The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor Union Traditions on Peronism

Author(s): Joel Horowitz

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (May, 1983), pp. 101-116
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/155925
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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 5, i,

oI-- II6

Printed in Great Britain

IO1

The Impact of Pre-1943 Labor

Union Traditions on Peronism*
by JOEL

HOROWITZ

Although in recent years there has been an increasing quantity of

suggestive and important investigations of Peronism, little attention has
been paid to the continuity between the pre-I943 and the Peronist labor
movement.' This continuity has been neglected despite general recognition
that there were important labor leaders from the earlier labor movement
who provided key initial support to Peronism and that the pre-I943 labor
movement was one of Latin America's strongest.
There can be no doubt that Argentine unions changed profoundly after
the coming to power of Juan Peron. The labor movement grew; it became
wealthy, less independent, and, for the first time, a major actor on the
political stage. The unions took on a different coloration under Peron, in
part because for the first time they had money and a government that was
truly interested in them. But that does not necessarily mean that older
methods and desires were abandoned.
Beneath the dissimilarities were continuities, based on one important
factor, leadership. Trade union leaders from the neo-conservative era,
1930-43, provided much of the crucial early support for Per6n. Therefore,

it should not be surprising that some basic ideas continued from the earlier
period. Two traits usually regarded as Peronist, a willingness to cooperate
with the government and a desire to provide social welfare programs for
* The researchupon which this article is based was made possible by
grants from the
Doherty Foundation and the Center for Latin American Studies, University of
California,Berkeley.An earlierversion of this paper was presentedat the Center for
LatinAmericanStudies,Universityof California,Berkeley.I would like to thankthose
who were present for their comments.
1 The principalexceptions are the ground-breakingwork by Miguel Murmisand Juan
Carlos Portantiero, Estudiossobrelos origenesdelperonismo(Buenos Aires, 1971), and
an excellent and suggestive article by Ricardo Gaudio and Jorge Pilone, 'Estado y
relacionesobrero-patronalesen los origenes de la negociaci6n colectiva en Argentina'
Centrode Estudios de Estado y Sociedad,Estudiossociales,no. 5 (Buenos Aires, 1976).
See also the articleby Torcuato S. Di Tella, 'Working-ClassOrganizationand Politics
in Argentina', Latin American ResearchReview, xvi, 2 ( 98 ), pp. 33-56.

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I02

JoelHorowitz

union members, will be examined to demonstrate that continuity did exist.

Other similarities can also be found.
Continuity in the Argentine labor movement has been partially obscured
by the sudden prosperity that the unions enjoyed during their growth
under Peron and, more importantly, after the establishment of a dues
check-off system in 1945 that provided a steady source of income.2 Before
1943 the style of the unions had been simple and puritanical, partly because
there was not enough money for large staffs or fancy offices. Ideology also
played a role. There existed a lingering mistrust of the paid staff member
and suspicion of anything that was not austere. Angel G. Borlenghi,
Secretary-General of the FederacionEmpleadosde Comercio(the retail clerks'
union), a largely middle-class organization, was attacked for being well
dressed and for having a rug on the floor of his office.3
A sudden inflow of money changed the realm of the possible, allowing
the fulfillment of plans that had been held in abeyance by insufficient funds
and permitted the hiring of new staff. For example, in June I943 the
FederacionObreros_yEmpleados Telef6nicos(the telephone workers' union)
received only I,264.50 pesos in monthly dues, but by March 1946 income
had risen to 4,303.30 pesos.4 More money presented an opportunity to
change the style of the unions.
The continuity has also been obscured by what has become the
'orthodox' view of why Peron was able to come to power and control
the labor movement. Essentially this argument is that the old labor
establishment was overwhelmed by the tens of thousands of migrants who
flocked to the cities and could not be integrated into the unions. In one
version, the migrants' support for Peron was a result of their lack of
political sophistication that left them susceptible to his paternalism. The
Peronists were not adverse to accepting the basic outlines of the argument
but, instead of seeing the new workers as naive, viewed the migrants as
being more Argentine than the immigrants who had supposedly dominated
the pre-i943 labor movement. The idea of a complete break with the old
movement was also appealing because the Peronists were more than
willing to accept credit for creating the existing Argentine labor movement.
In the last decade this view has come under a serious and wide-ranging
2 See Decreto
23,852 of 2 Oct. I945 in Anales de legislacionargentina,I94J, vol. v (Buenos
Aires, 1946), pp. 59 -6.
3 For a
lingering mistrust of paid staff, see Lucio Bonilla, Instituto Di Tella Oral History

Program, p. 52 (hereafter IDTOHP); La Vanguardia,19-2 3 Dec. 1931; Federacidn,Aug.

1931. For comments about Borlenghi, see Rafael Ginocchio, IDTOHP, p. 14; Pedro
Otero, IDTOHP, p. 76; Francisco Perez Leir6s, IDTOHP, pp. I29-30.
Federacidn, 31 July 1943, 3

Dec.

I946.

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Impact of Labor Union Traditionson Peronism

I03

attack.5 While not wanting to get into the polemics that surround this issue,
it is clear to the author that the orthodox argument has hindered the search
for any connection between the pre-i943 labor movement and that of
Peron, because its basic proposition entails the elimination of the old labor
movement.
Leadership
A sudden ideological shift with the coming to power of Per6n would be
surprising. Lured by the carrot and avoiding the stick, unions abandoned
their opposition to Peron. The vast majority of trade unions based in
Buenos Aires supported Per6n or, at least, maintained a neutral position
in the crucial years of change-

I944 through

I945. Only organizations

with strong political ties, Communist unions and a small handful of

Socialist ones, actively resisted.6 This is not a new observation, but what
most writers have failed to mention is that this meant a continuation in
union leadership both at the highest level and in secondary roles as well.
In the first few years of Peronism, many unions were controlled by men
who had been active in the labor movement in the earlier epoch. A good
example of this is the Union Ferroviaria(the railroad workers' union). It
was undoubtedly the strongest union in Argentina in June, I943 when
the neo-conservative era ended.7 A comparison of its seventeen-member
executive committee

of 1942-3 with that of 1945-6, shows that the same

ten men sat on both boards. Of the additional members of the later
committee,

one had served on the board in 1933-4, while at least five had

previously played some role in the union. In 1946-7 seven members had
served on the 1942-3 executive committee, while at least five others had
been active at other levels before 1943. During both of the later periods,
the titled officers, six in total, were executive committee veterans with the
5 This is an
over-simplification of a complex argument that became increasingly complex
as time went on. For the nature of recent arguments on the subject, see Desarrollo
Econdmico,nos. 51, 54, 56, 57 (I973-5). Also, see Walter Little, 'Popular Origins of
Peronism', in David Rock (ed.), Argentina in the TwentiethCentury(Pittsburgh, 1975),
pp. 162-78, and Di Tella, 'Working-Class Organization and Politics', pp. 47-5 i.
6 For detailed and
good descriptions, see Louise M. Doyon, 'Organized Labour and
Per6n (1943-I955): A Study of Conflictual Dynamics of the Peronist Movement in
Power' (Ph.D. diss., University of Toronto, 1978), pp. 197-3 56; Samuel L. Baily, Labor
Nationalism and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, N.J., 1967), pp. 7I-96.
7 For the nature of the Uni6n Ferroviaria, see Joel Horowitz,
'Adaptation and Change
in the Argentine Labor Movement, I930-1943: A Study of Five Unions' (Ph.D. diss.,
University of California, Berkeley, I979). Juan Carlos Torre in 'La caida de Luis Gay',
Todo es Historia, Oct. 1974, p. 82, makes the same argument that I am making here on
the continuity of the leadership, but he does not elaborate.

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104

Joel Horowitz

exception of one man in I946-7. He had been, however, a delegate to the

Union Ferroviaria's convention in I941.8
One other figure of great importance remained in place, the Union
Ferroviaria's top bureaucrat, Rafael Kogan. Kogan had a large amount of
power and held his position from the founding of the union until at least
I948.9 This over-all continuity is especially striking because in the period
prior to the coup the union had been rent by internal unrest, caused at
least partially by the continuation in office of certain key individuals.10
The continuity in the Union Ferroviaria was not unique. The same
tendency can be found in unions in which the top leaders became
important Peronists. Angel G. Borlenghi, who was Minister of the Interior
from 1946 until 195 5, was able to bring his union with him.l Borlenghi
had been the dominant force in the Federacion Empleados de Comercio of the
Federal Capital and the national Confederacion General de Empleados de
Comercio since I932. In late 1946 at least six of the national confederation's
eight representatives to the central committee of the Confederacion del
Trabajo (CGT, national labor federation) had been active in the union prior
to 1943, and a seventh was Angel Borlenghi's brother.12
A similar situation existed in the Federacion Obrerosy Empleados Telefdnicos.
Luis F. Gay, President of the Partido Laborista, which helped elect Per6n
in 1946, and Secretary General of the CGT for a short period in 1946-7,
8

Manuel F. Fernandez, La Union Ferroviariaa travesdel tiempo: TIeinticincoanos al servicio

de un ideal, I922-I947 (Buenos Aires, I948), pp. I49-6I. The job history of these men
and those in the unions discussed below are included in my files. If anything, I am
underestimating the number of those active at the secondary level, as I have made no
attempt to locate activists at the level of the local branches, nor do I have a complete
list of all those who attended conventions.
9 Fernandez, La Union Ferroviaria a traves del tiempo, pp. 362-5. For his role see, Uni6n
Ferroviaria, Libros de actas de la Comisi6n Directiva, Acta II, 20 July I931, p. 28;

Acta 21, 9 Dec. 1931, p. 28.

10 The dissent in 1942 and
1943

was principally directed by the Communists and the

Radicals and had strong political overtones but at least part of the problem lay
elsewhere. For contrasting view of the struggle, see La Hora and El ObreroFerroviario
during those years. For a summary, see Horowitz, 'Adaptation and Change in the
Argentine Labor Movement', pp. 4 58-65. One reason for the continuity may have been
the nature of the government intervention. For the intervention, see David Tamarin,
'The Argentine Labor Movement in an Age of Transition, I930-1945' (Ph.D. Diss.,
University of Washington, 1977), pp. 292--6. One of the union's employees in 976 was
related to the pre-I943 leadership.
11 He did have some
problems with the national confederation of retail clerks, but he was
able to overcome it. Juan Carlos Torre, 'La CGT y el 17 de octubre de 1945', Todo
es HTistoria,Feb. 1976, p. 74; Felix Luna, El 4X: Cronicade un ano decisivo(Buenos Aires,
1969), p. 225.
12

CGT, I 6 Nov. 946. For Borlenghi's dominance in the union see Horowitz, 'Adaptation
and Change in the Argentine Labor Movement', pp. 469-73.

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Impactof LaborUnionTraditionson Peronism

105

had been a dominant figure in the telephone workers' organization since

its founding

in I928.13 In 1947

the union

was taken over

by the

government after the public and well-known dismissal of Gay as Secretary

General of the CGT. At that time, the union's Secretary General, Modesto
Orozco, was a long-time militant, as were the two men chosen to hand
over the organization's property to the state.14
The continuation of old labor leaders in their positions of power was
not limited to unions which produced enthusiastic and vital supporters of
Per6n. Even in the organization of the municipal workers of the city of
Buenos Aires, the Union Obrerosy Empleados Municipales, which had
extremely close ties to the Socialist Party, leaders could be found who were
willing to support Peron. The municipal workers' union had been
dominated by workers placed in the city government as acts of patronage
by the Socialist Party. In 1944 the union was taken over by the government
because of supposed corruption, but the real reason was undoubtedly to
limit opposition to Per6n. Yet, when a national confederation of workers
and employees of municipalities was founded during the southern winter
of 1946, the three titular officers had been prominent in the Socialistdominated

union before I943.15

The only segments of the labor movement that did not produce support
for Peron were the Communist-dominated unions and a few Socialist
unions. Peron, however, fostered parallel unions which with active
government support displaced these organizations.16 Even before 1943,
in many industries there were competing unions. The Communist strength
in the meatpacking industry was challenged by a Syndicalist union based
in the town of Zarate.17 The Union Obrerosy EmpleadosMunicipaleshad
competition from four other unions, and a leader from the largest of these
organizations was an alternate for the executive committee of the national
confederation of municipal workers founded in 1946.18These organizations
provided a base for creating an opposition.
13
14
15

Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 490-500, especiallyp. 490.

CGT, 6 Mar. 1947. For informationon Gay's fall, see Torre, 'La caidade Luis Gay'.
For the union and patronage,P6rezLeir6s, IDTOHP, pp. 29-30; ConcejoDeliberante
de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Actas del H. Concejo Deliberante, 2 Dec. 1933, vol. Iv,
For the intervention, CGT, 16 May, I July 1946. The ex-Socialists served
pp. 4100-22.

16
17
18

the union for three yearsas advisors and then resigned and a strike followed, Doyon,
'Organized Labour and Per6n', p. 456.
To view a decline of a Communist-dominatedunion, see El ObreroTextil, 1943-6.
The union was active in the Syndicalistconfederation,U.S.A.
FranciscoP. Ruberto,AlejandroPriotti,EnriqueNigro, interviewconductedby Robert
J. Alexander, 2 Nov. 1946; CGT, 16 July I946. Some of the other unions were
ephemeral. For the alternate CGT, 12 July 1946; La Vanguardia, 12 Sept. 1934.

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io6

JoelHorowitT

The Peronist parallel unions were not created out of whole cloth, but
rather the leadership tended to be drawn from existing parallel organizations
or from second-level, non-Communist activists. Participation in the
pre-i943 labor movement helped the new leadership in their recruitment
of rank and file, as some credibility had already been established.'9 The
best example of this is the Union ObreraMetalzrgica (the metalworkers'
union), which under Peronist auspices was to displace a Communist
organization and to become the most important union in the country. The
Union ObreraMetalzrgicawas actually founded prior to June 1943. It was
originally a product of the struggle not between Peron and the Communists,
but between the leadership of the Union Ferroviariaand the Communists.
A group of Socialist metalworkers, dissatisfied with the Communist
organization, founded the new union with the aid of the UnionFerroviaria
and its branch of the CGT.20 It was these men who began to build the
union.
The leaders of the previous era played an essential role in the
establishment of the Peronist labor movement. They were influential in
unions that represented a considerable portion of the entire labor movement.
Many of those who had played important or minor roles in the union
movement before June 1943 continued to do so during the period in which
many of the goals and the style of Peronism were set.21. One cannot expect
them to abandon the desires and dreams that they had fought for, against
considerable odds.22 What was achievable and possible had changed.
It is clear that, when the labor leaders turned to Per6n, many of them
expected a very different and a more balanced relationship than they in
fact achieved.23 They had obviously misjudged their own strength and that
of Per6n. Much of the workers' loyalty went direct to him. After Per6n
had established his power, he was able to demand loyalty, and many of
the major labor leaders who had originally helped bring him to power were
19
20

Doyon, 'Organized Labour and Per6n', pp. 256-7.

El ObreroFerroviario,I May 1943; Angel Perelman, Cdmohicimosel 17 de octubre(Buenos
Aires, 196I), pp. 43-5.
21
It is significant that union men held important government positions that dealt directly
with labor. The man in charge of union affairs in the Labor Secretariat in 1944 was Luis
Cerutti, a former Secretary General of the CGT, CGT, i Sept. 1944. Juan Bramuglia,
the lawyer of the Uni6n Ferroviaria also held an important position. Robert J.
Alexander, The Perdn Era (New York, 195 ), p. 24.
22 It is interesting that as late as I April 1946, the CGT carried an article in remembrance
of Francisco Largo Caballero, the Spanish Socialist leader of the Second Republic. It
was written by Jose Marotta, who had been both an official of the municipal workers'
union and a member of the city council of the city of Buenos Aires, representing the
Socialist Party.
23
Many of the labor leaders had hoped to create a true labor party. See, for example, Luis
Gay, IDTOHP; Torre, 'La caida de Luis Gay'.

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Impact of Labor Union Traditionson Peronism

107

swept away. Luis Gay and Cipriano Ryes, possibly the most influential
figures in the labor movement in 1946, were publicly pushed aside. A new
era for the Peronist labor movement had started.24
The link between the leadership of the post-1947 period and that of the
pre-Peron period is unclear. There is, however, a very great likelihood that
a significant percentage had held at least secondary positions within the
labor movement.25 In any case it is clear that, in the first dynamic years
of the Per6n era, those who had led the unions before I943 were in a
position to establish many of the goals and tactics of the Peronist labor
movement.
Relations with governments

One characteristic of the Peronist labor movement has been a willingness

to cooperate and maintain a close relationship with the government in
order to better the movement's position. From the time of General
Lonardi and the early years of the presidency of General Ongania until
the present military regimes, elements of the labor movement have tried
to cooperate with governments.26 While often less than successful and at
times not pursued by all factions, it appears to be a dominant characteristic.27
In part this is a tactic intended to ensure survival in difficult times, but
it is also an attempt to re-create the relationship that existed with the
government under Peron. However, this type of relationship antedates
Peron.
Turning to the government for help did not start with Peronism, but
was an important feature of the labor movement during the neo-conservative era, and even before.28 While it is not possible to show the full scope
of this relationship within the space of this article, it is possible to
demonstrate that it existed.
24

25

26

27

28

For an important discussion of the periodization of the Peronist labor movement see
Little, 'La organizaci6n obrera y el estado peronista', Desarrollo Econ6mico, no. 75
(Oct./Dec.
979), PP. 33 I-76.
In Jose Luis de Imaz, Los quemandan(trans. Carlos A. Aztiz), (Albany, 1970), pp. 226-8,
it is stated that a significant portion of the top leadership even after 1946, had had union
experience prior to I943. This entire argument is in opposition to what Torcuato Di
Tella observed in 'Working-Class Organization and Politics', pp. 5o-I, but I do agree
that more work is necessary.
Juan Carlos Torre and Santiago Senen Gonziles, Ejercito y sindicatos (los 60 dias de
Lonardi) (Buenos Aires, i969); Ruben Rotondaro, Realidady cambio en el sindicalismo
(Buenos Aires, 1971), pp. 317-26; Rub6n H. Zorrilla, Estructuray dindmicadel sindicalismo
argentino(Buenos Aires, 1974), pp. 206-7; Reviewof the River Plate, 9 Apr. 1976, p. 473
and 18 June 1976, p. 870; La Nacion, edici6n internacional, 26 Apr. I976.
See David Rock, 'The Survival and Restoration of Peronism', in Rock (ed.), Argentina
in the TwentiethCentury,p. 8i.
For more details see Horowitz, 'Adaptation and Change in the Argentine Labor
Movement', pp. 342-430.

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io8

Joel Horowitz

The railroad unions, the most powerful labor organizations in Argentina,

regularly used the services of the government to settle disputes with the
companies. Whether the problem lay in the nature of the duties of the car
cleaners or in the railroads' attempts to reduce wages and lay off workers,
the government became involved. For example, in 1934, unhappy with the
existing wage structure, the two railroad unions threatened disruptive
activities. The organizations refrained from any action at the request of
the government and then submitted the dispute to arbitration by the
President of the nation.29 The railroad industry was tightly supervised;
work rules were laid out in great detail by a government agency ensuring
better working conditions.30 That government interest should be most
manifest in the railroad industry is not surprising. The railroads were of
unusual political significance - no Argentine government could afford to
see turmoil disrupt the movement of freight, and it was far easier to deal
with the unions than it was to use force.
The willingness of the government to deal with the railroad workers
was an exception, but the attitude of the unions did not differ greatly.
Almost all turned with some frequency to the state. Where the difference
principally lies with later periods is that the labor movement before Peron
could be successfully ignored. It was not an important part of the political
equation, but rather something that had to be taken into consideration only
rarely. On the other hand, the unions did need the government because
of their own weakness and the intransigence of the employers. Organizations
from all political ideologies sought aid from the state.
The Syndicalist telephone workers' union, directly after the establishment
of the dictatorship of General Jose F. Uriburu in I930, was faced with
pressure from the employer. The telephone company began to make
changes in the work rules, and workers who refused to cooperate were
fired. Rather than strike, which would have given the government an
opportunity to crush the union, a delegation from the union went to see
the chief of police, who agreed to mediate the dispute. The employer
re-hired the workers, but the victory was fleeting, as many of them were
laid off again within several months.31 This was by no means an isolated
29

30

31

Boletin de la Direccion General de Ferrocarriles,no. I (Jan. 1939), pp. 40-5; Horowitz,

'Adaptation and Change in the Argentine Labor Movement', pp. 190-4, 219-26,
especially 223-4.
The Leyy reglamentogeneralde losferrocarrilesnacionales.Publicacidnoficial (Buenos Aires,
1936) is 220 pages long.
Federaci6n Obreros y Empleados Telef6nicos, Luchas y conquistas: Las organi,aciones
telefonicasen elpais (Buenos Aires, 1944), pp. 78-80; La Vanguardia, 14 Sept. 2930. The
telephone company was in fact trying to crush the union.

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Impactof LaborUnionTraditionsonPeronism

o09

incident, as the union, when harassed by the company, continued to

approach the government, usually with less successful results.32
Other unions approached the government in different ways. The
Socialist-controlled FederacionEmpleados de Comerciowas dependent on
government action. The union leadership realized, for example, that it did
not have the strength to force compliance with the legally mandated
eight-hour day in the thousands of stores that dotted the capital, nor did
the government have the resources or the will. The union leadership
perceived that the only thing that they could do was limit the violations.
Their scheme was to have a law enacted that forced stores to close at 8 p.m.
Enforcement of such a statute could be done by a policeman on his beat.
The Federacionwas able to obtain the passage of this legislation through
an efficient political campaign.33 This and similar efforts were the major
organizing tools of a union that grew very rapidly during the I930s.34 The

unions' habitual dependence on the government is, perhaps, best

demonstrated by an incident in 1932. A union leader urged a group of
employees to strike to prevent lowering of salaries, saying essentially that
this was a different type of action from what the organization usually
followed, but that they could not turn to the government because there
was no law against lowering salaries.35
Even the Communist-controlled unions sought help from the government when they could. The FederacionObreraNacional de la Construccion
(the
construction

workers' union) from 1938 until 1941 turned regularly to the

National Department of Labor, to which it usually sent a copy of the list

of demands presented to an employer. When an agreement could not be
reached, the President of the Department of Labor was asked to mediate,
and negotiations continued at the department.36 The Union Obrera Textil
(the textile workers' union) followed a similar pattern.37
Dealing with the government became an accepted way of life. The CGT
32

See, for example, La Vanguardia, 8 Oct. to 5 Nov. I930, 30 Jan., 13 and 28 Feb. 1931;
Federacidn,Oct. 1930, May 1931.
33 La Vanguardia,Jan. 1932 to
Sept. 1933, especially 6 Aug., 21 Sept. 1932, 24 July I933.
34 For the other
campaigns see, Horowitz, 'Adaptation and Charge in the Argentine Labor
Movement', pp. 228-35, 268-70. The Federacidnhad 820 members in 1932 according
to Liga Patridtica, 'Sindicatos obreros de la Capital Federal' (Sept., 1932), enclosure in
U.S. Embassy, Buenos Aires, to Secretary of State, 13 October 1932, National Archives
Record Group 59, file no. 835.0OB/69. The original source is most likely the police.
In 1936 the union claimed a membership of 18,489. Departmento Nacional del Trabajo,
Boletin informativo,Sept./Oct. 1936, p. 4736.
35 La
Vanguardia, 8 May 1933.
36 Celia
Durruty, Clase obreray peronismo(C6rdoba, 1969), pp. 95-7.
37 Uni6n Obrera Textil, Memoriay balancecorrespondiente
al ano 1939 (Buenos Aires, 1940),
pp. 10-17; El Obrero Textil, Jan. 1940.

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I Io

Joel Horowitt

sent a delegation to the celebration of the first anniversary of the

assumption of office of Governor Manuel Fresco of the Province of Buenos
Aires, despite his exteme right-wing nationalist views.38 Government
officials were habitually invited to attend union events.39
That this co-existence between elements of the labor movement and the
state helped lead to Peronism is shown by the way in which Luis
Monsalvo met Per6n. Monsalvo was an important figure in the Union
Ferroviaria and the CGT and later was Secretary General of the Partido
Laborista. After the coup of 1943 some of the railroad workers wanted to
establish contact with the new leaders:
Thus we established contact with Mr Moran, head of the special section of the
central police department. Mr Moran had as his job the vigilance of the union
movement. [His office was also in charge of dealing with those that were perceived
as a threat to society.] I knew him personally because the CGT had entrusted to
me many times the obtaining from him of authorization for public functions,
assemblies, etc. We brought up the situation of the railroad workers and he took
an interest in the question. He told us to return the following day.
The next day the railroad men returned and met the chief of police, who
introduced them to Peron.40
Union representatives during the neo-conservative era had access to the
police and to the National Department of Labor, but rarely to people who
were important decision-makers.41 Unions were simply not considered to
be an important factor in the social and political equation. Even the so-called
workers' parties tended to exclude union leaders from political positions
of importance. On October 17, 1945, with the massive demonstration for
Per6n, the unions and the working class made their presence felt and they
could not thereafter be ignored - something that by its very nature
changed the relationship between governments and the labor movement.

Socialprograms
Any observant visitor to present-day Argentina will notice the large
number of hotels and hospitals controlled by the unions. In 1964 the labor
movement had 64 vacation resorts, 28 recreational facilities, 3 hospitals,
38
39

Feb. I937; Provincia de Buenos Aires, Ministerio de Gobierno, Politica

Federacion,
obreraylegislacidndel trabajodel gobiernode BuenosAires (La Plata, I937), p. 14.

See, for example, La Vanguardia, i Mar. 1937; El ObreroFerroviario, 16 Sept. I941.

40 Luis Monzalvo, Testigo de la primera hora delperonismo (Buenos Aires, 1974), pp. 64-5.
41 An
importantexceptionwas the contactduringa strikein 193 2 of the telephoneworkers
with Roberto M. Ortiz. Ortiz was elected President in I938. U.S. Embassy, Buenos
Aires, to Secretary of State, I July 1932, National Archives Record Group 59, file no.
pp. i-2; La Vanguardia, 12-14 July I932; La Nacion, 12-14 July 1932.
835.75/13,

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Impact of Labor Union Traditions on Peronism

1ii

and 122 clinics. In 1969 a quarter of the Argentine population was served
by union hospitals.42 This segment of union activity grew in the late 96os
and early 1970S. The post-1976 military regime has attempted to limit this
side of the labor movement in order to circumscribe the unions' power.43
Whereas most of these social programs were established after 1943 and
are identified with Peronism, they were a basic aspiration of the union
movement in the earlier period.44 This should not be surprising as the
Argentine labour movement was, at least at an intellectual level, influenced
by a European Social Democratic movement that attempted to produce
a separate set of social institutions for the working class.45
The establishment of health, sports, and recreational facilities was a goal
of many unions. Organizations appealing to as different a membership as
the poorly paid textile workers46 and the white-collar retail clerks had in
of mutual aid
their statutes clauses that called for the development
societies, cooperatives, and the provision of medical, dental and legal
consultations for their members. Emphasis was also placed on the creation
of technical schools and the practice of sports. The constitution of the
textile workers' union also called for the establishment of a vacation
resort.47
The goals were not just unfulfilled wishes. The retail clerks acquired
land to build a vacation resort for its members.48 Both organizations
established free or low-cost medical and legal consultations for members
42

Rotondaro, Realidady cambioen el sindicalismo,p. 370; Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Social Security

in Latin America: PressureGroups, Stratificationand Inequality(Pittsburgh, 1978), p. 200.
43 It has tried to limit union
power by lessening union income. Under General Ongania
the unions' power in this area had been greatly expanded.
44 A national
congress of the CGT felt called upon in 1947 to recommend to its member
unions that they establish various social welfare policies, CGT, i6 Nov. 1947. See
founding dates for vacation facilities in Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsi6n, Asesoria de
Turismo Social y Vacaciones, Tiempo librey coloniasde vacacions(Buenos Aires, 1956).
45 For a recent review of the literature
on such activities in Germany see Gerhard A. Ritter,
'Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany: Problems and Points of Departure for
Research', Journal of ContemporaryHistory, xiII, no. 2 (Apr. 1978), I65-89. See also,
Guenther Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working-Class
Isolation and National Integration(Totowa, N.J., 1963), especially pp. 212-47.
46
According to Departamento Nacional del Trabajo, Divisi6n de Estadistica, Investigaciones
sociales,1938(Buenos Aires, 1939), p. I 19, textile workers were the lowest-paid blue-collar
workers in the city of Buenos Aires.
47 El Obrero Textil, Dec. 1938; Federaci6n Empleados de Comercio, Informe del Concejo
Adminstrativo: Asamblea general ordinaria, 26 de agosto i93o (Buenos Aires, 1930), pp.
39-43; Confederaci6n General de Empleados de Comercio, Estatuto (Buenos Aires,
N.D.).
48 Federaci6n Empleados de Comercio, Memoria de la ComisionDirectiva, periodo desdeel 1?
de noviembrede 1936 al 3i dejulio de I937 (Buenos Aires, 1937), p. 77.

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II2

Joel Horowit.

on a limited basis.49 Many unions arranged for dental and health care and
legal consultations through individual practitioners. The nature of the
arrangement varied from union to union and from professional to
professional. Sometimes the service was free; sometimes union members
paid a small fee, and at other times, the union paid. In all cases the
compensation was very small, and it can be assumed that the professionals
were active in left-wing politics.50
Ideology does not seem to be a major determining factor in union
interest in this type of activity. The textile workers' union was a
Socialist-controlled union that became Communist-dominated, while the
retail clerks were staunch Socialists. The Syndicalist FederacidnObrera
Maritima (the maritime workers' union) built an out-patient clinic in their
headquarters.51
The failure to carry out the stated desires of the unions resulted not from
lack of will but, it appears, from lack of funds. The money raised from
dues was often insufficient for anything beyond the primary function of
the organization. The textile workers' union, for example, had an income
in April i941 of 3,986.42 pesos; after expenses for rent, utilities, salaries
and propaganda there was a surplus of 307.47 pesos. The textile workers
earned extremely low salaries; extra money could be raised for strikes but
for nothing else.52 Few unions before the Per6n era had the income and
the stability to provide anything but rudimentary social programs.
There were several influential and stable unions that did put together
significant social programs. These unions tended to be well established,
but unable to improve conditions for their members. For a variety of
reasons their ability to strike was strictly limited. One can hypothesize that
it was the need to provide the rank and file with something other than
improvements in salaries or working conditions that propelled them so
far in this direction. The municipal workers' of the city of Buenos Aires
and the two railroad unions most fully developed these concepts.
The municipal workers' union was in a particularly difficult position.
It felt that it could not strike. The neo-conservative-controlled executive
49 Federaci6n

Empleados de Comercio, Informedel ConcejoAdminstrativo: Asamblea general

ordinaria,26de agostoIo30, pp. 32-3; El ObreroTextil, June 1938, July 1941, Nov. I941,
Apr. 1943.
50 See, for
examples, Uni6n Ferroviaria, Libros de actas de la Comisi6n Directiva, Acta
21, 15 November 1933, p. 37; El Obrero Ferroviario, 15 Jan. 1933, i May 1936; La
Vanguardia, 26 Sept. 1930, 9 May, 20 June 1931; Federacidn,Feb., 1936.
51 El ObreroFerroviario, i6 Nov.
I94I.
52 This was a
typical month. For strike expenses, see May 194I. El ObreroTextil, primer
quincenal, July I941.

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Impact of Labor Union Traditionson Peronism

113

branch of the city government saw no need to improve significantly the

conditions of these well-paid workers. The Union Obrerosy Empleados
Municipales also faced competition from other organizations for the
loyalties of the workers. What the union could provide was social
programs. In this, it did have the support of the municipal government,
which, while not willing to make major concessions, was willing to make
minor ones, in order to placate the union's ally, the Socialist Party.53
The organization's social welfare program started prior to 1930. In 1927
the municipal government lent the union an empty field that the labor
organization built into a highly developed recreational area. Trees and a
children's wading pool were provided by the city.54The union built tennis,
bowls and basketball courts, soccer fields, a playground and facilities for
dances and entertainment.55As well as serving the members, the recreational
facilities were used to hold festivals and receptions for other labor
organizations.56
In 9 3 5 the municipal workers went a step further and opened a vacation
resort in the hills of Cordoba. The goal was to establish a place where the
membership could enjoy the benefits of a low-cost vacation away from the
city. In 1940 the resort had 62 rooms with accommodation for 181 people.
The union also acquired a bus to lessen transportation costs. The resort
was built with the help of the government.57 The union also provided the
same type of help with medical, judicial and pension problems that was
done by other organizations.
The two railroad unions, the Union Ferroviariaand La Fraternidad(the
engineers' and firemen's union), went the farthest in providing social
services. They were pushed in that direction by serious problems in their
industry. The fall in exports brought on by the depression and the
increasing use of trucks to move freight produced in the 1930S a major
crisis for the rail companies and their workers. The railroad unions had
to fight extremely hard to maintain the status quo. Despite this problem,
they were large, stable organizations that received sizable sums of money
53 The Socialist
Party was during the 1930S the largest or second largest party on the city
council of Buenos Aires. For the nature of the relationship between the union and the
government, see Horowitz,' Adaptation and Change in the Argentine Labor Movement',
pp. 369-75.
54
Concejo Deliberante de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Actas del H. Concejo Deliberante,
II, 28 June 1932, p. 2277; IV, 28 Dec. 1933, p. 4578; La Vanguardia, 8 July I932.
55 Uni6n Obreros Empleados
y
Municipales, Dignificandoen vacaciones:Obraquedebeimitarse
(Buenos Aires, 1940), front piece with no pagination.
56
See, for examples, La Vanguardia, I Oct. 193I, 27 May I932.
57
Uni6n Obreros y Empleados Municipales, Dignificando en vacaciones,pp. 9-i2; La
Vanguardia, 8 Sept. 1935; El ObreroFerroviario, 6 Feb. 935.

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I4

Joel Horowitt

in dues. In

1942

the Union Ferroviaria collected 800,468 pesos in dues and

had a capital of 2,569,80o pesos. The railroad unions, because of their

strategic position within the economy and their acceptance by the
companies and by the government as legitimate entities, found it extremely
difficult to strike. There was a tacit agreement between the unions and the
government that the railroad system would not be disrupted by a massive
action.58

This left the unions with large sums to carry out a social program, as
well as a need to do so. Even prior to the 1930S the two unions had begun
to provide some forms of social programs for their members. La
Fraternidadcreated its first technical school in I 890 in order to train firemen
to become engineers. By 1929 the two unions had sixty-three schools
spread across the country. In the 1930S the schools made available not only
technical education for the workers, but also a wide variety of courses,
from basic literacy to English and drawing, in which their families could
enroll.59
In the 1930S the unions extended their program. In late

1942,

the Union

Ferroviariaopened a vacation resort in the hills of C6rdoba for its members

and those of La Fraternidad.The former union also acquired a recreation
field in greater Buenos Aires and by I943 was searching for a property
to buy along the seacoast.60
The Unidn Ferroviaria had provided medical and dental care for its
members for free or at low cost, through individual health-care practioners.
In 1936 the two railroad unions outlined a more comprehensive scheme,
a plan to build a hospital, a sanatorium and, in key railroad centers,
out-patient clinics.6' By the end of the neo-conservative era the unions had
made major strides towards achieving their goal. In 1940 they purchased
a private hospital. Two years later an out-patient clinic was opened in
Rosario, Argentina's second largest city and a vital railroad center. The
58 For dues, see Uni6n Ferroviaria, Memoria balance
al ano I942 (Buenos
y
correspondiente
Aires, 1943), pp. 107,

2 . For the nature of the union and its philosophy,

see Horowitz,

'Adaptation and Change in the Argentine Labor Movement'.

59 Juan B. Chiti and Francisco
Agnelli, Cincuentenariode 'La Fraternidad': Fundacidn,
desarrollo,obra(Buenos Aires, 1937), pp. 337-41; Fernandez, La UnionFerroviariaa traves
del tiempo, p. 43 ; Partido Socialista, Anuario socialista i930 (Buenos Aires, I929), p. 48;
El Obrero Ferroviario, i Feb. I93I,

I Dec.

1937, I May, i Oct.

1939,

i6 Feb.

I942.

Libraries were also extremely important in the railroad unions and elsewhere in the labor
movement.
60 El Obrero Ferroviario, 16 Feb., i Mar. 1943; Uni6n Ferroviaria, Memoriay balance
al ano 1940 (Buenos Aires, 1941), p. 37; Uni6n Ferroviaria, Memoriay
correspondiente
al ano 1942, p. 46.
balancecorrespondiente
61
Fernandez, La Unidn Ferroviaria a traves del tiempo, pp. 255-260.

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Impact of Labor Union Traditionson Peronism

i5

facilities were available for use by all railroad workers and their families
who paid special dues, as part of an arrangement with the government in
which the state authorized the rail companies to deduct dues directly from
the salaries of any worker who wanted to participate. The deduction of
dues was an insurance that the flow of money would be steady. By
December I942, 44,677 railroad workers out of a possible 13I,oo6 were
eligible to use the medical facilities.62
The railroad unions had gone a long way towards implementing their
social welfare plan before the end of the neo-conservative era. The type
of program that could be built with more active state intervention can be
seen by what happened in the period immediately after I943.63 The
government, with the direct intervention of Juan Per6n - it was he who
made the announcement - provided money for the extension of health-care
services and established a mechanism for continued financing. Both the
workers and the companies were to contribute to this service. By the end
of 1946, the railroad unions were building a much larger hospital and had
clinics in nine additional cities.64 What had changed in the railroad unions
was not ideology but the ability to carry out their desires. Similar desires
existed in other unions but were blocked by a lack of money.
Conclusion
It is perhaps necessary to add that I am not trying to create a model in
which the unions did not change with the coming to power of Juan Peron.
There was undoubtedly a sharp shift in attitudes and behavior, but one
must examine the nature of that change, keeping in mind that the
environment of the labor movement had been drastically altered. Some
of the changes were produced by the increased attention from the
government and the unions' greater wealth rather than a shift in ideology.
Before I943 the labor movement had been an isolated group within a
62

63

64

El Obrero Ferroviario, I Mar. 1937, i6 Feb. I939, i Aug. I940; i Aug. I942; Uni6n
al ano 1942, p. 42; Juan Manuel Santa Cruz,
Ferroviaria, Memoriay balancecorrespondiente
Ferrocarrilesargentinos(Santa Fe, 1966), p. 33. The percentage would have been higher,
but the state railroad workers were already covered for hospitalization through a mutual
aid society.
Besides allowing for subtraction of the dues from the pay of the workers, the
government had offered to help finance the building of a hospital. The unions never
received the money because they bought a hospital. El ObreroFerroviario, 6 Nov. 1940,
i6 July/i Aug. 1943.
See CGT, i6 Jan. 1944, i6 Jan. I947. For information on individual clinics see, for
example, CGT, i6 Mar., I Sept I946. The rail unions were not the only organizations
to benefit. For example, the national confederation of retail clerks received two million
pesos to establish a vacation resort, CGT, i6 Oct. 1947.

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Joel Horowit.

society that paid little attention to it, except in a negative sense. Unions
were poor and unable to carry out many functions because of a lack of
funds. Under Peron, the unions became the keystone of the governing
group; a force that had to be both wooed and controlled. It is not
surprising that things changed. Among other factors, legal recognition and
dues check-off provided the possibility for a new style of activity.
Given the fact that there was not an entirely new leadership in the crucial
early years of Peronism, it should not be surprising to see certain trends
continuing from the earlier period. The connections may not always be
clear, but they are there. If we are going to understand fully what Peronism
was and is, it will be necessary to keep looking at the period in which
Peronism was formed, and at the same time not to assume that it was
something entirely new.

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