In political and social sciences, communism (from Latin communis common, universal)[1][2] is a social, political, and

economic ideology and movement whose ultimate goal is the establishment of the communist society, which is a
socioeconomic order structured upon the common ownership of the means of production, absence of social
classes, money,[3][4] and the state.
Despotism is a form of government in which a single entity rules with absolute power. That entity may be an individual, as
in anautocracy, or it may be a group,[1] as in an oligarchy. The word despotism means to "rule in the fashion of a despot"
and does not necessarily require a singular "despot", an individual.
Despot comes from the Greek despotes, which roughly means "master" or "one with power", and it has been used to
translate a wide variety of titles and positions.
Atomism (from Greek , atomon, i.e. "uncuttable", "indivisible"[1][2][3]) is a natural philosophy that developed in
several ancient traditions. The atomists theorized that nature consists of two fundamental principles: atom and void.
Unlike their modern scientific namesake in atomic theory, philosophical atoms come in an infinite variety of shapes and
sizes, each indestructible, immutable and surrounded by a void where they collide with the others or hook together
forming a cluster. Clusters of different shapes, arrangements, and positions give rise to the various macroscopic
substances in the world.[4][5]
Anarchy is the condition of a society, entity, group of persons or single person which does not recognize authority.[1] It
originally meant leaderlessness or lawlessness, but in 1840, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon adopted the term in his
treatise What Is Property? to refer to a new political philosophy, anarchism, which advocates stateless societies based
on voluntary associations.
The word anarchy comes from the ancient Greek (anarchia), which combines (an), "not, without"
and (arkhos), "ruler, leader." Thus, the term refers to a person or society "without rulers" or "without leaders."

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 27 October 21, 1972

DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL, TRANSFERRING TO THEM
THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR
In as much as the old concept of land ownership by a few has spawned valid and legitimate grievances that gave rise to
violent conflict and social tension,
The redress of such legitimate grievances being one of the fundamental objectives of the New Society,
Since Reformation must start with the emancipation of the tiller of the soil from his bondage,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, as amended do hereby decree
and order the emancipation of all tenant farmers as of this day, October 21, 1972:
This shall apply to tenant farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not;
The tenant farmer, whether in land classified as landed estate or not, shall be deemed owner of a portion constituting a
family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated;
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such
area or will now cultivate it;
For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the
value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 1/2) times the average harvest of three normal crop years
immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;
The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant in
fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations;
In case of default, the amortization due shall be paid by the farmers' cooperative in which the defaulting tenant-farmer is a
member, with the cooperative having a right of recourse against him;
The government shall guaranty such amortizations with shares of stock in government-owned and government-controlled
corporations;
No title to the land owned by the tenant-farmers under this Decree shall be actually issued to a tenant-farmer unless and
until the tenant-farmer has become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmer's cooperative;
Title to land acquired pursuant to this Decree or the Land Reform Program of the Government shall not be transferable
except by hereditary succession or to the Government in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms and other existing laws and regulations;
The Department of Agrarian Reform through its Secretary is hereby empowered to promulgate rules and regulations for
the implementation of this Decree.
All laws, executive orders, decrees and rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed and or modified accordingly.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 228 July 17, 1987

DECLARING FULL LAND OWNERSHIP TO QUALIFIED FARMER BENEFICIARIES COVERED BY PRESIDENTIAL

DECREE NO. 27: DETERMINING THE VALUE OF REMAINING UNVALUED RICE AND CORN LANDS SUBJECT TO
P.D. NO. 27; AND PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF PAYMENT BY THE FARMER BENEFICIARY AND MODE OF
COMPENSATION TO THE LANDOWNER
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 27; for purposes of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenantfarmer; provided that valuation shall be determined by crop productivity;
WHEREAS, there is a need to complete Operation Land Transfer and accelerate the payment to the landowners of lands
transferred to tenant-farmers; and
WHEREAS, there is also a need to maintain the financial validity of the Land Bank of the Philippines, the financing arm of
the agrarian reform program of the government;
NOW THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, here order that:
Sec. 1. All qualified farmer beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (hereinafter referred to as P.D. No. 27).
Sec. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. No. 27 shall be based on the average gross
production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum
Circular No. 26, Series of 1973, and related issuances and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied
by Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or
Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the
amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost
to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer beneficiary after October 21, 1972, shall be considered as advance
payment for the land. In the event of dispute with the land owner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer
beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve
the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular
No. 26, Series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the dispute,
the landowner's compensation claim shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the
Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the
dispute before the court.
Sec. 3. Compensation shall be paid to the landowners in any of the following modes, at the option of the landowners:
(a) Bond payment over ten (10) years, with ten percent (10%) of the value of the land payable immediately in
cash, and the balance in the form of LBP bonds bearing market rates of interest that are aligned with 90-day
treasury bills rates, net of applicable final withholding tax. One-tenth of the face value of the bonds shall mature
every year from the date of issuance until the tenth year.
The LDP bonds issued hereunder shall be eligible for the purchase of government assets to be privatized.
(b) Direct payment in cash or in kind by the farmer-beneficiaries with the terms to be mutually agreed upon by the
beneficiaries and landowners and subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform; and
(c) Other modes of payment as may be prescribed or approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council.
Sec. 4. All outstanding Land Bank bonds that are retained by the original landowners-payee or by their heirs, are deemed
matured up to on-twenty fifth (1/25) of their yearly face value from their date of issue to the date of this Executive Order
and may be claimed by the original landowner-payee by surrendering the bonds to the Land Bank. The original
landowner-payee may claim payment for the remaining unmatured period of the surrendered bonds under any of the
modes of compensation provided in Section 3, subsections (a) (b) or (c) hereof.
In order to meet the financial requirements mentioned in this Section, the Central Bank shall remit to the Land Bank such
sums as may b necessary from the Sinking Fund established by the Land Bank from the retirement of its bonds and other
long-term obligations and which Sinking Fund is administered by the Central Bank: Provided, however, That there is no
change in maturity of other outstanding Land Bank bonds acquired and held by transferees from original bondholders.
The landowner is exempt from capital gains tax on the compensation paid to him under this Executive Order.

Sec. 5. In the event that the landowner does not accept payment of the compensation due him, his compensation shall be
held in trust for him by the Trust Department of the Land Bank. The cash portion of the compensation and such portions
that mature yearly shall be invested by the Trust Department only in government securities fully guaranteed by the
Republic of the Philippines. All the net earnings of the investment shall be for the benefit of the landowner, his heirs or
successors in interest.
The rights of the landowners may be exercised by his heirs upon his death.
Sec. 6. The total costs of the land including interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum with a two percent (2%)
interest rebate for amortizations paid on time, shall be paid by the farmer-beneficiary or his heirs to the Land Bank over a
period up to twenty (20) years in twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. Lands already valued and financed by the Land
Bank are likewise extended a 20-year period of payment of twenty (20) equal annual amortizations. However, the farmerbeneficiary if he so elects, may pay in full before the twentieth year or may request the Land Bank to structure a
repayment period of less than twenty (20) years if the amount to be financed and the corresponding annual obligations
are well within the farmer's capacity to meet. Ownership of lands acquired by the farmer-beneficiary may be transferred
after full payment of amortizations.
Sec. 7. As of the date of this Executive Order, a lien by way of mortgage shall exist in favor of the Land Bank on all lands it
has financed and acquired by the farmer-beneficiary by virtue of P.D. No. 27 for all amortizations, both principal and
interest, due from the farmer-beneficiary or a valid transferee until the amortizations are paid in full.
Sec. 8. Henceforth, failure on the part of the farmer-beneficiary to pay three (3) annual amortizations shall be sufficient
cause for the Land Bank to foreclose on the mortgage.
Sec. 9. Thirty (30) days after final notice for payment to the defaulting tenant-farmer, a copy of which notice shall be
furnished to the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank may foreclose on the mortgage by registering a
certification under oath of its intent to foreclose with the Registry of Deeds of the city or province where the land is located
attaching thereto: a copy of the final notice for payment; proof of service to the tenant-farmer and the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the final notice for payment; and a certification that at least three (3) annual amortizations on the land
or the sum thereof remain unpaid. The mortgage is deemed foreclosed upon registration of said documents with the
Registry of Deeds.
In the event the defaulting tenant-farmer could not be served the final notice for payment, the Land Bank shall post the
notice for payment in the town hall, public market and barangay hall or any other suitable place frequented by the public of
the barangay where the defaulting tenant-farmer resides. A certification by the Land Bank to this effect will substitute for
the proof of service of the final notice of payment for purposes of foreclosure.
The Register of Deeds of all cities and provinces are directed to have a separate registry book to enter all the
requirements of foreclosure as provided herein.
Sec. 10. The tenant-farmer, or any of his compulsory heirs may lift the foreclosure within a period of two (2) years from its
registration by paying the Land Bank all unpaid amortizations on the land with interest thereon of six percent (6%) per
annum. In case of failure to lift the foreclosure within the said period, ownership of the land shall be deemed transferred to
the Land Bank.
Sec. 11. The Land Bank, not later than three (3) months after its acquisition of the land, shall sell the foreclosed land to
any interested landless farmer duly certified to as a bona fide landless farmer by the Department of Agrarian Reform of
the barangay or the two closest barangays where the land is situated. The cost of the land is the unpaid amortizations due
on the lands as of the date of the sale with interest thereon of six percent (6%) per annum. In the event that there is more
than one interested buyer, the actual buyer shall be determined by lottery in the presence of all the buyers or their
representatives and a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The Deed of Conveyance executed by the
Land Bank in favor of the farmer transferee shall be registered with the Register of Deeds of the city or province where the
land is located. Ownership shall transfer to the farmer transferee only upon registration with the Registry of Deeds. The
lien of the Land Bank by way of mortgage on the remaining unpaid amortizations shall subsists on the title of the
transferee.
Sec. 12. The Land Bank, at least one (1) month prior to the sale, shall furnish the Department of Agrarian Reform with a
notice of sale and shall post a similar notice in the town hall, public market and barangay hall or any other suitable place
frequented by the public of the barangay where the property is located. The notice shall state the description of the
property subject of the sale, the price, the date and place of sale.
Sec. 13. The National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration is hereby authorized to issue such rules and
regulations as may be necessary relative to the registration with the Register of Deeds of all transactions/activities

required herein taking into consideration the need to protect the integrity of the Torrens System, the interests of the parties
and innocent third parties.
All transactions/activities and their corresponding documents that are registered with the Register of Deeds pursuant to
the requirements of P.D. No. 27 and this Executive Order shall be free from all documentary stamps and registration fees.
Sec. 14. The Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank are authorized to issue the additional implementing
guidelines of this Executive Order which shall not be later than sixty (60) days from the date hereof.
Sec. 15. To ensure the successful implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program, an Agrarian Reform Operating Fund
(Agrarian Fund) shall be set up by the National Government in the Land Bank. The amount of this Agrarian Fund, to be
determined by the Government Corporation Monitoring and Coordinating Committee hereinafter referred to as GCMCC),
will source the funding requirements for Land Bank to carry out the full implementation of this program which will include
the net operating losses directly and indirectly attributable to this program and the credit facilities to farmers and farmers'
organizations. Within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Executive Order, the Land Bank shall submit to the
GCMCC its funding requirements for 1987. Thereafter, within sixty (60) days after the end of each calendar year, the Land
Bank shall submit to the GCMCC an accounting of all drawings the Land Bank had made against the Fund. At the same
time, it will also submit its prospective funding requirements for the current year for review and validation of the GCMCC.
The amount approved by the GCMCC shall be deemed appropriate and the amount programmed for release in
coordination with the Department of Finance, Budget and Management and the National Economic and Development
Authority. Within thirty (30) days from GCMCC's approval, such funds shall be remitted to the Land Bank for credit to the
Agrarian Fund.
Sec. 16. If any part of this Executive Order is declared invalid or unconstitutional, it shall not affect any other part thereof.
Sec. 17. All laws, presidential decrees, orders, letters of instructions, rules and regulations, and other issuances or parts
thereof inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 18. This Executive Order shall take effect upon its signing and publication as provided by law.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 17th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 103302. August 12, 1993.]

NATALIA REALTY, INC., and ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP.,petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR-REGION IV, respondents.

Loni M. Patajo for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1.
POLITICAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL LAW.
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and condominiums
in general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law
and a special law, the latter prevails (National Power Corporation v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXV, G.R. No.
72477, 16 October 1990, 190 SCRA 477).
2.
ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, JUSTIFIED IN THE
CASE AT BAR. Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant
petition, suffice it to say that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from those of petitioners.
The former involve possession; the latter, the propriety of including under the operation of CARL lands already
converted for residential use prior to its effectivity. Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public

respondents acted on their letter-protests, this after sitting it out for almost a year. Given the official indifference,
which under the circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to act to assert and protect their
interests. (Rocamora v. RTC-Cebu, Br. VIII, G.R. No. 65037, 23 November 1988, 167 SCRA 615).
3.
CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; AGRICULTURAL LAND, DEFINED; LANDS NOT DEVOTED TO
AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITY, OUTSIDE THE COVERAGE OF CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the
CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined
in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." (Sec. 3 (c), R.A. 6657)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands
which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
(Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51,
citing Record, CONCOM, 7 August 1986, Vol. III, p. 30) Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside
the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of
CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing
Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, (DAR Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1990), DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus ". . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances
as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use." The Secretary of Justice, responding to a query
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an Opinion that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No.
1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed
as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the
meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the
coverage of CARL.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies 1 prior to 15 June 1988, 2 covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? This is the pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari assailing the Notice of
Coverage 3 of the Department of Agrarian Reform over parcels of land already reserved as townsite areas before the
enactment of the law.
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of land located in
Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and 2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078
hectares, and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31527 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities
of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were
designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing subdivisions within the
reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC, for brevity), as developer of NATALIA
properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval and locational clearances by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission. The necessary permit for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of 13.2371
hectares, was issued sometime in 1982; 4 for Phase II, with an area of 80.0000 hectares, on 13 October 1983; 5 and for
Phase III, which consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986. 6 Petitioners were likewise issued
development permits7 after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988" (CARL, for
brevity), went into effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through
its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued on 22 November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of

the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection
to the Notice of Coverage.
EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice wrote him
requesting the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for brevity), filed a
complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain petitioners from developing areas
under cultivation by SAMBA members. 8 The Regional Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with
the development of the subdivision. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied. Instead, the Regional
Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB); however, on 16
December 1991 the DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator for further proceedings. 9
In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to set aside the Notice
of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action on the protest-letters, thus compelling
petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a year thereafter.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including undeveloped portions of
the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be
agricultural lands when they were included in the areas reserved by presidential fiat for townsite reservation.
Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They maintain that the permits
granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and
Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree," in that no
application for conversion of the NATALIA lands from agricultural to residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other
words, there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents allege that the instant petition was prematurely filed
because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated.
Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies available to
them before coming to court.
The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearances as well
as the Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that
contrary to the claim of public respondents, petitioners NATALIA and EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of
law.
Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development Corporation, the
agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the development of the townsite reservation, before applying for the
necessary permits from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. 10 And, in all permits granted to petitioners, the
Commission stated invariably therein that the applications were in "conformance" 11 or "conformity" 12 or
"conforming" 13 with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence, the argument of public
respondents that not all of the requirements were complied with cannot be sustained. llcd
As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval from DAR. The
NATALIA properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning
population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all
requisites were met. And, in the case at bar, there was compliance with all relevant rules and requirements. Even in their
applications for the development of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, the predecessor agency of HLURB noted that
petitioners NATALIA and EDIC complied with all the requirements prescribed by P.D. 957
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and condominiums in
general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to the Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which
makes it a special law. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the latter
prevails. 14
Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision which have already been developed. 15 Of course, this is contrary to its earlier position that there was no valid
conversion. The applications for the developed and undeveloped portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated.
Consequently, both did not need prior DAR approval.

We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL
shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands." As to
what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural
lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." 17
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any
language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be
agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question
continue to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the
fact that SAMBA members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development. The
enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion but this does not detract
from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR. In
its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR
itself defined "agricultural land" thus
". . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988
for residential, commercial or industrial use."
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such conversion. It
was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, noted in an
Opinion 19 that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part,
having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing
agency," are "not deemed 'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657." Not being
deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.
Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant petition, suffice it to say
that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from those of petitioners. The former involve
possession; the latter, the propriety of including under the operation of CARL lands already converted for residential use
prior to its effectivity.
Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents acted on their letter-protests, this after sitting
it out for almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under the circumstances could have continued forever,
petitioners had to act to assert and protect their interests. 20
In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in issuing the assailed
Notice of Coverage dated 22 November 1990 of lands over which they no longer have jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by virtue of
which undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B.
ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO,

FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE,
TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO
M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO,
PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME
ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground
thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules'
increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and
could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened
and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of
men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource
among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing
the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal
adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private
property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to
"formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the
uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform
program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable

retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State
shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the
Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded
almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for
the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on
July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the
President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of
farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are
not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common
discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first
be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and
his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were
declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is
invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small
landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a
court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5and Manotok
v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in
cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the
burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the
owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied
by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the
agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the
Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases ofChavez v.
Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land
Reform Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula
prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention

whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no valuation of their property
has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties because the
lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on
tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below
24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final
ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed
in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except
Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be
declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare land,
who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise
agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he
adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Copetitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit
the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative
power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period.
At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and
equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial
amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset
Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this
special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the amount
appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be
raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the
contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount
to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as
provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that may consist of part
cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed
upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the
sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to
them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are
a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which
claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another
motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both
motions were granted by the Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the
appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20
and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than
the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by
the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an
amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner
declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of
the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No.
131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the
Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP
and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a
different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing
public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the
petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the
corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation
law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is
actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated
later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of
E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional
because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the
House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of
Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land
transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he
filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These
orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private
respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and
arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the
Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police
power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of
his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that,
besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered
as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners
in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed
with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he
argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the
tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that
date should therefore be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14,
1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in
effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not
exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from
his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall
have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of
retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even
assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been
issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an
accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of
LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D.
No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off
Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the
petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency
of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has
not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is
especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own
more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them
also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the
ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere
letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government,
the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both
when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial
supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes
upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in
striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy
and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies
were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor
the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the
issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered
by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment
to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of
several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the
ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving
at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning
and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision.
Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall, and
heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the
people's will as expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we
shall.
II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been
sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President
Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was
formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the
legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost
her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or
declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of the
legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of
invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the
challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP
Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it
does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and
specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not
applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason
that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet
been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the
Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not
provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657
does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This
section declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility
as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of
its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the
title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called,
had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to
argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was
only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that
time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for
publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments successfully
challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a
general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that
mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised.
In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the
exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the
extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will
require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only.
For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to
decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to
take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case
to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of
law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the
application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for
example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets
of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved
was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous
aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the
subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company
which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee
assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without compensating
the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power.
He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner
of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property
without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from
dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious
use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it
or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with
paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious as it may because
of further changes in local or social conditions the restriction will have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent
domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing
power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of
the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which
sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on
different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of
private property for improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police
power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point

reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So
long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public
purpose," the pertinent measure need have afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive
growth of government's involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted
considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful
complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in
Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the
police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as
a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas
declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent
domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.

28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained
the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been
allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark.
Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the
owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area
could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court nonetheless
recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the
loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to
neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a
landmark the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance
atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling
Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger,
hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the
extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmerbeneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are
challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has
already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the
deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being
questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations
of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of
expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits
has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such
limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also
made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own.
However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must

be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to
a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share
the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event,
the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence
of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those
of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the
subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first
requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the
constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does
not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to
pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny
him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard
to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended
for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate
where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary
deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot
accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come
into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private
rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as
in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute).
The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public
agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring
private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute
private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments
in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it
has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known
as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It
refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative

or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now
includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not
be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private
landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under
the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may
assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between
the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal,
throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters
connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the
United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less than
the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their
owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and
R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or
collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. 39 It
has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just"
is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of
private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has
dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the
just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1)
the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must
be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures
before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the
condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and
all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law
provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from
the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides
that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-

... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the
land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the
above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty
(30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either
the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In
declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this
Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of
private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before
the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing
short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner
and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot
exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under
P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still
have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the
decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the
haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and
arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the
challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner
and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property.
But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive
upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of
justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such
amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the
criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50)
hectares Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below Thirty-five percent
(35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical
assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten
percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year
from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full
or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of
their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets
foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or
region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided
the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise,
preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or
region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That
the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain
percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments;
Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;

(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder
in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the
owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium
of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a
just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood
to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer
by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration,

46

this Court held:

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its
taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain
would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to
which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a
person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree
on as a price to be given and received for such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to
the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the
owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on
any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard
medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in
cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable
and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must
be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature
to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis
supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no
other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal
here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local
purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are
in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not
only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this
country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved in this program as we are today,
although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our
thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this
revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of
their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land
subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more

indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top
priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be
needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less
conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to
be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as
is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with
money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that
what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at
the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the members
regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project
even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the
landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as "progressive compensation"
and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of the just
compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the
general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner
in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in
the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain
degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely
anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations
of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will
result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and
resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find
further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on
the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller
the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government
financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are
likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock,
LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience.
As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious
as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share
in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more
as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the
requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure
or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes.
On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors
mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in
full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other
democratic jurisdictions. Thus:

Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing
just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition under the
Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property
taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the
condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As
early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to public
use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the
fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate
the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that
the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority
of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has
been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute
reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until
compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he
shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned
by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized
farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in
the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also
provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the
land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt
by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O.
No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express provision in
Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with
the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be
examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do
not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their
retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by
R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those
who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments
are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper
instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian
reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is
inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes.
We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in
freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to
clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but
also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his
servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now
can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth
his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the
retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.]

LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.

Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.

DECISION

PARAS, J p:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent injunction against
the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating
the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same
apply to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section
11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with
others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11,
Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated
on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on
January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is
also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing
the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for Reconsideration
regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an injunction bond in the amount of
P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda
(Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp.
186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a)

Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural

Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."

(b)

Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry

and swine raising . . ."

(c)

Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.

(d)

Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the

just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e)

Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13

". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That
these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the
DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit
after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the end of
the fiscal year . . ."

The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine
in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith.
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
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AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM

Section 4.

The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular

farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
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xxx"

Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the
correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law. It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution,
in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry
raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more
than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners
of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising
purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and
poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and
birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including
backyard raisers, about 80% of those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The
remaining 20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term
"agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's
International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words:
"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding,
breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution (J.M.
Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The
words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
[1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the
courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to
the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of

the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the
understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 [1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud
devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record,
CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to
insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial lands
and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal,
however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and
suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several questions, among
others, quoted as follows:
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xxx

"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and farmworkers. I wonder if it means
that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers to own directly or collectively the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers
include those who work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a poultry project and for
that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or
ultimately or collectively, the land on which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM,
August 2, 1986, p. 618).
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xxx

xxx

The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
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xxx

xxx

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay Commissioner Regalado
na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang
inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM,
August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent
that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is
simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing
"corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans"
(pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of
their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for
being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that
the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of
the case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742;
Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).

However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not
hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only
criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment
is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate "to
make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the people's will as
expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the
judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art.
VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the
Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the
writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I agree that the petition be granted.
It is my opinion however that the main issue on the validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include the
raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in their coverage can not be simplistically reduced to a question of constitutional
construction.
It is a well-settled rule that construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them. A close reading however of the constitutional text in point, specifically, Sec. 4,
Art. XIII, particularly the phrase, ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof," provides a
basis for the clear and possible coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine raising within the ambit of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. This accords with the principle that every presumption should be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute and the court in considering the validity of a statute should give it such reasonable
construction as can be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. 1
The presumption against unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater weight when a ruling to the contrary would,
in effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers in the
promotion of social justice, by the expedient conversion of agricultural lands into livestock, poultry, and swine raising by
scheming landowners, thus, rendering the comprehensive nature of the agrarian program merely illusory.
The instant controversy, I submit, boils down to the question of whether or not the assailed provisions violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1) which teaches simply that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. 2
There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to
cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising, that make
real differences, to wit:
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xxx

xxx

No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming. There are no tenants nor landlords, only
employers and employees.
Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land nor are they "fruits of the land."
Land is not even a primary resource in this industry. The land input is inconsequential that all the commercial hog and
poultry farms combined occupy less than one percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million hectares
of land supposedly covered by the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of land.
In every respect livestock and poultry production is an industrial activity. Its use of an inconsequential portion of land is a
mere incident of its operation, as in any other undertaking, business or otherwise.
The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry production as an agricultural enterprise is nowhere more evident when one
considers that at least 95% of total investment in these farms is in the form of fixed assets which are industrial in nature.
These include (1) animal housing structures and facilities complete with drainage, waterers, blowers, misters and in some
cases even piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts, generators, etc.; (3)
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) anti-pollution equipment such as bio-gas and digester
plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses and accessory
facilities; (6) modern equipment such as sprayers, pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities complete with expensive
tools and equipment; and a myriad other such technologically advanced appurtances.
How then can livestock and poultry farmlands be arable when such are almost totally occupied by these structures?
The fallacy of equating the status of livestock and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural tenants surfaces when one
considers contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total operating cost. The
98% balance represents inputs not obtained from the land nor provided by the farmworkers inputs such as feeds and
biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power cost, cost of money and several others.
Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy law. They are
entitled to social security benefits where tenant-farmers are not. They are paid fixed wages rather than crop shares. And
as in any other industry, they receive additional benefits such as allowances, bonuses, and other incentives such as free
housing privileges, light and water.
Equating livestock and poultry farming with other agricultural activities is also fallacious in the sense that like the
manufacturing sector, it is a market for, rather than a source of agricultural output. At least 60% of the entire domestic
supply of corn is absorbed by livestock and poultry farms. So are the by-products of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra meal),
banana (banana pulp meal), and fish (fish meal).
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xxx

xxx

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that both kinds of lands are not similarly situated and hence, can not be treated
alike. Therefore, the assailed provisions which allow for the inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within the coverage
of the agrarian reform program constitute invalid classification and must accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.