GOV.

EXEQUIEL

COMMISSION

ON

ALDON,

and

B.

JAVIER, petitioner, vs.

ELECTIONS,

CORNELIO

RAYMUNDO

P.
T.

ROQUERO, respondents.
Facts:
Section 261 (d) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code
prescribe coercion as an election offense punishable by
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six
years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides that
the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate
who violates Section 261 (d) or (e).
An

administrative

complaint

for

Gross

Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and Abuse of Authority was

filed against Valderrama Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero
However, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9581 prohibiting

any

public official from

suspending

any

elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay officer during

the election period for the May 13, 2013 elections.
Despite

the

COMELEC

resolution,

Governor

Javier

issued Executive Order No. 003, S. 2013, preventively

suspending

Mayor

Roquero

for

thirty

(30)

days

upon

recommendation by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan

Mayor Roquero filed an Election Offense complaint
against Gov. Javier for violating Section 261 (x) of the Election
Code.
Private

respondents

Cornelio

P.

Aldon

(Aldon)

and

Raymundo T. Roquero (Roquero) also filed a petition for

disqualification before the Commission against Gov. Javier on
the ground that the latter committed the election offenses
of Coercion of Subordinates [Sec. 261 (d)] and Threats,
Intimidation,

Terrorism

or

Other

Forms

of

Coercion[Sec. 261 (e)] by suspending Mayor Roquero. They

alleged

that

the

suspension

was

political

harassment

calculated to intimidate the Roqueros into backing out of the

2013 elections.
Come election time, Gov. Javier won in the May 2013
elections.

COMELEC ruled that Gov. Javier's act of preventively

suspending Mayor Roquero during the election period ban fell
within the contemplation of Section 261 (d) of the Election
Code, which is a ground for disqualification under Section 68.
The

Commission en

banc

affirmed

COMELEC

2nd

DIVISION.
Javier filed the present petition for certiorari contending
that the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. 7890 did not
remove Section 261 (d) of the Election Code as a ground for
administrative disqualification.
Issue:
Whether the Commission erred in ruling that R.A. No. 7890 did not
remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of
the Election Code.

Ruling: YES.
No less than the Constitution empowers the Commission
to decide all questions affecting elections except those
involving the right to vote. It is the sole arbiter of all issues
involving elections. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by COMELEC
cannot be reviewed even by this Court.
COMELEC's reasoning that coercion remains to be a
ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election
Code despite the passage of R.A. No. 7890 is erroneous.
R.A. No. 7890 expressly repealed Section 261 d (1) and (2) of
Batas

Pambansa

Blg.

881,

rendering

these

provisions

inoperative. The effect of this repeal is to remove Section 261

(d) from among those listed as ground for disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
With the express repeal of Section 261 (d), the basis for
disqualifying Javier no longer existed. The jurisdiction of the
COMELEC

to

disqualify

candidates

is

limited

to

those

enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All

other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in
nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the
conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election
offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders
before the regular courts of justice.

COMELEC

gravely

abused

its

discretion

when

it

disqualified Gov. Javier based on a provision of law that had

already been expresslyrepealed.

[G.R. No. 205728. January 21, 2015.]

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY
THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V.
MAJARUCON,respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring
to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of this case, contains the heading "Conscience Vote"
and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a
check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the
law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay,"
while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay":
Respondent Election Officer Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon issued a
Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner
Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra for being oversized, in
violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615.

COMELEC

Law

Department

issued

letter ordering

the

immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be

constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. The
letter of COMELEC Law Department was silent on the remedies
available to petitioners.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this
petition

for certiorari and

prohibition

with

application

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

for

The Supreme Court issued

a temporary restraining

order

enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and

letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013.
Respondents filed their comment arguing that the tarpaulin is an
election propaganda subject to regulation by COMELEC pursuant
to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution.
Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering its removal
for being oversized are valid and constitutional.
Issue:
WHETHER

THE

TARPAULINS

PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL

ARE

ADVERTISEMENT

ELECTION
WHERE

WHETHER COMELEC POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO

REGULATE
RULING: NO.

The tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that

is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made
in the passing of the RH law. While the tarpaulin may influence
the success or failure of the named candidates and political
parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda.
The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for
consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list
group.
The

second

paragraph

of

Section

(4)

of

COMELEC

Resolution No. 9615:

"political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any
matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in
any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand,
insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic
representation that is capable of being associated with a
candidate or party.

The action of the COMELEC in this case is a strong deterrent to

further speech by the electorate. The messages in the tarpaulins
are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election
paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more
declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary
allusion to any social objective.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally
valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates
or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are

not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech

that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons.
First, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners
consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice
Antonio Carpio, the present law Section 3.3 of Republic Act No.
9006 and Section 6 (c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if
applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. At
certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer
be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech
meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with
political consequences.

[G.R. No. 206666. January 21, 2015.]

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, petitioner, ALFREDO
S. LIM, petitioner-intervenor, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, respondents.
Facts:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder.
On

October

25,

2007,

however,

former

President

Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of

pardon, to former President Estrada.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. During that
time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC.
In the COMELEC Second Division, all three petitions were
effectively

dismissed

on

the

uniform

grounds

that (i) the

Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting

president; and (ii)the pardon granted to former President Estrada
by former President Arroyo restored the former's right to vote and

be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for

reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more
ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.
On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed
a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC. Risos-Vidal anchored her petition on the
theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for
Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan. She

relied

on

Section

40

of

the Local

Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus

Election Code (OEC). Moreover, the third preambular clause of
the pardon "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,"
makes the pardon conditional.
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second
Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification on the ground
that [Risos-Vidal] failed to present cogent proof sufficient to
reverse

the

standing

pronouncement

of

this

Commission

declaring categorically that [former President Estrada's] right to

seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
OSG contends that the subsequent grant of pardon to Estrada,
effectively restored his right to run for any public office." The
restoration of his right to run for any public office is the exception
to the prohibition under Section 40 of the LGC,as provided under
Section 12 of theOEC.
Issue: Whether or not RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT ESTRADA'S
PARDON NEITHER RESTORED HIS RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE NOR REMITTED
HIS PERPETUAL ABSOLUTE DISQUALIFICATION FROM SEEKING PUBLIC
OFFICE
RULING: NO.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that

fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of
the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified.

Section 40 of the LGC identifies who are disqualified from running

for

any

elective

local

position

while

Section

12

of

the OEC provides for similar prohibitions, but it provides for an

exception, to wit:

TcaAID

Section 12. Disqualifications. . . . unless he has

been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
(Emphasis supplied.)

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40 (a) of

the LGC is

worded

in

absolute

terms,

Section

12

of

the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary

pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any
person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether
local or national position.
The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and
political rights" as being restored.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended
by the President is in issue, the Court must turn to the only
evidence available to it, and that is the pardon itself. From a
detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing
therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas
Clause is actually a limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on
the grant of the pardon, such that the breach of the mentioned
commitment not to seek public office will result in a revocation or
cancellation of said pardon.