Journal of Phenomenological

Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

jour
nal
of

pheno
menol
ogical
psych
ology

brill.com/jpp

Somatic Apathy

Body Disownership in the Context of Torture

Yochai Ataria

The Program for the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel, Neurobiology Dept.,
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel
Yochai.ataria@gmail.com

Shaun Gallagher

Philosophy, University of Memphis, USA, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the

Arts, University of Wollongong, Australia
s.gallagher@memphis.edu

Abstract
Muselmann was a term used in German concentration camps to describe prisoners near
death due to exhaustion, starvation, and helplessness. This paper suggests that the
inhuman conditions in the concentration camps resulted in the development of a
defensive sense of disownership toward the entire body. The body, in such cases, is
reduced to a pure object. However, in the case of the Muselmann this body-as-object is
felt to belong to the captors, and as such is therefore identified as a tool to inflict suffering and pain on the Muselmann himself. In this situation, lacking cognitive resources,
the Muselmann may have no other alternative than to treat his body as an enemy, and
then to retreat or disinvest from the body. This response is a form of somatic apathy, an
indifference that is tied to a loss of the self/non-self distinction. This may, in turn, lead
to suicidal inclinations, even after liberation from the camp.

Keywords
Muselmann torture disownership sense of ownership sense of agency
YA would like to thank his doctoral supervisors: Prof. Yemima Ben-Menahem and Prof. Yuval
Neria. SG acknowledges support from the Humboldt Foundations Anneliese Maier Research
Award.

koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 5|doi 10.1163/15691624-12341286

106

Ataria and Gallagher

1 Introduction
According to Yehuda Bauer (1978), one of todays leading historians of the
Holocaust, in order to understand the uniqueness of the Holocaust, how it differs from other horrific acts, it is necessary to discuss it in the context of other
acts of genocide that both preceded and followed it. It appears that in this
larger context, one phenomenon unique to the Holocaust is the Musselman
(Agamben, 1999). Primo Levi, among twenty survivors from a transport of 650
sent from Italy to Auschwitz in 1944, describes in his work If This Is a Man (1959)
the process that transformed concentration camp inmates into Muselmnner
in the following manner:
It is enough to carry out all the orders one receives, to eat only the ration,
to observe the discipline of the work and the camp. Experience showed
that only exceptionally could one survive more than three months in this
way. All the mussulmans who finished in the gas chambers have the same
story, or more exactly, have no story; they followed the slope down to the
bottom (p. 103)
He continues to provide a detailed depiction of Muselmnner:
Their life is short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmanner,
the drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass,
continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who march and
labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them, already too empty
to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their
death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired
to understand (p. 103)
Agamben (1998; 1999), in agreement with Levi (1993), believes that the
Musselman constitutes the perfect witness. However, paradoxically, due to this
very fact, the Musselman is unable to testify. This is true even if by some miracle the Musselman survived and were once again to become a human being:
in that case the survivors testimony would no longer be that of the Musselman.
Indeed, the testimony of the Musselman, the extreme phenomenon, is lost in
the case of either death or recovery. Thus it appears that it is the compulsive
silence that makes the Musselman the perfect witness. The Musselman, using
Antelmes (1992) words, is a prey to a kind of infinite, untransmittable knowledge (p. 289). This impossible paradox leads eventually to a serious crisis of
testimony (Felman & Laub, 1992; Laub, 1995).
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

107

There is a general consensus among scholars, as among survivors, that

the phenomenon of the Muselmnner is beyond the possibility of description. Indeed, any attempt to depict the Musselmans experience (from the
Musselmans perspective) contradicts itself from the very outset. Accordingly,
it is important to emphasize that the aim of this paper is not to describe the
concentration camps, discuss the Holocaust or the Musselman as an historical phenomenon (or make any other historical claims).1 Likewise, this paper
does not pretend to explain the Musselmans experience or way of existing or
being-in-the-world. It does, however, seek to apply our existing knowledge
of the Musselman experience in order to understand the phenomenon of
body disownership, in which one feels as if ones body is not ones own: the
Musselman is the most extreme example of this phenomenon in the face of
absolute torture.
Typically, disownership is defined, in the context of pathologies such as
somatoparaphrenia, as the feeling that a body part is alien: It does not feel
like a part of their body, although the patients can acknowledge that it is contiguous with the rest of their body. They experience that the body part does
not belong to them (de Vignemont 2011, p. 90, emphasis added). According to
this description disownership is defined narrowly, in regard to limbs and not
with respect to the body as a whole. Yet, it seems that at least in some cases
of depersonalization, it is possible to refer to a sense of disownership towards
the entire body (Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David, 2005; Simeon & Abugel,
2006). Similarly, it has been suggested that during extreme trauma subjects
can feel somatic dissociation (Ataria, 2015a; Scaer, 2014). This paper seeks to
develop this notion further by suggesting that under conditions such as the
Muselmnner endured in the Nazi concentration camps, one may develop disownership toward ones entire body.
1 Bearing in mind the difficulties surrounding the testimonies of camp survivors in general
and the Musselman in particular, this paper does not utilize archival evidence but rather
relies on four central books written by former camp inmates who were familiar with (or who
experienced) the phenomenon of the Musselman. These works are 1) Levis If This is a Man
(1959; first published in Italian in 1947); 2) The Human Race (1992; first published in 1947) by
Robert Antelme who was deported to Buchenwald in July 1944 and later sent to Gandersheim
before being liberated in Dachau; 3) At the Minds Limits by Jean Amery (1980; written in
the years 19641966). Amery was arrested and tortured by the Gestapo, survived periods in
Auschwitz and Buchenwald and was finally liberated at Bergen Belsen; and 4) Fatelessness by
Imre Kertsz, who was sent to a concentration camp aged only 15 (2004; the work was written
in the years 19691973). All of these books are well known and readily available, yet at the
same time go beyond superficial descriptions. They have all been widely referenced in the
dialogue surrounding the Musselman.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

108

Ataria and Gallagher

The notion of a pattern theory of self can provide a theoretical background

for understanding this phenomenon. On a pattern theory of self (Gallagher
2013), the self is constituted by a variety of aspects that range from very basic
embodied (biological) and experiential differentiations of self and non-self,
to affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, narrative and extended
aspects. One can find situations in which different aspects of self can be disrupted, as in psycho- or neuro-pathologies, or in circumstances of torture or
solitary confinement (Gallagher 2014). In the case of the Muselman phenomenon we find a connection between a disowning of the body and a complete
loss of the very basic self / non-self distinction at the level of body experience.
The result is a complete apathy or in-difference tied to a lack of differentiation between ones body and ones enemy.
The next section provides a detailed discussion of the Muselmann, while the
third section demonstrates that not only is this phenomenon a case of disownership towards ones entire body, but that in extreme cases the subject experiences the body in a severe apathetic fashion, where the subject affectively
disinvests itself from and ignores the body.
2

The Muselmann

2.1 Background
Muselmann, the German word for Muslim,2 came to be used among concentration camp inmates to describe prisoners dying of starvation or exhaustion
who no longer possessed the will to live. The Muselmnner could not stand up
for more than a short period of time and therefore could not work. Since only
the healthy and those capable of work could pass the frequent selections conducted by the Nazis, the Muselmnner were among the first to be sentenced to
death (Sofsky, 1996).
The Muselmann has become a symbol of the mass murder committed by the
Nazis. Thus, if the concentration camp represents the most extreme situation
in which a human-being can exist, then the Muselmann, as a perfect product
of the concentration camp, is the extreme within the extreme: the figure of the
Muselmann encapsulates the very essence of being a prisoner in the concentration camps (Levi, 1993).
2 Some scholars suggest that the term arose as a result of the similarity between the near-death
prone state of a concentration camp Muselmann and the image of the Muslim at prayer,
prostrate on the ground (for more on this issue Agamben, 1999; Levi, 1993).

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

109

The most significant characteristic of Muselmnner was hopelessness; they

were practically living corpses. This is described in detail by many survivors of
the camps, perhaps most famously by Primo Levi in many of his works, among
them If this is a Man (1959), The Truce (1979), and The Drowned and the Saved
(1993). Since so many of the concentration camp inmates were themselves
close to becoming Muselmnner, many saw the Muselmann as a self-reflection,
a kind of warning sign:
There is nowhere to look in a mirror, but our appearance stands in front
of us, reflected in a hundred livid faces, in a hundred miserable and sordid puppets. We are transformed into the phantoms glimpsed yesterday
evening (Levi, 1959, p. 21).
Emaciated, eyes dimmed, an expression of sadness and apathy on their glazed
faces, their grey, paper-like skin crawling with lice, with cheek-bones and eye
sockets protruding from their elongated heads, the Muselmnner were easily
recognized. Kertsz (2004) describes them as follows:
Among them one can see those peculiar beings who at first were a little
disconcerting. Viewed from a certain distance, they are senilely doddering old codgers, and with their heads retracted into their necks, their
noses sticking out from their faces, the filthy prison duds that they wear
hanging loosely from their shoulders, even on the hottest summers day
they put one in mind of winter crows with a perpetual chill. As if with
each and every single stiff, halting step they take one were to ask: is such
an effort really worth the trouble? These mobile question marks, for I
could characterize not only their outward appearance but perhaps even
almost their very exiguousness in no other way, are known in the concentration camps as Musulmnner or Muslims, I was told.
The Muselmnner were often unable to move and in addition suffered from
weak muscles, pulse deceleration, shivering, drops in blood-pressure and temperature, slowing of the respiratory system, and at times edema, abscesses,
and diarrhea, forcing some to run to the latrine 3040 times each day and,
on occasion, even sleep in their own excrement (for details see Sofsky, 1996).
Nevertheless, according to Sofsky (1996), and this is an essential notion that
must be considered, it is not clear that the Muselmann can be reduced to
nosological diagnoses. By this Sofsky means that even if we were to gather
all the Muselmanns symptoms together, something would nevertheless be

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

110

Ataria and Gallagher

missing; the package of symptoms does not explain what it is like to be a

Muselmann. In fact, if one will choose to define the Muselmann in terms of a
nosological diagnosis one will undoubtedly miss the very essence of the experience of the Muselmann.
2.2 Hunger
In the first stages after arrival in a concentration camp, inmates were often
obsessed with food alone: A fortnight after my arrival I already had the prescribed hunger, that chronic hunger unknown to free men, which makes one
dream at night, and settles in all the limbs of ones body (Levi, 1959, p. 33).
Indeed if the prisoner could not find any way of supplementing the tiny and
non-nutritious meal provided by the camp, he or she would soon become a
Muselmann: Whosoever does not know how to become an Organisator,
Kombinator, Prominent (the savage eloquence of these words!) soon becomes
a musselman (Levi, 1959, p. 102). As Antelme (1992) puts it, Hunger has us
imprisoned already...we are obsessed with bread. Hunger is nothing less
than an obsession (p. 83). Indeed, according to his account, the Muselmann
begins to consume his own body: it is our body devouring itself (Antelme,
1992, p. 268).
Yet, once again, Sofsky (1996) highlights that it would be a fundamental mistake to (try to) explain the phenomenon of the Muselmann merely in terms of
starvation. Being a Muselmann meant much more than starving to death. In
the final phase of their lives, the Muselmnner did not feel hunger any more.
Indeed, the Musselman is often described as someone who will die holding
his bread in his hand, trailing it absent-mindedly, like somebody who has forgotten that he has bread in this hand, forgotten what bread is (Antelme, 1992,
p. 90). This constitutive moment at which the prisoner holds a piece of bread
yet is unable to eat it enables us to penetrate, at least to some extent, into the
very essence of the Musselman.
2.3
A New Metaphysical Stance toward the World
From the outside, the Muselmann may seem indifferent to the world, indifferent to the point of not even troubling to avoid tiredness and blows or to
search for food...when they send him to his death he will go with the same
total indifference (Levi, 1959, p. 42). The Muselmanns apathy towards life
and the world may be only a by-product, a symptom. Alternatively, given that
Muselmnner were completely helpless with regard to controlling their lives, it
may be that this apathy was in fact a kind of defense mechanism activated in
a radical situation:

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

111

Cold, damp, wind, or rain were no longer able to bother me; they did not
get through to me, I did not even sense them. Even my hunger passed;
I continued to carry to my mouth anything edible I was able to lay my
hands on, but more out of absentmindedness, mechanically, out of habit,
so to say (Kertsz, 2004).
This feeling of radical helplessness may eventually develop into a new metaphysical stance toward the world or, more precisely, toward the human race:
the Muselmann loses faith in fellow humans. Indeed, Levi (1959) presents the
following example: If some Null Achtzehn vacillates, he will find no one to
extend a helping hand; on the contrary, someone will knock him aside, because
it is in no ones interest that there be one more mussulman dragging himself
to work every day (p. 101). The Muselmann is in a state of total and complete
solitude: they suffer and drag themselves along in an opaque intimate solitude, and in solitude they die or disappear, without leaving a trace in anyones
memory (Levi, 1959, p. 102).
In this new metaphysical stance, the Muselmann develops the feeling that
everything around him is done for one purpose alone: to abuse him and bring
about his painful death (Levi, 1993). Indeed, according to Amery (1980), from
the Muselmanns perspective terror, torture, and abuse are not side effects
of the concentration camps but rather the main goal of these death factories,
the very essence of the Nazi system (Levi, 1993). The Muselmnner exist to be
abused by everybodyincluding, of course, the other prisoners. Essentially,
the Muselmnner internalized this principle. It was burned into their bodies.
The Muselmann as an object is constantly tortured and abused. In the
Muselmanns state of mind anything in his close surroundings is manipulated
and recreated in order to cause suffering. Consider the image of the Muselmann
holding a piece of bread yet unable to eat it. Since from the Muselmanns perspective any kind of object is, by definition, hostile, accordingly, this piece of
bread is also hostile. Thus even the piece of bread becomes a tool of abuse
holding the bread, the Muselmann realizes that it is useless, nothing more than
a horrifying black joke. Although the only thing that can save the Muselmann
is food, in this impossible physical condition the Muselmann cannot eat,3 and
3 It is important to remember that consumption of too much food resulted in the deaths
of many survivors after their liberation. For survivors, and in particular Muselmnner, the
issue of eating was very complicated. This is demonstrated by the description provided
by Antelmes wife, Marguerite Duras, of her husbands body upon his arrival in Paris from
Buchenwald: The head was connected to the body by the neck, as is customary with heads.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

112

Ataria and Gallagher

therefore the piece of bread is merely another tool to inflict misery and pain.
This image penetrates to the heart of the Muselmann phenomenon, revealing
a state of total helplessness. The Muselmann is unable to take help even when
it is available.
Indeed, the Muselmanns sense of helplessness results from the process by
which the Muselmann has profoundly internalized the concept that What is,
is. What we are, we are. And both are impossible (Antelme, 1992, p. 65). Thus
the Muselmanns sense of helplessness is as radical as can be (Levi, 1993).
2.4
Being a Pure Object
The Muselmanns unique state of mind, beyond apathy, finds expression in an
entirely new dialogue with the body:
I would never have believed, for instance, that I could become a decrepit
old man so quickly. Back home that takes time, fifty or sixty years at least;
here three months was enough for my body to leave me washed up. I can
safely say there is nothing more painful, nothing more disheartening
than to track day after day, to record day after day, yet again how much of
one has wasted away (Kertsz, 2004)
The Muselmann makes mechanical movements without any reason, no longer
controlling his own body; he is beaten without offering any kind of resistance:
at most they would beat me, and even then they could not truly do
much harm, since for me it just won some time: at the first blow I would
promptly stretch out on the ground and would feel nothing after that,
since I would meanwhile drop off to sleep (Kertsz, 2004).
Thus it may be possible to argue that the Muselmann becomes a pure object
and loses the subjective dimension: Head, face, chestit was all the same:
But the neck was so slender that you could wrap one hand around it. It was so desiccated
that wed ask ourselves how life could have passed through it. A spoonful of clear soup could
hardly get through; that alone would obstruct it....Through the neck wed see the vertebrae, the disks, the nerves, the flowing blood. The skin resembled cigarette paper. Something
gurgled out of it, something dark green, something that pulsated: shit the likes of which wed
never seen.... Since wed never encountered this phenomenon before, we sought explanations. Wed say that maybe his liver was being eaten up before our eyes. Maybe his body was
being eaten up. How could we know this? How would we know this unknown thing that was
included in his stomach and in his pain? We never got used to looking at it. We couldnt. (see
Consonni, 2009, pp. 2512).

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

113

bone covered with skin, stone wrapped in skin (Antelme, 1992, p. 122). Indeed,
Kertsz (2004) defines his body as a device: These devices, at least in my case,
caused a great deal of vexation (also see Levi, 1993). This radical notion is supported by several aspects of the condition, among them the following:
(1) Total numbness: Physically, as well as emotionally, the Muselmann suffers
from total numbness. Indeed, the Muselmanns senses are blunted and as
a result the Muselmann has lost the ability to be touched. Essentially, as
Slatman (2005) argues, the double structure of touching/touched (what
Merleau-Ponty [1968] calls the reversibility implicit in self-touch
when touching oneself, one is also being touched) is a prerequisite for
feeling alive, and when this structure collapses one ceases to feel alive.
Even when touching his own body, the Muselmann lacks the experience
of being touched and thus the double structure breaks down altogether
(for further discussion see: Ataria, in press).
(2) Lack of awareness: The Muselmanns level of awareness drops, in some
cases, to zero. This, in turn, is reflected in the collapse of the intentionality of consciousness. Thus it appears that the Muselmann cannot be
described as being conscious of something. Given the severity of this
phenomenon, as the description above suggests, the Muselmann drops
into a state of unconsciousness even while being beaten.
(3) Loss of identity: In the camps the Muselmann has no name, only a number.
Interestingly, when looking at the mirror, Antelme describes the following experience: I saw a face appear. Id forgotten about that (Antelme,
1992, pp. 5152). Thus the Muselmann becomes faceless,4 a nobody. As
time goes by, the Muselmanns previous life fades away: I forget, every
day I forget a little more, one gets father away, one drifts (Antelme, 1992,
p. 108). The Muselmanns identity collapses altogether, the Muselmann
loses a sense of self, and becomes a pure it.
(4) Loss of the time dimension: Along with this fading of the past, according
to Antelme (1992), in agreement with Levi (1993), memories become a
threat; the transfer from memories of ones previous life as a human being
to the present is too difficult and even dangerous, leading to an unbearable despair. In addition, it goes without saying that the Muselmann has
no future dimensionBut who can seriously think about tomorrow?
4 They crowd my memory with their faceless presences, and if I could enclose all the evil of
our time in one image, I would choose this image which is familiar to me: an emaciated man,
with head dropped and shoulders curved, on whose face and in whose eyes not a trace of a
thought is to be seen (Levi, 1959, p. 103).

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

114

Ataria and Gallagher

asks Levi (1959, p. 156). Antelme adds that in the concentration camps
one simply could not use the future tense (1992, p. 95). While starving
to death, the futural dimension is reduced to the next, so-called, meal.
However, as was already noted, the Muselmann holds a piece of bread yet
is unable to eat it, making it very clear that the Muselmann has no future;
in Levis (1959) words, Do you know how one says never in camp slang?
Morgen frh tomorrow morning (p. 156). Furthermore, unable to eat,
the Muselmanns sense of present also collapsesindeed if existence,
meaning, and time in the camp are all reduced to the piece of bread, then
the Muselmann, unable to eat that piece of bread, is outside time.
It seems that the Muselmann is reduced to a body as pure object. One Auschwitz
survivor, Liliana Segre, gives the following description, which supports this concept: we were no longer human beings in the regular sense of the word. Not
even animals, but bodies in stages of decomposition that dragged themselves
along on two legs (Segre, quoted by Consonni, 2009, p. 247). Nevertheless,
when considering this possibility a fundamental difficulty arises. Both Husserl
(1989) and Merleau-Ponty (1965) describe the body as being both a subject
(a lived body or Leib) and an object (body-as-object or Krper) at the same
time, since the body can feel itself feeling (Husserl, 1989). Having said that, as
already noted, in the case of the Muselmann this twofold structure of reversibility (touching/touched) collapses.
We may then argue that the Muselmann has lost the subjective dimension of
embodiment and has become a pure body-as-object (Krper),5 one that does
not touch and is not touched. As such, the Muselmann has no bodily experiences, which are critical for the sense of ownership (de Vignemont, 2010). As a
pure body-as-object, the Muselmann becomes totally detached from his living
body: my flesh is disappearing, I am losing my wrappings, my body is getting
away from me (Antelme, 1992, p. 138). Similarly, Kertsz (2004) describes his
experience in the following manner:
[M]y body was here, I had precise cognizance of everything about it, it
was just that I myself somehow no longer inhabited it. I had no difficulty
in perceiving that this entity, and other similar entities to its side and
above it, was lying there, on the wagons jolting flooring, on cold straw so
dampened by all sorts of dubious fluids that my paper bandage had long
5 We suggest that the Muselmann represents the most radical example of disownership
towards the body; accordingly we use this term (pure body-as-object). There is, however, a
need for further empirical study to investigate a continuous spectrum in which the sense of
the body-as-object becomes stronger over time.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

115

since frayed, peeled, and become detached, while the shirt and prison
trousers in which I had been dressed for the journey were pasted to my
naked wounds.
The Muselmanns sense of body ownership, the sense of this body being my
body (Gallagher, 2000), decreases, possibly falling to zero.
Losing any sense of body-as-subject and being reduced to a body-asobject, along with the accompanying loss of the sense of body ownershipas
reflected in Antelmes description, you discover that you can let go of yourself
to an extent you never imagined possible before (1992, p. 87)generates a
new kind of attitude towards the body: an attitude of disownership toward the
body, an active distancing of oneself from the body. The notion that this is an
active attitude (an active sense of disownership) is critical: the Muselmanns
body becomes the enemy, exactly like the figure of the perpetrator. Hence, in
order to deal with this impossible situation, the Muselmann must reject the
body in an active way. The paradox is that this active rejection can only be carried out by maintaining a complete apathy towards the body.
3

Disownership toward the Body

3.1 Disownership
Disownership of a body part (as in xenomelia or somatoparaphrenia) is the feeling that a body part is alien (de Vignemont, 2011). According to de Vignemont
(2010; 2007), there are three different kinds of body disownership: (1) experiencing a limb as alien, yet still believing that the limb belongs to you, as in
the case of Anarchic Hand Syndrome (Della Sala, Marchetti, & Spinnler, 1994);
(2) experiencing a limb as alien and also believing that the limb does not belong
to you; the limb may seem to belong to someone else, for example somatoparaphrenia (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009); and (3) experiencing a limb as part of
the body, but nevertheless believing that the limb does not belong to you, e.g.,
Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) (First, 2005). In these cases disownership is defined narrowly, on the level of limbs and not that of the entire body.
In cases of torture and severe trauma, however, it is possible that an experiential dissociation from ones whole body can be realized. This is thought to be
a defense mechanism (see, for example, Keleman, 1989). Ataria (2014a; 2014b;
2015b) has suggested, however, that in cases of severe and prolonged trauma
(as in the torture experienced by the Muselman) we should, at least theoretically, consider the possibility that the dissociative defense mechanism (DDM)
can collapse. In this case, there is a change in the quality of the disownership
experienced toward the entire body.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

116

Ataria and Gallagher

3.2
The Dissociative Defence Mechanism
It is well known that during severe trauma, DDMs can be activated (Foa &
Hearst-Ikeda, 1996; Herman, 1992; Janet, 1904; Morgan, et al., 2001; Nijenhuis,
Vanderlinden, & Spinhoven, 1998; Spiegel, 1997; van der Hart, Nijenhuis, Steele,
& Brown, 2004; van der Hart, van Dijke, van Son, & Steele, 2000). With this in
mind, based on several empirical studies, Ataria and colleagues constructed a
simple model that clarifies how the DDM enables the subject to function, even
if in a very limited fashion, during trauma (Ataria, 2014a; Ataria & Neria, 2013;
Ataria & Somer, 2013).
According to this model, a tradeoff occurs between the sense of agency (SA)
that one feels over ones action (or over what one can do) and the sense of body
ownership (SO), the sense that this is my body.6 SA and SO are considered two
aspects of basic experiential self-awareness (Gallagher 2000). This trade-off
model suggests that there exists a reciprocal relationship between SA and SO;
by giving up, to some degree, the SO over his body, the subject gains SA in other
areas (e.g., mental control or the ability to engage in imaginative distraction).
Essentially, this trade-off between SA and SO enables the traumatized subject
to maintain some limited sense of control during acute stress, even if he has
less control over his own body. By maintaining some degree of SA, the subject
maintains some aspect of an experiential self, even if the lack of SO for the
body introduces a distortion of self.
One can find clear examples of this in descriptions offered by former prisoners of war. One former prisoner of war, interviewed in Ataria (2010; Ataria
& Neria, 2013), states that he maintained SA over one important area his life:
It was very important for me to apply discipline to my thoughts because the
thing that most frightened me, apart from dying and being in pain, was losing
my sanity. And so I applied strong discipline to my thoughts, I made sure that
I would not go crazy (D) (Ataria & Neria, 2013, p. 168). The captive, facing continuing uncertainty and painful loss of control over his situation and his body,
attempts to construct a framework, some space (or dimension) containing
some certainty (Herman, 1992). This can at times be achieved by controlling an
imagined world, the world of thoughts. On this note, another former prisoner
comments: You are in zero control, so what I did to cut myself off from this
impossible reality was to start to delve into my thoughts (L) (Ataria & Neria,
6 The distinction between SA and SO, which pertains to the very basic experiential aspect of
self, was originally defined with respect to action, which could also include thinking understood as action (Gallagher 2000). SO can be modified in cases of somatoparaphrenia, for
example, or in experiments on the rubber hand illusion (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). SA may
be disrupted in schizophrenic delusions of control, or in Anarchic Hand Syndrome.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

117

2013, pp. 1689). Likewise, a third former prisoner, H, confirms that thinking
is an effective way to cut oneself off from the pain and uncertainty: When
there is darkness you dont know what is in front of you and then you cant be
in control. In a situation like this the instinct is to close your eyes because you
will feel better....Imagination begins to play a very important role in keeping
your sanity (H) (Ataria & Neria, 2013, p. 169). By maintaining an active imagination, the prisoner can lessen his feelings of loneliness, reduce the suffering of
the harsh reality which he endures, preserve a degree of control, and stop himself from slipping into insanity: Imagination has an important role in keeping
sane (Y) (Ataria & Neria, 2013, p. 169). Using these techniques, some captives
were able to achieve a sense of control, making the situation somewhat endurable: I think that all the time I was in a sort of control...that meditation, it did
not take me to some kind of place, because I was also always aware of everything that was going on around me (B) (Ataria & Neria, 2013, p. 169).
Thus it appears that during severe traumatic experiences, a strong SA, along
with a weak or even completely absent SO, is the only available option that
enables the subject to survive (Ataria, 2014a). Activating this kind of defence
mechanism, however, takes a significant amount of energy (cognitive and
otherwise). As the person weakens, physically and psychologically, the defence
mechanism may start to fail. In this case, a new kind of dissociation or disownership emerges.
3.3
The Collapse of the Dissociative Defence Mechanism
With this model in mind, we return to the Muselmann. Undoubtedly, the
Muselmann suffers from the most inhuman condition one can imagine, and
under these circumstances the possibility that the DDM will collapse is highly
likely. At some point, the Muselmanns SO drops to zero. However, given the
Muselmanns mechanical movements and inability/unwillingness to resist or
engage in self defence (for example, in the case of beatings the Muselmann
falls, and falls asleep) it appears that the Muselmann may also lose the SA.
Becoming totally helpless, he relinquishes control over life.
Bearing in mind the trade-off model that demonstrates how dissociation
functions as a defence mechanism during trauma, a decline of SO to zero
on a hypothetical Likert scale, represents the lowest possible limit while the
DDM is still properly activated. However, in extreme situations, including total
isolation, extreme hunger, lack of sleep, severe and prolonged torture etc.,
the DDM can become dysfunctional. In these cases, both SO and SA drop
to zero, and the sense of helplessness becomes unbearable. Indeed, at this
point the subjects sense of ownership over his body may move into a more
negative range.
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

118

Ataria and Gallagher

3.4
When the Body Becomes a Most Brutal Enemy
In the Muselmanns eyes, all objects are designed to produce suffering and pain.
It is indeed true that the concentration camps were intended to exploit the
prisoner until death (Levi, 1993). Under these conditions, the Muselmnner,
abused also by fellow prisoners (Levi, 1959) and completely helpless, feel that
the only reason they remain alive is to be tortured. Too desperate and too
exhausted even for suicide, the Muselmann has lost faith in the world and
humanity (Levi, 1993; Amery, 1980; Antelme, 1992). From the Muselmanns
point of view, even a piece of bread, like any other object, is designed to produce pain. Thus the Muselmann exists in a hostile world. However, given the
transformation that the prisoner has undergone in the process of becoming a
Muselmann, it is possible to suggest that the Muselmanns own body is also part
of this hostile world (the Muselmanns body is an object within the world), in
Kertszs (2004) words: me becoming a burden even to myself.
As discussed above, the Muselmann is reduced to a pure body-as-object. Yet,
since for the Muselmann all objects are part of the hostile world, when the
Muselmann is reduced to a pure object, ones own body is not only not ones
own, but becomes identified as an object designed, like any other in the camp,
to inflict pain: an object which is in fact no longer ones own body, but rather
ones most brutal enemy. Kertsz (2004) describes this process as follows:
Every day there was something new to surprise me, some new blemish,
some new unsightliness on this ever stranger, ever more foreign object
that had once been my good friend: my body. I could no longer bear looking at it without a sense of being at war with myself.
The body thus appears as a tool (device) used by others to maximize pain and
suffering. In effect, the Muselmanns body belongs to the camps system of
destruction.
The only possible alternative in this situation is to ignore ones own body;
indeed mere dissociation is no longer a realistic option. Thus what distinguishes
the prisoner still struggling to survive from the Muselmann is the formers ability to dissociate in order to gain (even very limited) control, in contrast to the
drowned, namely, one who develops an apathetic sense toward the body:
there comes to light the existence of two particularly well differentiated categories among menthe saved and the drowned. Other pairs of
opposites (the good and the bad, the wise and the foolish, the cowards
and the courageous, the unlucky and the fortunate) are considerably less
distinct, they seem less essential (Levi, 1959, p. 100)
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

119

3.5
The Shift from Disownership to Apathy
One problem with regard to the notion of disownership (toward ones entire
body) concerns the nature of the relationship between a passive loss of a sense
of body ownership and the active sense of disownership. In particular, it is not
clear that the sense of disownership is equivalent to a lack of sense of ownership (de Vignemont, 2011). An active disownership implies some degree of SA.
For the Muselmann, however, ones body is not a passive source of pain, or
something that he can actively disown; rather it becomes an enemy against
which one cannot win.
Principally, in the case of the Muselmann all of the following conditions
are met: (1) the victim has no available resource (physical, cognitive, mental, or emotional) to handle the situation; (2) the victim has the feeling that
any object in its surrounding, including the disowned body itself, is hostile;
(3) phenomenologically, the victim experiences constant torture; (4) the victim
suffers from an induced sense of helplessness, without support from others;7
(5) the victim accepts and internalizes the notion according to which he or she
must be annihilated (see Amery, 1980), and in so doing, (6) the victim ceases
to be an agent. The combination of the above (six) conditions (in particular
number 5) transforms the Muselmann into a limit figurein this situation the
Muselmann is pushed into an apathetic relation to the body as a whole, and is
unable to distinguish between self and non-self. In many cases, this inclines
the subject towards suicide. Primo Levi,8 Amery and many others (including
Paul Celan and Bruno Bettelheim to mention only a few names) committed
suicide after liberation. Indeed, Amery writes about his feeling that he must
finish the Nazis work.
In sum, we suggest that the transformation from camp inmate to Muselmann
occurs when the dissociative mechanism of defense collapses, as is expressed
in a shift from complete body disownership (or lack of sense of ownership)
into an apathetic sense toward ones body.

7 Marcel (2003) suggests in these kinds of cases, a progression from a loss of a sense of reliable
effectiveness to a lack of incentive motivation, leading to a learned, or as we phrase it, an
induced helplessness.
8 There are doubts surrounding this matter (see Diego Gambetta) yet three of Levis biographers agree on the issue (Carole Angier, Myriam Anissimov and Ian Thomson). Indeed, Elie
Wiesel, a noted writer and activist Holocaust survivor, said at the time, Primo Levi died at
Auschwitz forty years earlier. Ataria (in press) tries to deal with the long term implications
of disownership toward the entire body during trauma.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

120
4

Ataria and Gallagher

Concluding Remarks

An examination of the phenomenon of the Muselmann reveals that when

living in inhuman conditions for extended periods, a camp inmate may very
well develop a sense of disownership toward his/her own body, and that at the
extreme this turns into a complete apathy towards the body.
Indeed, dissociation involving a loss of a sense of body ownership, is a critical mechanism of defense that is activated during trauma (Ataria, 2014a; 2014b;
2015b). However, human deterioration to the point of lacking the necessary
cognitive resources to organize this defense, leads the subject into an apathetic
statea somatic apathya loss of differentiation between self and non-self
in the face of an enemy that one cannot fight.
References
Agamben, G. (1998). Homo sacer: Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
(1999). Remnants of Auschwitz. (D. Heller-Roazen, Trans.) New York: Zone
Books.
Amery, J. (1980). At the minds limits. (S. Rosenfeld, & S. P. Rosenfeld, Trans.) Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Antelme, R. (1992). The human race. (J. Haight, & A. Mahler, Trans.) Marlboro: Marlboro
Press.
Ataria, Y. (2010). Consciousness-body-time: How do people think lacking their body?
[Hebrew] MA Thesis: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
(2014a). Dissociation during Trauma: The Ownership-Agency Tradeoff Model.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 117, doi: 10.1007/s11097-014-9392-9.
(2014b). Acute Peritraumatic Dissociation: In Favor of a Phenomenological
Inquiry. Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, 15(3), 332347.
(2015a). Trauma from an Enactive Perspective: The Collapse of the Knowing
how Structure. Adaptive Behavior.
(2015b). Sense of ownership and sense of agency during trauma. Phenomenology
and the Cognitive Sciences, 14(1), 199212.
(in press). When the Body Becomes the Enemy: Disownership toward the
Body. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology.
Ataria, Y., & Neria, Y. (2013). Consciousness-Body-Time: How Do People Think Lacking
their Body? Humans Studies, 36(2), 159178.
Ataria, Y., & Somer, E. (2013). Total Otherness in Dissociative Identity Disorder. Journal
for Otherness, 4(1), 125.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

Somatic Apathy

121

Bauer, Y. (1978). The Holocaust in historical perspective. Seattle: University of Washington

Press.
Consonni, M. (2009). Primo Levi, Robert Antelme, and the Body of the Muselmann.
Journal of Literature and the History of Ideas, 7(2), 243259.
de Vignemont, F. (2007). Habeas corpus: The sense of ownership of ones own body.
Mind & Language, 22, 427449.
(2010). Embodiment, ownership and disownership. Consciousness and
Cognition, 20(1), 8293.
(2011). A self for the body. Metaphilosophy, 42(3), 230247.
Della Sala, S., Marchetti, C., & Spinnler, H. (1994). The anarchic hand: A frontomesial
sign. In F. Boller & J. Grafman (eds.), Handbook of neuropsychology (Vol. IX, pp. 233
255). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Felman, S., & Laub, D. (1992). Testimony: Crises of witnessing in literature, psychoanalysis, and history. Florence, KY, US: Taylor & Frances/Routledge.
First, M. B. (2005). Desire for amputation of a limb: Paraphilia, psychosis, or a new type
of identity disorder. Psychological Medicine, 35, 91928.
Foa, E. B., & Hearst-Ikeda, D. (1996). Emotional dissociation in response to trauma:
An information-processing approach. In L. Michelson & W. Ray (wds.), Handbook
of dissociation: Theoretical, empirical, and clinical perspectives (pp. 207224). New
York: Plenum Press.
Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive
science. Trends In Cognitive Sciences, 4(1), 1421.
2013. A pattern theory of self. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7 (443): 17.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00443
2014. The cruel and unusual phenomenology of solitary confinement. Frontiers
in Psychology. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00585
Herman, J. L. (1992). Trauma and recovery. New York: Basic Books.
Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas Pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophysecond book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution.
(R. Rojcewicz, & A. Schuwer, Trans.) Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Janet, P. (1904). Lamnesie et la dissociation dessouvenirs par lemotion. Journal de
Psychologie, 1, 417453.
Keleman, S. (1989). Patterns of distress: Emotional insults and human form. Berkeley,
CA: Center Press.
Kertsz, I. (2004). Fatelessness. (T. Wilkinson, Trans.) New York: Knopf.
Laub, D. (1995). Truth and testimony: The process and the struggle. In C. Caruth (ed.),
Trauma: Explorations in memory (pp. 6145). Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Levi, P. (1959). If this is a man. (S. Woolf, Trans.) New York: The Orion Press.
(1979). The Truce. (S. Woolf, Trans.) Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

122

Ataria and Gallagher

(1993). The drowned and the saved. (R. Rosenthal, Trans.) London: Abacus.
Marcel, A. J. (2003). The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action. In
Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in
Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 4893.
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1965). The structure of behaviour. (A. Fisher, Trans.) London:
Methuen.
Morgan, C., Hazlett, G. M., Wang, S., Richardson, G., Schnurr, P., & Southwick, S. (2001).
Symptoms of dissociation in humans experiencing acute, uncontrollable stress:
A prospective investigation. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 12391247.
Nijenhuis, E. R., Vanderlinden, J., & Spinhoven, P. (1998). Animal defensive reactions
as a model for trauma-induced dissociative reactions. Journal of Traumatic Stress,
11, 243260.
Scaer, R. C. (2014). Body bears the burden (Vol. 3). New York: Routledge.
Sierra, M., Baker, D., Medford, N., & David, A. S. (2005). Unpacking the depersonalization syndrome: An exploratory factor analysis on the Cambridge Depersonalization
Scale. Psychological Medicine, 35, 152332.
Simeon, D., & Abugel, J. (2006). Feeling unreal: Depersonalization disorder and the loss
of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Slatman, J. (2005). The sense of life: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty touching and being
touched. Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning the Thought of
Merleau-Ponty, 7, 30525.
Sofsky, W. (1996). The order of terror. (W. Templer, Trans.) Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Spiegel, D. (1997). Trauma, dissociation, and memory. Psychobiology of Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, 821, 225237.
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: Visuotactile integration and self-attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 31(1), 8091.
Vallar, G., & Ronchi, R. (2009). Somatoparaphrenia: A body delusion. A review of the
neuropsychological literature. Experimental Brain Research, 192(3), 53351.
van der Hart, O., Nijenhuis, E., Steele, K., & Brown, D. (2004). Trauma-related dissociation: Conceptual clarity lost and found. Australian and New Zealand Journal of
Psychiatry, 38, 906914.
van der Hart, O., van Dijke, A., van Son, M., & Steele, K. (2000). Somatoform dissociation in traumatized World War I combat soldiers: A neglected clinical heritage.
Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 1(4), 3366.

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 46 (2015) 105122

All in-text references underlined in blue are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and rea