OFF CASE

Topicality Domestic
BEST AGAINST IMMIGRATION

A. Definition
Domestic surveillance is defined by the target---the subject of
surveillance must be U.S. persons
Donohue 6 Laura K. Donohue, Fellow, Center for International Security
and Cooperation, Stanford University, ANGLO-AMERICAN PRIVACY AND
SURVEILLANCE, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, Spring, 96 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 1059, Lexis
5. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
As the extent of the domestic surveillance operations emerged, Congress
attempted to scale back the Executive's power while leaving some flexibility
to address national security threats. n183 The legislature focused on the
targets of surveillance, limiting a new law to foreign powers, and agents of
foreign powers - which included groups "engaged in international terrorism or
activities in preparation therefor." n184 Congress distinguished between
U.S. and non-U.S. persons, creating tougher standards for the
former. n185
[FOOTNOTE]
n185. The former included citizens and resident aliens, as well
incorporated entities and unincorporated associations with a substantial
number of U.S. persons. Non-U.S. persons qualified as an "agent of a foreign
power" by virtue of membership - e.g., if they were an officer or employee of
a foreign power, or if they participated in an international terrorist
organization. Id. 1801(i). U.S. persons had to engage knowingly in the
collection of intelligence contrary to U.S. interests, the assumption of false
identity for the benefit of a foreign power, and aiding or abetting others to
the same. Id. 1801(b).
[END FOOTNOTE]
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") considered any "acquisition
by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of
any wire or radio communication," as well as other means of surveillance,
such as video, to fall under the new restrictions. n186 Central to the statute's
understanding of surveillance was that, by definition, consent had not been
given by the target. Otherwise, the individual would have a reasonable

expectation of privacy and, under ordinary circumstances, the Fourth

Amendment would require a warrant. n187
BEST AGAINST FREEDOM ACT

Extension: Domestic surveillance must occur within the United

States
Oxford 15 Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary,
domestic, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english
/domestic
Definition of domestic in English:
adjective
1Of or relating to the running of a home or to family relations:
domestic chores
domestic violence
1.1chiefly British Of or for use in the home rather than in an industrial or
office environment:
domestic appliances
1.2(Of a person) fond of family life and running a home:
she was not at all domestic
1.3(Of an animal) tame and kept by humans:
domestic cattle
2Existing or occurring inside a particular country; not foreign or
international:
the current state of US domestic affairs

B. Violation
They curtail foreign, not domestic surveillance, the NSA is a foreign
intelligence agency.
FBI is domestic, NSA is foreign.
Jacob R. Lilly 2013
JD Cornell, 2003 National Security at What Price? A Look into Civil Liberty
Concerns in the Information Age under the USA Patriot Act in Information
Ethics : Privacy, Property, and Power edited by Adam D. Moore, 2013.
ProQuest ebrary.
E. Basic Elements of Electronic Surveillance in the United States

In the U.S. legal system, four basic methods of electronic surveillance exist .
73 These methods are (1) warrants authorizing the interception of

communications, (2) search warrants authorizing the search of physical

premises, (3) trapandtrace devices 74 and pentraps, 75 and (4) subpoenas
requiring the production of tangible records , such as printed e-mails or telephone logs.
76 When the surveillance is conducted for domestic reasons, these require a
sliding scale of proof in order to be activated . 77 Interception orders and search warrants must
meet the Fourth Amendments probable cause standard. 78 Court orders for certain documents, such as ISP 79 email
logs, require a lower standard. The government merely has to show reasonable grounds for believing that the information
being sought is relevant and material. 80 Pentrap surveillance uses an even lower standard in requiring only a sworn

Each of these standards

applies only when the surveillance conducted is of a domestic nature . 82
government declaration as to the relevance of the information being sought. 81

Domestic surveillance within the United States and abroad is carried out by a variety of
federal agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the primary federal agency
responsible for domestic activities, 83 with the National Security Agency (NSA) 84 and
theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) 85 forbidden by U.S. law from monitoring domestic
activities and able only to operate outside the United States . 86 All three agencies are
responsible for overseas surveillance, assisted by the Departments of State, Treasury, and Justice. 87

Extension: NSA = Foreign

Rajesh De, General Counsel, National Security Agency, 10-16- 2014, "The
NSA and Accountability in an Era of Big Data," Journal Of National Security
Law &
Policy, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1547942293/D7CD0D4112B54FC
9PQ/2?accountid=10422
As noted earlier, NSA is a foreign intelligence agency. Executive Order
12333 defines foreign intelligence as "information relating to the capabilities,
intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists." This language
largely mirrors that which Congress adopted in the National Security Act of
1947. FISA contains a more intricate definition of foreign intelligence
information for the specific purposes of that statutory scheme, but all support
the same overall conclusion - NSA's mission is neither open-ended, nor
is it discretionary. NSA may only collect signals intelligence for a
foreign purpose.

Extension: NSA Directive from the Department of Defense shows that NSA is
foreign
National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 (Department of
Defense)
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5100_20.htm

SORT: 5100.20
DOCI: DODD 5100.20
DATE: 19711223
TITL: DODD 5100.20 The National Security Agency and the Central Security Service
December 23, 1971, ASD(I), thru Ch 4, June 24, 1991

Refs: (a) National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6

I. PURPOSE

This directive prescribes authorities, functions, and responsibilities of

the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Security Service (CSS).

II. CONCEPT

A. Subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 6, and the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, and pursuant to the authorities vested in the
Secretary of Defense, the National Security Agency is a separately
organized agency within the Department of Defense under the direction,
supervision, funding, maintenance and operation of the Secretary of
Defense.

B. The National Security Agency is a unified organization structured to

provide for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) mission of the United States
and to insure secure communications systems for all departments and
agencies of the U.S. Government.

C. The Central Security Service will conduct collection, processing and

other SIGINT operations as assigned.

III. DEFINITIONS

A. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is a category of intelligence information

comprising all Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronics
Intelligence (ELINT), and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT).

B. COMINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign

communications by other than the intended recipients. COMINT is produced
by the collection and processing of foreign communications passed by
electromagnetic means, with specific exceptions stated below, and by the
processing of foreign encrypted communications, however transmitted.
Collection comprises search, intercept, and direction finding. Processing
comprises range estimation, transmitter/operator identification, signal
analysis, traffic analysis, cryptanalysts, decryption, study of plain
text, the fusion of these processes, and the reporting of results. COMINT
shall not include:

1. Intercept and processing of unencrypted written communications, except

the processing of written plain text versions of communications which have
been encrypted or are intended for subsequent encryption.

2. Intercept and processing of press, propaganda and other public

broadcasts, except for processing encrypted or "hidden meaning" passages
in such broadcasts.

3. Oral and wire interceptions conducted under DoD Directive 5200.24.

4. Censorship.

C. ELINT is technical and intelligence information derived from foreign,

non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than

atomic detonation or radioactive sources. ELINT is produced by the

collection (observation and recording), and the processing for subsequent
intelligence purposes of that information.

D. TELENT is technical and intelligence information derived from the

intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry.

E. SIGINT operational control is the authoritative direction of SIGINT

activities, including tasking and allocation of effort, and the
authoritative prescription of those uniform techniques and standards by
which SIGINT information is collected, processed and reported.

F. SIGINT resources comprise units/activities and organizational elements

engaged in the conduct of SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT or TELINT) activities.

Extension: The NSA is a Foreign Intelligence Agency

Frequently Asked Questions About NSA NSA 15 (Date Posted: Jan 15,
2009 | Last Modified: Jan 13, 2011 | Last Reviewed: Mar 23, 2015)
https://www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/about_nsa.shtml#about3
NSA/CSS has two interconnected missions: Signals Intelligence (known as
SIGINT) and Information Assurance. Through SIGINT, we gather information
that America's adversaries wish to keep secret. Through Information
Assurance, we protect America's vital national security information and
systems from theft or damage by others. Taken together, the SIGINT and
Information Assurance missions are essential to a third function: enabling
Network Warfare, a military operation. Through carrying out its
missions, NSA/CSS helps save lives, defend vital networks, and advance our
Nation's goals and alliances, while strictly protecting privacy rights
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and laws.

Domestic surveillance must collect information from within the

United States
Sladick 12 Kelli Sladick, Blogger at the Tenth Amendment Center,
Battlefield USA: The Drones are Coming, Tenth Amendment Center, 12-

10, http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2012/12/battlefield-usa-thedrones-are-coming/
In a US leaked document, Airforce Instruction 14-104, on domestic
surveillance is permitted on US citizens. It defines domestic surveillance as,
any imagery collected by satellite (national or commercial) and airborne
platforms that cover the land areas of the 50 United States, the District of
Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the US, to a 12 nautical mile
seaward limit of these land areas. In the leaked document, legal uses
include: natural disasters, force protection, counter-terrorism, security
vulnerabilities, environmental studies, navigation, and exercises.

They allow Affs that reduce surveillance internationally because data

of U.S. citizens are stored in servers overseas
Tracy 15 Sam Tracy, NSA WHISTLEBLOWER JOHN TYE EXPLAINS
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, Digital Fourth, 318, http://warrantless.org/2015/03/tye-12333/
Its been widely reported that the NSA, under the constitutionally suspect
authority of Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, collects all Americans phone
metadata. Congress has not yet passed any reforms to this law, but there
have been many proposals for changes and the national debate is still raging.
Yet Americans data is also being collected under a different program thats
entirely hidden from public oversight, and that was authorized under the
Reagan-era Executive Order 12333.
Thats the topic of a TEDx-Charlottesville talk by whistleblower John Napier
Tye, entitled Why I spoke out against the NSA. Tye objected to NSA
surveillance while working in the US State Department. He explains that EO
12333 governs data collected overseas, as opposed to domestic
surveillance which is authorized by statute. However, because Americans
emails and other communications are stored in servers all over the
globe, the distinction between domestic and international surveillance is
much less salient than when the order was originally given by President
Reagan in 1981.

C. Standards: Precision---our interpretation is based on

FISA, the gold standard for defining surveillance
Chiarella 97 Major Louis A Chiarella, Chief, Administrative Law Office of
the Staff Judge Advocate Fort Carson, Colorado and Major Michael A. Newton
Professor, International and Operational Law Department The Judge Advocate
Generals School, United States Army Charlottesville, Virginia, So Judge,
How Do I Get That FISA Warrant?: The Policy and Procedure for Conducting
Electronic Surveillance, THE ARMY LAWYER,
October,http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/sojudge.pdf

What is the FISA?

On 25 October 1978, President Carter signed the FISA into law. The explicit
purpose of the FISA was to balance the protection of individual privacy with
the needs of national security through the development of a regulatory
framework forcertain counterintelligence activities of the executive branch
of the federal government.31 Many factors necessitated this express
balancing act. First, the Supreme Courts decision in Keith did not address the
extent of the executives constitutional powers in the area of
counterintelligence.32 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell explicitly stated
that the opinion made no judgment on the scope of the Presidents
surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers or their
agents.33 Second, congressional hearings revealed that both the FBI and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had operated outside the law, in the name
of intelligence collection.34 The Church Committee35 realized that
counterintelligence was essential to the preservation of American civil
liberties, and it recognized the need to collect intelligence and to establish
appropriate limits on intrusive investigative techniques.36 Through the efforts
of key officials from the DOJ and the Church Committee,37 the FISA became
the gold standard of legality in the world of counterintelligence. 38
The FISA is a complex statute, with an elaborate structure and flexible
procedures. 39 It is not, however, a comprehensive statute for all intelligence
activities. The FISA regulates counterintelligence investigations;40 it does not
extend to domestic security investigations. The FISA also regulates specific
counterintelligence collection techniquesprimarily electronic
surveillance,41 but physical searches as well. Other intelligence collection
techniques have separate statutory and regulatory provisions.42 Additionally,
the FISA has no extraterritorial applicability;43 therefore, it does not regulate
the use of electronic surveillance outside of the United States. Because of the
limited application under the FISA, there are other statutory and regulatory
sources which control other counterintelligence activities.
All electronic surveillance for counterintelligence purposes within the United
States is subject to the requirements of the FISA. This does not mean,
however, that prior judicial authorization is always required. The Attorney
General may acquire foreign intelligence information for periods up to a year
without a judicial order if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath
that:
(A) the electronic surveillance is solely directed at . . . communications used
exclusively between or among foreign powers44. . . [or] technical
intelligence, other than the spoken communications of individuals, from
property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign
power . . .;
(B) there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the
contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party;

and (C) the proposed minimization procedures45 . . . meet [the statutory

definition] of minimization procedures . . . . 46

D. Voters
Limits---they explode the topic to include all foreign spying and
espionage. There are hundreds of military and specific country Affs,
each with distinct lit bases and advantages---makes in-depth
preparation impossible. foreign surveillance is called spying.

EXTEND VOTERS
The Judge should vote on topicality alone because topicality is the basis of
fairness and education in debate.

Topicality Act
(Ask what Bill means in CX?)
A. Definition:
Act Definition:
Duhaime's Law Dictionary,
(http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/A/Act.aspx)
a.A bill which has passed through the various legislative steps required for it and
which has become law.

Act Definition 2 :
Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/act?s=t )
act [akt] Spell Syllables Synonyms Examples Word Origin noun 1. anything done, being done,
or to be done; deed; performance: a heroic act. 2. the process of doing: caught in the act. 3. a
formal decision, law, or the like, by a legislature, ruler, court, or other authority; decree or edict; statute;
judgment, resolve, or award: an act of Congress. 4. an instrument or document stating something
done or transacted. 5. one of the main divisions of a play or opera: the second act ofHamlet. 6. a
short performance by one or more entertainers, usually part of a variety show or radio or television
program. 7. the personnel of such a group:

Act Definition 3:
Merriam Webster, (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/act)

act
noun \akt\
: something that is done

: a law made by a group of legislators

: one of the main divisions of a play or opera

Bill Definition:
Dictionary.com (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/bill)
a statement of money owed for goods or services supplied: He paid the h
otel bill when he checked out. 2. a piece of paper money worth a specifie
d amount: a ten-dollar bill.3. Government. a form or
...
[

ASPEC
Shells

1NC (Long)

1NC (Short)
A. Interpretation and Violationthe aff must specify the
branch of the government they act through in the
plan textthey dont.
B. Thats a voter
1. Groundits critical to our executive,
congressional, and judicial counterplans as well as
disadvantages and case arguments.
2. Educationits impossible to determine whether
the plan is valuable without looking to the branch
of government implementing it
Komesar 94 (Neil professor of law at the University of Wisconsin,
Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing institutions in Law, Economic, and Public
Policy, p. 4-5)
the central issue of constitutional law is the choice of who
decidesthe choices between alternative social decision-makers such as the executive,
the legislature, and the judiciaryand that; therefore, constitutional scholarship would be
For example, one would assume that

replete with sophisticated analyses of these alternatives. In turn, one would assume that, when economic
analysts of the lawusually non-constitutional lawconsider the issue of who decides, theses high priests
of trade-offs and opportunity costs would know that one cannot decide who decides by examining only one
alternative. Yet most constitutional scholars ignore the issue of who decides or treat it with superficial
maxims. And when economic analysts of law address the subject of who decides, they often focus their
attention on the attributes of only one alternative. Constitutional law and the economic approach to law
are important enough aspects of legal study that such anomalies standing alone would justify searching
inquiry. But, in fact, these anomalies are only dramatic examples of a pervasive problem in the analysis of

decisions about
who decides are buried in every law and public policy issue, they often
go unexamined, are treated superficially, or at best, are analyzed in terms of the characteristics of
law and, more generally, of public policy. Although important and controversial

one alterative. Most existing theories of law and public policy focus attention on social goals and values.
The economic approach to legal analysis is cast in terms of a single social goalresource allocation
efficiency. Its critics attack that goal as insufficient both normatively and descriptively, while its
proponents defend its validity. Constitutional law analysis is largely a debate about social goals and values
such as resource allocation efficiency, Rawlsaan justice, or Locken protection of property. Although the
choice among social goals or values is an important ingredient in understanding and evaluating law and

analysis of goal and value choices, standing alone, tells us

virtually nothing about these outcomeswhat they are or what they should be. Upon close
public policy outcomes,

inspection, each social goal bandied about in analyses of law ad public policy is generally consistent with
virtually any law or public policy outcome. In other words, a given goal can be seen as consistent with
liability or no liability, regulation or no regulation constitutional right or no constitutional right. Goal choice
may be necessary to the determination of law and public policy, but it is far from sufficient. A link is
missingan assumption overlookedin analyses that suppose that a given law or public policy result
follow from a given social goal. That missing link is institutional choice. Embedded
in every law and public policy analysis that ostensibly depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often
unarticulated, that

institution.

the goal in question is best carried out by a particular

Given the goal of protecting property, for example, the case for recognizing a
constitutional right involves the implicit judgment that the adjudicative process protects property better
than the political process. In turn, given the goal of promoting safety, the case for removing tort liability
involves the implicit judgment that the market or government regulations promote safety better than the
adjudicative process. Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy.
They are inextricably related. On the one hand, institutional performance and, therefore, institutional

choice cannot be assessed except against the bench mark of some social goal or set of goals. On the
other, because in the abstract any goal can be consistent with a wide range of public policies ,

the
decision as to who decides determines how a goal shapes public
policy. It is institutional choice that connects goals with their legal or public
policy results.

3. Plan flawno such actor as the United States

federal government, only specific branches
Rotunda 1 (Richard, prof. law at the university of Illinois, 18 const.
Commentary 319, The commerce clause, the political question doctrine, and
Morrision, lexis)
The Framers sought to protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers.
They divided power between the state and federal governments, and they further divided power
within the federal government by splitting it among the three branches of government,
and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting it
between two Houses of Congress.

C. Its too late to clarify

1. Makes the affirmative conditionalthey can always
specify new things in the 2AC and make our disads,
counterplans, and case arguments useless. They
could also conceivably replan in the 2AR. Thats a
voter for fairness
2. Makes them not topicalresolved means a firm
course of action according to American heritage
dictionary not specifying allows them to shift
agents and allows 2ac clarifications which make them
not topical. Voter for ground and education.

Prez Powers

Obama and his lawyers have massively

expanded presidential wartime powers
Jack Goldsmith, professor at Harvard Law School and a member of the
Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, served as
Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, 9-11- 2014,
Obamas Breathtaking Expansion of a Presidents Power To Make War Time,
http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/
The legacy began in 2011 with the seven-month air war in Libya. President
Obama relied only on his Commander in Chief powers when he ordered U.S.
forces to join NATO allies in thousands of air strikes that killed thousands of
people and effected regime change. His lawyers argued beyond precedent
that the large-scale air attacks did not amount to War that required
congressional approval. They also blew a large hole in the War Powers
Resolution based on the unconvincing claim that the Libya strikes were not
hostilities that would have required compliance with the law. Although he
backed down from his threat to invade Syria last summer, President Obama
proclaimed then the power to use unilateral force for purely humanitarian
ends without congressional or United Nations or NATO support. This novel
theory, which removed all practical limits on presidential humanitarian
intervention, became a reality in last months military strikes to protect
civilians trapped on Mount Sinjar and in the town of Amirli.

Congressional restraints spill over to

destabilize all presidential war powers.
Adam Heder, J.D., magna cum laude , J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University, 2010, The Power to End War: The Extent and Limits of
Congressional Power,
http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Hederreadytogo.pdf
This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquists oftquoted language
from the landmark political question case, Goldwater v. Carter . 121 In
Goldwater , a group of senators challenged President Carters termination,
without Senate approval, of the United States Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan. 122 A plurality of the Court held, 123 in an opinion authored by
Justice Rehnquist, that this was a nonjusticiable political question. 124 He
wrote: In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the
termination of a treaty, . . . the instant case in my view also must surely be
controlled by political standards. 125 Notably, Justice Rehnquist relied on
the fact that there was no constitutional provision on point. Likewise, there is
no constitutional provision on whether Congress has the legislative power to
limit, end, or otherwise redefine the scope of a war. Though Justice Powell
argues in Goldwater that the Treaty Clause and Article VI of the Constitution
add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not
unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President
alone, 126 the same cannot be said about Congresss legislative authority to
terminate or limit a war in a way that goes beyond its explicitly enumerated
powers. There are no such similar provisions that would suggest Congress
may decline to exercise its appropriation power but nonetheless legally order
the President to cease all military operations. Thus, the case for deference to
the political branches on this issue is even greater than it was in the
Goldwater context. Finally, the Constitution does not imply any additional
powers for Congress to end, limit, or redefine a war. The textual and historical
evidence suggests the Framers purposefully declined to grant Congress such
powers. And as this Article argues, granting Congress this power would be
inconsistent with the general war powers structure of the Constitution. Such a
reading of the Constitution would unnecessarily empower Congress and tilt
the scales heavily in its favor. More over, it would strip the President of his
Commander in Chief authority to direct the movement of troops at a time
when the Executives expertise is needed. 127 And fears that the President
will grow too powerful are unfounded, given the reasons noted above. 128 In
short, the Constitution does not impliedly afford Congress any authority to
prematurely terminate a war above what it explicitly grants. 129 Declaring
these issues nonjusticiable political questions would be the most practical
means of balancing the textual and historical demands, the structural
demands, and the practical demands that complex modern warfare brings .
Adjudicating these matters would only lead the courts to engage in
impermissible line drawing lines that would both confuse the issue and add

layers to the text of the Constitution in an area where the Framers

themselves declined to give such guidance.

Perception of weak presidential crisis response

collapses hegemony
John Bolton, Senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, 2009, The
danger of Obama's dithering,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/18/opinion/oe-bolton18
Weakness in American foreign policy in one region often invites challenges
elsewhere, because our adversaries carefully follow diminished American
resolve. Similarly, presidential indecisiveness, whether because of
uncertainty or internal political struggles, signals that the United States may
not respond to international challenges in clear and coherent ways. Taken
together, weakness and indecisiveness have proved historically to be a toxic
combination for America's global interests. That is exactly the combination
we now see under President Obama. If anything, his receiving the Nobel
Peace Prize only underlines the problem. All of Obama's campaign and
inaugural talk about "extending an open hand" and "engagement," especially
the multilateral variety, isn't exactly unfolding according to plan. Entirely
predictably, we see more clearly every day that diplomacy is not a policy but
only a technique. Absent presidential leadership, which at a minimum means
clear policy direction and persistence in the face of criticism and adversity,
engagement simply embodies weakness and indecision.

Heg solves nuclear war only engagement

prevents multipolar wars
Zalmay Khalilzad, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the UN
and former Director of Policy Planning at the Defense Department, 2-82011, The Economy and National Security; If we dont get our economic
house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-nationalsecurity-zalmay-khalilzad
We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing
rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and
Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems,
their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global
distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multipolar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to
grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will
emerge. The closing of the gap between the U nited States and its rivals could
intensify geopolitical competition among major powers , increase incentives
for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our
will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of
escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of
peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By
contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive
dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great
powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world
wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without
an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to
balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a
heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling
into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger
powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the
United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make
aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is
likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijings economic
rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval,
cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite
capabilities. Chinas strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying
the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative
economic ties in the region have grown, Chinas expansive territorial claims
and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and
incidents at sea have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and
Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier
facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

Hong Kong DA

1NC
US-Hong Kong ties are jeopardized by surveillance
accusations future revelations can still tip the scales.
Fraser 13 Niall Fraser. [Writer for the South China Morning Post] Hong
Kong-US relations may suffer from Snowden saga. South China Morning Post.
June 24th, 2013. http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1267572/hongkong-us-relations-likely-suffer-edward-snowden-saga
But the ramifications of the city's brief yet hugely public flirtation with the
realities of super-power espionage will be deep and long lasting. The
burning question - an answer to which will only come in time - is, was it United States
blundering or Hong Kong legal smarts that allowed the city and the nation to
walk away from all this relatively unscathed? Clearly, Beijing wanted to keep the situation
at arm's length. But as everyone knows, there tends to be a hand at the end of most arms. Snowden's
departure - two days after he celebrated his 30th birthday in hiding here - gets Hong Kong and Beijing out

The
downside - and again only time will tell if it was a price worth paying - is that relations
between the US and Hong Kong will suffer. Overnight on Saturday, Washington's
of a sticky situation. Crucially, it looks to have placated Hong Kong and mainland public opinion.

message was clear - give us our man or else. After years of close co-operation between the two
jurisdictions, these were harsh sentiments. What came next was equally surprising .

Two hours after

Snowden boarded Aeroflot flight 213, the Hong Kong government issued a
statement telling - yes, telling - the United States that they had not met the
requirements necessary under Hong Kong law for the city's police to detain
Snowden. Then there was the kicker. "Meanwhile", the statement went on to say, the city would
be seeking US clarification of Snowden's claims that Washington has been
hacking the computers of Hong Kong people and institutions as part of a
global cyberspying operation. The message from the Hong Kong government was clear; we run
this place according to our laws and we won't be pushed around. Professor Simon Young Ngai-man, director
of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law at the University of Hong Kong, was clearly taken aback by

The US government will be

irate with their Hong Kong counterparts and may even question whether
Hong Kong was acting in good faith pursuant to their treaty obligations . I have
events. "It's a shocker. I thought he was going to stay and fight it out.

no doubt that they were and it is quite common for government lawyers to seek more information on
surrender or mutual legal assistance requests before the local process can begin. But I'm surprised here."
Jin Canrong , the mainland's leading foreign relations scholar and associate dean of Renmin University's
School of International Relations, said Snowden's departure was ideal for Beijing. " A

time bomb that

could threaten the Sino-US relationship has been defused, even though the
saga will go on and Snowden can still make more revelations . The strategy Beijing
has been using in dealing with the case was to let Hong Kong handle it independently and keep a distance
from it. I believe Beijing would not proactively take advantage of the intelligence Snowden revealed,
because that would provoke Washington and rub salt into its wounds.

Plan improves perception of the US in Hong Kong

surveillance is a hot button issue.
Bradsher 13 Keith Bradsher. [Columnist for NYT] With Snowden Gone,
Hong Kong Focuses on U.S. Surveillance. The New York Times. June 26 th,
2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/asia/with-snowden-gonehong-kong-focuses-on-us-surveillance.html?_r=0

The abrupt departure from Hong Kong on Sunday of Edward J.

Snowden, the American former national security contractor, with the explicit approval of
the Hong Kong government, has drawn the ire of the United States . But in Hong
Kong the focus remains on Mr. Snowdens exposure of American intelligencegathering operations in Hong Kong and mainland China . Leung Chun-ying, the
HONG KONG

territorys chief executive, has called repeatedly for the United States to explain its surveillance activities
here, brushing aside White House criticism that Mr. Snowden was allowed to fly to Moscow despite a
pending American request for his arrest. Snowden

has left, but the matter is not

over, Mr. Leung said at a tea with local journalists on Tuesday, the contents of which were confirmed on
Wednesday by the government. The Hong Kong government needs to safeguard the interests of Hong

release of documents showing American efforts to hack into

computers in Hong Kong and mainland China has drawn support not just from
pro-Beijing groups in this semi-autonomous Chinese territory, but from prodemocracy groups that have long looked to the United States as an example
of strong protections for civil liberties.
Kong. Mr. Snowdens

Strong US-Hong Kong ties trade-off with US-China

cooperation on other issues.
Ching 14 Frank Ching [Frank Ching is a Hong Kong-based journalist and
commentator who has covered China for several decades. He opened The
Wall Street Journals Bureau in Beijing after the U.S. and China established
relations in 1979, becoming one of the first American reporters to be based in
China since 1949] Hong Kong a growing thorn in Sino-American relations.
Japan Times. October 14, 2014.
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/10/14/commentary/worldcommentary/hong-kong-growing-thorn-sino-american-relations/
Just as China and the United States are preparing for another Xi Jinping-Barack Obama summit next month,

China is
stepping up charges that Washington is secretly supporting student-led prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong. Warnings against foreign intervention
have been a constant theme in Chinese statements on the former British
colony, but recent commentaries in the official media have raised the level of the rhetoric to such an
extent as to make it appear as though the Hong Kong issue dominates the U.S.China bilateral relationship. Last Friday, the overseas edition of the official Peoples Daily
when the American president is scheduled to visit Beijing for the annual APEC leaders meeting,

newspaper published a front-page article accusing the National Endowment for Democracy, a nonprofit
organization funded by the U.S. government, of involvement in the demonstrations in Hong Kong. The next
day, the papers online edition continued allegations of interference in Hong Kong affairs in a commentary
headlined Why is the U.S. so keen on Color Revolutions? It repeated charges that Louisa Greve, vice
president of NED, had met with key people from Occupy Central, the group that had been threatening for
months to hold protests if China, in its view, did not allow genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong, with a
broad choice of candidates. The article linked Greve to reports about Tibetan independence and Eastern
Turkistan or Xinjiang. Apparently the meeting with key people took place last April when Martin Lee and
Anson Chan, two prominent advocates of democracy, visited Washington and appeared in an hour-long
public forum moderated by Greve. The State Department has rejected point-blank charges that the U.S.
government was manipulating the activities in any way of any person, any group, or any political party in
Hong Kong. But the Peoples Daily commentary said, It is hardly likely that the U.S. will admit to
manipulating the Occupy Central movement, just as it will not admit to manipulating other anti-China
forces. It turns out that the Peoples Daily was unhappy not only with the U.S. government, but with the
mainstream media as well. The

mainstream media of the U.S. have shown

exceptional interest in Occupy Central, the article said. Their reports are full of
approval and praise. This, no doubt, is true. Time magazine, for example, has devoted two cover

stories to Hong Kong, with the Oct. 20 issue featuring the 17-year-old student leader Joshua Wong on the
cover. But one can hardly blame the U.S. government for that. The Saturday commentary accused the U.S.
of hypocrisy, saying that while it purported to promote democracy and human rights, in reality it was
simply defending its own strategic interests. It said that, according to U.S. logic, a democratic country is

Chinas very public accusations

in the U.S. have affected public opinion on the mainland and also proestablishment political parties in Hong Kong . The House Committee of the Legislative
one that conducts its affairs in line with American interests.

Council on Friday passed a motion to investigate the Occupy Central movement, including sources of

If China continues to escalate its antiAmerican rhetoric, there is a danger that Hong Kong, which has basically
been a nonissue in the bilateral relationship, will eclipse genuine issues on
the U.S.-China agenda and, possibly, even affect the Obama visit in November. American
funding and whether foreign interference is involved.

unwillingness to overemphasize Hong Kong was evident in September when the U.S. national security
adviser, Susan Rice, visited Beijing and barely raised the issue. Then, when U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met Oct. 1, they discussed a plethora of issues, of which Hong
Kong was but one, and certainly not the most important. As the State Department spokesperson put it,

the discussion focused on bilateral issues, especially the forthcoming presidential visit.
Also discussed was a global climate deal in Paris next year. Other issues included Irans
nuclear program, terrorism especially the Islamic State the Ebola outbreak and
human rights. True, Hong Kong was discussed, and Kerry urged Chinese restraint, but it was hardly a
top American priority. In fact, with the midterm elections looming in the U.S., domestic issues dominate
political discussions. China does not figure in any campaign. The U.S. had decided not to allow Hong Kong

But if Beijing continues to raise charges of sinister

American activity in Hong Kong, it is unlikely that the geniality that
characterized the Sunnylands summit last year can be repeated . This then
will affect the resolution of global issues. It doesnt help anyone.
to become a distraction.

US-China relations are key to solve North Korean

denuclearization Xi Jinping is the cornerstone for
negotiations on the Korean Peninsula but this opportunity
wont last.
Rudd 15 Kevin Rudd. [Former Australian PM] The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Under Xi Jinping: Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism
for a Common Purpose. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
April 2015. http://asiasociety.org/files/USChina21_English.pdf
Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and
policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United
States, albeit always within the framework of his nationalist vision for Chinas future, and his definitive
conclusions concerning the continuing role of Chinas one-party state. When, therefore, Xi uses the
term win-win to describe his desired relationship with the U.S., it should not
be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. Xi does see potential
value in strategic and political collaboration with the United States. In short, there
For these several reasons,

is still reasonable foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings

although it is an open question how long it will be before policy

directions are set in stone, and the window of opportunity begins to close . I
argue that Xi is capable of bold policy moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic
bargains on intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful
re-unification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as creatively as it
with Xi Jinping,

can while it still lasts.

Prolif guarantees nuke war hair-trigger alert targeting

civilian populations
Roehrig 13. Terrence Roehrig [Professor of National Security Affairs and
the Director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College;
Research Fellow in the International Security Program and the Project on
Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy Schools Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs] "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Future Strategy
and Doctrine, Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Kennedy School, May 2013.
If North Korea does pursue a small operational
nuclear weapons program, there are several serious implications that could result.
DPRK STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS

First, North Korea will have a nuclear force that is too small and insufficiently accurate to use for a first

Pyongyang will
likely opt for a countervalue strategy that targets South Korean or Japanese
cities along with U.S. military bases in Japan. If the DPRK is able to improve
its long-range ballistic missiles, the U.S. mainland might be added to the
target list, a serious change in the strategic landscape for Washington.
Second, North Korea will seek to maintain a second strike capability that
ensures a part of its nuclear forces will survive an attack to retaliate. If North
strike that seeks to disarm an adversary through a counterforce strategy. Instead,

Korea chose to deploy its nuclear-tipped missiles on launch pads, these assets would be highly visible and

North Korea has two likely options for

ensuring survivability: storing road-mobile missiles in hardened sites such as
mountain tunnels and moving them out for launch; and moving road-mobile missiles
around on a road net making them more difficult to target. One other
dimension of "hardening" involves the construction of a missile launch facility
in 2008 that is 4050 km from the Chinese border. South Korea or the United
States might hesitate striking this site given the close proximity to China . Lastly,
if North Korea has any doubts about the survivability of its nuclear forces, it
may adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture. Under LOW North Korea's nuclear
forces are on hair-trigger alert to launch with little warning . Most of North Korea's
vulnerable to preemption. To address this vulnerability,

missiles are liquid-fuel rather than solid-fuel, a significant complication to an LOW posture. However, it is
reasonable to assume North Korea will move toward a solid fuel capability as its program progresses.
Indeed, some reports note that the KN-08 is likely to be a solid-fuel missile making it much easier to launch

If attacked, the DPRK would face a difficult decision, uncertain if

an incoming strike were a limited action of punishment for some provocation
or the prelude to regime change. If only a limited conventional strike and
North Korea responded with nuclear weapons, this would be an escalation
Seoul and Washington would not tolerate leading to the end of the DPRK regime. Also, it
may not matter if a South Korean or U.S. strike were conventional or nuclear
on short notice.

since the result could have the same strategic effect for North Korea of taking out its nuclear weapons. If
an attack on North Korea were indeed the start of regime change, North Korean leaders may believe they
have little to lose in using nuclear weapons.

crisis stability.

All of these scenarios place a premium on

NSA Circumvention
1NC: Reforms fail the NSA is a rogue agency that cant
be constrained
Glenn Greenwald, 2014, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA,
and the US Surveillance State. p. 130-131, mm
In the wake of our Snowden stories, a group of senators form both parties who had long been concerned
with surveillance abuses began efforts to draft legislation that would impose real limits on the NSAs

reformers, led by Democratic senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, ran into an

immediate roadblock: counter efforts by the NSAs defenders in the
Senate to write legislation that would provide only the appearance of reform ,
while in fact retaining or even increasing the NSAs powers. As Slates
powers. But these

Dave Weigel reported in November: Critics of the NSAs bulk data collection and surveillance programs
have never been worried about congressional inaction. Theyve expected Congress to come up with
something that looked like reform but actually codified and excused the practices being exposed and
pilloried. Thats whats always happened

every amendment or reauthorization to the

2001 USA Patriot Act has built more back doors than walls . We will be up against a
business-as-usual brigade made up of influential members of the governments intelligence leaderships,
their allies in think tanks [sic] and academia, retired government officials, and sympathetic legislators,
warned Oregon Sen. Ron Wyden last month. Their endgame is ensuring that any surveillance reforms are
only skin-deepPrivacy protections that dont actually protect privacy are not worth the paper theyre
printed on. The fake reform faction was led by Dianna Feinstein, the very senator who is charged with
exercising primary oversight over the NSA. Feinstein has long been a devoted loyalist of the US national
security industry, from her vehement support for the war on Iraq to her steadfast backing of Bush-era NSA
programs. (Her husband, meanwhile, has major stakes in various military contracts). Clearly, Feinstein was
a natural choice to head a committee that claims to carry out oversight over the intelligence community

for all the governments

denials, the NSA has no substantial constraints on whom it can spy
on and how. Even when such constraints nominally exist when American
citizens are the surveillance target the process has become largely hollow . The
NSA is the definitive rogue agency: empowered to do whatever it
wants with very little control, transparency, or accountability .
but has for years performed the opposite function. Thus,

Extensions: The NSA frequently circumvents the law

without consequence
Ben ONeill, 8/29/2013, Mises Daily: Austrian Economics, Freedom, and
Peace, The NSA and Its Compliance Problems,
https://mises.org/library/nsa-and-its-%E2%80%9Ccompliance-problems
%E2%80%9D, mm

the NSA has now acknowledged that its

analysts have often exceeded their legal limits even under the
widest interpretations of the Patriot Act by the NSA itself. An internal audit
of the agency found that in a single year there were 2,776
incidents of unauthorised collection, storage, access or distribution of
communications of US citizens, with many individual incidents covering large numbers of
communications. This included violation of court orders from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. Rather than referring to these as
instances of lawbreaking as what they are, the Director of National
Intelligence has instead referred to these legal violations as compliance
problems with the programs. He has made a point to stress that these kinds of problems are
After a long period of fervent denials,

monitored and assessed regularly by the agency and are to be expected in such a complex program. One

there is no actual sanction for unlawful activity

by the NSA. If compliance problems are just an expected part of government operations then
there is no sense in having any sanction for these legal breaches. The agency then operates
above the law, in the sense that its agents are pre-emptively acquitted of lawbreaking, on the
grounds that some degree of non-compliance with the law is
expected. Even for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, tasked
with supposed judicial oversight of the agency, attempting to hold the NSA to the rule
of law has been a farce. Chief Judge Reggie Walton explained to the press that, [t]he
FISC is forced to rely upon the accuracy of the information that is
provided to the Court. ... The FISC does not have the capacity to
investigate issues of noncompliance, and in that respect the FISC is in the same
consequence of this view is that

position as any other court when it comes to enforcing [government] compliance with its orders.

Extensions: The NSA breaks the law without

consequence it operates without effective legal
constraints
Ben ONeill, 8/29/2013, Mises Daily: Austrian Economics, Freedom, and
Peace, The NSA and Its Compliance Problems,
https://mises.org/library/nsa-and-its-%E2%80%9Ccompliance-problems
%E2%80%9D, mm

One of the core principles of good governance in society is the idea that the authority of law ought
to prevail over the brute power of people i.e., that society should operate under the rule of law ,

not the rule of men. Aristotle wrote that [t]he law ought to be supreme over all ... and argued that ... where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. The
principle has many important ramifications for society, but the most important is the view that government agents and agencies must be bound by the same law as their

This principle is of great relevance in the present NSA scandals ,

especially in light of recent NSA admissions of compliance
problems with the legal constraints that are supposed to operate
on the agency. For ordinary citizens, compliance problems with the law are better known as crimes (or possibly civil wrongs) and these lead to
judgment debts, fines, and possibly even jail time, depending on the severity of the lack-of-compliance. But for government officials
such notions are irrelevant legal compliance problems are just something you file a report about, and send to another
subjects.

bureaucrat higher up in the government chain, so that he can bury it on his desk. Unfortunately, this is not a new phenomenon. The notion of the rule of law is the
wellspring of an endless stream of hypocrisy in the modern social-democratic welfare-warfare state. It is difficult to find anyone who does not speak highly of the principle
when it is presented in abstract form, yet it is simultaneously rare to find people who really take the idea seriously when applied to concrete situations involving

In the case of the NSA, the principle of rule of law has

been jettisoned entirely, and the agency operates without any
effective legal constraints.
government wrongdoing.

Extensions: The NSA is non-compliant it frequently

ignores FISA restraints
Ben ONeill, 8/29/2013, Mises Daily: Austrian Economics, Freedom, and
Peace, The NSA and Its Compliance Problems,
https://mises.org/library/nsa-and-its-%E2%80%9Ccompliance-problems
%E2%80%9D, mm

The collection of metadata and communication content occurs without any probable cause to believe that
that the people targeted are a threat to anyone. It also occurs in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the
already very broad requirements of the Patriot Act, which requires applications for access to records to
have a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [records] sought

a recently declassified (but still heavily

opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
Judge James Bates wrote that [t]his court is troubled that the
governments revelations regarding NSAs acquisition of Internet
transactions mark the third instance in less than three years in
which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation
regarding the scope of a major collection program . In an earlier
ruling the court had found that legal requirements for data queries
had been frequently and systematically violated.
are relevant to an authorized investigation. In
redacted)

Extensions: FISA court decisions prove the NSA

constantly finds ways to circumvent the law
Nadia Kayyali, 8/15/2014, Electronic Frontier Foundation, what you need
to know about the FISA Court - and how it needs to change,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/what-you-need-know-about-fisa-courtand-how-it-needs-change, mm

FISC decisions that have been made public are

full of descriptions of the NSA not fulfilling its duties and being very
slow to inform the court about it. Judge John Bates noted: The court is troubled that the
The heightened duty of candor is not enough.

governments revelations regarding the NSAs acquisition of Internet transactions mark the third instance
in less than three years in which the government has disclosed a substantial misrepresentation regarding
the scope of a major collection program, and noted repeated inaccurate statements made in the

the requirements had been so

frequently and systematically violated that it can fairly be said that
this critical element of the overallregime has never functioned
effectively. Judges have consistently chastised the NSA for
inaccurate statements, misleading or incomplete filings and for
having circumvented the spirit of laws protecting Americans
privacy.
governments submission, concluding that

Extensions: Reforms fail the NSA will circumvent

Greenwald 14 (Glenn, lawyer, journalist and author he founded the
Intercept and has contributed to Salon and the Guardian, named by Foreign
Policy as one of the Top 100 Global Thinkers of 2013, CONGRESS IS
IRRELEVANT ON MASS SURVEILLANCE. HERES WHAT MATTERS INSTEAD,
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/19/irrelevance-u-s-congressstopping-nsas-mass-surveillance/)
All of that illustrates what is, to me, the most important point from all of this:
the last place one should look to impose limits on the powers of the U.S.
government is . . . the U.S. government . Governments dont walk around
trying to figure out how to limit their own power, and thats particularly
true of empires. The entire system in D.C. is designed at its core to
prevent real reform . This Congress is not going to enact anything
resembling fundamental limits on the NSAs powers of mass surveillance.
Even if it somehow did, this White House would never sign it. Even if all
that miraculously happened, the fact that the U.S. intelligence community
and National Security State operates with no limits and no oversight
means theyd easily co-opt the entire reform process . Thats what
happened after the eavesdropping scandals of the mid-1970s led to the
establishment of congressional intelligence committees and a special FISA
oversight courtthe committees were instantly captured by putting in
charge supreme servants of the intelligence community like Senators Dianne
Feinstein and Chambliss, and Congressmen Mike Rogers and Dutch
Ruppersberger, while the court quickly became a rubber stamp with
subservient judges who operate in total secrecy. Ever since the Snowden
reporting began and public opinion (in both the U.S. and globally) began
radically changing, the White Houses strategy has been obvious. Its vintage
Obama: Enact something that is called reform so that he can give a
pretty speech telling the world that he heard and responded to their concerns
but that in actuality changes almost nothing, thus strengthening the
very system he can pretend he changed. Thats the same tactic as
Silicon Valley, which also supported this bill: Be able to point to something
called reform so they can trick hundreds of millions of current and future
users around the world into believing that their communications are now safe
if they use Facebook, Google, Skype and the rest. In pretty much every
interview Ive done over the last year, Ive been asked why there havent
been significant changes from all the disclosures. I vehemently disagree with
the premise of the question, which equates U.S. legislative changes with
meaningful changes. But it has been clear from the start that U.S.
legislation is not going to impose meaningful limitations on the
NSAs powers of mass surveillance, at least not fundamentally.

Freedom Act Circumvention

The US Freedom act is too ambiguous for the aff to solve
Granick' 14 Granick is the Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet
and Society - May 21, 2014 http://justsecurity.org/10675/usa-freedom-act-oh-well-whatevernevermind //(maria)//

The initiallypromising USA Freedom Act could have ended the previously secret
government practices of collecting Americans calling records, internet transactional
information and who knows what else in bulk. Todaysversion would allow broad
collection to continue under the guise of reform The initial version of the bill would have reinforced existing statutory language
requiring a showing of relevance to an authorized investigation before agents can get an order requiring production of business records, dialing and routing information, and other data,
and would have added other limits to ensure massive collection would stop. It also would have implemented mild reforms to content surveillance under section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act, stoppingbackdoorsearches for Americans communications.Last week, aManagersAmendment watered those provisions down, substituting new language that would allow
agents to use a specific selection term as the basis for production. The bill defined specific selection term as something that uniquely describe[s] a person, entity, or account.

theres deep public mistrust for the law itself, since the intelligence communitys
nuanced definitions of normal words have made the public realize that they do not
understand the meaning of words like relevance, collection, bulk, or target.
Additionally, in December of 2013, Deputy Attorney General James Cole testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the NSAmightcontinueitsbulkcollection of
nearly all domestic phone call records, even if the original USA FREEDOM ACT passed
into law. As Iwroteatthetime, this testimony shows that the Administration and the
intelligence community believe they can do whatever they want , regardless of the
laws Congress passes, so long they can convince one of the judges appointed to the secretive Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to agree. All they
need is some legal hook they can present with a straight face.
This definitional change moved the needle from might
to probably wont end bulk collection under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, the NSL statutes, and
Worse,

the intelligence pen/trap statute, as USA Freedom was proposed to do. The new version also codifies a fishy interpretation of law that enables NSA collection of communications about a
target under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. These abouts, as the intelligence community calls them, entail surveillance when Americans talk with friends overseas about
matters of foreign intelligence interest. Since the definition of foreign intelligence information is quite broad, and includes information related to (A) the national defense or the security of
the United States; as well as (B) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States, this kind of collection canbequiteinvasive. Technologically, it also means collectionofpurelydomestic
aboutcommunications

. This is something that needs to end, not receive Congress blessing.

No Indo-Pak War
No India-Pakistan war nuclear deterrence checks
Khan 12 (Ikram Ullah, analyst for the South Asian Strategic Stability
Institute, Nuclear Pakistan: Defence Vs Energy Development, 7/26,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/26072012-nuclear-pakistan-defence-vs-energydevelopment-oped/)
nuclear weapons are here to maintain peace and stability between
Pakistan and India. Pakistan was forced to run its nuclear weapon program due to Indias nuclear weapon
program and its hegemonic ambition. Pakistan has long said that its nuclear weapon
program is security driven. While on other hand Indian nuclear weapon program is not security driven,
rather it is based on its regional and global aspirations. The security threats still exist for Pakistan, but due to its
credible nuclear deterrence Pakistan is capable of crushing such threats or plans. In
We must be clear that

the recent past, the tragedy, which many historians remember as the Fall of Dhaka, carries some lessons for us to be

the
nuclear capability of Pakistan deters India from perusing any kind of
learnt. If India could intervene at that time, then it is quite possible it could intervene in Baloachistan. Now

intervention because of the fear of perceived consequences. It is Pakistans credible

nuclear deterrence capability that effectively neutralizes any ill intent of its opponent
against its integrity and sovereignty. It is evident that after the December 13, 2001 terrorists attack on
Indian Parliament, India mobilized its armed forces to attack on Pakistan, but
refrained from doing so as it realized that any such irrational action would
lead to a nuclear war. The same was the case after Mumbai attacks on November
26, 2008 the nuclear deterrence prevailed and it prevented the likelihood of an all
out nuclear war in South Asia.

A2 CMS = Honeypot for Cyberattacks

CMS surveillance is not a honeypot of privacy aff claims are
exaggerated
Xynou 13 (Maria, Policy Associate on the Privacy Project at the Centre for
Internet & Society. She has previously interned with Privacy International and
with the Parliament of Greece. Maria holds a Master of Science in Security
Studies from the University College London. India's 'Big Brother': The Central
Monitoring System (CMS) April 8th - http://cis-india.org/internetgovernance/blog/indias-big-brother-the-central-monitoring-system)
the idea that the privacy of our messages and
online activity would be intercepted is a misconception. The expert stated that: The
police are actually looking out for open source intelligence for which
information in public domain on these sites is enough. Through the lab, police can
access what is in the open source and not the message you are sending to your friend.
Cyber security experts also argued that the purpose of the creation of the Mumbai
social media lab and the CMS in general is to ensure that Indian law enforcement
agencies are better informed about current public opinion and trends among
the youth, which would enable them to take better decisions on a policy level.
Another cyber security expert argued that

It was also argued that, apparently, there is no harm in the creation of such monitoring centres, especially
since other countries, such as the U.S., are conducting the same type of surveillance, while have enacted

the monitoring of our communications

appears to be justified, as long as it is in the name of security.
stringent privacy regulations. In other words,

Hack wont work Indias cyber-defenses are strong and

improving.
Times of India 10 (Internally citing senior military officials - Cyber war:
Indian Army gearing up - Times of India - July 19, 2010
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Cyber-war-Indian-Armygearing-up/articleshow/6187297.cms)
The Indian Army is fighting attacks in the cyber world with electronic warfare
capability of the "highest standard", say officials pointing out that virtual strikes have
shot up from hostile quarters in both sophistication and frequency. " The army is cognisant of the
threat to its cyber space from various state and non-state actors. But our network
is well secured in compliance with the highest standards of cyber security ," a

the
army has established an "impenetrable and secure wide area network
senior official in the military headquarters told IANS on condition of anonymity. The official said

exclusively for its functioning". Officials in the 1.3 million force privately admit they are facing "next
generation threats" and are rather worried over the complex world of cyber warfare amid reports of
Chinese and Pakistani spies targeting the Indian military establishment via the internet. Though attacks
from hackers - professional or amateur - can come from anywhere in the world, cyber onslaughts have
been more frequent from China and Pakistan, which have reportedly been peeking into India's sensitive
business, diplomatic and strategic records. As per reports from the cyber industry, China and Pakistan
hackers steal nearly six million files worldwide every day. A report in the US-based Defence Systems
magazine found that there were 25 million new strains of malware created in 2009. That equals a new
strain of malware every 0.79 seconds. The report underlines how the current cyber threat environment is
dramatically changing and becoming more challenging as the clock ticks. Howevever, the Indian army is

secret information had been secured with unhackable

electronic passwords, the official said various "cryptographic controls" have been incorporated
confident. Revealing that

in the wake of a significant number of viruses, worms and other forms of malware. To address cyber
defence, which is also under threat from terrorist outfits that have their own trained recruits, officials said
the army frequently upgrades its comprehensive cyber security policy to pro-actively deal with and
anticipate these threats. The force has established the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) to
respond to attacks targeting the army's critical systems and infrastructure. Another official said the army
has its own cyber audit process conducted by cyber security personnel. "The audit is conducted in
accordance with established security standards such as ISO 27001. Audit of the network is a continuous
and active process which helps identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities in a network to counter latest
threats as also check the network for cyber security policy compliance," he said. However, the official
admitted there was no room for complacency in times of rapid technological change. " In

the area of
cyber space, the battle between hackers and defenders is an ongoing process,
influenced by latest technological developments. Due to the dynamic nature of threats, the army is
constantly upgrading its network," he said.

Successful hack couldnt create havoc too much of Indias

critical infrastructure is not yet online. Dedicated networks also
check risk of an attack.
Shukla 13 (Ajai. Indian journalist and retired Colonel of Indian Army. He
currently works as Consulting Editor with Business Standard writing articles
on strategic affairs, defence and diplomacy. He earlier worked with DD News
and NDTV India's digital battleground - Business Standard - June 21, 2013 http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/india-s-digitalbattleground-113062101013_1.html)
India has been slow in fixing its attention on cyber security . This may partly be
because much of the country's critical infrastructure - power grids, public
transportation, nuclear power plants, defence systems - is controlled by
manual systems, or by standalone computer systems that are not linked over the
internet. In that respect, India's infrastructural backwardness has proved useful
against cyber-attacks. "It is not unusual to find central ministry officials in New Delhi using
unsecured email systems, sometimes even commercial email accounts on public servers. But India's
sensitive networks tend to be isolated, with no point of contact with the
Internet that would render them vulnerable to online hacking. Several
agencies have their own dedicated, secure fibre-optic networks, notably the
military, Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), and police's Crime and Criminal Tracking
Network System," says Praveen Swami, strategic affairs editor of Network 18.

Their scenario makes no sense - CMS is a data base for

communication records and telephone dataIt does not connect
to the banks or financial marketsHacking the CMS does not
equal attacks on financial institutions
Cyber attacks cant crush the economy because Indias economic
infrastructure is compartmentalized and the national data base is
protected
Shukla 13 Ajai Shukla reporter for Business Standard, Cyberspace: India's
digital battleground, 22nd Jun 13
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2013/06/cyberspace-indias-digitalbattleground.html
India, however, has been slow in fixing its attention on cyber security. This may partly be because much
of the countrys critical infrastructure --- power grids, public transportation,
nuclear power plants, defence systems --- is controlled by manual systems, or
by stand-alone computer systems that are not linked over the internet. In that respect,
Indias infrastructural backwardness has proved a useful safeguard against cyber attack. It is not unusual
to find New Delhis central ministry officials using unsecured email systems, sometimes even commercial

Indias sensitive networks tend to be isolated,

with no point of contact with the internet that would render them vulnerable
to on-line hacking. Several agencies have their own, dedicated, secure optic
fibre networks, notably the military; the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO); and
the polices Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS), the national database that is
being gradually rolled out, says Praveen Swami, the Strategic Affairs Editor of Network 18.
email accounts on public servers. But

Not UniqueCyber attacks on Indias financial infrastructure are

exploding now before CMS has been completed
Athavale 14 Dileep Athavale, reporter for the Times of India. Cyberattacks
on the rise in India , TNN | Mar 10, 2014,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/it-services/Cyberattacks-on-the-risein-India/articleshow/31757791.cms
The ease of online banking and transactions has brought with it a significant
rise in malicious attacks on digital devices and software systems. Most of these
attacks, as recent instances of online thefts have demonstrated, have been in the banking
and financial services domain. According to reports by research agencies, the problem has
become more complex with the proliferation of mobile devices and the users' preference towards
transactions on the go. In addition, there is also laxity on the part of the users when it comes to following
safe practices during such transactions, coupled with a significant lack of manpower with skills to handle
the rising number of such attacks, the agencies' reports state. Arbor Networks' research report states that

2013 witnessed a huge rise in attacks against the banking and financial
services sector. Government establishments also faced such attacks. The firm said there was a
136% increase in cyberthreats and attacks against government organizations and 126%
against financial services organizations in India. India has seen significant

increase in attacks against financials and government, with 34% and 43% of them reporting
cyberthreats and attacks respectively, up from last year's 15% and 19%, the report revealed. "From the ISP
to the enterprise, IT and security teams are facing a dynamic threat landscape and very skilled and patient
adversaries," Matthew Moynahan, president of Arbor Networks, said. "Multi-layered defenses are clearly
needed, but so is a commitment to best practices for people and process," he added. Another report, from
EC-Council Foundation pointed at a major gap in information security threat handling capabilities in India,
thanks mainly to the talent crisis in the country. The report shows talent levels in nine crucial segments of
information security, the implications of which could impact handling of cyberthreats in industries such as
banking and economy, defence, healthcare, information and energy among others. Close to an alarming
75% participants displayed low levels or a lack of skill in error handling, while 73% participants were not
adequately equipped with skills in file handling, the report revealed. Experts have recognized that
malicious file inclusions, malware distribution and distributed denial of service s(DDOS) attacks are known
threats that can arise out of improper file handling and such threats are often used to synchronize attacks
on websites or large networks, the report stated. Anshul Abhang, managing director and chief executive of
enterprise security solutions firm Deltaproactive, told ToI that a malicious attacker now looks for high-value
targets that can benefit him financially. "Hacking is no more a satisfaction game but has become serious
business. The attackers also look for indirect financial benefits by targeting particular organizations'
services and taking it down eventually. Such service outages result in financial loss as well as goodwill and
image loss in the market."

Indias banking sector is vulnerable to cyber attacks now

Kaushik 14 Ram. K. Kaushik ia a blogger for Cyber Security in India,
http://cybersecurityforindia.blogspot.com/
cyber security in India is in a poor condition. Cyber security of banks
in India is also required to be strengthened . The banks operating in India are
not at all serious about maintaining cyber security of banking related
transactions and this is resulting in many cyber and financial crimes in India .
However,

In the absence of appropriate skills development and modernisation of law enforcement agencies of India,
police force are finding it really difficult to solve technology related crimes. Further, cyber security of
sensitive databases like National Identity Cards would also require strong privacy protection and cyber
security compliances.

Turn, Only completing the CMS can allow the surveillance

necessary to stop cyber attacks on the financial system
GKT 15 General Knowledge Today: Indias Daily E Magazine, Feb 2015
http://www.gktoday.in/blog/developing-the-cyber-security-architecture/
Cyber warfare is the internet based conflict which arises when the information system of the strategic
departments of the country are attacked in order to get the classified information. In the modern world of
digitization such politically motivated snooping is done to interrupt the strategic affairs of the nation.
Sometimes it is aimed at attacking the major infrastructures of the nation. With the shrinking world, the
internet connectivity and heavy dependence of the government functioning on internet, it is imperative to

In the world of digitization critical infrastructure like

banking system, financial market, power infrastructure, and hydroelectric
projects are prone to such attack. The grid failure like instances can be its consequences.
have a cyber securing framework.

Hydroelectric projects prone to disaster, may be attacked and create disasters. 'Stuxnet' like malwares
which were introduce in the centrifuge of Iran was one such incidence. NSA's PRISM snooping incidence,
Dropmier, Tempora are such other global surveillance programmes which were operationalised to mine the
data strategic to India. Hackers from different countries like Pakistan and china try to deface the Indian

Hence it is imperative to have in the modern times

a properly tucked national security and monitoring system to have a digital
surveillance in the country protecting it from cyber warfare and cyber
website are the potential attackers.

espionage. Indias efforts to minimize the cyber threat With the rise of India in last some
decades as a global power and emerging economy it attracted global attention and remains
vulnerable with regard to information protection. India's cyber security
architecture as of now do not provide any mass surveillance mechanism with
only few distinguished agencies like RAW, IB get access to such monitoring after the approval. India's effort
include CERT-In (Computer Emergency Response Team- India) which was formed in 2002-03 to create
awareness on cyber threat, understand vulnerabilities and devise ways to mitigate them. National
Technical Response Organization (N'I'R0) was given responsibility of protecting the critical infrastructure
institution and developing offensive capabilities. Amendments to the IT act 2008, raised the level of
awareness about the cyber crimes. It recognizes various ways of cyber attacks and also provides help to
prosecute the cyber criminals. National cyber security policy 2013 was framed to build a secure and
resilient cyber space for government, citizen and business to protect the classified information critical to
India's security. Its features include range of provisions including 24X7 mechanisms to deal with cyber

India is following the path of developing intense surveillance system which not
only monitor the cyber threat to the national security but also seems to compromise the privacy
of its citizen in some cases. The Central Monitoring System (CMS) is an ambitious project that
is required to keep the national security and monitoring under surveillance. It
threats.

would be a centralized mechanism where the telecommunication and internet connections can be

Central and regional database would help

law enforcement agencies to monitor and intercept. Call data recordings and
data mining to identify call details of the targeted numbers. Another such Efforts is
analyzed by Indian government and its agencies.

NeTRA (Network Traffic Analysis System) will intercept and examine communication over the internet for
keywords like 'attack', 'blast', 'kill'. It appears to be Indian government first attempt of mass surveillance
rather than individual targets. It will scan the activities over the social networking websites like twitter and
would scan the mails and chat transcript and even the voices in the internet traffic. India's cyber security
has not only to be effectively implemented but also to be redrawn in line with growing cvber crimes.

Turn, metadata is key to DETER cyber attacks

Michaels 13 Jim Michaels, is a military writer for USA TODAY and has covered wars around the world. He

data mining can help stop

cybercrime, analysts say The huge volume of telephone records turned over to the U.S.
government could help investigators identify and deter a range of terrorist acts, including
cyberattacks, analysts say. "Once you have this big chunk of data and you have it forever you can
is a former Marine infantry officer USA TODAY June 6, 2013, NSA

do all sorts of analytics with it using other data sources," said Joseph DeMarco, former head of the
cybercrime unit in the U.S. attorney's office in New York City. "A data set like this is the gift that keeps on
giving," said DeMarco, a partner at the law firm DeVore & DeMarco.

Turn- NCCC Metadata program for preventing cyber terror

attacks is modeled after U.S. data collection and will prevent
cyber attacks
Keck 13 Zachary Keck is assistant editor of The Diplomat, India Sets Up
Domestic PRISM-Like Cyber Surveillance?,
http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2013/06/afghan-lessons-for-armingsyrian-rebels.html
the United States PRISM cyber-snooping program is raising alarm across the
world, India is in the midst of setting up a similar program designed to collect
Even as

intelligence via the internet domestically. The Hindu reports that the India government is creating a
centralized mechanism to coordinate and analyze information gathered from internet accounts throughout

The mechanism will be called the National Cyber Coordination

Centre [NCCC]. The federal Internet scanning agency will give law enforcement agencies
direct access to all Internet accounts, be it your e-mails, blogs or social networking data, the
the country.

Hindu reported, referring to the NCCC. A classified government note that The Hindu obtained explains
the NCCC in this way: The NCCC will collect, integrate and scan [Internet] traffic data from different
gateway routers of major ISPs at a centralised location for analysis, international gateway traffic and

The NCCC will facilitate real-time

assessment of cyber security threats in the country and generate actionable
reports/alerts for proactive actions by the concerned agencies NDTV, however, reports that
domestic traffic will be aggregated separately

the NCCC will not target individuals but rather will seek to access threats to Indias cyber infrastructure as
a whole. The new system will look for unusual data flow to identify and access cyber threats and not
individual data, NDTV reported, citing unnamed government officials. But the Hindustan Times reports

Indian authorities have long used meta-data to track potential cyber

threats inside the country. According to that paper, the program does not allow Indian authorities to
that

access actual content, but rather look for patterns in the manner emails, phone calls and SMSes are sent
and delivered. Its unclear how much the NCCC would expand this authority and in which ways, if at all.
One purpose of the NCCC seems to be simply trying to coordinate the different activities of government
agencies tasked with elements of cybersecurity. During a speech last month, Prime Minister Singh briefly
alluded to the then-forthcoming NCCC, We are implementing a national architecture for cyber security
and have taken steps to create an office of a national cyber security coordinator.

Turn, Indias metadata surveillance program will prevent cyber

attacks
Jhala 14 Krishna Jhala is an associate attorney at Priti Suri & Associates,
India gets ready to set up cyber snooping agency March 2014,
http://www.psalegal.com/FLASH_POPUP.php?flashID=144
India will soon be setting up a federal internet scanning agency called NCCC
to spy all internet accounts and online data . NCCC is to monitor cyber
security threats and inform concerned law enforcement agencies for
proactive action to prevent crime. NCCC will collect and integrate internet traffic data from
different gateway routers of major ISPs at a centralized location for analysis. NCCC would be set up at a
cost of INR 10 billion and all top government spy and technical agencies including Department of
Telecommunication, Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, Indian Computer Emergency
Response Team, Army, Navy, Air force, National Security Council Secretariat, Defence Research and
Development Organization will play an active role in the functioning of NCCC. PSA view - In the present

cyber attacks are on an increase and pose as a huge threat to the

safety and security of the nation. Recently, Central Bureau of Investigations website had been
internet era,

defaced by hackers and in another case attempts were made to break into Indian Railway Website.

NCCC is need of the hour and a step in the right direction to address the
shortcoming in the cyber security. 100% FDI allowed in telecom sector In a meeting of the
Therefore,

Department of Policy and Promotion chaired by Prime Minister on July 16, 2013, it was announced that FDI
limit in the telecom sector has been increased to 100%. The earlier limit was 74%. As per latest
announcements, investment up to 49% is allowed to come in through the automatic route and investment
above 49% is required to be brought in through the government route i.e. approval of the Foreign
Investment Promotion Board. PSA view - The announcement is seen as a welcome change. However, the
policy and implementation of these announcement is what is most awaited. The increased limits are set to
bring in billions of investments in this sector. Fresh foreign investments would help catalyze growth and the
process of proliferation in the telecom sector across the country. India set to frame new testing norms for
telecom equipment The Department of Telecommunications with the Department of Electronics & IT and
National Technical Research Organization are all set to frame new testing standards for telecom gear to
shield networks from potential cyber attacks. The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA)
clearance will no longer be enough to certify global telecom gear used in India, announced the National
Security Council Secretariat, the apex agency looking into Indias political, economic and energy and
strategic security concerns. PSA view - CCRA was created ten years back by UK, US, Canada, France,
Germany and the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand, to define a common process to evaluate

security-sensitive IT & telecom products and an objective to motivate global telecom vendors to find
common processes to reduce equipment certification costs worldwide. But now India has started creating
country-specific telecom gear testing standards and adopting several measures: (i) mobile phone
companies have been mandated to use equipment deemed safe by an authorized testing lab in India
from November 1, 2013; (ii) India is preparing a cyber security framework and a cyber security policy; (iii)

India is setting up a National Cyber Coordination Centre to monitor metadata

on cyber traffic flows; (iv) Establish a pilot lab and a full-fledged certification center and
development system; and (v) To adopt global approaches to its procurement policies, India is reviewing its
Preferential Market Access policy designed to compel foreign companies to manufacture electronic
products in India if they want to sell in India.

Bioterror Extremely unlikely- ISIS doesnt have

the means
Homeland Security, 14 (Use of Ebola virus as bioterror weapon
highly unlikely: Experts11 November 2014, Homeland Security News Wire,
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20141111-use-of-ebola-virusas-bioterror-weapon-highly-unlikely-experts )

Francisco Martinez, Spains state secretary for security, claimed that

ISIS fighters are planning to carry out lone wolf attacks using
biological weapons. He cites conversations uncovered from secret chat
rooms used by would-be militants. Bioterrorism experts say the use of
Ebola for bioterrorism is highly unlikely. Assuming a terrorist
organization manages to capture a suitable Ebola host, extract the
virus, weaponize the virus, transport the virus to a populated city and
deliver the virus, it is entirely likely that the sub-optimal climatic
conditions of a Western city will kill it off relatively quickly, says one
expert. Earlier in October, DHS secretary Jeh Johnson dismissed rumors
that the Islamic State (ISIS) was planning to use biological weapons
including weaponized Ebola, to attack the United States. Weve seen
no specific credible intelligence that ISIS is attempting to use any sort
of disease or virus to attack our homeland, Johnson said in remarks to
the Association of the United States Army. Francisco Martinez, Spains
state secretary for security, believes otherwise, claiming that ISIS
fighters are planning to carry out lone wolf attacks using biological
weapons. He cites conversations uncovered from secret chat rooms
used by would-be militants. ISIS militants consider the internet as an
extension of the battlefield, Martinez said, and many terrorism experts
agree with him. ISIS has launched a social media campaign meant to
recruit would-be militants, but bioterrorism in the form of Ebola may be
out of reach for the organization. The thing about Ebola is that its not
easy to work with, said Dr. Robert Leggiadro, a pediatric infectious

disease specialist in New York. It would be difficult to weaponize.

Live Science reports that in order to weaponize Ebola, a terrorist
organization would need to first obtain a live host infected with the
virus. The host would then need to be transported into a Category 4 or
Biosafety level 4 lab properly to transform the virus without risking
infection to the handler. Such labs are difficult to access, according to
Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, director of SecureBio, a U.K.-based CBRN
(chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense) firm. There are
less than two dozen Category 4 laboratories in the world, according to
the Federation of American Scientists. Failure to work inside a proper
lab would result in the death of whoever is weaponizing the virus, de
Bretton-Gordon said. The process to weaponize a biological agent is
complex and multi-staged, involving enrichment, refining, toughening,
milling and preparation, de Bretton-Gordon said. Moreover, the Ebola
virus is extremely fragile when compared to other viruses capable of
weaponization. The reason anthrax has been the biological weapon of
choice is not for its mortality rate when properly weaponized it is
similar to Ebola but for the fact that it is exceptionally hardy, de
Bretton-Gordon said. Anthrax can and will survive for centuries in the
ground, enduring frosts, extremes of temperature, wind, drought and
rain before re-emerging. In contrast, the Ebola virus is sensitive to
exposure to sunlight and extreme temperatures. Assuming a terrorist
organization manages to capture a suitable Ebola host, extract the
virus, weaponize the virus, transport the virus to a populated city and
deliver the virus, it is entirely likely that the sub-optimal climatic
conditions of a Western city will kill it off relatively quickly, de BrettonGordon said.

Biochemical Terrorism is dangerously overstated

Laura K. Egendorf, Bonnie Szumski, Scott Barbour, Helen Cothran,

'Terrorism: Opposing Viewpoints'. N.p., 2004. Web. 4 Oct. 2015.
Laura K. Egendorf is a published author and an editor of young adult books. Some of the published credits
of Laura K. Egendorf include Should Social Networking Websites Be Banned? (At Issue Series), Smoking
(Issues That Concern You), Sexually Transmitted Diseases (At Issue Series).
Until 2006, Bonnie was the publisher of Greenhaven Press, Lucent Books, and Kidhaven Press. During her
tenure at Greenhaven, she served on the original team that developed the foundational Opposing
Viewpoints series, and was instrumental in the creation of the Lucent and Kidhaven imprints. These
opportunities provided her with experience in developing nonfiction content across the K-12 market. Under
her direction, the company grew from a 2-person editorial staff with a list of 10 books to a 50-person

editorial, design, and production staff with a list of over 300 titles a year. Maintaining a strict budget and
publication schedule was a key part of her job.
Helen Cothran has been an English professor and editor of college and high school textbooks. She grew up
in the tiny desert town of Trona, California, and now lives in the San Diego area. When she isnt working at
her job as a copyeditor or writing the Sam Larkin Mystery series, she enjoys triathlon, hiking, and gardening.
Scott Barbour is a published author and an editor of children's books and young adult books. Some of the
published credits of Scott Barbour include Schizophrenia 2007 (Contemporary Issues Companion),
Individual Rights and the Police (Issues on Trial), Writing the Critical Essay: An Opposing Viewpoints Guide
- School Violence (Writing the Critical Essay: An Opposing Viewpoints Guide), and Introducing Issues with
Opposing Viewpoints - Genetic Engineering (Introducing Issues with Opposing Viewpoints).

Chemical weapons have been with us since World War I. Biological

weapons have an even longer history, stretching back centuries to the Peloponnesian War and,
more famously, to early America when Indian tribes were supplied with blankets infected with smallpox. Despite this long history,
biological and chemical weapons have rarely been used, and then only by
countries. No country, however, would attack the U.S. with such weapons for fear
of nuclear
First, consider the facts.

retaliation. There has not been a single death due to a bio-attack by terrorists .
Casualties from a terrorist chemical attack are almost as rare. Only once has a terrorist group used chemical weapons to deadly effectthe 1995 attack by the
Aum Supreme Truth, a Japanese cult. Even in that case, the attack was more failure than success; 12 people were killed in a crowded Tokyo subway. Had they
used a traditional high explosive, the death toll would have been far greater. Many warned that Aums attack would set off a wave of chemical attacks. That didnt

Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft, who threw the city of

Boston into a panic [on September 21, 2001] when he warned of a possible
attack, continues to use inflammatory rhetoric about chemical-biological terrorism. His aides admit that there is no new
intelligence to substantiate such claims. His warnings seem to coincide with testimony aimed at getting passage of
happen. Politicians and the media would have us believing the worst.

sweeping new anti-terrorism laws. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is a little more cautious. He claims that terrorists will eventually acquire such weapons
from countries. What he fails to mention is that no 40 country has ever provided a weapon of mass destruction to a terrorist group. They do not give them to groups
over which they have limited control and which might use the weapons against them later. Too Much Media Hype The media treatment of bio-chem terrorism has
been predictable and regrettable. This is particularly true of television, which cannot resist showing images of gas masks and exploding canisters. The typical story
begins with dire warnings about the consequences of a perfectly executed chemical or biological attack. This is followed by interviews with public health officials
who solemnly declare that the U.S. is unprepared for such an attack. Only at the very end is the viewer told that the risk of such an attack is exceedingly small. By

Anthrax Is Difficult to Spread It is not the single death from anthrax

that really worries us but the unknown possibility of a full-scale bioterror attack.
But here we need to rationally consider the risk of a large attack and the likely
harm it will cause. It takes a great deal of sophistication to generate the rightsized spores and, even more challenging, the right way of aerosolizing them over
a large area. Spiked letters are not terribly effective at spreading anthrax to thousands, let alone millions, of people. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Wall Street
then the damage is done.

Journal, October 22, 2001. If bio-chem threats are being hyped, why arent there more voices of caution? There are two reasons. First, there is no cost to being a
Cassandra. If the dire predictions do not come true, the analyst simply can say that we have been lucky. By contrast, the person who suggests that the threats are
overblown is taking a career-threatening risk. One attack even if it fails, even if it employs a household cleaner rather than sarin or anthraxwould be viewed as
having proved the skeptic wrong. There is a second, less obvious reason. There is an unwritten rule among the small fraternity of people who study weapons of
mass destruction. When colleagues engage in 41 hype, many of us will turn a deaf ear rather than publicly contradict them. We tell ourselves that hyping the threat

Today,
bio-chem hype has real consequences. It is needlessly scaring our children. It is
being used to justify a variety of questionable public policy proposals, and worse,
it may actually encourage terrorists to consider these weapons . The Disease of Fear Yes, we should
is the only way to get the attention of the U.S. public and therefore a necessary evil. [The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks] changed all that.

reduce the danger of a biological or chemical attack. We can improve the public health infrastructure and, in particular, the worldwide monitoring of infectious
disease. We can work on vaccines and techniques to prevent advances in the lab from becoming new weapons. Finally, the Bush administration should reverse

The
infectious disease gripping the U.S. is fear. Left untreated, this disease may have
disastrous consequencesfor public policy, for the economy and for our daily
lives and the lives of our children
course and support the chemical weapons and the biological weapons treaties, which aim to reduce the risks of biological and chemical warfare.

* keep in mind the last part, if you can trip up the negative into wasting time
because they werent listening well enough to ask why we talked about an
infectious disease (fear), it will be easily batted aside and give us an advantage*

Bioterror risk is lowdispersal problems, tech barriers,

risk fo back spreadexperts agree
John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University,
OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY
INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM,
2009, p. 21-22.

For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed

in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably
settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not
contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level . Moreover, 90
percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of
aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by
sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of
dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, longterm storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if
refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such

weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they
can be countered with medical and civil defense measures . And their impact
is very difficult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto
the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes
and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass
casualtiesas an aerosol that can be inhaledrequires a delivery system
whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the
most sophisticated terrorist" Even then effective dispersal could easily be
disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions ."
After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find
in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal
pathogens effectively, biological weapons expert Milton Leitenberg
compares his conclusions with glib pronouncements in the press about
how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and
a few glass jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer."
He sardonically concludes, "The less the commentator seems to know
about biological warfare the easier he seems to think the task is .""

Threat exaggeratedempirical record proves

Gregory D. Koblentz, Assistant Professor, Department of Public and
International Affairs and Deputy Director, Biodefense Program, George
Mason University, "Biosecurity Reconsidered," INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY, Spring 2010, p. 96+, ASP.

The threat of bioterrorism, however, may not be as severe as some have

portrayed it to be. Few terrorist groups have attempted to develop a

biological weapons capability, and even fewer have succeeded. Prior to the
anthrax letter attacks in 2001, only one group, the disciples of guru Bhagwan Shree
Rajneesh in Oregon, managed to cause any casualties with a biological agent. 86 The
U.S. intelligence community estimates that of the fifteen terrorist groups that

have expressed an interest in acquiring biological weapons, only three have

demonstrated a commitment to acquiring the capability to cause mass
casualties with these weapons. 87 Groups such as Japan's Aum Shinrikyo and alQaida have demonstrated the desire to cause mass casualties and an interest in
using disease as a weapon. Despite concerted efforts by both groups to

produce deadly pathogens and toxins, however, neither has caused any
casualties with such weapons, let alone developed a weapon capable of
causing mass casualties. The failures experienced by these groups
illustrate the significant hurdles that terrorists face in progressing beyond
crude weapons suitable for assassination and the contamination of food
supplies to biological weapons based on aerosol dissemination technology
that are capable of causing mass casualties. 88

No risk of weaponization risk is exaggerated

Johnson, at the Wall Street Journal, 8/11/10 (Keith, "Gaisn in
Bioscience Cause Terror Fears",
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870372280457536939
4068436132.html
Fears of bioterror have been on the rise since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, stoking
tens of billions of dollars of government spending on defenses, and the White House
and Congress continue to push for new measures. But the fear of a mass-casualty

terrorist attack using bioweapons has always been tempered by a single

fact: Of the scores of plots uncovered during the past decade, none have
featured biological weapons. Indeed, many experts doubt terrorists even have
the technical capability to acquire and weaponize deadly bugs. The new fear,
though, is that scientific advances that enable amateur scientists to carry out onceexotic experiments, such as DNA cloning, could be put to criminal use. Many wellknown figures are sounding the alarm over the revolution in biological science, which
amounts to a proliferation of know-howif not the actual pathogens. "Certain areas
of biotechnology are getting more accessible to people with malign intent," said
Jonathan Tucker, an expert on biological and chemical weapons at the James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Geneticist Craig Venter said last month at the
first meeting of a presidential commission on bioethics, "If students can order any
[genetic sequences] online, somebody could try to make the Ebola virus." Mr. Venter
is a pioneer in the field whose creation of a synthetic organism this spring helped
push the debate about the risks and rewards of bioscience from scientific journals to
the corridors of power in Washington. "We are limited more by our imagination now
than any technological limitations," Mr. Venter said. Scientists have the ability to
manipulate genetic material more quickly and more cheaply all the time. Just as
"Moore's Law" describes the accelerating pace of advances in computer science,
advances in biology are becoming more potent and accessible every year, experts
note. As recently as a decade ago, the tools and techniques for such fiddling were
confined to a handful of laboratories like those at leading research universities.
Today, do-it-yourself biology clubs have sprung up where part-timers share tips on
how to build high-speed centrifuges, isolate genetic material, and the like. The

movement has been aided by gear that can turn a backyard shed into a
microbiology lab. That has prompted the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
reach out to amateur biologists, teaching them proper security measures

and asking them to be vigilant of unscrupulous scientists . "The risk we're

seeing now is that these procedures are becoming easier to do," said Edward You,
who heads the outreach program at the FBI's Directorate for Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Biological weapons date back millennia. Rotting and plaguestricken corpses once were catapulted over besieged city walls. Wells were routinely
poisoned. More recently, fears that terrorist groups such as al Qaeda might
deploy weapons of mass destruction have kindled fears of bioterrorism .

Those fears reached fever pitch in the months after the World Trade Center
was downed, when anthrax-filled mail killed five people and prompted panic.
That's when Washington started boosting spending on biodefense, improving security
at laboratories that work with dangerous pathogens and stockpiling antidotes. Last
fall, President Barack Obama ordered the creation of a bioethics commission, and
the group spent much of its first meeting parsing the threat of biological terrorism.
He also issued an executive order earlier this month to beef up security for
the most dangerous pathogens, which include anthrax, ebola, tularensis,
smallpox and the reconstructed 1918 Spanish flu bug. Both houses of Congress
have legislation in the works to strengthen the country's ability to detect ,
prevent and, if necessary, recover from large-scale attacks using bioweapons .

All the government attention comes despite the absence of known terrorist
plots involving biological weapons. According to U.S. counterterrorism officials,
al Qaeda last actively tried to work with bioweapons specifically anthrax
before the 2001 invasion of that uprooted its leadership from Afghanistan. While
terrorists have on occasion used chemical weaponssuch as chlorine and
sarin gasnone have yet employed a biological agent, counterterrorism officials
and bioweapons researchers say. The U.S. anthrax attacks were ultimately
blamed on a U.S. scientist with access to military bioweapons programs.
That's why many experts caution that, despite scientific advances, it is still
exceedingly tough for terrorists to isolate or create, mass produce and
deploy deadly bugs. Tens of thousands of Soviet scientists spent decades
trying to weaponize pathogens, with mixed results. Though science has
advanced greatly since the Cold War, many of the same challenges remain . "I don't
think the threat is growing, but quite the opposite," said Milton Leitenberg, a
biological-weapons expert at the Center for International and Security Studies at
the University of Maryland. Advances in biological science and the proliferation of
knowledge are a given, he said, but there has been no indication they are
being used by terrorists. "The idea that four guys in a cave are going to
create bioweapons from scratchthat will be never, ever, ever ," he said.

Risk of bioterrorism low: (1) tech hurdles; (2) risk own

deaths; (3) cultural taboos; (4) easy alternatives
John Paranchi, Analyst, RAND Corporation, Anthrax Attacks, Biological
Terrorism, and Preventive Responses, RAND TESTIMONY, November
2001, p. 11-12, www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT186/CT186.pdf
The use of disease and biological material as a weapon is not a new method of
warfare. What is surprising is how infrequently it is has been used. Biological agents may appeal to the new terrorist groups
because they affect people indiscriminately and unnoticed, thereby sowing panic. A pattern is emerging that terrorists who
perpetrate mass and indiscriminate attacks do not claim responsibility.5 In contrast to the turgid manifestos issued by terrorists in
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, recent mass casualty terrorists have not claimed responsibility until they were imprisoned. Biological
agents enable terrorists to preserve their anonymity because of their delayed impact and can be confused with natural disease
outbreaks. Instead of the immediate gratification of seeing an explosion or the glory of claiming credit for disrupting society, the
biological weapons terrorist may derive satisfaction from seeing societys panicked response to their actions. If this is the case,

There are a number of countervailing

disincentives for states and terrorists to use biological weapons, which help
explain why their use is so infrequent. The technical and operational
this is a new motive for the mass casualty terrorist.

challenges biological weapons pose are considerable. Acquiring the material,

skills of production, knowledge of weaponization, and successfully
delivering the weapon, to the target is difficult. In cases where the
populations of the terrorist supporters and adversaries are mixed, biological
weapons risk inadvertently hitting the same people for whom terrorists
claim to fight. Terrorists may also hesitate in using biological weapons
specifically because breaking the taboo on their use may evoke
considerable retaliation. The use of disease as a weapon is widely
recognized in most cultures as a means of killing that is beyond the bounds
of a civilized society. From a psychological perspective, terrorists may be
drawn to explosives as arsonists are drawn to fire. The immediate
gratification of explosives and the thrill of the blast may meet a
psychological need of terrorists that the delayed effects of biological
weapons do not. Causing slow death of others may not offer the same psychic thrill
achieved by killing with firearms or explosives. Perhaps the greatest alternative to
using biological weapons is that terrorists can inflict (and have inflicted) many
more fatalities and casualties with conventional explosives t han with
unconventional weapons. Biological weapons present technical and operational
challenges that determined killers may not have the patience to overcome
or they may simply concentrate their efforts on more readily available
alternatives.

Bioweapons use is unlikelyvery difficult to deploy and

control
John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University,
OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY
INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM,
2009, p. 20-21.

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could indeed, if thus far only in
theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of people. The discussion

remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been

used. Belligerents have eschewed such weapons with good reason: they
are extremely difficult to deploy and to control. Terrorist groups or rogue
states may be able to solve such problems in the future with advances in
technology and knowledge, but, notes scientist Russell Seitz, while
bioterrorism may look easy on paper, "the learning curve is lethally steep in
practice." The record so far is unlikely to be very encouraging . For example,
Japan reportedly infected wells in Manchuria and bombed several Chinese cities with
plague-infested fleas before and during World War II. These ventures (by a state, not
a terrorist group) may have killed thousands of Chinese, but they apparendy also
caused considerable unintended casualties among Japanese troops and seem to have
had little military impact.

Bioweapons are expensive, difficult to use, and ineffective

STRATFOR, "Nuclear Weapons: Terrorism and the Nonstate Actor," 71-08,

www.stratfor.com/analysis/nuclear_weapons_terrorism_and_nonstate_a
ctor, accessed 8-10-09.

STRATFOR has repeatedly pointed out that chemical and biological weapons are

expensive, are difficult to use and have proven to be largely ineffective in

real-world applications. A comparison of the ineffectiveness of the Aum
Shinrikyo chemical and biological attacks in Tokyo with the effectiveness of
the March 2004 jihadist attacks in Madrid clearly demonstrates that
explosives, pound for pound, are far cheaper, easier to use and ultimately
more efficient at killing people. The failure by jihadists in Iraq to use chlorine effectively in their attacks also
underscores the problem of effectively using improvised chemical weapons. These cases are also illustrative of why CBRN
weapons are not necessarily weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is an important and stark distinction between these
two terms, which are too often viewed as synonymous. The former, CBRN, is a class of devices and weapons that are used to
inflict harm. The latter, WMD, is a measure of potential lethality. The anthrax attacks in the United States in the wake of 9/11 used
a CBRN agent but could hardly have been classified as attacks utilizing WMD.

heres more ev the Bioterror risk exaggerated its just

a conspiracy
Birch 06 (Douglas -- Sun foreign correspondent--

Baltimore Sun June 18th lexis)

Despite the concern of many scientists, some bioweapons experts say the
fears are overblown. In a book last year, Assessing the Biological Weapons and
Bioterrorism Threat, Milton Leitenberg, a biowarfare expert at the University of
Maryland, College Park, wrote that the threat of bioterror "has been
systematically and deliberately exaggerated" by an "edifice" of governmentfunded institutes and experts who run programs and conferences. Germ
weapons need to be carefully cultured, transported, stored and effectively
disseminated, said Raymond Zilinskas, a policy expert and biologist at the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies. Groups like al-Qaida and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo
attempted, and abandoned, efforts to make germ weapons because the task
was too difficult.

Bioterrorism unlikely: (1) difficult to weaponize; (2)

unpredictable
Jacqueline Simon, former member, SIPRI Chemcial and Biological
Warfare Project, Implications of the Terror Attacks for the BWC,
INESAP INFORMATION BULLETIN n. 19, March 2002, pp. 4-7.

The threat posed by chemical and biological weapons has often been
misrepresented. While manufacturing chemical agents or obtaining biological
agents is not particularly difficult, it is not easy, and using these agents to
cause mass casualty is extremely difficult. In order to cause mass casualty it is
necessary to take into account the lethality of an agent, its concentration,
environmental factors, and resistance of the population. Even more difficult is to
combine all of these factors with an effective method of dispersal . All of the

elements of this equation must be mastered in order to achieve significant results.

That would require extensive resources and scientific knowledge inaccessible to most
terrorists. An oft-cited example of the failure of a terrorist group to achieve success
with its biological warfare projects is the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, which,
despite vast funds and experienced scientists, was unable to wage a successful
biological attack. This example also illustrates the unpredictability of biological
weapons which has made them unattractive to many militaries and terrorist

organizations