Can the impasse on the nuclear deal be

broken?
The Hindu-Dec 26
Those who have chosen to oppose it must realise that by being outside the international regime,
India’s voice on global nuclear problems will not be heard.

During much of 2006 and the early part of 2007, India’s concerns over the nuclear deal with the
United States rested on the military-civilian separation plan, protecting its strategic programme,
ensuring uninterrupted fuel supply for the imported power plant, the right to reprocess imported
spent fuel, the use of plutonium in future fast breeder reactors, and inspection by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the civilian nuclear facilities and not an
additional inspection regime by the U.S. While these issues were largely resolved in the draft
123 agreement concluded in July 2007, other issues have dominated the debate and prevented
further movement on the deal. These issues are: the consequences of a future nuclear test by
India, any restriction on the size and nature of its nuclear arsenal and finally a perception that the
country will lose independence in its foreign policy.

India conducted its first test, then described as a peaceful nuclear explosion, in 1974. It was after
a lapse of 24 years that it carried out the Pokhran II tests. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
announced a voluntary moratorium on future tests in May 1998 itself, and the present
government, headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, continues to observe it. India’s
concern is the psychological and political compulsion to test in the event of a test being carried
out by China, Pakistan or the U.S. itself. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954 confers on the
President the right to recall supplies of plant (however impracticable) and fuel supplied to a state
if it carries out a nuclear test. The exemption from this condition applies to the other nuclear
weapons states (Russia, France, Britain and China). In negotiations with the U.S., India sought a
similar status but did not succeed as this involves amending the Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty, which is an extremely difficult proposition. The U.S. President, however, does have the
power not to invoke this right.

The draft 123 agreement, in the article dealing with ‘Termination,’ provides for mutual
consultations, a notice period of one year, taking note of the prevailing security situation, the
action of other parties and so forth before the U.S. can terminate the deal. Indeed, the words
‘Nuclear Test’ are totally absent from the text but their shadow hovers through compliance with
domestic laws, which both India and the U.S. have agreed to. It can be taken as certain that if
India were to test, as a response to a test by China or Pakistan, whoever is the President of U.S.
would not call for return of nuclear plant or fuel. If the U.S. were to carry out a test for whatever
reason, its President would hardly be able to invoke the right of return. The realistic scenario is
that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will, in all probability, come into existence in the
foreseeable future, to which the U.S., China, India and Pakistan will become parties.

Nuclear arsenal

On the size of the nuclear arsenal, both the NDA and UPA governments have declared that India
would develop a “Credible Minimum Deterrent,” consisting of a “triad,” that is airborne, land-
based and submarine nuclear assets and associated missiles. There is an extremist section of the
Indian strategic community which would like to see an open-ended development of nuclear
weapons and missile capability comparable to those possessed by the U.S. or Russia. The
majority of strategic experts in India are against India entering a nuclear arms race and support
the concept of a credible minimum deterrent. Of course, the size and nature of the deterrent will
have to take account of emerging realities in the geo-political environment.

The 123 draft clearly provides for ‘non-hindrance’ to India to pursue its nuclear strategic
programme in the manner it deems appropriate. The draft also provides that India and the U.S.
will work together with the international community to evolve a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
India’s policy has been that it supports an FMCT, provided it is universal, non discriminatory
and verifiable.

On the independence of foreign policy, it is a matter of perception. In the non-binding parts of

the Hyde Act, there is an expectation that India will work with the U.S. to prevent Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran is a signatory to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state and
therefore has obligated itself not to develop nuclear weapons. India, while upholding Iran’s right
to pursue civil nuclear use, would not want another nuclear weapon state in its neighbourhood
and expects Iran to fulfil its obligations under the NPT. It hopes that the nuclear dispute can be
resolved through the IAEA processes. The U.S. is finding that Russia and China are not
supporting the moves for more stringent sanctions. Regarding prospects of military action
against Iran, a majority of Americans themselves would oppose it. India is too large a country for
its foreign policy to be dictated by anyone.

We have seen recently at the climate conference in Bali, India was one of the principal
opponents to the U.S. having its way. In future also, there will be many issues on which the U.S.
and India will differ, as indeed there will be many others on which they will agree.

Both Russia and France are keen that India sign agreements with them for cooperation in civil
nuclear energy. They have well-developed programmes and have been cooperating with India in
the past. They have also made it clear that India should conclude an agreement with the IAEA on
safeguards to be applied on the civil nuclear programme and also obtain an exemption from the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The two countries and the U.S. are expected to use their influence in the NSG to obtain an
unconditional exemption. A factor to note is that neither Russia nor France has a law which
requires them to terminate cooperation with India if it were to conduct a test. It is vital that this
position is maintained in an undiluted manner in the NSG exemption for India.

After much persuasion, the UPA’s Left allies have allowed the government to hold talks with the
IAEA, and two rounds have been held. A draft agreement may emerge after a third round. The
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman has described these negotiations as “complex.” The AEC
should thereafter vet this draft, prior to it being discussed in the UPA-Left Committee. The
matter will then have to be considered by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Only after this
exercise is completed can the NSG be approached for an exemption. Thereafter, the U.S.
administration can place the 123 agreement before the Congress for its approval.

The political parties who have chosen to oppose the agreement must realise that by being outside
the international regime, India’s voice on emerging global nuclear problems will, in fact, not be
heard. On the other hand, by re-entering the international nuclear mainstream, India could greatly
help in evolving balanced solutions to these problems. While the U.S. stresses the importance of
non-proliferation policies, India sees that the only stable and peaceful world is one without any
nuclear weapons, with any country or any other entity.

Thus, prevention of proliferation is only an interim step on the path of reaching a nuclear
weapon-free world. It will be fully consistent with India’s civilisational heritage if it works
actively with the U.S., Russia, France, Britain, China and others to eliminate all nuclear weapons
from the world in the next two or three decades. Nuclear energy can then be used solely for
peaceful purposes, for the benefit of all mankind.

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