Domestic Surveillance is necessary to stop terror

and foreign espionage the NSA has found a happy

medium between privacy and security now
Honorof 13

Marshall How the NSA's Spying Keeps You Safe http://www.tomsguide.com/us/nsa-spying-keeps-safe,review-

1899.html

The U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) may have taken some fairly extreme liberties when it
comes to collecting user data, but the organization hasn't acted on a whim. Call
the NSA's surveillance unethical or unconstitutional or dangerous, but it has a responsibility to protect the
United States with every tool at its disposal. If you haven't been keeping up with the issue, Americans and Britons are very angry with their
governments right now. Reports from The Guardian and The New York Times indicate that the NSA and its British counterpart, Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), have the capacity to intercept just about everything their citizens do online, from social media information to
encrypted emails. While this anger is both understandable and justifiable, relatively few people have stopped to consider the other side of the coin.

You can have total privacy or total national security, but you cannot have
both. A modern democratic society requires a compromise between the two extremes. The most
important thing to keep in mind is that there is, at present, absolutely no indication that the
NSA has done anything illegal or outside the parameters of its mission statement. The NSA monitors
external threats to the U.S., and, in theory, does not turn its attention to American citizens without probable cause. There is
no evidence to the contrary among the documents that Edward Snowden leaked. "How do we protect our nation? How do we defend it?" asked Gen. Keith
Alexander, the NSA's director, at the Black Hat 2013 security conference, held in Las Vegas in July. "[This information] is not classified to keep it from you:

While the thought of the NSA

controlling every bit of information that the average American citizen
posts online is disconcerting, Alexander maintained that a terrorist attack
is even worse for a country's basic freedoms. "What we're talking about is future terrorist attacks,"
Alexander said, discussing a number of planned attacks that the NSA foiled over the last 10 years. " It is worth considering
what would have happened in the world if those attacks 42 of those 54
were terrorist plots if they were successfully executed. What would that mean to our civil
liberties and privacy?" James Lewis, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agrees. "The NSA said there were 54
cases where they were able to detect plans and stop them, and 50 of them
led to arrests," Lewis told Tom's Guide. "Fifty doesn't sound like a lot compared to the number of records [the NSA collected], but would you
have preferred to have 50 more Boston bombings?" Counterterrorism is not the only function of the NSA's widespread surveillance. Although it
cannot report exact numbers, Lewis theorizes that the data-mining has
allowed the NSA to put a stop to a number of international espionage
plots. "The original intent of all these programs was to find foreign spies," he said. "They haven't
a good person. It's classified because sitting among you are people who wish us harm."

talked about that, but presumably there have been some successes there, too. A lot of times when you see things and there doesn't appear to be any

As an example of how
domestic surveillance can unearth international plots, Lewis pointed to
the North Korean ship stopped in Panama in August 2013. The vessel turned
out to be smuggling illegal arms from Cuba. "The Panamanians just woke up one day and decided to look in
explanation of how we seemed to magically know about it, it might very well be espionage."

their ship? I think not," Lewis said. The NSA is not the only government in the world that runs surveillance programs. In fact, if the NSA is keeping tabs on
you, there's a good chance that other countries are as well. If you're lucky, they'll be Germany and Australia; if not, then Russia and China may have you
under the microscope. Robert David Graham, founder and chief executive officer
leverage surveillance data. "There are two parts

of Errata Security, spoke with Tom's Guide about how countries

to the information," he said. "Information about foreigners and information about your own citizens.

The information you get about your own citizens affects political processes
within your own country." He went on to explain that if you stir up negative sentiment about Germany, for example, the
Germans can hoard your emails just the same as the NSA. Just like the NSA, though, they are unlikely to do anything with those emails unless you
represent some kind of clear threat. "The Russians and the Chinese don't have anything to learn about how to do surveillance from us," Lewis said. He

"It's just par for the

course everywhere in the world." Lewis believes that the NSA's surveillance is much less problematic than its
explained that the Scandinavian countries and Australia have programs that rival the NSA's as well.

transparency on the issue. "[Security

and privacy] have to be balanced, and the debate has largely been 'they should stop doing this,'" he said. "It's
weird seeing Rand Paul and the ACLU getting together [to condemn the NSA]. If Rand Paul is for it, it's probably a bad idea." The NSA is also taking the
lion's share of the blame for a problem that began at the dawn of the consumer Internet age, got worse after 9/11, and still continues to this day: Internet

There really isn't any privacy anymore, and I

don't think Americans have realized that," Lewis said. Credit card companies, for example, know just about
everything about you, right down to what street you've lived on every year of your life. "This was commercial The NSA just
happens to be the poster child for this at the moment." There's one thing on which both staunch critics like Graham and
privacy, or more accurately, the almost total lack thereof. "

fierce proponents like Lewis agree: The U.S. government must be clear and open with its citizens regarding the need for security, even when that security

Total security means zero privacy. Total privacy means zero

security," Graham said. "The extremes are what we have to fear The NSA should
be monitoring people. It's just the issue of monitoring Americans without
probable cause that really bothers the heck out of me." "If you have the right rules,
if you have the right laws, if you have the right amount of transparency,
you can feel comfortable with this," Lewis said. "Comfortable" is a very strong word, but if the choice is
between invasive surveillance and the very real threats of terrorism and
espionage, it's not so easy to write the NSA off entirely.
becomes invasive. "

Going Dark DA

1NC
Current NSA has control of deep web by using existing
backdoors to bypass encryption methods.
Franceschi 07/15/15 (LORENZO FRANCESCHI-BICCHIERA is a staffwriter at
motherboard, The FBI Hacked a Dark Web Child Porn Site to Unmask Its Visitors
http://motherboard.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-fbi-hacked-a-dark-web-child-porn-siteto-unmask-its-visitors)
Its no secret that the FBI hacks into suspects computers during its investigations.
But the bureau is certainly not a fan of publicizing its methods. A recent case
involving two frequent users of an unnamed dark web child pornography site is no
different. Last week, two men from New York were indicted on child pornography
charges, and in court documents, the prosecutors and the FBI were careful not to
reveal too many details about the investigation. But a passage in the court
documents, spotted by Stanford computer science and law expert Jonathan Mayer,
reveals that the feds deployed a Network Investigative Technique to unmask the
two men and obtain their real IP address. That's the agency's current euphemism
for hacking, Mayer told Motherboard in an email. While the court document stops
short of explaining exactly what hacking technique the FBI used, the description
seems to point in the direction of a watering hole attack or a drive-by download,
techniques where hackers hijack a website and subvert it to deliver malware to all
the visitors. On February 20, 2015 the FBI seized the server hosting what the FBI
refers to only as Website A, according to court documents. That allowed the
bureau to use a Network Investigative Technique, or NIT, to monitor the electronic
communications of all visitors of the site until March 4. The NIT was designed was
designed to trick the computers of the more than 200,000 visitors of the site into
sending the FBI a host of information about the target, such as his or her actual IP
address, the computers operating system, and its MAC address, a computers
unique identifier, according to court documents. Given the way the FBI describes
how it unmasked the two suspects, Alex Schreiber and Peter Ferrell, for Mayer,
theres no other technical explanation that this was a case of hacking and use of
malware.

Deep web is a host of crimes specifically with drug trafficking

Grossman 11/11/13 (Lev Grossman, lead technology writer for the times, Nov. 11,
2013, The Secret Web: Where Drugs, Porn and Murder Live Online
http://time.com/630/the-secret-web-where-drugs-porn-and-murder-live-online/)
On the afternoon of Oct. 1, 2013, a tall, slender, shaggy-haired man left his house on
15th Avenue in San Francisco. He paid $1,000 a month cash to share it with two housemates who knew him only as
a quiet currency trader named Josh Terrey. His real name was Ross Ulbricht. He was 29 and had no police
record. Dressed in jeans and a red T-shirt, Ulbricht headed to the Glen Park branch of the public library, where he
made his way to the science-fiction section and logged on to his laptophe was using the free wi-fi. Several FBI
agents dressed in plainclothes converged on him, pushed him up against a window, then escorted him from the

The FBI believes Ulbricht is a criminal known online as the Dread Pirate
Roberts, a reference to the book and movie The Princess Bride. The Dread Pirate Roberts was the
building.

owner and administrator of Silk Road, a wildly successful online bazaar where
people bought and sold illegal goodsprimarily drugs but also fake IDs, fireworks and
hacking software. They could do this without getting caught because Silk Road was
located in a little-known region of the Internet called the Deep Web. Technically the Deep Web
refers to the collection of all the websites and databases that search engines like Google
dont or cant index, which in terms of the sheer volume of information is many times larger than the Web as
we know it. But more loosely, the Deep Web is a specific branch of the Internet thats
distinguished by that increasingly rare commodity: complete anonymity. Nothing you do on the Deep
Web can be associated with your real-world identity, unless you choose it to be. Most people never see it,
though the software you need to access it is free and takes less than three minutes
to download and install. If theres a part of the grid that can be considered off the grid, its the Deep Web.
The Deep Web has plenty of valid reasons for existing . Its a vital tool for intelligence
agents, law enforcement, political dissidents and

anybody who needs or wants to conduct

their online affairs in privatewhich is, increasingly, everybody. According to a survey published in
September by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 86% of Internet users have attempted to delete or conceal
their digital history, and 55% have tried to avoid being observed online by specific parties like their employers or

But the Deep Web is also an ideal venue for doing things that are
unlawful, especially when its combined , as in the case of Silk Road, with the anonymous,
virtually untraceable electronic currency Bitcoin. It allows all sorts of criminals who, in
bygone eras, had to find open-air drug markets or an alley somewhere to engage in bad activity to do it
openly, argues Preet Bharara, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, whose office is bringing
a case against Ulbricht and who spoke exclusively to TIME. For 2 years Silk Road acted as an
Amazon-like clearinghouse for illegal goods, providing almost a million customers
worldwide with $1.2 billion worth of contraband , according to the 39-page federal complaint
the government.

against Ulbricht. The Dread Pirate Roberts, the Deep Webs Jeff Bezos, allegedly collected some $80 million in fees.

Earlier today, FBI Director James Comey implied that a broad coalition of technology
companies, trade associations, civil society groups, and security experts were either
uninformed or were not fair-minded in a letter they sent to the President
yesterday urging him to reject any legislative proposals that would undermine the
adoption of strong encryption by US companies. The letter was signed by dozens of organizations and
companies in the latest part of the debate over whether the government should be given built-in access to
encrypted data (see, for example, here, here, here, and here for previous iterations).

The comments were made at the Third Annual Cybersecurity Law Institute held at Georgetown University Law
Center. The transcript of his encryption-related discussion is below (emphasis added).

Increasingly,

communications at rest sitting on a device or in motion are encrypted .

The device is encrypted or the communication is encrypted and therefore
unavailable to us even with a court order. So I make a showing of probable cause to a judge in a
criminal case or in an intelligence case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge that the content of a
particular defense or a particular communication stream should be collected to our statutory authority, and the
judge approves, increasingly we are finding ourselves unable to read what we find or were unable to open a device.
And that is a serious concern.

encryption is a good thing. I think there are tremendous societal benefits to

encryption. Thats one of the reasons the FBI tells people not only lock your cars, but
you should encrypt things that are important to you to make it harder for thieves to
take them.
I am actually I think

But we have a collision going on in this country thats getting closer and closer to an
actual head-on, which is our important interest in privacy which I am passionate about
and our important interest in public safety. The logic of universal encryption is inexorable that our
authority under the Fourth Amendment an amendment that I think is critical to ordered liberty with the right
predication and the right oversight to obtain information is going to become increasingly irrelevant. As all of our
lives become digital, the logic of encryption is that all of our lives will be covered by strong encryption, therefore all
of our lives I know there are no criminals here, but including the lives of criminals and terrorists and spies will
be in a place that is utterly unavailable to court ordered process.

And that, I think, to a democracy should be very, very concerning. I think we need to have a conversation about it.
Again, how do we strike the right balance? Privacy matters tremendously. Public safety, I think, matters
tremendously to everybody. I think fair-minded people have to recognize that there are tremendous benefits to a
society from encryption. There are tremendous costs to a society from universal strong encryption. And how do we
think about that?

A group of tech companies and some prominent folks wrote a letter to the President yesterday that I frankly found
depressing. Because their letter contains no acknowledgment that there are societal costs to universal encryption.
Look, I recognize the challenges facing our tech companies. Competitive challenges, regulatory challenges
overseas, all kinds of challenges. I recognize the benefits of encryption, but I think fair-minded people also have to
recognize the costs associated with that. And I read this letter and I think, Either these folks dont see what I see or
theyre not fair-minded. And either one of those things is depressing to me. So Ive just got to continue to have the
conversation.

I dont know the answer, but I dont think a democracy should drift to a place where suddenly law enforcement
people say, Well, actually we the Fourth Amendment is an awesome thing, but we actually cant access any
information.

Weve got to have a conversation long before the logic of strong encryption takes us to that place. And smart
people, reasonable people will disagree mightily. Technical people will say its too hard. My reaction to that is:
Really? Too hard? Too hard for the people we have in this country to figure something out? Im not that pessimistic. I
think we ought to have a conversation.

Turns case - drug trafficking has harsh economic consequences

UN 2012 (United Nation, 26 June 2012, Thematic Debate of the 66th session of the
United Nations General Assembly on Drugs and Crime as a Threat to Development
http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml )
On the occasion of the UN International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit
Trafficking
In the past decade, there has been significant growth in the illicit trafficking of
drugs, people, firearms, and natural resources. Trafficking in these and other commodities is generally
characterized by high levels of organization and the presence of strong criminal
groups and networks. While such activities existed in the past, both the scale and the geographic scope of the current challenge are unprecedented. In 2009,

Transnational organized crime and drug

trafficking is of growing concern, and particularly illicit trades broad impact on
development. Few, if any, countries are exempt. Drug trafficking has particularly severe implications
because of the vast illegal profits it generates: an estimated 322 billion dollars a
year. In several drug production and transit regions, criminal groups undermine
state authority and the rule of law by fuelling corruption, compromising elections,
and hurting the legitimate economy . In all cases, criminal influence and money are having a significant impact on the livelihoods and quality
the value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at US$1.3 trillion and is increasing.

of life of citizens, most particularly the poor, women and children. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document expressed Member States grave concern at the negative effects on
development, peace and security and human rights posed by transnational crime, including the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings, the world narcotic drug problem and the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. (A/RES/60/1 at 111). The General Assembly has most recently reiterated this concern and noted the increasing vulnerability of states to
such crime in Resolution A/Res/66/181 (Strengthening the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in particular its technical cooperation capacity). The
Assembly has also recognized that despite continuing increased efforts by States, relevant organizations, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the world drug problem
undermines socio-economic and political stability and sustainable development. See A/Res/66/183 (International cooperation against the world drug problem). A number of
international conventions on drug control, and more recently the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its protocols on human trafficking, migrant
smuggling and trafficking of firearms, as well as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), constitute the key framework for a strategic response. Such instruments call upon State
Parties to take into account the negative effects of organized crime on society in general, in particular on sustainable development, and to alleviate the factors that make persons,
especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity. See article 30 of the UNTOC and article 9 of the Trafficking
Protocol. See also article 62 of the UNCAC. They also commit parties to respect fundamental human rights in countering organized crime and drug trafficking. The Secretary
Generals 2005 "In Larger Freedom report highlighted that We will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy security without development". The SecretaryGenerals 2010 Keeping the Promise report (A/64/665) recognized that in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, integrity, accountability and transparency are crucial
for managing resources, recovering assets and combating the abuse, corruption and organized crime that are adversely affecting the poor. Par. 57. As we move towards 2015, and

As
economic development is threatened by transnational organized crime and illicit
drugs, countering crime must form part of the development agenda, and social and economic
development approaches need to form part of our response to organized crime . If we are to ensure that the MDGs are
achieved, we must strengthen strategies to deliver these goals , including stepping up efforts to address
issues such as money laundering, corruption and trafficking in wildlife, people and arms, and drugs. Organized crime and drugs impact
every economy, in every country, but they are particularly devastating in weak and
vulnerable countries. Weak and fragile countries are particularly vulnerable to the effects of transnational organized crime. These countries, some devastated
by war, others making the complex journey towards democracy, are preyed upon by crime. As a result, organized crime flourishes,
successes in development are reversed, and opportunities for social and economic
advancement are lost. Corruption, a facilitator of organized crime and drug
trafficking, is a serious impediment to the rule of law and sustainable development . It
can be a dominant factor driving fragile countries towards failure. It is estimated that up to US$40 billion annually is lost through corruption in developing countries. Drugs
and crime undermine development by eroding social and human capital . This
degrades quality of life and can force skilled workers to leave, while the direct
impacts of victimisation, as well as fear of crime, may impede the development of
those that remain. By limiting movement, crime impedes access to possible employment and educational opportunities, and it discourages the accumulation of
assets. Crime is also more expensive for poor people in poor countries, and disadvantaged households may struggle to cope with the shock of victimisation. Drugs and
crime also undermine development by driving away business . Both foreign and
domestic investors see crime as a sign of social instability , and crime drives up the cost of doing business. Tourism
is a sector especially sensitive to crime issues. Drugs and crime, moreover, undermine the ability of the state
to promote development by destroying the trust relationship between the people
and the state, and undermining democracy and confidence in the criminal justice system. When people lose confidence in the
criminal justice system, they may engage in vigilantism, which further undermines
the state.
take stock of the Millennium Development Goals, there is a growing recognition that organized crime and illicit drugs are major impediments to their achievement.

Link
Backdoors key to solving for encryption on the Internet
Kravets 07/08/15 (David Kravets, July 8, 2015, FBI chief tells Senate committee
were doomed without crypto backdoors https://www.benton.org/headlines/fbichief-tells-senate-committee-were-doomed-without-crypto-backdoors)
Comey, the director of the FBI, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the
government should have the right to lawfully access any device or electronic form of
communication with a lawful court order , even if it is encrypted. Director Comey and Deputy
Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates briefed the committee and complained that keys necessary to
decrypt communications and electronic devices often reside "solely in the hands of
the end user"-- which they said is emblematic of the so-called "Going Dark problem ."
Companies should bake encryption backdoors into their products to allow lawful
access, they said. "We are not asking to expand the government's surveillance authority, but rather we are
James

asking to ensure that we can continue to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority

"Mr. Chairman,
the Department of Justice believes that the challenges posed by the Going Dark
problem are grave, growing, and extremely complex ." To counter this, the duo said the
government is actively developing its own decryption tools. The remarks said, " We should also continue to
invest in developing tools, techniques, and capabilities designed to mitigate the
increasing technical challenges associated with the Going Dark problem . In limited
that Congress has provided to us to keep America safe," read the joint prepared remarks.

circumstances, this investment may help mitigate the risks posed in high priority national security or criminal cases,
although it will most likely be unable to provide a timely or scalable solution in terms of addressing the full
spectrum of public safety needs.

Mandates that ban decryption methods hurt FBIs ability to

navigate sites like the dark web. We should hold off on
mandates to ban decryption methods in the status quo
Wittes 07/12/15 (Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior
Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, July 12, 2015, Thoughts
on Encryption and Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits
http://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-encryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debatemerits)
There's a final, non-legal factor that may push companies to work this problem as
energetically as they are now moving toward end-to-end encryption: politics . We are
at very particular moment in the cryptography debate, a moment in which law enforcement
sees a major problem as having arrived but the tech companies see that problem as
part of the solution to the problems the Snowden revelations created for them. That is, we have an
end-to-end encryption issue, in significant part, because companies are trying to assure
customers worldwide that they have their backs privacy-wise and are not simply tools of NSA. I
think those politics are likely to change. If Comey is right and we start seeing law
enforcement and intelligence agencies blind in investigating and preventing horrible crimes and

the pressure on the companies is going to shift. And it may shift fast
and hard. Whereas the companies now feel intense pressure to assure customers
that their data is safe from NSA, the kidnapped kid with the encrypted iPhone is going
to generate a very different sort of political response . In extraordinary circumstances,
extraordinary access may well seem reasonable. And people will wonder why it doesn't exist. Which of these
approaches is the right way to go? I would pursue several of them simultaneously. At least for now, I
would hold off on any kind of regulatory mandate , there being just too much doubt at this stage
concerning what's doable. I would, however, take a hard look at the role that civil liability
might play. I think the government, if it's serious about creating an extraordinary access scheme, needs to
significant threats,

generate some public research establishing proof of concept. We should watch very carefully how the companies
respond to the mandates they will receive from governments that will approach this problem in a less nuanced

Comey should keep up the political pressure. The combination of

these forces may well produce a more workable approach to the problem than
anyone can currently envision.
fashion than ours will. And

Uniqueness
http://blog.acton.org/archives/71950-deep-dark-web-like-cockroaches-humantraffickers-prefer-dark.html

Recent stops of drug trafficking sites prove

Europol 14 ( Europol 7 November 2014, Global Action Against Dark Markets on Tor
Network
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/global-action-against-dark-markets-tornetwork)
On 6 November, law enforcement and judicial agencies around the globe undertook
a joint action against dark markets running as hidden services on Tor* network. 16 European
countries,** alongside counterparts from the United States, brought down several
marketplaces as part of a unified international action from Europols operational coordination centre in The
Hague. The action aimed to stop the sale, distribution and promotion of illegal and
harmful items, including weapons and drugs , which were being sold on online dark
marketplaces. Operation Onymous, coordinated by Europols European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the FBI, the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcements (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Eurojust, resulted in
17 arrests of vendors and administrators running these online marketplaces and more than 410 hidden services
being taken down. In addition, bitcoins worth approximately USD 1 million, EUR 180 000 euro in cash, drugs, gold
and silver were seized. The dark market Silk Road 2.0 was taken down by the FBI and the U.S. ICE HIS, and the
operator was arrested. The Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), located at Europols headquarters, supported
the operation. The J-CAT was created to serve as a platform for targeted operations against global criminal networks

we have
demonstrated that, together, we are able to efficiently remove vital criminal
infrastructures that are supporting serious organised crime. And we are not 'just' removing these
services from the open Internet; this time we have also hit services on the Darknet
using Tor where, for a long time, criminals have considered themselves beyond reach .
We can now show that they are neither invisible nor untouchab le. The criminals can run but
they cant hide. And our work continues...., says Troels Oerting, Head of EC3. Our efforts have
disrupted a website that allows illicit black-market activities to evolve and expand,
and provides a safe haven for illegal vices , such as weapons distribution, drug
trafficking and murder-for-hire, says Kumar Kibble, regional attach for HSI in Germany. HSI
and infrastructure, carried out by EC3 and our colleagues in EU Member States and beyond.

Today

will continue to work in partnership with Europol and its law enforcement partners around the world to hold
criminals who use anonymous Internet software for illegal activities accountable for their actions. Working

closely with domestic and international law enforcement, the FBI and our partners have
taken action to disrupt several websites dedicated to the buying and selling of
illegal drugs and other unlawful goods. Combating cyber criminals remains a top priority for
the FBI, and we continue to aggressively investigate, disrupt, and dismantle illicit
networks that pose a threat in cyberspace , says Robert Anderson, FBI Executive Assistant Director
of the of the Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch.

.terror impact
Bioweapons are easily accessible by terrorists and lead to mass deaths
Wilson 13 (Grant, 1/17/13, University of Virginia School of Law, MINIMIZING
GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW, professor @ University of Virginia School of Law,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/lawjournals/sites/lawjournals/files/3.%20Wilson%20%20Emerging%20Technologies.pdf, 7/15/15, SM)
ii. Risk of bioterrorism The threat of the malicious release of bioengineered organisms (i.e., bioterrorism) poses a

Bioengineering enables a malicious actor to create an organism that is

more deadly to humans, animals, or plants than anything that exists in the natural
world.76 Experts contend that the barriers for a terrorist to order a DNA sequence for a highly pathogenic virus
online or acquire a DNA synthesis machine online are surmountable. 77 Alternatively, bioterrorists could
break into laboratories housing dangerous bioengineered organismslike the
H5N1 virus, for exampleand release them. Meanwhile, third world countries with
laxer standards and lower laboratory accountability are rapidly discovering and
using bioengineering, which may give bioterrorists an easier pathway to obtain
deadly bioengineered organisms.78 There have already been several occasions in which groups
GCR/ER.75

attempted to use or successfully used biological weapons. One unsophisticated example of bioterrorism occurred
when an individual contaminated salads and dressing with salmonella in what apparently was an attempt to

occurred in 2001, when bioterrorists sent envelopes

containing anthrax spores through the mail, infecting twenty-two people and killing
five of them. 80 While these particular acts of bioterrorism did not cause widespread death, deploying
extremely deadly bioengineered organisms over a large area is a real possibility:
tests by the United States in 1964 demonstrated that a single aircraft can
contaminate five thousand square kilometers of land with a deadly bacterial
aerosol.81 The recent engineering of an airborne H5N1 virus demonstrates societys
concern over risks of bioterrorism arising from bioengineering. Before scientists could
decide a local election.79 Another example

publish their results of their bioengineered airborne H5N1 virus in the widely read journals Nature and Science, the
NSABB determined that the danger of releasing the sensitive information outweighed the benefits to society,
advising that the findings not be published in their entirety.82 The main risk is that either a state or non-state
actor could synthesize a weaponized version of the H5N1 virus to create a disastrous pandemic.83 There is
precedent of outside groups recreating advanced bioengineering experiments, such as when many scientists
immediately synthesized hepatitis C replicons upon publication of its genetic code. 84 However, the NSABBs
recommendation was nonbinding, and there is nothing to stop other scientists from releasing similar data in the
future. Furthermore, while the NSABB merely asserts that the blueprints of the virus should not be printed, other
biosecurity experts argue that the virus should never have been created in the first place because of risks that the
viruses would escape or be stolen.85

Split-Key CP

Counter-plan: The United States federal

government should protect backdoors by using
split crypto keys.

Split crypto key solves

Crawford 15 (Douglas Crawford, freelance writer quoting NSA Chief Mike Rodgers,
2015, NSA suggests split crypto keys to protect data
https://www.bestvpn.com/blog/16988/nsa-suggests-split-crypto-keys-to-protectdata/)
The stand-off between the US government and its various surveillance and
law enforcement agencies on the one hand, and just about everybody else on
the other, over encryption continues to deepen . The government has become increasingly
alarmed at tech companies (and in particular Apples) push to provide their customers with strongly encrypted
products that are genuinely secure even against the best efforts of law enforcement and national security

Such agencies use the time-worn boogeymen of terrorists and

pedophiles to argue that they must have access everyones personal data
agencies.

(I argue in this article that such demands have nothing to with catching criminals, and everything to do with

while privacy advocates, businesses, and anyone who does not

feel the government has an automatic right to paw through their metaphorical
undies drawer disagrees, while also pointing out that encryption with a
backdoor is really no encryption at all. Perhaps even more to the point, US tech companies
exerting state control),

are still reeling from the damage done (to the tune of billions of dollars) by Edward Snowdens revelations about
their cooperation with the NSA in spying on their customers, and desperately need to regain their trust.

According to The Washington Post, NSA chief Mike Rodgers recently gave
a rare hint at what he considers might be a technical solution to the
problem, suggesting that companies be forced to create a digital crypto
key that can be used to decrypt their customers data, but that this keys be
split into different parts that single entity (except presumably the owner of the data) would
have full access to without court orders, subpoenas, warrants etc. This would require the government
and tech companies to work together to access the data. I dont want a back door. I want a front
door. And I want the front door to

have multiple locks. Big locks.

SOLVENCY: 1nc - NSA circumvention

Redundant capabilities from other agencies

circumvent
Schneier, 15 - fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard
Law School, a program fellow at the New America Foundation's Open Technology
Institute, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, an Advisory Board
Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Chief Technology
Officer at Resilient Systems, Inc (Bruce, Data and Goliath: the Hidden Battles to
Collect Your Data and Control Your World, Introduction)//AK

The NSA might get the headlines, but the US intelligence community is
actually composed of 17 different agencies. Theres the CIA, of course. You

might have heard of the NROthe National Reconnaissance Officeits in charge

of the countrys spy satellites. Then there are the intelligence agencies
associated with all four branches of the military. The Departments of Justice
(both FBI and DEA), State, Energy, the Treasury, and Homeland Security all
conduct surveillance, as do a few other agencies. And there may be a still-secret
18th agency. (Its unlikely, but possible. The details of the NSAs mission remained
largely secret until the 1970s, over 20 years after its formation.)
After the NSA, the FBI appears to be the most prolific government
surveillance agency. It is tightly connected with the NSA, and the two
share data, technologies, and legislative authorities. Its easy to forget that
the first Snowden document published by the Guardianthe order requiring Verizon
to turn over the calling metadata for all of its customerswas an order by the FBI to
turn the data over to the NSA. We know there is considerable sharing
amongst the NSA, CIA, DEA, DIA, and DHS. An NSA program code-named
ICREACH provides surveillance information to over 23 government
agencies, including information about Americans.

AT Cyber Sec

Alt causes to data localization surveillance isnt

key
Hill 14* Technology policy consultant at Monitor 360, fellow of the Global
Governance Futures 2025 program at the Brookings Institution (Jonah, THE
GROWTH OF DATA LOCALIZATION POST-SNOWDEN: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND BUSINESS LEADERS p.1920)//GK
Upon first glance, the preceding case studies present a consistent narrative: for the nations now considering
localization for data, the Snowden revelations exposed an NSA that had overstepped the boundaries of acceptable
surveillance, violated citizen privacy, and catalyzed public and government opinion in favor of forceful action in

Under closer
examination, however, a more complicated picture emerges. The localization movement is
in fact a complex and multilayered phenomenon, with the objective not
response. For policymakers, data localization offers a seemingly simple and effective solution.

primarilyof protecting privacy. Depending on the country in which it is being

advanced, localization also serves to protect domestic businesses from foreign
competition, to support domestic intelligence and law enforcement ambitions, to suppress dissent
onlyor even

and to stir up populist enthusiasms for narrow political ends. Direct evidence of
these other objectives for which privacy seems to be a pretext is by its nature difficult to uncover: rarely to policymakers admit to seeking protectionist goals, to spying on their populations, to suppressing dissent or to exploiting
populist emotions. Yet, by viewing the localization movement in the context of other state and corporate interests

business interests
undoubtedly see data localization as an effective and convenient strategy for
gaining a competitive advantage in domestic IT markets long dominated by
U.S. tech firms. To localization proponents of this stripe, the NSA programs serve as a
powerful and politically expedient excuse to pursue policies protective of
domestic businesses. As an illustration, data localization in Germany presents clear economic benefits
and activities, it is possible to uncover these other, less exalted ends. Powerful

for a most powerful industry advocate for localization, Deutsche Telekom (DT). Whether by way of its email made
in Germany system or the Schengen area routing arrangement, DT looks poised to gain from efforts to reduce the
prominence of American tech firms in Europe. It is no wonder that the company has been spearheading many of the
localization proposals in that country. As telecommunications law expert Susan Crawford has noted, DT has been
seeking to expand its cloud computing services for years, but has found its efforts to appeal to German consumers
stifled by competition from Google and other American firms. 79 T-Systems International GmbH, DTs 29,000employee distribution arm for information-technology solutions, has been steadily losing money as a result.80
Moreover, Crawford suggests that DT would not be content with gaining a greater share of the German market; she
points out that through a Schengen routing scheme, Deutsche Telekom undoubtedly thinks that it will be able to
collect fees from network operators in other countries that want their customers data to reach Deutsche Telekoms
customers.81 Similarly, companies and their allies in government in Brazil and India look to profit from data
localization proposals. Indeed, the governments of both nations have for years sought to cultivate their own
domestic information technology sectors, at times by protecting homegrown industries with import tariffs and
preferential taxation. Brazilian President Rousseff has on numerous occasions stated that her government intends to
make Brazil a regional technology and innovation leader; in recent years the government has proposed measures to
increase domestic Internet bandwidth production, expand international Internet connectivity, encourage domestic
content production, and promote the use of domestically produced network equipment.82 India, more
controversially, has at times required foreign corporations to enter into joint ventures to sell e- commerce products,
and has compelled foreign companies to transfer proprietary technology to domestic firms after a predetermined
amount of time.83 Brazil and India are, of course, not alone in this respect. Indonesian firms are constructing
domestic cloud service facilities with the help of government grants, 84 while Korea is offering similar support to its

For the governments and corporations of these nations, long frustrated

by their inability to develop a domestic IT industry that can compete on an
even playing field with the U.S. technology giants, data localization is one means
to confront, and perhaps overcome, the American Internet hegemony. 85
own firms.

No impact to cyberattacks empirics their ev is

fear-mongering
Valeriano and Maness 5/13/15 co-authors of Cyber War versus Cyber
Realities, AND *Senior Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the
University of Glasgow, AND **Visiting Fellow of Security and Resilience
Studies at Northeastern University (Brandon and Ryan C., The Coming
Cyberpeace: The Normative Argument Against Cyberwarfare, Foreign
Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-13/comingcyberpeace

The era of cyber conflict is upon us; at least, experts seem to accept
that cyberattacks are the new normal. In fact, however, evidence
suggests that cyberconflict is not as prevalent as many believe.
Likewise, the severity of individual cyber events is not increasing, even
if the frequency of overall attacks has risen. And an emerging norm
against the use of severe state-based cyber tactics contradicts fearmongering news reports about a coming cyber apocalypse. The few
isolated incidents of successful state-based cyberattacks do not a trend
make. Rather, what we are seeing is cyberespionage and probes, not
cyberwarfare. Meanwhile, the international consensus has stabilized
around a number of limited acceptable uses of cyber technologyone
that prohibits any dangerous use of force. Despite fears of a boom in
cyberwarfare , there have been no major or dangerous hacks between
countries. The closest any states have come to such events occurred
when Russia attacked Georgian news outlets and websites in 2008;
when Russian forces shut down banking, government, and news
websites in Estonia in 2007; when Iran attacked the Saudi Arabian oil
firm Saudi Aramco with the Shamoon virus in 2012; and when the
United States attempted to sabotage Irans nuclear power systems
from 2007 to 2011 through the Stuxnet worm. The attack on Sony from
North Korea is just the latest overhyped cyberattack to date, as the
corporate giant has recovered its lost revenues from the attack and its
networks are arguably more resilient as a result. Even these are more
probes into vulnerabilities than full attacks. Russias aggressions show
that Moscow is willing to use cyberwarfare for disruption and
propaganda, but not to inflict injuries or lasting infrastructural damage.
The Shamoon incident allowed Iran to punish Saudi Arabia for its
alliance with the United States as Tehran faced increased sanctions;
the attack destroyed files on Saudi Aramcos computer network but
failed to do any lasting damage . The Stuxnet incident also failed to create
any lasting damage, as Tehran put more centrifuges online to
compensate for virus-based losses and strengthened holes in their
system. Further, these supposedly successful cases of cyberattacks are
balanced by many more examples of unsuccessful ones . If the future of
cyberconflict looks like today, the international community must
reassess the severity of the threat. Cyberattacks have demonstrated
themselves to be more smoke than fire . This is not to suggest that

incidents are on the decline, however. Distributed denial-of-service

attacks and infiltrations increase by the minuteevery major
organization is probed constantly, but only for weaknesses or new
infiltration methods for potential use in the future. Probes and pokes do
not destabilize states or change trends within international politics.
Even common cyber actions have little effect on levels of cooperation
and conflict between states.

No risk of a blackout on grids because of a

cyberattack
Perera 9/10/14 (David Perera is a cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO
Pro, 9/10/14, U.S. grid safe from large-scale attack, experts say
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/power-grid-safety110815.html#ixzz3gTzSBgeP)

The specter of a large-scale, destructive attack on the U.S. power grid is

at the center of much strategic thinking about Cybersecurity. For years,
Americans have been warned by a bevy of would-be Cassandras in
Congress, the administration and the press that hackers are poised to
shut it down. But in fact, the half-dozen security experts interviewed for
this article agreed its virtually impossible for an online-only attack to
cause a widespread or prolonged outage of the North American power
grid. Even laying the groundwork for such a cyber operation could qualify
as an act of war against the U.S. a line that few nation-state-backed
hacker crews would wish to cross. None denied that determined hackers
could penetrate the networks of bulk power providers. But theres a huge
gap between that and causing a civilization-ending sustained outage of
the grid. Electrical-grid hacking scenarios mostly overlook the
engineering expertise necessary to intentionally cause harm to the grid,
say experts knowledgeable about the power generators and high voltage
transmission entities that constitute the backbone of the grid whats
called the bulk power system. Theres also the enormity of the grid and
diversity of its equipment to consider. The grid is designed to lose
utilities all the time, said Patrick Miller, founder and director of the
Energy Sector Security Consortium. Im not trying to trivialize the
situation, but youre not really able to cause this nationwide cascading
failure for any extended duration of time, he added. Its just not
possible. ICS security in a nutshell Controlling the boilers, fans, valves and switches and
other mechanical devices that turn raw inputs and high-voltage transmission into flip-of-a-switch electricity is a
class of computers known as industrial control systems. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems, or
SCADA, is a type of ICS. ICSs arent general purpose computers like desktops .

At the level of direct

control over electromechanical processes via a device often classified as

a Programmable Logic Controller programming is mainly done in
specialized languages on obscure operating systems. Even just accessing
a PLC requires particular software. Hiding malware in field devices is
difficult to impossible. Many of the devices arent running multi-thread,
multi-tasking operations like our laptops, noted Chris Blask, chair of the
Industrial Control System Information Sharing and Analysis Center. And
penetration is just a starting point. Just hacking into the system, and
even taking complete control of a computer or crashing a bunch of
computers, wont necessarily bring down the bulk electric system, said
Dale Peterson, founder of Digital Bond, an industrial control system
cybersecurity consultancy. For example, hackers could cause a SCADA
system to crash, causing grid operators to lose system visibility
decidedly not a good thing. But the grid doesnt need the SCADA system
to continue operating. There has to be an understanding that simply
taking out the cyber assets doesnt cause a blackout, Peterson said.

AT ECON
International norms maintain economic stability
***Zero empirical data supports their theory the only financial crisis of the new
liberal order experienced zero uptick in violence or challenges to the central
factions governed by the US that check inter-state violence they have no
theoretical foundation for proving causality
Barnett, 9 senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New
Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009,
http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financialcrisis-398-bl.aspx)
When the

crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all
sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great
global financial

Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly
led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and

globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact

whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen
ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession.
Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the
economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the
15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in
realize how

2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening
ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential
campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway

we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix

of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the
recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea,
regions. Looking over the various databases, then,

are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to
global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major
interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the
planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis:
Israel v. Iran)

e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up
with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally
pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to
anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: No

significant uptick in mass

violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and
Latvia?); The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); Not a single state-on-state war
directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); No

great improvement or
disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all
that diplomacy); A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan
power (inevitable given the strain); and No

serious efforts by any rising great power to

challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional
deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on
basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in
Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the
late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented

friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the

most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis . Can we say that the world has
suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major
economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain
decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to
"stimulus" spending. If anything, the

insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade
rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was
designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic
radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's
growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking
forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting
fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke
major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed,
as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve
currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the
beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of
globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly
constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes

financial crisis has

proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.
undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global

Backdoor reform is key to solve, not abolishment

Burger et al 14
(Eric, Research Professor of Computer Science at Georgetown, L. Jean Camp,
Associate professor at the Indiana University School of Information and Computing,
Dan Lubar, Emerging Standards Consultant at RelayServices, Jon M Pesha, Carnegie
Mellon University, Terry Davis, MicroSystems Automation Group, Risking It All:
Unlocking the Backdoor to the Nations Cybersecurity, IEEE USA, 7/20/2014, pg. 1-

5, Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2468604)//duncan
This paper addresses government policies that can influence commercial practices to weaken security in products

The debate on information surveillance for

national security must include consideration of the potential cybersecurity
risks and economic implications of the information collection strategies
employed. As IEEE-USA, we write to comment on current discussions with respect to weakening standards, or
and services sold on the commercial market.

altering commercial products and services for intelligence, or law enforcement. Any policy that seeks to weaken
technology sold on the commercial market has many serious downsides, even if it temporarily advances the
intelligence and law enforcement missions of facilitating legal and authorized government surveillance.

we define and address the risks of installing backdoors in commercial

products, introducing malware and spyware into products, and weakening
standards. We illustrate that these are practices that harm Americas
cybersecurity posture and put the resilience of American
Specifically,

cyberinfrastructure at risk . We write as a technical society to clarify the potential harm should
these strategies be adopted. Whether or not these strategies ever have been used in practice is outside the scope

Individual computer users, large corporations and government agencies all depend
on security features built into information technology products and
services they buy on the commercial market. If the security features of
these widely available products and services are weak, everyone is in
greater danger. There recently have been allegations that U.S.
government agencies (and some private entities) have engaged in a number of activities
deliberately intended to weaken mass market, widely used technology. Weakening
commercial products and services does have the benefit that it becomes easier for
U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct surveillance on targets that use the weakened
of this paper.

technology, and more information is available for law enforcement purposes. On the surface, it would appear these
motivations would be reasonable. However,

such strategies also inevitably make it easier

for foreign powers, criminals and terrorists to infiltrate these systems for
their own purposes. Moreover, everyone who uses backdoor technologies may
be vulnerable, and not just the handful of surveillance targets for U.S. intelligence agencies. It is the opinion
of IEEE-USAs Committee on Communications Policy that no entity should act to reduce the security of a product or
service sold on the commercial market without first conducting a careful and methodical risk assessment. A
complete risk assessment would consider the interests of the large swath of users of the technology who are not

A methodical risk assessment would give

proper weight to the asymmetric nature of cyberthreats, given that technology is
the intended targets of government surveillance.

equally advanced and ubiquitous in the United States, and the locales of many of our adversaries.

Vulnerable products should be corrected , as needed, based on this assessment. The next
section briefly describes some of the government policies and technical strategies that might have the undesired
side effect of reducing security. The following section discusses why the effect of these practices may be a

Government policies can affect greatly the

security of commercial products, either positively or negatively. There are a number
decrease, not an increase, in security.

of methods by which a government might affect security negatively as a

means of facilitating legal government surveillance. One inexpensive
method is to exploit pre-existing weaknesses that are already present in
commercial software, while keeping these weaknesses a secret. Another

method is to motivate the designer of a computer or communications

system to make those systems easier for government agencies to access.
Motivation may come from

financial incentives. There are many ways

that a designer can facilitate government access once so motivated. For example, the system may be
equipped with a backdoor. The company that creates it and,
presumably, the government agency that requests it would know the
backdoor, but not the products (or services) purchaser(s). The hope is that the government
agency will use this feature when it is given authority to do so, but no one
else will. However, creating a backdoor introduces the risk that other parties
direct mandate or

will find the vulnerability, especially when capable adversaries, who are
actively seeking security vulnerabilities, know how to leverage such
weaknesses . History illustrates that secret backdoors do not remain
secret and that the more widespread a backdoor, the more dangerous its
existence. The 1988 Morris worm, the first widespread Internet attack,
used a number of backdoors to infect systems and spread widely . The
backdoors in that case were a set of secrets then known only by a small, highly technical community. A single,
putatively innocent error resulted in a large-scale attack that disabled
many systems. In recent years, Barracuda had a completely undocumented
backdoor that allowed high levels of access from the Internet addresses assigned to
Barracuda. However, when it was publicized, as almost inevitably happens, it became extremely
unsafe, and Barracudas customers rejected it. One example of how
attackers can subvert backdoors placed into systems for benign reasons occurred in the
network of the largest commercial cellular operator in Greece. Switches deployed in the
system came equipped with built-in wiretapping features, intended only
for authorized law enforcement agencies. Some unknown attacker was
able to install software, and made use of these embedded wiretapping features to
surreptitiously and illegally eavesdrop on calls from many cell phones
including phones belonging to the Prime Minister of Greece, a hundred high-ranking Greek
dignitaries, and an employee of the U.S. Embassy in Greece before the security breach
finally was discovered. In essence, a backdoor created to fight crime was used to
commit crime.

Tech high

Tech innovation sustainable

One India, 2010 (US to compete with India, china in R&D, September 15,
http://news.oneindia.in/2010/09/15/us-to-compete-india-china-in-development.html)

Obama said his administration had made the

largest investment in research and development so that the US can
compete with China, India and Germany. In an appearance at a private home, he said
Washington, Sep 15: President Barack

his administration had "tried to do to lay this foundation for long-term economic growth
is to put our investments in those things that are really going to make us more competitive
what

over the long term." "So we have made the largest investment in research and development, in basic research and
science, in our history, because that's going to determine whether we can compete with China and India and
Germany over the long term," he said.

Today people around the world "still want to

be the United States of America," he said, "as we still have a huge competitive edge and we've got the best
workers in the world. And we've got the most dynamic economy in the world. We've got the best
universities, the best entrepreneurs in the world." he added.

Competitiveness Wrong

Competitiveness not key to heg

Brooks and Wohlforth 8 -

Brooks is Assistant Professor AND*** William C. Wohlforth is Professor in the

Department of Government at Dartmouth College [Stephen G., World out of Balance, International Relations and
the Challenge of American Primacy, p. 32-35]

American primacy is also rooted in the county's position as the world's leading technological power. The United
States remains dominant globally in overall R&D investments, high-technology production, commercial first decade
of this century. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq-induced doubt about the utility of

many assessments of
U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic ; by
the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident . In particular, chronically
imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some
analysts that the United States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23
If concerns continue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first
material predominance, a doubt redolent of the post-Vietnam mood. In retrospect,

three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat

None of these crises , however, shifted the international

system's structure: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each
scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy
retained or strengthened.24 Our review of the evidence of U.S. predominance is not meant to suggest that
and Japan's challenge).

the United States lacks vulnerabilities or causes for concern. In fact, it confronts a number of significant

adverse trends for

the United States will not cause a polarity shift in the near future. If we take a long
view of U.S. competitiveness and the prospects for relative declines in economic
and technological dominance, one takeaway stands out: relative power shifts
vulnerabilities; of course, this is also true of the other major powers.25 The point is that

slowly . The United States has accounted for a quarter to a third of global output for over a century. No other
economy will match its combination of wealth, size , technological capacity, and
productivity in the foreseeable future (tables 2.2 and 2.3). The depth, scale, and projected

longevity of the U.S. lead in each critical dimension of power are noteworthy . But
what truly distinguishes the current distribution of capabilities is American
dominance in all of them simultaneously. The chief lesson of Kennedy's 500-year survey of leading
powers is that nothing remotely similar ever occurred in the historical experience innovation, and higher education
(table 2.3). Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by the
middle of the that informs modern international relations theory. The implication is both simple and
underappreciated: the counterbalancing constraint is inoperative and will remain so until the distribution of
capabilities changes fundamentally. The next section explains why.

Surveillance is key to stopping terrorism- empirics

Dozier 13
(KIMBERLY DOZIER is a Daily Beast and CNN contributor, after four years as APs
intelligence writer including traveling to cover the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and 17 years as an award-winning CBS News foreign and national security correspondent.
NSA: Surveillance Programs Foiled Some 50 Terrorist Plots Worldwide, 6-18-13, AP,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/nsa-surveillance_n_3460106.html, TMP)
The director of

the National Security Agency insisted

programs have foiled

Intelligence Committee. Army Gen. Keith Alexander said

of U.S.-based Internet servers by foreigners with

the

some

on Tuesday that the government's sweeping

50 terrorist plots worldwide

two recently disclosed

programs

one

that

surveillance

in a forceful defense echoed by the leaders of the House

gathers U.S. phone records and another that is designed to

track

the use

possible links to terrorism are critical in the terrorism

fight . Intelligence officials have disclosed

details on thwarted attacks

The programs "assist the
intelligence community to connect the dots,"
some

two

, and

Alexander promised additional information to the panel on thwarted attacks that the programs helped stop. He provided few additional details.

Alexander told the committee in a rare, open Capitol Hill hearing. Alexander got no

disagreement from the leaders of the panel, who have been outspoken in backing the programs since Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old former contractor with Booz Allen Hamilton, disclosed information to The Washington Post and the

the programs were

vital to the intelligence community and assailed Snowden's actions as
criminal.
our enemies within become almost as damaging as
Guardian newspapers. Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the committee, and Rep. C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of Maryland, the panel's top Democrat, said

"It is at times like these where

our enemies on the outside

United States and its allies at risk.

," Rogers said. Ruppersberger said the

"brazen disclosures" put the

The general counsel for the intelligence community said the NSA cannot target phone conversations between callers inside

the U.S. even if one of those callers was someone they were targeting for surveillance when outside the country. The director of national intelligence's legal chief, Robert S. Litt, said that if the NSA finds it has accidentally gathered
a phone call by a target who had traveled into the U.S. without their knowledge, they have to "purge" that from their system. The same goes for an accidental collection of any conversation because of an error. Litt said those
incidents are then reported to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which "pushes back" and asks how it happened, and what the NSA is doing to fix the problem so it doesn't happen again. Rogers previewed the latest public

Obama
defended surveillance
calling them transparent
" It is

airing of the NSA controversy the morning after President Barack

programs

in a lengthy interview Monday,

transparent ,"

, who is attending the G-8 summit in Ireland, vigorously

the

even though they are authorized in secret.

Obama told PBS' Charlie Rose in an interview. "

That's why we set up the FISA court ,"

the president

added, referring to the secret court set up by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes two recently disclosed programs: one that gathers U.S. phone records and another that is designed to track the use of U.S.-based

Obama
has named representatives to a privacy and
civil liberties oversight board to help in the debate over just how far
government data gathering should be allowed to go
Internet servers by foreigners with possible links to terrorism.

said he

a discussion that is complicated by the secrecy surrounding the FISA

court, with hearings held at undisclosed locations and with only government lawyers present. The orders that result are all highly classified. "We're going to have to find ways where the public has an assurance that there are checks
and balances in place ... that their phone calls aren't being listened into; their text messages aren't being monitored, their

brother

emails are not being read by

some

big

somewhere," the president said. A senior administration official said Obama had asked Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to determine what more information about the two programs could be

made public, to help better explain them. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to speak publicly. Snowden accused members of Congress and administration officials Monday of
exaggerating their claims about the success of the data gathering programs, including pointing to the arrest of the would-be New York subway bomber, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. In an online interview with The Guardian in which he
posted answers to questions Monday, Snowden said that Zazi could have been caught with narrower, targeted surveillance programs a point Obama conceded in his interview without mentioning Snowden. "We might have caught

him some other way," Obama said. "We might have disrupted it because a New York cop saw he was suspicious. Maybe he turned out to be incompetent and the bomb didn't go off. But, at the margins,

we are

increasing our chances of preventing a catastrophe like that through

these programs

," he said.

Obama repeated

earlier assertions that the

NSA programs were a

legitimate counterterror tool and that they were completely noninvasive

to people with no terror ties
something