Public Officers Cases

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER
PCGG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

February 23, 2000
Facts:
World Universal Trading & Investment
(WUTIC) was a societal anonema registered in
Panama, but was not registered/ licensed to do
business in the Philippine. It is represented by its
attorney-in-fact, W.M.
Lazaro & associates.
Construction Development Corp. of the Philippines
now known as Philippine National Construction
Corp. (CDCP/PNCC) is a corporation duly organized
& existing under the laws of the Philippines. It was
under Sequestration by the PCGG. July 24, 1987,
PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint
against Rodolfo M. Cuenca for the sequestration of
the PNCC for acquiring in an illegal manner assets
in the Cuenca-owned Corporation. To wit:
CDCP/PNCC, Asia International Hardwood Limited,
Hong Kong based Co., and construction
Development Corporation International Ltd., Hong
Kong, a wholly-owned subsidiary/alter-ego of
CDCP/PNCC.
The case is still pending in
Sandiganbayan. AHL had claims against CDCPI,
amounting to US $2,994,513.65 plus 12% interest
per annum & other costs, and assigned the same to
WUTIC. Eventually WUTIC obtained a favorable
judgment in a Hong Kong court CDCPI. Due to the
closure of CDCPI in Hong Kong, WUTIC filed a case
with RTC against PNCC/CDCP to enforce a foreign
judgment obtained against CDCPI. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of WUTIC. Writ of execution was
issued against CDCP/PNCC.
October 1977, PCGG Commissioner
Herminio Mendoza, a board member of PNCC,
attended a PNCC board meeting & discovered the
writ of execution and notice of garnishment. PCGG
noted that substantial stockholdings/equity in
CDCP/PNCC, CDCPI, AHL & the shareholdings of
Rodolfo Cuenca in CDCP/PNCC were under
sequestration
pending
with
Sandiganbayan.
However, PCGG did not participate in the action
before the trial court to enforce the foreign judgment.
Additionally, PCGG claimed that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint to enforce a
foreign judgment considering that the case involved
a sequestered corporation. It contended that the
Sandiganbayan has original & exclusive jurisdiction
over cases involving sequestered assets.
The
Sandiganbayan motu propio dismissed PCGGs
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the
petition with out motion to dismiss filed by any of the
parties.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul
the judgment of the RTC in a sequestration-related
case. RA 7975 provides that the Sandiganbayan has
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY BAR OPERATIONS
original jurisdiction over all civil & criminal cases filed

pursuant to and in connection with EO nos. 1,2,14
and 14-A or the so called ill-gotten wealth cases.
Since we have ruled that the civil case before the
RTC is considered as arising from, incidental to, or
related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, then the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to annul the decision
of the RTC in such case. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
has original & exclusive jurisdiction not only over
principal causes of action involving recovery of illgotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising
from, incidental to, or related to such cases.
BALUYOT VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

February 9, 2000
Facts:
During a spot audit conducted by a team of
auditors from Philippine National Red Cross
headquarters, a cash shortage of P154, 350.13 was
discovered in the funds of its Bohol chapter. The
chapter administrator, petitioner Baluyot whos held
accountable for the shortage. Affidavit-complaint
before the office of the Ombudsman was filed
charging petitioner of malversation under article 217
if the RPC and upon recommendation of respondent
Militante, Graft Investigation Officer I, an
administrative docket for dishonesty was also
opened against petitioner. Petitioner filed her
counter-affidavit raising principally the defense that
public respondent had no jurisdiction over the
controversy. She argued that the ombudsman had
authority only over government-owned/ controlled
corporation, which the PNRC was not. She states
that the PNRC falls under the International
Federation of Red Cross, a Switzerland-based
organization, & that the power to discipline
employees accused of misconduct, malfeasance of
immortality belongs to the PNRC Secretary General
by virtue of Section G article IX of its by-laws.
Issue:
Whether or not the ombudsman has
jurisdiction over the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC).
Held:
PNRC is a government owned & controlled
corporation, with an original charter under RA no. 95,
as amended. Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions,
and its employees are under the jurisdiction of CSC
and are compulsory members of GSIS. The PNRC
was not impliedly converted to a private
corporation simply because its charter was
amended to vest in it the authority to secure loans,
be exempted from payment of all duties, and taxes
fees & other services & in its benefits and fund
raising drives, and be allotted one lottery draw a
year by the PCSO for the support of its disaster relief
operation in addition to its existing lottery draws for
blood program. Clearly then, Public respondent has
Prepared by the POLITICAL LAW SECTION Chief MARILOU LINDA Assistant Chief CATHY AQUINO Members MAY AQUINO, ERRIZA
BUCU, MARICAR DELA CRUZ, KATHREEN GUNAYON, GRACIELA LEYGO, MARY GRACE MANZANO, RUTCHIE MARANON, and
DINAH MARTINEZ. All Rights Reserved by the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW BAR OPERATIONS 2003.
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jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to section 13,
RA 6770, otherwise known as The ombudsman Act
of 1989, to wit: The ombudsman & his deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporation, & enforce their
administrative, civil, criminal liability in every case
where the evidence warrants in order promoting
efficient service by the government of the people.
DORENTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

January 19, 2000
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be

made to RA no. 6758 & the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Title, and Salary Grades. An
officials grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter
of law which the court must take judicial notice.
Section 444 (d) of the LGC provides that the
municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly
compensation corresponding to salary grade 27 as
prescribed under RA 6758 & the implementing
guidelines issued pursuant thereto. Additionally, both
the 1989 & 1997 versions of the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and salary
grades list the municipal mayor under salary grade
27. Consequently, the cases against petitioner as
municipal mayor for violations of RA no. 3019, as
amended, are within the exclusive jurisdiction to the
Sandiganbayan.
Facts:
The case before the court is a special civil
action for certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the criminal cases against
municipal Mayor Crescente Dorente Jr. of
Sandiganbayan, Zamboanga Del Norte for violations
of RA no. 3019 otherwise known as the anti-graft &
corrupt Practices Act. The trial of the 2 criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun.
May 16, 1995, Congress enacted RA no. 7975
amending Section 4 of PD no. 1606, providing the
original jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.
It was
provided herein that in cases where none of the
principal
accused
are
occupying
positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher or PNP
officers occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial
court, MTC, Metropolitan Trial Court, & MCTC, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdiction as provided by Bp 129.
Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayn a
motion to dismiss or transfer the 2 criminal cases to
the RTC, Sandiganbayan, Zamboanga contending
that RA 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of its
jurisdiction over criminal cases against municipal
mayors for violations of RA no. 3019, as amended,
who receive salary less than that corresponding to
Grade 27, pursuant to Index Occupational Services
prepared by DBM.
OCAMPO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

January 18, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of
NIACOWSULT, Inc., a subsidiary of the National
Irrigation Authority. NIACOWSULT conducted the
training program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers
from February 06 to March 07, 1989. Agricultural
Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) thru its
representatives GTZ GmbH Technical Cooperation
of the Federal Republic of Germany paid to the
petitioner the agreed training fee in 2 installments.
Despite receipt of the demand letter by the President
of NIACOWSULT, petitioner failed to remit the said
amount prompting to file an administrative case by
one respondent Ombudsman for serious misconduct
and/or fraud or willful breach of trust. For failure of
the petitioner to file his counter affidavit,
Ombudsman issued the resolution discharging the
petitioner from service with special perpetual
disqualification to hold office in the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration & for reopening of the case which the court gave due
course. While the case is pending, petitioner filed a
Manifestation stating that criminal complaint for
estafa & falsification filed against him based on the
same facts or incidents which gave rise to the
administrative case was dismissed by the RTC.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7975 divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of
RA no. 3019, as amended, against municipal
mayors.
(1) Whether or not the dismissal of the

criminal case will give rise to the dismissal of the
Administrative case; (2) Whether or not petitioner
was denied the opportunity to be heard.
Held:
Held:
Sandiganbayan
has
jurisdiction
over
violations of RA no. 3019, as amended, against
municipal mayors. There is no merit to petitioners
averment that the salary received by a public official
dictates his salary grade. On the contrary, it is the
officials grade that determines his/her salary, not the
other way around. To determine whether the official
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
(1) The dismissal of the criminal case will note

foreclose the administrative action filed against
petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all
aspects.
The RTC in dismissing the criminal
complaint was simply saying that the prosecution
was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
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convictions. The lack or absence of proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any
evidence whatsoever for there is another class of
evidence in civil cases, this is preponderance of
evidence.
Then too, there is the substantial
evidence rule in administrative proceedings which
merely requires such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support conclusion.
(2) The essence of due process is an opportunity to
be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, & perhaps even many times
more creditably & practicable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In Administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure & evidence are not
strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot
be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense. Petitioners failure to present evidence is
solely of his own making & cannot escape his own
remission by paring the blame on the graft
investigator. A party who chooses not to avail of the
opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain
of a denial or due process.
AFIADO VS. COMELEC
September 18, 2000
her specific office. The said resolution is replete with

statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose
of the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice
Mayor for her official acts as vice Mayor. The title
itself suggests that the recall is intended for the
incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago City. Clearly, the
intent of the PRA is to remove the petitioner as Vice
Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by
reason of her official acts as such. To recall, then
the petitioner when she is already the incumbent city
Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will of the
PRA. Furthermore, even if the PRA were to
reconvene to adopt resolution for the recall of
Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of Santiago City
the same would still not prosper in view of Section
74(b) of Local Government code of 1991 which
provides that No recall shall take place within 1 year
from the date of officials assumption of office 1 year
immediately proceedings a regular election. There
is no more allowable time in the light of that law
within which to hold recalls elections for that
purpose. The then Vice Mayor Navarro assumed
office as Mayor on October 11, 1999. One year after
her assumption will be October 11, 2000 which is
already within the one year prohibited period
immediately preceding the next regular election in
May 2001.
Facts:
By virtue of the ruling of SC entitled Joel
Miranda vs. Antonio Abaya & COMELEC? In that
decision, we ruled that since the certificate of
candidacy of Jose Miranda was not valid, he could
not be validly substituted by his son Joel Miranda as
a mayoralty candidate in Santiago city. Hence, Joel
Miranda could not be validly proclaimed as the
winner in the mayoralty elections, thus, Vice-Mayor
Amelita Navarro became the new Mayor of Santiago
City by virtue of the law on succession. Navarro took
her oath of office & assumed her position as Mayor
of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. Meanwhile, on
July 12, 1999, while the said care was still pending
in the SC, petitioners Afiado, Quemado & Tangonan
convened the Barangay officials of Santiago city who
compose the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA).
On the same date, the PRA passed & adopted PRA
res. No. 1 for the recall of Vice Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro.
ARAZA VS. SHERIFFS GARCIA & TONGA

February 08, 2000
Facts:
The administrative case arose from a lettercomplaint dated July 02, 1997 filed by Wilfredo
Araza charging sheriffs Garcia & Tonga with grave
misconduct, violation of the Anti-graft & corrupt
practices act, gross ignorance of the law, gross
neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority, oppression,
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
gross inefficiency & incompetence, relative to the
implementation of the writ of execution in civil case
no. 4256 of MTC, Legaspi City entitled Salvacion
Araza & Wilfredo Araza vs. Lilia Itgu for sum of
money.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not an elective official who
became City Mayor by legal succession can be the
subject of a recall election by virtues of a
Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution which was
passed or adopted when the said elective official
was still the vice Mayor.
Held:
We deny the petition. The petition becomes
moot & academic.
The assumption by legal
succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of
Santiago City is a surprising event which rendered
the recall proceeding against her moot & academic.
A perusal is a specific elective official in relation to
Whether or not Respondent Marlon Garcia &

Nicolas Tonga are guilty of the charges against
them.
Held:
With respect to the charges against Garcia,
Judge Jacob found sufficient evidence to hold him
liable. As regards the fact that respondent Garcia
asked from complainant P1, 000 to be given to
assisting sheriff Tonga, the evidence showed that
complainant refused to give the amount demanded.
Such ask of asking complainant for money intended
for assisting sheriff Tonga was virtually extortion.
The sheriff assigned by the court was not authorized,
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on his own appoint as assisting sheriff or a
technical adviser. The court agrees with the finding
of irregularity in the manner of enforcement of the
writ of execution. Instead of following the terms of
the writ, respondent Garcia accepted a promissory
note executed by the judgment debtor & allowed the
materials levied upon to remain in the hardware
store of judgment debtor. When a writ is placed in
the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of
any instructions to the contrary, he proceed with
reasonable celerity & promptness to execute it
according to its mandate a sheriff is not required be
guilty judgment debtor sometime to raise cash.
Furthermore, the proceed of the writ should
be remitted to he clerk of court instead of turning
them over directly to the judgment creditor. The
conduct & behavior of every person connected with
an office charged with dispensation of justice, from
the presiding judge to the lowest clerks is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety & decorum, but also, &
above all else, be above suspicion. Thus,
respondent Garcia was dismissed from service with
forfeiture of retirement rights while sheriff Tonga is
found guilty of serious misconduct & fine of P 5000
and is given a stern warning that a similar conduct in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
Subject Matter: Execution Pending Appeal

LAPID VS. CA
June 29, 2000
Facts:
A complaint was filed in the office of the
Ombudsman charging Petitioner, Governor Manuel
M. Lapid with alleged Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the service for having collected fees from
various quarrying operators in Pampanga with out a
duly enacted provincial ordinance. Ombudsman
rendered a decision finding petitioner for misconduct
for which he meted out the penalty of 1 year
suspension with out pay pursuant to Section 25 of
RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). A motion for
reconsideration was denied by the office of the
Ombudsman. Petitioner then filed a petition for
review with the CZ praying for the issuance of a TRO
to enjoin the Ombudsman from enforcing the
questioned decision but to no avail. The DILG
implemented the assailed decision of the
Ombudsman and the highest ranking took her oath
of office as OIC-Governor of the province of
Pampanga. Petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to file
supplement to the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus and the supplement to the petition
itself were filed in view of the resolution of the CA
denying petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction.
He argued that the respondent court executed the
bounds of is jurisdiction, proceeding form the
promise that the decision of the Ombudsman had
not yet become final. The Solicitor General and the
office of the Ombudsman filed their comments to the

petition praying for the dismissal thereof and the
Solicitor General maintains that said decision is
governed by Section 12 Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court and is therefore immediately executory. The
office of the Ombudsman on its part maintains that
the Ombudsman Law and its implementary Rules
are silent to the execution of decisions rendered by
the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the
said law cited by the petitioner pertains to the finality
of the decision but not to its reinforcement pending
appeal. It is of the opinion of the Ombudsman that
since the Ombudsman Law is silent it has uniformly
adopted the provision of the LGC and Administrative
Code that decisions in administrative disciplinary
cases are immediately executory.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of
the
Ombudsman
finding
herein
petitioner
administratively liable for misconduct and imposing
upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension with out
pay is immediately executory pending appeal?
Held:
Petitioner was charged administratively
before the Ombudsman and accordingly the
provisions of the Ombudsman act should apply in his
case. Section 68 of the Local Government Code
only applies to administrative decisions rendered by
the Office of the President or the appropriate
Sanggunian against elective local government
officials. Similarly, the provision in the administrative
Code of 1987 mandating execution pending review
applies specifically to administrative decision of the
Civil Service Commission involving members of the
Civil Service. There is no basis in law for the
proposition that the provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on
execution pending review should be applied
suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act
as there is nothing in the Ombudsman act which
provides for such suppletory application. Courts
may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include therein situations not
provided or intended by the lawmakers. An omission
at the time of enactment, whether careless or
calculated cannot be judicially supplied however
later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. A
judgment becomes Final and Executory by
operation of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act
provides that any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of
public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one months salary shall be final and
unappeasable. In all other cases, the respondent
therein has the right to appeal to the Court of
appeals within ten days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision. In all these
other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein
will become final after the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an
appeal there from having been taken, the judgment
in the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final
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judgment which is then correctly categorized as a
final and executory judgment in respect to which
execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other
appeal from its decisions should generally carry with
it the say of these decisions pending appeal.
Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments
as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
GARCIA VS. MOJICA

314 SCRA 207
Facts:
Petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City
Mayor signed a contract with F. E. Zuellig for the
supply of asphalt to the city for the period of 19982001. In March 1999, news report came out
regarding the alleged anomalous purchases of
asphalt by Cebu City thru the contract signed by
petitioner. This prompted the Office of the
Ombudsman to conduct an inquiry into the matter.
On June 25, 1999, a preventive suspension
order was issued by the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-VIS-99-0453 against petitioner Cebu City
Mayor Alvin B. Garcia and eight (8) other city
officials. Under the said order petitioner was placed
under preventive suspension without pay for the
maximum period of 6 months and told to cease and
desist from holding office immediately. A motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petitioner
for certiorari and prohibition which prayed for TRO
and writ of PI. On July 19, 1999, the Supreme Court
directed the parties to maintain the status quo until
further orders from the court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess
of
jurisdiction
in
assuming
jurisdiction over OMB-VIS-ADM-99-0452
and issuing preventive suspension order.
2. Assuming arguendo that the Office of the
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over OMB-VISADM-99-0452, the preventive suspension
for six months was with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in gross violation of the
provisions of section 63 of the Local
Government Code which mandates that the
preventive suspension of Local Elective
Officials be ordered only after the issues
have been joined, and only for a period not
in excess of sixty (60) days.
3. What is the effect of petitioners re-election
in the administrative case filed against him.
Held:
1. Worth stressing, to resolve the present
controversy, we must recall that the authority of the

Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations

is mandated by no less than the Constitution. Under
Article XI, Section 13(1), the Ombudsman has the
power to: investigate on its own, or on complain by
any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, and omission appear to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. The question of whether or
not the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation
over a particular act or omission is different from the
question of whether or not petitioner, after
investigation, may be held administratively liable.
This distinction ought here to be kept in mind; even
as we must also take note that the power to
investigate is distinct from the power to suspend
preventively an erring public officer. Likewise worthy
of note, the power of the Office of the Ombudsman
to preventively suspend and official subject to its
administrative investigation is provided by specific
provision of law. Under Section 24 of R.A. 6770, we
have previously interpreted the phrase under his
authority to mean that the Ombudsman can
preventively suspend all officials under investigation
by his office, regardless of the branch of government
in which they are employed, excepting of course
those removable by impeachment, members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
2. We reach the foregoing conclusion,
however, without necessarily subscribing to
petitioners claim that the Local Government code,
which he averred should apply to this case of an
elective local official, has been violated. True, under
said code, preventive suspension may only be
imposed after the issues are joined, and only for a
maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was
suspended without having had the chance to refute
first the charges against him, and for the maximum
period of six months provided by the Ombudsman
Law. But as respondents argue, administrative
complaints commenced under the Ombudsman Law
are distinct from those initiated under the Local
Government Code. Respondents point out that the
shorter period of suspension under the Local
Government Code is intended to limit the period of
suspension that may be imposed by a mayor, a
governor, of the President, who may be motivated by
partisan political considerations. In contrast the
Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of
preventive suspension, is not likely to be similarly
motivated because it is a constitutional body. The
distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in
a specific case of preventive suspension.
3.
However, in the present case,
respondents point out that the contract entered into
by petitioner with F.E. Zuelling was signed just four
days before the date of the elections. It was not
made an issue during the election, and so the
electorate could not be said to have voted for
petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of
his life and character. For his part, petitioner
contends that the only conclusive determining
factor as regards the peoples thinking on the matter
is an election.
On this point, we agree with
petitioner. That the people voted for an official with
knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to
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eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the
extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will
obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter
do not distinguish the precise timing or period when
the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the
date of the officials reelection, except that it must be
prior to said date. In a number of cases, we have
repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not
be held administratively accountable for misconduct
committed during his prior term of office. The
rationale for this holding is that when the electorate
put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so
with full knowledge of his life and character,
including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, and then such
reelection is considered a condonation of his past
misdeeds. While petitioner can no longer be held
administratively liable for signing the contract with
F.E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the
filing of any case other than administrative against
petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken
to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for
whatever wrong doing, if any, might have been
committed in signing the subject contract.
REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

GR No. 137473 August 2, 2001
The main issue posed for resolution is
whether a civil service employee can be dismissed
from the government service for an offense which is
not work-related or which is not connected with the
performance of his official duty. Remolona insists
that his dismissal is a violation of his right to due
process under Sec. 2 (3), Art. XI-B of the
Constitution which provides that no officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause. Although the offense
of dishonesty is punishable under the Civil Service
Law, Remolona opines that such act must have
been committed in the performance of his function
and duty as postmaster. Considering that the charge
of dishonesty involves the falsification of the
certificate of rating of his wife Nery Remolona, the
same has no bearing on his office and hence, he is
deemed not to have been dismissed for cause. This
proposition is untenable.
It cannot be denied that dishonesty is
considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal
for the first offense under Sec. 23, Rule XIV of the
Rules implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292. And
the rule is that dishonesty, in the course of the
performance of duty by the person charged. The
rationale for is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or
grave misconduct, even if said defects of character
are not connected with his office, defects of
character are not connected with his office, they
affect his right to continue in office. The government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official,
even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is
given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellowmen, even against

offices and entities of the government other than the

office where he is employed; and by reason of his
office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence
and power which renders the victims of his grave
misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less
disposed and prepared to resist and to counteract
his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the
officer or employee to continue in office and the
discipline and morale of the service. The principle is
that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the
object sought out the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the publics faith and
confidence in the government.
We likewise find no merit in the contention
of Remolona that the penalty of dismissal is too
harsh considering that the penalty of dismissal is too
harsh considering that there was no damage caused
to the government since the certificate of rating was
never used to get an appointment for his wife.
Although no pecuniary damage was incurred by the
government; there was still falsification of an official
document that there was still falsification of an
official document that constitutes gross dishonesty
whish cannot be countenanced, considering that he
was an accountable officer and occupied a sensitive
position. The code of conduct and Ethical standards
for public officials and employees enunciates the
state policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service.
PEOPLE VS. TOLEDANO

GR NO. 110220, MAY 18, 2000
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
petitioner seeks to (1) annul and set aside the orders
of the RTC of Zambales in criminal case No. RTC
1274-I, entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Rolando Bunao, dated February 26, 1993 and April
12, 1993, which dismissed the information filed
against private respondent Bunao and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal order, respectively; and (2) prevent
respondent judge from hearing the case in the vent
of reinstatement of the information.
The pertinent provision of the old Local
Government code or BP Blg. 337 that was allegedly
violated provides that It shall be unlawful for any
lawful government official, directly or indirectly,
individually or as a member of a firm: to engage in
any business transaction with the Local Government
Unit of which he is an official or over whish he has
the power of supervision, or with any of its
authorized official, boards, agents, or attorneys,
whereby money is to be paid, or property or any
other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or
any other thing of value resources of the LGU to
such person or firm. Sec 221 of the same code
provides for the penal sanctions for such violation.
Before arraignment, private respondent
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that
7
the charge had already become moot and academic
and that any criminal liability he may have incurred
has been extinguished. In an order dated February
26, 1993 respondent court dismissed the
information.
The petition is meritorious. As indicated
above, respondent judge dismissed the information
on the ground that the administrative case filed
against private respondent Bunao with the office of
the Ombudsman had been dismissed.
In the
memorandum filed by the Solicitor General dated
January 11, 1995, said order of dismissal on the
ground of extinction of criminal liability is assailed for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting for having been issued with on the part of
respondent judge, thus: The respondent court
anchored its disposition in the case and against
private respondent Rolando Bunao. But Art. 89 of
the Revised Penal Code enumerated the grounds for
extinction of criminal liability; and, dismissal of them.
Administrative charge against accused is not one of
them.
The law is clear and unequivocal, there is
nothing in it which stakes that exoneration from an
administrative charge extinguishes criminal liability. It
is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative
law that administrative cases are independent from
criminal actions for the same act or omission.
Besides, the reliance made by respondent judge on
the re-election of private respondent as Kagawad in
the May 1992 election so as to warrant the dismissal
of the information filed against him, citing Aguinaldo
vs. Santos (212 SCRA 768), is misplaced. The
ruling in said case which forbids the removal from
office of a public official for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against said
public officer.
Finally, R.A. 7160 otherwise known as the
LGC of 1991, which repeated provision BP Blg. 337
re enacted in its Sec. 89 the legal provision of Sec.
41 of BP Blg. 337 under which private respondent
Bunao was charged and penalized the same act
previously penalizes under the repealed law, such
that the act committed before reenactment
continuous to be a crime. Hence, prosecution will
proceed under the provisions of Sec. 89 in relation to
Sec. 514 of R.A. 7160.
DECS SECRETARY VS. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL
JANUARY 19, 2000
Facts:
In 1994 former DECS Secretary Ricardo T.
Gloria filed a complaint against Maria Luisa C.
Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the
National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The complaint charged respondent Moral
with the pilferage of some historical documents. The
DECS Investigating Committee conducted several
hearings on the complaint. On September 25, 1996,
Sec. Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent

guilty.
She was ordered dismissed from the
government service with prejudice to reinstatement
and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other
remunerations. On September 30, 1996 respondent
received a copy of the resolution. She did not
appeal the judgment.
On October 2, 1996, respondent filed a
petition for the production of the DECS Investigation
Committee report purporting to guide her on
whatever action would be most appropriate to take
under the circumstances. Her petition was however
denied. Unfazed, she filed a reiteration for DECS
committee Report and DECS Resolution dated Sept.
25, 1996 which Sec. Gloria similarly denied. Moral
moved for reconsideration but the emotion was
merely note in for the production of the
Investigation Committee Report was final. As earlier
stated respondent did not appeal was final. As
earlier stated, respondent did not appeal the
resolution dated 39 September 1996 dismissing her
from the service. Instead, she instituted an action
for mandamus and injunction before the regular
courts against Sec. Gloria praying that she be
furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be
enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until
she received a copy of the said report.
Sec. Gloria moved to dismiss the
mandamus case principally for lack of cause of
action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus,
he elevated the case to the CA on certiorari imputing
grave abuse of discretion of the trial court. In its
assailed decision of 24 November 1997 the
appellate court sustained the trial court & dismissed
Sec. Glorias petition for lack of merit. The CA held
that petitioner Gloria acted prematurely, not having
filed any motion for reconsideration of the assailed
order with the respondent judge before filing the
instant petition to the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari for failure of petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
motion to dismiss, and in holding that the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to dismiss.
Held:
Ordinarily, certiorari will not lie unless the
lower court, through a motion for reconsideration,
has given an opportunity to correct the imputed
errors on its act or order. However, this rule is not
absolute and is subject to well-recognized exception.
Thus when the act or order of the lower court is a
patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory
provision of the rules, as in this case, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with and the
aggrieved party may assail the act or order of the
lower court directly on certiorari.
8
There is no law or rule which imposes a
legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a
copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, we
unequivocally held in Ruiz vs. Drilon that a
respondent in an administrative case is not entitled
to be informed of the findings & recommendations of
any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the
administrative decision based on substantial
evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented against her during the hearings of the
investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had
been accorded these rights.
Respondents
assertion
that
the
investigation report would be sued to guide (her) on
what action would be appropriate to take under the
circumstances hardly merits consideration. It must
be stressed that the disputed investigation report is
an internal communication between the DECS Sec.
& the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally
intended for that matter, except the DECS secretary.
More importantly, the DECS resolution is
complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the civil
service commission, that is, it contains sufficient
findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which the
respondents removal from office was grounded.
This resolution, and not the investigation report,
should be the basis of nay further remedies
respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see
how she would be prejudiced by denying her access
to the investigation report.
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY VS.

BIENVENIDO GARRIDO
On February 4, 1994, Garrido received a

letter dated January 27, 1994 from David informing
him that he has been dropped from the rolls effective
December 26, 1993 for being absent without official
leave for more than 30 days pursuant to Civil
Service Memorandum no. 38, Series of 1993.
Thus, Garrido appealed from Davids act of
dropping him from the rolls with the respondent
CSC, however the CSC dismissed the appeal. On
appeal with the CA, it reversed the resolutions of the
CSC.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is considered on
AWOL for more than thirty (30) days and hence his
separation from service is legal.
Resolution:
NO. While the granting or approval of
leaves depends upon the needs of the service and is
discretionary upon the head of the department or
agency which find that such discretion was not
exercised properly in this case. We note that
petitioner
disapproved
respondents
leave
application only on September 15, 1993, or almost 2
months from the time he filed the same on July 21,
1993. Such unexplained inaction by petitioner for an
unreasonable length of time apparently gave the
respondent the impression that there was no
impediment to his leave application. Indeed there is
no basis to conclude outright that he went on leave
on July 28, 1993 without an approved application.
Thus, respondent cannot be considered on
AWOL for more than 30 days. Hence, his separation
from service is illegal.
Facts:
Sometime in July, 1993, Garrido then
employed as Deputy administrator of PCA for
Corporate services Branch, verbally sought for
permission from PCA Administrator Virgilio M. David
to take more or less, five-month vacation leave in
connection with his intention to accept a job offer in
Sierra Leone, West Africa, as consultant of a private
firm. And on July 21, 1993, petitioner filed his
application for leave for 98 days, or from July 28,
19993 to December 17, 1993, with the Human
Resources Development Department (HRDD).
However, two months thereafter, the PCA
Administrator issued a Memorandum to Garrido
disapproving the latters application for leave.
On December 18, 1993, Garrido arrived in
the Philippines. And on December 20, 1993, he
reported back to his office and found the said letter
of disapproval. On December 21, 1993, petitioner
was rushed and confined at the Philippine Heart
Center until his discharge on January 2, 1994.
Thereafter, Garrido re-filed another vacation leave
covering the period from July 28, 1993-December
17, 1993 and incorporating therewith his sick leave
application for December 20, 1993-February 28,
1994.
PRINCIPE VS. FACT-FINDING AND

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU
Facts:
City Mayor Garcia endorsed to the HLURB
the proposed Cherry Hills Subdivision. Based on the
favorable recommendation of Mayor Garcia,
respondent Tan, issued the preliminary approval
and locational clearance for the development of
CHS. On July 28, 1991, Jasareno allowed the
leveling/earth-moving operations of the development
project of the area subject to certain conditions.
Eventually, Pollisco issued Small Scale Mining
Permit to Philjas to extract and to remove 10,000 cu.
Meters of filling materials from the area where the
CHS is located. Respondent Magno also informed
Rodriguez of Philjas that CHS is within the EIS
System and as such must secure ECC from the
DENR. Consequently, upon recommendation of
respondent Tolentino, Philjas application for ECC
was approved by respondent Principe, then
Regional Executive Director of DENR. And on
September 24, 1994, Gov. Ynares approved the
SSMP applied for by Philjas, allowing Philjas to
extract and remove 50,000 metric tons of filling
materials from the area.
On November 15, 1990, the Ombudsman

rendered a decision finding petitioner Principe
administratively liable for gross neglect of duty in
connection with the collapse of the housing project
at the Cherry Hills Subdivision and imposing upon
him the penalty of dismissal from office.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman may dismiss
petitioner from the service on an administrative
charge for gross neglect of duty, initiated,
investigated and decided by the Ombudsman
himself without substantial evidence to support his
finding of gross neglect of duty because the duty to
monitor and inspect the project was not vested in the
petitioner.
Resolution:
NO. Administrative liability could not be
based on the fact that petitioner was the person who
signed and approved the ECC, without proof of
actual act or omission constituting neglect of duty. In
the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect
of petitioner, administrative liability could not be
based on the principle of command responsibility.
The negligence of petitioners subordinates is not
tantamount to his own negligence. It was not within
the mandated responsibilities of petitioner to conduct
actual monitoring of projects. The principles
governing public officers under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provide that a
head of a department or a superior officer shall not
be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of
duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinates,
unless he has actually authorized by written order
the specific act or misconduct complained of.
As heretofore stated, the responsibility of
monitoring housing and land development projects is
not lodged with the office of the petitioner, but with
the Regional Technical Director.
DELA CRUZ VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the

Phils. vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform. The COA
Memorandum further stated that the SC decision
declared E.O. No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it
allows Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants to hold other offices, in addition to their
primary offices, and to receive compensation
therefor.
Accordingly the NHA Resident Auditor
Salvador J. Vasquez issued a Notice of
Disallowance, disallowing in audit the payment of
representation allowances and per diems of Cabinet
Members who were the ex-officio members of the
NHA Board of Directors and/or their respective
alternates who actually received the payments.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners as appointive
officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the
position of Assistant Secretary are covered by the
constitutional ban against dual or multiple positions.
Resolution:
YES. It bears stressing that under PD 757,
the law creating the National Housing Authority, the
persons mandated by law to sit as members of the
NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications,
(2) the Director-General of the National Economic
and Development Authority, (3) the Secretary of
Finance, (4) the Secretary of Labor, (5) the
Secretary of Industry, (6) the Executive Secretary,
and (7) the General Manager of NHA. While
petitioners are not among those officers, however,
they are alternates of the said officers, whose acts
shall be considered the acts of their principals.
Since
the
Executive
Department
Secretaries, as ex-officio members of the NHA
Board, are prohibited from receiving extra
compensation, whether be it in the form of a per
diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism, it follows that petitioners
who sit as their alternates cannot likewise be entitled
to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would
give petitioners a better right than their principals.
Facts:
Petitioners were members of the Board of
Directors of the National Housing Authority from
1991-1996.
On September 19, 1997, the COA issued
Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit
heads/auditors/team leaders of the national
government agencies and GOCCs which have
effected payment of any form of additional
compensation
or
remuneration
to
cabinet
secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple
positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance
of such additional compensation or remuneration
given to and received by the concerned officials, and
(b) effect the refund of the same from the time of the
finality of the SC En Banc Decision in the
consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs.
DE LEON VS. C.A

350 S 1
Facts:
Private Atty. Jacob Montesa who is not a
Career Executive Officer (CE SO) or a member of
the Career Executive was appointed as a legal
Ministry Legal Counsel -CESO IV in the necessity of
Local Government (Law department of Interior and
Local Government) by then Minister Aquilino
Pimentel Jr. Private respondents appointment was
approved as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission.
On July 25, 1987, then President Aquino
promulgated E.O. 262, reorganizing the Department
on April 8, 1988, then Secretary Luis T. Santos, who
succeeded Minister Pimentel, designated Nicanor M.
10
Patricio as chief, legal service in place of private
respondents who, in turn, was divided to report to
the office of the secretary to perform special
assignments. Consequently, private respondents
filed before this court a petition for quo warrants,
against then Secretary Luis T. Santos and Nicanor
Patricio. Ruling was rendered in favor of private
respondent Montesa and ordered his reinstatement
to his former position. Meanwhile, R.A. No. 6758
(otherwise known as the Salary Standardization
Law) took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto,
the position of Department Service Chiefs which
include the department Legal Counsel was
reclassified and ranked with Assistant Bureau
Directors under the generic position title of Director
III. Hence , respondent was reinstated to the
position: Department Legal Counsel and|/ director III.
On July 6, 199, then secretary Rafael
Alunan III issued Department Order No. 94-0370
relieving private respondents of his duties and
responsibilities reassigning him as Director III
(Assistant Regional Director), Region XI. private
respondent did not report to his new assigned
position. Instead he filed a 90- day sick leave, and
upon expiration thereof, he submitted a
memorandum signifying his intention to re-assume
his position as Department Legal Counsel / Chief
Legal Services. Private respondent was advised
however to report to region IX immediately. Private
respondent wrote a memorandum requesting for
consideration to no avail. He later appealed to the
CSC which sustained his reassignment to Region IX.
In view thereof, the Department directed private
respondent to report to his new assigned post
otherwise he shall be considered to be on absence
on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) as a
consequence will be dropped from the rolls of Public
Service. Private respondents instead of complying
therewith, filed with the CA a petition for Review
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and / or preliminary injunction. The
CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not
reassignment is valid.
private
respondent
is
Held:
Private respondents appointment did not
attain permanently. Not having taken the necessary
career executive Service examination to attain the
requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his
appointment and up to the present, posses the
needed eligibility for a position in the career
executive service. Consequently, his appointment as
a Ministry legal Counsel CESO IV/ Department
Legal Counsel and or Director III, was merely
temporary. Such being the case, he could be
transferred without violating the constitutionality
guaranteed right to security of tenure. Wherefore
Resolution of the CA are reversed and set aside.
MATIBAG VS. BENIPAYO
380 S 49
Facts:
February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc
appointed petitioner as Acting director Director IV
of the IED. Subsequently, then Chairperson Harriet
O. Demetriou reviewed petitioners appointment as
Director IV of the EID in a temporary capacity.
Again on February 15, 2001, Commissioner Rufino
S.B. Javeiro received again the appointment of
petitioner to the same position in a temporary
capacity.
On March 22, 2001, President Macapagal
Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as
COMELEC Commissioner, each for a time of seven
years and all expiring on February 2, 2008.
Benipayo took his oath of office and assumed the
position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason
likewise took their oaths of office and assume their
positions as COMELEC Commissioners. The office
of the President. Submitted to the Commissioner on
the Appointments the ad interim appointment of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason per confirmation. The
Commission, however, did not act on the said
appointments.
On June 21, 2001, respondents Arroyo
renewed
the
aforementioned
as
interim
appointments to the same position and with the
same conditions. Before the Commission could act
upon the confirmation of the renewed appointments
after receipt of such Congress adjourned.
The ad interim appointments were again
renewed upon which they took their oath anew.
Benipayo as the Comelec Chairman issued
a memorandum addressed to petitioners as director
IV of the EID director and to Cinco as Director III
also of the EID. Cinco Officer-in- Charge of the EID
and reassigns petitioners to the law department.
COMELEC EID Commissioner-charge objected to
petitioners reassignment in a memorandum
addressed to the Comelec en banc. Specifically,
Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo failure
to consult the Commissioner-in-charge of the EID in
the reassignment of the petitioners.
Petitioners requested to reconsider her relief
which was however denied by Benipayo. She moved
to appeal the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the Comelec en banc. She ruled
an administrative and criminal complaint with the law
dept against Benipayo.
Denying the pendancy of the complaint,
petitioners filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason.
In the meantime, President Arroyo rescued
once again the ad interim appointments.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the ad interim
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason are expressly allowed in the
Constitution.
2) Whether or not subsequent renewals of
such ad interim appointments invalid.
Held:
11
In the instant case, the President did in fact

appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the
vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to the
confirmation by the Commissioner on Appointments.
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended
permanent appointments during the recess of
congress. They were no opposite and or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike
Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs. Yorac.
The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are expressly allowed by
the
Constitution, which authorizes the president, during
the recess of Congress to make appointments that
take effect immediately. The Constitution imposes no
condition on the affectivity of an ad interim
appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment
takes effect immediately. The Constitution imposes
no condition o the effectivity of an ad interim
appointment, and thus an ad interim appointments
takes effect immediately. In the language of the
constitution the appointment is effective until
disapproved by Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress.
In the ad interim appointments and
subsequent renewal of the appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the
prohibition on reappointments because there were
no previous appointments that were confirmed by
the Commission of Appointments. A reappointment
presupposes previous confirmed appointments. The
same ad interim appointments will not also breach
the 7- year limit because all the appointments and
renewal of appointments of Benipayo, Borra, and
Tuason are for a fixed term expiring on February 2,
2008. Any delay in their confirmation will not extend
the expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently,
there is no danger whatsoever that the renewal of
the ad interim appointments of these three
respondents will result in any of the evils intended to
be exorcised by the twin prohibitions in the
Constitution. The certainly renewal of the ad interim
appointments of these three respondents, for so long
as their terms of office expires on February 2, 2008
does not violate the prohibition on reappointment in
the Sec. 1(2) article IX-C of the Constitution.
PABU-AYA VS. CA
356 S 651
that consequently, she could no longer continue in

the service.
She wrote the provincial board and
acknowledged therein her failure to perform her
duties and made a promise to improve her
performance should her appointment be renewed.
Her letter was indorsed by the Provincial Governor
under specified conditions. Petitioner appealed the
memorandum terminating her employment which
was however dismissed by the commission
Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that petitioners subsequent acceptance of a
temporary appointment (Bookbinder II) was an
indication of her relinquishment of her position
(Utility Worker) as a permanent employee and thus
foreclosed her right to contest her reinstatement.
Held:
In the case at bar the Court of Appeals acted
properly when it gave scant consideration to
petitioner Pabu-ayas claim that had she known of
the demotion in status from that of a utility worker, in
a permanent status, to that of Bookbinder II in a
temporary status she would have stuck to her old
permanent position of utility worker rather than put to
naught her long years of service in the government.
The temporary appointment of petitioner as
Bookbinder II was validly terminated. Petitioners
contention that she should be reinstated to her
former position as utility worker is untenable.
Petitioner Pabu-aya, by having accepted the
temporary appointment of Bookbinder II she had
abandoned or given up her former position of utility
worker. Her appointment as Bookbinder II being
terminable in character was terminable at the
pleasure of the appointing power with or without
cause.
The letter of petitioner expressing regret
over her own less than satisfactory performance and
promising to improve her work should her
appointment be renewed, also implies that there
were valid reasons for the proper authorities not to
renew her temporary appointment. Besides,
pursuant to Section 13 (b) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987, a temporary appointment shall not exceed
twelve months.
Facts
Petitioner Pabu-aya was an employee of the
Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. She started
as a casual laborer on July 1, 1973. On November
14, 1986, she was appointed as Utility Worker on a
permanent status. She was later appointed as
Bookbinder II in a temporary status.
On October 16, 1992, Vice Governor of
Negros Occidental issued a Memorandum informing
her that her temporary appointment as Bookbinder II
had already expired on September 16, 1992, and
ORCULLO VS. CSC

358 S 115
Facts:
Petitioner Norberto Orcullo, Jr. was hired as Project
Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the
Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP)BOT
Center effective March 11, 1996. His employment
was contractual and co-terminous with the said
12
project which was to end in January 30, 2000. On
September 23, 1996, or six months from his
assumption of office, petitioner issued a
memorandum from one Jorge Briones, terminating
petitioners contractual employment with the said
agency effective September 30, 1996. In a letter
petitioners termination as project manager of
CCPAP was confirmed by the undersecretary,
Francisco F. del Rosario. Aggrieved by the dismissal,
petitioner appealed the same to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The respondent CSC dismissed
petitioners appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Civil
Service Commission.
Held:
Upon a proper determination of the validity
of the information, it becomes mandatory for the
court to immediately issue the suspension order. The
Court has no discretion to hold in abeyance the
suspension of the accused in the pretext that an
order denying the motion to quash is pending review
before the appellate courts.
PANDI VS. COURT OF APPEALS

380 SCRA 36
Issue:
Facts:
Whether employees in the public service
regardless of their status of employment are
protected by the tenurial security right embodied in
the Constitution.
Held:
It is undisputed that petitioners employment
with the CCPAP is contractual and co-terminous in
nature. Such co-terminous employment fall under
the non-career service classification of positions in
the Civil Service. A perusal of petitioners
employment contract will reveal that his employment
with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase unless
terminated sooner. Thus, while such employment is
co-terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner
nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the
appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his
employment contract. We agree with the appellate
courts interpretation of the phrase unless
terminated sooner to mean that his contractual job
as project manager IV from March 11, 1996 to
January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January
30, 2000 of terminated by the other contracting party
employer CCPAP.
SOCRATES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
253 SCRA 773
On August 9, 1993, petitioner Dr. Jarmena

B. Macacua, the regional director and Secretary of
DOH of ARMM issued a memorandum designating
Dr. Lampa I. Pandi as OIC of Integrated Provincial
Health Office- Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHOAPGH) Lanao del Sur,.
On September 15, 1993, Provincial
Governor Mahid Mutilan of Lanao del Sur, issued
order no. 07 designating respondent Dr. Amer Saber
asa OIC of IPHO-APGH.
Dr. Saber filed in CA, a petitioner for quo
warrant w/ prayer for injunction questioning the
designation of DR. Pandi as OIC in IPHO-APGH
Lanao del Sur, because he claims that he is the
lawfully designated OIC of said government entity.
On October 29, 1993, then President Ramos
issued E.O
No. 133 transferring powers and
functions of the DOH in the region to the Regional
Government of ARMM. On November 6, 1993, Dr.
Macacera issued another memorandum reiterating
Dr. Pandis designation.
The Court of Appeals rendered a judgment
in favor of Dr. Saber, holding that the powers and
authority to appoint the provincial health officer is
vested don the governor of Lanao del Sur under the
LGC of 1991, section 478.
Hence the appeal.
Facts:
Issue:
Socrates was the incumbent governor of

Palawan who was first elected governor of the said
province in 1969 and re-elected in both 1971 and
1980 elections. After the EDSA Revolution in 1986
,he was replaced by Victoriano Rodriguez.
At the time Rodriguez wsa still the OIC
Governor, the Provincial Government of Palawan
represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board
Members of Palawan filed before the Office of the
Tanodbayan Complaints against Socrates for
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension of petitioner
pendent elite as governor of Palawan.
Who is empowered to appoint the Provincial

Health Officer of Lanao del Sur, the Provincial
Governor, the Regional Governor of the ARMM
Secretary of Health?
Issue:
Who may impose preventive suspension on
an erring officer?
Held:
The power to appoint or designate an
officer-in-charge for this position is determined by
the law in force at the time of such appointment or
designation.
Macacua as regional director and Regional
Secretary of Health designated Pandi Officer-incharge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur on August
9, 1993 and again on November 6, 1993. The
designation date of August 9, 1993 is void since the
Regional Secretary at that time did not exercise
supervision and control over the Provincial Health
13
Offices of the ARMM. However, the designation on
November 6, 1993 is valid since at the time E.O
No.133 had already been issued vesting in the
Regional Secretary of Health Supervision and
control over the functions and activities of DOH in
the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while
valid is only temporary in nature, good until a new
designation or permanent appointment is made.
MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS, SPECIFICALLY

THOSE MADE WITHIN TWO (2) MONTHS
IMMEDIATELY
PRIOR
TO
THE
NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, APPLIES ONLY TO
THE PRESIDENT OR ACTING PRESIDENT.
ALQUEIZOLA VS. OCOI

August 27, 1999
DE RAMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
353 SCRA 94
Facts:
Petitioner Conrado L. De Rama, mayor of
Pagbilao, Quezon, wrote a letter to the CSC seeking
the recall of the appointment of the 14 Municipal
employees on the allegation that the appointments
of the said employees were midnight appointments
of the former mayor in violation of Article VII, Section
15 of the 1987 Constitution.
The CSC denied the petitioners request for
recall and declared said appointments of the said
employees were issued in accordance with pertinent
laws. Thus, the same were effective immediately,
and cannot be reviewed or revoked by the
appointing authority until disapproved by the CSC.
The CSC also dismissed petitioners allegation that
these were midnight appointments pointing out that
the Constitutional provision relied upon by the
petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by
the president and cannot be made to apply to local
elective officials.
The court of Appeals, upon petition for
review held that there was no abuse of power of the
appointment on the part of outgoing mayor.
Facts:
Petitioner Ramon Alquizola has, won the
post of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lubod, Iligan
City. Respondents Gallardo Ocoi, Camilo Penaco,
Saturnino Mendoza, Rafael Ardiente, Vicente
Cazeres, Ricardo Zosa III and Sirad Umpa were
appointees of the former Punong Barangay. Said
respondents occupied the positions of Barangay
treasurer, Barangay secretary respectively with the
rest being barangay utility workers.
After the election, petitioner terminated the
services of the respondents and appointed hi copetitioners, Marissa Doromal and Adeco Seco as
barangay treasurer and as barangay secretary. In
consonance with section 394 and section 395 of the
LGC, he submitted both appointments to the
Sanguniang Barangay. For approval. The Sangunian
rejected the appointments.
Respondents filed a complaint for
quo warrant, mandamus and prohibition with the
RTC of Lanao del Norte to enjoin petitioner from
termination their services. The RTC ruled in favor of
the respondents. A motion for reconsideration was
denied
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal is valid.

Held:
Whether or not these are

appointments which maybe recalled.
midnight
Held:
Section 20 of the Rule VI of the Omnibus
Implementing
Regulations
of
the
Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Section 20: Notwithstanding the initial
approval of the appointments, the same maybe
recalled on any of the following grounds:
a) non-compliance with the procedures/
criteria provided in the agencys merit
promotion;
b) failure to pass through the agencys
selection/ promotional board
c) violation of the existing collective
agreement between managements and
employees relative to promotion; or
d) violation of other existing civil service
laws, rules and regulations.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private
respondents may only be recalled on the above cited
grounds. The CSC correctly ruled that the
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON SO CALLED
The questioned dismissal from office of the

barangay officials by the Punong barangay without
concurrence of the majority of all the members of the
Sanguniang Barangay cannot be legally justified.
MANALO VS. SISTOZA

312 SCRA 239
Facts:
On December 13, 1990, R.A. 6975 creating
the DILG was signed into law by the President
Aquino. Pertinent provisions of the Act reads:
The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by
the President from among the senior officers down to
the rank of the Chief Superintendent, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Sec. 31.Senior Superintendents to Deputy
Director General-appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Chief of PNP with the proper
endorsement by the Chairman of the CSC and
14
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; and
e) Director General- appointed by the
President from among the senior officers
down to the rank of
Chief
Superintendent in the service, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
In accordance therewith, the Presidents of
the Philippines, promoted the
fifteen (15) respondents police officers to the ranks
of Chief Superintendent and Director without their
appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation.
Hence, this petitioner questioned the
constitutionality and legality of the Appointments.
speech denouncing alleged anomalies in the

construction and operation of the of the centennial of
the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark
Special Economic Zone. Then, President Estrada
created an independent citizens committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances,
surroundings the centennial projects. The Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable
cause to inflict petitioner before the Sandiganbayan
for the violation of RA 3019 in relation to RA 1594.
Petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public
officer.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the PNP Chief is subject to
the
confirmation
of
the
Commission
on
Appointments.
Held:
Under section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the
government to be appointed by the President.
First, the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, and other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captains and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution.
Second, all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by the law.
Third, Those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint..
Fourth, officers of the lower rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
president alone.
Only Presidential appointments belonging to
the first group requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
The Philippine National Police is separate
and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Positions in the former need not be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, Section s6 and 31 of the R.A
6975, which empowered the Commission on
Appointments to confirm the appointment of public
officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution to be confirmed, are unconstitutional.
LAUREL VS. DESIERTO

Facts:
President Fidel Ramos have issued E.O
No. 128 creating the National Commission to take
charge of the nationwide preparation for the
celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the
declaration of the Philippine Independence. VicePresident was appointment chairman of the NCL. In
the Senate, Senator Coseteng delivered a privilege
Held:
Jurisprudence defines public office as the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creative power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
most important characteristic of a public office is the
creation and conferring of an office involves a
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public.
The Court held that the NCC perform
executive function. The Court did not agree with the
petitioners argument that the centennial celebration
may be likened to a national fiesta which is
proprietary rather that a government function. A town
cannot compare to the National Centennial
Celebration. The centennial celebration was meant
to commemorate the birth of our nation after
centuries of struggle against the former colonial
master.
Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign
functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and
petitioner, as its chair, is a public officer.
MACALINO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan two informations against petitioners
Felicito Macalino and his wife, Liwayway Tan
charging them with Estafa through falsification of
official documents and frustrated Estafa through
falsification of mercantile document. Petitioner was
then the Assistant Manager of the Treasury Division
and the Head of the Loans Administration and
Insurance Section of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC), a government
controlled corporation.
Issues:
15
1) Whether or not petitioner is a public
officer.
2) Whether or not Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over petitioner
Held:
Section 12 and 13, Article XI of the
Constitution provided that the Ombudsman and his
deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof , including governmentowned or controlled corporation with original charter.
Further, section 2 (1), article IX of the Constitution
provides that the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivision, instrumentalities and agencies of the
government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with the original character.
Inasmuch as the PNCC has no original
charter as it was incorporated under the general law
on corporation, it follows inevitably that petitioner is
not a public officer within the coverage of RA 3019,
as amended. Thus, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over him.
MALALUAN VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private
respondents Joseph Evangelista were both
mayoralty candidate in Kidapawan , North Cotabato.
Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board
of Canvasser asa the duly elected Mayor. Upon filing
of an election protest, the trial court declared the
petitioner as the duly elected mayor. Petitioner filed
a motion for execution pending appeal which was
granted by the trial court. Petitioner assumed the
office of the Municipal Mayor.
Private respondent appealed the trial courts
decision to the COMELEC. The COMELEC ordered
petitioner to vacate the office and declared private
respondent to
be duly-elected Mayor. The
COMELEC found petitioner liable for the actual
damages consisting of the attorneys fees, actual
expenses for Xerox copies and unearned salary and
other emolument from March 1994 to April 1995.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in awarding actual damages in
favor of private respondents.
Held:
The Supreme Court deemed the award of
salaries and other emoluments to be improper and
lacking legal sanction. The Court held that the
petitioner was not a usurper because, while a
usurper is one who undertakes to act to officially
without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the
duties of an elective under color of election thereto.
It matters not that it was the trial court not the
COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner,

because both, at different stages of the sectoral
process have power to proclaim winners in electoral
contests.
The division of a judicial body is no less that
the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened
Board of Canvassers for winning candidates right to
assume office, for both are undisputedly legally
sanctioned. The Court deemed petitioner to be de
facto officers who, in good faith, has had possession
of the office and had discharged the duties
pertaining thereto and is thus entitled to the
emolument of the office.
On Abandonment/Incompatible Offices
CANONIZADO, ET AL. V AGUIRRE
GRN 13132
FACTS:
Pursuant to a decision of the SC, Sec.8 of
RA 8551 was declared to be violative of petitioners
right to security of tenure, hence, their removal as
Commissioners of the NAPOLCOM and the
appointments of new Commissioners in their stead
were nullities, Petitioners were ordered to be
reinstated.
Respondents
however
contend
that
Canonizado is deemed to have abandoned his claim
for reinstatement because he has been appointed by
President Estrada to the position of Inspector
General of the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP
and has in fact accepted and taken his oath to such
position before the SC ordered his reinstatement.
ISSUES:
I. Whether Canonizado has abandoned his
office; and
II. Whether Canonizados acceptance of an
office incompatible with his former position resulted
to an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement to
his former position.
DECISION:
I. NO. Abandonment of an office is a
voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder,
with the intention of terminating his control and
possession thereof.
In order to constitute
abandonment of office, it must be total and under
such circumstances as clearly to indicate absolute
relinquishment. There are 2 essential elements of
abandonment: 1) an intention to abandon; and 2) an
overt or external act by which the intention is carried
into effect. Where the public officer vacates it in
deference to the requirements of a statute which is
afterwards declared as unconstitutional, such a
surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and
the officer may recover the office.
16
II. No. It is a well-settled rule that he who,
while occupying one office, accepts another
incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first
office, and his title is thereby terminated without any
other act or proceeding. However, the rule on
incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at
bar because at no point did Canonizado discharge
the functions of the two offices simultaneously. He
should not be faulted for seeking gainful employment
during the pendency of the case for his
reinstatement.
recognized as his child evidenced by the childs Birth

and Baptismal Certificates. Respondents admit that
they had a past illicit relationsip and that they had a
child. They however, deny living together and asked
that the SC be lenient in the imposition of penalty in
this administrative case considering that they are
only ordinary employees upon whom the high
standard of integrity and ethical conduct required of
a judge and a lawyer should not be applied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a distinction should be made
on the yardstick of morality between an ordinary
employee and a judge or lawyer.
On Abolition of Office
DECISION:
BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB V EXEC. SEC.
360 SCRA 718
FACTS:
Former President Aquino issued EO 1273
establishing the EIIB as part of the organizational
structure of the Ministry of Finance.
President Estrada thereafter issued EO 191,
deactivating the EIIB, motivated by the fact that its
functions are also being performed by other
agencies. All the personnel as specified were
deemed separated from the service pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization.
NO. Under the Administrative Code,

disgraceful and immoral conduct is a ground for
disciplinary action. The principle that public office is
public trust must always be adhered to. Moreover,
the image of the court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the
men and women who work thereat, from the judge to
the least and lowest of its personnel- hence, it
becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and
everyone in the court to maintain its good name and
standing as a true temple of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power
to abolish the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau.
DECISION:
The general rule has always been that the
power to abolish is lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the precept that the power to create
includes the power to destroy. The exception is that,
as far as bureaus, agencies, or offices in the
executive department are concerned, the presidents
power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office or certain laws may
grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.
On Disciplinary Actions
NAVARRO V NAVARRO
September 6, 2000
FACTS:
Julieta Navarro filed a complaint for gross
immorality against her husband Ronaldo Navarro
and Roberlyn Marinas, both working with the Office
of the Deputy Court as Legal Researchers. The
complaint alleged among others, that the
respondents are living together as husband and
wife, and that they begot a child whom Ronaldo

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