Militante vs.

National Labor Relations Commission

Facts:
The Golden Taxi Employees and Workers Union-ANGLO (GTEWU-ANGLO),
represented by Ernesto Serrano, as union president, filed a case against respondent
Golden Taxi Cab Co. (Company) and/or Lorenzo Zamora and Jose Zamora for illegal
lock-out, violation of B.P. Blg. 130, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, unfair labor
practice, and payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. In his decision, Labor Arbiter found that the closure of respondent company
was illegal, and ordered the Company to pay the members of GTEWU-ANGLO
separation pay. Upon appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On January 25, 1993, a complaint was filed by Danilo Q. Militante against
Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena Zamora and Doa Pacing Zamora for illegal lockout,
illegal dismissal, non-remittance of SSS deduction, deduction for burial benefits,
non-payment of premium pay for rest day, thirteenth-month pay and separation
pay. On March 9, 1993, another complaint was filed by Miguel C. Salonga against
respondent Company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena Zamora and Doa Pacing
Zamora, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of retirement benefit. On March 15,
1993, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the grounds
of res judicata and prescription, arguing that the NLRC decision barred these
subsequent complaints.
On March 19, 1993, another complaint was filed against respondent
company, Lorenzo Zamora, Doa Nena Zamora and Doa Pacing Zamora by
Bernardino O. Tejada again for illegal lockout, illegal deductions of SSS and burial
benefits, illegal dismissal, non-payment of separation pay, holiday pay and
thirteenth-month pay, and payment of moral damages and attorneys fees.
On April 28, 1993, Labor Arbiter issued an order dismissing the three
consolidated cases on the ground of bar by prior judgment. Upon appeal NLRC
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Petitioners appealed to
the Supreme Court insisting that they, being members of the rival union PACIWUTUCP, were not parties in the first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO.

Issue:
Whether or not the complaints filed by members of the rival union PACIWUTUCP were barred by prior judgment on the complaint filed members of GTEWUANGLO which is the exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of
respondent.

Held:
Yes. Inasmuch as GTEWU-ANGLO was certified as the exclusive bargaining
agent in the consent election, petitioners cannot now claim that they were not
parties in the first case filed by GTEWU-ANGLO, which represented not only PACIWUTUCP but also GTEWU-ANGLO. Hence, all the requisites of res judicata being
present, said principle should be made to apply, thus barring any subsequent action
such as the consolidated cases subject of this petition.

The effect of such a certification brought about the legal mandate that
henceforth, complainant Union shall be the exclusive representative (Art. 255,
Labor Code) of all the rank and file employees of respondent company not only for
the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement on terms and
conditions of employment but also in the matter of rights, benefits and of the said
represented workers.

Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. vs. Pepito

Facts:
Sometime in 1992, the National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed with the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election, alleging that
its members, which included private respondents Prisco Pepito, et al., were regular
employees of petitioner Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. (SSI). Finding that the NFL
members were rank-and-file employees of SSI, the Med-Arbiter issued an order
directing that a certification election be held.
However, Undersecretary Laguesma reversed the Med-Arbiters Order and ruled
that there was a valid subcontracting agreement between SSI and its
subcontractors, and that no employer-employee relationship existed between SSI
and private respondents, since the latter were the employees of the subcontractors.
In 1993, several cases for illegal dismissal were filed by private respondents
against SSI and its President, Vicente Sandoval. On December 27, 1996, the Labor
Arbiter found that private respondents were illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between SSI and private
respondents, reasoning that said issue has been laid to rest in the resolution of
Undersecretary Laguesma in the certification election case.

Issue:
Whether or not a decision in a certification election case regarding the
existence of an employer-employee relationship does not foreclose all further
disputes between the parties as to the existence or non-existence of such
relationship.

Held:
No. The decision in a certification election case, by the very nature of such
proceeding, is not such as to foreclose all further dispute as to the existence, or
non-existence of an employer-employee relationship between SSI and private
respondents herein.
The action or proceedings in which is issued the prior Judgment that would
operate in bar of a subsequent action between the same parties for the same
cause, be adversarial, or contentious, one having opposing parties; (is) contested,
as distinguished from an ex parte hearing or proceeding of which the party seeking
relief has given legal notice to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity
to contest it, and a certification case is not such a proceeding.
A certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense in which this term is
commonly understood, but a mere investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding
character, in which the investigating agency plays the part of a disinterested
investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of the employees as to the
matter of their representation.

Central Negros Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Secretary of DOLE

Facts:
On August 15, 1987, Central Negros Electric Cooperative (CENECO) entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with CENECO Union of Rational Employees
(CURE), a labor union representing its rank-and-file employees. On December
28,1989, CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
On January 18, 1990, CENECO denied CUREs request on the ground that, under
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union. Prior to
the submission of the proposal for CBA renegotiation, CURE members, in a general
assembly approved Resolution No. 35 whereby it was agreed that all union
members shall withdraw, aw, retract, or recall the union members membership
from CENECO in order to avail (of) the full benefits under the existing CBA entered
into by and between CENECO and CURE, and the supposed benefits that our union
may avail (of) under the renewed CBA." However, the withdrawal from membership
was denied by CENECO,
By reason of CENECOs refusal to renegotiate a new CBA, CURE filed a
petition for direct recognition or for certification election.
CENECO filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there are legal
constraints to the filing of the certification election, citing the ruling laid down by
the Supreme Court in Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A
Young, (BATANGAS case) to the effect that employees who at the same time are
members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions for
purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain
with himself or his coowners.

Issue:
Whether or not the employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership
from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement.

Held:
The argument of CENECO that the withdrawal was merely to subvert the
ruling of this Court in the BATANGAS case is without merit. The case referred to
merely declared that employees who are at the same time members of the
cooperative cannot join labor unions for purposes of collective bargaining. However,
nowhere in said case is it stated that member-employees are prohibited from
withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.
The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why
their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the
resignation of the member-employees is an expression of their preference for union
membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the
State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective

bargaining mandates that the employees right to form and join unions for purposes
of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.
Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a
right to vote during the annual meeting becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis-avis the primordial and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a
union of his choice.
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. Ferrer-Calleja

Facts:
Petitioner Union, formerly registered as the San Miguel Corporation Sales
Force Union Calasiao Beer Region-IBM Local No. 56, a local union of Ilaw at Buklod
ng Manggagawa (IBM), which is a national union, requested San Miguel Corporation
for voluntary recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the covered employees which consist of the monthly-and daily-paid employees of
the Calasiao Sales Office, now Dagupan Sales Office. As the territorial coverage of
the Calasiao Beer Region embraces the regional sales office and the six (6) sales
offices in Calasiao, Carmen, Alaminos, Tarlac, Cabanatuan and San Isidro, SMC
denied the unions request and instead, suggested that it avail of a certification
election. SMC filed a petition for certification election among the sales personnel of
the Region only, excluding the daily-paid and monthly-paid employees, but including
the sales offices of the entire beer region.
The Union filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the petition for certification
election was premature as it did not ask SMC to bargain collectively with it. The
Med-Arbiter issued an order for the conduct of certification election among the sales
force personnel of the SMC-North Central Luzon Beer Region.
Petitioner appealed the order to the BLR which denied the appeal for lack of
merit. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the BLR gravely abused
its discretion in ordering the holding of a certification election. Parenthetically, the
certification election was actually conducted resulting in NO UNION as the winner.

Issue:
Whether or not SMCs request for certification election is proper.
Held:
Yes. Ordinarily, in an unorganized establishment like the SMC Calasiao Beer
Region, it is the union that files a petition for a certification election if there is no
certified bargaining agent for the workers in the establishment. If a union asks the
employer to voluntarily recognize it as the bargaining agent of the employees, as
the petitioner did, it in effect asks the employer to certify it as the bargaining
representative of the employeesa certification which the employer has no
authority to give, for it is the employees prerogative (not the employers) to
determine whether they want a union to represent them, and, if so, which one it
should be.
The petitioners request for voluntary recognition as the bargaining
representative of the employees was in effect a request to bargain collectively, or
the first step in that direction, hence, the employers request for a certification
election was in accordance with Article 258 of the Labor Code, and the public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in granting the request.

Algire vs. De Mesa

Facts:
In the pre-election conference, it was agreed that the election by secret ballot be
conducted between Algire and de Mesa. The results of the election were as follows:
Algire-133 votes, De Mesa-133 votes, and spoiled-6 votes.
Algire filed s a protest before the DOLEs Med-Arbitration unit, to the effect that one
of the ballots wherein one voter placed two checks inside the box opposite the
phrase Lino Algire and his officers, hereinafter referred to as the questioned
ballot, should not have been declared spoiled, as the same was a valid vote in their
favor.
During the scheduled hearing thereof, both parties agreed to open the envelope
containing the spoiled ballots and it was found out that, indeed, one ballot
contained two (2) checks in the box opposite petitioner Algires name and his
officers.
Med-arbiter issued an Order declaring the questioned ballot valid, thereby counting
the same in Algires favor and accordingly certified petitioners group as the unions
elected officers.
De Mesa appealed from the decision of the med-arbiter to the Secretary of Labor
which granted the appeal and reversed the decision of med-arbiter. In its stead, it
entered a new one ordering the calling of another election of officers of the
Universal Robina Textile Monthly Salaried Employees Union (URTMSEU).

Issue:
Whether or not the protest filed by Algire regarding the questioned ballot
declared as spoiled is proper.

Held:
No. It is unmistakable that the election held was a consent election and not a
certification election. It was an agreed one, the purpose being merely to determine
the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate collective
bargaining unit. It is a separate and distinct process and has nothing to do with the
import and effort of a certification election.
The ruling of DOLEs representative in that election that the questioned ballot
is spoiled is not based on any legal provision or rule justifying or requiring such
action by such officer but simply in pursuance of the intent of the parties, expressed
in the written instructions contained in the ballot, which is to prohibit unauthorized
markings thereon other than a check or a cross, obviously intended to identify the
votes in order to preserve the sanctity of the ballot, which is in fact the objective of
the contending parties.
If indeed petitioners group had any opposition to the representation officers
ruling that the questioned ballot was spoiled, it should have done so seasonably
during the canvass of votes. Its failure or inaction to assail such ballots validity
shall be deemed a waiver of any defect or irregularity arising from said election.

Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions vs. Noriel

Facts:
Petitioner Confederation of Labor Unions (CCLU) was one of the four unions wanting
to be certified as the collective bargaining representative of the employees in the
Redson Textile Manufacturing Corporation Its co-petitioner, the Redson Employees
and Laborers Association, is a CCLU local in the said corporation.
The other unions aspiring to become the collective bargaining representative were
the National Union of Garments Textile and General Workers of the Philippines
(GATCORD), the National Trade Union (NATU) and the Associated Labor Unions
(ALU).
A certification election was held in the premises of the corporation. Out of the 831
votes cast, CCLU garnered 356 votes; ALU, 338 votes; NATU, 82 votes and
GATCORD, 42 votes. Eight votes were spoiled and five votes were challenged or
segregated. As no union obtained a majority vote, CCLU and ALU, agreed in a preelection conference that a run-off election would be held.
Election supervisors arrived at the Redson Textile compound but they were not
allowed by the security guard to enter the company. They decided to hold the
certification election outside the premises of the company in a small store outside
of the annex building .They used as ballot box an improvised carton box. The
union representatives did not object to the improvised polling place and ballot box.
The ALU representative, Taneo, executed a written protest alleging irregularities in
the election. Taneo prayed that the votes should not be counted, that another day
be scheduled for the continuation of the election and that the company be ordered
to allow its workers to vote.
The votes cast were canvassed. Of the 692 votes cast, ALU got 366 votes as against
CCLUs 313 votes, or a margin of 53 votes. There were 1,010 voters. Because ALU
won, Taneo, withdrew his protest by writing on the minutes of the proceeding that
his protest or manifestation was withdrawn before the close of the proceedings.
On the following day, CCLU through its representative, Fresnoza, filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations a protest wherein he prayed that the November 6
certification election as well as the continuation of the election on November 7 be
annulled.
Noriel, Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed CCLUs protest
for lack of merit. He observed that CCLU failed to file a protest either before or
during the election proceeding and, therefore, pursuant to section 3, Rule VI, Book
V of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, CCLU is deemed to have
waived its right to protest.
Noriel denied CCLUs motion for reconsideration and certified ALU as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in Redson Textile Manufacturing
Corporation.

Issue:
Whether or not the the certification election conducted is valid.

Held:
No, the certification election is invalid because of certain irregularities such
as that (1) the workers on the night shift (ten p.m. to six a.m.) and some of those in
the afternoon shift were not able to vote, so much so that out of 1,010 voters only
692 voted and about 318 failed to vote; (2) the secrecy of the ballot was not
safeguarded; (3) the election supervisors were remiss in their duties and were
apparently intimidated by a union representative and (4) the participating unions
were overzealous in wooing the employees to vote in their favor by resorting to
such tactics as giving free tricycle rides and T-shirts.
The purpose of a certification election is to give the employees true representation
in their collective bargaining with an employer (51 C.J.S. 969). That purpose was
not achieved in the run-off election because many employees or union members
were not, able to vote and the employer, through apathy or deliberate intent, did
not render assistance in the holding of the election.
It should be noted that ALUs written protest (later withdrawn) was based on the
same grounds invoked by CCLU in its protest. That fact alone should have alerted
Noriel to disregard the technicality that CCLUs protest was not filed on time.

National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines vs.

Trajano

Facts:
On June 21, 1982, petitioner National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of
the Philippines (NACUSIP)-TUCP, the certified exclusive bargaining representative of
the rank and file workers of Calinog Refinery Corporation, filed a petition for
deadlock in collective bargaining. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties
agreed to submit the petition for deadlock to compulsory arbitration on.
On July 21, 1982, private respondent Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR-TUCP) filed
with the Regional Office No. VI, DOLE, a petition for certification election among the
rank and file employees of private respondent company, alleging that: (1) about
45% of private respondent companys employees had disaffiliated from petitioner
union and joined private respondent union; (2) no election had been held for the
past 12 months; and (3) while petitioner union had been certified as the sole
collective bargaining agent, for over a year it failed to conclude a collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent company.
The Acting Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election for lack of
merit since the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock. Private
respondent union filed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations which rendered a
decision setting aside the order of the Acting Med-Arbiter. Med-Arbiter issued an
order in giving due course to the petition of private respondent FUR-TUCP and
ordering that an election be held. From the order of Med-Arbiter, petitioner
interposed an appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations.
During the pendency of the appeal, a collective bargaining agreement was entered
and executed by the management of the National Sugar Refineries Co., Inc. and
petitioner union and was subsequently ratified by a majority of the rank and file
employees. On the basis of the concluded CBA, Executive Labor Arbiter issued an
award adopting the submitted agreement as the CBA between the parties.
Respondent Director Trajano rendered a decision ordering the conduct of a
certification election and to respect the collective agreement by the union that shall
prevail in the election.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed during the
pendency of a bargaining deadlock submitted to arbitration or conciliation.

Held:
No. The clear mandate of the Section 3, Book V, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor is that a petition for certification election may be filed at
any time, in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the
rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election in the following cases:
(1) during the existence of a collective bargaining agreement except within
the freedom period;

(2) within one (1) year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final
certification election result; or
(3) during the existence of a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party and which had been submitted to conciliation
or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
The Deadlock Bar Rule simply provides that a petition for certification election
can only be entertained if there is no pending bargaining deadlock submitted to
conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or
lockout. The principal purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers
and the management.
In the case at bar, a bargaining deadlock was already submitted to arbitration
when private respondent FUR-TUCP filed a petition for certification election. The
same petition was dismissed for lack of merit by the Acting Med-Arbiter on the sole
ground that the petition is barred by a pending bargaining deadlock. However,
respondent Director set aside the same order and subsequently affirmed an order
giving due course to the petition for certification election and ordering that an
election be held.
The law demands that the petition for certification election should fail in the
presence of a then pending bargaining deadlock.

Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees- Unified Filipino

Service Workers vs. Laguesma

Facts:
Respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino
Workers after being declared as the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of respondent Capitol Medical Center (CMC), presented economic
proposals for the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). However,
respondent CMC contended that CBA negotiations should be suspended in view of
the Order issued by Med-Arbiter declaring the registration of respondent union as
null and void.
Due to respondent CMCs refusal to bargain collectively, respondent union
filed a notice of strike. After complying with the other legal requirements,
respondent union staged a strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over
the case and issued an order certifying the same to the National Labor Relations
Commission for compulsory arbitration where the said case is still pending.
Petitioner Capitol Medical Center Alliance of Concerned Employees (CMC-ACE)
filed a petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees
of CMC. It alleged in its petition that: 1) 331 out of 400 total rank-and-file employees
of respondent CMC signed a petition to conduct a certification election; and 2) that
the said employees are withdrawing their authorization for the said union to
represent them as they have joined and formed the union CMC-ACE. They also
alleged that a certification election can now be conducted as more that 12 months
have lapsed since the last certification election was held. Moreover, no certification
election was conducted during the 12 months prior to the petition, and no collective
bargaining agreement has as yet been concluded between respondent union and
respondent CMC despite the lapse of 12 months from the time the said union was
voted as the collective bargaining representative.
Respondent union opposed the petition and moved for its dismissal. It alleged
that it was not remiss in asserting its right as the certified bargaining agent for it
continuously demanded the negotiation of a CBA with the hospital despite the
latters avoidance to bargain collectively.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certification election must be granted.

Held:
No. If the law proscribes the conduct of a certification election when there is
a bargaining deadlock submitted to conciliation or arbitration, with more reason
should it not be conducted if, despite attempts to bring an employer to the
negotiation table by the certified bargaining agent, there was no reasonable effort
in good faith on the part of the employer to bargain collectively.
There was proof that the certified bargaining agent, respondent union, had
taken an action to legally coerce the employer to comply with its statutory duty to
bargain collectively, i.e., charging the employer with unfair labor practice and
conducting a strike in protest against the employers refusal to bargain. It is only

just and equitable that the circumstances in this case should be considered as
similar in nature to a bargaining deadlock when no certification election could be
held. This is also to make sure that no floodgates will be opened for the
circumvention of the law by unscrupulous employers to prevent any certified
bargaining agent from negotiating a CBA. Thus, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules should be interpreted liberally so as to include a circumstance,
e.g. where a CBA could not be concluded due to the failure of one party to willingly
perform its duty to bargain collectively.
National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Phils. vs. FerrerCalleja

Facts:
On November 14,1984, private respondent National Federation of Sugar
Workers (NFSW-FGT-KMU) and employer Dacongcogon Sugar and Rice Milling Co.,
Inc. (Dacongcogon) entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) for a term
of three (3) years, which was to expire on November 14, 1987.
When the CBA expired, private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon
negotiated for its renewal. The CBA was extended for another three (3) years with
reservation to negotiate for its amendment, particularly on wage increases, hours of
work, and other terms and conditions of employment.
However, a deadlock in negotiation ensued on the matter of wage increases
and optional retirement. In order to obviate friction and tension, the parties agreed
on a suspension to provide a cooling-off period to give them time to evaluate and
further study their positions. Hence, a Labor Management Council was set up and
convened, with a representative of the Department of Labor and Employment,
acting as chairman, to resolve the issues.
On December 5, 1988, petitioner NACUSIP-TUCP filed a petition for direct
certification or certification election among the rank and file workers of
Dacongcogon. Private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU moved to dismiss the petition on
the ground that there is a deadlock of CBA.
The Med-Arbiter denied the motion to dismiss and directed the conduct of
certification election among the rank and file workers of Dacongcogon. Respondent
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered a resolution reversing the order
of the MedArbiter.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for certification election may be filed after the 60day freedom period.

Held:
No. The clear mandate of Rule V, Section 6, Book V of the Rules Implementing
the Labor Code, as amended by the rules implementing Executive Order No. 111 is
that the petition for certification election filed by the petitioner NACUSIPTUCP should
be dismissed outright, having been filed outside the 60-day freedom period or a
period of more than one (1) year after the CBA expired.

It is a rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining

agreementi.e., an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to
certification elections. It is noteworthy that the Bureau of Labor Relations duly
certified the November 14,1984 collective bargaining agreement. Hence, the
contract bar is applicable.
This rule simply provides that a petition for certification election or a motion
for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of
an existing collective bargaining agreement. Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the
filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement except within the freedom period, as it is called, when the
said agreement is about to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability in
the relationships of the workers and the management by preventing frequent
modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in
good faith and for the stipulated original period.
Anent the petitioner's contention that since the expiration of the CBA in 1987
private respondent NFSW-FGT-KMU and Dacongcogon had not concluded a new
CBA, the Supreme Court stress that it shall be the duty of both parties to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the
existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is
reached by the parties. Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law
still considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have
been validly executed. Hence, the contract bar rule still applies.
Besides, it should be emphasized that Dacongcogon, in its answer stated that
the CBA was extended for another three (3) years and that the deadlock was
submitted to the Labor Management Council.

Associated Labor Union (ALU) vs. Ferrer-Calleja

Facts:
The Associated Labor Unions (ALU) informed GAW Trading, Inc. that majority
of the latters employees have authorized ALU to be their sole and exclusive
bargaining representative, and requested GAW Trading Inc. for a conference for the
execution of an initial Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
GAW Trading Inc. recognized ALU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
for the majority of its employees and for which it set the time for conference and/or
negotiation. ALU in behalf of the majority of the employees of GAW Trading Inc. and
GAW Trading Inc. signed and executed the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
In the meantime, the Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)
together with Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa GAW (NAMGAW) undertook a Strike after
it failed to get the management of GAW Trading Inc. to sit for a conference
respecting its demands, as to which strike GAW Trading Inc. filed a petition for
Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction, and which strike was held as illegal.
GAW Lumad Labor Union (GALLU-PSSLU) Federation filed a Certification
Election petition.
In the meantime, the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed by ALU and
GAW Trading Inc. was duly filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment in
Region VII, Cebu City;
Nevertheless, Med-Arbiter ruled for the holding of a certification election in
all the branches of GAW Trading Inc. in Cebu City.

Issue:
Whether or not contract bar rule applies in this case.

Held:
No. The collective bargaining agreement in question is indeed defective,
hence unproductive of the legal effects attributed to it. The mechanics of collective
bargaining are set in motion only when the following jurisdictional preconditions are
present, namely, (1) possession of the status of majority representation by the
employees representative in accordance with any of the means of selection and/or
designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of majority representation;
and (3) a demand to bargain under Article 251, paragraph (a), of the New Labor
Code. In the present case, the standing of petitioner as an exclusive bargaining
representative is dubious, to say the least. At the time of the supposed recognition,
the employer was obviously aware that there were other unions existing in the unit.
As earlier stated, respondent companys letter is dated May 12, 1986 while the two
other unions, Southern Philippine Federation of Labor (hereafter, SPFL) and
Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU, for short), went on strike earlier on
May 9, 1986. The unusual promptitude in the recognition of petitioner union by
respondent company as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in
GAW Trading, Inc. under the fluid and amorphous circumstances then obtaining, was
decidedly unwarranted and improvident.

An additional infirmity of the collective bargaining agreement involved was

the failure to post the same in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the
establishment at least five days before its ratification. Petitioners rationalization
was that (b)ecause of the real existence of the illegal strike staged by SPFL in all
the stores of GAW Trading, Inc. it had become impossible to comply with the posting
requirement in so far as the realization of its purpose is concerned as there were no
impartial members of the unit who could be apprised of the CBAs contents. This
justification is puerile and unacceptable.
In the first place, the posting of copies of the collective bargaining agreement
is the responsibility of the employer which can easily comply with the requirement
through a mere mechanical act. The fact that there were no impartial members of
the unit is immaterial. The purpose of the requirement is precisely to inform the
employees in the bargaining unit of the contents of said agreement so that they
could intelligently decide whether to accept the same or not. The assembly of the
members of ALU wherein the agreement in question was allegedly explained does
not cure the defect. The contract is intended for all the employees and not only for
the members of the purported representative alone. It may even be said that the
need to inform the non-members of the terms thereof is more exigent and
compelling since, in all likelihood, their contact with the persons who are supposed
to represent them is limited. Moreover, to repeat, there was an apparent and
suspicious hurry in the formulation and finalization of said collective bargaining
accord.
Additionally, the inapplicability of the contract bar rule is further underscored
by the fact that when the disputed agreement was filed before the Labor Regional
Office on May 27, 1986, a petition for certification election had already been filed on
May 19, 1986. Although the petition was not supported by the signatures of thirty
percent (30%) of the workers in the bargaining unit, the same was enough to
initiate said certification election.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Company Employees Union vs. Estrella

Facts:
On June 21, 1973, NLRC certified a three-year collective bargaining
agreement between respondents Associated Labor Union (ALU) and Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company of the Philippines. Said collective bargaining agreement was to be
effective from February 1, 1973 to January 31, 1976.
On February 1, 1974, the aforementioned respondents entered into a
Supplemental Agreement extending the life of the collective bargaining
agreement for one year, making it effective up to January 31, 1977. The extension
was not ratified by the covered employees nor submitted to the Department of
Labor for certification.
Within the sixty-day period prior to the original expiry date of the agreement,
some 233 out of about 400 rank-and-file employees of respondent Company
resigned from respondent ALU. Subsequently, the number of these employees who
resigned from the union was increased to 276 and, by way of letter to the Director
of the Bureau of Labor Relations, they requested for the issuance of a certificate of
registration in favor of petitioner Firestone Tire & Rubber Company Employees
Union (FEU). On January 28, 1976, Registration Permit No. 8571-IP was issued to
petitioner FEU.
On February 10, 1976, ten (10) days after the original expiry date of the
collective bargaining agreement, petitioner FEU filed a petition with the Bureau of
Labor Relations for direct certification or certification election, with the written
consent of 308 employees, or 77% of the 400-man bargaining unit.
Respondent ALU filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for the
cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner FEU, alleging that at the time
of FEUs registration, respondent ALU was the recognized and certified collective
bargaining agent in the unit. Respondent ALU prayed for the dismissal of petition
for certification election on the grounds, among others, that it has a pending
petition for the cancellation of FEUs registration certificate and that there is an
existing collective bargaining agreement, due to expire on January 31, 1977, which
constitutes a valid bar to the holding of a certification election.

Issue:
Whether or not the existing CBA between ALU and the company constitutes a
valid bar to the petition for certification election filed by FEU.

Held:
No. It was held that once the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated
beyond doubt, a certification election is the most expeditious way of determining
which labor organization is to be the exclusive bargaining representative.
It appearing that the extension of the life of the collective bargaining
agreement for a period of one year was not certified by the Bureau of Labor
Relations, it cannot, therefore, also bars the certification election. Only a certified
collective bargaining agreement would serve as a bar to such election.

Corollarily, therefore, petitioners application for registration was not

premature, as it need not have waited for the expiration of the one-year extension,
the agreement having expired on January 31, 1976.
United CMC Textile Workers Union vs. Bureau of Labor Relations
Facts:
Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective
bargaining representative of all rank and file workers of CENTEX since 1956.
Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor organization seeking representation as
the bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of CENTEX.
Petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor against CENTEX and PAFLU
alleging that CENTEX had helped and cooperated in the organization of the Central
Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the organizing members of the PAFLU to
solicit signatures of employees of the company who are members of the
complainant union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the respondent
PAFLU, during company time and inside the company premises.
While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU filed a Petition for Certification
Election among the rank and file workers of CENTEX. Petitioner intervened in the
Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the ULP Case
charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a prejudicial question and
bars the holding of the certification election.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations for
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having failed to effect
conciliation, the Labor Minister assumed jurisdiction. A Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by petitioner alleging that the Labor
Minister had already taken cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA negotiations and
constituted an impediment to the holding of a certification election.
In the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision
directing petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to take effect on
November 1, 1978 up to October 30, 1981 based on the guidelines enumerated
therein, and to furnish the Office of the Minister of Labor with a signed copy of the
renewed agreement.
In the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a
certification election among CENTEX rank and file workers. This was affirmed by
respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union
in the certification election proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial
question to the conduct of the election.

Held:
Yes. Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of
company domination is a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars proceedings
for a certification election, the reason being that the votes of the members of the
dominated union would not be free.

If it were a labor organization objecting to the participation in a certification

election of a company-dominated union, as a result of which a complaint for an
unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter
union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take
place. The reason is that the certification election may lead to the selection of an
employer-dominated or company union as the employees bargaining
representative, and when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in
the unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the
whole election proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.

Progressive Development Corp.-Pizza Hut vs. Laguesma

Facts:
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union)
filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE-NCR in behalf of the rank and
file employees of the Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut).
Petitioner filed a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud,
falsification and misrepresentation in the respondent Unions registration making it
void and invalid.
Petitioner filed a Petition seeking the cancellation of the Unions registration
on the grounds of fraud and falsification. Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with
the Med-Arbiter requesting suspension of proceedings in the certification election
case until after the prejudicial question of the Unions legal personality is
determined in the proceedings for cancellation of registration.
However, in an Order by Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah directed the holding
of a certification election among petitioners rank and file employees.

Issue:
Whether or not the order to conduct a certification election among
petitioners rank and file employees is proper considering that respondent Unions
legal personality was squarely put in issue.

Held:
No. The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized15
establishments, a petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate
labor organization. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization,
particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost,
depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a
legitimate labor organization.
In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioners
prayer that the former look into the legitimacy of the respondent Union by a
sweeping declaration that the union was in the possession of a charter certificate so
that for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a
legitimate labor organization.
The grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance with Article
239 of the Labor Code constitute a grave challenge to the right of respondent Union
to ask for certification election. The Med-Arbiter should have looked into the merits
of the petition for cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification
election. Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents
confer no legitimacy upon a labor organization irregularly recognized, which, at
best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances, the labor
organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights,
particularly the right to ask for certification election in a bargaining unit.

TUP vs. Laguesma

Facts:
Trade Unions of the Philippines-February Six Movement (TUPAS-FSM) filed a
petition for certification election with the DOLE, for the purpose of choosing a
bargaining representative for the rank-and-file employees of Transunion
Corporation-Glassware Division. Petitioner had then secured a Certification that
"Transunion Corporation" has no existing CBA with any labor organization. It
appears, however, that before the filing of said petition, Integrated Labor
Organization (ILO-Phils.) was duly certified by DOLE as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Transunion CorporationGlassware Division. A CBA was then forged between Transunion-Glassware Division
and ILO-Phils. covering the company's rank-and-file employees and was ratified by a
great majority of the rank-and filers. In the meantime, the President of ILO-PHILS
died. An inter-union conflict followed and the subject CBA was filed with DOLE, for
registration purposes, more or less, three (3) months from its execution.
ILO-Phils., intervened in the certification election proceedings initiated by
TUPAS-FSM. It opposed the petition in view of the existing CBA between ILO and the
Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division. It stresses that the petition for
certification election should be entertained only during the freedom period, or sixty
day before the expiration of the CBA. Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the
ground of prematurity. TUPAS-FSM appealed contending: (1) that pursuant to Article
231 of the Labor Code. CBAs shall be file with the Regional Office of the DOLE within
thirty (30) days from the date of signing thereof; (2) that said requirement is
mandatory, although it would not affect the enforceability of the CBA as between
the parties thereto; and (3) since the CBA was filed outside the 30-day period
specified under Article 231 of the Labor Code, the prohibition against certification
election under Article 232 of the same Code should not apply to third parties such
as petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the CBA is valid notwithstanding the fact that it was filed
beyond 30 days from its execution.

Held:
Yes. It appears that the procedural requirement of filing the CBA within 30
days from date of execution under Article 231 was not met. The subject CBA was
executed on November 28, 1989. It was ratified on December 8, 1989, and then
filed with DOLE for registration purposes on March 14, 1990. Be that as it may, the
delay in the filing of the CBA was sufficiently explained, i.e., there was an interunion conflict on who would succeed to the presidency of ILO-PHILS. The CBA was
registered by the DOLE only on May 4, 1990. It would be injudicious to assume that
the said CBA was filed only on April 30, 1990, or five days before its registration, on
the unsupported surmise that it was done to suit the law that enjoins Regional
Offices of Dole to act upon an application for registration of a CBA within five days
from its receipt thereof. In the absence of any substantial evidence that DOLE
officials or personnel, in collusion with private respondent, had antedated the filing
date of the CBA, the presumption on regularity in the performance of official
functions hold.

More importantly, non-compliance with the procedural requirement should

not adversely affect the substantive validity of the CBA between ILO-PHILS and the
Transunion Corporation-Glassware Division covering the company's rank and file
employees. A collective bargaining agreement is more than a contract. It is highly
impressed with public interest for it is an essential instrument to promote industrial
peace. Hence, it bears the blessings not only of the employer and employees
concerned but even the DOLE. To set it aside on technical grounds is not conducive
to the public good.
Davao Integrated Port vs. Abarquez

Facts:
Petitioner Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services (petitioner-company)
and private respondent ATU-TUCP (Union), the exclusive collective bargaining agent
of the rank and file workers of petitioner-company, entered into a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) on October 16, 1985 which, under Sections 1 and 3,
Article VIII thereof, provide for sick leave with pay benefits each year to its
employees who have rendered at least one (1) year of service with the company.
Upon its renewal on April 15, 1989, the provisions for sick leave with pay
benefits were reproduced but the coverage of the said benefits was expanded to
include the "present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this Agreement.
During the effectivity of the CBA of October 16, 1985, all the field workers of
petitioner who are members of the regular labor pool and the present regular extra
labor pool who had rendered at least 750 hours up to 1,500 hours were extended
sick leave with pay benefits. Any unenjoyed portion thereof at the end of the current
year was converted to cash and paid at the end of the said one-year period
pursuant to Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII of the CBA.
The commutation of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits
of the intermittent workers or its conversion to cash was, however, discontinued or
withdrawn when petitioner-company under a new assistant manager stopped the
payment of its cash equivalent on the ground that they are not entitled to the said
benefits under Sections 1 and 3 of the 1989 CBA.

Issue:
Whether or not intermittent workers are covered by the under Sections 1 and
3 of the 1989 CBA.

Held:
Yes. While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the
parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of
law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the
contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the
relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but
impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it
must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts
must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to
the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.

It is thus erroneous for petitioner to isolate Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989
CBA from the other related section on sick leave with pay benefits, specifically
Section 3 thereof, in its attempt to justify the discontinuance or withdrawal of the
privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick
leave benefit to regular intermittent workers. The manner they were deprived of the
privilege previously recognized and extended to them by petitioner-company during
the lifetime of the CBA of October 16, 1985 until three (3) months from its renewal
on April 15, 1989, or a period of three (3) years and nine (9) months, is not only
tainted with arbitrariness but likewise discriminatory in nature. Petitioner-company
is of the mistaken notion that since the privilege of commutation or conversion to
cash of the unenjoyed portion of the sick leave with pay benefits is found in Section
1, Article VIII, only the regular non-intermittent workers and no other can avail of
the said privilege because of the proviso found in the last sentence thereof.
After a careful examination of Section 1 in relation to Section 3, Article VIII of
the 1989 CBA in light of the facts and circumstances attendant in the instant case,
the Supreme Court find and so hold that the last sentence of Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1989 CBA, invoked by petitioner-company does not bar the regular
intermittent workers from the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the
unenjoyed portion of their sick leave with pay benefits, if qualified. For the phrase
"herein sick leave privilege," as used in the last sentence of Section 1, refers to the
privilege of having a fixed 15-day sick leave with pay which, as mandated by
Section 1, only the non-intermittent workers are entitled to. This fixed 15-day sick
leave with pay benefit should be distinguished from the variable number of days of
sick leave, not to exceed 15 days, extended to intermittent workers under Section 3
depending on the number of hours of service rendered to the company, including
overtime pursuant to the schedule provided therein. It is only fair and reasonable for
petitioner-company not to stipulate a fixed 15-day sick leave with pay for its regular
intermittent workers since, as the term "intermittent" implies, there is irregularity in
their work-days. Reasonable and practical interpretation must be placed on
contractual provisions. Interpetatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Such interpretation is to be adopted, that the thing may continue to have efficacy
rather than fail.
The Supreme Court finds the same to be a reasonable and practical
distinction readily discernible in Section 1, in relation to Section 3, Article VIII of the
1989 CBA between the two classes of workers in the company insofar as sick leave
with pay benefits are concerned. Any other distinction would cause discrimination
on the part of intermittent workers contrary to the intention of the parties that
mutually agreed in incorporating the questioned provisions in the 1989 CBA.

E. Razon vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment

Facts:
Petitioner E. Razon, Inc. (ERI) is a corporation organized in 1962 principally to
bid for the right to operate arrastre services in Manila. ERI and the government,
through PPA, executed a management contract covering all the piers in South
Harbor, Manila for a term of five years renewable for another five years. ERI became
Metro Port Services, Inc. (MPSI) in 1978. Upon the expiration of the management
contract in 1978, it was extended to June 30, 1980. The PPA then executed a new
contract with ERI/MPSI for a term of eight (8) years.
Two years before the expiration of the eight-year term, the PPA cancelled the
management contract for alleged violations thereof. The PPA issued Permit No.
104286 for cargo-handling services to Marina Port Services, Inc. (MARINA). The
permit contained the following pertinent paragraph as part of the additional terms
and conditions appended as Annex B to the permit:
7. Labor and personnel of previous operator, except those positions of trust
and confidence,
shall be absorbed by grantee. Labor or employees benefits
provided for under existing CBA shall likewise be honored.
Thus, MARINA began the arrastre services and required all workers of
ERI/MPSI to accomplish individual information sheets. Weeks later, the bulk of the
2,700 employees concerned discovered that they had been hired by MARINA as new
employees effective July 21, 1986. Hence, they clamored for the payment of their
separation pay but both the MARINA and ERI/MPSI refused to be liable therefor.

Issue:
Whether or not MARINA, as successor of MPSI, is liable for the payment of
separation pay under the provisions of CBA executed between MPSI and its workers.

Held:
No. By absorbing ERI/MPSI employees and honoring the terms and conditions
in the collective bargaining agreement between ERI/MPSI and the employees,
MARINA did not assume the responsibility of ERI/MPSI to pay separation pay to its
employees.
MARINA might have been impelled not only by compassion for the employees
but also by their tested skills in hiring them back upon their separation from the
employment of ERI/MPSI. It should be recalled, however, there is no law that
requires the purchaser to absorb the employees of the selling. As such, when
MARINA rehired the ERI/MPSI employees, it had all the right to consider them as new
ones. On the other hand, ERI/MPSI, to whom years of service had been rendered by
its suddenly jobless employees, had the corresponding obligation to grant them
what is theirs under the law and the collective bargaining agreement. After all, a
collective bargaining agreement is the law between the parties.
The situation in this case is completely different from that obtaining
in Filipinas Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, where the petitioner was obligated "not only
to absorb the workers of the dissolved companies but also to include the length of

service earned by the absorbed employees with their former employers as well"
because said case involved a merger of different companies into a single company
as a result of the PPA's integration of stevedoring/arastre services. On the other
hand, in the case at bar, there is no privity of contract between ERI/MPSI and
MARINA so as to make the latter a common or even substitute employer that it
should be burdened with the obligations of the former.
Liberty Flour Mills Employees vs. Liberty Flour Mills

Facts:
Respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) and respondent Liberty
Flour Mills, Inc. entered into a three-year collective bargaining agreement, providing
for a daily wage increase of P2.00 for 1974, Pl.00 for 1975 and another Pl.00 for
1976. The agreement contained a compliance clause which states that The wage
increase in the amounts and during the period above set forth shall, in the event of
any statutory increase of the minimum wage, either as allowance or as basic wage,
during the life of this Agreement, be considered compliance and payment of such
required statutory increase as far as it will go and under no circumstances will it be
cumulative nor duplication to the differential amount involved consequent to such
statutory wage increase.
PLAC filed a complaint against the respondent company for non-payment of
the emergency cost of living allowance under P.D. No. 525. A similar complaint was
filed by the petitioners, who apparently were already veering away from PLAC.

Issue:
Whether or not compliance clause of the CBA is invalid because it constitutes
a waiver by the laborers of future benefits that may be granted them by law.

Held:
No. While the principle is correct, the application is not, for there are no
benefits being waived under the provision. The benefits are already included in the
wage increases. It is the law itself that considers these increases, under the
conditions prescribed in LOI No. 174, as equivalent to, or in lieu of, the emergency
allowance granted by P.D. No. 525.
In fact, the company agreed to grant the emergency allowance even before
the obligation was imposed by the government. What the petitioners claim they are
being made to waive is the additional P50.00 allowance but the truth is that they
are not entitled to this because they are already enjoying the stipulated increases.
There is no waiver of these increases.
Moreover, Section 2 provides that the wage increase shall be considered
payment of any statutory increase of the minimum wage "as far as it will go," which
means that any amount not covered by such wage increase will have to be made
good by the company. In short, the difference between the stipulated wage increase
and the statutory minimum wage will have to be paid by the company
notwithstanding and, indeed, pursuant to the said article. There is no waiver as to
this.

Metrobank Union vs. NLRC

Facts:
On 25 May 1989, the bank entered into a collective bargaining agreement
with the MBTCEU, granting a monthly P900 wage increase effective 01 January
1989, P600 wage increase 01 January 1990, and P200 wage increase effective 01
January 1991. The MBTCEU had also bargained for the inclusion of probationary
employees in the list of employees who would benefit from the first P900 increase
but the bank had adamantly refused to accede thereto. Consequently, only regular
employees as of 01 January 1989 were given the increase to the exclusion of
probationary employees.
Barely a month later, Republic Act 6727, "an act to rationalize wage policy
determination be establishing the mechanism and proper standards thereof, fixing
new wage rates, providing wage incentives for industrial dispersal to the
countryside, and for other purposes," took effect.
Pursuant to the above provisions, the bank gave the P25 increase per day, or
P750 a month, to its probationary employees and to those who had been promoted
to regular or permanent status before 01 July 1989 but whose daily rate was P100
and below. The bank refused to give the same increase to its regular employees
who were receiving more than P100 per day and recipients of the P900 CBA
increase.
Contending that the bank's implementation of Republic Act 6727 resulted a
substantially reduced salary gap, the MBTCEU sought from the bank the correction
of the alleged distortion in pay.

Issue:
Whether or not the benefits under the CBA should be equated with those
granted RA6727.

Held:
Yes. The "intentional quantitative differences" in wage among employees of
the bank has been set by the CBA to about P900 per month as of 01 January 1989.
It is intentional as it has been arrived at through the collective bargaining process to
which the parties are thereby concluded. The Solicitor General has correctly
emphasized that the intention of the parties, whether the benefits under a collective
bargaining agreement should be equated with those granted by law or not, unless
there are compelling reasons otherwise, must prevail and be given effect.
In keeping then with the intendment of the law and the agreement of the
parties themselves, along with the often repeated rule that all doubts in the
interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of
labor, 13 we must approximate an acceptable quantitative difference between and
among the CBA agreed work levels. The Supreme Court is of the view that giving
the employees an across-the-board increase of P750 may not be conducive to the
policy of encouraging "employers to grant wage and allowance increases to their
employees higher than the minimum rates of increases prescribed by statute or
administrative regulation," particularly in this case where both RA 6727 and the CBA

allow a credit for voluntary compliance. As the Supreme Court also pointed out
in Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC: To compel employers simply to add on
legislated increases in salaries or allowances without regard to what is already
being paid, would be to penalize employers who grant their workers more than the
statutorily prescribed minimum rates of increases. Clearly, this would be counterproductive so far as securing the interests of labor is concerned.

SMTFM-UWP vs. NLRC

Facts:
Petitioner Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing United
Workers of the Philippines (SMTFM) was the certified collective bargaining
representative of all regular rank and file employees of private respondent Top Form
Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. At the collective bargaining negotiation held, the
parties agreed to discuss unresolved economic issues. According to the minutes of
the meeting, Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement was discussed. It
appears in said Minutes that Union proposed that any future wage increase given
by the government should be implemented by the company across-the-board or
non-conditional.
On October 15, 1990, the RTWPB-NCR issued Wage Order No. 01 granting an
increase of P17.00 per day in the salary of workers. This was followed by Wage
Order No. 02 dated December 20, 1990 providing for a P12.00 daily increase in
salary.
As expected, the union requested the implementation of said wage orders.
However, they demanded that the increase be on an across-the-board basis. Private
respondent refused to accede to that demand. Instead, it implemented a scheme of
increases purportedly to avoid wage distortion.

Issue:
Whether or not the Minutes of the meeting regarding the negotiation of a CBA
provision forms part of the entire agreement between the parties.

Held:
No, if there was indeed a promise or undertaking on the part of private
respondent to obligate itself to grant an automatic across-the-board wage increase,
petitioner union should have requested or demanded that such "promise or
undertaking" be incorporated in the CBA. After all, petitioner union has the means
under the law to compel private respondent to incorporate this specific economic
proposal in the CBA. It could have invoked Article 252 of the Labor Code defining
"duty to bargain," thus, the duty includes "executing a contract incorporating such
agreements if requested by either party." Petitioner union's assertion that it had
insisted on the incorporation of the same proposal may have a factual basis
considering the allegations in the aforementioned joint affidavit of its members.
However, Article 252 also states that the duty to bargain "does not compel any
party to agree to a proposal or make any concession." Thus, petitioner union may
not validly claim that the proposal embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms
part of the CBA that it finally entered into with private respondent.
Only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied
with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in the
CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its
implementation. Hence, petitioner union's contention that the Minutes of the
collective bargaining negotiation meeting forms part of the entire agreement is
pointless. The Minutes reflects the proceedings and discussions undertaken in the
process of bargaining for worker benefits in the same way that the minutes of court

proceedings show what transpired therein. At the negotiations, it is but natural for
both management and labor to adopt positions or make demands and offer
proposals and counter-proposals. However, nothing is considered final until the
parties have reached an agreement. If indeed private respondent promised to
continue with the practice of granting across-the-board salary increases ordered by
the government, such promise could only be demandable in law if incorporated in
the CBA.