1. SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION

COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL
519 SCRA 432 (2007), SECOND DIVISION
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of providing public
transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane,
crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). PNCCs
Sofronio Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon
tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was turned over to the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own
investigation. Because of lack of adequate space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus
be towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of the bus but
Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a collateral with the same value for the
reconstruction of the damaged radio room.
Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered Superlines to pay PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00,
representing actual damages to the radio room. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and
concluded that the caseshould have been brought against the police authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper
HELD:
Contrary to PNCCs contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of which is whether the owner of a
personal property may initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal
distraint. In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly
entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal
possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
In the case at bar, Superlines ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC, consideration of whether PNCC
has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus was towed by the PNCC on the request of Lopera in
violation of constitutional rightagainst unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superliness bus,
on Loperas request, were unquestionably violative of the right to be let alone by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and
any other police officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities,
through Lopera, having turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected
between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu proprio may implead as defendants the
indispensable parties Lopera and any other responsible police officers.
3. DAVID vs MACAPAGAL-ARROYO 489 SCRA 160
FACTS: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan
Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential
Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was
aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits
issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized
and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya)
was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however

grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot
visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot
be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution
are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an
overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue
has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021.
The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in
fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC
can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time
some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading
of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military,
particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was
also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes
in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a
plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is
actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth
doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to
state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents
calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent
an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP
1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers.
From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the callingout power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of
the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They
assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted
former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out
of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily
Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the
constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not
come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must
be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of
the calling out power of the president by the president.

4. Columbia Pictures, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144 , August 28, 1996
FACTS:Complainants thru counsel lodged a formal complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation for
violation of PD No. 49, as amended, and sought its assistance in their anti-film piracy drive. Agents of the NBI

and private researchers made discreet surveillance on various video establishments in Metro Manila including
Sunshine Home Video Inc. (Sunshine for brevity), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at
No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant with the courta quo against Sunshine
seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films all of which were enumerated in
a list attached to the application.The search warrant was served to Sunshine and/or their representatives. In
the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI Agents found and seized
various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by private
complainants. A "Return of Search Warrant" was filed with the Court. A "Motion To Lift the Order of Search
Warrant" was filed but was later denied for lack of merit.
A Motion for reconsideration of the Order of denial was filed. The court a quo granted the said motion
for reconsideration and justified it in this manner:
It is undisputed that the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were allegedly
copies (sic), were never presented in the proceedings for the issuance of the search warrants in question. The
orders of the Court granting the search warrants and denying the urgent motion to lift order of search warrants
were, therefore, issued in error. Consequently, they must be set aside.
Petitioners thereafter appealed the order of the trial court granting private respondents' motion for
reconsideration, thus lifting the search warrant which it had theretofore issued, to the Court of Appeals. As
stated at the outset, said appeal was dismissed and the motion for reconsideration thereof was denied. Hence,
this petition was brought to this Court particularly challenging the validity of respondent court's retroactive
application of the ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 6 in dismissing
petitioners' appeal and upholding the quashal of the search warrant by the trial court.
Private respondents aver that being foreign corporations, petitioners should have such license to be
able to maintain an action in Philippine courts. In so challenging petitioners' personality to sue, private
respondents point to the fact that petitioners are the copyright owners or owners of exclusive rights of
distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico
V. Domingo as their attorney-in-fact, as being constitutive of "doing business in the Philippines" under Section
1 (f)(1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them
the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do business. Consequently, they
have no right to ask for the issuance of a search warrant. 7
ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal standing in our courts to maintain the action in our courts, they being foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
RATIO: Petitioners flatly deny that they are doing business in the Philippines, 8 and contend that private
respondents have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business here, as would
require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, other than averments in the quoted
portions of petitioners'.
Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive right does not
conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the presumption of doing business. 9
The Corporation Code provides:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines
without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or
proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or
proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized
under Philippine laws.
The obtainment of a license prescribed by Section 125 of the Corporation Code is not a condition
precedent to the maintenance of any kind of action in Philippine courts by a foreign corporation. However,
under the aforequoted provision, no foreign corporation shall be permitted to transact business in the

Philippines, as this phrase is understood under the Corporation Code, unless it shall have the license required
by law, and until it complies with the law intransacting business here, it shall not be permitted to maintain any
suit in local courts. 10 As thus interpreted, any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may
maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the defendant
are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but "doing business" in the
Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other
words, although a foreign corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not
follow that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines. 11
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in"
or "transacting" business. Each case must be judged in the light of its own peculiar environmental
circumstances. 13 The true tests, however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or
substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it
and turned it over to another. 14
As a general proposition upon which many authorities agree in principle, subject to such modifications as may
be necessary in view of the particular issue or of the terms of the statute involved, it is recognized that a
foreign corporation is "doing," "transacting," "engaging in," or "carrying on" business in the State when, and
ordinarily only when, it has entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting
through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the sense that
it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts. 15
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or transacting business in
the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and
arrangements, and contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some of
the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and subject of its organization. 16
This traditional case law definition has evolved into a statutory definition, having been adopted with some
qualifications in various pieces of legislation in our jurisdiction.
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards, petitioners are
not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law,
petitioners are doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require
obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show
that petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention
to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Accordingly, the certification issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission 20 stating that its
records do not show the registration of petitioner film companies either as corporations or partnerships or that
they have been licensed to transact business in the Philippines, while undeniably true, is of no consequence to
petitioners' right to bring action in the Philippines. Verily, no record of such registration by petitioners can be
expected to be found for, as aforestated, said foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the
Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.
Although Section 1(g) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Omnibus Investments Code
lists, among others
(1) Soliciting orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts. Concrete and specific solicitations by a foreign
firm, or by an agent of such foreign firm, not acting independently of the foreign firm amounting to negotiations
or fixing of the terms and conditions of sales or service contracts, regardless of where the contracts are
actually reduced to writing, shall constitute doing business even if the enterprise has no office or fixed place of
business in the Philippines. The arrangements agreed upon as to manner, time and terms of delivery of the
goods or the transfer of title thereto is immaterial. A foreign firm which does business through the middlemen
acting in their own names, such as indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants, shall not be
deemed doing business in the Philippines. But such indentors, commercial brokers or commission merchants
shall be the ones deemed to be doing business in the Philippines.
(2) Appointing a representative or distributor who is domiciled in the Philippines, unless said representative or
distributor has an independent status, i.e., it transacts business in its name and for its own account, and not in
the name or for the account of a principal. Thus, where a foreign firm is represented in the Philippines by a
person or local company which does not act in its name but in the name of the foreign firm, the latter is doing
business in the Philippines.

as acts constitutive of "doing business," the fact that petitioners are admittedly copyright owners or owners of
exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into
an indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause
of action in local courts.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the State simply
because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such contracts are consummated outside the
State. 22 In fact, a view is taken that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the State merely because
sales of its product are made there or other business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged
agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where such activities are not under the direction and control
of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an independent business.23
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer who has
purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products sold are not a doing of business by the
corporation.24 Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its products to persons styled "distributing agents" in
the State, for distribution by them, is not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of
process therein, where the contract with these purchasers is that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign
corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices established by it. 25
It has moreover been held that the act of a foreign corporation in engaging an attorney to represent it in
a Federal court sitting in a particular State is not doing business within the scope of the minimum contact
test.26 With much more reason should this doctrine apply to the mere retainer of Atty. Domingo for legal
protection against contingent acts of intellectual piracy.
In accordance with the rule that "doing business" imports only acts in furtherance of the purposes for which a
foreign corporation was organized, it is held that the mere institution and prosecution or defense of a suit,
particularly if the transaction which is the basis of the suit took place out of the State, do not amount to the
doing of business in the State. The institution of a suit or the removal thereof is neither the making of a contract
nor the doing of business within a constitutional provision placing foreign corporations licensed to do business
in the State under the same regulations, limitations and liabilities with respect to such acts as domestic
corporations. Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to warrant
the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. 27
As a consideration aside, we have perforce to comment on private respondents' basis for arguing that
petitioners are barred from maintaining suit in the Philippines. For allegedly being foreign corporations doing
business in the Philippines without a license, private respondents repeatedly maintain in all their pleadings that
petitioners have thereby no legal personality to bring an action before Philippine Courts. 28
Among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under the Rules of Court are lack of legal capacity to
sue 29 and that the complaint states no cause of action. 30 Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff
is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or
does not have the character or representation he claims. 31 On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of
personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, hence grounded on failure to state
a cause of action. 32 The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality
to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to
the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion
to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; 33 whereas the second can be used as a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no
cause of action. 34
Applying the above discussion to the instant petition, the ground available for barring recourse to our
courts by an unlicensed foreign corporation doing or transacting business in the Philippines should properly be
"lack of capacity to sue," not "lack of personality to sue." Certainly, a corporation whose legal rights have been
violated is undeniably such, if not the only, real party in interest to bring suit thereon although, for failure to
comply with the licensing requirement, it is not capacitated to maintain any suit before our courts.
Lastly, on this point, we reiterate this Court's rejection of the common procedural tactics of erring local
companies which, when sued by unlicensed foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines,
invoke the latter's supposed lack of capacity to sue. The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on failure to
first acquire a local license is based on considerations of public policy. It was never intended to favor nor
insulate from suit unscrupulous establishments or nationals in case of breach of valid obligations or violation of
legal rights of unsuspecting foreign firms or entities simply because they are not licensed to do business in the
country. 35

6. PEOPLE vs. Libnao 395 scra 407

FACTS:
Appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga were charged of violating Article II, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. It appears from the evidence adduced
by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area.
They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were
transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing
tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga
Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga.[3] In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and
the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan
Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag.
The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, Pampanga on October
23, 1996. Forensic Chemist Daisy P. Babu conducted a laboratory examination on them. She concluded that
the articles were marijuana leaves weighing eight kilos
During their arraignment, both entered a plea of Not Guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II,
Section 4 of RA 6425 in relation to RA 7659, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos. SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPRECIATED
AND CONSIDERED THE DOCUMENTARY AND OBJECT EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION NOT
FORMALLY OFFERED AMOUNTING TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.
RULING:
NO.
The Court ruled that the appeal be dismissed.
Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and documentary
evidence of the prosecution despite the latters failure to formally offer them. Absent any formal offer, she
argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible.
The contention is untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they
have been properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified, presented
and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their formal offer, therefore, the
prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly identified those exhibits, and their
testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellants counsel had cross-examined the prosecution witnesses
who testified on the exhibits.
Appellant also assails the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. She first cites the
inconsistency between the testimony of SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, who said that it was SPO2 Antonio who
opened the black bag containing the marijuana; and that of SPO2 Antonio, who declared that the bag was
already open when he arrived at the Kabayan Center. She then focuses on the police officers failure to

remember the family name of the driver of the tricycle where she allegedly rode, claiming that this is
improbable and contrary to human experience.
Again, appellants arguments lack merit. The alleged inconsistencies she mentions refer only to minor details
and not to material points regarding the basic elements of the crime. They are inconsequential that they do not
affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact that appellant and her co-accused
were transporting marijuana. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and
relevant details concerning the principal occurrence. The identity of the person who opened the bag is clearly
immaterial to the guilt of the appellant. Besides, it is to be expected that the testimony of witnesses regarding
the same incident may be inconsistent in some aspects because different persons may have different
recollections of the same incident.
Likewise, we find nothing improbable in the failure of the police officers to note and remember the name of the
tricycle driver for the reason that it was unnecessary for them to do so. It was not shown that the driver was in
complicity with the appellant and her co-accused in the commission of the crime.
To be sure, credence was properly accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, who are law
enforcers. When police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption. In this case, no evidence has been presented to suggest any improper motive on the
part of the police enforcers in arresting the appellant.
Against the credible positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants defense of denial and alibi
cannot stand. The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can
just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The sole proof
presented in the lower court by the appellant to support her claim of denial and alibi was a sworn statement,
which was not even affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant. Hence, we reject her defense.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DENIED. The decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 in relation to R.A.
No. 7659, and sentencing her to an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of two million pesos
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
7. Miranda vs. Tuliao 486 scra 377
Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the
witness protection program.
2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC of
Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentenced
them 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at
large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the four accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the herein
petitioner Miranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal
complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against
the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or
quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumalian noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. The petitioners
appealed the resolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ.
The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing
the Joint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tulia
filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad

from further proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a
resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order
dismissing the information against the petition.
Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to
the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court
Held: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners.
It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process,
such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to
the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may
invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they
cannot seek judicial relief.

9. Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279
June 23, 1987
Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied
by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners
resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were
arrested and subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several
kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and
invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting
under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order
problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and
subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against
them.
Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not
excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches
and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of
those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was
there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were held inadmissible as evidence in any
proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the
items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should
remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision
against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 The prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.
10. People vs Amminudin 163 SCRA 402
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos
of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y
Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In
his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting
of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately
handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to
force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest
and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC
rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently
proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless
arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had
just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and
furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.
11. People vs Baula 344 scra 663
Facts:
On 13 December 1995, at around eight oclock in the evening, Jupiter Caburao, decided to follow his mother,
Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her
due obligations at a store, about one-and-a-half kilometers away, owned by a certain Brigida Tumamang. While
traversing the road towards the store, Jupiter noticed a commotion near the creek about ten meters away from
him. He focused his flashlight towards the direction where he heard the commotion and saw accusedappellants Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person who was lying on the ground,
while accused-appellants Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault lasted for about four

minutes. Accused-appellants fled but not before they had threatened Jupiter with death if he were to divulge
the incident to anyone. Jupiter went near the lifeless body of the victim who turned out to be his own mother.
Her head and face sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her brain tissues. Jupiter rushed
home and brought his niece and nephew to the house of a neighbor for their safety. For fear of reprisal from
accused-appellants and believing that the police would be able to solve the gory killing on their own, Jupiter did
not reveal the carnage to either his relatives or the police.
About two o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1995, the police authorities, led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande,
went to the locus criminis, and took pictures of the body of the victim.2 The investigation revealed that before
the victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that accused-appellants were also at the
store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between seven o'clock and eight o'clock in the
evening, and that, fifteen minutes later, accused-appellants also left.
SPO4 Mirande, with several policemen, repaired to the respective houses of accused-appellants. The
policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben
Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt.
The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos. Inside the hut, the group found hanging on the wall a
bloodstained bolo. The bloodstained pair of short pants, polo shirt and bolo, together with the victim's dried
blood samples, were sent on the same day to the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch
Office,4 for forensic examination. The results of the examination disclosed that the bloodstains6 found in the
bolo, the bloodstains8 on the polo shirt9 and the bloodstains10 on the pair of short pants had the same type "O"
blood as that of the victim.
Issue:
WON the evidence taken from the accused without a warrant is valid.
Held:
Accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time that the subject articles were allegedly taken from
them but were just being questioned by the police officers conducting the investigation about the death of
Patrocinia Caburao. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused
had committed the crime. Being in no position to effect a warrantless arrest, the police officers were thus
likewise barred from effecting a warrantless search and seizure.
Clearly, the police officers acted on a mere suspicion that accused-appellants could be responsible for the
commission of the crime and only because of their being at the store where the victim was last seen.
Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe
that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged.32 An illegal search cannot be
undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and all the accused-appellants are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and ordered to be immediately released from custody unless
detained for some other lawful reason. Costs de oficio.

12. People vs Sarap 399 scra 503

FACTS:

Armed with a search warrant, SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan together with
PO2 Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal St., Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on March 2,
1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe
Casabuena. The three were apprehended for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained at the Banga
Police Station. In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz and Roger
Amar were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March 4, 1996.
On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed Guarino that
there were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters. Then they proceeded to the house and saw a woman,
who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap. Melly saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and
immediately threw away her black canvass bag, which Roger Amar picked up. Guarino Blocked Saraps path
and grabbed from her the green plastic bag she was holding. The plastic bag was found to contain two blocks
of marijuana fruiting tops. Navida pursued Amar and arrested him. The accused-apellant denied the
accusations against her. The Court fines accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article II, Sec
4 of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. The accused appealed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the warrantless search and arrest conducted is legal.
(2) Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
RULING:
A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge
as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches
and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. Warrantless
searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the
evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not
dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of
suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no
sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants possession,
and thus confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An
illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the
search for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.
All told, the guilt of the accused-appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required
moral certainty of conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to overcome the
presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained
Wherefore the Accused-appellant Melly Sarap y Arcangeles is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
13. People vs Tutud 412 scra 142
Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a
report from a civilian asset named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors
have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their
area.
PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1
Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving
that night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto
asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, it was alright. Tudtud opened the
box himself as his companion looked on.

The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic
bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what
seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves.
The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the
police station. The two did not resist.
The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for
examination. Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Region XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers
suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another
890 grams. Police Chief Inspector Austero reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D220-99 dated 2 August 1999.
Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused
pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the
seizure of the evidence against them.
Issue: Whether or not the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants
Held: Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
As the search of appellants box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless
search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other
than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be
sustained.
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights
as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the
Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only
to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due process
clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right to personal
security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing.
14. Ladlad vs Velasco 523 scra 318
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for the writs of prohibition and certiorari to enjoin petitioners'
prosecution for Rebellion and to set aside the rulings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City (RTC Makati) on the investigation and prosecution of petitioners' cases.
Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24
February 2006 declaring a "State of National Emergency," police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on 25
February 2006, while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. An
inquest was held and Beltran was later charged with rebellion before the RTC. Beltran moved for a judicial
determination of probable cause. The trial court affirmed the existence of probable cause.
ISSUE: Is there probable cause to charge Beltran with rebellion?
HELD: No. Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is committed

By rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to
said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any
of their powers or prerogatives.
The elements of the offense are:
1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the Government; and
2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement is either
(a) to remove from the allegiance to said Government or its laws:
(1) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof; or
(2) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(a) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or
partially, of any of their powers and prerogatives.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in furtherance
of a political end. The RTC Makati erred when it nevertheless found probable cause to try Beltran for Rebellion
based on the evidence before it.
16. Mata vs Bayona 128 scra 388
FACTS: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the search warrant and other
pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of the City Court of Ormoc
replied, it is with the court. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion
was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact
that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case
is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the
records. Matas motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme
Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be
invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all
the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on
the matter.
ISSUE: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?
HELD:YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined
by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

18. Lim vs Felix 194 SCRA 292

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the
Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio
Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman
Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation
of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple
murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has
been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change
of venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice.
The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations, among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the
preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best
enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or
prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate
of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally
convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is
made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits
a grave abuse of discretion.
19. Tolentino vs Malanyaon 337 scra 162

Facts: Judge Nilo Malanyaon, presiding judge of Branch 30 of the RTC of Camarines Sur, dismissed 5
separate criminal cases for lack of evidence and also refused to issue warrants of arrest on the ground of lack
of probable cause. Acting State Prosecutor for Camarines Sur Romulo Tolentino assailed the orders for
dismissal and the refusal to issue the warrants for arrest alleging that Judge Malanyaon had abused his
authority and knowingly rendered unjust orders. Tolentino also complained that several motions had been filed
before respondent judge and have yet to be resolved and decided upon.
Issues:
(1) Did Judge Malanyaon exercise grave abuse of discretion and act in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal cases?
(2) Was Judge Malanyaon guilty of unreasonable delay for failing to act on the motions filed by State
Prosecutor Tolentino?
Held: (1) NO. The allegations that respondent judge had violated Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the Canons of Judicial
Conduct are without merit. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust decision
from being held accountable for errors of judgment on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. There is no proof of grave abuse of discretion.
These charges were dismissed by the Court.
(2) YES. The motions/incidents were left unacted upon from 3 to 5 months and were still pending when the
administrative complaint was filed against respondent. Respondent should be aware of his duties as an arbiter
of justice. Under Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge shall dispose of the courts business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. While the prosecutor in this case is not without fault,
the respondent cannot escape responsibility for his inaction of the pending motions before him. Even
assuming arguendo that the various motions filed by the prosecutor were considered to be mere scraps of
paper or without merit, the judge must nevertheless resolve on those matters promptly by granting or denying
them. It is the duty of the judge to rule upon the motions filed before him even if his actions are merely to deny
them. Respondent judge was found guilty for his failure to resolve pending motions and/or incidents and,
accordingly, a penalty of reprimand was imposed upon him with the warning that a repetition of the same or
similar violation will be dealt with a more severe penalty by the Court.

20. WEBB V DE LEON 247 SCRA 652

Facts:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of
Rape andHomicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie
Jennifer intheir home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30,
1991.Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R.
Zuno toconduct the preliminary investigation.The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of
Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherentlyweak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements.They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel
when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the allegedinconsistencies.Petitioners charge that respondent
Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issuedwarrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination.Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to animpartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused
with crimeof rape and homicide?(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their

discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the
accused?(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in theinformation as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not, acrime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear andconvincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not onevidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there
must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.Section
6 of Rule 112 provides that

upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.Clearly then, our laws repudiate
the submission that respondent judges should have conducted searching examinationof witnesses before
issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be
heard.The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the
panel to study theevidence submitted more fully.(4) NO.Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the
faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicialfunction, the sole prerogative of courts
and beyond executive and legislative interference.In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department whose principal power and responsibility isto see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.
22. Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's
house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However, the
officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets which
they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a search
warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses, Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine
Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same.
Afterwards, he subscribed and swore to the same before him.
ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the Search
Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with
the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the
search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)

The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken
considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information provided by the
witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay
and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled jurisprudence.