Miranda v Arizona

June 13, 1966

Facts:
On March 13, 1963, Miranda, was arrested and taken to the police station where officers questioned him
for two hours. He signed a written confession stating that it was made voluntarily and he had full
knowledge of his legal rights. The confession was used against him at trial and over his objection. The
officers admitted that they had not warned him about his right to counsel. Miranda was found guilty of
kidnapping and rape.
Procedure:
Miranda appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona and held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not
violated because he did not requested counsel. It affirmed the conviction
Issues:
1. W/N law enforcement officials must inform an accused of his constitutional rights?
2. W/N statements obtained from an individual subjected to custodial police interrogation admissible if he
has not been notified of his privilege under the 5th Amendment?
Decision:
1. Yes. When a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings
must be given: that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him; that
he has the right to an attorney present; and he cannot afford the services of an attorney, he will be
provided for with one.
2. No. Without these warnings, the statements were inadmissible.
Reasoning:
Mirandas signing a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of
his "legal rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights. Incommunicado interrogation jeopardize the privilege against self-incrimination whichguarantees to
the individual the "right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will," during a period of custodial interrogation as well as in the courts or during the course of other official
investigations.
Rule of the Case:
SCOTUS reversed the decision of the SC of Arizona.

Elonis vs. U.S., 13-983 (2015)

Facts:
Elonis used the Web site Facebook to post lyrics containing graphically violent language and imagery
concerning his wife, co-workers, children, and law enforcement, interspersed with disclaimers that the
lyrics were fictitious and that Elonis was exercising his First Amendment rights. His boss fired him. His
wife obtained an order of protection. Eloniss former employer contacted the FBI. The agency monitored
Eloniss Facebook activity and charged him under 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which makes it a crime to transmit in
interstate commerce any communication containing any threat . . . to injure the person of another.
Procedure: A grand jury indicted Elonis for making threats to injure patrons and employees of the park,
his estranged wife, police officers, a kindergarten class,and an FBI Agent, all in violation of 18
U.S.C.875(c).In the District Court, Elonis,moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege that he had
intended to threaten anyone. The District Court denied the motion, holding that Third Circuit precedent
required only that Elonis:intentionally made the communication, not that he intended to make a threat.He
requested a jury instruction that "the government must prove that he intended to communicate a true
threat." which was also denied.He was convicted on the last four of the five counts. He was sentenced to
44 months in prison, and three years supervised release.He appealed unsuccessfully to the circuit court
of appeals, renewing his challenge to the jury instructions.He appealed to the Supreme Court based on
lack of any attempt to show intent to threaten and on First Amendment rights.
Issue: Does a conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. 875(c) requires proof of the
defendant's subjective intent to threaten?
Decision: Yes, conviction of threatening another person under 18 U. S. C. 875(c) requires proof of the
defendant's subjective intent to threaten.
Reasoning: The Court held that the prosecution needed to show that Elonis intended the posts to be
threats, and therefore that there was a subjective intent to threaten. An objective reasonable person
standard does not go far enough to separate innocent, accidental conduct from purposeful, wrongful acts.
The Court held that, in this case, an objective standard would risk punishing an innocent actor because
the crucial element that makes this behavior criminal is the threat, not merely the posting.

Ruling of the case: The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
No. 14-86 (2015) Argued February 25, 2015Decided June 1, 2015
FACTS:
In 2008, Elauf applied to be a model with Abercrombie. Abercrombie models are sales employees who
work on the floor of the Abercrombie store, and are required to abide by an internal Look Policy, which
is marked by Abercrombies signature East Coast collegiate style. Abercrombies Look Policy requires
that models wear clothing similar in style to those sold by Abercrombie and specifically prohibits caps.
Samantha Elauf wore a hijab, or headscarf, as part of her religious observation. When Elauf interviewed
for a model position with Abercrombie in 2008, she was wearing her hijab. Her interviewer, an assistant
manager named Heather Cooke, took note of the headscarf but still gave Elauf a high enough score to
recommend her for hiring. After the interview, unsure of whether wearing the hijab at work would be a
problem for Elauf, Cooke contacted her supervisor, Randall Johnson, for advice. Johnson told Cooke that
the headscarf would be in violation of the Look Policy and instructed Cooke to lower Elaufs appearance
score on her interview, which dropped her overall score below that required to be given an offer of
employment. Elauf found out through a friend at Abercrombie, FarisaSepahvand, that she had not been
hired because of her hijab.
PROCEDURE
Thereafter, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Abercrombie on behalf
of Elauf in the Northern District of Oklahoma. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

granted summary judgment to the EEOC and held a trial on damages, which resulted in a $20,000 verdict
for the EEOC. On appeal, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the district court
with instructions to enter summary judgment on behalf of Abercrombie. The Circuit Court reasoned that,
as Abercrombie argued, under Title VII, an employer must have actual knowledge that a religious
accommodation is required by the plaintiff. The EEOC, to the contrary, argued that once the employer
has either direct or indirect notice that an employees religious belief or practice will conflict with a term of
their employment, the employer must reasonably accommodate that belief or practice.
ISSUE:
Whether the employer be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for refusing to
hire an applicant based on a religious practice if the employer did not have direct knowledge that a
religious accommodation was required?
HELD:
To prevail in a disparate-treatment claim, an applicant need show only that his need for an
accommodation was a motivating factor in the employers decision, not that the employer had knowledge
of his need. Title VIIs disparate-treatment provision requires Elauf to show that Abercrombie failed to hire
her because of her religious practice. And its because of standard is understood to mean that the
protected characteristic cannot be a motivating factor in an employment decision. Thus, rather than
imposing a knowledge standard, prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actors
knowledge: An employer may not make an applicants religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor
in employment decisions. Title VII contains no knowledge requirement. Furthermore, Title VIIs definition
of religion clearly in- 2 EEOC v. ABERCROMBIE & FITCH STORES, INC. Syllabus dictates that failureto-accommodate challenges can be brought as disparate-treatment claims. And Title VII gives favoured
treatment to religious practices, rather than demanding that religious practices be treated no worse than
other practices.
RULING:
The Tenth Circuit therefore erred in ordering the entry of summary judgment for Abercrombie. On
remand, the Tenth Circuit can consider whether there is sufficient evidence to support summary judgment
in favor of the EEOC on the question of Abercrombie's knowledge. The Tenth Circuit will also be required
to address Abercrombie's claim that it could not have accommodated Elauf's wearing the headscarf on
the job without undue hardship.

Bowers v. Hardwick
478 U.S. 186, 1986
FACTS :Atlanta police officer Keith Torick issued Michael Hardwick a citation for public drinking. Hardwick
then settled the matter by paying the $50 fine, but Torick showed up at Hardwick's apartment three weeks
later to serve the now-invalid warrant. Hardwicks roommate was sleeping on the couch in the living room.
The roommate invited officers in and directed them down the hall to Hardwicks room. The door was open
and the officers observed Hardwick and a companion engaged in mutual, consensual oral sex. Torick
then arrested both men for sodomy, a felony under Georgia law that carried a sentence of one to twenty
years imprisonment.
PROCEDURE: Hardwick then sued Michael Bowers, the attorney general of Georgia, in federal court for
a declaratory judgment that the states sodomy law was invalid. Hardwick asserted that he was a
practicing homosexual, that the Georgia statute placed him in imminent danger of arrest and that the
statute violated his constitutional rights. The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the case for failure
to state a claim. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision ruling that the statute violated the
Respondents fundamental rights because his homosexual activity was a private and intimate association.
The Georgia sodomy statute was indeed an infringement upon Hardwicks Constitutional right to
privacy.The State of Georgia appealed the case via petition for review on certiorari before theSupreme
Court of the United States.
ISSUE: WON the act of consensual homosexual sodomy is protected under the fundamental right to
privacy.
HELD: No. The act of consensual sodomy is not protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any
right protected under the United States Constitution. There is no precedent to support the Respondents
claimed constitutional right to commit sodomy. Fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States throughout history and through its traditions have in no way set any foundation
to include a case such as this under the Constitutional umbrella of protection.
REASONING: The SC Recognized that a right to privacy was implicit in the Due Process Clause of
theFourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to the court in this case, that this
right did not extend to private, consensual sexual conduct, at least insofar as it involved homosexual sex.
RULE OF THE CASE: The SCreversed the 11th Circuits decision, holding that the antisodomy law was
constitutional.

Lawrence v. Texas
Facts
In Houston, Texas, officers of the Harris County Police Department were dispatched to a private
residence in response to a reported weapons disturbance. They entered an apart- ment where one of the
petitioners, John Geddes Lawrence, and another man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a sexual act. The two
petitioners were arrested, held in custody overnight, and charged and convicted before a Justice of the
Peace.
Procedure
The petitioners exercised their right to a trial de novo in Harris County Criminal Court. They
challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
of a like provision of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const., Art. 1, 3a. Those contentions were rejected.
The petitioners, having entered a plea of nolocontendere, were each fined $200 and assessed court
costs of $141.25. App. to Pet. for Cert. 107a110a. The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth
District considered the petitioners federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and
Due Processbeing authoritative, this was proper.
Issues
1. Whether Petitioners criminal convictions under the Texas Homosexual Conduct law which
criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples
violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws?
2. Whether Petitioners criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate
their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Decision
1. Yes. Petitioners criminal convictions Texas Homosexual Conduct law violates the 14th amendment.
2. Yes. Criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violates their vital interests in
Liberty and privacy.

Reasoning
Laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in
private. A substantial number of sodomy prosecutions and convictions for which there are surviving
records were for predatory acts against those who could not or did not consent, as in the case of a
minor or the victim of an assault. As to these, one purpose for the prohibitions was to ensure there
would be no lack of coverage if a predator committed a sexual assault that did not constitute rape as
defined by the criminal law.
As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and some amici contend that
Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case requires us to address whether Bowers
itself has continuing validity. Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the
conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants. Equality of treatment and the due
process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked
in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests. If protected conduct
is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma
might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres.
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct
without intervention of the government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter.

Ruling
The court granted the certiorari of the petitioners.

REPUBLIC vs CA and MOLINA

This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and
Reynaldo Molinas marriage as void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
FACTS:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a
year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility on the early stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week
later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.
PROCEDURE
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker,
and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court
of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity
HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize
the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity
as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she
regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the
very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.
REASONING
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that
there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The
burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the
incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough;
(6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards
husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the
trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding
that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

LEO ECHEGARAY vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]
FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for the
crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime.
PROCEDURE:
Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration raising
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied.
Consequently, Congress changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order from carrying out the execution by lethal injection of petitioner for being: (a) cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of
due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international covenants, (d) an undue
delegation of legislative power by Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the
power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to
respondent Director. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the
Death Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment; execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is
constitutional, lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier
to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene
and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[14] with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear asAmicus
Curiae[15] alleging that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be implemented by
R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil society standards.
ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for:
(a) Violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,
(b) Violation of our international treaty obligations,
(c) Being an undue delegation of legislative power, and
(d) Being discriminatory.
DECISION:
LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19,
ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES
NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR
BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
REASONING:
LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19,
ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that "punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court
believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters
which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.
In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of

course the Constitution does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished. The cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment,
not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
For as long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most stringent
requirements provided by the Constitution, the Court must confine their inquiry to the legality of R.A. No.
8177, whose constitutionality was duly sustain in the face of petitioner's challenge. The Court find that the
legislature's substitution of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection
infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.

II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY
OBLIGATIONS
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life. Nevertheless, Article
6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to
life, subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Moreover, International
Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states that in countries which have not abolished the death penalty,
sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed nor ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS.
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form
of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the
task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the myriad problems demanding its attention. Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No.
8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map
out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death
sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring
so far as possible to mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as
well as during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient to cause the
instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of such task." The Court cannot
see that any useful purpose would be served by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the
definition of what constitutes a criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed
by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within
banks that keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by the Secretary of
Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under delegated legislative power is proper where
standards are formulated for the guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general,
are capable of reasonable application.[58]
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID
FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for being an
invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17

amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution by lethal
injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the sentence
or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter case, the
death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code."
On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit. While Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation
of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the
implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an instance when the death
sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83
of the Revised Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is
sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans
statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead remain
consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law." [67] An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.[68] In case of discrepancy between a provision of statute and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said statute, the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause
in Section 17 which suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following the date
of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, perforce Section 17
must be declared invalid.

RULE OF THE CASE:

The petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No.
8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because Section
17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act No.
7659. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the
aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees;

-VersusJAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., alias
"BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
Complainant Maggie Dela Riva, movie actress by profession was abducted and rape by the
accused Jose, et al on June 26, 1967. She alleged that by means of force and intimidation and with the
use of a deadly weapon, they had carnal knowledge against her will. The accused Jose, Canal and
Aquino pleaded not guilty while Pineda pleaded guilty. They alleged that Dela Riva accepted the deal of
Pineda to strip tease for 1000 pesos. They went to Swanky Hotel where the strip tease held. The trial
court finds the accused Jose et al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape and sentences each to the death penalty and each to indemnify the complainant of 10,000 pesos.
PROCEDURE:
Appeal to Supreme Court, Approved.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Jose, Canal and Aquino were involved in forcible abduction of the complainant?
2. Whether or not the absence of semen in the complainants vagina disproves the fact of rape?
3. Whether or not the publicity of the case affects the decision of the court?
DECISION:
1. Yes. Jose, Canal and Aquino were involved in forcible abduction of the complainant.
2. No, the absence of semen does not disproves the fact of rape.
3. No, publicity of the case does not affect the decision of the court.
REASONING:
1. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss
De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one
another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while
inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing
his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt.
2. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina
after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that period.
In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the
complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the
emission of semen, but penetration.
3. It appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. or another thing, Jose
himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments
of the press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
RULING:
The judgment under review is hereby modified. All of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify
the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each
shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEES

G.R. No. 180643
September 4, 2008

Facts:
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
(SBRC). He disclosed that the COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project, that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo about the bribery and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed
about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or
not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve. As a result, the
Senate cited him for contempt.
Procedure:
The petitioner refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring
that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
The Committee issued Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144;
and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the
parties were required to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal
system;
2. Whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by executive privilege;
3. Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
4. Whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order.
Decision:
There is a recognized presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege. It is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
However, the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under
the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order. Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that
led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the
members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to
the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008
was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show
that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008 deliberation
when the matter was taken up.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential communications
privilege. It pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional
principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. The information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege. Despite the
revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege. The privilege is said to be a
necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide the President and those who assist him with
freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a
way many would be unwilling to express except privately. Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked
by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said
information may impair the countrys diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.
The respondents violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of
Procedure. Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure.
Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.
There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As
respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and
public accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general public, the religious
community and the academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an
accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the
political branches of government. The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted
rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test
of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting
"search for truth" than the process here in question, if that is its objective.
Rule of the Case:
The respondent Committees Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.

Senate vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006
FACTS
Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President.
Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and
void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they can
validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive
privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers covered
by the EO.
PROCEDURE
The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public hearing was
sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.
Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On the same day
(Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this development, the investigation pushed
through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both
were subsequently relieved for defying the Presidents order.
Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for certiorari and
prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

RULING
1. No
2. Yes
3. Yes
REASONING
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the
power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a
proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
2. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern.
3. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication.
RULE OF THE CASE
The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005),
"Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are,
however, VALID.

Kalaw vs. Fernandez

G.R No. 166357, September 19, 2011
FACTS:
Tyrone Kalaw and respondent Malyn Fernandez met in 1973 and eventually married in Hong Kong in
1976. They have 4 children. Tyron had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano, who gave birth to a son in 1983. In
1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her 4 children with Tyrone. Then Tyrone started living with
Jocelyn, who bore him 4more children. Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36.
PROCEDURE:
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on
Malyns psychological incapacity. Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding
Malynsbehavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends
may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). Malyns NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her
duties as a mother. Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviewswith Tyrone,
Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and their son. Fr. Healy characterized Malyns psychological
incapacity as grave and incurable. He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts,
as well as the report of Dr. Dayan, Malyns expert witness. He clarified that he did not verify the
truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts duty
to do so.
On 19th of September 2011, the Supreme Court rendered its decision to dismiss the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that the evidence presented has no factual basis for
the conclusion of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malynsuffers from psychological incapacity
HELD:
NO. The burden of proving psychological incapacity ison the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the
incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be
incurable.
REASONING:
Petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of
respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to thebeauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when
performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
RULING:
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them
from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal
separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its
December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

JAMES OBERGEFELL, ET AL., PETITIONERS 14556 v. RICHARD HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL.;
FACTS:
Petitioner James Obergefell and John Arthur met over two decades ago. They fell in love and started a
life together, establishing a lasting, committed relation.
In 2011, however, Arthur was diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS. Before Arthur died,
Obergefell and Arthur decided to commit to one another. To fulfill their mutual promise, they traveled from
Ohio to Maryland, where same-sex marriage was legal. Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed
as the surviving spouse on Arthurs death certificate. By statute, they must remain strangers even in
death, a stateimposed separation Obergefell deems hurtful for the rest of time. He brought suit to be
shown as the surviving spouse on Arthurs death certificate.
PROCEDURE:
PetitionerObergefell filed the suit in United States District Courts of Ohio which ruled in his favor.
However, it was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on appeal. The Court
of Appeals held that a State has no constitutional obligation to license same-sex marriages or to
recognize same-sex marriages performed out of State.
Thus, the petitioner sought certiorari which was subsequently granted.
ISSUE:
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a samesex marriage licensed and
performed in a State which does grant that right.
DECISION:
Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize samesex marriages validly performed out
of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is
no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State
on the ground of its same-sex character
REASONING:
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion,
sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they
were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure
even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of
marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for
themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilizations
oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that
right.
RULE OF THE CASE:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

CHING VS. SPCBA

FACTS:
Respondent SPCBA is a domestic non-stock and non-profit corporation, formerly known as the Laguna
College of Business Administration. Its original incorporators and members were petitioner Remegio A.
Ching (Remegio), Edgardo A. Ching, Elmer A. Ching, Leoncia A. Ching, and Jolanda A. Apostol. In a
letter, dated September 19, 2001, Remegio tendered his irrevocable resignation stating as follows:
This [is] to tender my irrevocable resignation from San Pedro College of Business Administration effective
immediately.
As can be verified since the Board of Trustees has taken over the functions of undersigned, as well as my
duties as Treasurer of SPCBA since February, 2002, there is no existing property or money accountability
that may be attributable to me.
Very truly yours,
REMEGIO A. CHING
National Highway
San Pedro, Laguna
To SPCBA, the tenor of Remegio's resignation was not only as a trustee and treasurer, but also as its
member. For said reason, he was paid the amount of P20,000,000.00 representing the buy-out price of
his interest in SPCBA.
Remegio filed an intra-corporate casedocketed as SEC Case No. 86-2010-Cbefore the RTC for the
inspection of corporate books. He sought the recognition of his right to inspect the corporate books of
SPCBA as its member, alleging that his resignation letter covered his trusteeship and treasurership
positions only and not his membership in SPCBA.
After the trial, the RTC agreed with Remegio. SPCBA then went to the CA seeking the reversal of the
decision. SPCBA filed a "notice of appeal. For taking the wrong mode, the CA dismissed the appeal and
directed the RTC to issue a writ of execution.
Aggrieved, SPCBA came to the Supreme Court but denied the petition for its failure to show any
reversible error on the part of the CA. The Court likewise denied with finality its motion for reconsideration
in the February 29, 2012 minute resolution.
Earlier, on February 16, 2012, SPCBA's Board of Trustees held a joint meeting. Through its Board
Resolution, issued on the same date, it resolved to "affirm and/or confirm the previous removal of Mr.
Remigio A. Ching, not only as Trustee and Treasurer, but also as a Member of the Corporation, primarily
due to the payment unto said Mr. Remegio A. Ching, the buy out of sum of Twenty Million Pesos, for all
his rights as Trustee, Treasurer and Member of the Corporation."
On April 4, 2012, the judgment of the Court, which effectively affirmed the conclusions of the RTC in SEC
Case No. 86-2010-C, became final and executory per the Entry of Judgment issued by the Deputy Clerk
of the Court.
PROCEDURE:
On April 26, 2012, SPCBA filed a complaint, docketed as SEC Case No. 92-2012-C, against Remegio.
SPCBA sought to prevent Remegio from filing a nuisance and/or harassment suits against it and for the
RTC to affirm/confirm his removal as a member on the basis of the February 16, 2012 Board Resolution.
On the matter of his membership in SPCBA, Remegio countered that res judicata had already set in
following the decision rendered by the RTC in Case No. 86-2010-C. Accordingly, he espoused the theory
that the issue on his membership could not be made an issue again in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C.
The RTC agreed with Remegio on this point. Thus, in its December 11, 2012 Omnibus Order, the RTC
ruled that the principle of res judicata already barred SPCBA from claiming that he was not a member of
SPCBA.

In a petition for certiorari filed by SPCBA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA reversed the RTC
order. In ruling for SPCBA, the CA reasoned out that there was a marked difference in the causes of
action between SEC Case No. 92-2012-C and SEC Case No. 86-2010-C, which rendered the principle of
res judicata inapplicable. It stated that SPCBA introduced in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C a fact which did
not exist at the time the prior case was filed and terminated; that the issuance of the February 16, 2012
Board Resolution declaring the expulsion of Remegio from SPCBA arose only after the filing of Case No.
86-2010-C; and that the said fact did not occur and could not have occurred in the first case. This gave
SPCBA a new cause of action under Section 91 of the Corporation Code pertaining to termination of
membership or expulsion of a member from a non-stock corporation. Following the rule that res judicata
only applied to facts and conditions as they existed at the time judgment was rendered and to the legal
rights and relations of the parties fixed by the facts so determined, the CA granted SPCBA's prayer to
deny Remegio his affirmative defense of res judicata.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not affirming the application by the RTC in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C of
the principle of res judicata.
DECISION:
The Court finds that res judicata exists and should bar SPCBA from raising the question of Remegio's
membership in SEC Case No. 92-2012-C.
REASONING:
For issue preclusion to be applicable, (1) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the
issue or fact actually determined in a former suit, (2) the party to be precluded must be party to or was in
privity with a party to the former proceeding; (3) there was final judgment on the merits in the former
proceedings, and (4) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party against whom the
principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior proceedings. 37
The Court agrees with petitioner Remegio that the issue on his membership was fully determined or
disposed of by the RTC in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C, in a decision which became fmal and executory on
April 4, 2012. The parties are the same and the issues are essentially the same.
The issue of Remegio's membership was indispensable in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C because his prayer
to be permitted to inspect the books of SPCBA depended on its resolution.
It cannot be said either that SPCBA was not given a fair opportunity to litigate the issues in SEC Case No.
86-2010-C. Such opportunity is essential before res judicata in the concept of issue preclusion can be
considered pursuant to the requirements of due process.
There can be no question that all the opportunities were available to SPCBA, but for some reasons not
attributable to Remegio or the courts, it did not avail of these opportunities. If at all, the failure to take the
issue of his membership further in the echelons of judicial hierarchy was the fault of SPCBA and no one
else.
In sum, the confluence of all the elements of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment or
issue preclusion bars SPCBA from relitigating the same issue of Remegio's membership.
SPCBA's contention springs from desperation. A perusal of the board resolution reveals that it merely
echoed the events that led to the earlier illegal termination of his membership in SPCBA. It was nothing
new as the resolution merely affirmed or confirmed their claim that Remegio was already removed as a
member, something that the RTC in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C rejected. No new basis for the removal of
Remegio was forwarded in that resolution. Thus, it cannot be said that SPCBA had a new cause of action
that was not adjudged upon in SEC Case No. 86-2010-C. There was simply no supervening event.
RULE OF THE CASE:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the January 27, 2014 Decision and the June 27,
2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE..

ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR., Petitioner, vs. SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T. TORRESAGUINALDO, Respondents. RULE 65 CERTIORARI
FACTS:
Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Manila, a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres) for falsification of public
document. They alleged that titles to their properties, were transferred without their knowledge and
consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale. Torres denied the allegations of forgery
and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by Deed of Absolute Sale.
PROCEDURE:
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification of
public document against Torres, which was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC),
Branch 8, on October 3, 2001. Torres moved for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the
Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of
the information. The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied. A Motion to Withdraw
Information was filed which the MTC granted on June 11, 2003. It should be noted that petitioner has not
been arraigned. Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which was
granted in the assailed decision dated March 22, 2004. Torres motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reversing the investigating
prosecutors findings on the existence of probable cause.
DECISION: No.
RULING:
The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when what was
assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale. It ruled that the defenses raised by Torres should not have been
considered during the preliminary investigation but should be threshed out only during trial. Only the
evidence presented by the complainant should be considered in determining probable cause or the lack
thereof. The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI report and
disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of petitioner. It is well to note that
Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the submission of the
complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents,
but also directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating
prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the
evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Thus, in
determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the
complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting evidence presented by the
defense. While the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation and the admissibility of the
testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a
proper consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is
warranted to determine the persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination
must be based on the totality of evidence presented by both parties. Justice Secretary did not abuse his
discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused in determining
the existence or the lack of probable cause. There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists.
The complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect petitioner with the crime of falsification. While
the NBI report showed that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was
the author thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the alleged
forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of such facts and
circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical nexus between the acts and
omissions and the accused. RULE OF THE CASE The petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated March 22, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Secretary of
Justice dated November 12, 2002 is REINSTATED.

JONAS AONUEVOvs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA

[G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004]
Facts:
An accident occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine in the evening, at the intersection of Boni
Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on
his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number
PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan.
Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred.
Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in
1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.
Procedure:

Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
Aonuevo before the RTC judgment is against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo
Villagarcia had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Mandaluyong latter is acquitted
Both appealed to the Court of Appeals - the Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC
Decision in toto
Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo filed their respective petitions for review with this Court
denied (hence this petition)
Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the RTC

Issues:
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance?
Decisions:
No. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by
ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is
established between such failure and the injury sustained.
Reasoning:
There is the fact which we consider as proven, that Aonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and
such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would have imperiled
anyone unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into the intersection, whether they
are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have
avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially considering that
Aonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming
that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such
lapse on the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to
make the left turn.This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a
traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages.

The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident may have
sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal
consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it is but
indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would then
be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not determinative of
Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon

the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular circumstances
reasonably require. To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the
violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracias behavior in relation to the
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a matter of law
but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part in producing a
collision with a motorist. The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by statute or
ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist
as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision; however, the absence of
such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated by street
lights, if substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, if the motorist saw the
bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon, or if the motorist would have been unable to see the
bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights. A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes
may support a finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such
condition was a contributing cause of the accident.
Rule of the Case:
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 209135 July 1, 2014

Augusto L. Sy Juco Jr., petitioner
vs.
Sec. Florencio Abad, Department of Budget & Management and Senate Pres.
Hon. Franklin Drilon, respondents
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the
DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive.
Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said
funds will then be re-allotted to other priority projects.
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made
by Congress in the GAA.
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech
in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had
been allotted an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. It turns out that some nonExecutive projects were also funded.
This prompted several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP.
PROCEDURAL ASPECT:
Nine (9) consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the
issuances relating to the DAP were filed within days of each other from October to
November 2013.
Respondents filed their Consolidated Comment through the OSG.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional?
DECISION:
No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional.
REASONING:
It is true that the President and the heads of the other branches of the government
are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus,
no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of
funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects
were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is
concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA
because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
RULE OF THE CASE:
Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and
DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration
Program and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of
separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and
the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year and without complying
with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the
appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any

appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.

Estrada vs sandiganbayan
Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted for the crime of Plunder,wishes to impress upon the Court that the
assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid
from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it
suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mensrea in crimes already punishable under The Revised
Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of
the case is the alleged vagueness of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, this terms are:
combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the
validity of the mentioned law.
Procedure:
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate
Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659;
(b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e)
and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563,
for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558.
On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558
On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash.
On 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition.
On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
Petitioner filed a case in Supreme Court assailing the constitutionality of Plunder Law
SupremeCourt dismissed the case.
Issue:
Whether Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague.
Decision:
No. Plunder Law is not vague therefore its constitutional.
Reasoning:
The terms combination and series does not constitute vagueness. The petitioners contention that it would
not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what the law
seeks to penalize cannot be plausibly argued. Void-for-vagueness doctrine is manifestly
misplaced under the petitioners reliance since ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on
its face, wherein clarification by a saving clause or construction cannot be invoked. Said doctrine may not
invoke in this case since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity. Vagueness doctrine merely requires
a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude. On the other hand, over breadth doctrine decrees that governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms. Doctrine of strict scrutiny holds that a facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. Furthermore, in
the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech. A facial challenge to
legislative acts is the most difficult challenge to mount success fully since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists. Doctrines mentioned are analytical tools developed for facial
challenge of a statute in free speech cases. With respect to such statue, the established rule is that one
to who application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional. On its face invalidation of statues results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally

protected. It is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law is more imagined than real. The
crime of plunder as a malum in se is deemed to have been resolve in the Congress decision to include it
among the heinous crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
Ruling of the case:
The Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. First Metro Investment Corporation
G.R. No 132390
May 21, 2004
FACTS:
On August 25, 1989, FMIC, through its Executive Vice President Antionio Ong, opened a current account
and deposited a check of P100 million with BPI FB San Francisco del Monte Branch (BPI FB).
Through Jaime Sebastian, Branch Manager of BPI FB SFdM, BPI FB entered into an agreement with
FMIC guaranteeing the payment of P14,667,687.01 (representing 17% per annum interest of P100 million
deposited by FMIC). In turn, FMIC, assured BPI FB that it will maintain its P100 million deposit for one
year provided that the interest of 17% per annum is paid in advance. Subsequently, BPI FB paid FMIC
the P14,667,687.01 upon clearance of the latters check deposit.
However, on August 29, 1989, BPI FB transferred P80 million from FMICs current account to the savings
account of Tevesteco Arrastre-Stevedoring, Inc. (Tevesteco) on the basis of an Authority to Debit signed
by Ong and Ma. Theresa David, FMICs Senior Manager.
FMIC denied having authorized the transfer of its funds & claimed that the signatures of Ong and David
were falsified. In order to immediately recover its deposit, FMIC issued on September 12, 1989 a BPI FB
check for P86,057,646.72 payable to itself and drawn on its deposit with BPI FB SFDM branch. But upon
presentation for payment the next day, BPIFB dishonored the check as it was drawn against insufficient
funds (DAIF).
PROCEDURE:
FMIC filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 146, Makati City Civil Case No. 89-5280 against BPI FB.
FMIC likewise caused the filing by the Office of the State Prosecutors of an Information for estafa against
Ong, Sebastian and five others. However, the Information was dismissed on the basis of a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused.
On October 1, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay P80
million with interest at the legal rate from the time the complaint was filed less P14,667,678.01,
P100,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees and the cost.
On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs Decision with the modification that
BPI FB be liable to FMIC for P65,332,321.99 plus interest at 17% per annum from August 29,1989 until
fully restored. Further, the said interest shall itself earn interest at 12% from October 4, 1989 until fully
paid.

ISSUES:
1. Whether FMICs deposit is a demand deposit or a time deposit.
2. WON the earning of the interest from demand deposit should be prohibited per Central Bank
regulations.
3. WON the transaction is invalid due to the alleged overstepping of BPI FBs Branch Manager
when he entered into an agreement with FMICs Executive Vice President.
4. WON FMIC faulted in failing to initially inquire whether the P100 Million deposit and the fixing of
the interest rate were pursuant to BPI FBs internal procedures.
5. WON Court of Appeals faulted in not ordering the consolidation of the instant case with the case
filed by petitioner against Tevesteco.
HELD:
1. The parties did not intend the deposit to be treated as a demand deposit but rather as an interestearning time deposit not withdrawable any time. This is evident from the communications
between Sebastian and Ong. Both agreed that the P100 million deposit was non-withdrawable for
one year upon advance payment of the 17% per annum interest. Clearly, FMICs Investment of
money with BPI FB was intended as a time deposit, earning 17% per annum interest and
remaining intact until its maturity date.

A time deposit is defined as one the payment of which cannot legally be required within such a
specified number of days. In contrast, demand deposits are all those liabilities of the Bangko
Sentral and of other banks which are denominated in Philippine currency and are subject to
payment in legal tender upon demand by the presentation of (depositors) checks.
While FMIC demanded the withdrawal of P86,057,646.72 through the issuance of a check
payable to itself, the same was made as a result of the fraudulent and unauthorized transfer by
petitioner of its P80 million deposit to Tevestecos savings account. Certainly, such was a normal
reaction of a depositor to petitioners failure in its fiduciary duty to treat its account with the
highest degree of care.
Under this circumstance, the withdrawal of deposit by FMIC before the one-year maturity date did
not change the nature of its time deposit to one of demand deposit.
2. No.
Under Central Bank Circular No. 22, Series of 1994, demand deposits shall not be subject to any
interest rate ceiling. This is an open authority to pay interest on demand deposits, such interest
not being subject to any rate ceiling.
Likewise, time deposits are not subject to interest rate ceiling. In fact, the rate ceiling was
abolished and even allowed to float depending on the market conditions. The CBPs Manual of
Regulations provide that Time deposits shall not be subject to any interest rate ceiling (SEC.
1244) and Interest on time deposit may be paid at maturity or upon withdrawal or in advance.
Provided that interest paid in advance shall not exceed the interest for one year (Sec. 1244).
Thus, even assuming that respondents account with petitioner is a demand deposit, it would still
earn interest.
3. The transaction is valid.
It was held in Prudential Bank vs. Court of Appeals, that A bank holding out its officers and agent
as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds they may thus be enabled to
perpetrate in the apparent scope of their employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk its
responsibility for such frauds xxx Accordingly, a banking corporation is liable to innocent third
persons where the representation is made xxx by an agent acting within the general scope of his
authority, even though (he) is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to perpetrate a fraud
upon his principal or some other person for his own ultimate benefit.
Also, Corporate transactions would speedily come to a standstill were every person dealing with
a corporation held duty-bound to disbelieve every act of its responsible officers, no matter how
regular they should appear on their face (Francisco vs. Government Service Insurance System).
In passing upon the liability of a corporation in cases of this kind it is always well to keep in mind
the situation as it presents itself to the third party with whom the contract is made. Naturally he
can have little or no information as to what occurs in corporate meetings; and he must necessarily
rely upon the external manifestations of corporate consent. The integrity of commercial
transactions can only be maintained by holding the corporation strictly to the liability fixed upon it
by its agents in accordance with law xxx it is familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly
permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent
authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the
corporation will xxx be stopped from denying his authority; xxx if the corporation permits, this
means the same as if the thing is permitted by the directing power of the corporation. (Ramirez
vs. Orientalist Co)
4. No
What transpires in the corporate board room is entirely an internal matter. Hence, petitioner may
not impute negligence on the part of respondents representative in failing to find out the scope of
authority of petitioners Branch Manager. Indeed, the public has the right to rely on the trust
worthiness of bank managers and their acts. Obviously, confidence in the banking system is vital
in the economic life of our society.
Significantly, the transaction was actually acknowledged and ratified by petitioner when it paid
respondent in advance the interest for one year. Thus, petitioner is stopped from denying that it
authorized its Branch Manager to enter into an agreement with respondents Executive Vice
President concerning the deposit with the corresponding 17% interest per annum.

Anent the award of interest, the rule is well settled that when the obligation is breached, and it
consists in the payment of a sum of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing, as in this case. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. At any rate, courts may indeed grant the relief warranted
by the allegations and proof even if no such specific relief is prayed for if only concludes a
complete and thorough resolution of the issues involved.
5. No.
Suffice it to state that as found by both the trial court and the Appellate Court, petitioners transfer
of respondents P80 Million to Tevesteco was unauthorized and tainted with fraud. At this point,
we must emphasize that this Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, we uphold the finding of both lower
courts that petitioner failed to exercise that degree of diligence required by the nature of its
obligations to its depositors. A bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of
pesos. Here, petitioner cannot claim it exercised such a degree of care required of it and must,
therefore, bear the consequence.

RULE OF THE CASE:

The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 4, 1997 and the Resolution dated
January 28, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44986 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

AFFIDAVIT
I, Juana Dela Cruz, of legal age, single and a resident of Tondo, Manila hereby state that:
1. I am an applicant of this Mutual Benefit Association to which my grandfather, Juan Dela Cruz is a
member
2. My grandfather is a retired AFP General, evidenced by Retirement Order Certificate No. 12345
(Retirement Order Certificate is hereby attached)
3. Maria Corazon is the daughter of Juan Dela Cruz as evidence by NSO Birth Certificate No. 56776
(NSo Birth Certificate is hereby attached)
4. I am the daughter of Maria Corazon as evidenced by NSO Birth Certificate No. 7653 (NSO Birth
Certificate is hereby attached)
5. I am executing this affidavit to prove that I am a relative within the 2 nd degree of consanguinity of Juan
Dela Cruz.
6. I am executing this affidavit for the application of the said Mutual Benefit Associaton and for all other
legal purpose it may serve.
__________________________
Juana Dela Cruz
JURAT
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before me on the 1st day of December 2015 at the city of Manila with
ID no. 567210
Doc No. ___
Page No. ___
__________________
Book No. ___
Notary Public
Series of 2015

DEMAND CRIMINAL
ATTY. MARVEEN JAYRALD M. RODRIGUEZ
Attorney-at-law
2219 Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila
Tel. No. 658668, Fax: 9558556
E-mail: marveenrodriguez@gmail.com
29 February 2016
TRISTAN ZAPATA
124 RIZAL AVE., MANILA

Dear. Mr. Zapata,

My client, Victor Edrosolo, has sought information from me, for immediate legal action, the matter
of the unremitted amount of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(php2, 333,000).
According to my client, you were his agent in the Philippines since April 2000. He entrusted you
the amount of 2, 333,000 pesos. As such, the money given was used to construct a convenience store
sometime in January 2009 until you transferred its ownership to our client in May 2014.
During those years, you are instructed to remit to our client the earnings of the store. However,
after you have transferred its ownership to my client, he found out that you had not remitted these
amounts by claiming that the convenience store had little earnings.
An audit has been made of the clinic from 2009 2014. From this audit, you did not remit the total
amount of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (php2, 333,000).
Multiple demands have been sent to you since June 2014, but none were complied. In view
thereof, this serves as a FINAL DEMAND and is hereby made on you to PAY the amount ofTWO
MILLION THREE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (php2, 333,000) within Thirty (30)
days from your receipt of this letter, otherwise, we will be constrained to file against you the
corresponding case(s), including the filing of a criminal case for ESTAFA, to protect the interest of our
client.

Very truly yours,

ATTY. MARVEEN JAYRALD M. RODRIGUEZ

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
MANILA CITY

JUAN DELA CRUZ,

COMPLAINANT

IS. No.

-versus-

FOR: Robbery with violence

against or intimidation
of persons

ROMY DIAZ, BOMBER MORAN,

RESPONDENT
x----------------------------x
COMPLAINT - AFFIDAVIT
I, Juan Dela Cruz, of legal age, Filipino, with residence address #21 Galicia Street, Sampaloc Manila,
after having been sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state THAT:
1. Sometime on 25th of February 2016, around 11:30 PM, I was passing by P. Noval Street,
Sampaloc Manila on my way to my apartment.
2. While I was passing by the said street I was holding a bag on my rightarm and a book on the left
arm, walking in a moderate pace towards Espana Boulevard.
3. That at P.Noval Street, before I cross Espana Boulevard, two men riding a motorcycle stopped in
front of me. The man riding at the back, holding a knife which was pointed at me said, akin na
ang bag mo kung ayaw mong may mangyaring masama sayo.
4. Because of terrible fear that the man would stab me if I did not give my bag to him, I handed him
my bag containing the following:.
a. A black wallet with Identification cards, ATM card and a credit card inside together with a
cash worth Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
b. A cell phone (Iphone6)
c.

School materials such as a blue notebook and a pen.

5. That after the man took my bag, I screamed loudly the words magnanakaw! Magnanakaw!
Habulin niyo!
6. That maybe because of twist of luck, a police car passed by right after the said incident which
immediately chased the two men in motorcycle. They crossed Espana Boulevard and I already
lost sight of them after several seconds.
7. That the two men, as I remembered, were both wearing jackets; the man in front, driving was
wearing a blue jacket and maong pants while the man at the back was wearing a black jacket
with maong pants. The man in front was wearing a helmet while the man at the back was wearing
a black cap.
8. The motorcycle was a red Yamaha motorcycle and instead of a plate number, a
plate with the words for registration was visible from the back.
9. Both men are of normal built, appeared to be kayumanggi or brown skinned and of
height.

average

10. That after a few minutes of standing at that street, a police mobile suddenly appeared saying that
the other policemen in the car which chased the two men inthe motorcycle reported the incident
to them so they went to P.Noval area and found me standing in front of a closed establishment,
almost near Espana Boulevard.
11. That I was shaking when the policemen came to get me. They brought me to the a nearby police
station where I narrated the incident..
12. After about 40 minutes in the police station, there were two policemen, later on identified as PO2
Fernando Poe and PO2 Lito Lapid, who were accompanying two men who appeared to be the
men who grabbed my bag.
13. Later on, I positively identified the two men as those who were in the motorcycle because of the
black cap, the blue and black jackets that they wear respectively.
14. That the shoulder bag that was snatched from me with force and intimidation was with PO2 Poe
already who alleged that he got the same during the apprehension that they did. All the things
inside my bag were recovered in goodcondition.
15. That all these stated herein are true and were stated freely without any force or intimidation done
against me.
16. To attest to the truthfulness of the foregoing, I, Juan Dela Cruz, complainant, attaches my
signature below.

_________________________
Juan Dela Cruz
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, in the city of Manila, this 26nd day of February, 2015.

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
National Capital Judicial Region
Branch 12, Manila

DONALD TAILOR,
Plaintiff,
- versus -

CIVIL CASE NO. 12345

For:
Collection of Sum of Money
Plus Damages

EMPEROR,
Defendant.
x-------------------x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, by counsel, respectfully states:
1.
That Plaintiff DONALD TAILOR is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen, and a resident of
1200 Espaa Boulevard, Sampaloc, Manila;
2.
That Defendant EMPEROR is of legal age, married, Filipino citizen, and a resident of
Malacaang Palace, 1000 Jose P. Laurel, Sr., San Miguel, Manila, where he may be served with
Summons and other court processes;
3.
That plaintiff is a tailor of fine garments by trade and conducts business at his residence
address. He is a highly respected artisan whose garments have been worn by high-ranking public
officials, well-respected individuals, show business personalities throughout the country;
4.
On three (3) occasions prior to October 14, 2013, agents of the defendant contracted the
plaintiff to design, cut and sew his garments. The latter successfully accomplished these tasks to
defendants complete satisfaction on or before the dates they were to be worn;
5.
On October 13, 2013, plaintiff was contracted to create a unique suit of clothes never
before seen,which was to be worn by the defendant during his annual parade down Emperors Way on
Emperors Day. Plaintiff was instructed touse only the finest materials sewn according to the precise
measurements provided by palace officials;
6.
That three (3) days prior to the parade, plaintiff delivered to the palace a newly
constructed suit of garments, including underclothing, knee socks, knickers, a formal shirt with high collar,
which are avant-garde and a fashion statement beyond description. These garments were unique,
constructed from a new material,and which were described as a miracle fabric since these were woven
from a combination of unicorn fur and pig-hair that have been found to be amazingly light in weight;
incredibly smooth to the touch; and spectacularly beautiful to the eye [See attached Exhibits 1 and 1A]. Further, the material will never wrinkle nor stain, tear, or show wear of any kind no matter how much
abuse it sustains. It can be folded many times to fit into the smallest luggage. Finally, it is extremely
simple to accessorize and even change to size to compensate for changes in the wearer;
7.
That after fitting, defendant accepted these garments and agreed to give plaintiff a bonus
apart from the agreed upon fee. In fact, to his delight, defendant exclaimed, Ive never seen anything like
it before!;
8.
That during the parade, an uneducated child with an untrained eye was unable to
appreciate the subtleties of this fabric and remarked that he could not see its true beauty, causing the
Emperor to believe that something was amiss with the suit. Notwithstanding that the rank-and-file in the
Palace praised and complimented the suit, defendant,without any basis whatsoever, took the minors
words as gospel-truth and refused to pay the agreed-upon fee despite plaintiffs several verbal and written
demands.

9.
With plaintiffs delivery and defendants acceptance of these garments, plaintiff has a
sufficient cause of action against defendant due to the latters failure to pay the agreed amount of
P500,000.00 despite due demand contrary to the basic principlestated in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, defendants refusal to comply with his obligation to pay plaintiff the agreed fee, the latter can
enforce payment and claim for damages pursuant to Article 1191 of the same Code. Additionally, under
Article 1235 of the Code, defendant cannot skirt from his obligation simply because the minor could not
appreciate the true beauty of the garments since he has accepted them;
10.
Since defendant refused to pay the fee, plaintiffs reputation has been damaged and that
he has been subjected to humiliation and ridicule for which he is entitled to moral damages of at least
P200,000.00. Moreover, to serve as an example for the public good, plaintiff is entitled to exemplary
damages of at least P200,000.00. Finally, by reason of defendants unjustified refusal to pay plaintiffs
claim, the latter was constrained to engage the services of counsel thereby incurring P70,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial judgment be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff against the defendant ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff as follows:

1.
2.
3.
4.

P500,000.00 as payment for agreed-upon fee of the garments

At least P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages
At least P200,000.00 as exemplary damages
P70,000.00 attorneys fees
Other reliefs just and equitable in premises are likewise prayed for.
Respectfully submitted.
Manila City, 31January 2014.

DONALD TAILOR
Plaintiff

ATTY. RAPHAEL INNO B. PATAJO

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Roxas and Patajo& Associates Law Offices
20th Flr., Ayala Alabang Bldg.
#41 Lantana St., Ayala Alabang
123-4567; 890-1234
IBP No. 04772 / Lifetime
PTR No. 8582433/01-19-07/Q
Roll No. 47553

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

I, DONALD TAILOR, of legal age, Filipino, married,1200 Espaa Boulevard, Sampaloc, Manila, after
being sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state:
1. That I am a tailor by profession whose services have been contracted by agents of the defendant to
create such garments.
2. That I have caused the preparation of this complaint.
3. That I have read the allegations of this complaint and the same are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and based on authentic records.
4. That I hereby certify that the plaintiff has not thereto commence any action or claim pending therein.

5. That should I hereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending I shall
report that fact within 5 days therefrom to the court where the aforesaid Complaint has been filed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I hereunto affix my signature this 31st day of January 2014.

DONALD TAILOR
Affiant

Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
National Capital Judicial Region
Branch 12, Manila

DONALD TAILOR,
Plaintiff,
- versus -

CIVIL CASE NO. 12345

For:
Collection of Sum of Money
Plus Damages

EMPEROR,
Defendant.
x-------------------x
ANSWER
(WITH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM)
Defendant, by counsel, respectfully states:
ADMISSIONSAND DENIALS
For the reasons stated in and subject to defendants Affirmative Allegations and Defenses, Denials and
Compulsory Counterclaims hereinafter set forth, defendant admits the allegations in:
1. Paragraphs 1 and 2, concerning the personal circumstances of the parties;
2.

The matters stated in Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6are also admitted;

3.
Partially admits Paragraph 7 insofar that it alleges that, defendant has accepted the
contracted garments as well as the amount to be paid therefor but subject to the qualifications contained
in his Special and Affirmative Defenses;
4.
Partially admits Paragraph 8 insofar as it alleges that a minor commented that he could
not appreciate the true beauty of the suit but subject to the allegations contained in his Special and
Affirmative Defenses;

5.
6.

Denies Paragraph 9, the truth being that stated in his Special and Affirmative Defenses;
Denies Paragraph 10, for being baseless and unsubstantiated.

SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

7. Defendant is not obliged to pay plaintiff pursuant to Articles 1348 and 1409 of the Civil Code since the
miracle fabric allegedly made out of unicorn hair cannot exist given that a unicorn is a mythical animal
and that it is an object outside the commerce of men;
8. Defendant, as head of the State, may not be sued without his consent by reason of Sovereign Immunity
pursuant to Article 16, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution;

COUNTERCLAIM

By way of COUNTERCLAIM, defendant repleads that:

9. Contrary to the plaintiffs claim that his reputation was tarnished as a result of the minors comment, he
has contracted several orders to the point that his shop is currently backlogged with orders. On the other
hand, defendant became subjected to scorn, ridicule, embarrassment and humiliation during the parade

when the child commented that he could not see the true beauty of the garment in publicfor which he is
entitled to moral damages of at least P100,000.00.
10. Contrary to plaintiffs claim that he delivered the garments on time despite having to do additional
adjustments on the garments to suit the defendants preferred color and prescribed size, that they were
delivered only on the day of the parade itself to which this time the altered garments were made of the socalled miracle fabric. Since defendant had nothing better to wear but such garments as he was pressed
for time, he had no choice but to accept the garments despite its irregularities.

11. Likewise, due to the filing of this baseless and unfounded complaint which resulted to the ruin of the
defendants goodwill and reputation, he is entitled to pay exemplary damages of at least P100,000.00.
Finally, by reason of plaintiffs malicious suit against defendant as head of State, the latter was
constrained to engage the services of counsel thereby incurring P150,000.00 as attorneys fees and an
honorarium of P20,000.00 per appearance.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:
1. Dismissing the instant complaint, and
2. On defendants counterclaim:
Ordering the plaintiff to pay:
1. P100,000.00 for moral damages
2. P100,000.00 for exemplary damages
3. P150,000.00 for attorneys fee
Defendant pray for such other just and equitable reliefs.
Respectfully submitted,
Manila City, 28th of February 2014

EMPEROR
Defendant
Malacaang Palace, 1000 Jose P. Laurel, Sr., San Miguel,
Manila City, Philippines

ATTY. DINA PANALO

Counsel for Defendant
RCBS Plaza Tower 2, 6819 Ayala Avenue
Makati City, Philippines
Tel. No. 987-6543
Roll No. 14320
IBP No. 909123
PTR No. 456789
Copy furnished:

ATTY. RAPHAEL INNO B. PATAJO

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Roxas and Patajo & Associates Law Offices
20th Flr., Ayala Alabang Bldg.

#41 Lantana St., Ayala Alabang

123-4567; 890-1234

EXPLANATION
(re: service by registered mail)
In compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, counsel respectfully
manifests that service of the foregoing was done by registered mail for lack of manpower.
ATTY. DINA PANALO

Areglo&Asunto Law Office

1234 Emerald Road, OrtigasCneter, Pasig City
LEGAL OPINION

29 February 2016
Ms.KrizzyAquinyo
5678 Sandalwood Lane,
Manila

Dear Ms.Krizzy,
This Legal Opinion seeks to answer your question about validity of your marriage with James
Yep.

The Facts
Per our discussion and the documents you have shown me, the following are the pertinent facts:
You said that you and James Yep were married on January 1, 2014 about 9 in the morning in the
Cathedral at Baguio City. However you came to know that pastor Juan Dela Cruz who solemnized your
marriage was in fact a holder of an expired license to solemnize marriages. .
Thus the question on whether your marriage can be nullified based on such ground.

The Applicable Law

Under the Family Code, Article The formal Requisites of marriage are:
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer
2. X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
3. X xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
It is also Provided under the Family Code, Article 4, The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio
Now, based on the foregoing provision your marriage with James Yap is considered void or its did exist
from the beginning since the pastor that solemnized your marriage have no authority to do so because of
an expired license.

You may initiate an action for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage by filing it before the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio.
I appreciate the opportunity to advise you regarding this matter. Please let me know if you wish to discuss
any of these issues further. Thank You
Yours faithfully,
Atty. M. Areglado
(sdg.)