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SPECIALFIRSTDIVISION

[G.R.No.122544.January28,2003]

REGINA P. DIZON, AMPARO D.BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA, ESTER


ABAD DIZON and JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A. DIZON,
GERARD A. DIZON and JOSE A. DIZON, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT
OFAPPEALSandOVERLANDEXPRESSLINES,INC.,respondents.

[G.R.No.124741.January28,2003]

REGINA P. DIZON, AMPARO D.BARTOLOME, FIDELINA D. BALZA, ESTER


ABAD DIZON and JOSEPH ANTHONY DIZON, RAYMUND A. DIZON,
GERARD A. DIZON and JOSE A. DIZON, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION and OVERLAND
EXPRESSLINES,INC.,respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

OnJanuary28,1999,thisCourtrenderedjudgmentintheseconsolidatedcasesasfollows:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,bothpetitionsareGRANTED.ThedecisiondatedMarch29,
1994andtheresolutiondatedOctober19,1995inCAG.R.CVNos.2515354,aswellasthedecision
datedDecember11,1995andtheresolutiondatedApril23,1997inCAG.R.SPNo.33113oftheCourt
ofAppealsareherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE.
Lettherecordsofthiscaseberemandedtothetrialcourtforimmediateexecutionofthejudgmentdated
November22,1982inCivilCaseNo.VIII29155ofthethenCityCourt(nowMetropolitanTrialCourt)
ofQuezonCity,BranchIIIasaffirmedinthedecisiondatedSeptember26,1984ofthethenIntermediate
AppellateCourt(nowCourtofAppeals)andintheresolutiondatedJune19,1985ofthisCourt.
However,petitionersareorderedtoREFUNDtoprivaterespondenttheamountofP300,000.00which
theyreceivedthroughAliceA.DizononJune20,1975.
SOORDERED.
PrivaterespondentfiledaMotionforReconsideration,SecondMotionforReconsideration,
and Motion to Suspend Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of Substantial Justice, all of
which have been denied by this Court. This notwithstanding, the cases were set for oral
argumentonMarch21,2001,onthefollowingissues:

1.WHETHERTHEREARECIRCUMSTANCESTHATWOULDJUSTIFYSUSPENSIONOFTHE
RULESOFCOURT
2.WHETHERTHESUMOFP300,000.00RECEIVEDBYALICEDIZONFROMPRIVATE
RESPONDENTWASINTENDEDASPARTIALPAYMENTOFTHEPURCHASEPRICEOFTHE
PROPERTY,ORASPAYMENTOFBACKRENTALSONTHEPROPERTY
3.WHETHERALICEDIZONWASAUTHORIZEDTORECEIVETHESUMOFP300,000.00ON
BEHALFOFPETITIONERS
4.(A)IFSO,WHETHERPETITIONERSAREESTOPPEDFROMQUESTIONINGTHEBELATED
EXERCISEBYPRIVATERESPONDENTOFITSOPTIONTOBUYWHENTHEYACCEPTEDTHE
SAIDPARTIALPAYMENT
(B)IFSO,WHETHERALICEDIZONCANVALIDLYBINDPETITIONERSINTHEABSENCEOF
AWRITTENPOWEROFATTORNEY
5.(A)WHETHERTHEREWASAPERFECTEDCONTRACTOFSALEBETWEENTHEPARTIES
(B)WHETHERTHEREWASACONTRACTOFSALEATLEASTWITHRESPECTTOTHE
SHARESOFFIDELAANDALICEDIZONAND
6.WHETHERPRIVATERESPONDENTSACTIONFORSPECIFICPERFORMANCEHAS
PRESCRIBED.
In order to resolve the first issue, it is necessary to pass upon the other questions which
relatetothemeritsofthecase.Itisonlywherethereexiststrongcompellingreasons,suchas
serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof, that this Court can suspend
therules.[1]
After reviewing the records, we find that, despite all of private respondents protestations,
thereisabsolutelynowrittenproofofAliceDizonsauthoritytobindpetitioners.Firstofall,she
wasnotevenacoowneroftheproperty.Neitherwassheempoweredbythecoownerstoact
ontheirbehalf.
The acceptance of the amount of P300,000.00, purportedly as partial payment of the
purchase price of the land, was an act integral to the sale of the land. As a matter of fact,
private respondent invokes such receipt of payment as giving rise to a perfected contract of
sale.Inthisconnection,Article1874oftheCivilCodeisexplicitthat:Whenasaleofapieceof
land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing
otherwise,thesaleshallbevoid.
Whenthesaleofapieceoflandoranyinterestthereonisthroughanagent,theauthorityofthelatter
shallbeinwritingotherwise,thesaleshallbevoid.Thustheauthorityofanagenttoexecuteacontract
forthesaleofrealestatemustbeconferredinwritingandmustgivehimspecificauthority,eitherto
conductthegeneralbusinessoftheprincipalortoexecuteabindingcontractcontainingtermsand
conditionswhichareinthecontracthedidexecute.Aspecialpowerofattorneyisnecessarytoenterinto
anycontractbywhichtheownershipofanimmovableistransmittedoracquiredeithergratuitouslyorfor
avaluableconsideration.Theexpressmandaterequiredbylawtoenableanappointeeofanagency
(couched)ingeneraltermstosellmustbeonethatexpresslymentionsasaleorthatincludesasaleasa
necessaryingredientoftheactmentioned.Fortheprincipaltoconfertherightuponanagenttosellreal
estate,apowerofattorneymustsoexpressthepowersoftheagentinclearandunmistakable

language.Whenthereisanyreasonabledoubtthatthelanguagesousedconveyssuchpower,nosuch
constructionshallbegiventhedocument.[2]
Itnecessarilyfollows,therefore,thatpetitionerscannotbedeemedtohavereceivedpartial
payment of the supposed purchase price for the land throughAlice Dizon. It cannot even be
saidthatAliceDizonsacceptanceofthemoneyboundatleasttheshareofFidelaDizon,inthe
absence of a written power of attorney from the latter. It should be borne in mind that the
ReceiptdatedJune20,1975,whilemadeoutinthenameofFidelaDizon,wassignedbyAlice
Dizonalone.
Moreover, there could not have been a perfected contract of sale. As we held in our
Decision dated January 28, 1999, the implied renewal of the contract of lease between the
parties affected only those terms and conditions which are germane to the lessees right of
continued enjoyment of the property. The option to purchase afforded private respondent
expiredaftertheoneyearperiodgrantedinthecontract.Otherwisestated,theimpliedrenewal
oftheleasedidnotincludetheoptiontopurchase.Weseenoreasontodisturbourrulingon
thispoint,viz:
Inthiscase,therewasacontractofleaseforone(1)yearwithoptiontopurchase.Thecontractoflease
expiredwithouttheprivaterespondent,aslessee,purchasingthepropertybutremainedinpossession
thereof.Hence,therewasanimplicitrenewalofthecontractofleaseonamonthlybasis.Theotherterms
oftheoriginalcontractofleasewhicharerevivedintheimpliednewleaseunderArticle1670ofthe
NewCivilCodeareonlythosetermswhicharegermanetothelesseesrightofcontinuedenjoymentof
thepropertyleased.Therefore,animpliednewleasedoesnotipsofactocarrywithitanyimpliedrevival
ofprivaterespondent'soptiontopurchase(aslesseethereof)theleasedpremises.Theprovisionentitling
thelesseetheoptiontopurchasetheleasedpremisesisnotdeemedincorporatedintheimpliedly
renewedcontractbecauseitisalientothepossessionofthelessee.Privaterespondentsrighttoexercise
theoptiontopurchaseexpiredwiththeterminationoftheoriginalcontractofleaseforoneyear.The
rationaleofthisCourtisthat:
Thisisareasonableconstructionoftheprovision,whichisbasedonthepresumptionthatwhenthelessor
allowsthelesseetocontinueenjoyingpossessionofthepropertyforfifteendaysaftertheexpirationof
thecontractheiswillingthatsuchenjoymentshallbefortheentireperiodcorrespondingtotherent
whichiscustomarilypaidinthiscaseuptotheendofthemonthbecausetherentwaspaid
monthly.Necessarily,ifthepresumedwillofthepartiesreferstotheenjoymentofpossessionthe
presumptioncoverstheothertermsofthecontractrelatedtosuchpossession,suchastheamountof
rental,thedatewhenitmustbepaid,thecareoftheproperty,theresponsibilityforrepairs,etc.Butno
suchpresumptionmaybeindulgedinwithrespecttospecialagreementswhichbynatureareforeignto
therightofoccupancyorenjoymentinherentinacontractoflease.[3]
Therebeingnomeritintheargumentsadvancedbyprivaterespondent,thereisnoneedto
suspendtheRulesofCourtandtoadmitthemotionforreconsideration.While it is within the
poweroftheCourttosuspenditsownrules,ortoexceptaparticularcasefromitsoperation,
whenever the interest of justice require it, however, the movant must show strong compelling
reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof,

[4]noneofwhichobtainsinthiscase.
Litigationmustendsometimeandsomewhere.An effective and efficient administration of
justice requires that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a
meresubterfuge,deprivedofthefruitsoftheverdict.Courtsmust,therefore,guardagainstany
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to

controversies,courtsshouldfrownuponanyattempttoprolongthem.[5]
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Suspend Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of
SubstantialJusticefiledbyprivaterespondentisDENIEDWITHFINALITY.Nofurtherpleadings
willbeentertainedinthesecases.
SOORDERED.
Puno,J.,concur.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,(Chairman),seeseparateopinion,heretoattached.