CONTENT

Half a Century of Conflict: A Historical Perspective

Opposing Strategic Perceptions
Pakistan's Strategic Perception
India's Strategic Perception
Bilateral Disputes
Problematic Images
Non-Conventional Defense
Comparative Defense Spending
India - Pakistan Hostility: Politics or Ideology?
India - Pakistan Relations after 1998
Conclusion

INTRODUCTION
India-Pakistan relations are characterized by the sharp hostility that has driven their relations
since independence in 1947. One also notices the 'low' and 'high' in the cycle of hostility. There
have been some years when relations were exceptionally unfriendly, as against others, signifying
a relative lull. Interestingly, the 'low' in hostility denotes periods when Pakistan was less
confident of its ability to challenge India militarily, as opposed to other times, when it felt more
confident in doing so.
Another pattern could be observed that is based on a time frame. Here, India-Pakistan relations
may be categorized into two major periods:

(a) prior to acquisition of nuclear capabilities; and

(b) post acquisition of nuclear weapons capability.
In both periods, the two countries have allowed military prowess or comparative
militarytechnological capabilities to underwrite the course of their relations. This fact is
reflective of the nature of threat perception, their respective determination of national objectives
and the domestic interplay of vested interests.
In light of the above, the future of India-Pakistan relations depends on their respective
assessment of the qualitative shift in the geopolitical and geo-strategic environment of the region.
It is increasingly manifest over the years that a nuclear South Asia cannot afford a cycle of
hostility. The two countries need to develop an understanding that can help normalize relations a new equation that does not necessarily mean lowering the guard by one or the other, but to find
ways where both could live peacefully, pursuing their independent national objectives. The
question at this juncture, when both neighbours have entered into a peace process, is how these
factors could be internalized by the two sides to allow the process to move forward.
Indeed, the strength of both countries individually in the South Asian region lies in their ability
to reconcile their differences and progress simultaneously without threatening each other.
Whether their vested interests will allow such a positive outcome to materialize is an issue that is
discussed in the following pages. This study is an attempt to understand the various factors that
have shaped the course of India-Pakistan relations and how these relations are likely to unfold in
the future.

Half a Century of Conflict:

The post-independence history of the two neighbours is also a story of conflict and seemingly
unending hostility. Since 1947, the two countries have fought four-and-a-half wars and numerous
skirmishes.1 The cycle of tension includes the ten months of massive force mobilization in 2002
that raised the specter of a nuclear war in the region.
Though the India-Pakistan wars are known for limited casualties, their categorization is often
based on the use of major weapon systems. In all these conflicts the reported military casualties
of Pakistan were around 5,000 personnel, not quite qualifying these as battles or wars by the
standards of European wars, where the death tolls were very high. This is not to deny that IndiaPakistan hostility suffers from its own brand of insanity, where competition rather than
conciliation has driven the relationship for more than half a century.
The genesis of this relationship lies in 1947 and even earlier when the Muslim leadership of the
subcontinent, led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, demanded the creation of a separate homeland for
the Muslims of India. They were considered an 'endangered' species that could only flourish in a
separate homeland where their rights could be protected. It was feared that they would not get

their due share of economic and other opportunities in an undivided India dominated by the
Hindu majority.
While the inevitability of a separate homeland may be debated, the division of India and what
happened in the aftermath of partition definitely set the tone for a long-standing rivalry that was
to consume resources and energies of both the countries. The mass exodus of people in the wake
of the carnage in 1947 added to the hostility between the two states.
Presently, the fundamental overtone of their relationship is characterized by competition with the
smaller neighbour, Pakistan, adamant to compete with a bigger India at all levels. The national
objectives of Pakistan are juxtaposed against India's ambitions of attaining a global power status
in a complex manner. It is not these divergent objectives per se that create problems, but the
underlying perceptions that tend to make the objectives confrontational.

Opposing Strategic Perceptions

To understand India-Pakistan relations it is equally important to comprehend their conflicting
strategic perceptions, putting them on a confrontational course against each other. Strategic
perceptions, it must be noted, relate to political objectives, a national vision, their respective
perception of themselves and each other. In the case of India and Pakistan, their strategic
perceptions are also a product of their respective national insecurities. Pakistan's insecurity is
often viewed in terms of a smaller state forever threatened by the presence of an ambitious and
bigger adversary.
On the other hand, India's insecurity stems from its inability to get accepted as a bigger power in
the region and as a global actor. The ability of smaller countries like Pakistan to challenge India's
military might becomes a major irritant and part of New Delhi's insecurity syndrome. Moreover,
the ability of domestic political actors to challenge the primacy of the central authority in New
Delhi and the challenges that secessionist movements keep throwing up add to this insecurity.
The following sub-sections further explain the factors that shape these opposing perceptions.

Pakistan's Strategic Perception

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan's security perception has remained India-centric. The
interminable rivalry between the two neighbours resulted in four-and-ahalf wars, costing
Islamabad the Eastern wing in the 1971 war. Popular perception amongst the decision-making
elite makes the rivalry sound like a battle between good and evil, with the Indian 'Goliath'
forever trying to vanquish the Pakistani 'David' - suggestive of the ideological undertones in this
rivalry.

Even when the conflict is territorial, the key players link this hostile relation with religious
ideology: Pakistan - an Islamic state's urge to survive with honour against a predominantly Hindu
neighbour that is also perceived as having hegemonic designs. A segment of the elite also
believes that their divergent ideologies could never allow the establishment of normal
neighbourly relations between the two countries. The partition of the sub-continent, the
massacres in 1947 and the twonation theory are factors which cannot be excluded from the
bilateral equation.
Over the past 56 years, Pakistan's security perception and agenda have been dominated by an
acute sense of threat perceived from its bigger neighbour. Interestingly, despite its claim of an
extraregional identity (greater cultural and religious affiliation with the Middle East), Pakistan
has never ventured to extend its security vision beyond India. In Islamabad's rather simplistic
worldview, the world is divided between states considered important for being able to help
strengthen Pakistan against India and those that cannot. In its bid to get accepted as India's
sovereign equal, Pakistan's establishment also fails to understand the subtle difference between
equality and parity.
The nature and direction of India's domestic politics and the aggressive political statements of its
leadership do not help in changing this perception. Any hostile statement from across the border
reminds the people and policymakers of their deepest fear of India, wanting to eliminate
Pakistan. The various conflicts with India, especially the 1971 war resulting in the
dismemberment of Pakistan, have left deep fears and scars that are not easy to erase. Such fears
had relatively eased during the 1980s and part of the 1990s, but resurfaced after the Bharatiya
Janata Party's (BJP) rise to power in 1996-98.
Pakistan's policymakers tend to believe that a party driven by the politico-religious vision of
Hindu dominance is antithetical to a Muslim Pakistan's existence. Besides, India's 'sub-normal'
relations with all the other neighbouring states and its interference with internal matters of
regional states like Sri Lanka (1987), Maldives (1988), and Nepal (1989) makes Pakistan fairly
suspicious of India. Despite such perceptions, the peace moves denote a realization in Islamabad
that the global geo-political environment does not allow for pursuing certain goals, especially
through use of military means.
The outgoing Vajpayee (BJP) government's position on Kashmir during the Agra Summit and its
propaganda against Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 are held as examples of New Delhi's
animosity towards Islamabad. Pakistani fears of India's intentions are reinforced by violence
against Muslims, such as the Gujarat pogrom, and the plight of minorities at the hands of an
intolerant Hindu majority. Such tragic happenings convince the Pakistani establishment of the
Indian establishments enmity towards Pakistan.
This insecurity vis--vis India is rooted in the general sense of fear and insecurity ingrained in
the psyche of the Pakistani establishment. Some analysts see this as the obvious psychology of a

'homeland' state created for a minority. Like Israel, a sense of insecurity is supposedly inherent in
the case of Pakistan.
The presence of a big and ambitious neighbour, India, serves as a justification for this insecurity.
Given this mindset, no amount of military buildup could render an assurance to Pakistan that it
would not be targeted by India. The conventional military imbalance that Islamabad suffers from
only aggravates this sense of fear. There has never been a debate in Pakistan on this structural
anomaly aimed at drawing the nation out from this perpetual fear and the urge to indefinitely
compete with India. The problem is that Pakistan will not accept being treated by India like the
other smaller South Asian states. But lack of a parameter to assess how much security is
sufficient is a problem in itself. Besides, there has never been a dialogue between the two sides,
which surely needs to be conducted at multiple levels to discuss how the bigger neighbour could
inspire confidence in its smaller but competitive neighbour. The perception otherwise holds that
the insecurity vis--vis India is actually a tool that allows the military to stay on top of things in
Pakistan.
Pakistan's strategic perception and the definition of security generally follow a linear course.
Linearity is not a coincidence, though, and can be attributed to the influence of the military and
civil bureaucracy in policymaking, especially the armed forces' influence in the power politics of
the state. Pakistan's military, like any other, finds heightened threat perception congenial for its
institutional interest and survival. The incorporation of threat perception as part of the nationbuilding exercise has enabled the armed forces to occupy a key position in the country's politics.
Defending the territory and ideology of Pakistan, which is the raison d'etre of the military ,
builds an image that is conducive to the establishment's continued control of domestic politics
and governance. As part of this imagebuilding, the onus of India-Pakistan military conflicts is
usually put on India. Thus very few in Pakistan would believe that the 1947/48 and 1965 wars
were initi-ated by Pakistan and not by India. Given the weak political structures, the political
stakeholders also tend to conform to this narrow view of national security where security is
equated with only military security. Linearity of perception can also be attributed to the lack of
legitimacy of the military and political regimes. Religion and military security are two factors
that the policymaking elite, including military and civilian leaders, invoke when faced with the
problem of political legitimacy. This underscores the fact that domestic political confidence is a
prerequisite for changing the course of the current strategic perception in Pakistan.

India's Strategic Perception

India, on the other hand, has to struggle with its insecurity of not being accepted as a global
player. It has consistently sought to project power as a dominant regional and global actor. This
self-perception has been aptly captured by Krishan Nayyar, who believes that: The world has
learned to live with US power, Soviet power, even Chinese power, and it will have to learn to
live with Indian power.

Indeed, Indian policymakers find it extremely frustrating not being treated as one of the
topranking states. The struggle to attain this objective is reflected in their overall national and
defence policies. India's smaller neighbours obviously do not share these aspirations, and
question its logic, much to the dismay of a bigger India. For Pakistan, the worrisome point is that
India's quest for preeminence has a strong military orientation. Indian defense policy (and
nuclear policy in particular) is focused on the two 'villains', China, and even more so, Pakistan.
For the past ten years, India has been striving to elevate itself to not only the regional but also the
global level through increasingly focusing on China rather than Pakistan. Nonetheless, India's
frustration persists in not being able to disentangle itself from regional politics, especially
involving Pakistan. This results in strategic contradictions, such as the gap between tactical and
military strategic planning. While the tactical threat emerging from Pakistan makes tactical
military plans Pakistan-focused, India's strategic threat emanating from China entails an
altogether different approach.
This threat is not necessarily linked with border disputes or any hostile relations with China. In
fact, New Delhi is consistently moving towards improvement of relations with Beijing and a
possible settlement of the border dispute. Its competition with China is more strategic, as India
constantly tries to match China's level of military power. In the global geopolitical context, it is
this competition that would confer a certain strategic 'nuisance' value to New Delhi, convincing
other powers like the United States to engage in a strategic partnership with it. But its ongoing
rivalry with Pakistan detracts India from those efforts. New Delhi has, therefore, adopted a twopronged approach:
(a) use military and political pressure to settle disputes with Pakistan; and
(b) adopt a different tactical approach vis--vis other smaller adversaries (e.g. military-political
intervention, economic patronage, technical assistance, etc.).
To cope with Pakistan's tactical threat, India has to determine the appropriate level of military
response. Indian analyst Bharat Karnad suggests the raising of special forces that could take
proxy war into Pakistan the same way as Islamabad does in India. This approach, he opines,
would thwart Pakistani designs to escalate the overall level of tension and threat of conflict in the
region. Notably, it is such an escalation, possibly leading to a nuclear encounter in the region,
that invites pressure from the international community on India as well.
Successive Indian governments over the years remain committed to the pursuit of power
projection. Meanwhile, Indian analysts have begun relegating Pakistan to the level of a mere
tactical irritant, implying that India must pursue its power ambitions without bothering about
Pakistan. The approach suggests not getting bogged down by its troubled relations with Pakistan,
but embarking on a sustained military buildup until India becomes a regional and potential global
power. This strategy, however, is bound to exacerbate Islamabad's fears and calls for a concerted
dialogue between the two to understand each other's concerns better.

Bilateral Disputes
India-Pakistan rivalry and their threat perceptions have a physical manifestation in the form of
the on-going Kashmir dispute and other boundary issues. Control of territory, in fact, is central to
the bilateral hostility and competition with India. Since no other issue has gained the kind of
salience that the Kashmir dispute has, its significance for Pakistan's policymakers needs to be
understood. The dispute is considered vitally important to Pakistan's existence for a number of
reasons.
First, control of Indian occupied-Kashmir (IoK) is vital for Pakistan for ideological reasons,
intertwined with the logic of Pakistan's existence itself. To quote Pakistan's President and Army
Chief, General Pervez Musharraf:
The partition of the sub-continent took place on a religious-ideological basis. The Muslims of
India, under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, wanted a separate homeland, an idea
opposed by the Indian Congress. The princely state of Kashmir was annexed by India in
contravention of the agreed upon principles of partition. India denied the people of Kashmir the
right to determine their political future, as promised in the UN resolutions of 1948-49, and as
initially agreed by India. The popular perception in Pakistan is that given a fair chance, the
Kashmiris would have opted to join Pakistan.
Continued Indian control of Kashmir is viewed as a challenge to Pakistan's existence as a state
and its ideology. On the other hand, any concession on the issue by New Delhi is seen as
compromising India's status as a secular state.
Second, the control of Kashmir is held as strategically important for Pakistan. The water
resources and territorial security of Pakistan can be better ensured through controlling the entire
disputed territory. Recent Indian statements hinting at stoppage of water to Pakistan tend to
heighten the fears of India's intent and capacity to make life difficult for Pakistan.
In fact, since the ten month long troop mobilization in 2002, certain segments of the security elite
have vociferously argued about New Delhi's intention to strangulate Pakistan by blocking the
downstream flow of river waters. Water is an issue that allows the official threat perception to
permeate into areas such as Sindh, where people are otherwise not too bothered by India. But the
dominant view in Sindh is that the water crisis has less to do with India's negative manipulation
of water sources and is more due to the attitude of Punjab.
Since the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan has objected to the designs of India's
upstream Salal Dam, Wullar Barrage and, lately, the Baglihar Dam, for threatening to alter the
flow of river water in violation of the Indus Waters Treaty. Such issues strengthen the Pakistani
establishment's resolve to question India's control of Kashmir.

Kashmir has been central to the hostile relations between the two countries, often spilling over or
getting channelized into other bilateral disputes, for instance, the battle over the Siachin glacier
or the mini-war in Kargil in 1999.
The fight for control over the controversial and undemarcated Siachin glacier started in 1984.
The Glacier is 20,000 ft above sea-level and stretches over 1000 square miles (see Map). It had
been left out from demarcation of the Ceasefire Line in 1949. The Indians argue that since the
1970s Pakistan had been making moves to occupy it. During the late 1970s and the beginning of
the 1980s, Islamabad began to charge fees from scouting expeditions which would visit the
glacier. As a result, this land mass was shown as falling into Pakistani territory in certain
international maps.
The Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in New Delhi claimed that
through the occupation of the Siachin glacier, Pakistan could directly threaten Indian territory.
Whether or not the Pakistani military could achieve such an objective, it has still been argued
that in the early 1980s both the countries had their 'eye' on the glacier. According to a senior
Pakistan Army officer, President Zia had ordered an occupation in 1983. It was the army which
had relaxed , and as a result, they were caught in 1984 with 'their pants down' when the Indian
troops moved in.Robert Wirsing, an American expert, is of the opinion that a delay in action was
caused due to Pakistan's deeper involvement with Afghanistan at that time.
The Pakistani establishment holds the view that India had wanted to threaten the Karakoram
highway between itself and China. The only possible benefit that India could have by its action
was to undermine the Pakistan-China border agreement. However, keeping in consideration the
geographical and atmospheric hazards which the militaries of both India and Pakistan might have
faced in using the glacier to invade each other's territories, such claims appear dubious.In this
respect the occupation of the glacier cannot be explained logically. The only rational explanation
seems that the decisionmakers of both countries continue to be obsessed with military/territorial
security. This is being done in an age when the definition of security has acquired multiple
meanings. At best, the issue is an extension of the larger Kashmir issue.
It was certainly Kashmir that prompted Islamabad to re-engage New Delhi militarily in 1999.
This was done through militarily occupying certain strategic heights in the Drass-Kargil area
along the Line of Control (LOC). The timing of the operation was indeed odd since it coincided
with the Indian Premier Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan on the invitation of Pakistan's Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif, and expectations were high regarding improvement of relations between the two
states.
A number of explanations were offered by various analysts on this operation, ranging from
support to the mujahideen struggle in Kashmir, to an operation launched in response to India's
aggressive military moves in the area. Although neither of the two explanations seem plausible
and suffer from major flaws, the operation was presumably launched to place the Kashmir issue

on the negotiating table before it could completely disappear or get sidelined in the new geostrategic environment of the region, now dominated by nuclear weapons.
This is an approach that has been historically adopted by other smaller powers as well. However,
what made this particular operation problematic were two factors:
(a) the gap between the perceptions of the civil (political) and military leadership that became
very obvious during the course of the conflict; and
(b) the various strategic and tactical miscalculations made by the Pakistan Army. It was finally
the American diplomatic intervention that saved the region from a serious crisis.
Significantly, the Kargil conflict lent credence to India's claims that it was Pakistan aiding and
abetting violence or terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir. This is something that New Delhi had
always accused Islamabad of, an allegation that was persistently denied by Pakistan. Although
independent analysts haven't fully supported Indian claims regarding the Kashmiri struggle that
started in 1989 being an exclusively 'imported phenomenon', the Kargil conflict was a major
diplomatic setback, and a military disaster for Pakistan. More importantly, launched in a nuclear
environment, it had raised the specter of a military conflict that could have escalated to a nuclear
holocaust in case of miscalculation, either strategic or tactical.
However, Kashmir is not the only source of contention between the two countries. There are
other disputes as well, including the still un-demarcated maritime boundary issue. The absence of
a sea boundary is linked to the border dispute of the 60 mile-long estuary of Sir Creek in the
marshes of the Runn of Kutch, where the two countries fought a limited war over disputed
territory in April of 1965.
The area lies along the border between the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of
Sindh. Islamabad's claim over Sir Creek is based on the map drawn out in 1914, and relied upon
at the time of partition in 1947. This map places the boundary on the east bank of the creek.
India, on the other hand, insists on treating the line in the middle of the creek as the boundary
(see Map).
Following inconclusive pre-liminary talks in the mid-1970s, negotiations were held to resolve
the issue on several occasions in later years, especially in the 1990s. In 1994, New Delhi offered
to delineate the boundary seawards, an offer that was rejected allegedly because of other
unresolved disputes such as the Siachen glacier. Pakistan rejected the Indian proposal as being
unacceptable. It feared that acceptance of the Indian plan may result in accepting a maritime
boundary without really solving the dispute.
One of the problems in resolving the dispute is that a baseline needs to be determined by both
countries. This land terminus, the point where the India-Pakistan land boundary terminates on the
coast, would help determine the sea boundary from that point outwards.

Pakistan declared its baseline in 1996 but India did not do the same. The maritime boundary
problem is considered threatening by both sides. The Pakistani military authorities believe that
India had secretly built a new naval post called SIKKY, east of Sir Creek, which is a deep-water
berthing facility. The post, in Islamabad's assessment, could help the Indians gather military
intelligence, carry out infiltration in Pakistan, and harass Pakistani fishermen. The issue is
critical because the final maritime boundary delineation would determine the sea (also seabed)
territory of both countries. Indian Rear Admiral (Retd.) Raja Menon believes that, depending on
the final outcome, the gain or loss to either country could be about 250 square miles of ocean and
ocean floor. Pakistan, therefore, may not have wanted to consider the Indian offer for fear of
losing sea territory.
A maritime demarcation, however, would help in avoiding serious incidents at sea. Needless to
say, both boundary disputes create additional problems that have a human dimension to it. Thus,
one cannot ignore the suffering of the Kashmiri people, or the ordeal of innocent fishermen
apprehended by the coast guards for crossing a hitherto un-demarcated line in search of
livelihood.
There has been little inclination on both sides to solve the boundary issues. From Pakistan's
standpoint, it is the military more than the diplomatic option that can force India to discuss the
issue, exposing Islamabad to the accusation of revisionism in South Asia. Pakistan's military
establishment, however, seems to have realized post-Kargil, that a military solution is almost
impossible. This is a major shift considering that the Pakistan army's proxy war against India had
proved advantageous in the past. It also took much violence and conflict to convince India of the
efficacy of recognizing Kashmir as a dispute that had to be resolved.
However, this change in the Indian attitude does not necessarily imply a softening of New
Delhi's position on the final solution. India considers Kashmir an integral part not only because
of its strategic position, but also due to the basic Indian fear for its own integrity. The popular
notion is that any solution beyond the traditional Indian position might set off a chain reaction,
jeopardizing India's national unity. In fact, New Delhi considers any solution of Kashmir
inimical to India's security and integrity. Indian policymakers at present are, therefore,
unreceptive to the numerous proposals to solve the Kashmir dispute. This mindset, however,
negates India's larger design to become a major power. Unless India settles Kashmir and other
outstanding disputes with Pakistan, it will continue to get bogged down in regional conflicts.

Problematic Images
Public attitudes in India and Pakistan towards each other are still marked by considerable
hostility. Besides, public opinion having been systematically cultivated in each country against
the other, their mutual rivalry is accompanied by an "enemy" image of each other. This negative
image not only dominates all other images, but it also disallows factors such as shared history
and culture to facilitate greater understanding.

In Pakistan, the dominant image of India is that of a hostile nation and the primary threat to
Pakistan's security. Pakistan's policymaking elite tends to define a threat to its national security
mainly in terms of the peril perceived from New Delhi. India's hegemonic disposition is
considered to be the greatest danger to Pakistan's security and survival. The dominant view
influencing policymaking subscribes to the belief that the Indian leadership has never reconciled
to the existence of Pakistan and would not miss any opportunity to invade or destroy Pakistan.
Policymakers are equally uncomfortable with India's quest to achieve regional or global
preeminence and perceive it as harmful to Pakistan's security interests. The elite in Pakistan
widely believes that any increase in India's military capacity would eventually be used to
dominate other smaller South Asian states, a situation deemed as being totally unacceptable.
This perception allows little room for New Delhi's aspirations in the region and beyond. Hence,
restoring peace between the two neighbours is viewed as a responsibility that must be shared
squarely by New Delhi. There are those who also believe that internal political developments in
Pakistan, such as correcting the civil-military imbalance, depend on restoration of peace in the
region, which in turn depends on India. Such perceptions have persisted since the time of
independence. The feeling of insecurity emanating from India has been the hallmark of all
regimes in Pakistan, be these military, military-dominated or civilian. The absence of a varied
opinion in Pakistan results from the internal dynamics of policymaking, as discussed in the
coming pages.
Even though public opinion does not necessarily influence policies in both India and Pakistan,
image formation is essential in the framing of state policies. This underlines the importance of
images in national security discourse. India's image in Pakistan is rather narrowly perceived and
remains bleak. Despite our shared cultures, the dominant image of India is that of a hostile
country. The unprecedented people-to-people contact in recent years has a long way to go for the
two sides of the divide to develop a better understanding of each other's cultures and societies.
The years of indoctrination make it even harder to acknowledge cultural variations instead of
hating each other. Nonetheless, in some regions of Pakistan, anti-India sentiment is weaker than
in others, due to differences in political perceptions.
A number of people interviewed in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan did not attach the
kind of a importance to the Indian threat as is done in Punjab or parts of the Frontier province.
However, there is a consensus amongst people regarding India's image as a hostile neighbour.
This image is stronger particularly in Punjab and nearer the seat of the establishment in Pakistan.
Recurring reference to India's hegemonic designs indicates that such a policy is totally
unacceptable to the country's political and military elite. The media, particularly the state
electronic media and the Urdu press, play a crucial role in promoting such an image. Post-9/11
developments seem to have reinforced this image and converted more people to the idea of
aggressive Indian military political designs.

A hostile image being a shared problem, Pakistan's image in India is no more positive than the
other side's. In fact, one could argue that the image varies from a negative image to a non-image.
The South Indians, it is believed, have little knowledge or interest in Pakistan as compared to
North Indians. This is because a number of North Indians comprise migrants from what is now
Pakistan. However, there is a view that a number of critical events resulted in deepening
Pakistan's negative image in the South or, for that matter, other parts of India where people were
less concerned by the adversary earlier on.
Thus, a hostile Pakistani image, which was not commonly shared by South Indians, became
popular after Kargil and the hijacking of an Indian airliner to Kandahar. Of late, the Indian
electronic media and especially the Indian film industry are increasingly playing up the enemy
image of Pakistan. In addition, there is the image of Pakistan as a politically unstable and chaotic
state that might not sustain economic pressures if it engages in a reactive military buildup vis-vis India.
Greater people-to-people contact may help overcome such negative images on both sides.
Surely, such distant images of each other at the level of the civil society are based on lack of
interaction and sufficient knowledge of each other. It is noteworthy that despite a fixation with
each other, there are no notable research centres in Indian and Pakistani universities that
specialize on the other side.

Non-Conventional Defense
The military competition has also manifested itself in the form of nuclear weapons proliferation
in the region. Pakistan lagged behind India in the nuclear field. It was certainly not at par with
India when the latter acquired nuclear capability (not necessarily nuclear weapons programme)
before the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into effect in 1968.
The turning point for Pakistan, however, came in 1974 when India conducted its first so-called
"peaceful" nuclear explosion. The consequent reactive strategy is aptly explained by Dougherty:
Proliferation by reaction is a phenomenon associated with pairs of conflict-parties or historic
rivals rather than a chain-reaction involving indefinitely long series of countries. In
'proliferation by reaction model', if one country acquire (nuclear weapons), the traditional
foe feels itself under compulsion to acquire (nuclear weapons) for the sake of protective
equilibrium.

A latent capability could prove an effective safeguard against Indian nuclear blackmail, to deter
New Delhi from aggression, and neutralize its regional dominance.
This action-reaction model also applies to India that was concerned for its security vis--vis
nuclear capable China. However, India was also concerned about its status in the international
system. This factor is explained by K. Subrahmanyam:

In the current global strategic environment in which, against our opposition, nuclear
weapons have been made an international currency of power and surrounded by three
nuclear powers of the world, it is absurd for a country of India's size, population and
resources to talk of nonalignment and keeping her options open by renouncing the nuclear
weapons.

More importantly, both countries systematically developed their capabilities, culminating in the
nuclear tests of 1998. This was a point when India, followed by Pakistan, took the calculated risk
of going overt with their nuclear capabilities. Reportedly, India conducted five tests: two fission,
three low-yield and one thermonuclear device. Pakistan, on the other hand, responded by
conducting six tests: three low-yield, two fission and one boosted device. Since then, the two
neighbours have pursued their independent nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programmes.
The two countries appear to be pursuing independent trajectories based on their military
objectives. While India's aim is to develop a capability to counter two enemies, China and
Pakistan, Islamabad's programme is completely India-centric .

Currently, India has four types of missiles:

Prithvi series - a battlefield missile that has been developed for the three services. This is
also one of the key missiles that has been put through production;
Agni series - an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile);
Surya - an ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile), still under development;
Sagarika - a sea-launched missile, still under development.

India's programme is designed to fit into the plans for a nuclear triad (capacity to launch from the
land, air and sea). Such a capability is required to counter a twofront situation, against Pakistan
and China. Indian analysts generally advocate a large number of nuclear weapons. Rear Admiral
(Retd.) Raja Menon, for instance, proposes that India should produce 380 MIRVable (MIRV:
Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle, a type of payload fitted on long-range guided
missiles) nuclear warheads by 2020. In Menon's view, these numbers are vital to counter China's
military power. A smaller portion of this nuclear inventory will be dedicated against Pakistan.
This recommended number goes hand in hand with the views on New Delhi's potential targeting
plans. According to India's Brig. (Retd.) Nair, in case of a nuclear attack on Pakistan, the Indian
military will carry out strikes against 17 targets that include four metropolitan centres, two dams,
and a corps formation. The menu is indeed rich and sufficient to wipe out major infrastructure in
Pakistan.
These Indian nuclear plans have had a major impact on the thinking of military planners in
Pakistan. From the perspective of bilateral competition, the shortrange missiles like Prithvi or
aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons and reach most parts of Pakistan are critical. It is these
that Bharat Karnad has proposed removing to give Islamabad greater confidence vis--vis India.

Karnad is of the view that giving such confidence to Pakistan is essential to minimize or
neutralize the threat from Pakistan. Once this happens, India can focus on its competition with
China more comfortably.
In response to the Indian missile programme, Pakistan has developed three categories of
missiles:

Hatf series - copies of the Chinese M-9 and M-11;

Ghauri missile - based on North Korean technology and possessing a greater range;
Shaheen series - a fairly indigenous programme in which Pakistan's National
Development Complex (NDC) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
seem to have experimented with various ranges and rocket motors.

For Islamabad's counter-valuetargeting (against population centres) there are about 11 sites that
include major cities like New Delhi, Ahmedabad, Pune and others. One of the key objectives for
developing longer ranges is to be able to reach most parts of India. An advanced missile
capability is also meant to bridge the gap resulting from the limitations of the Pakistan Air Force
(PAF) which lacks sufficient number of deep strike aircraft for use as delivery platforms.
Moreover, if India manages to acquire even a limited ABM (antiballistic missile) capability, then
missiles would appear to be the only option to neutralize that capability gap. The underlying
security problematique is that Pakistan suffers from strategic depth and, hence, is more
vulnerable to a possible act of Indian aggression. The lack of strategic depth makes it less likely
for Pakistan to withstand and survive a full-scale Indian nuclear attack. So, in order to make
deterrence work, it is important for Pakistan to develop the necessary technological capabilities.
A missile force, therefore, is a vital component of Pakistan's deterrence planning.
Pakistan's conventional military buildup does not necessarily neutralize India's ability to enforce
the existing status quo. In fact, the induction of nuclear weapons in the region means that it will
become more difficult for Pakistan to change the politico-territorial dynamics of the region.
Given Islamabad's comparative technological inferiority, it becomes imperative for Pakistan not
to resort to military solutions as it has done in the past. Nuclear deterrence makes it equally
difficult for India to challenge Pakistan militarily.
Nuclear deterrence has established new norms for bilateral relations which demands that both
nations not resort to violence but negotiate politically. In this respect, nuclear weapons appear to
have increased the potential of a positive change in relations, which was not possible in the
period of conventional deterrence. Although both neighbours need to improve their system of
signaling, which is deemed as inadequate, engage in nuclear risk reduction talks and take other
measures to build greater confidence that would help check conflict escalation, the dynamics of
nuclear deterrence imposes certain limitations on the hostile behaviour of both the countries.

Comparative Defense Spending

According to the US State Department (Bureau of Verification and Compliance), India topped
the South Asiain region in military expenditure (ME) for the period 1993-97. Its defense
spending growth rate increased from 3.1% in 1987-97 to 6.8% in 1993- 97. Pakistan followed
next, though its spending decreased from 2.1% in 1987-97 to 1.7% in 1993-97. Both countries
spend a substantial amount of their GNP (Gross National Product and CGE (Central Government
Expenditures) on defense. Clearly, Pakistan's military expenditure as a percentage of its GDP or
CGE is much higher than India's. However, a few points need to be emphasized here:

First, comparative defense spending is not necessarily an indicator of bilateral military

competition, especially when the grand national strategic objectives of two countries
vary.
Second, defense spending, like any other expenditure, as a percentage of the GDP or
CGE, tends to vary with the revenue generation capacity of a state. Thus, India's military
expenditure as a percent of its GDP or CGE is lower than Pakistan's. It is certain,
however, that defense remains a priority for both the countries.
Third, a statistical comparison becomes difficult since the two countries do not use
similar criterion for accounting of their defense budgets. For instance, while India
includes defense pensions in its budget, Pakistan's defense budget excludes these figures.
Moreover, money spent on non-conventional defense is not included in the budget.
Resultantly, the one-line figure is not truly reflective of the whole picture of the net
military expenditure. Also, off-budget financing is not included in the budget and,
therefore, does not present a true picture of military expenditure shown in the budget. The
two countries do not use the standard NATO definition to calculate their defense
spending.
Fourth, what makes a comparison difficult is the fact that the level of transparency varies.
While India discloses some details of its military budget. Pakistan's defense budget is
basically a one-line figure that does not give any details of what is spent on essentials
versus non-essentials.
Fifth, substantial reduction of defense budgets is not possible since a major portion of the
military expenditure goes towards meeting personnel and maintenance costs. Large
standing forces do not necessarily mean greater technological input. In fact, the large size
of the forces limits technological spin-offs of the military in the two countries.

In both cases, one can observe reluctance towards reassessing the threat, force goals and plans,
and the general efficacy of a lopsided resource allocation policy. Over the years, domestic
sources of insecurity have also grown profoundly but the governments tend to see things only
through the lens of external threats. It may be noted that all South Asian states are 'soft states',
ridden with various domestic tensions.
The imbalance between defense and development will continue, especially in India where major
weapons acquisitions are underway. New Delhi increased its defense spending by about 28% in
the Financial Year-2003/4. However, India is far better placed than Pakistan to finance major

military purchases, especially to fund its approximately US $8 billion worth shopping list. In
December 2003, India's foreign exchange reserves crossed US $100 billion mark and have
grown since with FDI (foreign direct investment), export earnings and weakening of the US
dollar.
An economic boost would allow more technology acquisitions and minimize the relative burden
on development. The former BJP government, with its agenda of achieving for India the status of
a regional power, favoured investing in military technology to enhance India's military prowess,
and fill the gaps exposed during the Kargil crisis. New Delhi also ordered about 320 modern T90 tanks, four Tupolev- 22 long-range bombers, 40 MI-17 IV helicopters and an aircraft carrier
from Russia. This was in addition to the up-gradation of a number of weapon systems. The latest
wave of conventional military modernization appeared to have come after a virtual standstill for
a decade.
India's procurement budget is likely to grow as New Delhi continues to follow the military's
procurement plan. Future acquisitions include fighter aircraft, naval ships, aircraft carrier and
airborne early warning aircraft. Reportedly, the Indian Air Force's (IAF) objective is to build a
potent force of 60 squadrons consisting 1200 fighter aircraft by 2005-06. These will include
about 190 Su- 30 MKI aircraft, giving the IAF better offensive capability against both China and
Pakistan. The plans are also to seek Russia's help to up-grade and overhaul the MiG-21s that
currently form the core of the Indian Air Force. Along with 22 AEW (airborne early warning)
capable aircraft and the required up-gradation, the IAF has the potential of launching 830 sorties
per day against selected targets.
In addition, the Indian Navy is keen to acquire the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier with
specific configurations that include a 12 ski-jump to provide a short-takeoff-but-arrestedrecovery capability for its air group, comprising around 20 MiG-29K fighters and Kamov Ka-28
and Ka-31 early warning helicopters. A possible deal with Moscow may also include up to 60
MiG-29K fighters to be based on the Gorshkov at a total cost of more than US $2 billion.
Besides, India is also investing resources in the indigenous production of frigates and corvettes.
These acquisitions will bring India closer to its goal of having a capacity to challenge Chinese
naval buildup.
So far, Pakistan seems to have capped its defense budget, but this development is linked more
with external pressure from financial aid donors and the fact that the country has not yet
embarked on major weapon procurements. Once Islamabad activates its plan to acquire weapons
worth about US $ 10 billion in the next 6-7 years, defense spending will escalate. Islamabad's
wish list comprises about 150 JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft for which approximately US $3
billion have been requested by the PAF. The Navy also wants to purchase four Chinese frigates
that will cost about US $400 million. Other items include surveillance equipment, UAVs
(unmanned aerial vehicles), etc. Ultimately, a lot depends on the willingness of the suppliers to
transfer weapons to Pakistan.

Significantly, it is military modernization, as detailed above, that would effect escalation of

military expenditure. The other possibility for such increase is an outbreak of conflict. It is also
worth mentioning that not all Indian procurements are Pakistan specific. This does not, however,
mean that India will not have the option of deploying these weapons against Pakistan, but that
these are not being acquired to bolster New Delhi's capabilities vis-a-vis Pakistan.
An analysis of comparative defense spending does not necessarily mean evaluating the cost of
conflict between India and Pakistan. Such calculation, which has been attempted by other
analysts58, is not possible, owing to the varied political objectives of the two states. India's net
military capability can be used against Pakistan, though they may not necessarily have been
developed for this purpose. In the circumstances, it is difficult to conduct a statistical analysis of
the cost. It could, however, be argued that giving high priority to military security generally has a
financial and opportunity cost, and so it is for conflict. But it will not be possible to establish a
direct co-relation between peace and increase in development spending or reduction in hostilities
with decrease in military expenditure for the two countries.

Instances of Cooperation
Despite the overriding conflict, there are instances when the two countries have cooperated and
negotiated peace. The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 or a number of CBMs (confidence building
measures) agreed upon during the 1980s and the 1990s have varyingly worked over the years.
The Indus Waters Treaty relates to the water disputes between the two countries, resulting from
the partition, over utilization of the shared irrigation waters. An agreement worked out through
the World Bank's mediation provided for the creation of a Permanent Indus Commission and
periodic meetings between officials of the two states. This Treaty still holds, and is the basis of
bilateral negotiations, despite disputes having arisen due to India's construction of dams on the
upper reaches of the shared river(s) designed in violation of the Treaty.
The two governments have also abided by the agreed upon CBM to exchange information on
nuclear facilities, as well as the CBM of non-attack on each other's nuclear facilities. There were
a number of military CBMs agreed upon during the 1990s that are being followed, while the
need exists for more military and nuclear-related restraints and nonmilitary CBMs.
The geo-political environment of the subcontinent is thus far lacking in sustainable CBMs.
Traditionally, CBMs have been used as confidence-avoidance measures required in times of
military conflict. Measures recognized as CBMs are hurriedly propped up to contain tension and
outbreaks of conflict between the two countries. The two governments also tend to use tools such
as track-II or back channel diplomacy to keep in contact with the other side during periods of
heightened tension. For the CBMs to become sustainable, they have to be translated into formal
agreements and protocols. This is not to say that formal accords are always necessarily upheld.
However, in the existence of formal instruments, official channels of communication remain
open and are generally far more effective in crisis situations than informal channels.

During the ten month military standoff in 2002, CBMs collapsed almost entirely. Despite this
shortcoming, CBMs are necessary, particularly in the absence of a sustained peace process. The
peace process initiated by the outgoing BJP government and statements so far by the new
Congress-led coalition leadership promise continued progress in India-Pakistan normalization. In
case the peace process gets scuttled or delayed, as has happened in the past, the CBMs,
especially those linked with nuclear restraint, should continue. This is necessary to survive in a
nuclear environment. Additionally, such CBMs would provide a window of communication on
which relations could be rebuilt. Most importantly, nuclear CBMs must be pursued independent
of any dispute or issue.

India - Pakistan Relations after 1998

The past ten years are marked by significant developments impacting the basic dynamics of
India-Pakistan relations. The first change relates to both neighbours having declared their
respective nuclear weapons capabilities. The second refers to geo-political developments after
September 11, 2001.
In the first instance, the nature of India-Pakistan equation has changed dramatically after 1998
because of the qualitative shift resulting from the nuclear tests. Today, both India and Pakistan
are nuclear weapon states. In theory, this capability should improve their negotiating capacity in
the global political system. This does not necessarily mean less sensitivity to geopolitical
developments or the hierarchy dominated by the more powerful nations of the world.
In fact, this capability demands greater responsibility and appreciation of the possible role that
the two neighbours have played or can play in the international system. In bilateral terms, this
also means that the amount of risk involved in mutual hostility has increased manifold. Although
deterrence seems to have worked in the region, there still remains greater need for stability in the
relationship.
Nuclear deterrence and continuation of tension signify that conflict or prolonged tension is no
longer an option available to either India or Pakistan, as existing in the pre-nuclear deterrence
period. It is not just the fear of a conflict spinning out of control, but the general cycle of
instability that is set into motion. This instability becomes costly in terms of economic, social
and psychological dynamics of the two states. By now, perhaps, the military commanders and
political leaders of the two countries understand the new dynamics and behave quite rationally,
as is obvious from the past four years. The new dynamics pertain to the realization of the fact
that nuclear deterrence only allows for calculated risks.
That the Pakistani forces withdrew from the Kargil forward positions in 1999 confirms this
rationality. So does the withdrawal of troops by India after ten months of active mobilization in
2002. However, such developments tend to destabalize the region at many levels. The ten months
of mobilization created an environment that was considered hostile by foreign investors. Travel

advisories were issued for the entire region that affected India more than Pakistan. The lesson
drawn here is that such situations must be scrupulously avoided.
Peace is indispensable despite the fact that the military balance in the region is undergoing a
change. India is acquiring technologies and introducing revolution in military affairs (RMA) in
its armed forces that can give it a definite lead over Pakistan. Such qualitative changes will
increase New Delhi's comparative advantage. However, the existing structural problems of
defense management and the overall lack of maintenance of equipment and other factors denote
serious problems that do not necessarily translate India's quantitative advantage into qualitative
superiority. India remains a medium power, unable to convincingly impress its smaller neighbour
Pakistan.
An analytical approach that does not take into account other qualitative factors might not present
an accurate assessment of India's supposed military superiority. There is a lot of ground that
India needs to cover. There are, nonetheless, five factors that must to be mentioned here:

First, Pakistan's rational reaction should be based on evaluating the amount of security
required and a cost-effective way of attaining that goal.
Second, certain structural adjustments like restructuring of the armed forces,
strengthening of socio-political environment and employment of diplomatic means would
prove more advantageous to Pakistan.
Third, Pakistan must not needlessly enter into a negative competition with an India that is
experiencing a new phase of its nationhood, in which external actors are keen to
recognize New Delhi as a significant actor and are willing to establish relations with it,
including arms transfer links.
Fourth, India's linkages with the US are not necessarily at the cost of Pakistan-US
relations. The fact that Washington has agreed not to play a zero-sum game (ones gain
equals anothers loss) in South Asia will allow Islamabad to capitalize on its own
advantages.
Fifth, the course that India and Pakistan adopt does not have to be excessively
confrontational. However, a lot will depend on solving outstanding disputes between the
two. Here, the domestic dynamics and the manner in which these have an impact on
intra-state relations would be a key factor in bringing about a fundamental shift in
relations.

Conclusion
The predicament of the subcontinent, especially in terms of hostile relations between India and
Pakistan, is lack of vision in the leadership that makes the issue of finding a solution to the
Kashmir problem difficult. Although the two governments have agreed to solve the issue, one is
still not sure of the political ability of both to make major compromises. The vested interests of a
number of key stakeholders also play a major role in the continuation of the crisis.

Considering the lack of clarity regarding a vision in both countries, the possibility of their
leadership agreeing to a solution that might not bring about peace and stability in the medium to
long term is highly likely. Any solution that divides the people of Kashmir might not bring longlasting peace to the region.
This mindset has perpetrated insecurity regarding the integrity of the territorial frontiers. In many
respects, the centrality of territory to the geo-political debate in the region relegates both
countries to political backwardness.
It does not allow the people of the two countries to reap greater benefits of cooperation that can
be seen in the case of the European Union, for instance. This is not to suggest a political union,
but certainly cooperation at economic, social and cultural levels with each state making its own
rich and diverse contribution.
The history of India-Pakistan relations has so far been uninspiring and is ridden with conflict,
mistrust and disillusionment towards each other. However, those traditional vested interests in
both the countries, who are direct beneficiaries of this conflict, are now less obstructionist than
before in allowing a mutually beneficial change in the two societies.
Both India and Pakistan have drifted towards greater religious extremism, which does not benefit
either. Although such sociological development cannot be entirely attributed to the bilateral
hostility, their rivalry has been a major contributory factor.
The future of India is equally threatened by the rise of a fascistic Hindu militancy that will
probably haunt the country for some time to come, despite the BJP's recent electoral setback.
The rise in extremism has taken place in the backdrop of grinding poverty and underdevelopment
in both countries. This, in fact, is a greater challenge for policymaking than anything else.
Therefore, any recommendation on the way forward should also be based on an evaluation of
this problem. Political development in Pakistan is necessary to foster peace and stability in the
region.
A better future for the two peoples depends on whether the leadership in the two states can look
beyond the interests of the ruling elite, which do not necessarily subscribe to the betterment of
their teeming millions. It is premature to speculate on the ultimate outcome of the peace process,
initiated on the Indian side by outgoing BJP/Vajpayee government. Recent statements by the
Congress-led coalition leadership on the future course of the India-Pakistan peace process,
though seemingly positive, are often couched in ambiguities.
Pending a breakthrough in the peace process, for which no timeline can thus far be conceived, at
least clarity of purpose and consistency of the process itself is what might help the two
leaderships find a way out of the morass of hostility. A delay of six months to a year in the peace
process could prove costly. It could revive circumstances that were dangerous for bilateral

relations in the past. What remains a matter of greater concern is that a next round of hostilities
might be far more devastating than before.