Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used
by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and
magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General
claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to
compel print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private
personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent
Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The
taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine
publishers.
Facts:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal and setting aside of the decision of CA
which affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
OSG. The RTC adjudged that respondents Ayala Land Incorporated (Ayala Land),
Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza Corporation (Shangri-la),
and SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to provide free parking
spaces in their malls to their patrons and the general public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce found that the collection of parking
fees by shopping malls is contrary to National Building Code and figuratively
speaking, the Code has expropriated the land for parking. Also, Committee stated
that the collection of parking fees would be against Article II of RA 9734 (Consumer
Act of the Philippines) as to the States policy of protecting the interest of
consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the National Building Code gives the
responsibility for the administration and enforcement of the provisions of the Code,
including the imposition of penalties for administrative violations thereof to the
Secretary of Public Works. This is not being strictly followed as the LGUs are tasked
to discharge the regulatory powers of DPWH instead of DPWH instead.
OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from collecting parking fees and contending that
their practice of charging parking fees is violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity to institute the proceeding it being a
controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition for declaratory relief is proper since all
the requisites are present; 3) the Building Code with its IRR does not necessarily
impose that parking spaces shall be free of charge and providing parking spaces for
free can be considered as unlawful taking of property right without just
compensation; and 4) there was no sufficient evidence to justify any award for
damages. They deemed that the respondents are not obligated to provide parking
spaces free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking spaces to be free of charge. On the
otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate appeal to the CA, contending that: 1)
RTC erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in
failing to declare IRR ineffective for not having been published as required by law;
3) RTC erred in dismissing the OSGs petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and 4) RTC erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal standing as it
is not a real party-in-interest.
As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the instant Petition for Review.
Issues:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
Held:
1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSGs petition:
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for
specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters
by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters
for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a
minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale
and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to
the aim of safeguarding life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with
the principles of sound environmental management and control. Adequate parking
spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking.
Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance
of buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely,
to control partially or, as in this case, absolutely the imposition of such fees.
The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term parking fees cannot even be found at all in the
entire National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if
a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building
Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said
provisions do not regulate the collection of the same
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include
the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section
102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard
life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control; but totally ignores the second part of said
provision, which reads, and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide
for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. While the first part of Section 102
of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part
thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of
the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to
the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health, property,
and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said officials to
ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for all buildings and
structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates
that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX
is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law
because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor
of the basic law.
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the
use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case,
absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict
rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and
the political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same.
Even so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition
by the DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon
respondents; but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who
use the mall parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection
of parking fees for the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or
prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting
the collection of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to justify
the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building officials,
of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate,
however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking
or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that
inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives
any person of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him
to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation
to be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that
unreasonably restricts the right to use business property for business purposes
amounts to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees
from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish,
they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering
therefrom the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking
facilities.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated 25 January 2007 and Resolution dated 14 March 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, affirming in toto the Joint Decision dated 29 May
2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 001208 and No. 00-1210 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No.
60 which extends P500 burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross
family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken
out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro
Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program.
However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare,
safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be
disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it violates the equal protection
clause
since
it
will
only
benefit
few
individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the
general
welfare
2.
Whether
the
questioned
3.
Whether
the
resolution
resolution
violates
clause
is
the
for
equal
public
protection
purpose
clause
Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on
the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort
and
convenience
of
the
people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations . Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent
powers
of
the
State.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause.
Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection
of
property
therein.
2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely,
veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope,
over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of
the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a
broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general
welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with
conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation.
Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely
indicate
the
limits
of
police
power.
of
the
common
good.
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing
the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by
such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This
decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal
for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate doleouts for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389,
September 11, 1991)
RULING:
Ortigas & Co. sold to Emilia Hermoso a parcel of land located in Greenhills Subdivision, San Juan
with several restrictions in the contract of sale that said lot be used exclusively for residential
purposes, among others, until December 31, 2025. Later, a zoning ordinance was issued by MMC
(now MMDA) reclassifying the area as commercial. Private respondent (Ismael Mathay III) leased
the subject lot from Hermoso and built a single storey building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car
sales company. Ortigas & Co. filed a petition a complaint which sought the demolition of the
constructed car sales company to against Hermoso as it violated the terms and conditions of the
Deed of Sale. Trial court ruled in favor of Ortigas & Co. Mathay raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals from which he sought favorable ruling. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the zoning ordinance may impair contracts entered prior to its effectivity.
HELD:
Yes. The zoning ordinance, as a valid exercise of police power may be given effect over any
standing contract. Hence, petition is denied.
RATIO:
A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions
could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate
exercise by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must
be read into every contract. Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the
Supreme Court already upheld subject ordinance as a legitimate police power measure.
GR 135962
March 27, 2000
FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice
requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune Street, to public
vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent
was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying
for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening
of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.
ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as
an agent of the state endowed with police power.
HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a
body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC
of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and
bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and
in the proper exercise of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the
Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is
no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court
did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated
power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
invalid.
The
may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the
project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several
cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On
December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4,
1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances
before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court
of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement
HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or
suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should
not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This
decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting
the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called
preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery
laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del
Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable
in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; there
was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be
violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for
being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the
hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?
Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should not lightly
set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights
under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power.
As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover,
the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income
of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in
each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal
infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and
perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due process are
not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to
meet the due processrequirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police
power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate,
but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known
legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or
tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale
of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount,"
here the license fee of theoperator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a
police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24
hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not
license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of
the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
well-being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike in the sole
case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the
assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment- Holmes- We agree to all the generalities
about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no canon against using
common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."