Ching and Po Wing vs.

Rodriguez Digest
G.R. No. 192828
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners, v. HON.
JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES
IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S.
BALAJADIA, Respondents.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:
The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and Stroghold Insurance
Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia
Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all
persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary
Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary Injunction." In the complaint, the
respondents alleged that (1) they are the heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon
misrepresented himself as Antonios son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth
certificated merely simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime
suspect and prior to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory
of the formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the titles to Antonios
properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering to him a
Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio and the TCTs of
two condo units registered under Ramons name; (4) Ramon illegally transferred to
his own name through a forged document 40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5)
Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating
solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6)
Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's estate,
was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably low price.
The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to restrain Ramon or his
representatives from disposing or selling any property that belongs to the estate of
Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio
Ching; and (3) declaring null the unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss with regard to
the issues which could only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in an
ordinary civil action

HELD:
No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled
that the denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss was proper.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will
wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC
and the CA that while the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint
sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting
the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer
for Ramon's disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
Even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents
have the standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their
claims that there was no consideration for their execution, and that Ramon
exercised undue influence and committed fraud against them. Consequently, the
respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Antonios
estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the said
affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues
raised shall first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere
defense which is not determinative of which court shall properly exercise
jurisdiction.
In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject
of the civil case could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific
case was instituted to protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts
of Ramon. In the event that the RTC will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for
by the respondents, the only consequence will be the reversion of the properties
subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. The civil case was not instituted to
conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91
of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be
strategically sound, because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if
their intent is to recover from Ramon the properties alleged to have been illegally
transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents' Complaint
and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are
matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.

FERNANDEZV.MARAVILLA 10SCRA589
FACTS: Maravillasoughttheprobateofhislatewifeswill.Thesiblingssoughtdenialof
probate on the ground that it wasn't signed on each and every page by the
decedent.Theylikewiseprayedfortheappointmentoftheirbrotherasspecial
administratorinlieuofthehusbandtoprotecttheirinterestandalsoduetothe failuretofile
aninventory.Theprobateofthewillinthemeantimewasdenied andtothis,thehusband
appealed.Consequently,thebrotherwasappointedas administrator. The husband filed
a petition for certiorari and for preliminary injunction,prayingthereintheannulmentof
thebrotherascoadministratorand the prohibition of the probate court from
proceeding in his removal as administrator.Thepetitionersmovedforthecertificationof
thesametotheSCas theamountinvolvedexceedsthejurisdictionoftheCA.Nevertheless,
theCA decidedinfavorofthehusband.
HELD: UnderSection2,Rule75,oftheRulesofCourt,thepropertytobeadministered and
liquidatedintestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceasedspouseis,not onlythatpartof
theconjugalestatepertainingtothedeceasedspouse,butthe entireconjugalestate.This
Courthasalreadyheldthatevenifthedeceasedhad leftnodebts,uponthedissolutionofthe
marriagebythedeathofthehusbandor wife,thecommunitypropertyshallbeinventoried,
administered,andliquidatedin thetestateorintestateproceedingsofthedeceased
spouse.Inanumberofcases whereappealwastakenfromanorderofaprobatecourt
disallowingawill,this Court,ineffect,recognizedthattheamountorvalueinvolvedorin
controversy thereinisthatoftheentireestate.Nothavingappellatejurisdictionoverthe
proceedings in probate (CAG.R. No. 27478R), considering that the amount involved
thereinismorethanP200,000.00,theCourtofAppealscannotalsohave original
jurisdictiontograntthewritsofcertiorariandprohibitionprayedforby respondentinthe
instantcase,whicharemerelyincidentalthereto.
Notealsothatthepresentproceedingsunderreviewwerefortheannulmentof the
appointmentofEliezarLopezasspecialcoadministratorandtorestrainthe probatecourt
fromremovingrespondentasspecialadministrator.Itistherefore,a contestforthe
administrationoftheestateand,consequently,theamountor valueoftheassetsofthe
wholeestateisthevalueincontroversy(4C.J.S.204).It appearingthatthevalueofthe
estateindisputeismuchmorethanP200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no
original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

Case Digest on Rufina Lim vs. CA, Auto Truck, TBA Corp, et. al.
Rufina Lim vs CA, Auto Truck, TBA Corporation, Sspeed Distributing Inc.,
Active Distributors, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Action Company, Inc.
(January 24, 2000)
Tests to Pierce the Veil of Corporate Fiction
Facts: Rufina Lim is the surviving spouse of Pastor Lim whose estate is the subject
of probate proceedings. The private respondents are corporations formed,

organized and existing under Philippine Laws and which own real properties. Pastor
Lim died June 1994, Rufina Lim filed for the administration of the estate. The
properties which were owned by the corporations were included in the inventory of
the estate. They filed for the exclusion of the properties from said estate and the
cancellation of the annotation of lis pendens in the TCTs of said properties.
The RTC granted the motions. However Rufina Lim filed an amended petition which
averred that such corporations were owned by Pastor Lim, that such were dummies
of Pastor Lim, that those listed as incorporators are there only for the purpose of
registration with the SEC, and that the real properties, although registered in the
name of the corporations, were actually acquired by Pastor Lim during his marriage
with Rufina Lim. The RTC acting on such motion set aside its order and ordered the
Register of Deeds to reinstate the lis pendens. The respondent filed for certiorari
with the CA which granted its prayer. Rufina Lim disputes such decision and urges
that not only are the properties of the corporations part of the estate but also the
corporations themselves. She cites that Pastor Lim during his lifetime organized
and wholly owned the 5 corporations.
Issue: Whether or not a corporation in its universality be the proper subject of and
be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Held: The real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor
Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from
their stockholders and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private
respondents should stand. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
separate and distinct from that of persons composing it. It may not generally be
held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
A corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it. But
when the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a
vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery
or crime, the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation fromwill
be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. First
Philippine International Bank vs CA (252 SCRA 259)
The test in determining the applicability of piercing the veil of corporation fiction is
as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control but complete
domination not only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as of this transaction had at the
time no separate mind, will or existence of its own. 2) Such control must have
been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation
of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in
contravention of plaintiffs legal right. 3) The control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury. The absence of these elements prevent the piercing.
Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that would justify such piercing. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by a corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock is not sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.

San Luis vs. San Luis

Short Summary: Former Laguna governor had 1st spouse who predeceased him,
then married again to an American citizen who divorced him, then remarried again.
He died with his 3rd wife but his 2nd wife and the children in the 1st marriage
contested the standing of the 3rd wife, claiming that the said marriage was
bigamous since the 2nd marriage was still subsisting under RP law (can't apply FC
retroactively). Court held that even with FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn and
other jurisprudence sufficiently provides the validity to the 3rd marriage, thus
recognizing divorce obtained by an alien spouse against the Filipino spouse.
However, as the 3rd marriage was not sufficiently proved, the case was remanded
in order for the 3rd spouse to present further evidence on this.
Facts
FELICISIMO SAN LUIS contracted 3 marriages:
VIRGINIA SULIT: had 6 children, died before he did in 1963
MERRY LEE CORWIN: US citizen, had son Tobias, divorced him before Hawaiian
courts which was granted in 1973
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN LUIS: married before a Presbyterian Church in
California n 1974, lived with him until he died for 18 years in their Alabang
residence
-when Felicisimo died, Felicidad filed for DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
ASSETS AND SETTLEMENT OF FELICISIMO'S ESTATE, filing for a letter of
administration before RTC Makati
-petition was contested (MTD) by Felicisimo's children for 2 grounds:
Venue improperly laid: should have filed petition in Laguna (domicile) and not in
Makati (covers Alabang, decedent's residence at the time of his death)
No legal personality to sue: Felicidad is only a mistress - marriage to Merry Lee was
still valid (Family Code provision cannot be applied retroactively as it would impair
their vested rights in accordance with Article 256, FC)
---these were denied but Felicidad still filed Opposition to MTD, showing evidence of
the ff:
Felicisimo exercised office in Laguna, but went home in Alabang - to prove proper
venue

Decree of absolute divorce by Hawaii dissolving the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry

Lee - to prove capacity to sue
RTC Makati: Dismissed petition
CA: reversed and set aside
Place of residence should be understood in as the personal, actual or physical
habitation so petition was properly filed
Art26.2, FC should be given effect, allowing a Filipino to remarry under Philippine
law
WON Venue properly laid? YES
-The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases.
-there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and
"residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
WON Felicidad had capacity to sue? YES
As the legal wife: even if FC not applied retroactively, Van Dorn v. Romillo (1985)
sufficiently provides the legal basis for holding valid divorce obtained by an alien
spouse against the Filipino spouse (as well as other cases which were in Ma'am's
book)
-it look at the legislative intent of FC provision assailed, it was based on the Van
Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again
---In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to
marry Felicidad. However, as the marriage between Felicidad and Felicisimo was not
sufficiently proven, remand the case to RTC
Even if not qualified as the legal spouse, she could still petition for a letter of
administration as an "INTERESTED PARTY" with Art144, CC and A148 FC both stating
that she is considered a co-owner of properties owned by persons living as husband
and wife but whose marriage is void.

Roberts v. Leonidas (April 27, 1984)

Ramon Aquino, J.:
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

PROBLEM: A will already probated in Utah was filed before Manila CFI Branch 38
while intestate proceedings for the same estate were ongoing in Manila CFI Branch
20.
HELD: The two proceedings must be consolidated and the testate proceeding
should be continued. It would be anomalous to undergo intestate proceedings when
the deceased died with two wills.
FACTS:
EDWARD Grimm, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, was
married twice.
o FIRST MARRIAGE (divorced) = Juanita Kegley Grimm (MRS. GRIMM).
Children: JUANITA Grimm Morris and ETHEL Grimm Morris.
o SECOND MARRIAGE = MAXINE Tate Grimm. Children: Edward Miller
Grimm II (PETE) and LINDA Grimm.
Jan. 23, 1959 Edward executed 2 wills, one for his Philippine properties
(PH WILL) and one for his properties abroad (FOREIGN WILL).
o Edward described his Philippine properties as conjugal property of his
second marriage.
o In the PH will, Juanita and Ethel were given their legitimes.
o They were not given anything in the foreign will, because according to
Edward he had already given them their legitimes in the PH will.
o The rest of the 2 wills favored Maxine and her children
Nov. 27, 1977 Edward died in the Makati Medical Center.
Jan. 9, 1978 Ethel instituted intestate proceedings for Edwards estate
before Manila CFI Branch 20.
o Ethel was named special administratrix.
o Maxine admitted that she was notified of the proceedings
March 7, 1978 Maxine presented the 2 wills for probate before the 3rd
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah, USA.
o Juanita and Ethel were notified of the proceeding
March 11, 1978 Maxine, through ACCRA, moved to dismiss the intestate
proceeding on the ground that Edwards wills were being probated in Utah.
April 10, 1978 Utah court admitted the 2 wills to probate.
April 25, 1978 COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO
CAMPS
o made in Utah with knowledge of the intestate proceedings before the
Manila CFI
o signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the
parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by
the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita and Mrs. Grimm
o STIPULATIONS
Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as administrators of
Edward's Philippine estate
Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be
reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus
the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa, Manila.
Computation of the "net distributable estate"

Recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the
ACCRA law firm
Pete, Linda, Ethel and Juanita "shall share equally in the Net
Distributable Estate"
Ethel and Juanita should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the
total of the net distributable estate and marital share.
Included a supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978
May 23 and June 2, 1978 Pursuant to the Compromise Agreement, CFI
Branch 20 (intestate court) allowed Maxine to withdraw her opposition.
Maxine, Pete and Ethel were appointed administrators of the estate. The
court ignored the will already found in the record (I think it was there because
it was submitted together with the compromise).
March 21, 1979 Maxine, Pete and Ethel, acting as administrators, sold one
of Edwards businesses (Palawan Pearl Project) for P75,000, to a company
named Makiling Management Co. [whose incorporators were Ethel, her
husband Rex Roberts and Maxines former lawyer William Limqueco]
o The admins also sold 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation to Joseph
Server and others for P1,546,136.
July 27, 1979 Branch 20 Judge Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half
(4/8) of the Edward's Philippine estate and one-eight (1/8) each to his four
children or 12-1/2%. No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
(anlabo mo judge)
August 9, 1979 Maxine, through a new lawyer, moved to defer approval of
the partition (as per the Utah agreement ata). Court considered it moot
because the shares had already been adjudicated in the July 27 order.
April 18, 1980 Juanita moved for accounting of the estates properties filed
a motion for accounting to facilitate partition and close the present intestate
estate.
June 10, 1980 ACCRA filed appearance as collaborating counsel for Maxine
Sep. 8, 1980 Maxine, through Rogelio Vinluan of ACCRA, filed the
assailed petition for probate of the 2 wills already probated in Utah.
The case was heard before Manila CFI Branch 38
o ALLEGATIONS
Maxine and her children were defrauded due to the
machinations of the Roberts spouses
1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal
the intestate proceeding is void because Edward died testate
the partition was contrary to Edward's wills
o Petition also asked that:
the 1979 partition approved by Br. 20 be set aside and the
letters of administration be revoked
Maxine be appointed executrix
Ethel and Juanita be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and to return the same to Maxine
Ethel moved to dismiss, Judge Leonidas denied.
Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
o RELIEFS SOUGHT:
Dismissal of the testate proceeding, OR

Consolidation of the two proceedings in Branch 20

That the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise
agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate
ISSUE (HELD): Can a petition for allowance of wills and annulment of partition approved in an intestate proceeding by one branch of the CFI - be entertained by
another branch (after a probate in the Utah district court)? (YES)
RATIO:
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Edward died with two
wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed" (NCC 838; ROC 75, Sec. 1).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara and Baluyot vs.
Pao).
It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled
in an intestate proceeding.
The intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and
the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.
Ethel may file her answer to the petition anyway.
DISPOSITION: Petition denied, CFI affirmed.

URIARTEV.CFI 33SCRA252
FACTS: UponthedeathofDonJuanUriarte,hisallegednaturalsonfiledforintestate
proceedingsintheNegrosCourt.Thiswasopposedtobyoneofthenephews, allegingthata
willwasindeedexecutedinSpainandaskedforthesubmissionof thesaidwill.Meanwhile,
oneofthenephews,whowasinpossessionofthe allegedwill,institutedintheManilaCopurt
petitionforprobateofthewill.Healso soughttointerveneintheinstestateproceedingsin
NegrosCourt.
HELD:
Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionof theestate
ofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestate successionorin
accordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingfor thesettlementofhis
estate.Itisequallytrue,however,thatinaccordancewith settledjurisprudenceinthis
jurisdiction,testateproceedings,forthesettlementof theestateofadeceasedpersontake
precedenceoverintestateproceedingsfor the same purpose. Thus it has been held
repeatedly that, if in the course of intestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtoffirst
instanceitisfoundithatthe decedenthadleftalastwill,proceedingsfortheprobateofthe
lattershould replacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstageanadministratorhad
already beenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnoverthe
estateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.This,however,is
understoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedor is
disapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadverted to,thisisa

clearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriority overintestate
proceedings.
Zamaconashouldhavesubmittedforprobatethewillhehasonhandwiththe Negroscourt.
In the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensiveadministrationofjusticetounnecessarilymultiplylitigation,especially if
severalcourtswouldbeinvolved.This,ineffect,wastheresultofthesubmission ofthewill
aforesaidtotheManilaCourt.Inthesecondplace,whenrespondent HiginioUriartefiledan
oppositiontoVicenteUriarte'spetitionfortheissuanceof letters of administration, he
had already informed the Negros Court that the deceasedJuanUriarteyGoitehadlefta
willinSpain,ofwhichacopyhadbeen requestedforsubmissiontosaidcourt;andwhenthe
otherrespondent,Juan UriarteZamacona,filedhismotiontodismissSpecialProceeding
No.6344,hehad submittedtotheNegrosCourtacopyoftheallegedwillofthedecedent,
from whichfactitmaybeinferredthat,likeHiginioUriarte,heknewbeforefilingthe petition
for probate with the Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding
pendingintheNegrosCourtforthesettlementoftheestateofthe samedeceasedperson.As
farasHiginioUriarteisconcerned,itseemsquiteclear thatinhisoppositiontopetitioner's
petitioninSpecialProceedingNo.6344,he hadexpresslypromisedtosubmitsaidwillfor
probatetotheNegrosCourt.
Butthefactisthatinsteadoftheaforesaidwillbeingpresentedforprobatetothe Negros
Court,JuanUriarteZamaconafiledthepetitionforthepurposewiththe ManilaCourt.Wecan
notacceptpetitioner'scontentioninthisregardthatthe lattercourthadnojurisdictionto
considersaidpetition,albeitwesaythatitwas notthepropervenuetherefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waiveable
proceduraldefect,and,inthelightofthecircumstancesobtainingintheinstant case,weare
oftheopinion,andsohold,thatpetitionerhaswaivedtherightto raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to considerinthisconnectionthat
petitionerknewoftheexistenceofawillexecuted byJuanUriarteyGoitesinceDecember
19,1961whenHiginioUriartefiledhis opposition to the initial petition filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the allegedlastwillinthePhilippinesandofthefilingofthepetition
foritsprobate withtheManilaCourtsinceAugust28,1962whenJuanUriarteZamacona
fileda motionforthedismissalofSpecialProceedingNo.6344.Allthesenotwithstanding, it
was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding
No.51396anOmnibusmotionaskingforleavetointerveneandforthe dismissaland
annulmentofalltheproceedingshadthereinuptothatdate;thus enabling the Manila
Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexedbutalsotoadmitsaid
willtoprobatemorethanfivemonthsearlier,or morespecifically,onOctober31,1962.To
allowhimnowtoassailtheexerciseof jurisdictionovertheprobateofthewillbytheManila
Courtandthevalidityofall theproceedingshadinSpecialProceedingNo.51396wouldputa
premiumonhis negligence.

CUENCOV.COURTOFAPPEALS 53SCRA360
FACTS: UponthedeathofSenatorCuenco,leavinghiswidowand2minorchildren,letters
foradministrationoftheestatewasfiledbyrespondentinCebuCity,alleging thereinthat
thedeceaseddiedintestateandthathislastknownresidencewasin CebuCity.Inthe
meantime,thewidowfiledinQuezonCity,whereinthedeceased has died, petition to
admit into probate the last will and testament of the decedent. Upon learning of the
pending petition in Cebu City, she filed her oppositionandmotiontodismissthe
petitionbyrespondent.
HELD: TheJudiciaryActconcededlyconfersoriginaljurisdictionuponallCourtsofFirst
Instanceover"allmatterofprobate,bothoftestateandintestateestates."Onthe other
hand,Rule73,sectionoftheRulesofCourtlaysdowntheruleofvenue,as theverycaptionof
theRuleindicates,andinordertopreventconflictamongthe differentcourtswhich
otherwisemayproperlyassumejurisdictionfromdoingso, theRulespecifiesthat"thecourt
firsttakingcognizanceofthesettlementofthe estateofadecedent,shallexercise
jurisdictiontotheexclusionofallothercourts."
ItshouldbenotedthattheRuleonvenuedoesnotstatethatthecourtwithwhom theestateor
intestatepetitionisfirstfiledacquiresexclusivejurisdiction.
TheRulepreciselyanddeliberatelyprovidesthat"thecourtfirsttakingcognizance ofthe
settlementoftheestateofadecedent,shallexercisejurisdictiontothe exclusionofallother
courts."
AfairreadingoftheRulesinceitdealswithvenueandcomitybetweencourtsof equal and
coordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petitionisfirstfiled,
mustalsofirsttakecognizanceofthesettlementoftheestate inordertoexercise
jurisdictionoverittotheexclusionofallothercourts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviouslyhadhisconjugaldomicileandresidedwithhissurvivingwidowandtheir minor
children,andthattheallegationoftheintestatepetitionbeforeitstating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizanceofthepetition
andholdthepetitionbeforeitinabeyance,andinstead defertothesecondcourtwhichhas
beforeitthepetitionforprobateofthe decedent'sallegedlastwill.
This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitionerwidow's filing with it a motion
to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyanceits
actiononthedismissalmotionanddeferredtotheQuezonCitycourt, awaitingitsactionon
thepetitionforprobatebeforethatcourt.Implicitinthe Cebucourt'sorderwasthatifthewill
wasdulyadmittedtoprobate,bytheQuezon Citycourt,thenitwoulddefinitelydeclineto
takecognizanceofLourdes'intestate petitionwhichwouldtherebybeshowntobefalseand
improper,andleavethe exerciseofjurisdictiontotheQuezonCitycourt,totheexclusionof
allothercourts. Likewisebyitsactofdeference,theCebucourtleftittotheQuezonCitycourt
to resolvethequestionbetweenthepartieswhetherthedecedent'sresidenceatthe time
ofhisdeathwasinQuezonCitywherehehadhisconjugaldomicilerather thaninCebuCityas
claimedbyrespondents.TheCebucourtthusindicatedthatit woulddeclinetotake

cognizanceoftheintestatepetitionbeforeitandinstead defertotheQuezonCitycourt,
unlessthelatterwouldmakeanegativefindingas totheprobatepetitionandtheresidence
ofthedecedentwithinitsterritoryand venue.
Itcannotbedeniedthataspecialproceedingintendedtoeffectthedistributionof theestate
ofadeceasedperson,whetherinaccordancewiththelawonintestate successionorin
accordancewithhiswill,isa"probatematter"oraproceedingfor thesettlementofhis
estate.Itisequallytrue,however,thatinaccordancewith settledjurisprudenceinthis
jurisdiction,testateproceedingsforthesettlementof theestateofadeceasedpersontake
precedenceoverintestateproceedingsfor the same purpose. Thus it has been held
repeatedly that, if in the course of intestateproceedingspendingbeforeacourtoffirst
instanceitisfoundthatthe decedenthadleftalastwill,proceedingsfortheprobateofthe
lattershould replacetheintestateproceedingsevenifatthatstateanadministratorhad
already beenappointed,thelatterbeingrequiredtorenderfinalaccountandturnoverthe
estateinhispossessiontotheexecutorsubsequentlyappointed.Thishowever,is
understoodtobewithoutprejudicethatshouldtheallegedlastwillberejectedor is
disapproved,theproceedingshallcontinueasanintestacy.Asalreadyadverted to,thisisa
clearindicationthatproceedingsfortheprobateofawillenjoypriority overintestate
proceedings.

SOLIVIOV.CA 182SCRA119
FACTS: ThiscaseisregardstheestateofthelateauthorEstebanJavellanaJr.Whenhe died,
hewassurvivedbyonlyhismaternalaunt,petitionerSolivioandpaternal aunt,respondent
Villanueva.Wishingtofulfillthedecedentswishtoplacehis propertiesintoafoundation,
Soliviofiledapetitionforthelettersofadministration of the estate be issued to her and
consequently be appointed as a special administrator.Thepetitionwaslateramended
todeclareherassoleheirofthe decedent.ThecourtruledinSoliviosfavorandshe
explainedthatshedidthisto facilitatetheformationofthefoundationamongother
reasons.Subsequently, Villanuevabelatedlysoughtthereconsiderationoftheorderofthe
court,averring thatSoliviowasnttheonlyheirofthedecedentbuttothis,shewas
overruled. Shethenfiledacaseforreconveyanceandpossessionofproperty,whichthetrial
courtdecidedinherfavor.
HELD:
Afteracarefulreviewoftherecords,wefindmeritinthepetitioner'scontention that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partitionand
recoveryofhershareoftheestateofEstebanJavellana,Jr.whilethe probateproceedingsfor
thesettlementofsaidestatearestillpendinginBranch23 ofthesamecourt,therebeingas
yetnoordersforthesubmissionandapprovalof theadministratix'sinventoryand
accounting,distributingtheresidueoftheestate totheheir,andterminatingthe
proceedings.
Itistheorderofdistributiondirectingthedeliveryoftheresidueoftheestateto thepersons
entitledtheretothatbringstoaclosetheintestateproceedings,puts anendtothe

administrationandthusfarrelievestheadministratorfromhis duties.Theassailedorder
declaringCeledoniaasthesoleheiroftheestateof EstebanJavellana,Jr.didnottolltheendof
theproceedings.Asamatteroffact, the last paragraph of the order directed the
administratrix to "hurry up the settlementoftheestate."

UTULOV.VDA.DEGARCIA 66Phil302(1938)
FACTS: JuanGarciadiedintestateleavinghischildren,oneofwhomisLuzGarcia,andhis
wifeasheirs.Duringthependencyoftheintestateproceedings,Luzdiedandshe leftno
legitimatedescendants.Heronlyheirswerehermotherandhusband.Her husbandthen
appliedforjudicialadministrationoftheproperty,absentanywill fromhislatewife.Thiswas
opposedtobythemotherhowevershewasoverruled andthecourtdecidedinthe
husbandsfavor.
HELD: As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providinginpartthat"ifnoexecutorisnamedinthewill,orifapersondies intestate,
administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the generalrulethat
whenapersondieslivingpropertyinthePhilippineIslands,his propertyshouldbejudicially
administeredandthecompetentcourtshouldappoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in the section, in case the deceasedleftnowill,orincasehehadleft
oneshouldhefailtonameanexecutor therein.Thisrule,however,issubjecttothe
exceptionsestablishedbysections596 and597ofthesameCode,asfinallyamended.
Accordingtothefirst,whenallthe heirsareoflawfulageandtherearenodebtsduefromthe
estate,theymayagree inwritingtopartitionthepropertywithoutinstitutingthejudicial
administrationor applyingfortheappointmentofanadministrator.Accordingtothe
second,ifthepropertyleftdoesnotexceedsixthousandpesos,theheirsmayapplytothe
competentcourt,aftertherequiredpublications,toproceedwiththesummary partition
and,afterpayingalltheknownobligations,topartitionalltheproperty constitutingthe
inheritanceamongthemselvespursuanttolaw,withoutinstituting thejudicial
administrationandtheappointmentofanadministrator.
Construingthescopeofsection596,thiscourtrepeatedlyheldthatwhenaperson dies
withoutleavingpendingobligationstobepaid,hisheirs,whetherofageor not,arenot
boundtosubmitthepropertytoajudicialadministrationandthe appointmentofan
administratoraresuperfluousandunnecessaryproceedings.

Vda. De Reyes v. CA, 169 SCRA 524 (1989)

Short Facts: Beatriz, (not sure if illegit or legit child) opposes the correction of
judgment and the re-opening of the probate proceedings to correct a alleged
typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo land in question, claiming that there

was no typographical error and the parties intended to share only that area of land.
Decedent: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.
Pilar Ibanez de Susuarregui: surviving spouse of decedent
-administratix of the estate
Illegit children:
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Enrique de Zuzuarregui
Jose de Zuzuarregui
*Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. Re reyes: daughter of Antonio Sr. by another mother
Pacita Javier: niece of administratix
-mother of the three illegit children
Project of partition:
Pilar: 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of the assets (share of conjugal partnership)
Beatriz: 1/16
Antonio, Jr.: 1/16
Enrique: 1/16
Jose: 1/16
Antipolo, Rizal property: mentioned 4x in document
-adjudicated to Pilar (12/15), Antonio Jr. (1/15), Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15)
-Pacita relinquished her right "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real
estate property"
-administratix and other three distributees filed a MOTION TO REOPEN SPECIAL
PROCEEDIGNS for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the
description of the parcel of land (correct land area: 803,781.51, not 83,781sqm)
-opposition to motion
TC:
(1) opened for purpose of correcting clerical error in description of land
(2) correct land area to conform with description of land area in TCT
(3) correction be made in the project of partition
-CA: Affirm
Pacita's allegation: no clerical area. The area in the project of partition is correct.
She would not have relinquished her share in the Antipolo land if she new nothing
would remain from the land. It was even repeated 4x in the project of partition
WON there was a clerical error, which is an exemption to correcting or supplying a
final judgment already entered?
NONE.
On correction of clerical errors:
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes
or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied
even after the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an
exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the

court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The court may make this
amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by
the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in
the body of the decision.
-TC already found that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by
inadvertence in the project of partition
-probate proceeding, nature:
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to
settle the ENTIRE estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be
absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion
thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to
end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso
without designation or segregation of shares.
-It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact
it is, a full and complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate,
necessarily including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the
intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the
subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of the
remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs
have in holding in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square
meters?
-if they cannot see eye to eye, why share properties as co-owners?
-weird that the parties came up with 83,781, just omitting the zeroes. So only logical
reason is that they just forgot to put zero.
-according to her own computation, she already received her 1/16 share in the
estate. There would not be a substantial difference in value in their shares...

Vda. De Reyes v. CA (Gr. 92436)

FACTS: The ascendant of the petitioner owned a parcel of land, which was
transferred to the petitioners; the petitioners partitioned the said property amongst
themselves albeit not deduced into writing.
One of the heirs sold his share of the property to the private respondent, the
petitioners now claim that since the same was never validly partitioned and was
extrajudicial settled the said sale was allegedly void.

ISSUE: WON the sale was valid.

HELD: Yes, since although not reduced into writing the said partition was valid;
The requirement that a partition should be deduced into writing and be made into a
public document was merely for the constructive notice to others, thus does not
affect it`s validity.
And for argument that said property was never partitioned the same may still be
sold as an undivided claim/interest/share to the property.
Also discussed by the court is that an extrajudicial settlement does not create
a right in favor of an heir. Since it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or
right to property.
And since at the present case the said property was sold the petitioner never had a
right to speak of in the first place.

BENNY SAMPILO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-10474. February 28, 1958

FACTS:
Teodoro Tolete, died leaving his wife and nephews and nieces who are children of his
deceased brothers and sisters. His wife executed an affidavit of self adjudicating
saying that Teodoro had no children or or dependents, neither ascendants or
acknowledged natural children, neither brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces.Then,
his wife sold the properties to Sampilo, then the latter sold it to Salacup.
Sinopera instituted estate proceedings asking for letters of administration. She
alleged that Teodors wife, has no right to execute the affidavit of self-adjudication
for there others heirs aside from her.
The trial court ruled in favor of Sinopera. In their appeal, the petitioners argue that
Sinoperas cause of action has already prescribed because according to the rules of
court, persons deprived of their rights due to the partition or self adjudication for
there are other heirs aside from her. The CA modified the ruling stating that the
affidavit of Teodoros wife is null and void, but the subsequent sales are valid insofar
as it is not above her share from Teodoros estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the casue of action has already prescribed.
RULING:
No. The rule applies only to persons who participated in the said special
proceedings and does not prejudice those who did not have the chance to
participate.

There are two significant provisions in section 1, and 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all of
them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made
more imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the
clause "and not otherwise". By the title of Section 4, the "distributees and estate"
are indicated as the persons to answer for rights violated by extrajudicial
settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made
expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take
part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that
those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner
deprived of their lawful right or share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement,
they may demand their rights or interest within the period of two years, and both
the distributees and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest.
Evidently, they are the persons who, in accordance with the provision, may seek to
remedy the prejudice to their rights within the two-year period. But as to those who
did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent or
of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision, and it is unreasonable and
unjust that they also be required to assert their claims within the period of two
years. To extend the effect of the settlement of them, to those who did not take part
or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect,
would be violative of the fundamental right to due process of law.

Cua v. Vargas, 506 SCRA 374

SHort Summary: Cua bought property from some of the co-heirs who were also
signatories to the 2 documents they executed, excluding some of the other heirs
who were not notified before the alleged partition, though there was a publication of
the partition after the partition was done.
Mom/Decedent: Paulina Vargas
Heirs:
Ester
Visitacion
Juan
Zenaida
Rosario
<>
Andres
Gloria
Antonina
Florentino
Those who signed the notarized EJ Settlement:
Ester
Visitacion

Juan
Zenaida
Rosario
-the said EJ Settlement was published in Catanduanes Tribune for 3 consecutive
weeks
-they were also the ones who executed an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale with
Cua
*the latter 4 never signed any document
*all documents executed and published in 1994
-one of the heirs (Gloria Vargas, widow of Santiago Vargas) claimed that she only
knew of the EJ Settlement + Sale when the original house was demolished
sometime in 1995; claimed she was unaware of said settlement
-tried to redeem the property from Cua but Cua refused their offer
-amicable settlement not reached in barangay level
-ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF EJ SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL REDEMPTION OF LOT,
MTC: 30-d period ff a written notice by vendors to co-owners not sent to them so the
EJ Settlement and Sale were null and void and had no legal effect on them
MTC: DISMISS
-transaction occurred after partition so the co-owners could validly dispose of their
shares
-written notice of sale under A1088, though not sent, was cured by the ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF SALE (which was more than 30d before filing of complaint)
-no bad faith on part of Cua
RTC, appeal: affirm MTC
CA: Reversed RTC and MTC
-pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement
made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter
never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
-MR Denied
WON PUBLICATION of the EJ Partition was binding on the non-signatory heirs
because it constitutes due notice and therefore, the non-signatory co-heirs were
already estopped from assailing the partition and sale
NO. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION WAS MADE, NOT BEFORE WHICH
WAS REQUIRED IN R74.1
-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule
plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has
been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed
upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already
been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first
deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
-The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the

heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice
after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful
participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present
case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.
WON THE RESPONDENTS NON-SIGNATORY CO-HEIRS HAD RIGHT TO
REDEEM?
YES.
-sale of pro indiviso shares allowed, subject to right of redemption of other co-heirs.
This right was never lost because the non-signatory co-heirs were never notified in
writing of the actual sale. NOTIFICATION IN WRITING OF THE SALE BY THE VENDOR
is required to start the period of redemption (w/n 1 month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale); even if the co-heirs have actual knowledge of sale,
the notification in writing is still required. As there was no such notice here, the right
to redeem the shares is still with the non-signatory co-heirs.
-method of notification remains exclusive, no alternative provided by law
-purpose of A1088: keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership
WON Cua was a builder in GF
-not in GF because he was very much aware that NOT ALL THE HEIRS PARTICIPATED
IN THE EJ SETTLEMENT + SALE, as evident from the face of the document itself
-since no valid partition yet, no sale could occur. Despite this glaring fact, and over
the protests of the respondents, he still constructed improvements on the property
WON MTC does not have jurisdiction, this being incapable of pecuniary estimation
Cua estopped thru active participation in the MTC
WON it should still be dismissed for non-joinder of indispensable parties
NO.
-indispensable party: party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final
determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or
defendant.
-here: prayer of complaint was that they be allowed to redeem shares in property
sold. The other co-heirs already relinquished their right over their shares to Cua with
the alleged sale. As a result, the other co-heirs who sold him the property are not
anymore needed.
On improper verification and CNFS
Rule may be relaxed. And since the respondent share a common interest with the
other respondent, her sole signature complies with the rules.

G.R. No. 156536

October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS,
EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.
FACTS:A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San
Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4,
1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and
among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas,
Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina
Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot
in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino,
Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester,
Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement
Among Heirs was published in the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive
weeks.3
On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale 4 was
again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with
the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and
Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square
meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
Respondents argue that said Extra Judicial Settlement cannot bind them for it was
executed without their consent and participation.
ISSUE:WON said Settlement would bind the respondents who did not give their
consent?
HELD:No. It would not bind them. The Supreme Court gave the following reason.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule
plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. 18 It contemplates a notice that
has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed
upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of
extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already
been executed19 as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

G.R. No. 161220

July 30, 2008

SPOUSES
GORGONIO
BENATIRO
and
COLUMBA
CUYOS-BENATIRO
substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and
ROSIE
M.
BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia CuyosMijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.

FACTS:On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria)
represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition 4 for
Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner."
The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by
Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective
counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an
Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate.

Subsequently, the respondents questioned the said Compromise Agreement for

they did not give their consent and participation.

The petitioners claimed that they were constructively notified through publication.

ISSUE:WON the said agreement is binding to the heirs who did not consent to the
Agreement?
HELD:No. Said agreement is not binding upon those heirs who did not give their
consent to said agreement. The Supreme Court held as follows:

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a
hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite

the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI
adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs
attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance
to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.

PEDROSA, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 118680. March 5, 2001

FACTS
Miguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina and their legally
adopted daughter Maria Pedrosa, the petitioner. Rosalina and Maria entered into an
extra judicial settlement of his estate.
The other Private respondents, the
Rodriguezes, however filed an action an action to annul Marias adoption which the
CFI upheld. It was also appealed to the Court of Appeals which also upheld the
adoption as legal.
In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away with no other
heirs but her brothers and sisters, the private respondents. Who then entered into
an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate
of Miguel and of his sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of
Miguel Rodriguez. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered
fourteen parcels of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These
properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of
Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.
Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties and after being
unable to do so, filed a complaint to annul the partition. Her complaint was
dismissed by the RTC and on appeal was also dismissed by the CA.
ISSUES
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and Partition had already prescribed;
(2) whether or not said deed is valid;

(3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had
already been transferred to the respondent buyers.
RULING
1. No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribed
Section 4, Rule 74] provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who
have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in
addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1of Rule 74 have been strictly complied
with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the
extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial
partition. So the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The
applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De
Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of
fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such
discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the
Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question
which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers
only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it
excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned
property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition
was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the
trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution in 1941
2. No. The deed of partition is not valid.
No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The
rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of
Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties
to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition,
not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule
74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the
said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of

extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an
heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone
descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from
participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code
3. The court ruled that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue.
The properties sought to be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered
under the name of third parties. Well settled is the doctrine that a Torrens
Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for such purpose.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA

DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE LA ROSA vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
FACTS:
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado and Lucio Campo,
both of whom were never married. Five other children were born to the couple who
are full-blood siblings of Josefa and natural children of Felisa. Felisa also had another
son with another man (Ramon Osorio) named Luis Delgado. Josefa Delgado died on
September 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives.
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa but whether a marriage
in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived
together as husband and wife but were never married. Petitioners point out that no
record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as an
unmarried woman. They never had any children but took into their home
Guillermina and Nanie. They were never legally adopted but was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan. Guillermina was alleged to be the illegitimate child of
Guillermo with another woman.
Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did
not mean that no marriage transpired and that Guillermina was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child and such right had prescribed upon the death
of Guillermo. They maintain that Guillermo and Josefa were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa.
During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their
relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition, they
presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947; 3.
Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia himself swore to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3
June 1919; 4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that
he was married to Josefa Delgado.
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original
petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa
Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila. This petition was opposed by
the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias
late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. The
opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the
other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate
half-blood relative Josefa Delgado. Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in
the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of
Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors, the motion was granted.
The RTC ruled that petitioner and her co-claimants are entitled to the estate of the
late Josefa Delgado and declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate
of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
As the estates of both decedents have not as yet been settled, a single
administrator was appointed in the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa.
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION were issued to CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of P500,000.00.
Upon appeal in the CA said court reversed the decision.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado; 2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are; 3. who should be issued letters of administration.
First issue: The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation
of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be
married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original
petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975
referred to them as "spouses." These arguments are very persuasive.
Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support
thereof. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo
Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of
no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to
the properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more
than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents
which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein
was presented by petitioners. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the
parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in
constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Second Issue: The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
Since Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children
born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo,
namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio
and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.
The SC ruled that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers
and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply
to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference
when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten
with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like
legitimate children of half-blood relation. The court ruled that the rules regarding
succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them.
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she
may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or
recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged
illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February
28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is

compulsory in any of the following cases:
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing. There
was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from
her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any judicial action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed. Therefore the right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia.
Third Issue: Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order
of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in

the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here.
The SC found it fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado
vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia.
They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a
nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon
their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be
determined by the trial court.

G.R. No. 125715 December 29, 1998

RICARDO F. MARQUEZ, AUREA M. CABEZAS, EXEQUIEL F. MARQUEZ,
SALVADOR F. MARQUEZ, ANTONIO F. MARQUEZ, and RAFAEL F. MARQUEZ,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO F. MARQUEZ and BELEN F.
MARQUEZ, respondents.
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez begot
twelve children, namely: (1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena; (5)
Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr., (9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11)
Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.
Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161
square meters in San Juan Del Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No.
47572, 1wherein the constructed their conjugal home.

In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. Thirty years later or in 1982, Rafael
Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole
ownership to the property
Thereafter, on December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos" 3 covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the
house constructed thereon to three of this children, namely: (1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.;
(2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen, both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his
other children
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual possession of the land.
However, when petitioners learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they
immediately demanded that since they are also children of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they
are entitled to their respective shares over the land in question.
In view of the private respondents' indifference, petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr.,
filed a complaint on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages"
alleging that the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their
father in making him execute the said documents, thus making the other
documents fraudulently made.
Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet prescribed, assert that by
virtue of the fraudulent "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation" wherein
they were allegedly deprived of their just share over the parcel of land, a
constructive trust was created. 9 Forthwith, they maintain that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years.
In their Answer, private respondents argued that petitioner's action was already
barred by the statute of limitations since the same should have been filed within
four years from the date of discovery of the alleged fraud.
RTC: in favor of petitioners (not yet prescribed)
CA: reversed, in favor of respondents (prescribed already)
ISSUE: Whether their action for reconveyance had prescribed.
RULING:
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952; thus, succession to her estate
is governed by the present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her compulsory
heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners and private respondent
therein, and her spouse, Rafael Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, As such, when Rafael
Marquez Sr., for one reason or another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit
that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and
managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive
trust under Article 1456 was established.

In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied

or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens
title over the property. 13 For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall
start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus,
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the
action.
Prescinding therefrom, can Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, validly
donate this portion to the respondents? Obviously, he cannot, as expressly provided
in Art. 736 of the Civil Code, thus:Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate
the property entrusted to them.Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does
not belong to
him.
Whether this donation was inofficious or not is another matter which is not within
the province of this Court to determine inasmuch as it necessitates the production
of evidence not before it.
Finally, while we rule in favor of petitioners, we cannot grant their plea for moral
damages and attorney's fees 20since they have not satisfactorily shown that they
have suffered "mental anguish" as provided in Article 2219 and Article 2290 of the
Civil Code.

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and

DELFIN GERONA, petitioners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and
VICTORIA DE GUZMANrespondents
FACTS: , Petitioners herein, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who
died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his
first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de
Guzman married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, which are now the
respondents, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September
11, 1945;
On May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein
that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman,
although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his forced heirs; that such fraud
was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case.

Petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents their (petitioners) share in said

properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the respondents refused
to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners.
Respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de
Guzman, was not entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being
merely a spurious child of the latter, and that petitioners' action is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased
Marcelo de Guzman, the present action for partition of the latter's estate is not
subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected by said statute, the
period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery
of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or
1957; and that accordingly, said period had not expired when the present action
was commenced on November 4, 1958.

ISSUE:WON an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe?

HELD: Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs
does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold
the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is
asserted by the possessor of the property.
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement
stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and
secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded
the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title
adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the
annulment of said deed upon the ground that the same is tainted with fraud.

G.R. No. 160530

November 20, 2007
CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner, vs. DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN
NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition
for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. After hearing and with due notice to the
compulsory heirs, the probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic
will. Later, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters
testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittschers
surviving spouse, herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of
the said petition. However, the court denied petitioners motion to dismiss, and
granted respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. Atty.
Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondents petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and that she was denied due process.Petitioner
contends that respondents petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked
a certification against forum-shopping.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not certificate of non-forum shopping is required? (2)
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case? (2) Whether or not petitioner
was denied due process?
HELD: (1) Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-949 of the
Court require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed
in court. However, in this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary
is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the
probate of Dr. Nittschers will. Hence, respondents failure to include a certification
against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not
a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.
(2) Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had
estate. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr.
Nittscher was a resident of Las Pias, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such
factual finding, which we find supported by evidence on record, should no longer be
disturbed. Time and again we have said that reviews on certiorari are limited to
errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are
totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or
weigh evidence all over again. Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher

correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered Las Pias, Metro Manila,
the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.
(3) Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally.

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.
In this case, petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittschers
children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the
probate proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondents
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to
dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for reconsideration of the
issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion to dismiss. We
are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.
Therefore, petitioners allegation that she was denied due process in the probate
proceedings is without basis. Petitioner should realize that the allowance of her
husbands will is conclusive only as to its due execution. 11 The authority of the
probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. 12 Thus,
petitioners claim of title to the properties forming part of her husbands estate
should be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.

June 19, 1982

G.R. No. L-57848
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS: Soledad Maninang filed a petition with the CFI-Quezon City for the probate of
the holographic will of Clemencia Aseneta who instituted her and her husband as
heirs. Later on, Bernardo Aseneta (herein private respondent), claiming to be the
adopted child of the deceased and her sole heir instituted intestate proceedings
with the CFI-Rizal. The two cases were consolidated with the latter court. Bernardo
filed a motion to dismiss the testate case on the ground that the will was null and
void because he, being the only compulsory heir, was preterited; thus, intestacy
should ensue. In her opposition, Soledad averred that the court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will and
that Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. The motion was

granted. The motion for reconsideration by Soledad Maninang was denied for lack of
merit. In the same order, the court appointed Bernardo Aseneta as administrator
considering he is a forced heir and is not shown to be unfit to perform the trust.
Soledad Maninang filed petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. It was
denied. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: whether or not the dismissal of the court a quo of the testate case proper?
HELD: No, it was not proper. Probate of a will is mandatory as required by law and
public policy. Ordinarily, the probate of the will does not look into its intrinsic
validity; but on the extrinsic validity which includes the capacity of the testator to
make a will and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of wills.
However, when practical considerations demand, the intrinsic validity of the will
may be passed upon like when on its face there is really preterition or invalid
disinheritance making the will void. The probate might become an idle ceremony if
on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Such would shorten the proceedings if
the issues are decided as early as during the probate proceedings.
In the instant case, there is still doubt to the alleged preterition or disinheritance of
the private respondent cannot be clearly seen on the face of the will and needs
further determination which can only be made if the will is allowed to be probated.

. Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondent

G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
FACTS: Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised
by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad. Crispin was the owner of six lots
of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and
thereafter, she executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor of
Maria covering all the six lots. The Deed provided that such will become effective
upon the death of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the
Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided, however, that
anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone of them who should survive,
they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the
land.
Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde executed a last
will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to Maria and the remaining lot to
Zenaido. Maria died a few months after Matildes death. Thereafter, Marias heirs
(herein petitioners) filed before the RTC a complaint for declaration and recovery of
ownership and possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido,
alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because such lots have

been previously alienated to them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. The lower
court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA reversed said decision upon
appeal of Zenaido which held that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation
mortis causa, not inter vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the
formalities of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration,
the present Petition for Review has been filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or
not such deed is valid?
HELD: The donation to Maria Aluad (petitioners mother) is one of mortis causa, it
having the following characteristics:
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor,
or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the
transferor at will, ad nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde
did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during
the formers lifetime. Further the statement, anytime during the lifetime of the
DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated, means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the
right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is
an attribute of ownership. The phrase, anyone of them who should survive is out
of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the
death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more
witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right
to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to
Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by her last will and
testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect
to the conveyed lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.

36. RALLA v. UNTALAN, (G.R. Nos. L-63253-54 April 27, 1989)

FACTS: The late Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in the
then CFI of Albay, which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 564. In his will he
left his entire estate to his son, Pablo (the petitioner herein), leaving nothing to his
other son, Pedro. In that same year, Pedro Ralla filed an action for the partition of
the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella.
Petitioners Brother-in- law filed a petition, docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 1106, for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the ground that the
decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo then filed a manifestation stating that he had
no objections to the probate; thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as Petitioner
for the Probate of the Will." This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite the
written opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate was
granted; Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed special
administrator, over and above the objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. However, in
taking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla,
Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by
the project of partition mentioned earlier. Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the
private respondents herein) moved to exclude from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the
aforesaid parcels of land. Private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For
Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of the 67 Parcels of Land Subject Of The
Project Of Partition. However, Judge Untalan ruled that the partition should be
respected and upheld. Hence the 63 parcels should be excluded from the probate
proceedings, and likewise the administration of Amine, Jr.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the
Will had been probated
HELD: The rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the
will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is
inapplicable in this instance where there are two separate cases (Civil Case No.
2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a
will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo
Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.

37. FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA ( October 12, 1967)

FACTS: Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance
a petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes,
executed on October 22, 1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the
petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. Fernandez et. al., all
surenamed Reyes, claiming to be the heirs intestate filed oppositions to the probate
asked. The lower court found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but
deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time
when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when
the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."

Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new

trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and
resolved; whereupon, on July 27, 1959, the Court overruled the claim that proponent
was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the parties the
right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time." The appellate
Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to probate, had
become final for lack of opportune appeal
ISSUE: Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to
probate had become final for lack of appeal
HELD: It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are
valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676; Mercado vs.
Santos, 66 Phil. 215; Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil. 710). As such, the probate
order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or
judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will."
Appellants argue that they were entitled to await the trial Court's resolution
on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there
would be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts. This contention is without
weight, since Rule 109, section 1, expressly enumerates six different instances
when appeal may be taken in special proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was
not appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the
appellate courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon
which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was
correctly dismissed.

38. REMEDIOS NUGUID v. SALONGA PAZ NUGUID (L- 23445, June 23, 1966)
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid,
and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado,
Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some
11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Felix and
Paz Nuguid entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter

alia, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is
void. The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may rule on the validity of the Will.
HELD: The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited
to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears
in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists
that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we
might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

39. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
FACTS: On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's
(Annie sand) holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was
of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress,fraud or undue influence, and
was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
This was opposed on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in
decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by decedent;
and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the
disposition in the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner.

The trial court having found that the holographic will in question was written
entirely, dated and signed in
the handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have explicitly and
categorically identified the
handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the
genuine handwriting and
signature of the testatrix admitted the probate, however on appeal with CA this was
reversed and the
petition for probate was dismissed on the ground that it fails to meet the
requirements for its validity by not complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC which
read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date
validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will,
the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,
or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:Whether or not the CA was correct in disallowing the probate of the will
based on the provisions of Art Art 813 and Art 814?
HELD: No.The Court said it is erroneous for the CA to say that the holographic will
of Anne Sand was not
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law and held that Articles
813 and 814 of the New Civil Code were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the
probate of said will.
The Court cited: Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be
disallowed in
any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the
time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary, or of
some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not
intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto. In the same vein, Article
839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at
the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of
the beneficiary or of
some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed
should be his will at the
time of affixing his signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a
petition to admit a
holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in
accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the
execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
In the case of holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided
under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need
not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the
testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament
void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding noncompliance with the
provisions of Article 814. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted
under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most
only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. Thus, unless
the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date
of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not

invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance
of such changes.
Only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in
Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a
holographic will.
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house
and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No
costs.

40. JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R.

INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-INFANTE,
TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA R-INFANTE DE DIAS,
MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE
CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRAN CH NO. 166, PASIG, METRO
MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988
FACTS: On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the
late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and ad- dresses
of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees.
On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing
on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the
"Nueva Era, newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared thus,
moved to 12 May 1986, on which date, the probate court issued an order admitting
private respondents evidence ex-parte, allowed the latter to place Arturi Arceo as
one of the testamentary witnesses, and appointed private respondent as executor.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging
that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule
76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. Probate court,
acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners,
issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was,
however, referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners contention: Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal notice of
probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional
requirement in the probate of a will and that under Sec. 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court, said requirement of the law is mandatory and its omission constitutes a
reversible error for being constitutive of grave abuse of discretion.
Court of Appeals contention: The requirement of notice on individual heirs,
legatees and devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better
satisfy in some instances the requirements of due process,
ISSUE: Whether or not personal notice of probate proceedings to the known
legatees and devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will.
HELD: Yes. We grant the petition.
Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail
or personally. The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the
time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and deposited in
the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20)
days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy
of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as
executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal
service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.
It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence,
if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The
petition for the allowance of the will itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite such knowledge, the probate
court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of
the law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the
notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

Tan vs Gedorio
Facts: Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo
Lim Suga and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the
decedent moved for the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as
special administrator. This was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and
Geraldine Tan, claiming that none of the respondents can be appointed since they
are not residing in the country, that Romualdo does not have the same competence
as Vilma Tan who was already acting as the de facto administratrix of the estate,
and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate children, is preferred in the choice
of administrator (claiming that the respondent were illegitmate children). However,
upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the
estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in
their selection of a special administrator.
Ruling: The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next
of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special
administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the
court, and is not appealable. If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the
order of preference , they should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator
and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special
administrator. Comment: The court was correct in granting the appointment of
Romualdo as special administrator since it was shown that Vilma was in remiss after
failing to follow the series of directives and extension given to her to account for the
estate.
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order
the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. on the issue of personal
service, as in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous" because the distance from the
petitioner's residence and the respondent court is very far. Petition granted.
Comment: Yes, in this case the court was too blinded with its sense of duty to follow
to the rules to the letters. The court should have relaxed and liberally construed the
procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal
service, in the interest of substantial justice. Because in the end, it would be the
estate that would benefit upon being given notice of a money claim against it so it
can be inspected and verified.