequently fired on the crowd, killing around 200 civilians (International Travel News).

The United States had to respond to the worsening state of affairs in Somalia. Its policy

of policing the globe against terrorism in a sense required it to go back to Somalia and create a

counter-strike to oust Aidid. Aidid's men had killed four US military police with a remote-

detonated land mine and, two weeks later, six more U.S. soldiers were wounded. It was at this

point that Task Force Ranger was deployed to Somalia. The pursuit of General Aidid was
 Fleming 8

proving unsuccessful, and as the military situation worsened, the UN Secretary General Boutros-

Ghali asked the new U.S. administration of President William J. Clinton to assist him in

capturing Aidid. On August 22nd, 1993, Clinton's Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, directed the

deployment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks

made by Aidid supporters upon American and UNOSOM II forces and installations (Brown 17).

The JSOTF, named Task Force Ranger, had the mission of capturing Aidid and his key

lieutenants and turning them over to UNOSOM II forces. The task would prove extraordinarily

difficult, for Aidid had gone underground after the AC-130 air raids and ground assaults on his

strongholds in June and July. Task Force Ranger was comprised of elite US Rangers, sent in to

reinforce the US rapid deployment force left in Mogadishu after the handover of jurisdiction

from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. Led by General William Garrison, the force had 440 troops,

including a unit of Delta Force operatives. Aidid was the man responsible for genocide and a

proponent of the ongoing savagery in Somalia, and they intended fully to capture him. Task

Force Ranger operated independently from the UNOSOM II forces. Garrison reported directly

to the US Central Command and not Major General Montgomery, the Commander of United

States Forces in Somalia. General Garrison kept General Montgomery well informed and in the

mix (Parker). Task Force Ranger was a strictly United States-based operation and it involved the

most important events that define America's relationship with Somalia.

Plans were formulated to detain Aidid while intel was being gathered on his whereabouts,

but at the same time, and without informing the military, the Clinton administration began a

secret initiative to negotiate with Aidid, utilizing former President Carter as a Special Envoy

(Parker). In the beginning of their deployment, the soldiers of Task Force Ranger conducted six

missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes and beneficial to the US effort to
 Fleming 9

slow down and detain Aidid. The raids were organized to capture men close to Aidid and they

utilized both helicopters and vehicles to reach their targets. During one of these operations,

Osman Atto, a close advisor of Aidid and his chief financial aid, was captured. Although Aidid

himself remained free, the cumulative result of these efforts was to severely hamper his

movements and effectiveness. This does not mean, however, that the Somali militias fought any

weaker; the raids, instead, increased their resolve to fight against the US soldiers. The raids

could not prevent the situation in Mogadishu from worsening; what had been an effort to keep

peace had become a gun fight and now the men of Task Force Ranger had to deal with the irate

populace. In September of 1993, the US soldiers suffered great casualties in their efforts to clear

roadblocks and conduct missions. They were constantly attacked, and on one occasion, a group

of militiamen brought with it a crowd of 1,000 civilians, so it was impossible for the US troops

to effectively engage the threats (Brown). Many armored vehicles and helicopters were

destroyed in Mogadishu, but the greatest tragedy of the operation occurred in the beginning of

October.

Task Force Ranger conducted its seventh operation on October 3rd, 1993. US intelligence

learned of a secret meeting to take place in a two-floor building called the Olympic Hotel. It was

suggested and confirmed that Aidid himself would be there, so the mission proposed a

tremendous opportunity for the Task Force to finally seize Aidid. The plan of attack utilized

around 120 Delta Force members and Rangers and AH-1 Cobra, OH-6 Little Bird and UH-60

Blackhawk helicopters. Another batch of troops would be traveling by convoy through the

streets in armed HUMVEEs and trucks. Air and ground command would be controlled by Delta

Force officials in another circling Blackhawk. A United States Navy P-3C Orion would provide

surveillance overhead. The operation was given the code name "Irene" and would be
 Fleming 10

commenced as soon as a final assessment of Aidid's presence was given (Bowden). The attack

ensued and, through a style of shock and awe, Cobra helicopters bombarded the building just as

four Blackhawk transports deployed their troops around the building. Delta Force was given the

mission to go inside and capture Aidid and anyone else of importance (Eversmann). The

Rangers would cover the outside of the building and form a protective security barrier around the

building. US troops were able to capture 24 prisoners - none of which were General Aidid. In

fact, Aidid was not even present at the meeting let alone in the building. Intelligence failure, but

the prisoners were still valuable (Bowden). The Somali forces, by this time, had rallied and

were ready to fight the Americans. Each one was told to just kill one American, then go home.

With these motives, the "skinnies" posed a great threat to the US soldiers. The mission was

going well; however, Somali militiamen knew how easy Blackhawk helicopters were to hit, and

fired an RPG-7 rocket at one hovering just above them. Despite evasive maneuvers, the rocket

struck the tail rotor and sent the aircraft spinning to the ground, about 3 blocks away from the

Olympic Hotel. To get to the crash became the primary objective of the forces in Mogadishu,

both American and Somali. Back at command center, when the first Blackhawk was shot down,

General Garrison muttered to himself, "we just lost the initiative" (Bowden). And indeed they

did. What was supposed to be a 30 minutes snatch-and-grab of Aidid and his sympathizers

turned into a 17 hour battle for survival. There is so much detail within these 17 hours, as each

minute was filled with fighting: there was no rest for the men of Task Force Ranger on that day.

The Battle of Mogadishu is marked by events like the confusion the convoy suffered as it tried

desperately to reach its fellow soldiers. Around each turn, it was hit with fire and it collectively

suffered the worst casualties and had to return to base, leaving the Rangers and Delta Force to

fight. Another Blackhawk, piloted by Mike Durant, was shot down, as well. In an epic display
 Fleming 11

of heriosm, M. Sgt. Gary Gordon and SFC. Randall Shughart volunteered to protect this crash

for an indefinite amount of time until ground support arrived. They fought until they ran out of

ammunition and they died trying to save Durant and his crew from the Somalis. Each was

awarded the Medal of Honor and Durant was the only survivor, taken as a prisoner by Aidid's

captains (Clinton personally demanded his safe return and ordered an American force of tanks to

storm into Mogadishu and reclaim Mike Durant) (Durant). The Rangers were forced to hold

through the night as all of Mogadishu came down upon them. They waited for the UN Quick

Reaction Force to save them. The force consisted of roughly 300 soldiers and specialists from

the US 10th Mountain Division with some remaining Delta Force and Rangers accompanying

them. UN forces also provided tanks and armored personnel carriers to transport the Americans

out of Mogadishu and to a stadium that would serve as a hospital. One of the most moving

events of the Battle of Mogadishu is the Mogadishu Mile, in which about 15 Delta Force

members and Rangers could not be afforded room in personnel carriers, so they had to run all

the way from the first crash site to the stadium while under enemy fire and a night of only

fighting and no rest (Military Factory). The Battle of Mogadishu, though a blunder, is an

example of the sheer heroism of the United States military. In all, the United States suffered 73

wounded members , 18 dead, and Mike Durant taken prisoner. The Somali militiamen and

civilians suffered over 500 dead and another 1,000 wounded. Sadly, many of them were women

and children, as they were either caught in the crossfire or took up arms themselves against the

Americans (Church).

There was a huge political and popular response to the Battle of Mogadishu. In the

Rangers, "no one gets left behind" (Bowden). The bodies of crew of the second downed

Blackhawk and the bodies of Gordon and Shughart, however, were taken before the US forces
 Fleming 12

could get to them. The day after the battle, people internationally watching in horror as images

of the bodies of American soldiers were being dragged through the streets of Somalia showed on

their TVs. President Clinton reacted almost immediately to the Somali crisis and the events of

the Battle of Mogadishu. In his address to the nation, he states his views of the endeavors in

Somalia and his foreign policy towards the country, and this foreign policy would form the

defining foreign policy basis for the Clinton administration in subsequent years (Henriksen).

The United States entered Somalia "because only the United States could help stop one of the

great human tragedies of this time" (Clinton). The efforts of the armed forces in Somalia were

entirely necessary, and Somalia was in a very fragile but fixable state. Clinton claimed that if

America "were to leave Somalia...other nations would leave, too. Chaos would resume. The

relief effort would stop, and starvation soon would return." To leave would just lead to a repeat

of history made only a year prior, when UNITAF gave its power to UNOSOM II. Clinton's

foreign policy in Somalia was not to "to rebuild Somalia's society or even to create a political

process that [could] allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace" (Clinton). He did believe

that Somalia had a political problem and that American diplomats should work with Somali

officials to establish sound government, but he did gave the initiative to the Somalis, because

UNOSOM II had tried to impose government in Somalia, and, as Mike Durant notes in his book,

the Somalis were not willing to lay down their guns to accept western democracy. To facilitate

the new and final effort of the United States to aid Somalia, Clinton ordered 5000 additional

troops to go to Somalia and serve to protect the other troops and help to complete the mission.

The forces would be under American command and on March 31st, 1994, all American forces

would be out of Somalia. The public accepted these notions, but they urged for the return of the

troops. Most Americans wanted the US government to let the UN deal with Somalia.
 Fleming 13

Had Task Force Ranger stayed to complete its mission, either by

capturing Aidid or by crippling his organization, the U.N. might have

successfully concluded a peace agreement between the other competing

warlords, and Somalia today might have a government, peace, and a

promising future, but today, Somalia is as hostile as ever. Lawlessness ravages the

country and terrorism is all that it has to offer. After 1994, America withdrew completely from

Somalia and has remained apart from it for over a decade, but today, it poses a massive threat.

Before 9/11, Somalia was ranked #2 on America's chart of threats to national security.

Influences of al-Qaida are a known presence in the country and Islamic jihadists flock to Somalia

for weapons and out of it for training. Today, an organization called al-Shabab has been

designated by the US State Department as one of the most dangerous terrorist groups. Al-

Shabab men are responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in

1998 and also made recent threats to bomb stadiums in South Africa in the 2010 Soccer World

Cup. In President George W. Bush's time, Ethiopia was encouraged to fight against the Somali

Muslim extremists, and they did (even with the help of some American covert operatives and air

support) (Gettleman). Now, Barack Obama has to deal with Somalia very carefully. Obama has

already adopted a policy that supports the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia

(Carson). Secretively, he authorized sending weapons and ammunition to TFG forces in Somalia

to battle against al-Shabab (Dickinson). Obama's Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, vows that

that the US will "continue to provide equipment and training to the TFG as well as humanitarian

assistance to the Somali people." The key word is provide: there is no mention that the US will

conduct the training and relief efforts. Even if the United States wanted to dive into the Somalia

crisis head first, the truth is that it has a very limited ability to shape short-term outcomes in
 Fleming 14

Mogadishu. As the world has learned from watching other attempts to fight the war on terrorism

elsewhere, the hard work of combating radicalism, promoting state-building, pushing for

reconciliation, and encouraging political moderation is impossible without minimally dedicated

and competent local partners. The TFG does not perform well, and al-Shabab is really in control

of Mogadishu (Parke). Obama will not use direct contact with Somalia in his foreign policy.

Rather, he focuses on tactics similar to those used by American legislators in the Cold War era,

who strove to place boundaries around a growing Soviet-communist presence. America, today

and in recent years, centers its effort on keeping the states around Somalia viable powers and

supplying those against Islamic radicalism and anti-Americanism with means to keep their

enemies at bay.

Somalia poses as a growing threat to the western world, and it is this way because of its

history. Without sound government since 1991 and in a constant state of anarchy, Somalia

breeds fighters with naught to do but follow in their father's footsteps, down paths of terrorism,

death, and unrest. The United States has always tried to ameliorate the situation in Somalia,

starting with UNITAF in Operation Restore Hope, basing foreign policy on the fact that America

is a defender of humanitarianism; however, after the events of the Battle of Mogadishu and the

atrocities witnessed by the American people, America's foreign policy has shifted to a far more

wary one in which direct contact is adamantly avoided and order is defended through economic

support and trade. American foreign policy towards Somalia continues to evolve as the country

changes. It is never the same, and the US government must remain vigilant at all times, for it is a

ticking bomb.
 Fleming 15

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 Fleming 16

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