CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General
The increase in the number of terrorist attacks especially in the last few years has shown
that the effect of blast loads on buildings is a serious matter that should be taken into
consideration in the design process. Although these kinds of attacks are exceptional cases, manmade disasters; blast loads are in fact dynamic loads that need to be carefully calculated just
like earthquake and wind loads.
The objective of this topic is to shed light on blast resistant building design theories, the
enhancement of building security against the effects of explosives in both architectural and
structural design process and the design techniques that should be carried out. Firstly,
explosives and explosion types have been explained briey. In addition, the general aspects of
explosion process have been presented to clarify the effects of explosives on buildings. To have
a better understanding of explosives and characteristics of explosions will enable us to make
blast resistant building design much more efciently. Essential techniques for increasing the
capacity of a building to provide protection against explosive effects is discussed both with an
architectural and structural approach.
Damage to the assets, loss of life and social panic are factors that have to be minimized
if the threat of terrorist action cannot be stopped. Designing the structures to be fully blast
resistant is not a realistic and economical option, however current engineering and architectural
knowledge can enhance the new and existing buildings to mitigate the effects of an explosion.
1.2 Objective Of The Blast Design
The primary objectives for providing blast resistant design for buildings are:
-Personnel safety
-Controlled shutdown
-Financial consideration
Blast resistant design should provide a level of safety for persons in the building that is
no less than that for persons outside the buildings in the event of an explosion. Evidence from
past incidents has shown that many of the fatalities and serious injuries were due to collapse of
1

buildings onto the persons inside the building. This objective is to reduce the probability that
the building itself becomes a hazard in an explosion.
Preventing cascading events due to loss of control of process units not involved in the
event is another objective of blast resistant design. An incident in one unit should not affect the
continued safe operation or orderly shutdown of other units. Preventing or minimizing nancial
losses is another objective of blast resistant design. Buildings containing business information,
critical or essential equipment, expensive and long lead time equipment, or equipment which if
destroyed, would constitute signicant interruption or nancial loss to the owner should be
protected.

CHAPTER II
Literature Survey
2.1 General
The need and requirements for blast resistance in buildings have evolved over recent
years. Buildings have become more complex and have increased in size thus increasing the risk
of accidental explosions. Such explosions have demolished the buildings, in some cases
resulting in substantial personnel causalities and business losses. Such events have heightened
the concerns of the industry, plant management, and regulatory agencies about the issues of
blast protection in buildings have the potential for explosions. Generally, these issues relate to
plant building safety and risk management to prevent or minimize the occurrence of such
incidents and to siting, design, and operations.
2.2 Explosion - Major of All Terrorist Activities
The probability that any single building will sustain damage from accidental or
deliberate explosion is very low, but thecost for those who are unprepared is very high.
2.2.1 Expected Terrorist Blast On Structures
-External car bomb
-Internal car bomb
-Internal package
-Suicidal car bombs
2.2.2 Major Cause of Life Loss After The Blast
-Flying debris
-Broken glass
-Smoke and re
-Blocked glass
-Power loss
-Communications breakdown
-Progressive collapse of structure

2.3 Goals of Blast Resistant Design

The goals of blast-resistant design are to :
-Reduce the severity of injury
-Facilitate rescue
-Expedite repair
-Accelerate the speed of return to full operation.
2.4 Basic Requirements To Resist Blast Loads
To resist blast loads,
- The rst requirement is to determine the threat. The major threat is caused by terrorist
bombings. The threat for a conventional bomb is dened by two equally important elements,
the bomb size, or charge weight, and the standoff distance the minimum guaranteed distance
between the blast source and the target.
- Another requirement is to keep the bomb as far away as possible, by maximizing the keepout
distance. No matter what size the bomb, the damage will be less severe the further the target is
from the source.
- Structural hardening should actually be the last resort in protecting a structure; detection and
prevention must remain the rst line of defense. As terrorist attacks range from the small letter
bomb to the gigantic truck bomb as experienced in Oklahoma City, the mechanics of a
conventional explosion and their effects on a target must be addressed.
2.4.1 Mechanics of a Conventional Explosion
With the detonation of a mass of TNT at or near the ground surface, the peak blast
pressures resulting from this hemispherical explosion decay as a function of the distance from
the source as the ever-expanding shock front dissipates with range. The incident peak pressures
are amplied by a reection factor as the shock wave encounters an object or structure in its
path.
Except for specic focusing of high intensity shock waves at near 45 incidence, these
reection factors are typically greatest for normal incidence (a surface adjacent and
perpendicular to the source) and diminish with the angle of obliquity or angular position
relative to the source. Reection factors depend on the intensity of the shock wave, and for
large explosives at normal incidence these reection factors may enhance the incident pressures
by as much as an order of magnitude.

Charges situated extremely close to a target structure impose a highly impulsive, high
intensity pressure load over a localized region of the structure; charges situated further away
produce a lower-intensity, longer-duration uniform pressure distribution over the entire
structure. In short by purely geometrical relations, the larger the stand-off, the more uniform the
pressure distribution over the target. Eventually, the entire structure is engulfed in the shock
wave, with reection and diffraction effects creating focusing and shadow zones in a complex
pattern around the structure. Following the initial blast wave, the structure is subjected to a
negative pressure, suction phase and eventually to the quasi-static blast wind. During this
phase, the weakened structure may be subjected to impact by debris that may cause additional
damage
2.5 Types of Explosions
Mainly there are two types of explosions
2.5.1 Unconned Explosion
Unconned explosions can occur as an air-burst or a surface burst. In an air
burstexplosion, the detonation of the high explosive occurs above the ground level
andintermediate amplication of the wave caused by ground reections occurs prior to
thearrival of the initial blast wave at a building Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1:Air burst with ground reections

As the shock wave continues to propagate outwards along the ground surface, afront
commonly called a Mach stem is formed by the interaction of the initial waveand the reected
wave.
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However a surface burst explosion occurs when the detonation occurs close to oron the
ground surface. The initial shock wave is reected and amplied by the groundsurface to
produce a reected wave. Figure 2.2. Unlike the air burst, the reected wavemerges with the
incident wave at the point of detonation and forms a single wave. In the majority of cases,
terrorist activity occurres in built-up areas of cities, where devices are placed on or very near
the ground surface.

Figure 2.2:Surface burst

2.5.2 Conned Explosions
When an explosion occurs within a building, the pressures associated with the initial
shock front will be high and therefore will be amplied by their reections within the building.

Figure 2.3:Fully vented, partially vented and fully conned explosions

This type of explosion is called a conned explosion. In addition and depending on the
degree of connement, the effects of the high temperatures and accumulation of gaseous
products produced by the chemical reaction involved in the explosion will cause additional
pressures and increase the load duration within the structure.
Depending on the extent of venting, various types of conned explosions are possible.
Figure2.3
2.6 Explosion Process For High Explosive
An explosion occurs when a gas, liquid or solid material goes through a rapid chemical
reaction. When the explosion occurs, gas products of the reaction are formed at a very high
temperature and pressure at the source. These high pressure gasses expand rapidly into the
6

surrounding area and a blast wave is formed. Because the gases are moving, they cause the
surrounding air move as well. The damage caused by explosions is produced by the passage of
compressed air in the blast wave. Blast waves propagate at supersonic speeds and reected as
they meet objects. As the blast wave continues to expand away from the source of the explosion
its intensity diminishes and its effect on the objects is also reduced. However, within tunnels or
enclosed passages, the blast wave will travel with very little diminution.
Close to the source of explosion the blast wave is formed and violently hot and
expanding gases will exert intense loads which are difcult to quantify precisely. Once the blast
wave has formed and propagating away from the source, it is convenient to separate out the
different types of loading experienced by the surrounding objects.
Three effects have been identied in three categories. The effect rapidly compressing
the surrounding air is called air shock wave. The air pressure and air movement effect due to
the accumulation of gases from the explosion chemical reactions is called dynamic pressure
and the effect rapidly compressing the ground is called ground shock wave.

Figure 2.4:Blast wave pressures plotted against time

The air shock wave produces an instantaneous increase in pressure above the ambient
atmospheric pressure at a point some distance from the source. This is commonly referred to as
overpressure. As a consequence, a pressure differential is generated between the combustion
gases and the atmosphere, causing a reversal in the direction of ow, back towards the center of
the explosion, known as a negative pressure phase.
This is a negative pressure relative to atmospheric, rather than absolute negative
pressure Figure 2.4. Equilibrium is reached when the air is returned to its original state.
As a rough approximation, 1kg of explosive produces about 1m3 of gas. As this gas expands,
its act on the air surrounding the source of the explosion causes it to move and increase in
pressure. The movement of the displaced air may affect nearby objects and cause damage.
7

Except for a connement case, the effects of the dynamic pressure diminish rapidly with
distance from source.
The ground shock leaving the site of an explosion consists of three principal
components. A compression wave which travels radially from the source; a shear wave which
travels radially and comprises particle movements in a plane normal to the radial direction
where the ground shock wave intersects with the surface and a surface or Raleigh wave. These
waves propagate at different velocities and alternate at different frequencies.

CHPATER III
Architectural Aspect of Blast Resistant Building Design

3.1 General
The target of blast resistant building design philosophy is minimizing the consequences
to the structure and its inhabitants in the event of an explosion. A primary requirement is the
prevention of catastrophic failure of the entire structure or large portions of it. It is also
necessary to minimize the effects of blast waves transmitted into the building through openings
and to minimize the effects of projectiles on the inhabitants of a building. However, in some
cases blast resistant building design methods, conicts with aesthetical concerns, accessibility
variations, re ghting regulations and the construction budget restrictions.
3.2 Planning And Layout
Much can be done at the planning stage of a new building to reduce potential threats
and the associated risks of injury and damage. The risk of a terrorist attack, necessity of blast
protection for structural and non-structural members, adequate placing of shelter areas within a
building should be considered for instance. In relation to an external threat, the priority should
be to create as much stand-off distance between an external bomb and the building as possible.
On congested city centers there may be little or no scope for repositioning the building, but
what small stand-off there is should be secured where possible. This can be achieved by
strategic location of obstructions such as bollards, trees and street furniture. Figure 4.1 shows a
possible external layout for blast safe planning.
3.3 Structural Form and Internal Layout
Structural form is a parameter that greatly affects the blast loads on the building.
Arches and domes are the types of structural forms that reduce the blast effects on the building
compared with a cubicle form. The plan-shape of a building also has a signicant inuence on
the magnitude of the blast load it is likely to experience. Complex shapes that cause multiple
reections of the blast wave should be discouraged.
Projecting roofs or oors, and buildings that are U-shaped on plan are undesirable for
this reason. It should be noted that single story buildings are more blast resistant compared with
multi-story buildings if applicable.

Figure 3.1:Schematic layout of site for protection against bombs

Partially or fully embed buildings are quite blast resistant. These kinds of structures take
the advantage of the shock absorbing property of the soil covered by. The soil provides
protection in case of a nuclear explosion as well.
The internal layout of the building is another parameter that should be undertaken with
the aim of isolating the value from the threat and should be arranged so that the highest exterior
threat is separated by the greatest distance from the highest value asset.
Foyer areas should be protected with reinforced concrete walls; double-dooring should
be used and the doors should be arranged eccentrically within a corridor to prevent the blast
pressure entering the internals of the building. Entrance to the building should be controlled
and be separated from other parts of the building by robust construction for greater physical
protection. An underpass beneath or car parking below or within the building should be avoided
unless access to it can be effectively controlled.
A possible re that occurs within a structure after an explosion may increase the damage
catastrophically. Therefore the internal members of the building should be designed to resist the
re.

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Figure 3.2:Internal planning of a building

3.4 Bomb Shelter Areas
The bomb shelter areas are specially designated within the building where vulnerability
from the effects of the explosion is at a minimum and where personnel can retire in the event of
a bomb threat warning. These areas must afford reasonable protection against explosions;
ideally be large enough to accommodate the personnel involved and be located so as to
facilitate continual access. For modern-framed buildings, shelter areas should be located away
from windows, external doors, external walls and the top oors if the roof is weak. Areas
surrounded by full-height concrete walls should be selected and underground car parks, gas
storage tanks, areas light weight partition walls, e.g. internal corridors, toilet areas, or
conference should be avoided while locating the shelter areas. Basements can sometimes be
useful shelter areas, but it is important to ensure that the building does not collapse on top of
them. The functional aspects of a bomb shelter area should accommodate all the occupants of
the building; provide adequate communication with outside; provide sufcient ventilation and
sanitation; limit the blast pressure to less than the ear drum rupture pressure and provide
alternative means of escape.
3.5 Installation
Gas, water, steam installations, electrical connections, elevators and water storage
systems should be planned to resist any explosion affects. Installation connections are critical
points to be considered and should be avoided to use in high-risk deformation areas. Areas with
high damage receiving potential e.g. external walls, ceilings, roof slabs, car parking spaces and
lobbies also should be avoided to locate the electrical and other installations. The main control
units and installation feeding points should be protected from direct attacks. A reserve
11

installation system should be provided fora potential explosion and should be located remote
from the main installation system.
3.6 Glazing And Cladding
Glass from broken and shattered windows could be responsible for a large number of
injuries caused by an explosion in a city centre. The choice of a safer glazing material is critical
and it has been found out that laminated glass is the most effective in this context. On the other
hand, applying transparent polyester anti-shatter lm to the inner surface of the glazing is as
well an effective method.
For the cladding, several aspects of design should be considered to minimize the
vulnerability of people within the building and damage to the building itself. The amount of
glazing in the facade should be minimized. This will limit the amount of internal damage from
the glazing and the amount of blast that can enter. It should also be ensured that the cladding is
xed to the structure securely with easily accessible xings. This will allow rapid inspection
after an explosion so that any failure or movement can be detected.
3.7 Floor Slabs
Treatments for conventional at slab design are as follows:
1. More attention must be paid to the design and detailing of exterior bays and lower
oors, which are the most susceptible to blast loads.
2. In exterior bays/lower oors, drop panels and column capitols are required to shorten the
effective slab length and improve the punching shear resistance.
3. If vertical clearance is a problem, shear heads embedded in the slab will improve the shear
resistance and improve the ability of the slab to transfer moments to the columns.
4. The slab-column interface should contain closed-hoop stirrup reinforcement properly
anchored around exural bars within a prescribed distance from the column face.
5. Bottom reinforcement must be provided continuous through the column. This reinforcement
serves to prevent brittle failure at the connection and provides an alternate mechanism for
developing shear transfer once the concrete has punched through.
6. The development of membrane action in the slab, once the concrete has failed at the column
interface, provides a safety net for the post damaged structure. Continuously tied
reinforcement, spanning both directions, must be detailed properly to ensure that the tensile
forces can be developed at the lapped splices. Anchorage of the reinforcement at the edge of the
slab is required to guarantee the development of the tensile forces.

12

3.8 Columns
Treatment for conventionally designed columns to improve blast resisting mechanism:
1. The potential for direct lateral loading on the face of the columns, resulting from theblast
pressure and impact of explosive debris, requires that the lower-oor columns be designed with
adequate ductility and strength.
2. The perimeter columns supporting the lower oors must also be designed to resist this
extreme blast effect.
3. Encasing these lower-oor columns in a steel jacket will provide connement, increase shear
capacity, and improve the columns ductility and strength. An alternative, which provides
similar benets, is to embed a steel column within the perimeter concrete columns or wall
section.
4. The possibility of uplift must be considered, and, if deemed likely, the columns must be
reinforced to withstand a transient tensile force.
5. For smaller charge weights, spiral reinforcement provides a measure of core connement that
greatly improves the capacity and the behavior of the reinforced concrete columns under
extreme load.
3.9 Transfer Girders
The building relies on transfer girders at the top of the atrium to distribute the loads of
the columns above the atrium to the adjacent columns outside the atrium. The transfer girder
spans the width of the atrium, which insures a column-free architectural space for the entrance
to the building.
Transfer girders typically concentrate the load-bearing system into a smaller number of
structural elements. This loadtransfer system runs contrary to the concept of redundancy
desired in a blast environment. The column connections, which support the transfer girders, are
to provide sustained strength despite inelastic deformations.
The following recommendations must be met for transfer girders:
1. The transfer girder and the column connections must be properly designed and detailed,
using an adequate blast loading description.
2. A progressive-collapse analysis must be performed, particularly if the blast loading exceeds
the capacity of the girder.

13

3.10 External Treatments

The two parameters that most directly inuence the blast environment that the structure
will be subjected to are the bombs charge weight and the standoff distance. Of these two, the
only parameter that anyone has any control over is the standoff distance.
3.11 Facade And Atrium
The facade is comprised of the glazing and the exterior wall. Better glazing has already
been discussed above and wall obviously should be hardened to resist the loading.
Presence of an atrium along the face of the structure will require two protective measures. On
the outside of the structure, the glass and glass framing must be strengthened to withstand the
loads. On the inside, the balcony parapets, spandrel beams, and exposed slabs must be
strengthened to withstand the loads that enter through the shattered glass.
3.12 Overall Lateral Building Resistance, Shear Walls
The ability of structures to resist a highly impulsive blast loading depends on the
ductility of the load-resisting system. This means that the structure has to be able to deform in
elastically under extreme overload, thereby dissipating large amounts of energy, prior to
failure.. In addition to providing ductile behavior for the structure, the following provisions
would improve the blast protection capability of the building:
1. Use a well-distributed lateral-load resisting mechanism in the horizontal oor plan.
This can be accomplished by using several shear walls around the plan of the building this will
improve the overall seismic as well as the blast behavior of the building.
2. If adding more shear walls is not architecturally feasible, a combined lateral-load resisting
mechanism can also be used. A central shear wall and a perimeter moment-resisting frame will
provide for a balanced solution. The perimeter moment resisting frame will require
strengthening the spandrel beams and the connections to the outside columns. This will also
result in better protection of the outside columns.
Several recommendations were presented for each of the identied features. The
implementation of these recommendations will greatly improve the blast-resisting capability of
the building under consideration.

14

3.13 Lower Floor Exterior

The architectural design of the building of interest currently calls for window glass
around the rst oor. Unless this area is constructed in reinforced concrete, the damage to the
lower oor structural elements and their connections will be quite severe.
Consequently, the injury to the lower oor inhabitants will be equally severe. In general,
two sizes of charges can be discussed
1. To protect against a small charge weight, a nominal 300 mm (12 in.) thick wall with 0.3
percent steel doubly reinforced in both directions might be required.
2. For intermediate charge weight protection, a 460 mm (18 in.) thick wall with 0.5percent steel
might be needed.
3.14 Stand Off Distance
The keep out distance, within which explosives-laden vehicles may not penetrate,
mustbe maximized and guaranteed. As we all know, the greater the standoff distance, the more
the blast forces will dissipate resulting in reduced pressures on the building. Several
recommendations can be made to maintain and improve the standoff distance for the building
under consideration:
1. Use anti-ram bollards or large planters, placed around the entire perimeter. These barriers
must be designed to resist the maximum vehicular impact load that could be imposed. For
maximum effectiveness, the barriers-bollards or planters-must be placed at the curb.
2. The public parking lot at the corner of the building must be secured to guarantee the
prescribed keepout distance from the face of the structure. Preferably, the parking lot should be
eliminated.
3. Street parking should not be permitted on the near side of the street, adjacent to the building.
4. An additional measure to reduce the chances of an attack would be to prevent parking on the
opposite side of the street. While this does not improve the keep out distance, it could eliminate
the parked bomb, thereby limiting bombings to Park and run.
3.15 Internal Explosion Threat
The blast environment could be introduced into the interior of the structure in four
vulnerable locations:

15

The entrance lobby, the basement mechanical rooms, the loading dock, and the primary
mail rooms. Specic modications to the features of these vulnerable spaces can prevent an
internal explosion from causing extensive damage and injury inside the building.
1. Walls and slabs adjacent to the lobby, loading dock, and mail rooms must be hardened to
protect against the hand delivered package bomb, nominally a 10-20 kg explosive. This
hardening can be achieved by redesigning the slabs and erecting cast- in-place reinforcedconcrete walls, with the thickness and reinforcement determined relative to the appropriate
threat.
2. The basement must be similarly isolated from all adjacent occupied ofce space, including
the oor above, from the threat of a small package bomb

16

CHAPTER IV
Structural Aspect of Blast Resistant Building
4.1 General
The front face of a building experiences peak overpressures due to reection of an
external blast wave. Once the initial blast wave has passed the reected surface of thebuilding,
the peak overpressure decays to zero. As the sides and the top faces of thebuilding are exposed
to overpressures (which has no reections and are lower than the reected overpressures on the
front face), a relieving effect of blast overpressure is experienced on the front face. The rear of
the structure experiences no pressure until the blast wave has traveled the length of the
structure and a compression wave has begun to move towards the centre of the rear face.
Therefore the pressure built up is not instantaneous. On the other hand, there will be a time lag
in the development of pressures and loads on the front and back faces.
This time lag causes translational forces to act on the building in the direction of the
blast wave.

F
igure 4.1:Sequence of air-blast effects
Blast loadings are extra ordinary load cases however, during structural design, this
effect should be taken into account with other loads by an adequate ratio. Similar to the static
loaded case design, blast resistant dynamic design also uses the limit state design techniques
which are collapse limit design and functionality limit design. In collapse limit design the target
is to provide enough ductility to the building so that the explosion energy is distributed to the
structure without overall collapse. For collapse limit design the behavior of structural member
connections is crucial. In the case of an explosion, signicant translational movement and
moment occur and the loads involved should be transferred from the beams to columns. The
structure doesnt collapse after the explosion however it cannot function anymore.

17

Functionality limit design however, requires the building to continue functionality after
a possible explosion occurred. Only non-structural members like windows or cladding may
need maintenance after an explosion so that they should be designed ductile enough.
When the positive phase of the shock wave is shorter than the natural vibration period of the
structure, the explosion effect vanishes before the structure responds.
This kind of blast loading is dened as impulsive loading. If the positive phase is longer
than the natural vibration period of the structure, the load can be assumed constant when the
structure has maximum deformation. This maximum deformation is a function of the blast
loading and the structural rigidity. This kind of blast loading is dened as quasi-static loading.
Finally, if the positive phase duration is similar to the natural vibration period of the structure,
the behavior of the structure becomes quite complicated. This case can be dened as dynamic
loading. Frame buildings designed to resist gravity, wind loads and earthquake loads in the
normal way have frequently been found to be decient in two respects. When subjected to blast
loading; the failure of beam-to-column connections and the inability of the structure to tolerate
load reversal. Beam-to-column connections can be subjected to very high forces as the result of
an explosion. These forces will have a horizontal component arising from the walls of the
building and a vertical component from the differential loading on the upper and lower surfaces
of oors. Providing additional robustness to these connections can be a signicant
enhancement.

18

Figure 4.2: Enhanced beam-to-column connection details for steelwork and reinforced concrete

In the connections, normal details for static loading have been found to be inadequate
for blast loading. Especially for the steelwork beam-to-column connections, it is essential for
the connection to bear inelastic deformations so that the moment frames could still operate after
an instantaneous explosion. Figure 2.8 shows the side-plate connection detail in question. The
main features to note in the reinforced concrete connection are the use of extra links and the
location of the starter bars in the connection Figure 2.8. These enhancements are intended to
reduce the risk of collapse or the connection be damaged, possibly as a result of a load reversal
on the beam.
It is vital that in critical areas, full moment-resisting connections are made in order to
ensure the load carrying capacity of structural members after an explosion. Beams acting
primarily in bending may also carry signicant axial load caused by the blast loading.
On the contrary, columns are predominantly loaded with axial forces under normal loading
conditions, however under blast loading they may be subjected to bending.
Such forces can lead to loss of load-carrying capacity of a section. In the case of an explosion,
columns of a reinforced concrete structure are the most important members that should be
protected. Two types of wrapping can be applied to provide this. Wrapping with steel belts or
wrapping with carbon ber reinforced polymers (CFRP).
Cast-insitu reinforced concrete oor slabs are the preferred option for blast resistant
buildings, but it may be necessary to consider the use of precast oors in some circumstances.
Precast oor units are not recommended for use at rst oor where the risk from an internal
explosion is greatest. Lightweight roofs and more particularly, glass roofs should be avoided
and a reinforced concrete or precast concrete slab is to be preferred.
4.2 Structural Failure
An explosion will create blast wave. The air-blast shock wave is the primary damage
mechanism in an explosion. The pressures it exerts on building surfaces may be several orders
of magnitude greater than the loads for which the building is designed.
The shock wave will penetrate and surround a structure and acts in directions that the
building may not have been designed for, such as upward force on the oor system.
19

In terms of sequence of response, the air-blast rst impinges on the weakest point in the vicinity
of the device closest to the explosion, typically the exterior envelope of the building. The
explosion pushes on the exterior walls at the lower stories and may cause wall failure and
window breakage. As the shock wave continues to expand, it enters the structure, pushing both
upward and downward on the oor slabs

Figure 4.3:Shock Front from Air Burst,

Figure 4.4:Shock Front from Surface Burst

4.3 Comparison of Blast And Seismic Loading

Blast wave and seismic loading are two different type of extreme force that may cause
structural failure. However, they share some common similarities. Similarities between seismic
and blast loading includes the following:
1. Dynamic loads and dynamic structural response.
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2. Involve inelastic structural response.

3. Design considerations will focus on life safety as opposed to preventing structural
damage.
4. Other considerations: Non-structural damage and hazards.
5. Performance based design: life safety issues and progressive collapse.
6. Structural integrity: includes ductility, continuity, and redundancy; balanced design.
The differences between these two types of loading include:
1. Blast loading is due to a propagating pressure wave as opposed to ground shaking.
2. Blast results in direct pressure loading to structure; pressure is in all directions,
whereas a Seismic event is dominated by lateral load effects.
3. Blast loading is of higher amplitude and very short duration compared with a seismic
event.
4. Magnitude of blast loading is difcult to predict and not based on geographical
location.
5. Blast effects are conned to structures in the immediate vicinity of event because
pressure decays rapidly with distance; local versus regional even.
6. Progressive collapse is the most serious consequence of blast loading.
4.4 Damage Evaluation Procedure For Building Subjected To Blast Impact
1.Slab failure is typical in blasts due to large surface area subjected to upward pressure not
considered in gravity design.
2. Small database on blast effects on structures.
3.Seismic-resistant design is mature compared with blast-resistant design.
In summary, while the effect of blast loading is localized compared with an earthquake, the
ability to sustain local damage without total collapse (structural integrity) is a key similarity
between seismic-resistant and blast-resistant design. In this study, the evaluation data that had
been listed in inspection form is adapted and modied from inspection form for building after
an earthquake. Even though, seismic loading will cause global response to building compared
to blast loading which will cause localized response, but similar damage assessment procedure
could be used.

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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDY
5.1 World Trade Center Collapse
The collapse of the World Trade Center (WTC) towers on September 11, 2001, was as
sudden as it was dramatic; the complete destruction of such massive buildings shocked nearly
everyone. Immediately afterward and even today, there is widespread speculation that the
buildings were structurally decient, that the steel columns melted, or that the re suppression
equipment failed to operate. In order to separate the fact from the ction, I have attempted to
quantify various details of the collapse.
The major events include the following:
The airplane impact with damage to the columns. The ensuing re with loss of steel
strength and distortion (gure 5.3)
The collapse, which generally occurred inward without signicant tipping.(gure 5.4)
Before going to the details it is useful to review the overall design of the towers
5.1.1 The Design
The towers were designed and built in the mid-1960s through the early 1970s each
tower was 64 m square, standing 411 m above street level and 21 m below grade. This produces
a height-to-width ratio of 6.8. The total weight of the structure was roughly
500,000 t. The building is a huge sail that must resist a 225 km/h hurricane. It was designed to
resist a wind load of 2 kPa, a total of lateral load of 5,000 t.
In order to make each tower capable of withstanding this wind load, the architects
selected a lightweight perimeter tube design consisting of 244 exterior columns of 36 cm
square steel box section on 100 cm centers(gure 3). This permitted windows more than onehalf meter wide. Inside this outer tube there was a 27 m 40 m core, which was designed to
support the weight of the tower. It also housed the elevators, the stairwells, and the mechanical
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risers and utilities. Web joists 80 cm tall connected the core to the perimeter at each story.
Concrete slabs were poured over these joists to form the oors.
In essence, the building is an egg-crate construction, i.e. 95 percent air. The egg-crate
construction made a redundant structure (i.e., if one or two columns were lost, the loads would
shift into adjacent columns and the building would remain standing). The
WTC was primarily a lightweight steel structure; however, its 244 perimeter columns made it
one of the most redundant and one of the most resilient skyscrapers.

Figure 5.1:A cutaway view of WTC structure

5.1.2 The Details of The Impact

5.1.2.1 The Airplane Impact
The early news reports noted how well the towers withstood the initial impact of the
aircraft; however, when one recognizes that the buildings had more than 1,000 times the mass
of the aircraft and had been designed to resist steady wind loads of 30 times the weight of the
aircraft, this ability to withstand the initial impact is hardly surprising.
Furthermore, since there was no signicant wind on September 11, the outer perimeter
columns were only stressed before the impact to around 1/3 of their 200 MPa designallowable.
The only individual metal component of the aircraft that is comparable in strength to the box
perimeter columns of the WTC is the keel beam at the bottom of the aircraft fuselage. While
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the aircraft impact undoubtedly destroyed several columns in the WTC perimeter wall, the
number of columns lost on the initial impact was not large and the loads were shifted to
remaining columns in this highly redundant structure. Of equal or even greater signicance
during this initial impact was the explosion when 90,000Lgallons of jet fuel, comprising nearly
1/3 of the aircrafts weight, ignited. The ensuing re was clearly the principal cause of the
collapse (see gure 5.2)

Figure 5.2: A graphic illustration, from the USA Today newspaper web site, of the World Trade
Center points of impact

The re is the most misunderstood part of the WTC collapse. Even today, the media
report (and many scientists believe) that the steel melted. It is argued that the jet fuel burns very
hot, especially with so much fuel present. This is not true. Part of the problem is that people
often confuse temperature and heat. While they are related, they are not the same.
Thermodynamically, the heat contained in a material is related to the temperature through the
heat capacity and the mass. Temperature is dened as an intensive property, meaning that it
does not vary with the quantity of material, while the heat is an extensive property, which does
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vary with the amount of material. One way to distinguish the two is to note that if a second log
is added to the replace, the temperature does not double; it stays roughly the same, but the
length of time the re burns, doubles and the heat so produced is doubled. Thus, the fact that
there were 90,000 L of jet fuel on a few oors of the WTC does not mean that this was an
unusually hot re. The temperature of the re at the WTC was not unusual, and it was most
denitely not capable of melting steel.
In combustion science, there are three basic types of ames, namely, a jet burner, a premixed ame, and a diffuse ame. A jet burner generally involves mixing the fuel and the
oxidant in nearly stoichiometric proportions and igniting the mixture in a constant-volume
chamber. Since the combustion products cannot expand in the constant-volume chamber, they
exit the chamber as a very high velocity, fully combusted, jet. This is what occurs in a jet
engine, and this is the ame type that generates the most intense heat.

Figure 5.3: Flames and debris exploded from the World Trade Center south tower immediately
after the airplanes impact. The black smoke indicates a fuel-rich re

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In a pre-mixed ame, the same nearly stoichiometric mixture is ignited as it exits a

nozzle, under constant pressure conditions. It does not attain the ame velocities of a jet burner.
An oxyacetylene torch or a Bunsen burner is a premixed ame.
In a diffuse ame, the fuel and the oxidant are not mixed before ignition, but ow
together in an uncontrolled manner and combust when the fuel/oxidant ratios reach values
within the ammable range. A replace ame is a diffuse ame burning in air,as was the WTC
re. Diffuse ames generate the lowest heat intensities of the three ame types.
If the fuel and the oxidant start at ambient temperature, a maximum ame temperature
can be dened. For carbon burning in pure oxygen, the maximum is 3,200C; for hydrogen it is
2,750C.
Thus, for virtually any hydrocarbons, the maximum ame temperature, starting at
ambient temperature and using pure oxygen, is approximately 3,000C. This maximum ame
temperature is reduced by two-thirds if air is used rather than pure oxygen. The reason is that
every molecule of oxygen releases the heat of formation of a molecule of carbon monoxide and
a molecule of water. If pure oxygen is used, this heat only needs to heat two molecules (carbon
monoxide and water), while with air, these two molecules must be heated plus four molecules
of nitrogen.
Thus, burning hydrocarbons in air produces only one-third the temperature increase as
burning in pure oxygen because three times as many molecules must be heated when air is
used. The maximum ame temperature increase for burning hydrocarbons (jet fuel) in air is,
thus, about 1,000Chardly sufcient to melt steel at 1,500C.
5.1.2.2The Collapse

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Figure 5.4:Collapse of WTC

Nearly every large building has a redundant design that allows for loss of one primary
structural member, such as a column. However, when multiple members fail, the shifting loads
eventually overstress the adjacent members and the collapse occurs like a row of dominoes
falling down.
The perimeter tube design of the WTC was highly redundant. It survived the loss of
several exterior columns due to aircraft impact, but the ensuing re led to other steel failures.
Many structural engineers believe that the weak points were the angle clips that held the oor
joists between the columns on the perimeter wall and the corestructure .With a 700 Pa oor
design allowable, each oor should have been able to support approximately 1,300 t beyond its
own weight. The total weight of each tower was about 500,000 t.
As the joists on one or two of the most heavily burned oors gave way and the outer
box columns began to bow outward, the oors above them also fell. The oor below (with its
1,300t design capacity) could not support the roughly 45,000 t of ten oors (or more) above
crashing down on these angle clips. This started the domino effect that caused the buildings to
collapse within ten seconds, hitting bottom with an estimated speed of 200 km per hour. If it
had been free fall, with no restraint, the collapse would have only taken eight seconds and
would have impacted at 300 km/h.
5.1.3 Can Building Resist Direct Airplane Hits
If the design terrorist attack is similar to that of Sept. 11, can buildings be given the
capacity to meet this demand? To answer this question, it is important to understand the physics
at work when a plane in ight is stopped by a building.
If the performance objective is to resist a direct airplane hit and protect people in- side
the building, the plane cannot be allowed to penetrate the exterior wall. To stop a Boeing 767
traveling in excess of 500 miles per hour in a distance of a few feet would take a deceleration
force in excess of 400 million pounds. Each tower of the World Trade Center was designed for
a total horizontal force (or design wind load) of about 15 million pounds. The total design wind
load for a more commonly sized high-rise, say, 40 stories tall, would be about 4 million pounds.
In other words, to resist the amount of force generated by a direct 767 hit, todays
buildings would need to be 100 times stronger than dictated by code, which is both physically
and economically impossible.

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So why did the World Trade Center Towers not collapse immediately due to theimpact
load on the system? The planes did not stop in a few feet, but had an effective stopping distance
of over 100 feet. This would drop the deceleration force down to something close to the
capacity of the building. Another part of the answer to this question lies in the way that the
exterior of the building was structured. The exterior columns were 14-inch square welded steel
box columns spaced at 40 inches on center. This means that there was only 26 inches clear
between each column. The columns were integral with the steel spandrels beams and formed
essentially a solid wall of steel with perforations for windows. This wall construction was able
to form a Vierendeel bridge over the hole created in one side of each of the towers.
Both of these facts that the plane was not stopped at the exterior and that the columns
and spandrels were extremely dense were necessary to prevent the building from collapsing
immediately upon impact.
Can buildings be designed for direct airplane hits? Yes and no.
Yes, for small aircraft. A denite no, for large commercial aircraft.
5.1.4 How Can We Minimize The Chance of Progressive Collapse
This is still one more question that some people are asking. Because the towers
ultimately collapsed with one oor crashing down upon the next, it has been called a
progressive collapse.
Again, it is important to think carefully about the question. Arent all collapses progressive?
Something breaks, and then something else breaks, and so on. Normally, when the term
progressive collapse is used, it specically refers to the loss of one or two columns or bearing
walls that cause a collapse to propagate vertically. In the case of the World Trade Center there
were about 40 columns lost on one face of each of the towers and there was no propagation of
collapse from this loss. So did the World Trade Center have good resistance to progressive
collapse? By normal use of the term progressive collapse it did. The collapse that did ultimately
occur was progressive, like all collapses, but was not progressive collapse that some
international codes address.
The difculty in understanding this concept is illustrated with the following story. A
New York re chief wrote that experienced reghters know that the buildings that are most
susceptible to progressive collapse are buildings that are well-tied together (i.e., able to transfer
building loads from one element to another, such as a column). Yet, virtually every structural
28

engineer will advise that one of the best ways to prevent progressive collapse is to tie the
building together. How can there be this kind of a contradiction?
The difference is that the engineer is thinking about losing a column or two and the re
chief is talking about losing a whole part of a building. As the event that initiates the
progressive collapse becomes larger than losing a column, the risk becomes that the strong
horizontal ties of a building will cause the collapse to propagate horizontally. Any discussion of
code provisions with respect to progressive collapse must recognize that both the engineer and
the re chief are right depending on the kind of hazard that is dened. At least six safety
systems present in the World Trade Center towers were completely and immediately disabled or
destroyed upon impact: reproong, automatic sprinklers, compartmentalization and
pressurization, lighting, structure and exit stairs.

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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The aim in blast resistant building design is to prevent the overall collapse of the
building and fatal damages. Despite the fact that, the magnitude of the explosion and the loads
caused by it cannot be anticipated perfectly, the most possible scenarios will let to nd the
necessary engineering and architectural solutions for it.
In the design process it is vital to determine the potential danger and the extent of this
danger. Most importantly human safety should be provided. Moreover, to achieve functional
continuity after an explosion, architectural and structural factors should be taken into account in
the design process, and an optimum building plan should be put together.
This study is motivated from making buildings in a blast resistant way, pioneering to
put the necessary regulations into practice for preventing human and structural loss due to the
blast and other human-sourced hazards and creating a common sense about the explosions that
they are possible threats in daily life. In this context, architectural and structural design of
buildings should be specially considered.
During the architectural design, the behavior under extreme compression loading of the
structural form, structural elements e.g. walls, ooring and secondary structural elements like
cladding and glazing should be considered carefully. In conventional design, all structural
elements are designed to resist the structural loads. But it should be remembered that, blast
loads are unpredictable, instantaneous and extreme. Therefore, it is obvious that a building will
receive less damage with a selected safety level and a blast resistant architectural design. On
the other hand, these kinds of buildings will less attract the terrorist attacks.
Structural design after an environmental and architectural blast resistant design, as well
stands for a great importance to prevent the overall collapse of a building. With correct
selection of the structural system, well designed beam-column connections, structural elements
designed adequately, moment frames that transfer sufcient load and high quality material; its
possible to build a blast resistant building. Every single member should be designed to bear the
possible blast loading. For the existing structures, retrotting of the structural elements might
be essential. Although these precautions will increase the cost of construction, to protect special
buildings with terrorist attack risk like embassies, federal buildings or trade centers is
unquestionable.
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REFERENCES:

JOMY, P. (2013) Architectural And Structural Design Blast Resistant Buildings,

Sreepathy Institute of Management & Technology, Vavannor, Palakad District, Koottanad,

Kerala 679533, India
2
Koccaz Z. (2004) Blast Resistant Building Design, MSc Thesis, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey.
3
Smith P.D., Hetherington J.G. (1994) Blast and ballistic loading of structures.
Butterworth Heinemann.
4
Yandzio E., Gough M. (1999). Protection of Buildings Against Explosions, SCI
Publication, Berkshire, U.K.
5
Website
:http://docslide.us/education/architectural-and-structural-design-of-blastresistant-buildings-report.html
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Civil engineering articles at google.com

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