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#3.

EN BANC
JOSE MARI EULALIO C. LOZADA and ROMEO B. IGOT, petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. L-59068 January 27, 1983
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot as a representative suit for and
in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent
COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan
Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads:
(2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular
election, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days
after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of Quezon City,
Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that,
as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973
Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as
citizens and desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed the instant petition on
their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound and general interest. "
The respondent COMELEC, represented by counsel, opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the
Interim Batasan Pambansa.
The petition must be dismiss.
I
As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being
illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its
ministerial duty under the constitutional provision above cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds.
It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal
expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. 1 What the case at bar seeks is one that
entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal because it would be spent for a purpose that of calling a
special election which, as will be shown, has no authority either in the Constitution or a statute.
As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute the
present petition. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. 2 In the case before Us, the alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill-up the
existing vacancies in the Batasan Pambansa, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all
citizens. Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in
common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all
citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to
cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. 3 When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance"
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant
exercise of jurisdiction. 4 As adverted to earlier, petitioners have not demonstrated any permissible personal stake, for
petitioner Lozada's interest as an alleged candidate and as a voter is not sufficient to confer standing. Petitioner Lozada
does not only fail to inform the Court of the region he wants to be a candidate but makes indiscriminate demand that

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special election be called throughout the country. Even his plea as a voter is predicated on an interest held in common
by all members of the public and does not demonstrate any injury specially directed to him in particular.
II
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or
rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XI IC Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this Court under
its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision which is the only known provision conferring
jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC. It is not alleged that the COMELEC was asked by
petitioners to perform its alleged duty under the Constitution to call a special election, and that COMELEC has issued
an order or resolution denying such petition.
Even from the standpoint of an action for mandamus, with the total absence of a showing that COMELEC has
unlawfully neglected the performance of a ministerial duty, or has refused on being demanded, to discharge such a
duty; and as demonstrated above, it is not shown, nor can it ever be shown, that petitioners have a clear right to the
holding of a special election. which is equally the clear and ministerial duty of COMELEC to respect, mandamus will
not lie. 5 The writ will not issue in doubtful cases. 6
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge
expenditure of money. Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this
power of the Batasan Pambansa may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel
the Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the holding of
special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the
matter must come from said body, not the COMELEC, even when the vacancies would occur in the regular
not interim Batasan Pambansa. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of the legislative body,
the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section
5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now Batasan
Pambansa, not to the Interim Batasan Pambansa, as will presently be shown.
III
Perhaps the strongest reason why the aforecited provision of the Constitution is not intended to apply to the Interim
National Assembly as originally envisioned by the 1973 Constitution is the fact that as passed by the Constitutional
Convention, the Interim National Assembly was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as
well as the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and the members of the Senate and House of Representatives
of Congress under the 1935 Constitution. With such number of representatives representing each congressional district,
or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no need for filing vacancies occurring in the
Interim National Assembly, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. What was in the mind of the
Constitutional Convention in providing for special elections to fill up vacancies is the regular National Assembly,
because a province or representative district would have only one representative in the said National Assembly.
Even as presently constituted where the representation in the Interim Batasan Pambansa is regional and sectoral, the
need to fill up vacancies in the Body is neither imperative nor urgent. No district or province would ever be left without
representation at all, as to necessitate the filling up of vacancies in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. There would always
be adequate representation for every province which only forms part of a certain region, specially considering that the
Body is only transitory in character.
The unmistakable intent of the Constitutional Convention as adverted to is even more positively revealed by the fact
that the provision of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the New Constitution is in the main body of the said Constitution,

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not in the transitory provisions in which all matters relating to the Interim Batasan Pambansa are found. No provision
outside of Article VIII on the "Transitory Provisions" has reference or relevance to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.
Also under the original provision of the Constitution (Section 1, Article XVII-Transitory Provisions), the Interim
National Assembly had only one single occasion on which to call for an election, and that is for the election of
members of the regular National Assembly.1wph1.t The Constitution could not have at that time contemplated to
fill up vacancies in the Interim National Assembly the composition of which, as already demonstrated, would not raise
any imperious necessity of having to call special elections for that purpose, because the duration of its existence was
neither known or pre-determined. It could be for a period so brief that the time prescriptions mentioned in Section 5(2),
Article VIII of the Constitution cannot be applicable.
The foregoing observations make it indubitably clear that the aforementioned provision for calling special elections to
fill up vacancies apply only to the regular Batasan Pambansa. This is evident from the language thereof which speaks
of a vacancy in the Batasan Pambansa, " which means the regular Batasan Pambansa as the same words "Batasan
Pambansa" found in all the many other sections of Article VIII, undoubtedly refer to theregular Batasan, not
the interim one. A word or phrase used in one part of a Constitution is to receive the same interpretation when used in
every other part, unless it clearly appears, from the context or otherwise, that a different meaning should be applied. 7
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

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# 8. SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
BUGNAY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. CRISPIN C.
LARON Judge of the Court of First Instance (RTC), Branch 44, Dagupan City, P AND M AGRODEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and REGINO RAVANZO, JR., respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Respondent judge is taken to task in this special civil action for certiorari for having issued the following
orders and writ, viz: (1) order, dated August 5, 1987, denying the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. D8696; (2) order, dated August 7,1987, denying the motion for reconsideration of the preceding order; (3)
order of August 12, 1987 for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; and (4) writ of preliminary
injunction issued on August 14, 1987.
The records show that on March 3,1978, the City of Dagupan (City, for short) awarded a lease contract 1 in
favor of respondent P and M Agro-Development Corporation (hereinafter, P and M) over a city lot called the
Magsaysay Market Area with an approximate area of three thousand six hundred ninety-two (3,692) square
meters. By reason of P and M's failure to comply with the conditions of the contract, the City filed on May 25, 1982
an action to rescind the lease contract with the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Dagupan City, Branch 41,
and docketed therein as Civil Case No. D-6157. 2 This case was decided on January 16,1985 3in favor of the City
on the basis of a "Joint Manifestation" of both parties, dated September 20, 1984. 4 Upon motion of the City, a writ
of execution was issued on September 26, 19855 ordering the immediate delivery of the possession of the
premises to the movant City.
Thereafter, on November 5, 1985, P and M filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.
However, it was only on August 17,1987 when the incident was resolved 6 by the court which set aside the
decision previously rendered on the ground that the joint manifestation on which it was based is not in the nature
of a compromise agreement for the following reasons: (1) the joint manifestation was not signed by the party
plaintiff; (2) the said pleading did not pray that a decision be rendered based thereon; (3) if the parties really
intended it to be a compromise agreement, they should have entitled it as such; (4) the parties agreed that the
joint manifestation is without prejudice to the continuance of the case, which is contrary to the very nature of a
compromise agreement in that it terminates the case upon the court's approval thereof ; (5) the joint manifestation
did not specify the "proposed terms and conditions" offered by P and M, hence it cannot be a valid basis for a
judgment on compromise which requires that the terms and conditions be spelled out clearly in order that the
court may determine whether they are in accordance with law, public policy, public order, and good customs; and
(6) the alleged proposals are subject to the review of the proper government agencies, which is not allowed in a
judgment on compromise wherein only the court may determine the legality thereof. 7 The City's motion for the
reconsideration of said resolution which set aside the decision rendered in Civil Case No. D-6157 was denied by
said trial court in an order dated October 26, 1987. 8
It appears, however, that on April 20, 1987, during the pendency of the resolution on the motion for
reconsideration filed by P and M in Civil Case No. D-6157, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Dagupan adopted Resolution No. 1462-87 "Authorizing the City Mayor, Honorable Liberate Ll. Reyna, Sr., to
Enter Into a Contract of Lease with Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation over that Parcel of
Lot owned by the City of Dagupan. 9 On April 27, 1987, pursuant to said resolution, herein petitioner entered into
a contract of lease 10 with the City over the Magsaysay Market Area, wherein petitioner agreed to finance,
establish, construct, develop, manage, operate, maintain, control and supervise a commercial center and a
modern public market building, paying a monthly rental of eight pesos (P8.00) per square meter, for a period of
twenty (20) years to begin from the date when the stallholders in the area aforementioned shall be relocated, with
the obligation to turn over, without demand, the entire market building and all attached appurtenances to the
lessor City upon the expiration of the lease period. Upon the fulfillment of the condition for the commencement of
the term of the lease, i.e., the relocation of the stallholders in the area, petitioner immediately started its
construction work.

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On June 15, 1987, P and M, through its counsel, herein private respondent Regino R. Ravanzo, Jr., filed an
action 11 for "Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, Annulment of
Contract, and Damages" against the City, its officials and herein petitioner, which case was docketed as Civil
Case No. D-8664 and assigned to Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City. In its complaint, P and
M averred that inasmuch as Civil Case No. D-6157 was still pending, its lease contract with the City continued to
exist, hence the lease contract executed by the City with herein petitioner is allegedly null and void ab initio and
an ultra vires act. P and M consequently prayed that petitioner be enjoined from continuing with the construction
of the market building. A temporary restraining order 12 initially issued by said Branch 43 on June 19, 1987 was
subsequently dissolved in its order dated June 30, 1987, 13 on the ground that no great or irreparable injury would
result to the therein applicant P and M if no restraining order will be issued. Thereafter, the defendants therein
filed their respective pleadings.
On July 17, 1987, private respondent Regino R. Ravanzo, Jr., professedly in his capacity as a resident and
taxpayer of Dagupan City, filed with the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City the present action for
"Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and Damages" against the City of
Dagupan, the City Mayor and herein petitioner which was docketed as Civil Case No. D-8696, and, this time,
was assigned to Branch 44 of said court presided over by herein respondent judge. 14 As party plaintiff therein
and, on the basis of the very same facts alleged in Civil Case No. D-8664, herein private respondent Ravanzo
attacked the legality of the contract of lease entered into between the City and petitioner, alleging thirty (30)
reasons in his complaint why the contract should be declared null and void, and prayed for the issuance of a writ
of injunction directing petitioner to desist from continuing with the questioned construction. On July 24, 1 987,
respondent judge issued a restraining order 15 enjoining herein petitioner from continuing with the construction of
the Magsaysay Market building.
On July 28,1987, the City and its Acting Mayor filed a motion to dismiss 16 on the grounds that therein plaintiff
Ravanzo is not the real party in interest; the complaint states no cause of action; there is another action (Civil
Case No. D-8664) pending between the same parties involving the same subject matter, issues, purpose and
prayer; and, in effect, there was forum-shopping.
On August 5,1987, respondent judge issued an order 17 denying the motion to dismiss. The motion for
reconsideration, 18 filed by the City was likewise denied in an order dated August 7,1987. 19
Thereafter, respondent judge granted the filing of a bond by respondent Ravanzo in the amount of one
hundred thousand pesos (Pl00,000.00), in his order of August 12, 1987 20 as a consequence of which a writ of
preliminary injunction 21 was issued on August 14,1987.
Hence, this petition.
We have recast, for brevity, the following determinative issues raised by petitioner for resolution, viz:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, when, instead
of dismissing the alleged taxpayer's suit (Civil Case No. D-8696), he instead issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent Ravanzo, in spite of the clear pendency of
another action between the same parties for the same cause;
2. Whether or not the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion when he
denied the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. D-8696, by refusing to recognize that the herein
respondent Ravanzo does not have any personality to file a taxpayer's suit hence he has no
cause of action against the defendants in the court a quo; and
3. Whether or not under the facts of this case the private respondents were guilty of forumshopping.
We find for the petitioner.

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This petition is a proper recourse from the assailed orders of respondent judge. While generally an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, where such denial was issued with grave
abuse of discretion or is without or in excess of jurisdiction, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and
prohibition will lie. 22
It is readily apparent from ajudicious perusal and evaluation of the pleadings filed in Civil Case No. D-8696
that duly raised in issue therein was the pendency of another case between the same parties for the same
cause; that in said Civil Case No. D-8696, therein plaintiff Ravanzo was neither a real party in interest nor
could he have validly maintained said case as a so-called taxpayer's suit; and that these considerations, in
tandem, virtually dictated that said case should have been dismissed outright.
On the pendency of another action between the same parties for the same cause, or litis pendentia as a
ground for dismissal, there must be between the action under consideration and the other action (1) identity
of the parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions, (2) identity of the rights
asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, (3) the identity in both cases is such
that the judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case. 23 This ground is also referred to as lis pendens or auter action
pendant. 24
In the case at bar, while it may superficially appear that there are two different plaintiffs in the prior case and
in the present action, namely, P and M in Civil Case No. D-8664 and Regino R. Ravanzo, Jr. in Civil Case
No. D-8696, there can be no dispute that both represent the same interest. It is admitted that Ravanzo is the
counsel of record of P and M in Civil Case No. D-8664. As seen earlier, after the restraining order in said
case was lifted and P and M's prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain herein petitioner from continuing
with the construction of the market building in the aforesaid case was not acted upon, Ravanzo personally
applied for another temporary restraining order and another writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the very
same act of construction, this time under the guise of a taxpayer suit with himself as the plaintiff in Case No.
D-8696. It is all too ludicrously transparent and readily apparent that respondent Ravanzo merely sought in
another branch of the same court, figuratively using the hat of a taxpayer, what he failed to obtained in one
branch, under the hat of a representing counsel. His allegation that he has no interest in common
whatsoever with P and M is an affront to the credulity and patience of this Court. He even belied his own
misrepresentation in the present proceedings before this Court wherein he appeared and filed common
pleadings for and behalf of himself and P and M.
P and M, through its said counsel, respondent Ravanzo, alleged in Civil Case No. D-8664 that it is the
holder of the previous lease award for the Magsaysay Market; that on May 25, 1982, the City of Dagupan
filed a suit to rescind such contract, the case having been docketed as Civil Case No. D-6157 in Branch 41
of the Regional Trial Court in Dagupan City; that a decision was promulgated in the said case on January
16, 1985 but it filed a motion to set aside such decision on November 5, 1985, which motion had not been
resolved; that on April 20,1987, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dagupan City passed Resolution No. 146287 authorizing City Mayor Liberato Ll. Reyna to enter into a contract of lease over the Magsaysay Market
with petitioner Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation and on April 27, 1987 the City
represented by Mayor Reyna, and petitioner entered into a contract of lease over the Magsaysay Market;
that inasmuch as Civil Case No. D-6157 was still pending, the previous lease contract in favor of P and M
was still subsisting, hence the City could not lease the premises to another party; that the enactment of
Resolution No. 1462-87, the execution of the lease contract with petitioner corporation and the construction
by petitioner of the commercial center all constitute an unwarranted and abusive exercise of power that
deprives P and M of its property without due process and is an ultra vires act. These are basically the same
allegations raised in Civil Case No. D-8696 with respondent Ravanzo as plaintiff.
There is regrettable vacuity in respondent Ravanzo's insistence that he is suing for "Injunction with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" whereas P and M's action is for "Injunction with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, Annulment of Contract and Temporary Restraining Order" which actions,
so he claims, seek distinct and different reliefs. Indeed, it is empty verbiage to deny that in Case No. D-8696

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Ravanzo is actually asking for the declaration of the nullity of the lease contract executed by the City and
petitioner, which is also what is prayed for by P and M in Case No. D-8664.
Undeniably, whatever judgment may be rendered in Case No. D-8664 will necessarily constitute res
judicata in Case No. D-8696. And, it is too entrenched a rule brooking no dissent that a party cannot, by
varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape theation of the
principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated. 25
The trial court, in taking cognizance of the purported taxpayer's suit, declared that respondent Ravanzo has
the legal capacity to sue since his interest as a taxpayer is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act of
the City of Dagupan, invoking the doctrine enunciated in City Council of Cebu City, etc., et al. vs. Carlos J.
Cuizon etc., et al.,26 to wit:
Plaintiffs' right and legal interest as taxpayers to file the suit below and seek judicial
assistance to prevent what they believe to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse public funds
of the city and to contest the expenditure of public funds under contracts and commitments
with defendant bank and Tropical which they assert to have been entered into by the mayor
without legal authority and against the express prohibition of law have long received the
Court's sanction and recognition. In Gonzales vs. Hechanova, the Court through the now
Chief Justice dismissed the challenge against the sufficiency of therein petitioner's interest to
file the action, stating that 'since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with
public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek
judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully
disburse said funds.
Contrarily, it thus results that the trial court's reliance is self-defeating since the very doctrine cited holds that
only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation
win the taxpayer's suit be allowed. The essence of a taxpayer's right to institute such an action hinges on the
existence of that requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.
We accordingly held in Gonzales vs. Marcos, etc., et al . 27 that:
It may not be amiss though to consider briefly both the procedural and substantive grounds
that led to the lower court's order of dismissal. It was therein pointed out as 'one more valid
reason' why such an outcome was unavoidable that the funds administered by the President
of the Philippines came from donations (and) contributions (not) by taxation. Accordingly,
there was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest.'. . . It is only to make
clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental
requisite for a taxpayer's suit. ...
Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality standing or interest are procedural matters.
Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping
with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of the Government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that
they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and take cognizance of the suit. 28
However, for the above rule to apply, it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. 29 Before he
can invoke the power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation 30 and that he wig sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. 31 It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to an members of the public. 32

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On its face, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the lease contract entered into between petitioner and
the City shows that no public funds have been or will be used in the construction of the market building. The
terms of the contract reveal that petitioner shall finance the project, the capital investment to be recovered
from the rental fees due from the stallholders. Furthermore, petitioner undertook, at its own expense, to
insure the building, to have the site cleared for construction, and to hire personnel necessary to prevent
unfair competition to its stallholders. It was likewise agreed that suits arising from and in connection with
said construction shall be at the expense of petitioner without right of reimbursement. Finally, the building
shall be turned over at the end of the lease period to the City of Dagupan as its exclusive owner, also
without right of reimbursement. No disbursement of public funds, legal or otherwise, being involved in the
challenged transaction, the locus stand claimed by plaintiff in Civil Case No. D-8696 is non-existent.
Forum-shopping, an act of malpractice, is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing
their processes. It is improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. The rule has been
formalized in Paragraph 17 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983, in
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act. Thus, said Paragraph 17 provides
that no petition may be filed in the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals "if another
similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court' and vice-versa. The Rule ordains that
"(a) violation of the rule shall constitute a contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary dismissal
of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or party
concerned. 33
This rule has been equally applied in the recent case of Limpin, Jr., et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
et al.,34 where the party having filed an action in one branch of the regional trial court shops for the same
remedies of a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in another branch of the same court. We ruled
therein that:
So, too, what has thus tar been said more than amply demonstrates Sarmiento's and Basa's
act of forum shopping. Having failed to obtain the reliefs to which they were not entitled in
the first place from the "Solano Court," the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, they
subsequently instituted two (2) actions in the 'Beltran Court' for the same purpose, violating
in the process the ruling against splitting causes of action. The sanction is inescapable:
dismissal of both actions, for gross abuse of judicial processes.
That both actions ought to be dismissed is further bolstered by the fact that Branch 43 hearing Civil Case
No. D-8664 also acted on the belief that the first action filed by the City against P and M, Civil Case No. D6157, constitutes a prejudicial question to Civil Case No. D-8664 as stated in its resolution of June 30,1987:
.....It is the considered opinion of this Court that the matter of Restraining Order, Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and other forms of redress to the plaintiff could be better treated upon
the result of the (sic) Civil Case No. D-6157 because should the above-mentioned be
ultimately decided in favor of the City of Dagupan, all matters to be treated in the instant
case will become moot and academic. In the event, however, that the P and M Agro
Development prevailed in that case then may be some of the matter (sic) raised in this case
should have been treated in that aforementioned case. Or some remedies are available to
the prevailing party.
Since the Court believes that there is some sort of a prejudicial question involved in Civil
Case No. D-6157, which may affect this case to a certain extent, then it would not be naive
to discreetly wait for the final determination of Civil Case No. D-6157 and therefore the
parties here should be treated in their previous positions status quo anti (sic) bellum. 35
Hence, as earlier seen, said branch dissolved the restraining order it had previously issued and does not
appear to have taken any further action in the case before it. On all the foregoing considerations, the
dismissal of both Civil Cases Nos. D-8664 and D-8696 is definitely in order.

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Respondent Judge Laron in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, supposedly relied on the doctrine
enunciated in Sabado, et al. vs. Cristina Gonzales, Inc., et al, 36 that a judge of a branch of the former court of
first instance, now the regional trial court, has jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in a case pending
in that branch, although a similar writ had been denied by another branch of the same court. This is a specious
invocation since in said case the parties involved did not engage in forum shopping by filing two cases based on
the same cause of action in two different branches of the same court. Involved therein were two actions with two
different causes of action, the first being usurpation of real rights by the defendants therein and the second based
on violations of a leasehold grant by the plaintiff in the first action. In the present controversy, as already
demonstrated, the same reliefs of a restraining order and preliminary injunction were sought apparently in two
separate cases which, however, are in a procedural situation of litis pendentia as to each other, with the same
cause of action and the other elements thereof.
However, equitable considerations and the practical desirability of and necessity for the resolution of the
issues raised in both Civil Cases Nos. D-8664 and D-8696 persuade Us that the dismissal thereof shall be
without prejudice to whatever principal or ancillary remedies private respondents may deem proper to
protect their rights by filing or availing thereof in Civil Case No. D-6157, or to be consolidated therein or
jointly decided therewith, as the proper forum for the adjudication of all the respective rights and liabilities of
the parties concerned. Consequently, and considering the public purpose of the subject matter in litigation,
the presiding judge of Branch 41 is hereby directed to act with all practicable dispatch towards the early and
judicious termination of the proceedings in Civil Case No. D-6157 pending therein and all such other
incidents as may hereafter be filed or involved in said case for the complete determination thereof.
Private respondent Regino R. Ravanzo Jr. is hereby reprimanded for engaging in conduct equivalent to
forum shopping with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be severely
dealt with. For permitting such a state of affairs to take place in his court, public respondent Judge Crispin C.
Laron is hereby strictly admonished to be more perceptive and circumspect in his judicial appreciation and
conduct of cases assigned to him, with the same warning in the event of a repetition of his actuations herein
complained of.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby:
1. ORDERS the dismissal of Civil Cases Nos. D-8664 and D-8696 in Branches 43 and 44, respectively, of
the Regional Trial Court, Dagupan City, without prejudice to the filing or availment of such remedies the
parties may deem proper in Civil Case No. D-6157 in Branch 41 of the same court;
2. DISSOLVES the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the aforesaid Civil Case No. D-8696; and
3. DIRECTS presiding judge of Branch 41 of the aforesaid court to expedite and terminate the trial and
adjudication of Civil Case No. D-61 57 and all other remedies and incidents that the parties may properly file
and consolidate for determination therein.
SO ORDERED.

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# 9 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in
their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for
being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed
his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken
his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also
a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said
Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the
Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years
of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not
be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on
the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a
candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein:

Page | 10

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... The election shall be held on January 30,
1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The election period shall be fixed by the
Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The
period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979 and terminate on January 28,
1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation
of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the
ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide
candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The question of
accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions.
Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlao does not
join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The
respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his
individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a
taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have
required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot and
Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely (1) the existence of an appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising
the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the
necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera 65
Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the
issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.

Page | 11

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52,
quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to
prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely
affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed
before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being
asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a
petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record
Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now Chief
Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for
in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is
said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor
charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective
positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal
nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in
seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule
enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works
(110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain
a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at
the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the
theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may
be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected,
but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys

Page | 12

raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez,
et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and
6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be
held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their
tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution
Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15
SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As
held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice,
this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the
legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in
appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate
case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of
action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural
regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being
entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed
in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in Gonzalez vs.
Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our
present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and
the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied
by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the
challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's
Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well
taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the
groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated
differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly
classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a
reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be

Page | 13

to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be
that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service
at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree
could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the
retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result
from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are
sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not
violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and
Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil.
1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it
may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando,
The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned
provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach. Courts are practically
unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs.
Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence
of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a candidate for office provided
they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first
provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence
of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should
be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally
defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one such
clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV,
section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with

Page | 14

guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually
placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which
carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence
(Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time
constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome
the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than
before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two
government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is
mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big.
52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of
the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared
as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired
elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to
run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing
that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 15

# 11 G.R. No. 171396

May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.,
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT
AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO
CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1 Superior
strength the use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be
vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty.
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases
involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of
the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions
that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional
validity."2
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria MacapagalArroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the
Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually
trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances
are void for being unconstitutional.
Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the
Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with
the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?3
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in
my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State
of National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine
State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over
a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;
Page | 16

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of
the national media;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance
including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in
government and their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right
the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute aclear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the
Filipino people;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right,
represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad
front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the
national media;
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including
hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and
their faith in the future of this country;
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the
Filipino people;
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National
Emergency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under
the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do
hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of
the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all
these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which
reads:

Page | 17

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on
the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and
suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as
may be necessary;
WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless
violence and rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency
has ceased to exist.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers,
leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners
counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to
the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of
the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not
respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting
the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence
San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny,
escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain
defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our
displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in
protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed
plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio
City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President
Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the
PMA parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province.
Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members
of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette
cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced
through DZRH that the "Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of
Edsa I."
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNPSpecial Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General
Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public
statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with
proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty."
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos
brother, businessmen and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo
administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic,
Page | 18

called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also
phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the
Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo."8
B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga,
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join
the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on
February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the
soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the
President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of
command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the
Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and
the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman
Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the
entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of
bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much
longer to end it."9
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North
Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing
rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted
personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of
the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the
groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing
its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan
and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the
directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro
Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.10
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet
members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP
and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and
undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the
streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities
related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political
rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are
cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and takeover of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of
protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang
Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging
at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge
clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water
cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants.
The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and
to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an
EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12

Page | 19

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of
their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S.
David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily
Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures,
and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed
inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police
District were stationed outside the building.13
A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the
premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong
presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing
down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not
follow "standards set by the government during the state of national emergency." Director General
Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are - if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5
and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner
Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of
the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering
the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not
hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage
when the national security is threatened.14
Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing
the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in
Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the
warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long
been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not
be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the
rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a
public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken
into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while
with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael
Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan
Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was
turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay
indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur
Ocampo,et al., are not being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has
ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded
President Arroyo as respondent.
Page | 20

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it
encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the
CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They
also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar
occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty
one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo,
Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a
declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling
out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and
a showing that there is necessity to do so."
In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and
the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No.
5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of
Article III, (c)Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and
unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really
a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of
emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017
"goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative
Code."
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
"unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed
under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances
prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should
be dismissed for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda),
171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it
is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has
constitutional and legal basis; andfifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression
and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking
issues which may be summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.), 171489(Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
Page | 21

a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
A. PROCEDURAL
First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review
enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation -The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political
authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously
or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it
in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate
the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is
the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22
But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts may
exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case
or controversy;second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.24
Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our
discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General
refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were
rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.27 Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot
and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to
petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in
the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no
rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."30
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts
in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest is involved;32third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.34
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the
instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the
Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the
Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has
the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and

Page | 22

the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents
contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into
account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided
"provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged
as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule
pointed out by the Chief Justice.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to
have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private
suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public
right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public.
He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a
"stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that
he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers
suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected
by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of
mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the
duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain
the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in
public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex
Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed inTileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show
that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has
a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as,Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers
Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix.48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta
v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act
liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved
to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding
Page | 23

its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a
chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.51
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury,
they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the
following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the
constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are
matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;
(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the
transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing
requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties
seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement;
(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in
their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of
Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v.
Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly
and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization
does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so
where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any
allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not
allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court
reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional
issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act."
In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its
leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of
Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a
usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to
petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be
devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
Page | 24

Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.


The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The
same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc.
They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers.
They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those
affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court
the alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran
Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful
assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing
to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of
the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the
IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by
the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient
to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court
declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there
are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no
consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality
will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances
prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown
that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the
transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question
of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal
standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question
which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of
Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The
petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net
This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving
as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
Page | 25

usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the
President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the
people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by
impeachment.69
B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases
Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President
Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his
Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v.
Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v.
Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political
questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75Barcelon and Montenegro were in
unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the
President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view.
There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to
inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From
the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances,
"under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted
to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is
vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court ofLansang was divided in Aquino v.
Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which
greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that
"in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the
very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is
answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."79
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at
bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "calling-out"
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly
a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority
of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It
speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82
As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that
"judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct,"
but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but
arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he
fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings."
Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017,
is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
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Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with
supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine
Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between
the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military
aid.
Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5
Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency
This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A
glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our
ensuing discussion.
John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of
prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law
enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action
necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act
according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes
even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of
prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its
abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other
remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to
Heaven."85
Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of
government in time of emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in
certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the
State
It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend
their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...
If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the
method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the
sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the
peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish.86
Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed
it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an
"appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid
perpetuation of the dictatorship.87
John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from
condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a
temporary dictatorship."88
Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited
government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and
attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional measures;
for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once
established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil
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purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a
remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it.89
Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution a
regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in
time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious
reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective
constitutional restraints.90
Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by
constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.91 Frederick M.
Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal
institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent
injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous
forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency
governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the
executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that power."93 Watkins placed his real
faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a
dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship should always be
strictly legitimate in characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any
given case must never rest with the dictator himself"94 and the objective of such an emergency
dictatorship should be "strict political conservatism."
Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating
power in a government where power has consciously been divided to cope with situations of
unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally
strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what
end."96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers,
to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means i.e., he must be
legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency
powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency
action must be the defense of the constitutional order."97
Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain,
France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of
"constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like Watkins
and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated
unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its
constitutional order
2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the
man or men who will constitute the dictator
3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions
for its termination
4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government
should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements
5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered
any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .
6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be
permanent in character or effect
7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry
interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .
8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional
dictatorship. . .
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9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should
never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .
10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it
was instituted
11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the
political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional
dictatorship99
Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than
did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination
of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating
committees.100
Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one
in saying that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an
authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional
theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort
the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal
sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering
emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the implication
of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of
constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:
A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency
powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H.
McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the
substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political
responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in
discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of
constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government
responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an
exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power.
He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of
government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant
difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished from "weak"
government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to
the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which
all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political
responsibility of government to the governed.101
In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from Locks
"theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwains
"principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance,
i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while
insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under
effective limitations and checks.
Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the
1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government
in the concept of Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial
powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is
supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each
branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does
not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in
times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in
the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate
within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.
a. "Facial Challenge"
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Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its
enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens.
A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes infree speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103
A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104the US Supreme Court held that "we have not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment"
(freedom of speech).
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and
"constitutionally unprotected conduct." InBroadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face
and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very
least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and
that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior
that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct
even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect
legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied
to protected conduct."106Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum
of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious.
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to
whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably
be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.108 A writer and
scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some
of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute
is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and
can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those
third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP
1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the
assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that:
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[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process
of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-byline analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly
unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed
law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is
unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is
facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it
is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like
overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in
all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand
the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017
Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:
"by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion"
Second provision:
"and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;"
Third provision:
"as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power
The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety
requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by
a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.

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The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the
least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the
Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier,
considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.
Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual
condition of the country.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every
act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power
when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the
power, the greater are the limitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a
"state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While
President Arroyos authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition
of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in
the words ofSanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases,
PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only
rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public
interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation
cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas.
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is
no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President
invoked was her calling-out power.
The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon
by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts,
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they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more
difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."113
In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It
is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute
critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to
secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In
fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call
by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be
used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other
purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra
vires.
Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b)
ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d)
issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commanderin-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely
an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing
or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among
others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the
powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local
Government.119
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano,
Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated
upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
\
Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was
lifted120 from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire
Page | 33

Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as
their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause
states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017
issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction."
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"?
PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in
executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative
orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to
depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government
shall be embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration,
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies,
bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special
orders.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot
issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.121
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of
the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these
decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military
to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
Page | 34

relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP
1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.
The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP
1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but
also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP
1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to
grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter
of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take
over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine
National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the
successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national
emergency."
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos
inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency
powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national
emergency" and toexercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President,
for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also
to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from
the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then
the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize
the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that
President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
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But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same
subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.123 Considering
that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national
emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency
powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section
23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot
delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not
be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.124
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking
over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers
generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held:
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision
of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the
President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers
under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The
executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of
cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of
war. Such cases need not concern us here.Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept,
we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in
order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nations lawmakers,
not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that
grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending
of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first
section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . ."126
Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers
to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency."
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Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of
existing danger to life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions
are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations,
classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a)economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and c) national
security.130
"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion,
economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide
proportions or effect.131This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:
MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of "national emergency" which appears in
Section 13, page 5? It reads:
When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural
disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency."
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government
service.132
xxxxxx
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national
emergency or could this be economic emergency?"
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133
It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and,
therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary
measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis.
"x x x
After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of
powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects
and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The
Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of
other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of
crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws
been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a
total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that
under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are
called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017,
this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority from Congress.
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Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist
warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor
can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by
Congress.
c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE"
One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military
necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that
in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, and of assemblyunder the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest
blow.
Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury."
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were
arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power
I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on
February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three
policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis
was PP 1017.
And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were
"turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th
Anniversary of People Power I.
A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from
theimplementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In
general,does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be
abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and
its efficiency to accomplish the end desired,not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is
merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights.
Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor
committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance
is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result
arising from its exertion.138This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe
declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were
so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time
ago.
President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are
"acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
the proper and efficientadministration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except
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between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.139 They are based on and are
the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object.140 For these
reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or
capricious.
G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."
Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and
which is invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is
still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of
terrorism.
In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not
only our country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:
In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of
the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and
against groups operating internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist
organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known
to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests.
The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the most
recent by the United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.
Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states,
by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.
The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom
fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further
be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson
Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a
few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later
became internationally respected statesmen.
What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts
from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?
Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a
consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has
been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by nonstate groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those
who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or
against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.
The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting
categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri
resistance groups who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan
the earlier Contras in Nicaragua freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist
camp or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during
the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States,
and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of
conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way because of opposing political
interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.
How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and
the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking
inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of
an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the
definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the

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rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not
of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa.
The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism
exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every
instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terroristsfreedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has
been the unavoidable consequence.
This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in
spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become even more serious
in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security
Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being
marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001 I the United States.141
The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the
police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet
the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them
pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered
that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the
corresponding penalty thereon.
So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January
16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying
The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive
Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following provision: "That one who conspires
with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force,
violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished byreclusion temporal x x x."
P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines)
enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define
"acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under
G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this
aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without
warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and
dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in
the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly,
they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of
terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what
arenecessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their
authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.
We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches,
seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant
or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person
and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to
issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.143
In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested
without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was
brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a
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criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push
him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No.
880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was
eventually released for insufficiency of evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
x x x.
Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During
the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting
officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the
invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the
rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if
he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also
stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known
whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147
But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against
warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.
Section 4 of Article III guarantees:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
"Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of
speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not
subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a
permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to
be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be
validly required.
The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right
to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and
present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor
General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v.
Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:
Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for
peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings
cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful
assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to
its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds
of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed
crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and
order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere
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participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal
charge.
On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the
members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on
the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units.
This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle
that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the
rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present
danger that the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or
convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local
government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice
and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were
not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at
the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a persons right is restricted by
government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair,
reasonable, and according to procedure.
G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom
of the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the
following: first, theDaily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives
seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the
morning of February 25, 2006; fourth,the search was conducted in the absence of any official of
the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at
the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael
Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell
media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards
and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not
subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend
a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio
networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He
warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that
violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is
threatened.151
The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section
8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section
9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and
democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of
Staff152 this Court held that -As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises
Page | 42

were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a
democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their
enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in
the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media,
are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen
that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say
on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was
subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot
tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens.
Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the
duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154
Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of
the Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that
the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus:
JUSTICE CALLEJO:
You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune
for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the
clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the
Tribune?
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and
these are inadmissible for any purpose.155
xxxxxxxxx
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those
past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and without any search
warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on
Proclamation 1017.
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the
police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper.
SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:
Is it based on any law?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.
Page | 43

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:


So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?
SOLGEN BENIPAYO:
Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say this, we do
not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can
sue and there are remedies for this.156
Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor
General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.
SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:
I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the
occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said,
a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility.157
The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and
"should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter."
The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been
exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by
the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which
violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional
and illegal.
In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is
considered an integral part of this ponencia.
SUMMAT ION
In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have
normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal
acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or
one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006
that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent."
Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now
be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP
1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17,
Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privatelyowned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as
Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017.
Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the
"necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and
made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While
"terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and

Page | 44

eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O.
No. 5.
On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the
warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on
media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the
whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative
sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and
given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations
have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any
specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.
It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are
ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without
unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic
state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet
they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.
Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing
political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without
surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary
power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the
AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President,
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national
emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration
does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should
implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet
been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless
search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 45

# 13 EN BANC
G.R. No. 191988

August 31, 2010

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, Petitioner,


vs.
JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, C.J.:
What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he
President shall not be eligible for any reelection?"
The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case present a temptation that
magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence
dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already been mooted by
subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional requirement of the existence of a "case" or an
"actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure
of making a grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding opinion.
The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the
President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines
in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held
on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed a
petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).1 His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
COMELEC en banc.2
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari3 on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing
of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that
is sought to be reviewed.4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for
the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of
votes.5
1avvphi1

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or
not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal
rights exists.6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. 7 No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon
by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.8 As such, one of the essential requisites
for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely
lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. 9 The Court is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.10 In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes
non-justiciable.11
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and

Page | 46

hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the
parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by
subsequent events.12
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly
elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that
elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his
"reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 47

# 14 EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32

July 30, 2009

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, Petitioner,


vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N. CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120,
seeks a reconsideration of the Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichongs
petition forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogos
petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division
dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a
congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
Biraogo prefaced his motion by stating that justice and constitutionalism must remain entrenched in
Philippine case law. To achieve this end, he maintained that the Court should reconsider its April 1, 2009
Decision. He also prayed for an oral argument, which he posited, would help the Court in the just and proper
disposition of the pending incident.
After an assiduous review of the motion for reconsideration, we resolve that the same should be denied for
lack of merit.
Most of the arguments advanced by Biraogo are a mere rehash of his previous arguments, which we have
all considered and found without merit in the Decision dated April 1, 2009. Nonetheless, in order to lay to
rest once and for all Biraogo's misgivings, we shall discuss only the relevant issues and revalidate our
Decision by ruling on his motion as follows:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The
contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she
lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that
ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was
eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of
the House of Representatives.
Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens.2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v.
COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and
after proper proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the
court of justice would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to
hold office. But, first things first.

Page | 48

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.
In our Decision, We held that:
However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with
Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings
by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge
may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration in the Civil Register:
1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
2. If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization
certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and establish his permanent
residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in
his native country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country,
shall be considered asprima facie evidence of his intention of taking up his permanent residence in
the same:
3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;
4. If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or
private high school recognized by the Office of Private Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of
the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring
them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization
certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior [now Office of the
President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General];
5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of
the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise,
use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, where the Court of First Instance judge motu propio and not in the
proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees of certificates of naturalization (who
had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to
procedural infirmities, the Court held that:
x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for naturalization were
tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction
of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the
procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5),
Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore
quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal."In other words, the initiative must come from these
officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization
proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the
naturalized citizens descendant.

Page | 49

Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of it, to hold an office requiring one to be a
natural-born citizen, be attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution. Proper
proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's
disqualification on account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process must be observed,
for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right to hold office as a Member of the House of
Representative but her constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put their trust on
through their votes. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who
has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for her bona fide,
without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then
qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. 4
lavvphil

These precepts, notwithstanding, Biraogo remained firm in his belief that this Court erred in its Decision and
that the COMELEC Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong should have been
affirmed. He even went to a great extent of giving a dichotomy of the said Joint Resolution by stating that it
was composed of two parts, the first part of which is the substantive part, and the second, pertains to the
injunctive part. For this purpose, the dispositive portion of the said COMELEC Joint Resolution is
reproduced below:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED
from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby directed to strike out
the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates for the said position, and the
concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN
SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any, until this decision has become final.
SO ORDERED.5
Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution
of the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not
suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC
should not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.
His argument has no leg to stand on. We cannot take a decision or resolution on a piece-meal basis and
apply only that part which is seemingly beneficial to one's cause and discard the prejudicial part which,
obviously, would just be a hindrance in advancing one's stance or interests. Besides, the COMELEC Joint
Resolution which Biraogo dichotomized was effectively suspended when Limkaichong timely filed her Motion
for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 13(c),6 Rule 18 and Section 2,7 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Hence, it cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained its finality.
Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution.
Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and
she was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009
Decision that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should
now assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:
x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
andassumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.8 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with
respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI

Page | 50

of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.10
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be thesole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
xxxx
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that Limkaichongs
proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from acquiring jurisdiction.
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted
with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. 11 The Court has shed light on this in the case
of Vinzons-Chato,12 to the effect that:
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath
of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth Congress); hence, the COMELEC
correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by
petitioner Chato essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's
proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET.
Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not divest the HRET
of its jurisdiction:
x x x [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his
oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET.
The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate.
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against respondent Unico
would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET from assuming
jurisdiction over all matters essential to a members qualification to sit in the House of Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or a petition
forquo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives. In our Decision, we ruled that the tenday prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification based on citizenship,
because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the
required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. 13 Accordingly, the 1987 Constitution
requires that Members of the House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of
their election but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's
citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period
notwithstanding.
lavvphi1

In fine, we hold that Biraogo had not successfully convinced us to reconsider our Decision and grant his
motion for reconsideration.

Page | 51

In a last-ditched attempt to muddle the issues, Biraogo observed that the Decision dated April 1, 2009 is a
complete turn-around from the ruling embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes which,
although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by fourteen (14) Associate Justices and approved by the
Court en banc on July 15, 2008. He decried the absence of an explanation in the Decision dated April 1,
2009 for the said departure or turn-around.
Such a position deserves scant consideration.
The Court in Belac v. Commision on Elections,14 held that a decision must not only be signed by the
Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to
wit:
[A] true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before
that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of. The vote
cast by a member of the Court after the deliberation is always understood to be subject to confirmation at
the time he has to sign the decision that is to be promulgated. The vote is of no value if it is not thus
confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even
after they have cast their votes, wish to preserve their freedom of action till the last moment when they have
to sign the decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they may believe to be the best fruit of
their most mature reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this practice, before a decision is signed
and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court,
remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves.
Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for
designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but in no way is that decision binding unless
and until signed and promulgated.
We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente. Indeed, if any
member of the court who may have already signed it so desires, he may still withdraw his concurrence and
register a qualification or dissent as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated. A promulgation
signifies that on the date it was made the judge or judges who signed the decision continued to
support it.
Thus, an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential
internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public. A decision becomes binding only
after it is validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if
some or all of the Justices have already affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from
the time of signing until the promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had
signed the decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one's vote, thereby preserving one's freedom of
action.
In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied.
This Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification
based on citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C.
Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

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# 20 EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989
MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET PRIVATIZATION
TRUST, MAKATI AGRO-TRADING, INC., and LA FILIPINA UY GONGCO. CORP., respondents.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
In this petition for review, Mantruste Systems, Inc. (or MSI seeks the annulment of the decision dated
September 29, 1988 and the resolution dated January 4, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated
cases of "Makati Agro-Trading, Inc., et al. vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No. 13929)
and "Asset Privatization Trust vs. Judge Job Madayag, et al." (CA-G.R. SP No. 14535) which set aside the
writ of preliminary injunction that was issued on December 19, 1987 by Judge Madayag in Civil Case No.
18319 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("Mantruste Systems, Inc. vs. Development Bank of the
Philippines, Asset Privatization Trust, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation").
Judge Madayag enjoined the defendants in. that case from doing the acts stated in its temporary restraining
order of November 13, 1987, namely:
... from approving the winning bid and awarding the BAYVIEW property, subject matter of this case,
in favor of the winning bidders, the herein defendants, Makati Agro-Trading, Inc. and La Filipina UyGongco Corporation;
enjoining the Defendants DBP and APT from taking physical possession of the BAYVIEW property,
or ejecting the plaintiff and its concessionaires, representatives and agents, from the leased
premises;
from terminating the Contract of Lease (Annex N); and
from disturbing and obstructing the plaintiff, through the defendants' designated security guards, in
the pursuit of its business in the leased premises, until further orders from this Court. (p. 18, Rollo.)
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
... Herein private respondent Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an 4 "interim lease
agreement" dated August 26, 1986 with Page 139 the Development Bank of the Philippines
owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel wherein the former would operate the hotel for "a minimum of
three months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP."
On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Launching a Program for
the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the
(acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization
Trust." The Bayview Hotel properties were among the government assets Identified for privatization
and were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for disposition.
To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the "interim
lease agreement." In a certificate dated September 18, 1987 signed by Ernesto S. Salgado,
President and Chairman of the Board of herein private respondent (Annex D; Exh. 2-APT) the latter
agreed to the termination with the following terms:
1. Thirty days from today as of the signing of this Certification, I will consider the
Lease Contract between MANTRUSTE SYSTEM, INC. and DEVELOPMENT BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES terminated.

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2. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be made available for inspection at all times by
other bidders.
3. The Bayview Prince Hotel will be ready for delivery to any new owners thirty (30)
days from signing of this Certification.
On October 7, 1987 the APT sent a letter to MSI through Mr. Salgado granting the latter an extension
of thirty days from October 18 "within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Prince Hotel to
APT." The extension was given to "allow (MSI) to wind up (its) affairs and to facilitate a smooth turnover of the facilities to its new owners without necessarily interrupting the hotel's regular operation."
The signature of Mr. Salgado appears on the lower left hand of the letter under the word
"CONFORME."
However, fifteen days later, or on October 22, 1987, MSI through its Executive Vice-President
Rolando C. Cipriano informed APT of the following points:
xxx xxx xxx
MSI is of the opinion . . . since its lease on the hotel properties has been for more
than one year now, its lease status has taken the character of a long term one. As
such MSI as the lessee has acquired certain rights and privileges under law and
equity.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . it is the company's firm contention that it has acquired a priority right to the
purchase of Bayview Hotel properties over and above other interested parties . . .
(Annex F, petition, SP-14535).
APT's response to this demand was equally firm. It informed MSI that APT has ". . . not found any
stipulation tending to support your claim that Mantruste System, Inc., as lessee, has acquired ...
priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel . . ." The Trust also pointed out that the "Pre-Bidding
Conference" for the sale of the hotel has already been conducted such that for APT to favorably
consider your (MSI's) request would not be in consonance with law, equity and fair play (Annex G,
Idem)
On October 28, Salgado, speaking for MSI, wrote APT informing the latter of the alleged "legal lien"
over the hotel to the amount of P10,000,000 (should be P12,000,000). Moreover, he demanded that
the Trust consider MSI a "very preferred" bidder. Nevertheless, on November 4, 1987 herein private
respondent allegedly prepared to submit its bid to the APT for P95,000,000.00 in cash or
P120,000,000 in installment terms.
On the same occasion, however, MSI asked the Trust for clarification on the following points: (1)
whether APT had a clean title over the property; (2) whether the Trust knew the hotel had back
taxes; (3) who should pay the tax arrears; and (4) whether MSI'S advances made in behalf of DBP
would be treated as part of the bid offer.
From there, the versions of the MSI and the Trust differed. According to herein private respondent,
because of the questions it posed to the Trust, it was "immediately disqualified from the public
bidding." The trust alleged on the other hand that MSI voluntarily desisted from participating in the
bidding. The property eventually was awarded to herein petitioners Makati-Agro Trading and La
Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation which submitted a bid for P83,000,000 (should be P85,000,000).

Page | 54

On November 13, 1981, herein private respondent filed a complaint with respondent lower court
docketed as Civil Case No. 18319 praying among others for: (1) the issuance of a restraining
order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private
petitioners, and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease; (2) the
award of the Bayview property in favor of MSI as the highest bidder. On December 15, 1937, the
lower court, as already said, granted the writ of preliminary injunction. (pp. 247- 250, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals nullified the lower court's writ of preliminary injunction for being violative of Section 31
of Proclamation No. 50-A dated December 15,1986, which provides:
No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the Trust in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it . . . Nor shall such order
or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser
from taking possession of any assets purchased by him.
The Court of Appeals rejected Judge Madayag's opinion that the above provision of Proclamation No. 50-A
is unconstitutional because: (1) it ceased to be operative in view of the 1987 Constitution; (2) it constitutes a
deprivation of property without due process of law; and (3) it impinges upon the judicial power as defined in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that:
(1) Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, by virtue of
Section 3, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) providing that:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed, or revoked.
(2) Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not deprive MSI of its property existent, and its belief that
DBP had declared it to be the preferred buyer of the hotel is "illusory." Its only "property right" was its
reimbursable advances allegedly amounting to P12 million (but denied by DBP in its answer to the
complaint) which, it may sue to collect in a separate action.
(3) In view of Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the
lower court against the APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of power, i.e., the power to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, for does not have a legally
demandable and enforceable right of retention over the hotel. In any case, judicial power is "not unqualified."
It may be regulated and defined by the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) and by law, and the
law in this particular case (Sec. 31, Procl. No. 50-A) provides that judicial power may not be exercised in the
form of an injunction against the acts of the APT in pursuance of its mandate.
The seven grounds of this petition for certiorari may be compressed into the following propositions:
(1) that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in substituting its own discretion for that of the trial
court on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo and to protect
Mantruste's contractual right to retain possession of the Bayview Hotel until all its advances are paid; and
(2) that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in holding that Mantruste's property rights are non-existent except its
right to the refund of its alleged advances; (b) in not declaring unconstitutional Section 31 of Proclamation
50-A prohibiting the issuance of an injunction against the APT and (c) in finding that Mantruste is to blame
for its failure to participate in the bidding for the Bayview Hotel
We find no merit in the petition.

Page | 55

While the well-known and basic purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
property subject of the action to protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting the same during the pendency of
the suit (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445, 452; Lasala vs. Fernandez, 5 SCRA 79; Rivera vs. Florendo, 144
SCRA 643), and that generally, the exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court will not be
interfered with (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, 232), the Court of Appeals however correctly found that,
under the lease agreement between the DBP and Mantruste, the latter's claim to a "patent contractual right
to retain possession of the Bayview Hotel until all its advances are paid" is non-existent. As the right of
retention does not exist, neither does the right to the relief (injunction) demanded (Sec. 3, Rule 58, Rules of
Court).
Furthermore, there is Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A to be reckoned with which explicitly prohibits
courts and administrative agencies from issuing "any restraining order or injunction against the Trust APT in
connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of
assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
While the petitioner decries the "probable injustice" that it will suffer if it is ousted from the hotel and
possession of the property is delivered to the private respondents as the winning bidders/purchasers at the
public auction sale, the greater prejudice and injustice to the latter who, after paying P85 million to purchase
the hotel have been deprived of its possession by the illegal issuance of the writ of injunction, may not be
glossed over. On the other hand, as indicated by the Appellate Court, the petitioner is not without adequate
remedy to recover its alleged P12 million advances on behalf of the DBP to make the hotel operational. It
may sue either the DBP, or its successor-in-interest, the APT for payment of the claim.
Mantruste's right to reimbursement for those advances (the exact amount of which remains to be
determined) may not be denied. However, its claim to a right of retention over the hotel pending such
reimbursement, is, as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals, "illusory" and "non-existent." A mere
lessee, like Mantruste, is not a builder in good faith, hence, the right of retention given to a possessor in
good faith under Article 546 of the Civil Code, pending reimbursement of his advances for necessary repairs
and useful improvements on another's property is not available to a lessee whose possession is not that of
an owner.
A lessee is not entitled to retain possession of the premises leased until he is reimbursed for alleged
improvements thereon, for a lessee cannot pretend to act in good faith in making improvements.
A lessee, in order to be entitled to one half the value of the improvements introduced by him in the
leased premises, or to remove them should lessor refuse to reimburse the half value thereof, must
show that the same were introduced in good faith; are useful; suitable to the use for which the lease
is intended without altering the form and substance of the premises. (Imperial Insurance, Inc. vs.
Simon, 14 SCRA 855.)
Petitioner's contention that he is a builder in good faith for which reason he may not he evicted
unless he is indemnified for the cost of his improvements on the leased premises, has no merit.
Knowing that his right to occupy the premises was temporary, he is deemed to have built his house
at his own risk. (Lopez, Inc. vs. Phil. & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., 98 Phil. 348.)
It is a settled rule that lessees are not possessors in good faith, because they know that their
occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease, hence they cannot, as a
matter of right, recover the value of their improvements from the lessor, much less retain the
premises until they are reimbursed therefor. (Bacaling vs. Laguna, et al., 54 SCRA 243.)
Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair
the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to

Page | 56

the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued Proclamation
No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and
the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this
instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out "the expeditious
disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof' (Proc. No. 50),
absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This
proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by
Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution).
While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation of
powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of
the Government is limited only to the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in the
performance of Page 145 their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Courts may not
substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and
the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets
transferred to it.
There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except
when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of,
or without jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that paragraph 2 of the Contract of Lease which provides:
2. The term of the lease is a minimum of three (3) months or until such time that said properties are
sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP (p. 1, Annex N of Annex A hereof; Exh. I.)
does not give Mantruste preferred standing or "a right of first refusal" as a prospective buyer of the Bayview
Hotel. That provision of the lease contract gives it only the right, equally with others, to bid for the property.
In any event, assuming that Mantruste did have that preferred status (for it was assured by Estela Ladrido,
DBP's officer-in-charge of the Bayview Hotel, that "all things equal (sic) DBP would be more inclined to sell
the Bayview property to MSI Mantruste lost that preferential right by failing to participate in the bidding for
the property. Its allegation that it would have submitted a higher bid than the winning bidders, is futile, for the
fact is that it did not submit a bid. Its excuses for failing to do so are unconvincing. The real reason is difficult
to fathom but the following statement in its petition
Considering that Mantruste has made capital expenditures of more than P12 million, then this would
mean an uninterrupted, peaceful and continued possession by Mantruste of Bayview for more than
twenty (20) years in order to complete the offsetting process. (p. 44, Petition.)
may provide a clue. Mantruste may have banked on its alleged advance of P12 million to keep it in
possession of the hotel for 20 years, without having to buy it at the APT's auction.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is
dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 57

# 21 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL,
JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR.,
ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional Regulation Commission so that it
cannot pass upon the validity of the administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit
the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like three (3) days
before the date of the examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this petition for
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation
Commission."
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission
to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent
provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall
receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III
of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for
injuction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to
restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the
lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from
enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for the nullification of the above Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the
Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:

Page | 58

WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated
October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is declared null and void. The respondent court is
further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila had no jurisdiction to entertain the
case and to enjoin the enforcement of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are co-equal bodies. Thus it held
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory Commission is at least a co-equal body with the
Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-equal bodies have no power to control each other or
interfere with each other's acts. 3
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on National Electrification Administration vs.
Mendoza, 4 which cites Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6where this Court
held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the two being co-equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why this Court
ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and Exchange
Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever
a party is aggrieved by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, he
cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act
No. 83, as amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers and functions of the old
Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review.
Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna, it was stressed that if an order of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then,
to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities
and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Professional
Regulation Commsision in the same category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the procedure that need be taken when one is
aggrieved by its order or ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course of action
for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike
Commonwealth Act No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential Decree
No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are
appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950,
which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation
Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional Regulation Commission is attached
to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is the

Page | 59

view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court). In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the
Civil Service Commission and of the residential Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be
no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this
conclusion:
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to
recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executives, the legislative
and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a
presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not to be implied
therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts.
The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior
to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the
courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the
President's decision on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of
Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the Courts
should be governed by the same principles as govern the jucucial review of all
administrative acts of all administrative officers. 10
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another case in point. Here, "the Executive
Office"' of the Department of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the authority
of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a complaint for injunction was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular would impair
some contracts already entered into by public school teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that
"the Court of First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is otherwise the clear and
explicit provision of the memorandum circular issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect
of law." In resolving the issue, We held:
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8)
because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a
legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .
Hence there is a clear infringement of private respondent's constitutional right to enter into
agreements not contrary to law, which might run the risk of being violated by the threatened
implementation of Executive Office Memorandum Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which
prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and disbursing officers from honoring special powers of
attorney executed by the payee employees. The respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to
take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right is allegedly
infringed by the administrative action of a government office. Courts of first Instance have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the Court of First Instance has the
authority to decide on the validity of a city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the
Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent
Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.

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Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the
Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards
of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as provided for in Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein
the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasijudicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicialadjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation . 14 This does not cover rules and regulations of
general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and
functions like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the
integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the
issue presented was whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an
order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party which originated from an
invitation to bid. The said issue came about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments,
decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of
First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the
Commission on Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its invitation to bid
comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly appealable to this court
on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or
proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order of the Commission granting the award to a
bidder is not an order rendered in a legal controversy before it wherein the parties filed their
respective pleadings and presented evidence after which the questioned order was issued; and that
this order of the commission was issued pursuant to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to
election purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was
not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent

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administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be
deemed as a "final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in
character, no contempt order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and
exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said
order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs. Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here,
petitioner Central Bank, like respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg.
129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate, for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is
among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose judgments are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court, "to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that may
review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or
orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to
the IAC. 20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 8637950 and enjoin the respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it imperative to decide once and for all the
validity of Resolution No. 105 so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be affected
by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to
preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to
conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an
examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any review center or the like or any
reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even
without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously
in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and
fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how
they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all
the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have
every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to
enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a
decision of the United States Supreme Court:

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The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison.
It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the
equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue
such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their
highest enjoyment. 23
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools
concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full fledged
public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical,
or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. At
this juncture, We call attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for
itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not
to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving
them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be
refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and
psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten
branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it
right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or
swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if
violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of
the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and
freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be
curtailed.
In the light of the above, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 10591 and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void
and of no force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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# 24 EN BANC
G.R. No. 191002

March 17, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the
coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to
many legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from
making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII
(Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be
filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being
considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even
during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? Does mandamus lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC?
Precs of the Consolidated Cases
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 1 and G.R.
No. 1911492 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to
submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief
Justice.
In G.R. No. 191032,3 Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from
conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice.
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus,4 the Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by
Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered
by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department.
In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC,5 petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a
ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments
to the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 191342,6 which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with the petitions earlier filed,
petitioners Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors
for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a
list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment during the period provided
for in Section 15, Article VII.

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All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President
can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly
impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is
any Presidents most important appointment.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and
Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela),7 by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited
the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal
luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two
months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as
President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to
executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the
appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom
to send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.8 He
opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself "the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the
Constitution," which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not
empowered it to "finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme
Court under the Constitution." As such, he contends that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
deferring the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that a "final and definitive resolution of
the constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go
a long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system." 9
In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search,
nomination, and selection process for the position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because
the appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, the Presidents authority
being limited to the appointment of the Members of the Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not
intervene in the process, unless a nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme Court. 10
For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No. 191057 that "unorthodox and exceptional
circumstances spawned by the discordant interpretations, due perhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of
Sec. 15, Art. VII in relation to Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution" have bred "a frenzied
inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional provisions mentioned that has divided the bench and the bar
and the general public as well, because of its dimensional impact to the nation and the people," thereby
fashioning "transcendental questions or issues affecting the JBCs proper exercise of its "principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary" by submitting only to the President (not to the next President) "a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy" from which the
members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts may be appointed." 11 PHILCONSA further
believes and submits that now is the time to revisit and review Valenzuela, the "strange and exotic Decision
of the Court en banc."12
Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC "to immediately
transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon
the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the
Constitution" in the event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during
the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution. 13
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy, considering that the "JBC has
initiated the process of receiving applications for the position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the
evaluation process for the applications to the position," and "is perilously near completing the nomination
process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the President, entering into the period of

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the ban on midnight appointments on March 10, 2010," which "only highlights the pressing and compelling
need for a writ of prohibition to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list, especially if it
will be cone within the period of the ban on midnight appointments." 14
Antecedents
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy."
On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be
commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution, 15 which reads:
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up
the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief
Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno.
It will publish the opening of the position for applications or recommendations; deliberate on the list of
candidates; publish the names of candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the applications; conduct
public interviews of candidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates.
As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on the matter.
18 January 2010.
(sgd.)
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA
Clerk of Court &
Ex-Officio Secretary
Judicial and Bar Council
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published
for that purpose its announcement dated January 20, 2010,16 viz:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application or recommendation, of the
position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, which will be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO.
Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not later than 4 February 2010
(Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat xxx:
The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine
Star.17
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC "automatically considered" for the position of Chief Justice
the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio;
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice

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Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two
declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.18
Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon,
applied, but later formally withdrew his name from consideration through his letter dated February 8, 2010.
Candidates who accepted their nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona;
Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice
Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales. 19 Declining their
nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on
February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr. (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of
the JBC on February 8, 2010).20
The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards
set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to
cases pending in the Office of the Ombudsman).21
In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of
the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any,
not later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate
Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate
Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star
issues of February 13, 2010.22
Issues
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance
with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the
position due to the controversy now before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in
quick step towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legal luminaries, but also among
non-legal quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the incumbent President can
appoint the next Chief Justice or not. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the
appointments of two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed this issue now before us as an
administrative matter "to avoid any possible polemics concerning the matter," but he opines that the
polemics leading to Valenzuela "would be miniscule [sic] compared to the "polemics" that have now erupted
in regard to the current controversy," and that unless "put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by a ruling
from the Court, the integrity of the process and the credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief
Justice, may irreparably be impaired."23
Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the order of the chronological filing of
their petitions.
G.R. No. 191002
a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutional question of whether the
incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period?
b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appoint during the election ban the
successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on
May 17, 2010?
G.R. No. 191032

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a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme Court en banc?
G.R. No. 191057
a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution applicable only to positions in the Executive Department?
b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution also applies to
members of the Judiciary, may such appointments be excepted because they are impressed with
public interest or are demanded by the exigencies of public service, thereby justifying these
appointments during the period of prohibition?
c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to include and submit the names of
nominees who manifested interest to be nominated for the position of Chief Justice on the
understanding that his/her nomination will be submitted to the next President in view of the
prohibition against presidential appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010?
A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC
a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to positions in the Judiciary
under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution?
b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the Judiciary after March 10,
2010, including that for the position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17,
2010?
G.R. No. 191149
a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo?
G.R. No. 191342
a. Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President without
committing a grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent
President from making midnight appointments two months immediately preceding the next
presidential elections until the end of her term?
b. Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the candidates for the position of Chief
Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBC's illegal composition allowing each member from
the Senate and the House of Representatives to have one vote each?
On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment
on the consolidated petitions, except that filed in G.R. No. 191342.
On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, reporting therein that the next stage of the process
for the selection of the nominees for the position of Chief Justice would be the public interview of the
candidates and the preparation of the short list of candidates, "including the interview of the constitutional
experts, as may be needed."24 It stated:25
Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing
authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme
Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next

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presidential elections and up to the end of his term" and Section 261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines.
12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution, the JBC will be guided by
its decision in these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter.
On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the incumbent
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement by May 17, 2010.
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal
function under the Constitution to recommend appointees in the Judiciary; (b) the JBC's function to
recommend is a "continuing process," which does not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination,
because the goal is "to submit the list of nominees to Malacaang on the very day the vacancy arises"; 26 the
JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it commenced and set in motion the process of selecting the
nominees to be submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice
Puno;27 (c) petitioner Soriano's theory that it is the Supreme Court, not the President, who has the power to
appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his misinterpretation of the phrase "members of
the Supreme Court" found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as referring only to the Associate
Justices, to the exclusion of the Chief Justice; 28 (d) a writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to
submit the list of nominees to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three
nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to
perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose principal function is executive, is not
vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has
no discretion to withhold the list from the President; 29 and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel
the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees, considering that there is no imperative
duty on its part to include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBC's
determination of who it nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty.30
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the
prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence,
pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; 31 that in their deliberations on the mandatory period
for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban
against midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa; 32 that had the framers intended
the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written
in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or
limitations on the President's power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence
from "political vicissitudes" and its "insulation from political pressures," 33 such as stringent qualifications for
the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a
Supreme Court Justice.
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges, the situation now refers
to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate,
Valenzuela even recognized that there might be "the imperative need for an appointment during the period
of the ban," like when the membership of the Supreme Court should be "so reduced that it will have no
quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question requiring expeditious resolution be
divided";34 and that Valenzuela also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in
the public interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of the
appointments during the period of the prohibition.35
Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to
appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is "quite
expected";36 (b) the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole

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judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President
and, as such, has "the power to correct manifest errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of
canvass (COC)";37 (c) if history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed
immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the Constitution, there is
now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice
Puno;38 and (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the selection
process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the constitutional mandate. 39
On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following comments/oppositions-in-intervention, to wit:
(a) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Peter Irving Corvera (Corvera); 40
(b) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim);
(c) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 23, 2010 of Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr. (Tan);
(d) The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 1, 2010 of the National Union of People's
Lawyers (NUPL);
(e) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Atty. Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano);
(f) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao
del Sur Chapter and its Immediate Past President, Atty. Israelito P. Torreon (IBP- Davao del Sur);
(g) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of Atty. Mitchell John L. Boiser (Boiser);
(h)The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of BAYAN
Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo; BAYAN Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand
Gaite; Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria Arellano; Alyansa
ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken
Leonard Ramos; Tayo ang Pag-asa Convenor Alvin Peters; League of Filipino Students (LFS)
Chairman James Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon; National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP)
Chairman Einstein Recedes, College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP) Chairman Vijae
Alquisola; and Student Christian Movement of the Philippines (SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela
Guevarra (BAYAN et al.);
(i) The opposition-in-intervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales
(Bello et al.); and
(j) The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 4, 2010 of the Women Trial
Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP), represented by Atty. Yolanda QuisumbingJavellana; Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip; Atty. Teresita Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena
Kasilag-Villanueva; Atty. Marilyn Sta. Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; and Atty. Guinevere de Leon
(WTLOP).
Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL take the position that De
Castro's petition was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is
constitutionally banned from making any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including
the appointment of the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC
to submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition is already in effect.
Tan adds that the prohibition against midnight appointments was applied by the Court to the appointments to
the Judiciary made by then President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty of the President to fill the

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vacancies within 90 days from occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the submission
of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional prohibition.
Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence that
Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent
circumstances warrant the appointment, because that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the
absence of a Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute disruption
or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They insist that even without the successor of Chief Justice
Puno being appointed by the incumbent President, the Court is allowed to sit and adjudge en banc or in
divisions of three, five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court is not
necessary; that petitioner De Castro's fears are unfounded and baseless, being based on a mere possibility,
the occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is not in the national interest to have a Chief Justice whose
appointment is unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation will create a crisis in the
judicial system and will worsen an already vulnerable political situation.
ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political situation in the country when the
election-related questions reach the Court as false, because there is an existing law on filling the void
brought about by a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice; that the law is Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, which has not been repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other law; that a temporary or an
acting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that the designation of an acting Chief Justice
is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated by practical necessity; that the practice was intended to
be enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, but the Commissioners decided not to write it in the Constitution on
account of the settled practice; that the practice was followed under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992, at
the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the
position as Acting Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that said filling up of a
vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used by analogy in the case of the
vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, perBrillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that
the history of the Supreme Court has shown that this rule of succession has been repeatedly observed and
has become a part of its tradition.
Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as
an election offense the act of any government official who appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in
salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee during the period of 45 days
before a regular election; that the provision covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a
government office, agency or instrumentality, including the President; that for the incumbent President to
appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban
under the Omnibus Election Code, constitutes an election offense; that even an appointment of the next
Chief Justice prior to the election ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because there can be no
appointment until a vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position can occur only by May 17, 2010.
Intervenor Boiser adds that De Castro's prayer to compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the
incumbent President is off-tangent because the position of Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a
list, much more a submission of such list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposed
advance appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will be unconstitutional; and that
no list of nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there is no vacancy.
All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section 15, Article VII makes no distinction between the kinds of
appointments made by the President; and that the Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the
President of the two judges during the prohibition period were void.
Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply only to the
appointments in the Executive Department, but also to judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of
PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as
applicable to judicial appointments.

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Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Soriano's contention that the power to appoint the Chief
Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief
Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at
any rate, the term "members" was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to
refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court; that PHILCONSA's prayer that
the Court pass a resolution declaring that persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but with
conditions, shall not be considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in the
body of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the relief prayed
for highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSA's petition; that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from
the constitutional prohibition on the President; and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow the rule of
law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only to the next duly elected President after the period of the
constitutional ban against midnight appointments has expired.
Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC - because it is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body has no duty under the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a
Chief Justice during the period of prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up with a short list, it
still has to bow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defer submission of
the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simply respecting the clear mandate of the
Constitution; and that the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not
violate the principle of separation of powers, because said provision is an exception.
Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBC's act of nominating appointees to the
Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no
default on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that the call for
applications only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the
commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice
only begins from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is no definite legal basis for any
party to claim that the submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the President by the JBC is a
matter of right under law.
The main question presented in all the filings herein - because it involves two seemingly conflicting
provisions of the Constitution - imperatively demands the attention and resolution of this Court, the only
authority that can resolve the question definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests on the everpresent need, first, to safeguard the independence, reputation, and integrity of the entire Judiciary,
particularly this Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily dragged into the harsh polemics brought on
by the controversy; second, to settle once and for all the doubt about an outgoing President's power to
appoint to the Judiciary within the long period starting two months before the presidential elections until the
end of the presidential term; and third, to set a definite guideline for the JBC to follow in the discharge of its
primary office of screening and nominating qualified persons for appointment to the Judiciary.
Thus, we resolve.
Ruling of the Court
Locus Standi of Petitioners
The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
Black defines locus standi as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." 41 In public or
constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the
petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct
any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices
involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.: 42

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The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 43 Accordingly, it has
been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal.
He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or
is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.44
It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,45 the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining
whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would
assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the
Senate,46 Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente,47 Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines
v. Felix,48 and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.49
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can
be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,50 the
Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same
way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.51
In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,52 this Court decided to resolve the issues raised
by the petition due to their "far-reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit.
The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases,
permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic
organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings. 53
However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional
executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general.
Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it
is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the
Court in the vindication of a public right.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That
is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities
nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,54 the Court
aptly explains why:
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,55 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is
in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public
concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:56 "In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan57 held that "the right of a citizen
and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his
injury cannot be denied."58
Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all
assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue

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of the appointment of the next Chief Justice. De Castro and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers,
with Soriano averring that he is affected by the continuing proceedings in the JBC, which involve
"unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds." 59
PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, non-profit organization existing under the law for the purpose
of defending, protecting, and preserving the Constitution and promoting its growth and flowering. It also
alleges that the Court has recognized its legal standing to file cases on constitutional issues in several
cases.60
In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states that he is a citizen of the Philippines, a member of the Philippine Bar
engaged in the active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General, former Minister of Justice, former
Member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa, and former member of
the Faculty of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that they have the legal standing to enjoin the submission
of the list of nominees by the JBC to the President, for "[a]n adjudication of the proper interpretation and
application of the constitutional ban on midnight appointments with regard to respondent JBC's function in
submitting the list of nominees is well within the concern of petitioners, who are duty bound to ensure that
obedience and respect for the Constitution is upheld, most especially by government offices, such as
respondent JBC, who are specifically tasked to perform crucial functions in the whole scheme of our
democratic institution." They further allege that, reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal
interest in the process of selecting the members of the Supreme Court, and in the selection of the Chief
Justice, considering that the person appointed becomes a member of the body that has constitutional
supervision and authority over them and other members of the legal profession. 61
The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the
controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental
importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone
(including the petitioners), regardless of one's personal interest in life, because they concern that great
doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring
incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too
great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any
petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of
the requirement.62
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to
remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We
are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than
otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,63 we pointed out: "Standing is a
peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have
been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens,
taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest." But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners "are
not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised." 64
Justiciability
Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no actual case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
adjudication, considering that although the selection process commenced by the JBC is going on, there is
yet no final list of nominees; hence, there is no imminent controversy as to whether such list must be
submitted to the incumbent President, or reserved for submission to the incoming President.

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Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination,
pointing out that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has already completed its selection
process and is now ready to submit the list to the incumbent President; and that petitioner De Castro is
merely presenting a hypothetical scenario that is clearly not sufficient for the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review.
Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castro's petition rests on an overbroad and vague
allegation of political tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are seeking a mere advisory opinion on what the JBC
and the President should do, and are not invoking any issues that are justiciable in nature.
Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no conflict of legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal
claims in any of the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not allege any action taken by the JBC, but simply
avers that the conditional manifestations of two Members of the Court, accented by the divided opinions and
interpretations of legal experts, or associations of lawyers and law students on the issues published in the
daily newspapers are "matters of paramount and transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general
public"; that PHILCONSA fails not only to cite any legal duty or allege any failure to perform the duty, but
also to indicate what specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does not even attempt to
portray the matter as a controversy or conflict of rights, but, instead, prays that the Court should "rule for the
guidance of" the JBC; that the fact that the Court supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the
Court can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition, because supervision involves oversight,
which means that the subordinate officer or body must first act, and if such action is not in accordance with
prescribed rules, then, and only then, may the person exercising oversight order the action to be redone to
conform to the prescribed rules; that the Mendoza petition does not allege that the JBC has performed a
specific act susceptible to correction for being illegal or unconstitutional; and that the Mendoza petition asks
the Court to issue an advisory ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to correct a wrong act by the
JBC, but to declare the state of the law in the absence of an actual case or controversy.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The
reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included
in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice
Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the
process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the
list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for
judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of
the short list of candidates, and the "interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed."
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy
has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its
process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which
unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court
(be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the
authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of
the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to
submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC
from submitting the short list to the incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted
instead to the next President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already prohibited under
Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10,
2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are only
some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy,

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considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17,
2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the
controversy will surely settle - with finality - the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving
on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of
the process.
We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for
judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a
constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the
occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a
challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the
issues.65 Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.
Substantive Merits
I
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides:
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states:
Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that
the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17,
2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does
not extend to appointments in the Judiciary.
The Court agrees with the submission.
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time
to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the
organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done
by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution
should contain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of
government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and
the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation
of powers that underlies the political structure, as Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a
worthy member of the Court) explained in his sponsorship speech:

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We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in government because
we believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and divide the awesome powers of
government. Hence, we return to the separation of powers doctrine and the legislative, executive and judicial
departments.66
As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections
14, 15 and 16 of the Article.
Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of
the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically
providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three
nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Although Valenzuela67 came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be
disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this
Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply
to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail.
Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:
V. Intent of the Constitutional Commission
The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses that the original proposal
was to have an eleven-member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the
number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any
appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed that any vacancy "must be filled
within two months from the date that the vacancy occurs." His proposal to have a 15-member Court was not
initially adopted. Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be
decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision
(anent the Court's membership) of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME
SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." He later agreed to
suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was
approved. As it turned out, however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it
was that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command to fill up any
vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence.
In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any "vacancy shall be filled within ninety
days" (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article
VII, which is couched in stronger negative language - that "a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments"

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The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member of this
Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph: "WITH RESPECT TO LOWER
COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE
SUBMISSION OF THE LIST" (of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide stated
that his purpose was to provide a "uniform rule" for lower courts. According to him, the 90-day period should
be counted from submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of the possibility that the
President might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the President of his appointing power
"two months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of his term" - was approved
without discussion.68
However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the
result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine
in the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, "a command [to the President] to fill
up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence," which even Valenzuela conceded. 69 The
exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the
filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President, viz:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice,
are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom has the
Court had a complete complement.70
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative, operating to impose a duty
that may be enforced71 - should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the
imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the
appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that
Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was "couched in stronger negative language." Such interpretation
even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations on
Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly warranted. According to an authority on
statutory construction:72
xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize
and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a statute, or any other writing
for that matter, which may not in some manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears to the reader
to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a

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definite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears to be on its face a conflict
may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favored over one which leaves
some word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word should not be given effect, if to
do so gives the statute a meaning contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if full effect
cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the
provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may
be that two provisions are irreconcilable; if so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers should
control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the
latest expression of the legislative will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved criticism. It is seldom
applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable conflict exists between different sections of the
same act, and after all other means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been exhausted.
Where the conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rule's application, largely
because of the principle of implied repeal.
In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate.
Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1),
Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored
that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in
the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats
the intent of the framers.73
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that
Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like
Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed. 74 It will not do to merely
distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with
what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the
unworthy and forgettable.
We reverse Valenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was
to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the
appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo. 75 In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so
observed, stating that:
xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for
buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made
within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
xxx
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight"
appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly
elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more
than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the
incoming President." Said the Court:

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"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of
deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and appointee's qualifications
may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction
of almost all of them in a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be
regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive
the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments."
As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to
be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and
so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly,
several appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were
upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only "midnight" appointments - those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by
their number and the time of their making - but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of the Presidential election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII - allowing appointments to be made
during the period of the ban therein provided - is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The
exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction
on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of
conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs
the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary
vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only
once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as
earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is considered
an election offense.76
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The
framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment
of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with
irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to
subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, 77 the appointments to the Judiciary made
after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior
processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the
purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment,
because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the statute,"
i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose,
and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it. 78
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for
the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The
experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at

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any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being
recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the
JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the
Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process
was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.
Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was
confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to
discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the Court of
Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that "on the basis of the
(Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of
Appeals."79 This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for
consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. 80
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice
Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers
rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the
President's power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been
dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on
the confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.
Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the
appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting
President,81 and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to
appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the
independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will.82 The letter and spirit of the Constitution
safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of
appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first and
second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments after the requirement was removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because
of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.83
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of
the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.
This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment.84 It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section
15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be
clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4
(1) thereof.
Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary
further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department
from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court
to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.
Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint

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the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can
also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President
does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by
June 30, 2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to
appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1),
Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article
VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice
Puno's retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy
in the Supreme Court.
The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-day
period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its
comment.
Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the
elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held
on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the
prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill
the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference
between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for
appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty
to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not
have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned,
nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply
to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.
Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is
necessary at all for the President - any President - to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from
the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:
xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
xxx
The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a nonmember of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those
who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the
JBC.
Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?
The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and
when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to

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consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile's statement that the President can appoint the
Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.
II
The Judiciary Act of 1948
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next
President appoint the successor.
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. - In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the
Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is
appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the
office of Chief Justice.
The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or
in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and powers. In either of such
circumstances, the duties and powers of the office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed.
Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court has hereby
resolved the question of consequence, we do not find it amiss to confront the matter now.
We cannot agree with the posture.
A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice
and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice,
and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea
that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court.
Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to
defy the plain intent of the Constitution.
For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied in an
acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section 12
of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet
appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office.
It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the
1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation
process might take longer than expected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate
Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and
Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the
leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief
Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire
Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire
Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal.

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There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the
incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist
that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the retirement and the
resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to and assumption of office of
his successor, on the other hand. As summarized in the comment of the OSG, the chronology of succession
is as follows:
1. When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18, 1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap was
appointed on the same day;
2. When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan was appointed on
the same day;
3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief Justice Andres Narvasa was
appointed the following day, December 8, 1991;
4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. was
sworn into office the following early morning of November 30, 1998;
5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban was
appointed the next day, December 20, 2005; and
6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
took his oath as Chief Justice at midnight of December 6, 2006.85
III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC
May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. 86 It
is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or
officer.Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.87
For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to
the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by
law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be
performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the
President for every vacancy in the Judiciary:
Section 8. xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

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For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the
submission of the list.
However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list,
in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC
should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the
occurrence of the vacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day
period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after
the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to
make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will
thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to
reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment.
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day period
to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to
the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should
only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary,
because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that
duty.88 For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in
recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following
manner:
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or
duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.89
Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of
mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still
has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.
IV
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the
Chief Justice. Hence, Soriano's petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the
JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit.
On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge
mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote
each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the
chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance
with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners' actual interest, because they have not alleged in

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their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the
petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149,
and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit;
and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief
Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the
Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.

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# 25 EN BANC
G.R. No. 191002

April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs.JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition
for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or
before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and
submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Motions for Reconsideration
Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and
Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBPDavao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.);
Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L.
Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also
filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed.
We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:
Soriano
1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate the Chief
Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc.

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2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not
involve a justiciable controversy.
3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex
officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member
of the Court.
Tolentino and Inting
1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments
from the express ban on midnight appointments.
2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions when none
exists.
3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an executive, not
a judicial, power.
4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the terms of
the clear prohibition.
5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has raised the
Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to be outside the
realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it.
6. Valenzuela should not be reversed.
7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal composition of the
JBC.
Philippine Bar Association
1. The Courts strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case.
2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply it. The
provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting
the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and distinction.
3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight appointments.
4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight appointments, and
the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the other, for the Courts duty is
to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be.
5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the
Constitution.
6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on statutory
construction holding that such headings carried very little weight.
7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on
temporary appointments to executive positions.

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8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates to fill the
vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of
nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants the Court only
the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do
it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC.
9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.
10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Courts directing the JBC to comply with the
decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election offense.
11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court
en banc.
12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed.
Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary.
13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing
Presidents powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is
undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office.
IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.
1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the
Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement.
2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional
Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the appointing power of
the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of Article VII
apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government.
3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases.
Lim
1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Courts exercise of judicial review.
2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other
appointments to the Judiciary.
3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against
midnight appointments in the Judiciary.
Corvera
1. The Courts exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is
based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and Judicial
Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on
the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity in Section 15,
Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the
Government, should have controlled.

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3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and physical
arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield to the
plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution.
5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the
Constitution.
BAYAN, et al.
1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable
controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of the Chief Justice
was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the
President.
2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice
Regalado.
3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the
principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole,
such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no conflict between
the provisions; they complement each other.
4. The form and structure of the Constitutions titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight in
statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation.
Tan, Jr.
1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and interests in the
present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the
Chief Justice has yet occurred.
2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict
with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one exception,
temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish, because the law itself
makes no distinction.
3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight
appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado
to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted.
4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any vacancy
lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has roughly the same
time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of
the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and
political uncertainty.1avvphi1
5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended.
6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive to the
JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense.
7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc, even when it
acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and VicePresident. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

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WTLOP
1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the
President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the candidates, because
it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or the Constitution; exercised
control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela.
2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to the
effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we should not
distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides
that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office
of the Chief Justice.
Ubano
1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation
2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its
provisions.
3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of the
Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous.
4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010 at the
latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the vacancy has occurred.
Boiser
1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary
appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments.
2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the appointee
beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the
outgoing President be continually influential.
3. The Courts reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare decisis.
Bello, et al.
1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is prohibited
from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the Constitutional Commission
support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial appointments.
2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in
accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules.
3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable
controversy.
Pimentel

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1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general intent of
the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of the rights of the
people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation should always
be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives.
2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to republican
constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without proper authority.
Comments
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus:
OSG
1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief Justice.
2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice.
3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary.
4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight
appointments.1awph!1
5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related matters.
JBC
1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the
time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and
because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the President.
2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the President to
appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines
the independence of the JBC.
3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its
implementing rules and regulations.
For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the JBC were
the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the
administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts:
1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate opinion.
2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over the JBC as provided by
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Courts adjudicatory power under Section 1,
Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was whyValenzuela was
docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to submit the
short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of
supervision over the JBC.
3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution.

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4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio
Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or
Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism).
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new,
have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010.
Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis.
First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has
erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1
The contention has no basis.
Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to
unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative
authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and
until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as
precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts
and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by
them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of
the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court
does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights. 4
The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with
a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a
rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges
make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not
always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a
subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning
and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability.
For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should
guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently
forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or
principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7
Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended
to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.
The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did
not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on
nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to
include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the
persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr.
withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication," 8 such that the
final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit:
Section 13. xxx

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The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure
be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the
Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction.
The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles
of statutory construction.
For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on
appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is selfcontradiction at its worst.
Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the
express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said
provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment
upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their
meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the
law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new
words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either
with or without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in
the language of the law itself.10
Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed:
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable
to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting
Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any
quarter.
Final Word
It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of
the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to
appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice.
The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair.
The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary
proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged
the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members
composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and
tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the
vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply
with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality.

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SO ORDERED.

# 26 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 118509 December 1, 1995
LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and NATIONAL BOOK STORE, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The issue in the petition before us is whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioner
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. and respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) covering the sale of a
parcel of land, approximately 3.3 hectares in area, and located in Barrio Bagong Ilog, Pasig City, Metro
Manila.
Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Pasig ruled that
there was a perfected contract of sale between petitioner and BPI. It stated that there was mutual consent
between the parties; the subject matter is definite; and the consideration was determined. It concluded that
all the elements of a consensual contract are attendant. It ordered the cancellation of a sale effected by BPI
to respondent National Book Store (NBS) while the case was pending and the nullification of a title issued in
favor of said respondent NBS.
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, it was held that no contract of sale was perfected
because there was no concurrence of the three requisites enumerated in Article 1318 of the Civil Code. The
decision of the trial court was reversed and the complaint dismissed.
Hence, the instant petition.
Shorn of the interpretations given to the acts of those who participated in the disputed sale, the findings of
facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrate basically the same events and occurrences. The
records show that on May 14, 1976, Philippine Remnants Co., Inc. constituted BPI as its trustee to manage,
administer, and sell its real estate property. One such piece of property placed under trust was the disputed
lot, a 33,056-square meter lot at Barrio Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 493122.
On June 23, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., a licensed real estate broker was given formal authority by BPI to sell
the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter. This arrangement was concurred in by the owners of the Philippine
Remnants.
Broker Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim of petitioner company who agreed to buy the land. On July 8, 1988,
petitioner's officials and Revilla were given permission by Rolando V. Aromin, BPI Assistant Vice-President,
to enter and view the property they were buying.
On July 9, 1988, Revilla formally informed BPI that he had procured a buyer, herein petitioner. On July 11,
1988, petitioner's officials, Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai, went to BPI to confirm the sale. They were
entertained by Vice-President Merlin Albano and Asst. Vice-President Aromin. Petitioner asked that the price
of P1,000.00 per square meter be reduced to P900.00 while Albano stated the price to be P1,100.00. The
parties finally agreed that the lot would be sold at P1,000.00 per square meter to be paid in cash. Since the
authority to sell was on a first come, first served and non-exclusive basis, it may be mentioned at this
juncture that there is no dispute over petitioner's being the first comer and the buyer to be first served.
Notwithstanding the final agreement to pay P1,000.00 per square meter on a cash basis, Alfonso Lim asked
if it was possible to pay on terms. The bank officials stated that there was no harm in trying to ask for

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payment on terms because in previous transactions, the same had been allowed. It was the understanding,
however, that should the term payment be disapproved, then the price shall be paid in cash.
It was Albano who dictated the terms under which the installment payment may be approved, and acting
thereon, Alfonso Lim, on the same date, July 11, 1988, wrote BPI through Merlin Albano embodying the
payment initially of 10% and the remaining 90% within a period of 90 days.
Two or three days later, petitioner learned that its offer to pay on terms had been frozen. Alfonso Lim went to
BPI on July 18, 1988 and tendered the full payment of P33,056,000.00 to Albano. The payment was refused
because Albano stated that the authority to sell that particular piece of property in Pasig had been withdrawn
from his unit. The same check was tendered to BPI Vice-President Nelson Bona who also refused to receive
payment.
An action for specific performance with damages was thereupon filed on August 25, 1988 by petitioner
against BPI. In the course of the trial, BPI informed the trial court that it had sold the property under litigation
to NBS on July 14, 1989. The complaint was thus amended to include NBS.
On June 10, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment in the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Bank of the
Philippine Islands and National Book Store, Inc.:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 493122 in the name of the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, situated in Barrio Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila, in favor of National
Book Store, Inc., null and void;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title
which may have been issued in favor of National Book Store, Inc. by virtue of the aforementioned
Deed of Sale dated July 14, 1989;
3. Ordering defendant BPI, upon receipt by it from plaintiff of the sum of P33,056,000.00, to execute
a Deed of Sale in favor of plaintiff of the aforementioned property at the price of P1,000.00 per
square meter; in default thereof, the Clerk of this Court is directed to execute the said deed;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, upon registration of the said deed, whether executed by
defendant BPI or the Clerk of Court and payment of the corresponding fees and charges, to cancel
said T.C.T. No. 493122 and to issue, in lieu thereof, another transfer certificate of title in the name of
plaintiff;
5. Ordering defendants BPI and National Book Store, Inc. to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiff
the sums of P10,000,000.00 as actual and consequential damages and P150,000.00 as attorney's
fees and litigation expenses, both with interest at 12% per annum from date hereof;
6. On the cross-claim of defendant bank against National Book Store, ordering the latter to indemnify
the former of whatever amounts BPI shall have paid to the plaintiff by reason hereof; and
7. Dismissing the counterclaims of the defendants against the plaintiff and National Book Store's
cross-claim against defendant bank.
Costs against defendants.
(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)

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As earlier intimated, upon the decision being appealed, the Court of Appeals (Buena [P], Rasul, and
Mabutas,JJ.), on August 12, 1994, reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed petitioner's complaint for
specific performance and damages.
The issues raised by the parties revolve around the following four questions:
(1) Was there a meeting of the minds between petitioner Limketkai and respondent BPI as to the subject
matter of the contract and the cause of the obligation?
(2) Were the bank officials involved in the transaction authorized by BPI to enter into the questioned
contract?
(3) Is there competent and admissible evidence to support the alleged meeting of the minds?
(4) Was the sale of the disputed land to the NBS during the pendency of trial effected in good faith?
There is no dispute in regard to the following: (a) that BPI as trustee of the property of Philippine Remnant
Co. authorized a licensed broker, Pedro Revilla, to sell the lot for P1,000.00 per square meter; (b) that
Philippine Remnants confirmed the authority to sell of Revilla and the price at which he may sell the lot; (c)
that petitioner and Revilla agreed on the former buying the property; (d) that BPI Assistant Vice-President
Rolando V. Aromin allowed the broker and the buyer to inspect the property; and (e) that BPI was formally
informed about the broker having procured a buyer.
The controversy revolves around the interpretation or the significance of the happenings or events at this
point.
Petitioner states that the contract to sell and to buy was perfected on July 11, 1988 when its top officials and
broker Revilla finalized the details with BPI Vice-Presidents Merlin Albano and Rolando V. Aromin at the BPI
offices.
Respondents, however, contend that what transpired on this date were part of continuing negotiations to buy
the land and not the perfection of the sale. The arguments of respondents center on two propositions (1)
Vice-Presidents Aromin and Albano had no authority to bind BPI on this particular transaction and (2) the
subsequent attempts of petitioner to pay under terms instead of full payment in cash constitutes a counteroffer which negates the existence of a perfected contract.
The alleged lack of authority of the bank officials acting in behalf of BPI is not sustained by the record.
At the start of the transactions, broker Revilla by himself already had full authority to sell the disputed lot.
Exhibit B dated June 23, 1988 states, "this will serve as your authority to sell on an as is, where is basis the
property located at Pasig Blvd., Bagong Ilog . . . ." We agree with Revilla's testimony that the authority given
to him was to sell and not merely to look for a buyer, as contended by respondents.
Revilla testified that at the time he perfected the agreement to sell the litigated property, he was acting for
and in behalf of the BPI as if he were the Bank itself. This notwithstanding and to firm up the sale of the land,
Revilla saw it fit to bring BPI officials into the transaction. If BPI could give the authority to sell to a licensed
broker, we see no reason to doubt the authority to sell of the two BPI Vice-Presidents whose precise job in
the Bank was to manage and administer real estate property.
Respondent BPI alleges that sales of trust property need the approval of a Trust Committee made up of top
bank officials. It appears from the record that this trust committee meets rather infrequently and it does not
have to pass on regular transactions.

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Rolando Aromin was BPI Assistant Vice-President and Trust Officer. He directly supervised the BPI Real
Property Management Unit. He had been in the Real Estate Division since 1985 and was the head
supervising officer of real estate matters. Aromin had been with the BPI Trust Department since 1968 and
had been involved in the handling of properties of beneficial owners since 1975 (tsn., December 3, 1990, p.
5).
Exhibit 10 of BPI, the February 15, 1989 letter from Senior Vice-President Edmundo Barcelon, while
purporting to inform Aromin of his poor performance, is an admission of BPI that Aromin was in charge of
Torrens titles, lease contracts, problems of tenants, insurance policies, installment receivables, management
fees, quitclaims, and other matters involving real estate transactions. His immediate superior, Vice-President
Merlin Albano had been with the Real Estate Division for only one week but he was present and joined in the
discussions with petitioner.
There is nothing to show that Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai knew Aromin before the incident. Revilla
brought the brothers directly to Aromin upon entering the BPI premises. Aromin acted in a perfectly natural
manner on the transaction before him with not the slightest indication that he was acting ultra vires. This
shows that BPI held Aromin out to the public as the officer routinely handling real estate transactions and, as
Trust Officer, entering into contracts to sell trust properties.
Respondents state and the record shows that the authority to buy and sell this particular trust property was
later withdrawn from Trust Officer Aromin and his entire unit. If Aromin did not have any authority to act as
alleged, there was no need to withdraw authority which he never possessed.
Petitioner points to Areola vs. Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 643 [1994]) which cited Prudential Bank
vs. Court of Appeals (22 SCRA 350 [1993]), which in turn relied upon McIntosh vs. Dakota Trust Co. (52 ND
752, 204 NW 818, 40 ALR 1021), to wit:
Accordingly a banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the representation is
made in the course of its business by an agent acting within the general scope of his authority even
though, in the particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to
perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person for his own ultimate benefit.
(at pp. 652-653.)
In the present case, the position and title of Aromin alone, not to mention the testimony and documentary
evidence about his work, leave no doubt that he had full authority to act for BPI in the questioned
transaction. There is no allegation of fraud, nor is there the least indication that Aromin was acting for his
own ultimate benefit. BPI later dismissed Aromin because it appeared that a top official of the bank was
personally interested in the sale of the Pasig property and did not like Aromin's testimony. Aromin was
charged with poor performance but his dismissal was only sometime after he testified in court. More than
two long years after the disputed transaction, he was still Assistant Vice-President of BPI.
The records show that the letter of instruction dated June 14, 1988 from the owner of Philippine Remnants
Co. regarding the sale of the firm's property was addressed to Aromin. The P1,000.00 figure on the first
page of broker Revilla's authority to sell was changed to P1,100.00 by Aromin. The price was later brought
down again to P1,000.00, also by Aromin. The permission given to petitioner to view the lot was signed by
Aromin and honored by the BPI guards. The letter dated July 9, 1988 from broker Revilla informing BPI that
he had a buyer was addressed to Aromin. The conference on July 11, 1988 when the contract was perfected
was with Aromin and Vice-President Albano. Albano and Aromin were the ones who assured petitioner
Limketkai's officers that term payment was possible. It was Aromin who called up Miguel Bicharra of
Philippine Remnants to state that the BPI rejected payment on terms and it was to Aromin that Philippine
Remnants gave the go signal to proceed with the cash sale. Everything in the record points to the full
authority of Aromin to bind the bank, except for the self-serving memoranda or letters later produced by BPI
that Aromin was an inefficient and undesirable officer and who, in fact, was dismissed after he testified in this

Page | 98

case. But, of course, Aromin's alleged inefficiency is not proof that he was not fully clothed with authority to
bind BPI.
Respondents' second contention is that there was no perfected contract because petitioner's request to pay
on terms constituted a counter-offer and that negotiations were still in progress at that point.
Asst. Vice-President Aromin was subpoenaed as a hostile witness for petitioner during trial. Among his
statements is one to the effect that
. . . Mr. Lim offered to buy the property at P900.00 per square meter while Mr. Albano counter-offered
to sell the property at P1,100.00 per square meter but after the usual haggling, we finally agreed to
sell the property at the price of P1,000.00 per square meter . . .
(tsn, 12-3-90, p. 17; Emphasis supplied.)
Asked if there was a meeting of the minds between the buyer and the bank in respect to the price of
P1,000.00 per square meter, Aromin answered:
Yes, sir, as far as my evaluation there was a meeting of the minds as far as the price is concerned,
sir.
(ibid, p. 17.)
The requirements in the payment of the purchase price on terms instead of cash were suggested by BPI
Vice-President Albano. Since the authority given to broker Revilla specified cash payment, the possibility of
paying on terms was referred to the Trust Committee but with the mutual agreement that "if the proposed
payment on terms will not be approved by our Trust Committee, Limketkai should pay in cash . . . the
amount was no longer subject to the approval or disapproval of the Committee, it is only on the terms." (ibid,
p. 19). This is incontrovertibly established in the following testimony of Aromin:
A. After you were able to agree on the price of P1,000.00/sq. m., since the letter or authority
says the payment must be in cash basis, what transpired later on?
B. After we have agreed on the price, the Lim brothers inquired on how to go about
submitting the covering proposal if they will be allowed to pay on terms. They requested us
to give them a guide on how to prepare the corresponding letter of proposal. I recall that,
upon the request of Mr. Albino Limketkai, we dictated a guide on how to word a written firm
offer that was to be submitted by Mr. Lim to the bank setting out the terms of payment
but with the mutual agreement that if his proposed payment on terms will not be approved by
our trust committee, Limketkai should pay the price in cash.
Q And did buyer Limketkai agree to pay in cash in case the offer of terms will be cash
(disapproved).
A Yes, sir.
Q At the start, did they show their willingness to pay in cash?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that the agreement on terms was to be submitted to the trust committee for
approval, are you telling the Court that what was to be approved by the trust committee was
the provision on the payment on terms?

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A Yes, sir.
Q So the amount was no longer subject to the approval or disapproval of the committee, it is
only on the terms?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, Dec. 3, 1990, pp. 18-19; Emphasis supplied.)
The record shows that if payment was in cash, either broker Revilla or Aromin had full authority. But because
petitioner took advantage of the suggestion of Vice-President Albano, the matter was sent to higher officials.
Immediately upon learning that payment on terms was frozen and/or denied, Limketkai exercised his right
within the period given to him and tendered payment in full. The BPI rejected the payment.
In its Comment and Memorandum, respondent NBS cites Ang Yu Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals (238 SCRA
602 [1994]) to bolster its case. Contrarywise, it would seem that the legal principles found in said case
strengthen and support petitioner's submission that the contract was perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the parties.
The negotiation or preparation stage started with the authority given by Philippine Remnants to BPI to sell
the lot, followed by (a) the authority given by BPI and confirmed by Philippine Remnants to broker Revilla to
sell the property, (b) the offer to sell to Limketkai, (c) the inspection of the property and finally (d) the
negotiations with Aromin and Albano at the BPI offices.
The perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for BPI, agreed to sell and Alfonso
Lim with Albino Limketkai, acting for petitioner Limketkai, agreed to buy the disputed lot at P1,000.00 per
square meter. Aside from this there was the earlier agreement between petitioner and the authorized broker.
There was a concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object, and on the cause thereof.
The phases that a contract goes through may be summarized as follows:
a. preparation, conception or generation, which is the period of negotiation and bargaining,
ending at the moment of agreement of the parties;
b. perfection or birth of the contract, which is the moment when the parties come to agree on
the terms of the contract; and
c. consummation or death, which is the fulfillment or performance of the terms agreed upon
in the contract (Toyota Shaw, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116650, May 23, 1995).
But in more graphic prose, we turn to Ang Yu Asuncion, per Justice Vitug:
. . . A contract undergoes various stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its
perfection and, finally, its consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the
prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is
concluded (perfected). Theperfection of the contract takes place upon the concurrence of the
essential elements thereof. A contract which is consensual as to perfection is so established
upon a mere meeting of minds, i.e., the concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object
and on the cause thereof. A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the delivery of
the object of the agreement, as in a pledge orcommodatum, is commonly referred to as
a real contract. In a solemn contract, compliance with certain formalities prescribed by law,
such as in a donation of real property, is essential in order to make the act valid, the
prescribed form being thereby an essential element thereof. The stage of consummation

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begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract culminating
in the extinguishment thereof.
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to which the topic for discussion about the
case at bench belongs, the contract is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates
himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another,
called the buyer, over which the latter agrees.
(238 SCRA 602; 611 [1994].)
In Villonco Realty Company vs. Bormaheco (65 SCRA 352 [1975]), bearing factual antecendents similar to
this case, the Court, through Justice Aquino (later to be Chief Justice), quoting authorities, upheld the
perfection of the contract of sale thusly:
The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of
contracts. (Art. 1475,Ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the
cause which are to constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute. A qualified acceptance constitutes a counter-offer (Art. 1319, Civil Code). "An
acceptance may be express or implied." (Art. 1320, Civil Code).
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that an acceptance may contain a request for certain changes in the terms of the
offer and yet be a binding acceptance. "So long as it is clear that the meaning of the
acceptance is positively and unequivocally to accept the offer, whether such request is
granted or not, a contract is formed." (Stuart vs. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 105 Fed. 2nd 965,
citing Sec. 79, Williston on Contracts).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the vendor's change in a phrase of the offer to purchase, which change does not
essentially change the terms of the offer, does not amount to a rejection of the offer and the
tender or a counter-offer. (Stuart vs. Franklin Life Ins. Co., supra.)
(at pp. 362-363; 365-366.)
In the case at bench, the allegation of NBS that there was no concurrence of the offer and acceptance upon
the cause of the contract is belied by the testimony of the very BPI official with whom the contract was
perfected. Aromin and Albano concluded the sale for BPI. The fact that the deed of sale still had to be signed
and notarized does not mean that no contract had already been perfected. A sale of land is valid regardless
of the form it may have been entered into (Claudel vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 113, 119 [1991]). The
requisite form under Article 1458 of the Civil Code is merely for greater efficacy or convenience and the
failure to comply therewith does not affect the validity and binding effect of the act between the parties
(Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Revised Edition, p. 552). If the law requires a
document or other special form, as in the sale of real property, the contracting parties may compel each
other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. Their right may be exercised
simultaneously with action upon the contract (Article 1359, Civil Code).

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Regarding the admissibility and competence of the evidence adduced by petitioner, respondent Court of
Appeals ruled that because the sale involved real property, the statute of frauds is applicable.
In any event, petitioner cites Abrenica vs. Gonda (34 Phil. 739 [1916]) wherein it was held that contracts
infringing the Statute of Frauds are ratified when the defense fails to object, or asks questions on crossexamination. The succinct words of Justice Araullo still ring in judicial cadence:
As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the testimony of the plaintiff
with respect to the contract; and as the motion to strike out said evidence came too late; and,
furthermore, as the defendants themselves, by the cross-questions put by their counsel to
the witnesses in respect to said contract, tacitly waived their right to have it stricken out, that
evidence, therefore, cannot be considered either inadmissible or illegal, and court, far from
having erred in taking it into consideration and basing his judgment thereon, notwithstanding
the fact that it was ordered to be stricken out during the trial, merely corrected the error he
committed in ordering it to be so stricken out and complied with the rules of procedure
hereinbefore cited.
(at p. 748.)
In the instant case, counsel for respondents cross-examined petitioner's witnesses at length on the contract
itself, the purchase price, the tender of cash payment, the authority of Aromin and Revilla, and other details
of the litigated contract. Under the Abrenica rule (reiterated in a number of cases, among them Talosig vs.
Vda. de Nieba 43 SCRA 472 [1972]), even assuming that parol evidence was initially inadmissible, the same
became competent and admissible because of the cross-examination, which elicited evidence proving the
evidence of a perfected contract. The cross-examination on the contract is deemed a waiver of the defense
of the Statute of Frauds (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Revised Edition, supra,
p. 563).
The reason for the rule is that as pointed out in Abrenica "if the answers of those witnesses were stricken
out, the cross-examination could have no object whatsoever, and if the questions were put to the witnesses
and answered by them, they could only be taken into account by connecting them with the answers given by
those witnesses on direct examination" (pp. 747-748).
Moreover, under Article 1403 of the Civil Code, an exception to the unenforceability of contracts pursuant to
the Statute of Frauds is the existence of a written note or memorandum evidencing the contract. The
memorandum may be found in several writings, not necessarily in one document. The memorandum or
memoranda is/are written evidence that such a contract was entered into.
We cite the findings of the trial court on this matter:
In accordance with the provisions of Art. 1403 of the Civil Code, the existence of a written contract of
the sale is not necessary so long as the agreement to sell real property is evidenced by a written
note or memorandum, embodying the essentials of the contract and signed by the party charged or
his agent. Thus, it has been held:
The Statute of Frauds, embodied in Article 1403 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines,does not require that the contract itself be written. The plain test of Article
1403, Paragraph (2) is clear that a written note or memorandum, embodying the
essentials of the contract and signed by the party charged, or his agent suffices to
make the verbal agreement enforceable, taking it out of the operation of the statute.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

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In the case at bar, the complaint in its paragraph 3 pleads that the deal had been
closed by letter and telegram (Record on Appeal, p. 2), and the letter referred to was
evidently the one copy of which was appended as Exhibit A to plaintiffs opposition to
the motion to dismiss. The letter, transcribed above in part, together with the one
marked as Appendix B, constitute an adequate memorandum of the transaction.
They are signed by the defendant-appellant; refer to the property sold as a Lot in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, covered by T.C.T. No. 62, give its area as 1,825 square
meters and the purchase price of four (P4.00) pesos per square meter payable in
cash. We have in them, therefore, all the essential terms of the contract and they
satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
(Footnote 26, Paredes vs. Espino, 22 SCRA 1000 [1968]).
While there is no written contract of sale of the Pasig property executed by BPI in favor of plaintiff,
there are abundant notes and memoranda extant in the records of this case evidencing the elements
of a perfected contract. There is Exhibit P, the letter of Kenneth Richard Awad addressed to Roland
Aromin, authorizing the sale of the subject property at the price of P1,000.00 per square meter giving
2% commission to the broker and instructing that the sale be on cash basis. Concomitantly, on the
basis of the instruction of Mr. Awad, (Exh. P), an authority to sell, (Exh. B) was issued by BPI to
Pedro Revilla, Jr., representing Assetrade Co., authorizing the latter to sell the property at the initial
quoted price of P1,000.00 per square meter which was altered on an unaccepted offer by
Technoland. After the letter authority was issued to Mr. Revilla, a letter authority was signed by Mr.
Aromin allowing the buyer to enter the premises of the property to inspect the same (Exh. C). On
July 9, 1988, Pedro Revilla, Jr., acting as agent of BPI, wrote a letter to BPI informing it that he had
procured a buyer in the name of Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. with offices at Limketkai Bldg.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, represented by its Exec. Vice-President, Alfonso Lim (Exh. D).
On July 11, 1988, the plaintiff, through Alfonso Lim, wrote a letter to the bank, through Merlin Albano,
confirming their transaction regarding the purchase of the subject property (Exh. E). On July 18,
1988, the plaintiff tendered upon the officials of the bank a check for P33,056,000.00 covered by
Check No. CA510883, dated July 18, 1988. On July 1, 1988, Alfonso Zamora instructed Mr. Aromin
in a letter to resubmit new offers only if there is no transaction closed with Assetrade Co. (Exh. S).
Combining all these notes and memoranda, the Court is convinced of the existence of perfected
contract of sale. Aptly, the Supreme Court, citing American cases with approval, held:
No particular form of language or instrument is necessary to constitute a
memorandum or note in writing under the statute of frauds; any document or writing,
formal or informal, written either for the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract
or for another purpose, which satisfies all the requirements of the statute as to
contents and signature, as discussed respectively infra secs. 178-200,
and infra secs. 201-205, is a sufficient memorandum or note. A memorandum may
be written as well with lead pencil as with pen and ink. It may also be filled in on a
printed form. (37 C.J.S., 653-654).
The note or memorandum required by the statute of frauds need not be contained in
a single document, nor, when contained in two or more papers, need each paper be
sufficient as to contents and signature to satisfy the statute. Two or more writings
properly connected may be considered together, matters missing or uncertain in one
may be supplied or rendered certain by another, and their sufficiency will depend on
whether, taken together, they meet the requirements of the statute as to contents and
the requirements of the statutes as to signature, as considered
respectively infra secs. 179-200 and secs. 201-215.
(pp. 460-463, Original RTC Record).

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The credibility of witnesses is also decisive in this case. The trial court directly observed the demeanor and
manner of testifying of the witnesses while the Court of Appeals relied merely on the transcript of
stenographic notes.
In this regard, the court of origin had this to say:
Apart from weighing the merits of the evidence of the parties, the Court had occasion to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses they presented. This is one important factor that inclined the Court to
believe in the version given by the plaintiff because its witnesses, including hostile witness Roland V.
Aromin, an assistant vice-president of the bank, were straightforward, candid and unhesitating in
giving their respective testimonies. Upon the other hand, the witnesses of BPI were evasive, less
than candid and hesitant in giving their answers to cross examination questions. Moreover, the
witnesses for BPI and NBS contradicted each other. Fernando Sison III insisted that the authority to
sell issued to Mr. Revilla was merely an evidence by which a broker may convince a prospective
buyer that he had authority to offer the property mentioned therein for sale and did not bind the bank.
On the contrary, Alfonso Zamora, a Senior Vice-President of the bank, admitted that the authority to
sell issued to Mr. Pedro Revilla, Jr. was valid, effective and binding upon the bank being signed by
two class "A" signatories and that the bank cannot back out from its commitment in the authority to
sell to Mr. Revilla.
While Alfredo Ramos of NBS insisted that he did not know personally and was not acquainted with
Edmundo Barcelon, the latter categorically admitted that Alfredo Ramos was his friend and that they
have even discussed in one of the luncheon meetings the matter of the sale of the Pasig property to
NBS. George Feliciano emphatically said that he was not a consultant of Mr. Ramos nor was he
connected with him in any manner, but his calling card states that he was a consultant to the
chairman of the Pacific Rim Export and Holdings Corp. whose chairman is Alfredo Ramos. This
deliberate act of Mr. Feliciano of concealing his being a consultant to Mr. Alfredo Ramos evidently
was done by him to avoid possible implication that he committed some underhanded maneuvers in
manipulating to have the subject property sold to NBS, instead of being sold to the plaintiff.
(pp. 454-455, Original RTC Record.)
On the matter of credibility of witnesses where the findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals and the
trial court are contrary to each other, the pronouncement of the Court in Serrano vs. Court of Appeals (196
SCRA 107 [1991]) bears stressing:
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their
candor or lack thereof. While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not rule on the issue of credibility of
witnesses, that being a question of fact not properly raised in a petition under Rule 45, the Court has
undertaken to do so in exceptional situations where, for instance, as here, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals arrived at divergent conclusions on questions of fact and the credibility of
witnesses.
(at p. 110.)
On the fourth question of whether or not NBS is an innocent purchaser for value, the record shows that it is
not. It acted in bad faith.
Respondent NBS ignored the notice of lis pendens annotated on the title when it bought the lot. It was the
willingness and design of NBS to buy property already sold to another party which led BPI to dishonor the
contract with Limketkai.

Page | 104

Petitioner cites several badges of fraud indicating that BPI and NBS conspired to prevent petitioner from
paying the agreed price and getting possession of the property:
1. The sale was supposed to be done through an authorized broker, but top officials of BPI personally and
directly took over this particular sale when a close friend became interested.
2. BPI Senior Vice President Edmundo Barcelon admitted that NBS's President, Alfredo Ramos, was his
friend; that they had lunch meetings before this incident and discussed NBS's purchase of the lot. Barcelon's
father was a business associate of Ramos.
3. George Feliciano, in behalf of NBS, offered P5 million and later P7 million if petitioner would drop the case
and give up the lot. Feliciano went to petitioner's office and haggled with Alfonso Lim but failed to convince
him inspite of various and increasing offers.
4. In a place where big and permanent buildings abound, NBS had constructed only a warehouse marked by
easy portability. The warehouse is bolted to its foundations and can easily be dismantled.
It is the very nature of the deed of absolute sale between BPI and NBS which, however, clearly negates any
allegation of good faith on the part of the buyer. Instead of the vendee insisting that the vendor guarantee its
title to the land and recognize the right of the vendee to proceed against the vendor if the title to the land
turns out to be defective as when the land belongs to another person, the reverse is found in the deed of
sale between BPI and NBS. Any losses which NBS may incur in the event the title turns out to be vested in
another person are to be borne by NBS alone. BPI is expressly freed under the contract from any recourse
of NBS against it should BPI's title be found defective.
NBS, in its reply memorandum, does not refute or explain the above circumstance squarely. It simply cites
the badges of fraud mentioned in Oria vs. McMicking (21 Phil. 243 [1912]) and argues that the enumeration
there is exclusive. The decision in said case plainly states "the following are some of the circumstances
attending sales which have been denominated by courts (as) badges of fraud." There are innumerable
situations where fraud is manifested. One enumeration in a 1912 decision cannot possibly cover all
indications of fraud from that time up to the present and into the future.
The Court of Appeals did not discuss the issue of damages. Petitioner cites the fee for filing the amended
complaint to implead NBS, sheriffs fees, registration fees, plane fare and hotel expenses of Cebu-based
counsel. Petitioner also claimed, and the trial court awarded, damages for the profits and opportunity losses
caused to petitioner's business in the amount of P10,000,000.00.
We rule that the profits and the use of the land which were denied to petitioner because of the noncompliance or interference with a solemn obligation by respondents is somehow made up by the
appreciation in land values in the meantime.
Prescinding from the above, we rule that there was a perfected contract between BPI and petitioner
Limketkai; that the BPI officials who transacted with petitioner had full authority to bind the bank; that the
evidence supporting the sale is competent and admissible; and that the sale of the lot to NBS during the trial
of the case was characterized by bad faith.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The June 10, 1991 judgment of Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of The National Capital Judicial
Region stationed in Pasig, Metro Manila is REINSTATED except for the award of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) damages which is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

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# 32 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-329

April 16, 1946

VICENTE SOTTO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.


FERIA, J.:
This is a petition filed by Vicente Sotto for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections which
declared the respondent Emilio M. Javier as the true and legitimate President of the Popular Front
(Sumulong) Party. The petitioner Vicente Sotto contends in his petition that he is the President of said
Party, and prays that said decision be reviewed and reversed and that petitioner be declared the
legitimate President of the Party.
The Commission on Elections after stating the facts and the evidence submitted by both parties in this
case, makes, among others, the following findings of fact and law in its decision.
(. . . Spanish decision . . .)
Before proceeding to discuss the questions involved in this case, it is necessary to determine whether
or not, under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, we can review the findings of fact of the
Commission on Elections. Said section 9 provides:.
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly the law, in using the words "may be reviewed by writ of certiorari," does not refer to the
special civil action of certiorari (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court), for by this special civil action the
superior court can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions
when the respondent acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, in order to annul or modify the
acts complained of. By certiorari errors committed by the respondent can not be reviewed and
corrected.
Under section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, as well as our Rules of Court, final
judgment and decrees of the inferior or lower courts may be reviewed by this Court by appeal, writ of
error, or certiorari. By appeal the appellate court reviews all the findings of law and of fact of the court a
quo, as in special proceedings (Rule 105, Rules of Court). By writ of error the appellate court reviews
only the findings of law or of fact of the lower court assigned in the assignment of errors of the
appellant, as in ordinary civil actions (section 19, Rule 48). And by certiorari the appellate or superior
Court can only review questions or errors of law decided or committed by the lower court, as provided
in Rules 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of court. Questions or findings of fact of the inferior tribunal, can not
be reviewed on certiorari. "Evidence which is made a part of the record can not be examined to
determine whether or not it justifies the finding on which the decision or judgment was made. (See the
following rule.).
The general rule is that, in the absence of statue or local practice otherwise, questions or
findings of fact, in the inferior tribunal, are not reviewable on certiorari, and that evidence which
is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justified the
findings on which the decision or judgment was made; nor will rulings on questions of fact,

Page | 106

within the inferior tribunal's jurisdiction, be reviewed. (14 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 311, 312.)
(Emphasis supplied.) .
In accordance with the provision of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, this Court can not,
therefore, review the rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections.
It is true that Article X, section 2, of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that "decisions, orders
and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court." As the review may
only be effected, as above-stated, by any one of the three modes or ways abovementioned, and not by
the three at the same time, for the scope of each one is different and at variance with the others, and
the Philippine Congress has provided in section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 657, that decisions, orders
and rulings of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by this Court by writ of certiorari in
accordance with the Rules of Court, we have to apply said provision of Act No. 657, since its
constitutionality is not assailed by the parties in this case, and the presumption is that it is constitutional.
It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised,
if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course
will be adopted and the constitutional will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision
upon such question will be unavoidable (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, p. 231).
The contention in the dissenting opinion that "whether the point (unconstitutionality) of the provision of
section 9, Act No. 657, is raised or not by either party, we can not close our eyes to the constitutional
mandate," is therefore evidently erroneous.
But assuming that this Court may review the findings of facts in the decision of the Commission on
Elections, it is obvious that the findings of fact as well as of law in the decision of the Commission are
supported by the evidence in the record and are in accordance with the law.
There is no question that respondent Emilio M. Javier was designated in November, 1941, by the late
Juan Sumulong, President of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party as his substitute or acting President
of the Party during his illness, under section 13 (third paragraph) of the "Rules and Regulations of the
Party." After the death of Juan Sumulong on January 9, 1942, not only the members of the Directorate,
but also the members of the Party in the convention of January 27, 1946, considered and recognized
Emilio M. Javier as Acting President of the Party (Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16 and 19-Javier; and Exhibit
H-Sotto). The right of said respondent to act as such President was only questioned after the meeting
of four members of the Directorate held on February 1, 1946, in which the said four members adopted a
resolution accepting the alleged resignation of respondent Javier tendered in his letter dated April 30,
1942, and designating petitioner Sotto as Acting President.
The only question raised and to be determined by this Court, is whether or not the action or resolution
of the four members of the Directorate, Lorenzo Sumulong, Jose Robles, Jr., Jose de Leon and Vicente
Sotto, accepting the said resignation of respondent Javier and designating or appointing Vicente Sotto
as Acting President of the Party, was valid.
We are of the opinion and so hold that Commission on Elections' conclusion to the effect that it is not
valid, and that respondent Emilio M. Javier continues to be up to now the acting President of the
Popular Front Party (Sumulong), is in conformity with the facts and the law of the case, for the following
reasons:
First, because respondent Javier's letter dated April 30, 1942 (Exhibit F), in which he tendered his
resignation as acting President of the Party, was not a real resignation. According to him, he was
compelled to write said letter not because he really wanted to resign, but in order to avoid being
molested by the Japanese who wanted to appoint him to some government position. This explanation
Page | 107

has not been contradicted, and is confirmed by the subsequent attitude or acts of the said respondents.
If it will really his intention to resign he would have insisted on or reiterated his resignation, and not
acted as President in all the meetings of the Directorate and the convention of the Party after the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government, as shown in Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 19 (Javier) and H
(Sotto). The fact that the four members of the Directorate had to dig it up from the records and papers
of the party, wherein it lay buried and forgotten since the year 1942, and acted on said letter of
resignation only after the Party convention on January 27, 1946, in their meeting of February 1, 1946,
which was called by the Secretary without the knowledge and held without the consent of respondent
Javier (Exhibit 10-Javier), confirms this conclusion.
Secondly, because said meeting of February 1, 1946, was called by the Secretary on January 30, of the
same year, without the knowledge and consent of the President Emilio Javier. According to the Rules
and Regulations of the Party, "an executive council, consisting of not less than five nor more than
fifteen, shall act as a body of immediate advisers to the President, when their opinion is sought by the
President regarding questions falling within his powers and prerogatives" (section 12). "The President
and Executive Council shall constitute the Directorate of the Party" (section 13). And "the executive
council shall be called to a meeting by the President at least once every month or as often as, in the
opinion of the President, the affairs of the country or of the party so require" (section 12). As the
President and the Executive Council constitute the Directorate, and there is no provision in said Rules
and Regulations about when the Directorate shall meet and by order of whom the meeting thereof shall
he called, it is obvious that the meetings of the Directorate shall be called and held at the same time
and in the same manner as those of the Executive Council. That it was called without the knowledge
and consent of Emilio A. Javier is admitted by Secretary Laude, who further testified that according to
said section 12, the call to a meeting must be made by the President or by his authority (testimony of
Laude, p. 37). Whether or not the Secretary had, in case the President was absent or incapacitated,
authority to call a Directorate meeting upon the request of some members, is immaterial in the present
case, for acting President Javier was not then absent or incapacitated to act as President.
Thirdly, because the meeting was called without previous notice to all the members of the Directorate,
at least to President Javier. According to section 13 of the Rules and Regulations of the Party, "The
presence of four members of the Directorate shall be sufficient for the adoption of valid measures, if the
General Secretary or the Secretary to the President should certify that all the members were duly
notified." It is true that at the foot of the resolution adopted by the petitioner and three other members of
the Directorate in their meeting of February 1, 1946 (Exhibit E-Sotto), there appears a certificate of
Secretary Laude to the effect that all the members of the Directorate were notified of the holding of said
meeting; but such certificate constitutes at most a presumptionjuris tantum of the truth of the facts
therein stated. And that presumption was rebutted by the fact affirmed by the respondent Javier in the
letter he wrote to Nicolas Laude on January 30, 1946 (Exhibit 10-Javier), as soon as Javier knew about
the proposed meeting on February 1, 1946, through Geronimo Santiago, in which letter he reproached
Laude for having called a meeting without the knowledge and consent of Javier as President and for
having sent notice thereof only to the few members of the Directorate who solicited therefor, which
imputation Laude did not deny in his answer of January 31, 1946 (Exhibit W-Sotto). Javier's letter reads
as follows:.
It has come to my attention that you are calling a meeting of the National Directorate of our
party for this coming Friday, February 1, 1946, at 3 p.m. in the Office of Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong,
candidate nominated by the Roxas faction, Liberal Wing of the Nacionalista Party. As President
of the party, I did not have any previous knowledge of this proposed meeting. Nobody has
asked me for the holding of the same and I have not authorized anyone that this meeting be
called. I am, therefore, directing you to cancel the notification that you have given the few
members who have solicited for this meeting for reasons that are obvious.

Page | 108

The requirement of notice to all the members of the Directorate or Board of Directors for the validity of
the acts or resolutions adopted by those present in a special meeting, as that of February 1, 1946, is in
conformity with the following well-established rule, which may be applied to special meeting of
directorates of political parties and other associations:.
The great weight of authority, therefore, is to the effect that notice of a special meeting must be
given to every director, unless there is some express provision in the charter or by-laws or
established usage to the contrary, or unless it is impossible or impracticable to do so. Except in
these cases, a special meeting held in the absence of some of the directors, and without any
notice to them, is illegal, and the action at such a meeting, although by a majority of the
directors, is invalid, unless subsequently ratified or unless rights have been acquired by
innocent third persons, as against whom the corporation must be held estopped. A provision
that a majority shall form a board for the transaction of business does not change the rule. The
reason for this rule has been said to be that "each member of a corporate body has the right to
consultation with the others, and has the right to be heard upon all questions considered, and it
is presumed that, if the absent members had been present, they might have dissented, and their
arguments might have convinced the majority of the unwisdom of their proposed action and thus
have produced a different result. If, however, they had notice and failed to attend they waived
their rights, likewise if they signed a waiver of notice prior to the meeting." Moreover, a director
cannot be deprived of his right to be notified of a special and unusual matter which is to be
considered and acted upon at a directors' meeting on the ground that if such notice had been
given and by reason thereof he had been present he would have been unable have induced the
directors to have refrained from the action taken. So it is no excuse for failure to give notice to
say that the quorum present at the meeting all voted in favor of the act under consideration, and
that the presence at the directors not have notified would not have changed the
result. (Emphasis supplied; Flecther's Cyclopedia of Private Corporations, Vol. 3, pp. 30593061.)
Fourthly, the resolution (Exhibit B-Sotto) adopted in the meeting of February 11, 1946, by the votes of
the same four members, and those cast by Lorenzo Sumulong by proxy from Jose Alejandrino and
Sixto Lopez, in which the resolution adopted in the meeting of February 1, 1946, was ratified, shows
that the petitioner and his associates impliedly admit that the previous resolution was of no effect
unless so ratified. But said resolution of February 11 could not have the effect of validating the previous
one because the resolution of February 11 was also null and void for the same reasons or grounds
militating against the validity of the resolution of February 1, 1946. Respondent acting President Emilio
M. Javier did not cease and was still the acting President of the Party when the meeting of February 11
was called, and the only members called to the said meeting, according to Exhibit N-Sotto, were
Lorenzo Sumulong, personally and as attorney in fact of Jose Alejandrino and Sixto Lopez, Jose
Robles, Jr., Jose de Leon and Vicente Sotto, and Geronimo Santiago who refused to attend alleging
that the meeting was being called in violation of the Rules and Regulations (Exhibit N-1-Sotto).
The question raised and decided in the present case as to who is the legitimate President of the party,
Popular Front (Sumulong), is material and necessary for the purpose of determining who form or
constitute the Directorate if the Popular Front Party. As some members of the Directorate have sided
with the petitioner Vicente Sotto, and the others with respondent Emilio M. Javier, the decision on said
question carries necessarily with it the determination of which of the two sets claiming to constitute the
Directorate is the legitimate one. The Commission On Elections having declared that respondent Emilio
M. Javier is the legitimate President, the members of the Directorate who support him constitute the
Directorate of the Party.
The calls to meetings and minutes of the meetings of the Directorate signed by the Secretary Nicolas
Laude, which are the only reliable records which can be taken into consideration, for all the records and
Page | 109

papers of the Party were destroyed by fire in the house of the late President Juan Sumulong (testimony
of Laude, p. 3), show that the members of the Directorate were the following: Emilio Javier as acting
President and Chairman of the Directorate, Geronimo Santiago, Vicente G. Cruz, Jose Palarca, Jose
de Leon, Jose Alejandrino, Lorenzo Sumulong, Vicente Sotto (Exhibit 6-Javier), Servando de los
Angeles (Exhibit 8-Javier), Mamerto Manalo, Jose Robles and Josefina Phodaca (Exhibit 11-Javier). Of
these eleven members, Jose de Leon, Jose Robles, Jr., and Lorenzo Sumulong have sided with
petitioner Vicente Sotto, and Jose Alejandrino and Sixto Lopez (the latter's name does not appear as
member of the Directorate in the calls to and minutes of the meetings presented as evidence) gave
their proxy to Sumulong, which was issued by the latter in the meeting of February 11, 1946. And the
majority of the members, Geronimo Santiago, Vicente G. Cruz, Jose Palarca, Servando de los Angeles,
Mamerto Manalo and Josefina Phodaca, who have sided with respondent Emilio M. Javier, constitute,
therefore, the legitimate directorate of the Popular Front Party.
According to section 11 of the Rules and Regulations of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong), "the
President shall be the supreme representative of the Party." Respondent Javier, with the Directorate
formed by the majority of the members thereof who have remained loyal to the party and have sided
with him, is the one who can act for the party. The individual members of the Directorate who refuse to
recognize the legitimate President of the Party can not be considered as members of the Directorate of
said party, because section 13 of the said Rules and Regulations provides that the President and his
Executive Council shall constitute the Directorate of the Popular Front Party. Any subsequent defection
or resignation of the members of the legitimate Directorate of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong) could
not affect the constitution of the Directorate, since according to the last paragraph of said section 13,
"vacancies occurring in the Directorate shall be filled by the remaining members who shall elect, by
unanimous or majority vote of all the members, the persons who are to fill the vacancies." .
The contention that, the minority party Popular Front (Sumulong) having split itself in two groups, one
headed by Vicente Sotto, and the other by Emilio M. Javier, "the practical, equitable, just, and lawful
way of deciding this case, in my opinion, is to divide equally the number of inspectors corresponding to
the Sumulong Popular Front Party in every city or municipality where said party polled at least ten per
centum of the number of votes cast it the last national election in this manner ..." is untenable. Because
there is nothing in the record to show that there was a split or division of the Popular Front Party
(Sumulong) or that Vicente Sotto, Lorenzo Sumulong, Jose de Leon and Jose Robles, Jr. have formed
a faction of national character. In fact, the evidence shows that the Directorate of the respondent voted
to give Lorenzo Sumulong inspectors if he filed his certificate of candidacy in the name of the Popular
Front (Exhibit 14-Javier); and that Sumulong, in a letter he sent to Javier during the pendency of this
case and exhibited by the latter at the hearing in this Court, asked the latter to appoint him as
representative of the Party who shall propose election inspectors in his representative district. The most
that can be inferred from the facts of the present case is that there has been a tentative secession of
those members of the Directorate from the Popular Front Party (Sumulong); and according to section
72 of the Election Code "no inspector shall be granted to any branch or faction which has seceded from
its respective party ...." .
Besides, assuming, arguendo, that the Popular Front Party (Sumulong) was split into two groups or
factions of national character, the provision of section 8 of the Commonwealth Act No. 725, to the effect
that "should the majority party be divided into two factions of national character with candidates for
President, Vice-President and Senators, each faction shall have one inspector and his substitute, etc."
can not be invoked by analogy. If Congress had to expressly so provide in said section 8 of Act No.
725, it was because without such express provision, the faction of the Nacionalista Party headed by
Manuel A. Roxas would not have been entitled to election inspectors under the Election Code. And as
said section 8 applies only in case of a division of the majority into two factions, it is to be presumed
that it was not the intention of Congress to authorize a division or distribution of election inspectors in

Page | 110

case of a split of any one of the minority parties, which are entitled to at most one inspector. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius.
Whether a pact of alliance with the faction of the Nacionalista Party headed by Manuel A. Roxas was
validly adopted in the convention of the Party held on January 27, 1946, as contended by the petitioner
Vicente Sotto, or not as contended by the respondent Dr. Emilio M. Javier, is immaterial and foreign to
the question submitted to the Commission on Elections. The latter has no jurisdiction to determine that
question which is a matter of policy of the Party, nor to enforce compliance with said resolution (section
3, Commonwealth Act No. 657 in connection with section 2, Article X, Philippine Constitution). Such
alliance has nothing to do with the right to appoint representatives who shall propose the election
inspectors to which the party is entitled under the law. Even if such an alliance had been actually
effected, said faction of the Nacionalista Party could not have acquired the right of the Popular Front
Party to have one election inspector in certain representative districts; though the Popular Front Party
was free to designate persons affiliated to the said faction of the Nacionalista Party as its
representatives who shall propose the election inspectors to which it is entitled. As the Rules and
Regulations (Exhibits A-Sotto, 1-Javier) do not authorize the Directorate to remove or appoint the
President of the Party, the proper procedure would have been to submit to said convention of January
27, 1946 or some other convention duly called for the purpose, the question whether respondent Emilio
M. Javier should continue acting as President or a new one appointed in his place.
The statement in the dispositive part of the decision of the Commission on Elections to the effect that
the President Emilio M. Javier "tiene derecho, por medio de su Directorio," to appoint the persons who
shall propose the election inspectors to which the party is entitled, is not erroneous. Section 8 of Act
No. 725 provides that the inspector shall be recommended by the political party. A political party, as any
other association, acts generally through its directorate. But in the present case, section XI of the Rules
and Regulations of the Popular Front Party provides that the President is the supreme representative of
the Party, and acts as chairman of the Directorate. Although the Directorate votes for or selects the
representatives, the President, as chairman of the Directorate and the supreme representative of the
Party, is the one who shall appoint the representative selected or approved by the Directorate. The
Commission on Elections in stating that the President has the right to appoint "por medio de su
Directorio," does not mean to say that the President is the only one who selects and appoints them,
and that the only function of the Directorate is to transmit the selection and appointment made by the
President to the proper authorities. It means to say that the President has the right, with the express or
implied approval of the Directorate, to appoint such representatives. That such is the meaning of that
part of the decision complained of, is confirmed by the petitioner himself, who in paragraph 2 of his
petition alleges "que el recurrente es el actual presidente interino del Partido Politico denominado
Frente Popular Sumulong, y, como tal es el que tiene derecho, por medio de su directorio, a nombrar
las personas que han de proponer los inspectores electorales a que tiene derecho dicho partido en las
proximas elecciones." .
In view of all the foregoing, the Commission on Elections' decision that the respondent Emilio M. Javier,
and not the petitioner Vicente Sotto, is the legitimate President of the Popular Front Party and,
therefore, the members of the directorate who have sided with him constitute the legitimate Directorate
of the Party, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Page | 111

# 34 EN BANC
G.R. No. 102782 December 11, 1991
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R.
CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY
and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:p
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023,
promulgated on July 13, 1990, 1 the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor
vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the
case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it
allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that decision
was submitted. The judgment became final and executory on August 6, 1990, and it was duly entered in
the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court that when he was
stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de
los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent a letter to the
Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek
damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L. Monsanto,
complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license by Traffic Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an
alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also for
confiscation of his driver's license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time from Grandy N. Trieste,
another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front license plate by E. Ramos of the
Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's license by
Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez invoked Ordinance No.
7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste's driver's license pursuant to a memorandum
dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine
National Police, authorizing such sanction under certain conditions.

Page | 112

Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own
Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a
memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated
February 28, 1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of
license plates and not the confiscation of driver's licenses.
On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,
authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention ofthe Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan Manila Authority
of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila
Authority, thru the Traffic Operatiom Center, is authorized to detach the license
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar (as
reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not
be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has
received several complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for
alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that
may be imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and motorists, the
Court resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Solicitor General to submit,
within ten (10) days from notice hereof, separate COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the
said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it
was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof
vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or
consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of
a code of basic services requiring coordination, andexercise of its rule-making powers.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because the
latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the decision itself said that
the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why
Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked
collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.

Page | 113

For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it
violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the
removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in
the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the early resolution of
the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the uncertainty of their vahdity. A similar motion
was filed by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in
question should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can
be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However,
that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as
those in the present controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great deal of confusion
among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains
that these sanctions are illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be
stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver's license
dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would not stop their "habit" unless they
received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to
the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive
of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and
decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical objection
raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the Court has
the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in
the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." 2 In
proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which
otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 3 where
Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure."
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment ofjustice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. (Aznar III vs.
Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of
the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly
to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).

Page | 114

Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately
on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental question which, in our
view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the
objection to the personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054
and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044
and L2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters,
since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners'cause of action or the propriety of the
procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R.
No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor General a petition for
prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropohtan Manila
Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A.
Monsanto, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners
and the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are hereby impleaded as
respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The comments already submitted are duly
noted and shall be taken into account by the Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which the Court has
recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in
this particular case, it is because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding
against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the
important substantive issues raised.
Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific authority
conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the
General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. 4 It is not disputed that both
measures were enacted to promote the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the
worsening traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it
appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness
of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. 5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all its terms and
provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What
only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the discretion to
determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient
standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus
"prevent the delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is settled that the
"convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is
an acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate's authority. 6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we
must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

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The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national
legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal.
To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of
a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public
policy. 7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass
the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605
does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose
such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and
otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws,
ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such
penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the powers of the Land Transportation
Commission and the Board of Transportation under existing laws over such violations and
punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the
proper penalty to be imposed issuspension or revocation of driver's license or certificate of
public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or
revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver's license or the report of
suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the Land
Transportation Commission or the Board of Transportation, as the case may be, for their records
update.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3.` Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a
twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall subject the violator to
graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense, P20.00 for the and offense, P50.00 for
the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver's license for the fourth offense, and
a revocation of the driver'slicense for the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila
Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances
prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in
Metropolitan Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated but the erring
driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the
violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their
branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan
Manila Commission or the law-enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the
Page | 116

proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent
traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver's license and records show that he has an unpaid fine,
his driver's license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding
surcharges.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders,
ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The
Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is
the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by
the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the
driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the
Municipality of Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from
the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). 8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the
power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and
effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the
measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the
Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs, Bemardo, 9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of
Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act. The decision held in part:
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the
enactment of the questioned ordinance. Section 1 of said ordinance clearly
conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not require
subdivision plans to be submitted to the City Engineer before the same is
submitted for approval to and verification by the General Land Registration Office
or by the Director of Lands as provided for in Section 58 of said Act. Section 2 of
the same ordinance also contravenes the provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the
latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03 per square meter of every lot subject
of such subdivision application; Section 3 of the ordinance in question also
conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the latter law does not mention of a
certification to be made by the City Engineer before the Register of Deeds allows
registration of the subdivision plan; and the last section of said ordinance impose
Page | 117

a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act 496 does not impose. In other
words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes upon a subdivision owner
additional conditions.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a
halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as
already intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable
ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights
granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local
ordinance.
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so
violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed
imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the
validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder;
and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard
and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila
area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land
Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein
prescribed, including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila
through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same
time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of
such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the
fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the
imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they
cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such
sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in
LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No.11, Seriesof l991,of theMetropolitan Manila Authority and Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1988 of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, NULL and VOID; and

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(2) enjoining all law enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of
motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and confiscating driver licenses for traffic
violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.

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# 38 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and
THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be attached to a statute
subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of this appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco
Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her suit against
defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the other defendant, the
Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan, from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land
belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no longer enforceable, the
prescriptive period having lapsed. There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant
that if the moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act subsequently found unconstitutional
were to be counted in the computation, then the right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In
arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the inflexible view
that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as
inoperative as if it had never been. It was oblivious to the force of the principle adopted by this Court
that while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of its character as a juridical norm,
its having been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal consequences. As
will hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower court resulted in an erroneous decision. We find
for appellant Philippine National Bank, and we reverse.
There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant
Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage duly registered
covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of Pangasinan. As of November 27,
1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same
year, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial
Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered
with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity,
July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant
Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its
answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription
would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to
July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared
invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps
for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and
decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.
Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit, there being a failure on the
part of the lower court to adhere to the applicable constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given to a
statute subsequently declared invalid.
1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the
Page | 120

fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of
paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. 3 It
is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative
or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than
that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive
act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior
to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness
that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not
a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of
the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." 4 This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill 5 and the decision in Manila
Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. 6 An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for
the Court inFernandez v. Cuerva and Co. 7
2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power legislation intended to
promote public welfare but adversely affecting property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed
on due process, equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to avoid the
corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the
whole is not likely to allow an enactment suffering, to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of out
running the bounds of reason and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be of course that if challenged,
an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the Constitution could still be shown.
In the meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon by the public and
accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would indeed be the fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its
constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is dependent on the actual
situation, never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to
altered circumstances, be stricken down.
That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation,
which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the
enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers. So it was
explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban 8 where such enactment was considered in 1953 "unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared
null and void and without effect." 9 At the time of the issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945 and
of the passage of such Act in 1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines
was confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the
Japanese military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures,
Page | 121

radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance of normalcy could be
restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of
enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was declared first by executive order and then
by legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting the contention that on its face, the
Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of
contracts. Considering the circumstances confronting the legitimate government upon its return to the
Philippines, some such remedial device was needed and badly so. An unyielding insistence then on the
rights to property on the part of the creditors was not likely to meet with judicial sympathy. Time passed
however, and conditions did change.
When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was its satisfying the rational
basis test, not as of the time of its enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found
unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail over the assertion of
community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that such indeed was
the case. As stated in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact
that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders
Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar
debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that
the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not
oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded
works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect
collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the
relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States. 10 The conclusion to which the foregoing
considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication, it was apparent that Republic Act
No. 342 could not survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That
before the decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There is all the more
reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or executive
order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.
3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental
response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a
series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that
Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run. So it has been
held from Day v. Court of First
Instance, 11 decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, 12 handed down only last year. What is deplorable
is that as of the time of the lower court decision on January 27, 1960, at least eight decisions had left
no doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile prior to such adjudication of
invalidity. 13 Speaking of the opposite view entertained by the lower court, the present Chief Justice,
in Liboro v. Finance and Mining Investments Corp. 14has categorized it as having been "explicitly and
consistently rejected by this Court." 15
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her
loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant
Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was tolled however,
from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision
of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously
then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time
to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Page | 122

WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10,
1959 dismissed. No costs.

Page | 123

# 41 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106531. November 18, 1999]
FERNANDO GARCIA, JUANITO GARCIA, and WENCESLAO TORRES, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. RICARDO P. GALVEZ, in his official capacity as the
Presiding Judge of Branch 29, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J. :
The case before the Court is a special civil action for mandamus to compel the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Iloilo, to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 20774 to the Supreme Court for
automatic review of the decision finding petitioners guilty of murder and sentencing each of them
to reclusion perpetua, to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Jose Estrella the sum of P30,000.00 as
civil indemnity, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.
We deny the petition.
The facts are as follows:
On September 29, 1986, the Provincial Fiscal of Guimaras filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City, an information charging petitioners with murder for the killing of one Jose Estrella.[1]
After due trial, on September 21, 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay jointly and severally, the heirs of Jose Estrella the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, to suffer
the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.[2]
On September 24, 1990, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.[3] However, on September 2, 1991, the trial court denied the motion. [4] On September 5, 1991
petitioner received notice of the order of denial. [5] Petitioners did not interpose an appeal[6] from the
decision by the filing of a notice of appeal. Thus, the decision became final on September 17,
1991.Accordingly, the trial court issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners.
On November 13, 1991, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to
allow accused to appeal, arguing that there was no need for them to appeal the decision as the same
was subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court.[7]
On January 17, 1992, the trial court denied the motion.[8]
On February 14, 1992, the trial court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[9]
Hence, the present recourse.[10]
On July 15, 1992, we required respondents to file comment on the petition, [11] which the Solicitor
General filed on August 25, 1992.
On January 18, 1995, we gave due course to the petition.[12]

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At issue is whether the Supreme Court must automatically review a trial courts decision convicting
an accused of a capital offense and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. In other words, is the
accused not required to interpose an appeal from a trial courts decision sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua to the Supreme Court because the latters review of the sentence is automatic?
The issue is not new. We have consistently ruled that it is only in cases where the penalty actually
imposed is death that the trial court must forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court for
automatic review of the conviction.[13]
As the petitioners did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise indicate their desire to appeal from the
decision convicting them of murder and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, the decision
became final and unappealable.
Consequently, mandamus will not issue to compel the trial court to elevate the records to the
Supreme Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for mandamus to compel the trial
court to elevate the records of Criminal Case No. 20774 to the Supreme Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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# 44 SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 1312-CFI January 31, 1978
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, complaint, vs. DISTRICT JUDGE MARIANO CASTAEDA, JR., COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, BRANCH III,respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
(Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano
Castaeda to another branch and administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the
Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of
oppression; and (4) bribery.
After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and administrative complaint, the Court
resolved on August 3, 1976 to refer the a administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. Under date of September 1, 1977 and after duly
hearing the parties, Justice Bautista submitted the following report:
Complainant Antonio V. Raquiza charges the dent Hon. Mariano Castaeda Jr., under four counts, namely:
I. Violation of the Anti-Graft Law;
II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal;
III. Extortion by means of oppression; and
IV. Bribery.
I Under Count I. complainant charges respondent of giving Mrs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza and Mrs.
Nieves Toledo-Gozun unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in violation of paragraph (e), Section
3, Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law. which reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of hisofficial
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, respondent bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
These two parties according to complainant are not entitled to get any share from the second release of
P1,000,000.00 for the Castellvi Estate and yet they were able to receive P200,000.00 and P500,000.00,
respectively. Complainant further claims that Mrs. Raquiza has no more share or participation in the
Castellvi Estate and in the case of Mrs. Gozun she has no right to be given a share of the second release as
it is intended solely for the Raquiza children.

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Complainant also charges respondent under paragraph (f), section 3 of Republic Act 3019 which provides:
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter Pending before him for the purpose of obtaining,
directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue
advantage in favor of discriminating against any other interested party.
in having allegedly neglected or refused after several motions and oral demands, the release of the amount
of P1,000,000.00 (Treasury Warrant No. D-04,231,948) to the Raquiza children thereby giving undue
advantage to both Mrs. Raquiza and Mrs. Gozun discriminating against the Raquiza children.
II Under Count II, complainant charges respondent with a violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code for knowingly and deliverately issuing his illegal orders of February 25, and 26, 1976 allowing Mrs.
Raquiza to obtain a loan of P200,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using the equivalent amount in
the second release of P1,000,000.00 deposited in the bank in the name of the Castellvi Estate as collateral.
Complainant contends that respondent Judge knows that Mrs. Raquiza has no more participation or interest
in or any rights to the Castellvi Estate since according to the records in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled "Pobre
vs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza," both parties agreed to give all the properties subject matter of the suit to
the Raquiza children.
III Under Count III, complainant alleges that respondent committed attempted extortion by oppression in
that after Mrs. Raquiza got the total of P330,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank in connection with the
first release of P1,000,000.00, he visited the respondent Judge in his house asking that he would also
release the balance of P300,000.00 to the Raquiza children because part of the money would be used by
complainant in going to the United States for his eye treatment; and that respondent promised to give the
necessary order the following day. Complainant went to Pampanga the following morning per advice of
respondent and saw the judge in his private chamber; that the judge invited complainant to a corner of the
room and told him that he needed money, that taken aback by such alleged act of graft and corruption,
complainant shouted in a very loud voice, "You are corrupt." There is graft and corruption in this office and
then left the room; but that following the saying, "a man in need is a beggar", complainant called the judge a
few days later and assistant. that they were reconciled but nonetheless. the respondent despite several
requests from Atty. Yuzon, counsel for the complainant, consistently failed to comply with his promise that he
would release money for the Raquiza children; that after the reconciliation, complainant visited the
respondent Judge in his house and the latter promised to give the order the following day; that it was only
after repeated trips of Atty. Yuzon or his assistant. Mr. Gracio Dacutan, to Pampanga that the respondent
Judge released the total amount of P350,000.00 to the Raquiza children; that as the Raquiza children
urgently needed some of the money for themselves, the balance was not enough anymore to finance the trip
of the complainant to the United States; hence, he asked again the President to release another
P1,000,000.00; that the complainant brands the imposition of this hardships by respondent Judge, which is
supposedly a case of extortion by means of oppression where respondent subjected complainant, his
counsel Atty. Yuzon and his assistant Gracio Dacutan, had to shuttle everyday for a period of about one
month between Manila to Pampanga to get the promised order of release which never came up to the
present.
IV As to the fourth count, the complainant charges the respondent of bribery, in that "he (respondent) gets
bribe money from Mrs. Raquiza and surely from all other parties;" that on the first release of P1,000,000.00,
respondent Judge extorted P70,000.00 from Mrs. Raquiza out of the release of about P330,000.00.
In his comment or answer to the charges, respondent alleged that those indictments are devoid of factual
and/or legal basis because:
As to Charge I (Violation of Anti-Graft Law) and II (knowingly rendering unjust and illegal judgment),
respondent Mrs. Raquiza still has a share in the Castellvi Estate because by testamentary provision

Page | 127

approved by final judgment, Natividad Castellvi Raquiza as instituted heir, is entitled to 2/8 share of the
estate although one-half (1/2) of said 2/3 had been transferred to her children by virtue of a compromise
agreement submitted by Urbane Pobre in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled Urbano Pobre vs. Natividad CastellviRaquiza (Exhs. 2 & 3, Orders of Judge Honorio Romero dated March 29, 1971 and May 26, 1971 in Sp.
Proc. No. 6824). Note that a case for reconveyance was filed by Natividad Castellvi Raquiza (Civil Case No.
3509 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against her children. Said case is still pending hearing and
decision according to respondent. Respondent avers that it was only after careful study of the records (16
big volumes) of Special Proceeding No. 6824 that he granted on June 19, 1975 the motion of Mrs. Raquiza
filed on January 23, 1975 for authority to obtain loan believing that Mrs. Raquiza still has a share, interest
and participation in the subject estate.
Respondent also explained that the testate estate of Alfonso Castellvi is still on liquidation when the first
release of 1 million was made by the government in partial payment of the expropriated property of the
estate; that as several claim of creditors have not been paid, respondent was not inclined at the outset to
allow any Cash release; and that the second release of 1 million could not have been intended solely for the
Raquiza children, much less for the use of the complainant in his trip to the United States for his eye
treatment as claimed; that the reason given in complainant's request to the President dated December 29,
1975 for the release of the P1 million out of the P2,600,000.00 was that the money would be used "in
patenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world" (Exh. 5); that
complainant's representative capacity as attorney-in-fact of his children as well as the purpose for seeking
the withdrawal of the entire second release of P1 million is questionable because Lily Raquiza, one of the
complainant's children, denied having signed or granted any power of attorney (p. 32, Rollo); that in view of
the foregoing, respondent judge could not properly be charged with having knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment or interlocutory order.
As to Charge III (IX) by Means of Oppression):
Respondent states that the commission of attempted extortion against complainant is highly improbable; that
complainant did not describe the' shouting spree' incident faithfully because:
Respondent does not approve of being approached in his house in connection with his official functions and
without promising complainant anything, advised the latter to see respondent in his office; that the following
morning when complainant went to his court chamber, Atty. Celia Macapagal and other lawyers and two or
three of the court's personnel were inside the chamber; that complainant then pleaded for help that he would
be able to go to the United States for his eye treatment, saying that after all the first release was authorized
by the President precisely for that purpose; that complainant wanted in the corresponding order to be issued
by respondent that so much amount of his children's shares in the second release should be specifically
ordered paid or given to complainant; that in a nice way, respondent explained to complainant of the
unsettled claims of creditors of the late that even more complainant was not the movant but his children and
what his children would want to lend him is a matter between him and his children; that complainant then
replied, "Judge, if you would not give me the small amount I need, I will be your number one enemy ... you
chut"; that respondent stood up to reach for his crutches (respondent then had swollen foot due to his
arthritis) and ordered 'Arrest that man' but complainant had already left; that complainant's accusation is the
height of absurdity since respondent would not be that stupid and careless to choose his court chamber
(barely 2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) and in the presence of many listeners and viewers to attempt an extortion
against complainant, a man of known stature, an ex-Governor. Congressman, Cabinet member and a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
As to Charge IV - (Bribery):
Respondent explains this is unthinkable because
Petitioner should surely admit that Mrs. Raquiza is even hard to converse
with. To talk to her, one has to speak loud or shout. She could much less be

Page | 128

whispered to. This considering, one could not ask something from her without
being heard. Write her a note, for evidence in order to be caught This is
absurd.
that authority was given Mrs. Raquiza only on June 19, 1975 almost 5 months of study of her motion filed on
January 23, 1975; that the authority was for P500,000.00, which was even reduced to only P333,000.00 or
1/3 of P1,000,000.00 when such release was known.
As the letter complaint and the answer or comment of respondent are both verified, they were adopted as
part of the respective evidence of the parties. They also introduced additional oral and documentary proofs.
Besides complainant, his counsel Atty. Manuel Yuson and the latter's assistant. Gracio Dacutan, testified.
For the respondent, Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Vicente Sicat and respondent Judge offered testimonial and
documentary evidence.
After a careful study of all the evidence on record, I find the charges not substantiated. There is factual and
legal basis for respondent's conclusion that Mrs. Raquiza has still a share or participation in the Castellvi
estate and that Mrs. Gozun has likewise a right to be given a share of the second release. As to the first
(Mrs. Raquiza,' her right as instituted heir of 2/3 of the estate is recognized by final judgment although by
compromise agreement, 1/2 was transferred by her to her children (Exh. 2). The Raquiza children sought a
reconsideration of the order of Judge Romero (Exh. 2), but the motion was denied by the same Judge (Exh.
3). There appears no appeal from said order.
Moreover, the Raquiza children subsequently respected the remaining share of their mother by expressly
agreeing to her request to the Philippine Veterans Bank president for additional loan (Exh. 4).
It is not also rebutted that several claims chargeable against the estate has not been completely settled for
which reason respondent at the outset refused to grant any release. However, for humanitarian
considerations and
... mainly on the basis of the President's handwritten note on complainant's letter, dated July
16, 1975 (Exh. 8), respondent authorized the withdrawal from the funds of the Castellvi
Estate in the Philippines Veterans Bank derived from the first release of P1 million, for the
delivery to the Raquiza children Daisy, Antonio. Jr.. Levy and Douglas, in the amount of
P248,000.00, and an additional amount of P20,000.00, under his orders, dated August 20,
1975 and November 24, 1975 respectively; and a separate amount of P60,000.00 to
complainant's daughter Lily Raquiza (Exh. 9 and 19); and after the said Raquiza children
were granted their aforementioned shares, respondent ordered the immediate payment of
Mrs. Raquiza's loan by the said bank, in the amount of P330,000.00;
19 That under his letter, dated December 29, 1975, (Exh. 5), complainant
requested again the President to release P1 million from the funds of the
Castellvi Estate to the Raquiza children to be used by them in patenting the
Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world', and after
the President authorized the release of PI million by the Government subject
to the availability of funds, the Treasurer of the Philippines, following the
recommendation of the TJAG of the AFP, issued Treasury Warrant No. D281-948 for payment to the Castellvi Estate, which was actually released to
the Phil. Veterans Bank, by the Army, on February 11, 1976;
As regards the payment to Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun it appears that of the three expropriated properties,
one parcel belongs to the Castellvi Estate while two parcels are owned by Maria Nieves Toledo, who at the
time when payment was ordered, had not yet received any partial payment and had filed a motion for
execution (Civil Case No. 1623 or G.R. No. L-20620) praying for partial payment. As respondent correctly
argues, '... for reasons of justice and equity (he) just followed the mandate of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.

Page | 129

L-20620, August 15, 1974, for payment of the corresponding just compensation to both owners of the
properties condemned.' Thus, in sharing landowner Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun in the second release,
respondent had factual and legal basis and can hardly be branded as giving "unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference" under paragraph (e), section 3 of the Anti-Graft Law.
Similarly, considering that Mr. Raquiza has a sham in the Castellvi estate which is still on liquidation; that the
second release could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children nor for complainant's trip to the
United States for his alleged eye treatment; and that complainant's authority to represent all his children had
been questioned by no less than one of his children, I find it hard to respondent Judge knowing that they
unjust and illegal.
Relative to the charge of extortion by means of oppression, the undersigned believes as more probable the
version testified to by the respondent at the investigation as well as in his verified comment. Indeed, it would
be stretching credibility to its b point to believe that in a small room (2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) the respondent
would have thrown all precautions to the winds and demand bribe money in the presence of Atty. Celia
Macapagal, Atty. Sicat, Atty. Yuzon, Fiscal Macalino, Messrs. Yalong and Dacutan- Complainant's version
cannot stand the test of common experience and the ordinary instincts of human nature and therefore
should be disbelieved. There is no evidence presented by complainant that when he visited that respondent
in the latter's residence in Quezon City, the respondent asked for money. There is more privacy in
respondent's home rather than in his small office and yet respondent in a place of absolute privacy never
asked or demanded for bribe money.
One salient fact also denies the veracity of the version of the complainant relative to the "shouting incident."
It is not denied that at the time the respondent could hardly stand and walk without crutches. He could not
have stood therefore on a corner of the court chamber during the incident. What is more, as he was seated
on a chair at the end of his desk to the right and that since complainant was only one meter away from him,
the conversation naturally would have been audible and the witnesses inside the court chamber never
testified that the respondent was asking money from the complainant. The evidence also remains
unrebutted that a few days after the said incident, the complainant apologized to the respondent for what he
had done. On top of it all, it is difficult to believe that the respondent would have committed extortion or
attempted extortion against the complainant, who is reputedly of high stature, not counting that he was a
former provincial governor, congressman, cabinet member and delegate to the Constitutional Convention
and it could have taken so much nerve and daring to do such an act.
As regards the fourth charge of bribery, complainant claims that Mrs. Raquiza had told him that out of the
P300,000.00 she obtained as loan from the first release of P1 million, she gave P70,000.00 to the
respondent, the undersigned also finds that this charge was not substantiated. In the first place, the
testimony is purely hearsay. As the complainant testified on cross-examination:
Q Your other charge is bribery. You mentioned that the Judge extorted P70,000 from Mrs.
Raquiza, what is your basis ?
A It was told to me by Mrs. Raquiza.
Q I thought you are a widower?
A I am separated from her, but she comes to the house very often.
INVESTIGATOR:
May the Investigator inquire, is that separation legal
A I filed a divorce in the States.

Page | 130

xxx xxx xxx


Q So you are not a widower?
A I am a widower.
Q I cannot understand that?
A Yes, I am married to another woman.
Q You said you were told by Mrs. Raquiza?
A She told me she practically spent 1/2 of what was given to her.
xxx xxx xxx
Q So, your basis is what you got from Mrs. Raquiza
A Yes.
Q Of your own personal knowledge, you don't know that?
A I have not seen Mrs. Raquiza giving the money to him. (pp. 16 17,18, tsn., Feb. 2, 1977)
Mrs. Raquiza was not presented to testify on the matter. The rules even in an administrative case demands
that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
presented against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The judiciary, to which
respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it should be only after due
investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in this case the
charges are penal in nature.
The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in
office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply (33 C.J. 945, see. 47); also National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) vs. Martinez, 62 SCRA 411; Castral vs. Bullecer 64
SCRA 289; Melquiades Udani Jr. vs. Pagharion 65 SCRA 549)
Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment' (Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even if respondent were
not collect in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless
the contrary sufficiently appears. And undersigned finds, as above discussed, that complainant's evidence is
wanting in this respect.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for
lack of merit.
We have reviewed the record, including the pt of the testimonies of the witnesses and the other evidence
submitted by the parties. After careful consideration thereof, We find the conclusions of fact and the
recommendations of the Investigator in the above report to be well taken and fully sup. ported by the
evidence on record.

Page | 131

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Bautista is approved, the respondent judge is
exonerated and the administrative case against him is dismissal The petition to transfer Special Proceedings
No. 6824 to another judge is denied.

Page | 132

# 46 EN BANC
[G.R No. 202143 : July 03, 2012]
FAMELA R. DULAY v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JULY 3, 2012, which reads as
follows: cralaw
"G.R No. 202143 (Famela R. Dulay v. Judicial and Bar Council and Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., as
Executive Secretary.). - This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, filed by petitioner Famela R.
Dulay against the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.,
raising the following issues:
A. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can legitimately, validly and constitutionally accepts
(sic) application for nomination and interview of nominees for the position of a Chief Justice of
the Honorable Court and, thereafter, submits (sic) short list of nominees to the President of the
Republic of the Philippines for the appointment of a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court;
B. Whether the President of the Republic of the Philippines may legitimately, validly and
constitutionally appoint a Chief Justice of the Honorable Court, in replacement of the removed
and impeached Honorable Renato C. Corona;
C. Whether the respondent Honorable JBC can constitutionally be headed by a retired Associate
Justice of the Honorable Court, instead of an incumbent Chief Justice of the Honorable Court.[1]
Petitioner claims that the President of the Republic of the Philippines cannot legitimately, validly, and
constitutionally appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, because the 1987 Constitution only
empowers him to appoint members or Justices but not the Chief Justice.[2] She adds that the Chief
Justice should be replaced and designated exclusively from among their peers.[3] Petitioner also
contends that the JBC cannot be validly, legally and constitutionally headed by a retired Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, because the Constitution specifically provides that it be headed by the
incumbent Chief Justice and no other.[4]
We dismiss the petition.
At the outset, we look into the locus standi of petitioner to institute the present petition.
As held in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council:[5]
xxx In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of thelocus
standi of the petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of
the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of
public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must
have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.[6]
Indeed a liberal approach had been adopted in several notable cases. Petitioner may not be as
adversely affected by the action complained against as are others provided that she sufficiently
demonstrates in her petition that she is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of
a public right. The assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging an official action rests on the
theory that the petitioner represents the public in general.[7]
In this case, however, petitioner has not shown in her petition that she is entitled to protection or relief
from the Court. She did not even explain her capacity in instituting the present special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition. Nowhere in her petition did she assert her right either as citizen or taxpayer
filing her petition on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issues. Accordingly, she is
wanting in legal standing to institute the instant petition. Outright dismissal of the present petition is,
therefore, warranted.
Page | 133

Even if we ignore the technical defect and we look into the merits of the case, the petition is still bound
to be dismissed.
Simply stated, petitioner seeks the resolution of two substantive issues: (1) whether or not the
President of the Philippines has the constitutional power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court; and (2) whether or not the JBC can validly be headed by a person other than the incumbent
Chief Justice.
We answer in the affirmative to both questions.
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, provides for the appointment of Justices and Judges, to wit:
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In interpreting the above-stated constitutional provision, petitioner considers only the Associate Justices
as the "members of the Supreme Court" thereby excluding the Chief Justice from the President's
appointing power. Said interpretation is baseless.
A plain reading of the constitutional provisions on the Judicial Department in Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution clearly shows that the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" and the words "Members"
and "Member" are repeatedly used to refer to the Justices of the Supreme Court without distinction
whether he be the Chief Justice or any of the Associate Justices or all fifteen Justices.
Section 4 (l),[8] Article VIII thereof defines the composition of the Supreme Court, namely, "a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices" who may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three,
five, or sevenMembers; Section 4 (2)[9] and (3)[10] describe the manner of conducting business in the
Court whether it be En Banc or in division; Section 7 (1)[11] enumerates the qualifications of the
Members of the Court and the other members of the Judiciary; Section 11[12] provides for the security of
tenure in the Judiciary; Section 12[13]states the prohibition on non-judicial assignments of the Members
of the Supreme Court and of other courts; and Section 13[14] lays down the process of decision-making.
In all of these provisions, the phrase "Members of the Supreme Court" was repeatedly used to refer not
only to the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court but includes the Chief Justice. Thus, in Section 9
of the same Article VIII on the appointment of Justices and Judges, the phrase "Members of the
Supreme Court" clearly refers to the fifteen Justices of the Court - one Chief Justice and fourteen (14)
Associate Justices - who are within the appointing power of the President. Although decided under a
different Constitution, we reiterate the Court's pronouncement in Vargas v. Rilloraza[15] that "there can
be no doubt that the Chief Justice and Associate Justices required x x x to compose the Supreme Court
are the regular members of the Court."[16]
We, likewise, do not agree with petitioner that the JBC can only be headed by the incumbent Chief
Justice and no other. Petitioner, in effect, argues that the JBC cannot perform its task without an
incumbent Chief Justice. To follow this logic would lead to an eventuality where a vacancy in the
Judiciary will not be filled if a vacancy occurs in the JBC. We can likewise infer from this argument that
if the Office of the Chief Justice is vacated, the same will not be filled because there will be no
"incumbent Chief Justice" to act as Chairman of the JBC.
We definitely cannot sustain these arguments. The principal function of the JBC is to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary.[17] For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at least
three nominees and the President may not appoint anybody who is not in the list.[18] Any vacancy in the
Supreme Court is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof.
[19]
This 90-day period is mandatory. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only because the
constitutionally-named Chairman could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if the
membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its mandated task of
submitting the list of nominees to the President even if the constitutionally-named ex-officioChairman
does not sit in the JBC. This intention is evident from the exchanges among the Commissioners during
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, viz.:
MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief
Justice, are only 11.
Page | 134

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.


MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom has the
Court had a complete complement.
MR. DE CASTRO. By that time, upon ratification of this Constitution, the Judicial and Bar Council shall
be in operation.
MR. CONCEPCION. We hope so.
MR. DE CASTRO. And one of the members thereof is a Member of Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. An ex officio member. By the time this is ratified, Congress is not yet convened and
there will still be an election; so there will still be a delay of more than 90 days. Maybe before the
vacancies occur in the Supreme Court, they will be filled up by the President.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is possible.
MR. DE CASTRO. Therefore, it will take perhaps until November or December before the four other
justices will be appointed, if we follow the Judicial and Bar Council. Or can the Judicial and Bar
Council function without the presence yet of a member of Congress who is anexofficio member?
MR. CONCEPCION. It can operate without the ex-officio member because a majority would be
enough, although it would be preferable if it were complete.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that upon ratification of this Constitution, it is possible, and the President may do
it by appointing the members of the Judicial and Bar Council without first a representative from
Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct.
MR. DE CASTRO. So that we can immediately fill up the four vacancies in the Supreme Court.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is correct.
MR. DE CASTRO. I am asking this just for the record, that the vacancies in the Supreme Court be
immediately filled up so that our backlog of cases can be immediately attended to.
x x x (Emphases supplied)[20]
Considering, however, that complete membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its
supervisory power over the JBC, this Court should not be deprived of representation. The most Senior
Justice of this Court who is not an applicant for the position of Chief Justice should participate in the
deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside over the proceedings in
the absence of the constitutionally-named Ex-OfficioChairman, pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, to wit:
Section 12. Vacancy in office of Chief Justice. - In case of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall
devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or
another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate
Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, we DISMISS the petition." (Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion, Abad and Sereno, JJ., no part, Peralta, J., presiding, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., present)

Page | 135

# 51 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46267

November 28, 1938

FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner, vs. SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent.


VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be
illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to
continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said
respondent.
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising
solely the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
said city, by virtue of an ad interimappointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his
favor on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly on September 8th of the same year.
On
November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as
the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth a new ad interim appointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan,
issued in accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937,
without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad
interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he
took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties thereof. After his
appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner,
acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts, some of which consist in the
designation of the assistant clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as
administrative officer, under the orders of the petitioner, as executive judge of said court, to take
charge of all matters pertaining to the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which are handled by
said execute judge in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as
notary public for the Province of Palawan, said appointment to expire on December 31, 1938
(Exhibit 3); in having authorized justice of the peace Iigo R. Pea to defend a criminal case the
hearing of which had begun during the past sessions in Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having
granted a leave of absence of ten days to justice of the peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa),
Palawan (Exhibit 8); and in having granted a leave of absence of thirteen days to the justice of the
peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the
aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of
Justice on the 20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable
Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office. On the
same date, August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to said appointment of judge
of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the
corresponding final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit
11).
Page | 136

The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the
rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge
of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of
First Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the
discharge of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.
The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the
petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad
interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the
Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an
appointment issued to him on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on
September 8th of the same year, he received, on November 7, 1936, a new ad
interim appointment, issued in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145,
which took effect on the same date, to discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
the Court of First Instance of Palawan, upon which he immediately took the corresponding oath
and entered into the discharge of his office. Under his former appointment of June 2, 1936, the
petitioner had authority preside solely over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan, while, according to his new appointment of
November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not only over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First
Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First Instance of Palawan. It should be noted that the
territory over which the petitioner could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last
appointment is wider than that over which he could exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue
of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility between the two appointments and, consequently, in
the discharge of the office conferred by each of them, resulting in the absorption of the former by
the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office
conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same, disposing of both
judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the courts of First Instance of Manila and of
Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the exercise of
the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an
appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible
with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by
taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent
in said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46
Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is
excepted from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public
interest or when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American
Jurisprudence, 770, par. 124). lawphi1.net
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth
Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of
public interest, being one of the means employed by the Government to carry out one of its
purposes, which is the administration of justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice
in the Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes, the temporary
disability of a judge may be immediately remedied without detriment to the smooth running of the
judicial machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act
No. 145 is unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at
Page | 137

least, he should have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to
the laws compelled him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final
determination of the question whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware
of his constitutional and legal rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code),
accepted the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of
Palawan and entered into the performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the
necessary oath, thereby acting with full knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which
he was appointed, he would later be estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by
alleging that the law, by virtue of which his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise
knew, or at least he should know, that his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the
Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly and that if said commission were to
disapprove the same, it would become ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his appointment
of June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial
District, whose Fifth Branch was being presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting
the ad interim appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of first instance of the
Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over said Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Manila together with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into the
discharge of the functions of said office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the office
occupied by him under his said appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he has been
appointed judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
which appointment was disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National
Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed,
by accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the
office conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by both American and
Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional questions, this court deems it
unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg,
56 Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board
of Public Utility Commissioner, 36 Phil., 116; Government of the Philippine Islandsvs. Municipality
of Binagonan, 34 Phil., 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699,
section 40; id., 780, section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold when a judge of first instance,
presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of
First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new
judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into
the discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he
abandons his old office and cannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of
the law by virtue of which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment
having been disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither
can he claim to continue occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment,
having ipso jure ceased in the discharge of the functions thereof.
Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs
to the petitioner. So ordered.

Page | 138

# 53 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78272 August 29, 1989
DR. and MRS. MERLIN CONSING, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARIDAD
SANTOS, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Merlin Consing is the registered owner of a 9,643 sq. m. parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 312970 located in barrio Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Rizal. Sometime in
1971, Consing caused the subdivision of said parcel of land into thirty-eight (38) lots and submitted a
subdivision plan to the Land Registration Commission (LRC) which was approved on January 25, 1971
as a simple subdivision plan. Subsequently, Consing filed a petition for segregation of title and the
issuance of separate certificates of title for the 38 lots. In the same petition, Consing likewise informed
the Register of Deeds that he voluntarily grants the right of way in lots 2, 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, 20, 25, 26, 31,
32, 35, 36, and 37 [Exh. "3"]. The petition for segregation was granted and thereafter, doing business
under the name Mearle Homes, the spouses Consing engaged in the sale of these 38 lots.
On October 4, 1971 private respondent Caridad Santos and the Consings entered into an agreement
denominated as a "Contract of Sale" whereby the latter agreed to sell, transfer and convey to the
former a house and lot more particularly described as follows:
A newly constructed 4 bedrooms, two bathrooms, complete with light and water connections
bungalow, fenced on two parcels of land (Lot No. 26 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd 134075 and
Lot No. 25 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd 134075, all being a portion of Lot B (LRC) Psd
133634, LRC Rec No. 7672 containing an area of TWO HUNDRED NINETY FOUR (294)
SQUARE METERS & TWO HUNDRED NINETY FIVE (295) SQUARE METERS, respectively
more or less including the voluntary right of way, covered by TCT No. 313386 and TCT 313385,
respectively; located at Barrio Bayanbayanan, Municipality of Marikina, Rizal [Exh."11"].
It is stipulated in said "Contract of Sale" that in consideration of the agreement to sell the buyer will pay
the seller P 110,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum, payable as follows: P25,000.00 upon the
signing of the contract and a monthly installment of P 1,020.14 payable on or before the fifth day of
each month beginning December 1971 without necessity of demand until the amount of the purchase
price and interest shall have been fully paid after which ownership would be transferred to the buyer.
Santos paid her monthly installments to the Consings. Starting May 1972, however, she defaulted in
her payments. Consing sent her several letters of demand to which she did not reply. On June 28,
1974, counsel for the Consings sent a final demand letter to Santos asking her to settle her obligations
which by then have accrued to Pl 2,818.61, otherwise, they shall be constrained to resort to court
litigation. [Record, p. 12].
Santos, represented by a lawyer, manifested her willingness to settle her obligations on the condition
that the Consings comply with all the laws and regulations on subdivisions and after payment to her of
damages as a consequence of the use of a portion of her lot, more or less 168 sq.m., as a subdivision
road [Record, p. 13].
Subsequently, on July 26, 1974, the Consings filed an ejectment case against Santos. After trial, on
November 4, 1974, judgment was rendered by Judge Gregorio de la Paz of the Municipal Court of
Marikina in favor of the Consings.
It appears, however, that on August 22, 1974, with the ejectment case still pending, Santos filed with
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for specific performance with damages against the
Consings. On March 17, 1975, the CFI issued a restraining order enjoining the Municipal Court of
Marikina from resolving the motion for execution filed by the Consings in the ejectment case and from
taking further action in said case until further orders from the CFI [Record, p. 69].
Also borne out by the record is the criminal complaint filed by Santos against Merlin Consing charging
him with the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1964 of Marikina for contracting
to sell to her the two lots in question without first securing the approval of the Municipal Council of
Page | 139

Marikina for his subdivision plan [Exh. "1"]. On May 21, 1975 this complaint was dismissed by the fiscal
on the grounds of lack of a prima facie case and prescription [Exh. "1-b"].
At about the same time, Consing submitted his subdivision plan to the Municipal Council of Marikina for
approval. The council, in turn, referred the same to the Department of Local Government and
Community Development (DLGCD) in compliance with its Memorandum Circular No. 73-41 of
September 7, 1973. The DLGCD in its second endorsement dated March 13, 1975, noted that the
"subdivision plan meets in general the requirements in the subdivision regulations of this Office with
respect to lot areas and lot frontages except the street widths which are not indicated as road lots and
which are below the 10 m. minimum requirement. It is therefore recommended that the existing roads
should be indicated on the plan as road lots and the corresponding areas along the sides of the said
roads as corrected, be reserved for future road widening and annotated in the title as such and should
be excluded from the sale of the corresponding affected lots. . . ." [Exh. "D"]
On August 28, 1981, the CFI rendered judgment finding that although the Consings may have
"corrected the irregularities and/or [have] complied with the legal requirements for the operation of their
subdivision, they cannot escape their liability to [Santos] for having sold to her portions of the roads or
streets denominated as right-of-way. On this ground alone, this Court believes that [Santos] was fully
justified in refusing to pay further her monthly amortizations. In the interest of justice, fair play and
equity, this Court believes that there shall be a proportionate reduction of the purchase price of the two
lots corresponding to the area of 168 square meters, more or less, used as a [right] of way." [Record, p.
485]. The dispositive portion of the CFI decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff (Santos), ordering the
defendants Consings to allow the plaintiff to continue paying her monthly amortizations of the
two lots in question of the reduced purchase price of P 78,375.68, after deducting whatever
amounts were already paid by her.
Defendants are further ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P 10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees.
The restraining order issued against Municipal Judge Gregorio C. de la Paz is made permanent.
Plaintiffs other prayers for relief, as well as defendants' counterclaim, are dismissed, for lack of
merit.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED [Record, p. 486].
The Consings interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the CFI with
modification as to the computation of the amount to be deducted from the purchase price. The decretal
portion of the CA decision 1 is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with the modification that the reduced
purchase price of the property in question should be, as it is hereby fixed, at P 94,312.16
instead of P 78,375.68. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED [CA Decision, pp. 12-13].
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses filed this petition for review citing the
following reasons why the decision of respondent court should be reviewed and their petition allowed:
1. The decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals in this case does not comply with
the requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the New Constitution;
2. It is arbitrary and there is no law to support Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of
Appeals in holding that when the Consings constituted a voluntary right of way on Lots 25 and
26, the portions subject to the right of way ceased to be owned by the Consings and became
streets or road lots which the Consings have no right to sell;
3. It is arbitrary and contrary to the documented facts for the respondent Court of Appeals to say
that the portions of Lots 25 and 26 subject to a voluntary right of way are actually used as
streets or roads even though it is clearly stated in the lot titles, in the location plans, and in the
Page | 140

contract of sale, that said portions are not streets or roads, but are portions subject to voluntary
right of way, and in spite of the fact that the subdivision was approved by the Land Registration
Commissioner as a simple subdivision plan which clearly shows that there are no streets or
road lots in the subdivision.
4. It is arbitrary for Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals to suppose that the
portions of Lots 25 and 26 subject to right of way are streets or road lots and then compute the
value of the said portions in a careless and erroneous manner, deducting afterwards the value
so computed from the P 110,000 purchase price; and
5. There is no legal or factual basis in ordering the Consings to pay P 10,000 attorney's fee to
Caridad [Rollo, pp. 24-25].
Thereafter, private respondent, as required by the Court, filed her Answer/Comment to which petitioners
filed their Reply. On May 2, 1988 the Court, after considering the allegations contained, the issues
raised and the arguments adduced in the pleadings submitted by the parties, gave due course to the
petition [Rollo, p. 84].
Petitioners first raise the issue of the Court of Appeals' non-compliance with the certification
requirement under Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en
banc or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for
the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice
shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the
parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution
must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate
courts. [Emphasis supplied].
The first sentence of this provision outlining the decision-making process of the Supreme Court is
adopted from both the 1935 2 and 1973 3 Constitutions. The latter Constitution further broadened the
application of the requirement on the decision-making process by mandating that this "shall be
observed by all inferior collegiate courts."
The certification 4 requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the framers of the 1987
Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the court
sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-writing. The
decision is thus rendered by the court as a body and not merely by a member thereof [I Record of the
Constitutional Commission 498-500], This is in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which
arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of
the required majority vote.
The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for
decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule
131, Rules of Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of
failure to observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for
the omission to account therefor [See I Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such absence of
certification would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.
The second and third assigned errors of petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals finding
that a portion of Lots 25 and 26, although called a voluntary right of way, is a subdivision road which
they have no right to sell. The Consings argue that it is a voluntary easement which they have a right to
constitute by virtue of Art. 619 of the New Civil Code and "[b]y constituting and establishing a voluntary
right of way in said two lots, the portions subject to the voluntary right of way did not become streets or
roads as held by Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals; they continue to be the property
of the Consings but subject to an encumbrance, i.e. subject to an easement of right of way." [Petition, p.
22; Rollo, p. 27]. Further, the Consings contend that "the portions of Lots 25 and 26 subject to voluntary
Page | 141

right of way can never be used as streets or road lots because [their] subdivision plan was approved by
the Land Registration Commissioner as a simple subdivision plan which means that there are no
streets or road lots in the subdivision, otherwise it would not have been approved as [such]." [Petition,
p. 24; Rollo, p. 29]. In fine, the Consings are alleging that there is no basis for the reduction in the
purchase price of the two lots.
Private respondent Santos on the other hand, avers that the alleged right of way is actually a
subdivision road. This road is included in the two lots sold to her and she is deprived of the use and
enjoyment thereof, hence, a reduction in the purchase price of said lots is in order.
Petitioners' contentions are devoid of merit. The evidence on record negates the Consings' assertion
that the portions subject to the voluntary easement of right of way are not roads. It is undisputed that
the Consings' subdivision plan was approved by the LRC as a simple subdivision which indicated no
streets or roads. However, this does not preclude the need for them within the subdivision. An
examination of the Consings' subdivision plan reveals that the land is subdivided into 38 lots with the
so-called voluntary right of way cutting across lots 2 and 3, 7 and 6, 8 and 9,13 and 12,14 and 15, 19
and 18, 20 and 21, 25 and 24, 26 and 27, 31 and 30, 32 and 33. The relative position of this "right of
way" vis-a-vis the lots shows that it is in fact a road without which the subdivision lot buyers would have
no means of access to and from the subdivision.
Moreover, as heretofore stated, when the Municipal Council referred the Consings subdivision plan to
the DLGCD the latter recommended that the existing roads within the subdivision should be indicated
on the plan as road lots. In turn, the Municipal Council of Marikina passed Resolution No. 70 approving
the subdivision plan of Mearle Homes, Inc. subject, however, to several conditions one of which is the
subdivision owner's compliance with the recommendation of the DLGCD. On May 19, 1975, Merlin
Consing wrote a letter addressed to the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Council of Marikina wherein he
admitted that "the road lots as shown in the plan originally approved by the Land Registration
Commission are the Right-of-way which are annotated in the corresponding transfer Certificate of
Titles, copies of which were supplied or forwarded to your office. These are the road lots
mentioned. ..."[Exh."24"].
In this same letter, Merlin Consing stated that "the road lots annotated in their corresponding titles ARE
NOT INCLUDED in the sale of the property." However, the transfer certificates of title covering lot 25
and lot 26 clearly state the boundaries thereof and when compared to the Consings' subdivision plan
would reveal that the seller sold that portion covered by the right of way to the buyer. Further, the
"Contract of Sale" between the parties is specific that the property sold to Santos includes the voluntary
right of way [See Exh. "11" pertinent portion quoted in p. 2 of this decision].
In Lim v. De los Santos [G.R. No. L-18137, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 798] the Court had occasion to
state one duty of a subdivision lot seller. In said case the subdivision lot buyers instituted an action for
specific performance with damages to compel the sellers to construct the necessary roads in the
subdivision that would serve as outlets. The sellers' motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action was sustained by the trial court because the contract to sell between the parties mentioned no
obligation on the part of the defendants to construct roads. The case reached this Tribunal and in
resolving the issue of whether or not the complaint stated a cause of action, the Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice JBL Reyes, declared that "[t]he allegations in the complaint that defendant-vendor
made representations that 'she would have constructed (i.e., would cause to be built) adequate outlets'
for the lots sold do not strike us to be so improbable as to justify their being disbelieved de plano. After
all, a seller's duty is to deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by the buyer for the
purposes contemplated (Sent. Trib. Supreme of Spain, 17 Nov. 1930), and proper access to a
residence is essential to its enjoyment. . . ." [at 802; Emphasis supplied].
In the case at bar, in including as part of Santos' purchase price the value of the subdivision road,
petitioners have shifted to her the burden of providing for an access to and from the subdivision. The
Consings have thus failed in their duty as subdivision lot sellers and for such failure and consequent
unfairness and injustice to Santos, the latter should be entitled to a proportionate reduction in her
purchase price of the two lots.

Page | 142

Petitioner-spouses also allege that the CA erred in its computation of the amount to be deducted from
the purchase price of the lots. They contend that respondent court had no basis when it made its
computation and it merely assumed the price to be deducted.
The CFI's computation deducted from the total purchase price of P 110,000.00 the price per square
meter of the lots multiplied by the total area covered by the right of way which is 168 sq.m. In arriving at
the price per square meter of the two lots, the trial court divided the total purchase price by the total
area of the two lots, which is 589 sq.m.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Consings took exception to this method of computation alleging
that the trial court failed to take into account the value of the bungalow constructed on the lots and
which is part of the contract. The Court of Appeals found merit in this allegation and re-computed the
price per square meter of the two lots in the following manner:
... There is, however, no evidence showing the price of the land sold, separately from that of the
house erected thereon. Be that as it may, it may be reasonably assumed under the
circumstances of the case, that one-half (1/2) of the price of the property corresponds to the
house and the other half to the lot. Upon this assumption, the price per square meter of the land
(with a total area of 589 square meters) may be placed at P 93.38, and the price of 168 square
meters of right of way at P 15,687.84 (instead of P31,375.68 stated in the appealed decision)
which is logically and reasonably deductible from the total purchase price due from the appellee.
In consequence, the total reduced purchase price of the subject property may be fixed at P
94,312.16 (or P l10,000.00 minus P l5,687.84). [CA Decision, p. 11].
Indeed, the record is bereft of any evidence as regards the price of the two lots sold to Santos
separately from the price of the bungalow constructed thereon. The exhibits presented by the parties
and their testimonies do not reveal separate valuations of the bungalow and the two lots. Evident
therefore is the fact that the purchase price of P110,000.00 is for both the bungalow and the two lots
sold as one property. Further, to require the parties to adduce their respective evidence as to the
separate valuations of the properties in question would only serve to unduly delay the disposition of the
case. Under these circumstances, the Court of Appeals' computation that one-half of the purchase price
of P 110,000.00 corresponds to the value of the bungalow and the other half to the two lots is both just
and fair. Accordingly, the Court will not disturb the same.
Finally, petitioners allege that "there is no basis for awarding attorney's fees to (private respondent] in
this case because the Consings have not 'acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy
[Santos'] plainly valid, just and demandable claim' (Art. 2208, para. 5 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines)" [Petition, p. 26; Rollo, p. 31]. The evidence on record, however, proves otherwise. While
the Consings have secured the necessary licenses to operate a subdivision from the Municipal Council
of Marikina and the National Housing Authority they, however, exerted the effort to obtain them only
after private respondent filed a complaint for specific performance against them. Moreover, as
heretofore mentioned, petitioner-spouses constituted an alleged "right of way" over the two lots sold to
private respondent which as the evidence on record reveals was intended to be a subdivision road
occupying 168 sq. m. of the total 589 sq. m. of the lots sold. This conduct on the part of the petitioners
clearly shows gross and evident bad faith, not to mention lack of fairness, for which reason affirmance
of the award of P 10,000.00 attorney's fees in favor of private respondent is in order.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 143

# 54 & # 64 EN BANC
A.M. No. 2756 March 15, 1988
PRUDENTIAL BANK complainant, vs.JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M.
GRECIA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition" filed by respondent Benjamin M.
Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that the decision of November 12,1987, and the resolution of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered by this Court
dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the respondent, the Court RESOLVED (1) the EXPUNGE
said Petition, it being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration filed without leave of Court, besides the
fact that the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same respondent had already been denied with finality on
January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE OUT Annex "1" of the Petition and its exclosures, Annex "1" being a xerox copy
of a letter dated 04 August 1986 written by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being
immaterial and impertinent to this case for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules of Court). The Court will not allow
the filing of such kinds of Petitions/Annexes that are not only irrelevant to the issue and presented out of time as
hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.
Certain points raised in the Petition, however, call for separate treatment and determination.
1) The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Justice Teodoro R. Padilla is
DENIED there being no legal nor factual basis therefor. It is settled jurisprudence that after a member has given
an opinion on the merits of the case, a motion to disqualify a member of the Supreme Court cannot be considered
because litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort
after decision has been rendered (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, citing Government of the Philippine Islands
vs. Heirs of Abelia, 49 Phil. 374).
The decision to disbar respondent lawyer was the collective judgment of the Court, with the exception of Justice
Sarmiento who had inhibited himself, with no member in the least bit attempting to influence one or the other. In
fairness to the Chief Justice, and to disabuse the fears and suspicions of respondent Grecia, it should be made of
record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the Chief Justice show any ill will nor any signs of
"vindictiveness" much less any attempt to "exact vengeance for past affront" against respondent lawyer. All
discussions were characterized by judicial objectivity dictated only by the highest interests of the profession and
public welfare.
Similarly, the plea for the inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being devoid of any valid reason.
Justice Padilla was counsel for Cityland Development Corporation in the case of Manchester Development
Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development Corporation, et al. (G.R. No. 75919, May
7,1987,149 SCRA 562), for which reason he took no part in the said suit. Cityland, however, is not a party in this
administrative case.
2) The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of
certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certification
requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by. any formal certification.
In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be
deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R-510-P entitled
"Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision
were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole,
there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal
certification is obviously not required.
3) No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court's Minute Resolution, dated January
12,1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been
previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so that the
Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be ... denied without
stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the

Page | 144

denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the
grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45). SO ORDERED.

Page | 145

# 55 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 186652

October 6, 2010

ATTY. ALICE ODCHIGUE-BONDOC, Petitioner, vs. TAN TIONG BIO A.K.A. HENRY
TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the installment payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the
Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. (FilEstate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot, despite
repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand for the refund of the purchase price. 1
Respondent, later learning that the lot "sold" to him was inexistent, 2 filed a complaint for Estafa
against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc
(petitioner) and other employees.3
In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner alleged that, inter alia,
xxxx
5. I had no participation at all in the acts or transactions alleged in the Complaint-Affidavit. As a
Corporate Secretary, I have never been involved in the management and day-to-day operations of
[Fil-Estate]. x x x
x x x x.
7. x x x. [Herein respondent] alleges:
"The letter showed that the request was approved by [herein petitioner], provided that the transfer
fee was paid, and that there be payment of full downpayment, with the balance payable in two
years."
8) The handwritten approval and endorsement, however, are not mine. I have never transacted,
either directly or indirectly, with Mrs. Ona or [herein respondent]. x x x4 (emphasis partly in the
original, partly supplied; underscoring supplied)
On the basis of petitioners above-quoted allegations in her Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a
complaint for Perjury against petitioner, docketed as I.S. No. PSG 03-07-11855 before the Pasig
City Prosecutors Office, which dismissed it by Resolution of June 17, 2004 5 for insufficiency of
evidence, and denied respondents Motion for Reconsideration. 6
On petition for review, the Department of Justice (DOJ), by Resolution of July 20, 2005 signed by
the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, 7 motu proprio dismissed the petition on
finding that there was no showing of any reversible error, following Section 12(c) of Department
Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (National Prosecution Service [NPS] Rule on Appeal).
Respondents motion for reconsideration having been denied 8 by Resolution of January 23, 2006,
he filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, by Decision of September 5,
2008,9 set aside the DOJ Secretarys Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution.10
The appellate court went on to hold that the matter of disposing the petition outright is clearly
delineated, not under Section 12 but, under Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal which
categorically directs the Secretary to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after
arraignment; and that under Section 7, the Secretary may dismiss the petition outright if he finds
Page | 146

the same to be patently without merit, or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised
are too unsubstantial to require consideration. 11
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, she filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner asserts that the requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to
decisions of "courts of justice"12; that, citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, 13 the constitutional
provision does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ; and
that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal allows the DOJ to dismiss a petition for review motu
proprio, and the use of the word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution simply means "altogether,"
"entirely" or "openly."14
In his Comment, respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts,
citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 15 as it extends to
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by
these tribunals.
Further, respondent, citing Adasa v. Abalos,16 argues that the DOJ "muddled" the distinction
between Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal and that an "outright" dismissal is not
allowed since the DOJ must set the reasons why it finds no reversible error 17 in an assailed
resolution.
The petition is impressed with merit.
A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since "the prosecutor in a preliminary
investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." 18
x x x [A prosecutor] does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof. While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be
acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
[prosecutor].19 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A preliminary investigation thus partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole
purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken. 20
Balangauan v. Court of Appeals21 in fact iterates that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in
reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered
a quasi-judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body." 22 Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
Respondent posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the present case for, as the
Supreme Court stated, the DOJ "rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a lengthier
one when it resolved [the therein] respondent[s] . . . motion for reconsideration." 23 Respondents
position fails.
Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution in resolving the therein
respondents motion for reconsideration is immaterial. The extended resolution did not detract from
settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
Respondents citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans is
misplaced as the Ombudsman dismissed the therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary
investigation. The Ombudsman merely evaluated the complaint pursuant to Section 2, Rule II of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which reads:
SEC. 2. Evaluation.Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be:
Page | 147

a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;


b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (emphasis supplied)
Respecting the action of the Secretary of Justice on respondents petition for review under Section
12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, respondent posits that "outright" dismissal is not sanctioned
thereunder but under Section 7. Respondents position similarly fails.
That the DOJ Secretary used the word "outright" in dismissing respondents petition for review
under Section 12 of the Rule which reads:
SEC. 12. Disposition of the appeal.The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(a) That there is no showing of any reversible error;
x x x x (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
does not dent his action. To be sure, the word "outright" was merely used in conjunction with the
motu proprio action.
Section 7 has an altogether different set of grounds for the outright dismissal of a petition for
review.1awphil These are (a) when the petition is patently without merit; (b) when the petition is
manifestly intended for delay; (c) when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration; and (d) when the accused has already been arraigned in court. 24
When the Secretary of Justice is convinced that a petition for review does not suffer any of the
infirmities laid down in Section 7, it can decide what action to take (i.e., reverse, modify, affirm or
dismiss the appeal altogether), conformably with Section 12. In other words, Sections 7 and 12 are
part of a two-step approach in the DOJ Secretarys review power.
As for respondents reliance on Adasa, it too fails for, unlike in the case of Adasa, herein petitioner
has not been arraigned as in fact no Information has been filed against her.
In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone
determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal
information,25 courts will not interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be swamped with
petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal complaint is dismissed
or given due course.26
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the Resolutions of July 20, 2005 and
January 23, 2006 of the Secretary of Justice are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 148

# 56 Macario Tayamura v. IAC = no case found -_# 57 FIRST DIVISION


G.R. No. 88709 February 11, 1992
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, JUAN COQUINCO and CARLOS COQUINCO, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORINO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Ex-Officio Sheriff of Bulacan,
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, MANUEL L. CO, GOLDEN STAR INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
We are asked once again to interpret the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, 1 this time in
connection with an order of the trial court sustaining demurrer to the evidence. 2 The order has been affirmed by
the respondent Court of Appeals, 3 and the appellant has come to this Court in this petition for review
on certiorari, invoking the said provision and alleging several reversible errors.
In the complaint filed by the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, it was alleged that on
January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent
United Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two
parcels of land located at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of
the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after
the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was
the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it for P3,558,547.64. On August 29, 1983,
UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who on the same day transferred
them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, upon whose petition a writ of
possession was issued to it on November 4, 1983. On September 6, 1984, NICOS and the other petitioners,
as chairman of its board of directors and its executive vice-president, respectively, filed their action for
"annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction."
Golden Star and Victorino P. Evangelista, as ex officio sheriff of Bulacan, moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, prescription, estoppel, and regularity of the sheriff's sale. Co denied the
allegations of the plaintiffs and, like the other defendants, counterclaimed for damages. In its answer with
counterclaim, UCPB defended the foreclosure of the mortgage for failure of NICOS to pay the loan in
accordance with its promissory note and insisted that the sheriff's sale had been conducted in accordance
with the statutory requirements.
The plaintiffs presented two witnesses, including petitioner Carlos Coquinco, who testified at three separate
hearings. They also submitted 21 exhibits. On April 30, 1986, Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page
demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission; that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that
the sheriff's sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a
newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on
time. No opposition to the demurrer having been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge
Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the
following
ORDER
Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P.
Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file
their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the
Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was in complete accord with the requirements of
Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it
appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff
Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that his cause is actually-against the other officers and
stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the
corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the

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corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and devices of the responsible officials of the
corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the stockholders . . ." a subject matter not
within the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same to be impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective counterclaims
are likewise dismissed.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside.
It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the
aforementioned constitutional requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does
not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. They also stress that the sheriff's sale
was irregular because the notices thereof were published in a newspaper that did not have general
circulation and that the original date of the sheriff's sale had been changed without its consent, the same
having been allegedly given by a person not authorized to represent NICOS. It is also contended that the
original P2 million loan had already been paid and that if there was indeed a second P2 million loan also
secured by the real estate mortgage, it was for UCPB to prove this, as well as its allegation that NICOS had
defaulted in the payment of the first quarterly installment on the first loan.
The petitioners complain that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the
trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no
jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision
that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
Rejecting this contention, the respondent court held:
In their first assignment of error, appellants faults the court for its failure to state clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which the order of dismissal is based, as required by Section 1, Rule 36, of
the Rules of Court and the Constitution.
An order granting a demurrer to the evidence is in fact an adjudication on the merits and
consequently the requirements of Section 1, Rule 36, is applicable. We are not however prepared to
hold that there is a reversible omission of the requirements of the rule in the Order appealed from, it
appearing from a reading thereof that there is substantial reference to the facts and the law on which
it is based.
The Order which adverts to the Demurrer to the Evidence expressly referred to the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff as showing that the Sheriff's auction sale conducted on July 11, 1983, was in
complete accord with the requisites of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was
apparently held and conducted. It likewise makes reference to the allegations in paragraph 13 of
plaintiff's pleadings and plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that the case is actually against
the other officers and stockholders of plaintiff NICOS Industrial Corporation and concludes, rightly or
wrongly, that the subject matter thereof is not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court.
We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be
desired, substantially complies with the rules.
This Court does not agree. The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the
letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply
say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal.
It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders,
such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to
decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters." 4 As for the minute
resolutions of this Court, we have already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that
The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as
final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in

Page | 150

nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions
were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules.
The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.
The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. As it is settled that an
order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, 6 it is imperative that it be a
reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.
It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the merits
and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established principle.
However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction
and not when some other additional ground is invoked.
A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for lack of
jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the sheriff's sale.
Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from the very evidence
adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3,
Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to explain why it believed that the legal
requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an
admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second
ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof
was fatal to the order.
Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case after all. This
made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient.
In People v. Escober, 7 the trial court in a decision that covered only one and a half pages, single spaced found
the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. Holding that the decision violated the constitutional
requirement, the Court observed through then Associate Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:
The above-quoted decision falls short of this standard. The inadequacy stems primarily from the
respondent judge's tendency to generalize and to form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. Thus, he concluded that the material allegations of the
Amended Information were the facts without specifying which of the testimonies or the exhibits
supported this conclusion. He rejected the testimony of accused-appellant Escober because it was
allegedly replete with contradictions without pointing out what these contradictions consist of or what
"vital details" Escober could have recalled as a credible witness. He also found the crime to be
attended by the aggravating circumstances of cruelty, nighttime, superior strength, treachery, in
band, "among others" but did not particularly state the factual basis for such findings.
While it is true that the case before us does not involve the life or liberty of the defendant, as in Escober,
there is still no reason for the constitutional short-cut taken by the trial judge. The properties being litigated
are not of inconsequential value; they were sold for three and a half million pesos in 1983 and doubtless
have considerably appreciated since then, after more than eight years. These facts alone justified a more
careful and thorough drafting of the order, to fully inform the parties and the courts that might later be called
upon to review it of the reasons why the demurrer to the evidence was sustained and the complaint
dismissed.
In Romero v. Court of Appeals, 8 the Court, somewhat reluctantly, approved a memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals consisting of
4 pages, single-spaced, which adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Court of Agrarian Relations. While holding that the
decision could be considered substantial compliance with PD 946, Section 18, 9 and BP 129, Section 40, 10 Justice Jose Y. Feria

nevertheless expressed the misgiving that "the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by just
adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly studying the appealed case."

Obviously, the order now being challenged cannot qualify as a memorandum decision because it was not
issued by an appellate court reviewing the findings and conclusions of a lower court. We note that, contrary
to the impression of the respondent court, there is not even an incorporation by reference of the evidence

Page | 151

and arguments of the parties, assuming this is permitted. No less importantly, again assuming arguendo that
such reference is allowed and has been made, there is no immediate accessibility to the incorporated
matters so as to insure their convenient examination by the reviewing court. In Francisco v.
Permskul, 11 which is the latest decision of the Court on the issue now before us, we categorically required:
. . . Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of the regional trial court,
Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals. It is this circumstance, or
even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum decision challenged in this case
and spared it from constitutional infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a
condition for the proper application of Section 40 of BP Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to be
valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only
byremote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of BP Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the
decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of
the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the facts
and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest
that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision
being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
In Escober, the Court observed that the flawed decision "should have been remanded to the court a quo for
the rendition of a new judgment" but decided nevertheless to decide the case directly, the records being
already before it and in deference to the right of the accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. However, we are not so disposed in the case now before us.
It is not the normal function of this Court to rule on a demurrer to the evidence in the first instance; our task
comes later, to review the ruling of the trial court after it is examined by the Court of Appeals and, when
proper, its decision is elevated to us. In the present case, we find that the respondent court did not have an
adequate basis for such examination because of the insufficiency of the challenged order. It must also be
noted that we deal here only with property rights and, although we do not mean to minimize them, they do
not require the same urgent action we took in Escober, which involved the very life of the accused. All things
considered, we feel that the proper step is to remand this case to the court a quo for a revision of the
challenged order in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution.
Review by the Court of the other issues raised, most of which are factual, e.g., the allegation of default in the
payment of the loan, the existence of a second loan, the nature of the newspapers where the notices of the
sale were published, the authority of the person consenting to the postponement of the sale, etc., is
impractical and unnecessary at this time. These matters should be discussed in detail in the revised order to
be made by the trial court so that the higher courts will know what they are reviewing when the case is
appealed.
In one case, 12 this Court, exasperated over the inordinate length of a decision rife with irrelevant details,
castigated the trial judge for his "extraordinary verbiage." Kilometric decisions without much substance must be
avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less
unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual
findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and, having done so, ends.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of
the Order of June 6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution,
subject to the appeal thereof, if desired, in accordance with law. It is so ordered.

Page | 152

# 58 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 114323 July 23, 1998
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION, petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INC., respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of
Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against
the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED.
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the
private respondent is a private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent has its roots in
a contract entered into by and between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the private
respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (4,300)
metric tons of oil well cement. In consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private
respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in
favor of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV SURUTANA NAVA at the
port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a
dispute between the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in Bangkok and
did not reach its point destination. Notwithstanding the fact that the private respondent had already
received payment and despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private respondent
failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the parties and they
agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement with
Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated port. However, upon inspection, the Class
"G" cement did not conform to the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their
contract which stipulates:
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes,
relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other
question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply
order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise
concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to
the sole arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of
dispute. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a
Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the matter to which the supply or
contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's employee he had
expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference.
The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his
office or being unable to act for any reason the Member of the Commission shall appoint
another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the contract/supply order.
Such person shall be entitled to proceed with reference from the stage at which it was left
by his predecessor. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, or any
Statutory modification or re-enactment there of and the rules made there under and for the
time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause.
The arbitrator may with the consent of parties enlarge the time, from time to time, to make
and publish the award.
The venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun. 1*
On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in petitioner's
favor setting forth the arbitral award as follows:
Page | 153

NOW THEREFORE after considering all facts of the case, the evidence, oral and
documentarys adduced by the claimant and carefully examining the various written
statements, submissions, letters, telexes, etc. sent by the respondent, and the oral
arguments addressed by the counsel for the claimants, I, N.N. Malhotra, Sole Arbitrator,
appointed under clause 16 of the supply order dated 26.2.1983, according to which the
parties, i.e. M/S Oil and Natural Gas Commission and the Pacific Cement Co., Inc. can refer
the dispute to the sole arbitration under the provision of the Arbitration Act. 1940, do hereby
award and direct as follows:
The Respondent will pay the following to the claimant:
1. Amount received by the Respondent
against the letter of credit No. 11/19
dated 28.2.1983 US $ 477,300.00
2. Re-imbursement of expenditure incurred
by the claimant on the inspection team's
visit to Philippines in August 1985 US $ 3,881.00
3. L.C. Establishment charges incurred
by the claimant US $ 1,252.82
4. Loss of interest suffered by claimant
from 21.6.83 to 23.7.88 US $ 417,169.95
Total amount of award US $ 899,603.77
In addition to the above, the respondent would also be liable to pay to the claimant the
interest at the rate of 6% on the above amount, with effect from 24.7.1988 up to the actual
date of payment by the Respondent in full settlement of the claim as awarded or the date of
the decree, whichever is earlier.
I determine the cost at Rs. 70,000/- equivalent to US $5,000 towards the expenses on
Arbitration, legal expenses, stamps duly incurred by the claimant. The cost will be shared by
the parties in equal proportion.
Pronounced at Dehra Dun to-day, the 23rd of July 1988. 2
To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed a Petition before the
Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun. India (hereinafter referred to as the foreign court for
brevity), praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. The
foreign court issued notices to the private respondent for filing objections to the petition. The
private respondent complied and sent its objections dated January 16, 1989. Subsequently,
the said court directed the private respondent to pay the filing fees in order that the latter's
objections could be given consideration. Instead of paying the required filing fees, the
private respondent sent the following communication addressed to the Civil judge of Dehra
Dun:
The Civil Judge
Dehra Dun (U.P.) India
Re: Misc. Case No. 5 of 1989
M/S Pacific Cement Co.,
Inc. vs. ONGC Case
Sir:
1. We received your letter dated 28 April 1989 only last 18 May 1989.
2. Please inform us how much is the court fee to be paid. Your letter did not mention the
amount to be paid.
3. Kindly give us 15 days from receipt of your letter advising us how much to pay to
comply with the same.
Thank you for your kind consideration.
Pacific Cement Co., Inc.
By:
Jose Cortes, Jr.
President 3

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Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court refused to admit the private
respondent's objections for failure to pay the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order on
February 7, 1990, to wit:
ORDER
Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc. Suit No. 5 on 7.2.90,
therefore, award should be made Rule of the Court.
ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions
of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The
plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs
ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9%
interest per annum till the last date of realisation. 4
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the
petitioner for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by
the foreign court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a complaint with Branch
30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement of the aforementioned
judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the
following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue; (2) lack of cause of action; and (3)
plaintiffs claim or demand has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The petitioner
filed its opposition to the said motion to dismiss, and the private respondent, its rejoinder thereto.
On January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order upholding the petitioner's legal capacity to sue,
albeit dismissing the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The RTC held that the rule
prohibiting foreign corporations transacting business in the Philippines without a license from
maintaining a suit in Philippine courts admits of an exception, that is, when the foreign corporation
is suing on an isolated transaction as in this case. 5 Anent the issue of the sufficiency of the
petitioner's cause of action, however, the RTC found the referral of the dispute between the parties
to the arbitrator under Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. According to the RTC,
[a] perusal of the shove-quoted clause (Clause 16) readily shows that the matter covered by
its terms is limited to "ALL QUESTIONS AND DISPUTES, RELATING TO THE MEANING
OF THE SPECIFICATION, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN
BEFORE MENTIONED and as to the QUALITY OF WORKMANSHIP OF THE ITEMS
ORDERED or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but qualified to "IN
ANY WAY ARISING OR RELATING TO THE SUPPLY ORDER/CONTRACT, DESIGN,
DRAWING, SPECIFICATION, etc.," repeating the enumeration in the opening sentence of
the clause.
The court is inclined to go along with the observation of the defendant that the breach,
consisting of the non-delivery of the purchased materials, should have been properly
litigated before a court of law, pursuant to Clause No. 15 of the Contract/Supply Order,
herein quoted, to wit:
"JURISDICTION
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this
supply order, shall be subject to the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT,
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order
is situated." 6
The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to the arbitrator as a
"mistake of law or fact amounting to want of jurisdiction". Consequently, the proceedings
had before the arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no
legal award which could be the source of an enforceable right. 7
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator
did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could not
validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, the appellate court observed that the full text of the
judgment of the foreign court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no findings of fact
and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine
Page | 155

court as it would violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. 8 The
appellate court ruled further that the dismissal of the private respondent's objections for nonpayment of the required legal fees, without the foreign court first replying to the private
respondent's query as to the amount of legal fees to be paid, constituted want of notice or violation
of due process. Lastly, it pointed out that the arbitration proceeding was defective because the
arbitrator was appointed solely by the petitioner, and the fact that the arbitrator was a former
employee of the latter gives rise to a presumed bias on his part in favor of the petitioner. 9
A subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner of the appellate court's decision was
denied, thus, this petition for review on certiorari citing the following as grounds in support thereof:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL SINCE:
A. THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CARGO WAS A MATTER PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY
THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE 16 OF THE CONTRACT;
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL COURT OF DEHRADUN, INDIA WAS AN
AFFIRMATION OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS OF THE ARBITRATOR AND
THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE IN THIS JURISDICTION;
C. EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED TO REPEL THE EFFECT OF A PRESUMPTIVE
RIGHT UNDER A FOREIGN JUDGMENT. 10
The threshold issue is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract. To reiterate, Clause 16
provides as follows:
Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all questions and disputes,
relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other
question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the supply
order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions or otherwise
concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof shall be referred to
the sole arbitration of the persons appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of
dispute. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a
Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the matter to which the supply or
contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's employee he had
expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference. 11
The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of the 4,300 metric tons of oil well
cement to the petitioner. The primary question that may be posed, therefore, is whether or not the
non-delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16.
The petitioner contends that the same was a matter within the purview of Clause 16, particularly
the phrase, ". . . or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising or
relating to the supply order/contract, design, drawing, specification, instruction . . .". 12 It is argued
that the foregoing phrase allows considerable latitude so as to include non-delivery of the cargo
which was a "claim, right or thing relating to the supply order/contract". The contention is bereft of
merit. First of all, the petitioner has misquoted the said phrase, shrewdly inserting a comma
between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" where none actually exists. An accurate
reproduction of the phrase reads, ". . . or as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever,
in any way arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification,
instruction or these conditions . . .". The absence of a comma between the words "supply
order/contract" and "design" indicates that the former cannot be taken separately but should be
viewed in conjunction with the words "design, drawing, specification, instruction or these
conditions". It is thus clear that to fall within the purview of this phrase, the "claim, right or thing
whatsoever" must arise out of or relate to the design, drawing, specification, or instruction of the
supply order/contract. The petitioner also insists that the non-delivery of the cargo is not only
covered by the foregoing phrase but also by the phrase, ". . . or otherwise concerning the materials

Page | 156

or the execution or failure to execute the same during the stipulated/extended period or after
completion/abandonment thereof . . .".
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is equally
applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual stipulations, such
as the aforementioned phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made clear and specific by considering the company of the words in which it is found or
with which it is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by
reference to associated words. 13 A close examination of Clause 16 reveals that it covers three
matters which may be submitted to arbitration namely,
(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification designs, drawings and
instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered; or
(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or relating to the
supply order/contract design, drawing, specification, instruction or these conditions; or
(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment thereof.
The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and disputes relating to the
design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply/order contract.
In the third category, the clause, "execution or failure to execute the same", may be read as
"execution or failure to execute the supply order/contract". But in accordance with the doctrine
of noscitur a sociis, this reference to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the
preceding words with which it is associated, meaning to say, as being limited only to the design,
drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The
non-delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure
to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the
contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to arbitration
is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person possessed with the required skill
and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.
This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is
a matter properly cognizable by the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their
contract:
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply
order, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated. 14
The following fundamental principles in the interpretation of contracts and other instruments served
as our guide in arriving at the foregoing conclusion:
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual. 15
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing the
doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. 16
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In the construction of an
instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. 17
Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract should not be read in
isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the other
related provisions. 18 The whole and every part of a contract must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the canon of construction that in
interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be
given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge
of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative
should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. 19

Page | 157

The petitioner's interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to contemplate even the nondelivery of the oil well cement would in effect render Clause 15 a mere superfluity. A perusal of
Clause 16 shows that the parties did not intend arbitration to be the sole means of settling
disputes. This is manifest from Clause 16 itself which is prefixed with the proviso, "Except where
otherwise provided in the supply order/contract . . .", thus indicating that the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator is not all encompassing, and admits of exceptions as may be provided elsewhere in the
supply order/contract. We believe that the correct interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in
the contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes arising from or relating to the
design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract,
and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
The petitioner then asseverates that granting, for the sake of argument, that the non-delivery of the
oil well cement is not a proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to
conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling within the ambit of Clause 16.
In this contention, we find merit. When the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement were not delivered
to the petitioner, an agreement was forged between the latter and the private respondent that
Class "G" cement would be delivered to the petitioner as replacement. Upon inspection, however,
the replacement cement was rejected as it did not conform to the specifications of the contract.
Only after this latter circumstance was the matter brought before the arbitrator. Undoubtedly, what
was referred to arbitration was no longer the mere non-delivery of the cargo at the first instance but
also the failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the specifications of the contract, a matter
clearly within the coverage of Clause 16.
The private respondent posits that it was under no legal obligation to make replacement and that it
undertook the latter only "in the spirit of liberality and to foster good business
relationship". 20 Hence, the undertaking to deliver the replacement cement and its subsequent
failure to conform to specifications are not anymore subject of the supply order/contract or any of
the provisions thereof. We disagree.
As per Clause 7 of the supply order/contract, the private respondent undertook to deliver the 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement at "BOMBAY (INDIA) 2181 MT and CALCUTTA 2119 MT". 21 The
failure of the private respondent to deliver the cargo to the designated places remains undisputed.
Likewise, the fact that the petitioner had already paid for the cost of the cement is not contested by
the private respondent. The private respondent claims, however, that it never benefited from the
transaction as it was not able to recover the cargo that was unloaded at the port of
Bangkok. 22 First of all, whether or not the private respondent was able to recover the cargo is
immaterial to its subsisting duty to make good its promise to deliver the cargo at the stipulated
place of delivery. Secondly, we find it difficult to believe this representation. In its Memorandum
filed before this Court, the private respondent asserted that the Civil Court of Bangkok had already
ruled that the non-delivery of the cargo was due solely to the fault of the carrier. 23 It is, therefore,
but logical to assume that the necessary consequence of this finding is the eventual recovery by
the private respondent of the cargo or the value thereof. What inspires credulity is not that the
replacement was done in the spirit of liberality but that it was undertaken precisely because of the
private respondent's recognition of its duty to do so under the supply order/contract, Clause 16 of
which remains in force and effect until the full execution thereof.
We now go to the issue of whether or not the judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this
jurisdiction in view of the private respondent's allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts
and law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. The pertinent portion of the
judgment of the foreign court reads:
ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On the basis of conditions
of award decree is passed. Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The
plaintiff shall also be entitled to get from defendant (US$ 899,603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs
ninety nine thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) along with 9%
interest per annum till the last date of realisation. 24
As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of
the decree". This is a categorical declaration that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and
Page | 158

law of the arbitrator as contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper No. 3/B-1, contains an
exhaustive discussion of the respective claims and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator's
evaluation of the same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have been incorporated into the
foreign court's judgment the appellate court was in error when it described the latter to be a
"simplistic decision containing literally, only the dispositive portion". 25
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein dearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity
of "memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. In Francisco v. Permskul, 26 this Court held that the
following memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not transgress the
requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court hereby
adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no
cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 27 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the earlier case of Romero v. Court
of Appeals, 28 where the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and
disposition of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:
We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the
same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial court's
factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and
expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts and
conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our
decision. 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the
cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the
decision of the higher court. 30This is particularly true when the decision sought to be
incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at, as
in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of eighteen (18) single spaced pages.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the
fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. 31 This Court has held that
matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment
may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In
the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court becomes
final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide
otherwise.
The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been blatantly violated, first by
reason of the fact that the foreign court never answered its queries as to the amount of docket fees
to be paid then refused to admit its objections for failure to pay the same, and second, because of
the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former employee of the petitioner.
Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense 33 or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be
heard. 34 Thus, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the
party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so. 35
In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that it was notified by the foreign
court to file its objections to the petition, and subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for its
objections to be given consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, however, the private
respondent sent a communication to the foreign court inquiring about the correct amount of fees to
Page | 159

be paid. On the pretext that it was yet awaiting the foreign court's reply, almost a year passed
without the private respondent paying the legal fees. Thus, on February 2, 1990, the foreign court
rejected the objections of the private respondent and proceeded to adjudicate upon the petitioner's
claims. We cannot subscribe to the private respondent's claim that the foreign court violated its
right to due process when it failed to reply to its queries nor when the latter rejected its objections
for a clearly meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded sufficient opportunity to be
heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court to reply to the private respondent's written
communication. On the contrary, a genuine concern for its cause should have prompted the private
respondent to ascertain with all due diligence the correct amount of legal fees to be paid. The
private respondent did not act with prudence and diligence thus its plea that they were not
accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or sympathy from this
Court. 36
The private respondent bewails the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator who was a former
employee of the petitioner. This point deserves scant consideration in view of the following
stipulation in the contract:
. . . . It will be no objection any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a
Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the matter to which the supply or
contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Commission's employee he had
expressed views on all or any of the matter in dispute or difference. 37 (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals 38 that:
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings
and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a
tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent
title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of
Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it
was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official
duty. 39
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment, the private respondent herein, had
the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in the instant
case.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than to order its
enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner merely prays for the remand of the case to the
RTC for further proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability of the said
foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in the RTC for the reception of evidence to
prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint in
Civil Case No. 4006 before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City is REVERSED, and another in its
stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INC. to
pay to petitioner the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said case.
SO ORDERED.

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# 59 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-82273 June 1, 1990
JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SAMSON LAO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for damages filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 8 docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-8679, petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo charges Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.
Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office of this Court, with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly
"maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of
Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273.
Summons were issued by the lower court requiring the respondents to answer the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from receipt thereof. Since the summons arose from a complaint against a resolution of the Third
Division and the complaint is against personnel of the Third Division acting in their official capacity upon
orders issued to them by the Third Division, the summons were initially referred, to the Third Division. In a
resolution dated April 25, 1990, the summons were referred by the Third Division to the Court En Banc.
This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In
several letter-complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman 1 Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he
"suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which
were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3),13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution . 2 His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the
signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted
therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not
state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore
"unconstitutional, null and void."
In the present case for-damages filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Mr. Borromeo charges that
Attys. Carreon, Marasigan and Ilustre usurped judicial functions by issuing a "supposed" resolution of the
Third Division of the Court in G.R. No. 82273, and further alleges that, "the wanton, malicious and deceitful
acts of defendants in impeding, obstructing, and defeating the-proper administration of justice by depriving
plaintiff of due process, equal protection of the laws, and his cardinal primary rights through said illegal,
unjust and fake 'resolutions' and 'Entry of Judgment,' has caused plaintiff grave moral shock, mental
anguish, sleepless nights, severe embarrassment and endless worry, for which the former must be
condemned to pay MORAL DAMAGES in the amount of not less than P50,000.00."
The September 13, 1989 resolution of the Supreme Court through its Third Division which disposed of
Borromeo's petition is a four-page resolution which more than adequately complies with the constitutional
requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The petition and its
incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the Third Division during the April 13, 1988
session; the September 28,1988 session; the November 28,1988 session; the January 25, 1989 session;
and the April 12, 1989 session before the issuance of the September 13, 1989 resolution. On November 27,
1989, a motion for reconsideration, which was received by the Court more than a month after a copy of the
September 13, 1989 resolution denying the petition was served on the petitioner, was noted without action
as the Court found that the motion merely reiterated the same arguments earlier raised in the petition and
already passed upon by the Court and was, therefore without merit.
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute
resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merits where the
issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by: substantial evidence
and, is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In
Re: Wenceslao Laureta(148 SCRA 382,417 [1987], "[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" (Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it

Page | 161

can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. The Court
ordinarily acts on the incidents or basic merits of three hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases through its
Divisions every Monday and Wednesday when the Divisions meet and on one hundred (100) to one
hundred twenty (120) cases every Tuesday and Thursday that it meets en banc or around one thousand
(1,000) cases a week. It is only on Fridays; and week-ends that the members of the Court work in their
separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session--either in Divisions or En Banc.
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are promulgated by the Court through the
Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the action taken
on their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the
deliberations of case. All decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the caseG.R. No. 56280, "Rhine Marketing Corp. v.
Felix Gravante, et al.", where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court said"[M]inute resolutions of this
Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a
thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise of
its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a
petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order together
with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."
In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the Court
clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and law
on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under the
constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review ... shall be refused due course ...without
stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after deliberating on
a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course
to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent court's
decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliancewith the
constitutional requirement.
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a
case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to sign all
resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their
time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time could be
more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature
and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. Remediallegislation to meet this problem is also pending in Congress.
In discharging its constitutional duties, the Court needs the fun time and attention of its Clerks of Court and
other key officials. Its officers do not have the time to answer frivolous complaints filed by disgruntled
litigants questioning decisions and resolutions of the Court and involving cases deliberated upon and
resolved by the Court itself. As earlier stated, all resolutions and decisions are actions of the Court, not its
subordinate personnel. The Court assumes full responsibility: for all its acts. Its personnel cannot answer
and should not be made to answer for acts of the Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, all private law practitioners, government, lawyers, government prosecutors,
and Judges of trial courts are ORDERED to themselves with the above procedures and to refrain from filing,
taking cognizance of, and otherwise taking part in harassment suits against officers of the Supreme Court
insofar as the latter are sought to be held liable for decisions, resolutions, and other actions of the Supreme
Court and/or its Justices. Instead, all such complaints against resolutions, decisions, and other actions of the
Supreme Court must be forwarded to the Court itself for remedial or other appropriate action. Any violation
of this order by a member of the Bar or the judiciary shows gross ignorance of the law and shall constitute a
ground for appropriate proceedings. In this particular case, Judge Rafael R. Ybaez, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 18, is hereby ORDERED to QUASH the summons issued and to
DISMISS Civil Case No. CEB-8679. He is further DIRECTED not to issue summons or otherwise entertain
cases of similar nature which may in the future be filed in his court.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 162

# 61 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127682. April 24, 1998]
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAXIMO
CONTRERAS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:
Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and denominated as a
Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
September 10, 1997. This resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the specific
prohibition against second motions for reconsideration[1] Which are applicable thereto. Considering
however, the increasing practice by defeated parties of conjuring scenarios which they blame for their
debacle instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court is constrained to once again
express its displeasure against such unethical disregard of the canons for responsible advocacy, with
the warning that this insidious pattern of professional misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass
with impunity.
Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors and irregularities in the
disposition of this case to both the Court of Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions amounting
to misconduct on the part of counsel for respondent private corporation and with specific imputations
against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith.These will hereafter be discussed in light
of the records of this Court and the vigorous disclaimer of counsel for said private respondent.
Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its petition for review
on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent Court of Appeals[2] was denied by this Court for
failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned
judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second Division of this Court of the
merits of the challenged decision and the extended resolution of respondent court denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present petition for review on
certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of petitioner, and the joint rejoinder of
respondents, as well as the respective annexes of said pleadings.Indeed, the parties had all the
opportunity to expound on and dissect the issues in this case, and in some instances even the nonissues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such pleadings.
Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court required respondents to
comment thereon, after which petitioners reply filed without leave was nonetheless admitted, and to
which, on leave sought and granted, respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these pleadings, just like
those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so extensive, to the point of even incorporating new
and modified issues, as to cover all possible aspects of the case to subserve the partisan views of the
parties. Since no additional and substantial arguments were adduced to warrant the reconsideration
sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on January 26, 1998.[4]
It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the parties should further have
been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to its petition,
while simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were not read. Indeed, petitioner would even dictate
how this Court should have acted on its petition, with the improbable theory that because the case had
progressed to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due course and a decision be rendered
thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably erroneous submission that since
respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo, this Court is duty bound to determine the
facts involved. Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of our jurisprudence which merely holds that, in
such a case, this Court may at its option review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals instead of
being bound thereby. Secondly, and worse for petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings of the
two lower courts as the Court of Appeals actually adopted the findings of fact of the trial court.

Page | 163

In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different tack by lecturing this Court
on its theory that the minute resolutions it assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14, Article VIII
of the present Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure adopted by this
Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment proceedings. Petitioner
is, of course, free to believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may likewise be minded to take the
appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all and sundry to now imbibe the
consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.
As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al, [5] it has been stressed that these resolutions
are not decisions within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al.,[6] and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission on
Audit, et al.[7] that the constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e.,
given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the
petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefore stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when
the Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides to deny due course to the
petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible error in the respondent
courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.[8]
For, as expounded more in detail in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:[9]
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by
substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear
from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgmentand for noncompliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives
the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987]), [T]he Court
is not duty bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case (Italics
supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly discharge
its constitutional functions. x x x.
xxx
In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the
Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts
and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under
the constitutional provision which states that, No petition for review x x x shall be refused due course x
x x without stating the legal basis therefor (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions
decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no
reversible error in the respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the
resolution, there is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
The course of action adopted by the Court in disposing of this case through its two resolutions,
after a thorough review of the issues and arguments of the parties in the plethora of pleadings they
have filed, is not only in accord with but is justified by this firm and realistic doctrinal rule:
x x x The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment
shall be framed. It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a minute
resolution should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute
Resolution of dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of
the controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due
course to a Petition for Review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is
no need to fully explain the Courts denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals opinion. A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court
Page | 164

of Appeals can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions
of the Court of Appeals, in other words that the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.
[10]

That this Court was fully justified in handing down its minute resolution because it agrees with or
adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals since the decision sought to be reviewed
and set aside is correct, is best demonstrated and appreciated by reproducing the salient
pronouncements of respondent court on the real issues actually involved in this case. The material
holdings in its decision[11] of June 28, 1996 are as follows:
The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
Sometime in 1975, NIDC granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) and
a Two Million ((P2,000,000.00) guarantee to secure PNB.(Exh. M of petitioner and Exh. 22 of
respondent PNB and intervenor SLDC, T.S.N. October 14, 1992 pp. 19-28). As security thereof,
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated April 24, 1975 was executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of
NIDC, covering, among others, a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in and
covered by TCT NO. 469737 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal (now Makati,
Metro Manila). At the instance of Respondent PNB and with the conformity of its subsidiary,
NIDC, in order to secure the obligation of Petitioner KIPI under Respondent PNBs deferred
letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00 in favor of Toyota Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, Petitioner KIPI
executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 covering the same parcel of
land and its improvements under TCT No. 469737 on a pari passu basis in favor of Respondent
PNB and NIDC. (Exhibit H, H-1 to H-9). Upon full payment of Petitioner KIPIs account with
NIDC and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and
Cancellation of Mortgage[12] dated January 7, 1981 releasing the mortgage on TCT No. 469737
(Exhibit 1 to 1-4 of Petitioner and Exhibits 7 to 7-D of Respondent PNB and Intervenor
SLDC). In this Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, it is provided among the
whereases that Whereas, the credit accomodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC. (Exh. 1-5). By virtue of this full payment and the
execution of the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, NIDC returned the owners
copy of the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and accordingly the Deed of Release and
Cancellation of Mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deed on January 28,
1981. (Exhibits E to E-5) (sic) that there were some accounts chargeable to Petitioner KIPI on
deferred letters of credit opened and established in 1974 and 1975 settled by Respondent PNB
with the foreign suppliers in 1978 and 1979 but came to the knowledge of Respondent PNB only
in 1981 and 1982 (Exhibits 21-1 to 21-L. T.S.N. May 20, 1992 pp. 16-30).
In a letter to Petitioner KIPI dated March 31, 1992, Respondent PNB requested for the return of
the owners copy of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. 22). On July 7, 1982 in a letter addressed to Mr.
Ricardo C. Silverio, then President of Petitioner KIPI, Respondent PNB reiterated for the return
of the aforesaid TCT NO. 469737 (Exh. 22-A) and the said title was returned to Respondent
PNB.
On May 7, 1982, Respondent PNB filed a Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse Claim
with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila and was able to have the same
annotated at the back of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. 9 joint exhibit of Respondent PNB and
Intervenor SLDC).
On November 2, 1983, Respondent PNB filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati, Metro Manila
a Petition of Sale Under ACT 1508, as amended by P.D. 385 to extra-judicially foreclose various
properties belonging to Petitioner by virtue of a Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney dated
June 21, 1978 (Exhibits J to J-4).
On November 25, 1983, Petitioner KIPI received an undated Notice of Sheriffs Sale to the effect
that the land covered by TCT No. 469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19,
1983 at 9:00 a.m. (Exh. K to K-2).
xxx

Page | 165

Simplifying and summing up all the assigned errors of both appellants Philippine National Bank
and Santiago Land Development Corporation, there are actually three main issues to be
resolved in this appeal, to wit: (1) Whether the Deed of Release dated January 7, 1981
executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of appellee
Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. [Exhibit I, p. 76 Record Vol. I; Exhibit 7, p. 1494 Record Vol. IV],
had the effect of releasing the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National
Bank, as embodied in the Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 [Exhibit H, p. 64
Record Vol I; Exhibit 6, p. 1482 Record - Vol. IV]; (2) Whether the foreclosure of appellees
property conducted on May 17, 1984 is valid; (3) Whether there is legal and/or factual basis for
the awards of damages in favor of the appellee.
Anent the first issue, We rule that the Deed of Release dated January 7, 1981 executed solely
by the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of the appellee Komatsu
Industries (Phil.) Inc., did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of
appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated
June 21, 1978. Said Deed of Release is not binding upon the appellant Philippine National Bank
which was not a signatory to it and has not ratified the same.
It is axiomatic under Our law on obligations and contracts that contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs (Art. 1311, New Civil Code). The characteristic of
relativity of contracts renders it binding only upon the parties and their successors. [Civil Code
of the Philippines, Annotated, Paras, Vol. IV 1994 ed., pp. 550-552]. A contract cannot be
binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it [Civil Code of the
Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 citing Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336, Ibaez vs.
Rodriguez, 47 Phil. 554, etc.] even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge
thereof [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995, p. 428 citing Manila Port
Service et al. vs. Court of Appeals et al. 20 SCRA 1214]. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by the act, declaration, or omission of another, and proceedings against one cannot
affect another, except as expressly provided by law or the Rules of Court [Civil Code of the
Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 / Rule 123 sec. 10 Rules of Court].
We accordingly find no legal basis for the courts ruling that the Deed of Release dated January
7, 1981, had the effect of releasing the mortgage in favor of appellant bank despite the fact that
it was executed solely by the National Investment and Development Corporation without any
conformity or authority whatsoever of its joint mortgagee, the appellant Philippine National
Bank. It is not disputed that PNB is a corporation with a separate and distinct personality from
that of NIDC. The court a quo erred in holding that PNB recognized the release of the mortgage
as shown by its Exhibit 22 wherein Vice President Ramirez stated in his memo to the Litigation
and Collection Division of the PNB that upon discovery of the aforecited release of the
mortgage, we immediately wrote NIDC informing them that KIPI effected the release of PNBs
mortgage using NIDCs Deed of Release. The same memo stated that PNB requested KIPI to
return the title for the reannotation of PNBs mortgage which was erroneously cancelled (p.
1712, Record). Accordingly, the same exhibit indubitably showed that PNB promptly objected to
the erroneous cancellation of the mortgage in its favor. Moreover, as above pointed out, an
agreement cannot bind one who is not a party even if he had knowledge of the agreement and
had acted on the basis thereof.
Moreover, a reading of the Amendment of Mortgage Deeds executed by Komatsu, PNB and NIDC, will
show that it covered not only the credit accommodations obtained by Komatsu with NIDC as described
in the first whereas clause, but also another obligation arising from the establishment of a deferred
letter of credit for US$1,564,826.00, and other credit accommodations. We quote from the said
Amendment:
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Deed of Mortgage in favor
of NIDC referred to in the first Whereas clause hereof shall be as it is hereby amended in the sense
that the mortgage shall be in favor of PNB and NIDC, their successors and assigns on a pari-passu
basis to secure the respective obligations of the Mortgagor to PNB and NIDC as follows:
NIDC : a) Direct loan of P8,000,000.00
Page | 166

: b) Guarantee in the amount of P2,000,000.00 issued in favor of PNB to secure the Credit Line of the
MORTGAGOR with PNB
PNB : US $1,564,826.00 or equivalent in Philippine Currency by way of deferred Letter of Credit issued
by PNB in favor of Toyoda Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, thru Republic National Bank of New York, N.Y.
plus interest and charges as well as all other obligations, whether direct or indirect, primary or
secondary, as appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB and other reasonable
expenses and charges arising thereunder, whether such obligations have been contracted before,
during or after date hereof. Subject to condition No. 4 hereinbelow, in case the MORTGAGOR execute
subsequent promissory note or notes either as renewal of the former note, an extension thereof, as
new loan, or is given any kind of accommodations such as overdraft, letters of credit, acceptance and
bills of exchange, release of import shipments, on trust receipts etc., this mortgage shall also stand as
security for the payment of said promissory notes or notes and/or accommodations without necessity of
executing new contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said
promissory notes or notes and/or accommodations were existing on the date hereof. However, if the
MORTGAGOR shall pay to the MORTGAGEES, their successors or assigns the obligations secured by
this mortgage, together with interest, costs and other expenses on or before the date they are due and
shall keep and perform all the covenants and agreements herein contained for the MORTGAGOR then
this mortgage shall be null and void, otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect. (pp. 65-66,
Record).
It is clear that the reference to the credit accommodations consisting of P8,000,000.00 direct loan
and P2,000,000.00 guarantee mentioned in the third whereas clause of the Deed of Release as having
been fully paid by the borrower was to these two obligations obtained from NIDC, and not to the other
obligation described in the Amended Mortgage as pertaining to PNB directly, arising from the issuance
of the deferred letter of credit in the amount of US $1,564,826.00, the express inclusion of which
obligation in the Amended Mortgage cannot be ignored. It is equally clear that NIDC was in no position
to state that Komatsus direct obligation to PNB has been fully paid. And on the basic proposition abovestated that the deed of release executed by NIDC cannot bind its joint mortgagee, which is an entirely
different entity, We find that the court a quo erroneously invoked the 3rd whereas clause stating that the
credit accommodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
NIDC.
We are thus unable to accept the trial courts reasoning that the release executed by NIDC will
necessarily include the mortgage to PNB. The hypothesis that NIDC being a wholly owned subsidiary of
its joint mortgagee could not have executed the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage without
the knowledge and consent of respondent PNB, its mother company, has no support in law and
jurisprudence. Neither does the evidence of record show that any confirmation or ratification of the
release of mortgage was made by the PNB. Nothing short of an actual payment of the debt or an
express release will operate to discharge a mortgage (55 Am. Jur. 394).
Defendants-appellants also question the trial courts ruling that even granting that PNBs claim is correct
that insofar as it is concerned, the mortgage was not released it being separate entity and the mortgage
being on a pari passu basis, the extrajudicial foreclosure should be to the extent only of its
proportionate credit.
We do not agree that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property
is null and void. A mortgage is indivisible in nature, so that payment of a part of the secured debt does
not extinguish the entire mortgage (See Paras, Civil Code Anno., 1995 ed., Vol. V, p. 1044; Art. 2089,
Civil Code). There is also no language in the mortgage instrument to indicate otherwise, i.e. that the
mortgage of the Pasong Tamo property is divisible, so that in case of the payment of the obligation to
one mortgagee the mortgage would subsist only to the extent of the remaining lien of the other
mortgagee. The mortgage instrument contemplated not only obligations existing on the date thereof,
but also future obligations or accommodations appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC
and PNB, thus rendering it unlikely and impractical for the parties to have intended a division of the
mortgaged property in accordance with the proportionate credits of the two joint mortgagors.
The case of Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 46) cited by the court a
quo is not in point. It refers to a mortgage of one parcel of land in favor of one mortgagee, where there
Page | 167

was a failure of consideration, i.e., the entire amount of the loan was not released to the mortgagor and
the mortgage was thus held to be enforceable only to the extent of the amount of the loan that was
released. The factual situation in this case is obviously different. The mortgage here is not being
enforced for more than the actual sum due.
With respect to the courts pronouncement that the Petition for Correction of Entry or Adverse Claim
cannot be made as basis of any foreclosure proceeding, suffice it to point out that the records bear out
defendants-appellants claim that the PNB filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act
No. 3135 pursuant to the provisions of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed (Records, pp. 1482 to
1493). The Petition for Sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, dated October 8, 1983, was made the
basis for the issuance of the Notice of Sheriffs sale (Exhs. 9 to 9-d, 9-e to 9-bbb, 9-ccc Komatsu; Exhs.
10, 14 to 14-b, 15, 17 PNB,/SLDC). The plaintiff-appellee has not controverted the veracity of these
documents either in the court below or in its Appellees brief. Accordingly, We rule that since the
mortgage in favor of PNB is still subsisting, the sheriffs sale on the basis of the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure is valid.
Finally, consistently with Our above ruling relative to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the
non-binding effect of the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and Development
Corporation in so far as the mortgage in favor of the appellant Philippine National Bank is
concerned. We rule that the appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. is not entitled to any award of
damages pursuant to the principle of damnum absque injuria, i.e. there might have been a loss (on the
part of the appellee-mortgagor) arising from the foreclosure but said loss does not create a ground of
legal redress. A loss or damage which does not constitute the violation of a legal right or amount to a
legal wrong is damnum absque injuria [Huyong Hian vs. Court of Appeals, 59 SCRA 134; Gilchrist vs.
Cuddy, 29 Phil. 548]. (Italics supplied)
Consequently, respondent court reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case
NO. 5957 and declared legal and valid the First Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated November 12, 1983, the
Second Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated April 6, 1984, the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Proceedings held and
conducted thereunder, the Certificate of Sale dated May 17, 1984 and the registration thereof, the Final
Deed of Sale, its registration and the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to respondent Philippine
National Bank as the highest and lone bidder, the Deed of Sale in favor of and the Transfer Certificate
of Title issued to the intervenor Santiago Land Development Corporation.
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its
resolution[13] of January 14, 1997, from which we quote the following pertinent excerpts:
The motion for reconsideration has no merit.
We reiterate our ruling that the Deed of Release executed solely by National Investment and
Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of
appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the Amendment of Mortgage Deed. This issue was
fully discussed in our decision and We find no substantial argument in the motion for reconsideration,
the petitioner-appellees memorandum or at the hearing, that would warrant a reversal of our previous
findings.
It is evident that the Deed of Release pertains only to the mortgage executed in favor of the National
Investment and Development Corporation whose credit has been fully paid. Insofar as the mortgage
executed in favor of PNB is concerned, the same subsists as the credit in the amount of $1,564,826.00
remained unpaid. Contrary to appellees submission, the Deed of Release executed by the National
Investment and Development Corporation is not an exercise in futility for said document actually
released the indebtedness due to the National Investment and Development Corporation consisting of
an P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee loan.
Petitioner-appellee submits that in the light of Article 2089 of the Civil Code, the Amendment of
Mortgage Deed is null and void, and there was no valid mortgage in favor of PNB. Hence when the
Deed of Release cancelled the only valid mortgage in favor of National Investment Development
Corporation, there was no more mortgage left to be foreclosed by Philippine National Bank.
We do not agree.

Page | 168

At the outset, We note that the legality and validity of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed was never put
in issue before the trial court nor was it raised in the appeal proper. If well recognized jurisprudence
precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue
be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the appellate court [Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303].
At any rate, We are not inclined to uphold appellees contention that the Amendment of Mortgage Deed
(which is the basis of the mortgage in favor of the PNB) is null and void on the argument that Article
2089 of the Civil Code prohibits a situation where two or more creditors, with separate and distinct
credits secured a mortgage over a single property.
There is nothing in Article 2089 of the Civil Code that prohibits the mortgagor from mortgaging the same
property for a separate and distinct debt in favor of another creditor. In this jurisdiction, the mortgagor is
allowed to obtain subsequent loans by means of subsequent and successive mortgages on the same
property. We further agree with appellant that if an owner-mortgagor can enter into second and further
mortgages, there is no law that prohibits the mortgagor and the mortgagee from agreeing that the
mortgages would be pari-passu. What is proscribed by Article 2089 is for a debtor who has mortgaged
his property to secure a debt, to demand that the mortgage be released in proportion to the amount of
the debt he has paid. Under the said article, the mortgagor has to pay the debt in full before he can ask
for the release of the mortgage. This is compatible with the principle that a mortgage is indivisible.
Our ruling that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is valid
since the mortgage is indivisible in nature is not inconsistent with our statement that the Deed of
Released executed solely by National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to
release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank. The fact that
the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation did not
operate to release the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, does not
render the mortgage divisible. Indeed, foreclosure of the property in its entirety by Philippine National
Bank is necessary because of the indivisible nature of a mortgage. The fact that there are two
obligations secured by the same mortgaged property does not render the mortgage divisible. The
indivisibility of the mortgage or pledge does not affect the divisibility of the principal obligation.When the
same thing is pledged or mortgaged to several creditors, the indivisibility of the pledge or mortgage
entitled each and every creditor to the same action against the thing which is liable in its entirety for the
individual share of each creditor. [Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino, Vol. V, pp. 538-539, 1992
Ed.].
The rest of the arguments of the appellee in its motion for reconsideration are mere rehash of what
have been raised in its brief and were already fully considered and discussed in our decision.
(Emphasis ours)
In the same manner, we readily found that, despite the lengthy and repetitious submissions of
petitioner in its pleadings filed with this Court as earlier enumerated, all the arguments therein are also
mere rehashed versions of what it posited before respondent court. We have patiently given petitioners
postulates the corresponding thorough and objective review but, on the real and proper issues so
completely and competently discussed and resolved by respondent court, petitioners obvious
convolutions of the same arguments are evidently unavailing. It must be noted that its recourse to
respondent court was by appeal on writ of error, hence the preceding quotation in extenso of said
courts decision readily shows how the real issues were correctly particularized and summarized to
meet petitioners assignment of errors, and then ably adjudicated on both evidential and legal grounds.
Petitioner has come to this Court this time on appeal by certiorari and it must be aware of the
elementary rule that, as emphasized in the decisions previously cited, a review thereunder is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor.[14] Here, there is no novel question of substance nor has respondent court
decided the case contrary to law or our applicable decisions. On the contrary, it acted with
commendable fealty to the same, and that is the other reason why we extensively reproduced the
pertinent discussions in its challenged decision.
All these notwithstanding, petitioner still comes up with another supposed issue, this time faulting
respondent court for allegedly not resolving the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to
Page | 169

redeem its foreclosed property from respondent Philippine National Bank in the event the foreclosure
thereof is held to be valid. We agree with respondents observation that this matter is not proper at this
stage of the case since it was never raised in the complaint or admitted as an issue at the pre-trial, but
was raised only in petitioners memorandum before the trial court. [15] Also, respondents point out that the
period of redemption had long lapsed since the sheriffs certificate of sale was registered on May 17,
1984 and, citing applicable authorities, the one-year redemption period is not suspended by an action
for nullification of the auction sale.
What is more telling against petitioners new proposition, however, is the documented fact that as
early as April 17, 1985, it executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of Redemption over the property in
question in favor of Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing. [16] In fact, the exercise of such right of redemption by
the assignee is involved in Civil Case No. 105 of the Regional Trial court of Makati, and the side issue
of the right of respondent Santiago Land Development Corporation to intervene therein was decided by
this Court in G.R. NO. 106194. On both substantive and procedural considerations, therefore,
petitioners presentation of that so-called issue in the present appellate stage is an undue imposition on
the time of this Court.
We have stated, at the outset, that petitioners second motion for reconsideration could have been
correctly rejected outright. But, as further noted, petitioner has distressingly adopted the lamentable
technique contrived by losing litigants of resorting to ascriptions of supposed irregularities in the courts
of justice as the cause for their defeat. Here, petitioner speaks of pressure having been employed by
respondents against the trial court. It then proceeds to insinuate anomalous haste on the part of
respondent court in reversing the trial court, pointing to the supposed short period of time it took the
former to come out with its decision. It never even bothered to mention that the issues are actually very
simple, that the evidence is basically documentary, and that the questions raised are easily answered
by applying settled doctrines of this Court.
On top of that, it now veers towards this Court, spinning the yarn that retired Justice Teodoro
Padilla first approached the ponente to whom its petition had been raffled, and asked for a disposition
in favor of respondents as a birthday and parting gift; that said ponente declined and unloaded the case
such that it was again raffled to a good friend of Justice Padilla. The records, however, show that this
case was directly raffled to the Second Division on January 28, 1997 and there was no prior ponente to
whom it was assigned who then supposedly unloaded it; and under the internal rules of this Court,
when a case is unloaded, there is no need for holding a second raffle.
Petitioner could have rendered a signal service to the judiciary if it had only verified and proved the
facts it purveyed but which are now belied even just by the internal rules of this Court, of which
petitioner appears to be ignorant hence the valor of his denunciation. The members of the Second
Division of this Court vehemently deny and denounce the animadversion on their allegedly having been
approached by Justice Padilla regarding this case. The Padilla Law Office, counsel for respondent
private corporation, has submitted its response to the imputations against it, thus calling for petitioner to
prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner to prove its charges. The same
burden is also imposed upon petitioner for the aspersions it has cast upon respondent Court of
Appeals. We, therefore, leave it to the aforesaid law firm, Justice Teodoro Padilla and the Court of
Appeals, on the one hand, and to herein petitioner, on the other, to decide for themselves whether to
further pursue this incident in the proper proceedings.
On such contingency, this Court will content itself for the nonce with a stern admonition that
petitioner refrain from conduct tending to create mistrust in our judicial system through innuendos on
which no evidence is offered or indicated to be proffered. Responsible litigants need not be told that
only pleadings formulated with intellectual honesty on facts duly ascertained can subserve the ends of
justice and dignify the cause of the pleader.
WHEREFORE, petitioners second motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit
and EXPUNGED as an unauthorized pleading. This resolution is immediately final and executory, and
no further pleadings or motions will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 170

# 62 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35612-14 June 27, 1973
NORBERTO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, GUMACA BRANCH, PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN
MONTECILLO, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON PROVINCE,respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas
corpus, certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was our ruling
that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality
or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It
is to credit of his able counsel, former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for provisional
liberty is carried on with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to
secure his release is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary.
Deference to its command precludes a reconsideration. This resolution will likewise briefly touch
upon the question of why the issuance of a brief dismissal order does not in any wise offend
against the constitutional provision requiring that no decision "shall be rendered by any court of
record without on which it is based." 1
1. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his
detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as
the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing in its
reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no toleration of illegal restraint.
Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave
responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has to
discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in
court as soon as possible. What is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be
demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from
responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.
The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation.
Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a
determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced. 2 No allegation to the
contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that petitioner's co-accused, Nelso Unal,
Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come to this court to challenge the
filing of one information where there were three victims. Accordingly, this Court, in Unal v.
People, 3 required three separate amended informations. There was no question, however, as to
the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued, not only in the case of the parties in such
petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would not therefore
lie." 4
2. Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he,
however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of
any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of
fact, was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter,
however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such
actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief
Justice Concepcion, People v. Hernandez, 5 the right to bail was rightfully stress as an aspect of the
protection accorded individual freedom which, in his eloquent language," is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, ...." 6 To be more matter of fact about it,
there is this excerpt from de la Camara v. Enage 7 "Before conviction, every person is bailable
Page | 171

except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach.
It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so
where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of
his cage. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the
language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure
the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in
denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the
likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence,
an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted." 8
The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it
could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on behalf of respondent
Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence of authority on the part of special
counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to intervene in this case on behalf of the state
but did so, his failure to object being the basis of the bail granted by the municipal court of
Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation was denied by petitioner. We are not called upon to rule
definitely on this aspect as independently thereof, there are two other basic objections. One was
that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could
not have granted bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. 9 Thus: "'The
constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged
with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person
applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of
bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is
free.'" 10 Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its
evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People v. San Diego 11 is thus squarely in point: "Whether
the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil
action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of
procedural due process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void." 12
Nor is the San Diego ruling novel. As far back as 1958, in People v. Raba, 13 it was held:
"Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the provincial fiscal
at least three days before the hearing thereof and the court failed to require that a reasonable
notice thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly in reducing the
bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard" 14 Just after San Diego, this Court had
occasion to stress anew such a principle in People v. Bocar. 15 As set forth in the opinion of Justice
J.B.L. Reyes: "It cannot be denied that, under our regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal
presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused is entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the
only exception being when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. But even in the latter instance, the high regard reserved by the law for personal freedom is
underscored by the provision placing upon the prosecution, not on the defense, the burden of
proving that the accused is not entitled to bail. This protective attitude towards the sanctity of the
liberty of a person notwithstanding, due process also demands that in the matter of bail the
prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if
it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence
against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued upon incomplete
evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute grave abuse of discretion that
would call for the remedy of certiorari." 16

Page | 172

The last sentence in the above excerpt finds application in the matter before us. No grave abuse of
discretion yo justify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has been shown. That is why our
resolution sought to be reconsidered should stand.
3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our dismissing
the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an extended
decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision requiring a decision
by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
According to a recent decision, Jose v. Santos, 17 what is expected of the judiciary "is that the
decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as
established. Nor is there any regid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the
requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while
not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use upon
pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs." 18 What must
then be stressed is that under such a provision as held in the early case of Soncuya v. National
Investment Board, 19 the decision spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous
presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which
its disposition is to be based. In Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. Henares, 20 the above decision
was cited with approval, with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following. "Plaintiffappellant assigns as another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of
the facts and the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the
Rules of Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since
these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions of the merit and not to orders of the trial
court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar." 21
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is
subjected, to searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere
incident in the prosecution of petitioner Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to
provisionary liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the clearly demonstrate, with the plea
for habeas corpus be unavailing, we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would require less
time than a full-blown decision, was not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties
dwell at length on their respective contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision
arrived at was reached without according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are
entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any
way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed
that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a
minimum resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a
constitutional command.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, our resolution of January 26, 1973
dismissing the petitions for of merit reiterated and the temporary restraining order issue by us on
October 16, 1973 lifted so that the case against petitioner can be duly heard forthwith. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Page | 173

# 63 EN BANC
G.R. No. 81006 May 12, 1989
VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. WINAI PERMSKUL and THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
An important constitutional question has been injected in this case which started out as an ordinary
complaint for a sum of money. The question squarely presented to the Court is the validity of the
memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 in the light of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution.
On May 21, 1984, the petitioner leased his apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a
period of one year for the stipulated rental of P3,000.00 a month. Pursuant to the lease contract,
the private respondent deposited with the petitioner the amount of P9,000.00 to answer for unpaid
rentals or any damage to the leased premises except when caused by reasonable wear and tear.
On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the property. He thereafter requested the refund
of his deposit minus the sum of P1,000.00, representing the rental for the additional ten days of his
occupancy after the expiration of the lease. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the lessee
still owed him for other charges, including the electricity and water bills and the sum of P2,500.00
for repainting of the leased premises to restore them to their original condition. 1
The private respondent sued in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. After the submission of
position papers by the parties, a summary judgment was rendered on October 11, 1985, sustaining
the complainant and holding that the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant was
ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P7,750.00, representing the balance of the deposit after
deducting the water and electricity charges. The plaintiff was also awarded the sum of P1,250.00
as attorney's fees, plus the Costs. 2
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose
C. de la Rama on January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum decision reading in full as
follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this
Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds
that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto. 3
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on September
29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. 4 He is now before
us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the regional
trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
This provision reads as follows:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be
refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has
been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the
1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to
Page | 174

apply to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to
inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the
court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court
rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are
more substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze
the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a
higher tribunal. For another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing
party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the
litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts
and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will
constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents
in the resolution of future controversies. As the Court said in Rosales v. Court of First Instance. 5
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially
Identical with previous litigations. Argumentum a simili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are
guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the highways and byways of
the law in the search for truth and justice. These pronouncements represent the wisdom of
the past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except where there is
a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an altered situation, they urge
us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is best.
According to the petitioner, the memorandum decision rendered by the regional trial court should
be revoked for non-compliance with the above-quoted constitutional mandate. He asks that the
case be remanded to the regional trial court for a full blown hearing on the merits, to be followed by
a decision stating therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For his
part, the private respondent demurs. He justifies the memorandum decision as authorized by B.P.
Blg. 129 and invokes the ruling of this Court in Romero v. Court of Appeals, 6 Which sustained the
said law.
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 reads as follows:
Sec. 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. Every decision or final resolution of a court
in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly state the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law on which it is based which may be contained in the decision or final resolution itself, or
adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision, order or resolution appealed from.
The above section was applied in the Romero case, together with a similar rule embodied in
Section 18 of P.D. No. 946, providing that:
All cases of the Court of Agrarian Relations now pending before the Court of Appeals shall
remain in the Division to which they have been assigned, and shall be decided within sixty
(60) days from the effectivity of this Decree; Provided, however, That if the decision or order
be an affirmance in toto of the dispositive conclusion of the judgment appealed from, then
the Court of Appeals may, instead of rendering an extended opinion, indicate clearly the trial
court's findings of fact and pronouncements of law which have been adopted as basis for
the affirmance.
In the said case, Justice Jose Y. Feria, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared:
As previously stated, the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations consisted of thirteen
pages, single space. The above-quoted decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
consists of four pages, three of which contains verbatim the dispositive portion of the
decision appealed from. The remaining page is devoted to an explanation of why "for
judicial convenience and expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the
findings of facts and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of
this Our decision." The said decision may be considered as substantial compliance with the
above-quoted provisions in Section 18 of P.D. No. 946 and Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Page | 175

Nevertheless, he was quick to add a tenable misgiving and to express the following reservation:
The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law from those set forth in the appealed decisions should be exercised with
caution and prudence, because the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance
by just adopting the findings and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly studying
the appealed case.
This caveat was necessary because, as he correctly observed:
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that just as important as the intrinsic validity of a
decision is the perception by the parties-litigants that they have been accorded a fair
opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate before judgment is rendered. It
is this perception, coupled with a clear conscience, which enables the members of the
judiciary to discharge the awesome responsibility of sitting in judgment on their fellowmen.
There is no question that the purpose of the law in authorizing the memorandum decision is to
expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the courts themselves.
Concerned with the mounting problem of delay in the administration of justice, the Constitution now
contains a number of provisions aimed at correcting this serious difficulty that has caused much
disaffection among the people. Thus, Section 16 of the Bill of Rights reiterates the original
provision in the 1973 Constitution guaranteeing to all persons "the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." Section 14(2) of the same
Article III retains the rule that the accused shall be entitled to a trial that shall not only be public and
impartial but also speedy. In Article VIII, Section 5(3), the Supreme Court is expressly permitted to
temporarily assign a judge from one station to another when the public interest so requires, as
when there is a necessity for less occupied judge to help a busier colleague dispose of his cases.
In paragraph 5 of the same section, it is stressed that the rules of court to be promulgated by the
Supreme Court "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases." In Section 15, of the same article, maximum periods are prescribed for the decision or
resolution of cases, to wit, twenty-four months in the case of Supreme Court and, unless reduced
by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other
lower courts.
The courts of justice are really hard put at coping with the tremendous number of cases in their
dockets which, to make matters worse, continues to grow by the day despite the efforts being
taken to reduce it. In the Supreme Court alone, an average of 400 cases is received every month
as against the average of 300 cases disposed of during the same month, leaving a difference of
100 cases monthly that is added to some 5,000 still unresolved cases that have accumulated
during the last two decades or so. At this rate, the backlog will increase by 1,200 cases every year
on top of the earlier balance, much of which, despite its age, is still viable and have still to be
resolved. Considering that the Court spends four days of the week for studying and deliberating on
these cases in its en banc and division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time allowed its
members for the actual writing of its decisions. (This particular decision, while extended, happens
fortunately to be less complicated than many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more
time to write, not to mention the antecedent research that may have to be made.)
Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision can be welcomed
indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice,
But expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the
Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does not justify the means. It is plain that if Section
40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
In the case at bar, we find that a judgment was made by the metropolitan trial court in compliance
with the rule on summary procedure. The decision consisted of three typewritten pages, single
space, and stated clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based. It was a

Page | 176

concise and well-written decision, and a correct one to boot, for which Judge Paciano B. Balita is to
be commended.
The problem, though, as the petitioner sees it, is that in affirming this judgment, the regional trial
court of Makati rendered a mere memorandum decision that simply adopted by reference the
findings of fact and law made by Judge Balita and then concluded, without saying more, that "there
was no cogent reason to disturb the same." It is claimed that as Judge de la Rama did not make
his own statement of the facts and the law as required by the Constitution, his memorandum
decision was a total nullity. Worse, when the appeal was taken to the respondent court, what it
reviewed was not the memorandum decision of the regional trial court but the decision rendered by
the metropolitan trial court which, legally speaking, was not before the appellate court.
It is not really correct to say that the Court of Appeals did not review the memorandum decision of
the regional trial court which was the subject of the petition for review. A reading of its own decision
will show that it dealt extensively with the memorandum decision and discussed it at some length
in the light of the observations and reservations of this Court in the Romero case. Moreover,
in reviewing the decision of the metropolitan trial court, the Court of Appeals was actually reviewing
the decision of the regional trial court, which had incorporated by reference the earlier decision
rendered by Judge Balita.
The question, of course, is whether such incorporation by reference was a valid act that effectively
elevated the decision of the metropolitan trial court for examination by the Court of Appeals.
To be fair, let it be said that when Judge dela Rama availed himself of the convenience offered by
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, he was only acting in accordance with the ruling announced
in Romero permitting the use of the memorandum decision. It must also be observed that even if
the respondent court appeared to be partial to the reservation rather than the rule in the said case,
it nevertheless had the duty which it discharged to abide by the doctrine announced therein
by the highest tribunal of the land. The respondent court could not have acted otherwise.
This Court is not hampered by such inhibitions. As we may re-examine our own rulings and modify
or reverse them whenever warranted, we take a second look at the memorandum decision and the
Romero case and test them on the touchstone of the Constitution.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt
by reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or
resolution on appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not
indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section
40 or elsewhere in the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this
jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as
follows:
Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. -The judgment or final resolution of a court in appealed
cases may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision or final order appealed from.
It is clear that where the decision of the appellate court actually reproduces the findings of fact or
the conclusions of law of the court below, it is not a memorandum decision as envisioned in the
above provision. The distinctive features of the memorandum decision are, first, it is rendered by
an appellate court, and second, it incorporates by reference the findings of fact or the conclusions
of law contained in the decision, order or ruling under review. Most likely, the purpose is to affirm
the decision, although it is not impossible that the approval of the findings of fact by the lower court
may lead to a different conclusion of law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing
the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of
the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. The Idea is to avoid having
to repeat in the body of the latter decision the findings or conclusions of the lower court since they
are being approved or adopted anyway.

Page | 177

Parenthetically, the memorandum decision is also allowed in the United States, but its form (at
least) differs from the one under consideration in this case. Such a decision is rendered in that
country upon a previous' determination by the judge that there is no need for a published opinion
and that it will have no precedential effect. The judgment is usually limited to the dispositive portion
but a memorandum is attached containing a brief statement of the facts and the law involved,
mainly for the information of the parties to the case.
When a law is questioned before the Court, we employ the presumption in favor of its
constitutionality. As we said in Peralta v. Commission of Elections, "to justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication." 7 Courts will bend over backward to sustain that presumption. In case of
doubt, it is the duty of the judiciary to exert every effort to prevent the invalidation of the law and the
nullification of the will of the legislature that enacted it and the executive that approved it. This norm
is based on a becoming respect that the judiciary is expected to accord the political departments of
the government which, it must be assumed in fairness, thoroughly studied the measure under
challenge and assured themselves of its constitutionality before agreeing to enact it.
The Court has deliberated extensively on the challenge posed against the memorandum decision
as now authorized by law. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which it is allowed, and
bearing in mind the above-discussed restraint we must observe when a law is challenged before
us, we have come to the conclusion that Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129, as we shall interpret it here, is
not unconstitutional.
What is questioned about the law is the permission it gives for the appellate court to merely adopt
by reference in its own decision the judgment of the lower court on appeal. It is easy to understand
that this device may feed the suspicion feared by Justice Feria that the court has not given the
appeal the attention it deserved and thus deprived the parties of due process. True or not, this
impression is likely to undermine popular faith in the judiciary as an impartial forum which hears
before it decides and bases its decision on the established facts and the applicable law.
No less objectionable is the inconvenience involved in having to search for the decision referred to,
which, having been incorporated by reference only, does not have to be attached to the
memorandum decision. The Court had occasion earlier to complain about this difficulty in the case
of Gindoy v. Tapucar, 8 where we said:
. . . True it is that the Court of First Instance may adopt in toto either expressly or impliedly
the findings and conclusions of the inferior court, and as a rule, such adoption would
amount to a substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate discussed herein, but
where, as in this case, the specific arguments presented against the decision of the inferior
court are of such nature that a blanket affirmance of said decision does not in fact
adequately dispose of the strictures against it, it is but proper, if only to facilitate the action
to be taken by the appellate court on the petition for review, that the concrete bases of the
impugned decision should appear on its face, instead of the appellate court having to dig
into the records to find out how the inferior court resolved the issues of the case.
As to this problem, the Solicitor General correctly points out that it does not exist in the case at bar
because the decision of the Court of Appeals extensively quoted from the decision of the
metropolitan trial court. Although only incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of
the regional trial court, Judge Balita's decision was nevertheless available to the Court of Appeals.
It is this circumstance, or even happenstance, if you will, that has validated the memorandum
decision challenged in this case and spared it from constitutional infirmity.
That same circumstance is what will move us now to lay down the following requirement, as a
condition for the proper application of Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129. The memorandum decision, to
be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only
by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately
available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to
be allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted, which must be
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contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision
authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of
the decision.
It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision
of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper examination of the
facts and the law on which it was based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should
suggest that such an examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the
decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of
incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation.
The Court finds it necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly
used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for its validity
that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted
by both parties or easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications
involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision
may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is
obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it.
Despite the convenience afforded by the memorandum decision, it is still desirable that the
appellate judge exert some effort in restating in his own words the findings of fact of the lower court
and presenting his own interpretation of the law instead of merely parroting the language of the
court a quo as if he cannot do any better. There must be less intellectual indolence and more pride
of authorship in the writing of a decision, especially if it comes from an appellate court.
It ill becomes an appellate judge to write his rulings with a pair of scissors and a pot of paste as if
he were a mere researcher. He is an innovator, not an echo. The case usually becomes
progressively simpler as it passes through the various levels of appeal and many issues become
unimportant or moot and drop along the way. The appellate judge should prune the cluttered record
to make the issues clearer. He cannot usually do this by simply mimicking the lower court. He must
use his own perceptiveness in unraveling the rollo and his own discernment in discovering the law.
No less importantly, he must use his own language in laying down his judgment. And in doing so,
he should also guard against torpidity lest his pronouncements excite no more fascination than a
technical tract on the values of horse manure as a fertilizer. A little style will help liven the opinion
trapped in the tortuous lexicon of the law with all its whereases and wherefores. A judicial decision
does not have to be a bore.
The interpretation we make today will not apply retroactively to the memorandum decision
rendered by the regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of the respondent court
such decision on the strength ofRomero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was
substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct availability and actual review of the
decision of Judge Balita incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of Judge de la
Rama. The memorandum decision as then understood under the Romero decision was a valid act
at the time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced binding legal effect. We also affirm
the finding of the respondent court that the summary judgment without a formal trial was in accord
with the Rule on Summary Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not improper.
Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as
to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon
the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed
judgment as a lawless disobedience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. This decision is
immediately executory. It is so ordered.

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