Iribarren2001 Responsio Secundum Thomam' and The Search For An Early Thomistic School

Responsio secundum Thomam and the Search for an Early Thomistic School
ISABEL IRIBARREN
1. The Paris and Oxford Condemnations and their Connection to Thomas Aquinas
It has been generally assumed that following the aftermath of the Paris
and Oxford condemnations of 1277 and 1284 respectively, in which
important Thomistic theses 1 were at least indirectly compromised (in the
case of the condemnation at Paris), a movement in defence of Thomas
Aquinas doctrine emerged which eventually resulted into a Thomistic
school.2 The main representatives of this movement were not only defending the person of their fellow brother, but also the meaning and
implications of the Thomist innovations,3 their acceptance of which
constitutes the characteristic mark of the members of this movement.
Thus as early as the 1280s there was a Thomistic school of thought being
formed mainly as a response to ecclesiastical intervention, and led by a
group of English and French Dominicans who understood the full import
of the current Thomistic tenets.
1
Particularly the unicity of substantial form and the existence of matter without form.
See William de la Mares Correctorium, art. 31, 127-129, ed. P. Glorieux, in: Les premires
polmiques thomistes: Le Correctorium Corruptorii Quare, Le Saulchoir, Kain 1927.
2
See F.E. Kelley, The Thomists and Their Opponents at Oxford in the Last Part of the Thirteenth
Century, unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford University 1977 (MS. Bodleian D.Phil. D. 6258),
p. ii. Kelleys introductory passage runs as follows: In the years following the 1277 condemnation of St. Thomas teaching at Oxford until the end of the century, there appeared
by way of reaction to the condemnation what one might call the early Thomistic movement.
Its literary remains are ample enough to enable the historian to form a picture of the
principal persons of this school [ . . .], p. i. (My italics) See also F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic
School, Dubuque, Iowa 1964, ix: [. . .] the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form in
creatures constituted the most basic yardstick by which to judge the character of any early
Thomist at the time. [. . .]. It is by the acceptance or rejection of these theses [viz. the
unicity of form, the pure potentiality of primary matter, the spirituality of separated substances] along with their correct understanding that the Thomism of an early defender of
St. Thomas must be judged. Subsequently, Roensch embarks on a bio-bibliographical
account of the representations of an early English school and an early French school.
Roensch, then, seems to make the same equation as Kelley between Thomism (i.e. a
philosophical and/or theological allegiance to Aquinas main tenets) and a Thomistic
school.
3
Kelley 1977 (op. cit., above, n. 2), 4. Also see F.E. Kelley, Two Early English Thomists:
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001
Vivarium 39,2
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This approach, in its turn, has been based on a traditional understanding of the 1277 and 1284 condemnations, particularly that of 7
March 1277 in Paris.4 According to this view, Bishop Stephen Tempiers
condemnation was a reaction to heterodox Aristotelianism at the
faculty of arts. Tempier was acting after the orders of Pope John XXI,
who had asked him to conduct an inquiry concerning dangerous doctrines reported to be circulating at the University. 5 As a result, Tempier
formed a commission of sixteen theologians, including Henry of Ghent,
and had a list of 219 propositions drawn up somewhat hastilyso that
the order of the propositions appears disorganised and the names of scholars behind these propositions do not appear speci ed. Without reporting
back to the Pope, Tempier issued this condemnation on 7 March 1277
on his own authority. Within ten days, on 18 March, a prohibition by
the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, was issued in Oxford,
this time envisioning directly Aquinas thesis on the unicity of substantial
form. On 29 October 1284, in a visit to the Oxford Chapter, John
Pecham, Kilwardbys successor as Archbishop, rati ed his predecessors
Thomas Sutton and Robert Orford vs. Henry of Ghent, in: The Thomist, 45 (1981), 345-87. Cf.
D.A. Callus, The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford, The Aquinas Society of London, no.
5 2nd ed. 1955 [1946 1]. P. Glorieux, Comment les thses thomistes furent proscrites Oxford
(1284-1286) , in: Revue Thomiste, 32 [nouv. srie 10] (1927), 259-91, and id., Les correctoires. Essai de mise au point, in: Recherches de thologie et philosophie ancienne et mdivale, 14 (1947), 286-304, talks about a certain milieu Thomiste and a cole naissante which
he maintains emerged in Paris and Oxford in the midst of the aforesaid con icts. Likewise,
P. Mandonnet, Premiers travaux de polmique thomiste, in: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques
et Thologiques, 7 (1913), 46-70 & 245-62. Also Roensch 1964 (op. cit., above, n. 2), 19:
. . . early Dominicans not only defended St. Thomas, but understood his teaching in
exactly the same way he did himself. See especially pp. 185-9.
4
Among the main upholders of this view, are P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et laverrosme latin au XIII e sicle, 2 volumes, Louvain 1908-11, I, 28-9, 59-63, 142-95; F. Van
Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, Louvain 1955, 198-208; id., La Philosophie au XIII e sicle,
second ed., Louvain 1991, 354-59; and also by the latter, Matre Siger de Brabant, Louvain
1977, 149-58; R. Hissette, Albert le Grand et Thomas dAquin dans la censure Parisienne du 7
mars 1277, in: Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 15 (1982), 226-46, esp. 235, 237-41, 246; John F.
Wippel, Medieval Reactions to the Encounter Between Faith and Reason, Milwaukee 1995; id.,
Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277, in: The Modern Schoolman, 72 (1995), 23372. For Wippel, however, it is clear that, as contemporaries such as William de la Mare,
Godfrey of Fontaines, and John of Naples indicate in their diVerent ways, a number of
the propositions condemned on 7 March 1277 were aimed directly at Aquinas (cf. Wippel
1995 (Thomas Aquinas), 241, 268-9). In this Wippels position diVers notably from that of
Hissette, who believes that, although some of the propositions were common to masters
of arts and Aquinas, the condemnation indirectly aVected Aquinas.
5
From a letter sent by John XXI to Stephen Tempier on 18 January 1277, ed.
H. Deni e E. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, Paris 1889, I, 541. (Hereafter,
Chartularium).
the search for an early thomistic school
257
censure, and this time condemned the thirty erroneous and ridiculous
propositions that the Oxford masters still maintained in disobedience of
Kilwardbys censure.6 The actual condemnation at Oxford is therefore
seen as the deliberate intervention of a Franciscan, Pecham, who, being
juridically incapable of enacting an explicit censure on Aquinas in Paris,
rati ed what was only a prohibition in Oxford. By extension, the censure of Thomistic theses has been perceived as a question of Order rivalries, and of Augustinian principles versus Aristotelian metaphysics.7
Later contributions, however, have challenged the prevailing view of
the condemnations. In order to revise the assumption that the Paris and
Oxford condemnations led to the formation of an early Thomistic school,
it would be worthwhile to take a brief look at what these recent contributions tell us about the condemnations.
Based on the sources of the 1277 condemnation at Paris, Robert
Wielockx8 claims that Aquinas was object of a separate process both from
the 7 March 1277 condemnation and from Giles of Romes censure.
Wielockxs main sources are (1) a letter written by Archbishop Pecham
of Canterbury on 7 December 1284 to the Chancellor and Regent Masters
at Oxford; (2) some remarks made by Henry of Ghent in the rst version of his Quodlibet X, q.5 (1286); (3) remarks made by William de la
Mare in his Correctorium.9
(1) As Wielockx interprets it, the letter by Pecham refers how Tempier,
the Bishop of Paris, had thought about proceeding ( procedere cogitaret ) against
Aquinas. However, during the vacancy in the Apostolic See after the
death of John XXI (20 May 1277) and before the election of Nicholas
III (25 November 1277), some cardinals of the Roman Curia ordered
Tempier to abandon his cause. However, Pecham diVerentiated clearly
the case from Oxford, and added that the canonical judgement regarding Aquinas was only restricted to Paris.10
(2) In Advent 1286, Henry of Ghent mentions in his Quodlibet X that
ten years earlier (that is, between Christmas 1276 and Easter 1277),
Chartularium, 625.
See particularly Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 3); Callus 1946/1955 (op. cit., above,
n. 3).
8
R. Wielockx, Autour du procs de Thomas dAquin, in: A. Zimmermann (ed.), Thomas von
Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen, Berlin 1988, 413-38. See also Wielockx,s
edition of Giles of Romes Apologia, in: Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, III, 1, Florence 1985,
92-6, 215-24.
9
Wielockx 1988 (op. cit., above, n. 8), 413.
10
Chartularium, I, 624-6, n. 517. Wielockx 1988 (op. cit., above, n. 8), 413-4.
6
7
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Tempier, supported by the Papal Legate Simon de Brion, summoned a

meeting in which the Parisian masters would have examined a number
of articles, one of them literally corresponding to Aquinas Summa Theologiae
Ia, q.76, a.4 (Quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis, scilicet anima
intellectiva). According to Henry, at this meeting the masters had unanimously maintained, with only two exceptions, that the aforesaid thesis
was false.11
(3) In his Correctorium (between 1277 and 1279), William de la Mare
con rms the evidence given by Pecham and Henry of Ghent. According
to William, the masters at Paris had reproved the thesis that in man
there is only one substantial form. The formulation of the thesis again
corresponds to Aquinas Summa Ia., q.76, a.4.12
Wielockx adds further arguments in favour of a separate process against
Aquinas, based on two aspects: on the one hand, the distinctive phrasing of the censured propositions as they appear in the three diVerent
censures. On the other hand, the slight chronological gap which separates the syllabus of 7 March 1277 from Giles of Romes censure, and
the latter from the process against Aquinas (whose articles are nally
examined sometime between 2 April 1285 and 14 April 1286).13 Whether
Wielockxs thesis is accepted in its entirety or not, his main contribution
resides in having connected the questioning of Aquinas theses to Giles
of Romes censure.
Wielockxs thesis has received mainly two reactions, the rst one by
John F. Wippel,14 and the second one by J.M.M.H. Thijssen.15 As for
Wippel, he revises Wielockxs view based on the three diVerent sources
advanced by him. According to the way Wippel reconstructs the evidence
of Pechams reference to Tempier and his plans to move against Aquinas,
it is certain that Tempier was thinking of proceeding to a discussion of the
11
Text of Henry of Ghents Quodlibet X edited by L. Hdl, Neue Nachrichten ber die
Pariser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre, in: Scholastik, 39 (1964), 178-96. Wielockx
1988 (op. cit., above, n. 8), 414.
12
For Williams text, see Glorieux (op. cit., above, n. 1), 127-9.
13
For Wielockxs proofs for the chronology for Aquinas process in connection to Giles
censure, see Wielockx 1988 (op. cit., above, n. 8), 422-30. For the chronology for Giles
censure in connection to the 7 March 1277 condemnation, see pp. 433-7.
14
John F. Wippel, Bishop Stephen Tempier and Thomas Aquinas: A Separate Process Against
Aquinas?, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift fr Philosophie und Theologie, 44 (1997), 117-36.
15
J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400, Philadelphia
1998, 40-55. Thijssen treats this issue in more detail in 1277 Revisited: A new Interpretation
of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, in: Vivarium, 35 (1997),
72-101.
259
articles in question but was prohibited from doing so until further notice.
Wielockx, as Wippel sees it, seems to be reading something more into
the text when he suggests that the process was already underway. Pechams
letter of itself, however, does not support this evidence.16
Similarly, Henry of Ghents reference (Advent 1286) to the meeting of
the masters in 1277 17 concerning the thesis of the unicity of substantial
form, does not necessarily allude to a separate censure against Aquinas.
Again, taken alone, Henrys text does not justify the conclusion that the
meeting of the masters was summoned speci cally to deal with Aquinas
views.18
Although Wippel acknowledges that William de la Mares remarks in
his Correctorium constitute an explicit statement concerning the masters
rejection of the unicity thesis, Williams testimony is not however clear
about whether the meeting of the masters was not simply a part of some
other process (like Giles).19
In conclusion, as regards Wielockxs claim, Wippel considers that it
still remains to be demonstrated whether the process coming after 7 March
1277 constitutes a separate censure against Aquinas. For it is possible that
the later discussion on the unicity of substantial form was part of the
meeting concerned with Giles rehabilitation to University functions.
Therefore, Wielockxs evidence, although possible, is not conclusive.20
Thijssens main complaint about Wielockxs thesis is that the proposal
of a separate inquiry against Aquinas presupposes that he was not directly
targeted by any of the errors included in the syllabus of 7 March 1277.
Furthermore, like Wippel, Thijssen also questions Wielockxs interpretation of the evidence and argues that it is not suYciently compelling.21
Wippel 1997 (op. cit., above, n. 14), 121-2.
This episode must not be confused with another meeting reported by Henry of
Ghents X Quodlibet. This second meeting took place in 1285, when the regent and nonregent masters of theology gathered to examine a list of articles on the orders of Pope
Honorius IV. Included in the list was the thesis on the unicity of substantial form. Again,
all masters, except two dissenters, agreed that the article was false. See Thijssen 1997,
(op. cit., above, n. 15), 76.
18
19
Wippel 1997 (op. cit., above, n. 14), 126-30. Furthermore, at least in what regards
the thesis of the possible existence of matter without form, contemporaries such as Richard
Knapwell and John of Paris appear to doubt or even to deny that such meetings took
place. For Richard, see Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 116. For John of Paris, see
Jean-Pierre Mller, Le Correctorium Corruptorii Circa de Jean Quidort de Paris, Rome 1941,
137.
20
21
Thijssen 1998 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 53; Thijssen 1997 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 72-3.
16
17
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According to Thijssen, the testimonies put forward by Wielockx, namely

that of John Pecham, Henry of Ghent, and William de la Mare, may
also be explained as references to the inquiry against Giles of Rome.22
What is decisive in their account, is that the latter inquiry concerns views
of Aquinas. Thijssen believes that the process taking place at that time
of Giles of Rome could be characterised as an investigation of Thomistic
theses (viz. the unicity of substantial form, the existence of matter without form). Therefore, if we are to take into account Pechams letter, the
inquiry which was interrupted in 1277 by the command of the Roman
Curia, could have well been Giles. Moreover, the evidence concerning
Giles of Romes process and career after his conviction suggest that the
case against him was suspended.23 In agreement with Wielockx, Thijssen
believes that the reason why the papal court might have interfered with
the proceedings against Giles, is mainly due to a strong Dominican
presence at the curia which happened also to be in favour of Aquinas.24
Giles of Rome, therefore, escaped an oYcial condemnation on account
of the similarity between his theses and those of Aquinas.25
In conclusion, Thijssen holds that Tempier was involved in two doctrinal processes in 1277, both of which implied theses that were also held
by Aquinas: one against unspeci ed members of the arts faculty (that of
7 March 1277), and another one against the theologian Giles of Rome
only the former having been brought to completion.26
Beyond his reaction to Wielockxs thesis, however, Thijssens main
contribution to the discussion over the understanding of the 1277 condemnation is twofold. On the one hand, Thijssen connects the events
leading up to 7 March 1277 with the process against Siger of Brabant.27
Thijssen 1997 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 87-8.
Thijssen 1998 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 54-5; Thijssen 1997 (op. cit., above, n. 1),
90-101.
24
See Wielockx 1988 (op. cit., above, n. 8), 427-9. According to Wielockx, the abstention of two masters (in 1277 and 1285) from censuring some Thomistic theses as false
(reported by Henry in his Quodlibet X) indicates that they were two Dominican regent masters, and that they counted with the support from the Dominican authorities, both at Paris
and at the papal court. The Order had powerful protectors at the curia: cardinal Giovanni
Gaetano Orsini, cardinal Giacomo Savelli, William of Moerbeke. (See A. Potthast, Regesta
Ponticum Romanorum inde ab anno 1198 ad annum 1304, t. 2, Berlin 1875.) Moreover, John
of Verceil, the General Master of the Dominicans at Paris from 1264 to 1283, was
favourable to Aquinas, as can be concluded from the General Chapters at Milan (1278)
and Paris (1279) presided by him.
25
Thijssen 1998 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 55.
26
Thijssen 1998 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 55; Thijssen 1997 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 95-101.
27
Thijssen 1998 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 44-9.
22
23
261
On the other hand, and more to our purpose, Thijssen connects

Aquinas theses to the members of the arts faculty as target of the 1277
condemnation. The targets of the 1277 condemnation are unspeci ed
members of the arts faculty at Parisin fact, they could have well been
students and not necessarily masters.28 Thijssen considers, therefore, that
one of the reasons why it has seemed so diYcult to identify the names
behind the condemned errors, is that the examination 29 has been based
on the assumption that Tempiers condemnation only envisioned faculty
of arts masters. Some propositions may well be connected to Arabic
sources and others could be derived from the teaching of theologians such
as Aquinas, but propagated by arts members.30
Based on the discussion above, this article will take into account three
main ideas concerning our understanding of the Paris and Oxford condemnations. First, the two condemnations, although connected, belong to
diVerent proceedings and respond to diVerent situations in Paris and in
Oxford. The Paris condemnation of 7 March 1277 envisioned a series
of general theses pronounced or propagated by members of the arts faculty, some of the theses entailing problematic theological repercussions.
Whether or not attempting to disguise a particular target, it is clear that
Bishop Tempier wanted to check a general intellectual tendency in the
arts faculty the full import of which could prove detrimental to certain
matters of dogma. In this light, Archbishop Kilwardbys action at Oxford
in 1277 could well be seen as a prudential procedure inspired by the
recent measures taken at Paris. As for the condemnation carried out by
Pecham in 1284, it is most likely that its more explicit character is due
to certain contumacy on the part of Oxford masters who had been resisting Kilwardbys authority. In that case, Pecham, as Tempier and Kilwardby
himself, could have initially only intended a general admonitory word
against intellectual trends with controversial theological signi cance.
Pechams further action against individual Oxford Dominicans (like Knapwell in 1286) could have well been caused by provocative action on the
28
In support of this claim, Thijssen quotes from the preface to the 1277 condemnation: [. . .] nonulli Parisius studentes in artibus. (Chartularium, I, 542.) My italics.
29
Notably Hissettes, Enqute sur les 219 articles condamns Paris le 7 mars 1277, LouvainParis 1977, 317.
30
Thijssen 1998 (op. cit., above, n. 15), 50-2. Note that also Wippel 1997 (op. cit., above,
n. 14) argues in favour of this view. Also Wippels 1995 (op. cit., above, n. 4), 269, were
he states that contemporaries such as William de la Mare, Godfrey of Fontaines, and John
of Naples indicate in diVerent ways how they thought that a number of the articles of
7 March 1277 had been aimed directly at Aquinas.
262
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part of Oxford members. That they happened to be Dominicans is

understandable, for they were perhaps incited by a certain esprit de
corps to defend the name and the person of a fellow brotherthis time
aVected directly by an explicit condemnation.
Second, whether or not there was a separate process undertaken against
Aquinas, what is important for our purposes is that the 1277 condemnation at Paris already envisions Aquinas theses. Although nominally
the censure concerned the arts faculty, it involved theological theses, or
at least theses propounded by theologians. As far as Aquinas unicity thesis is concerned, it was considered worrisome for theological reasons
something which appears clearer at the Oxford condemnation.31 In any
case, the unicity thesis is ultimately a medieval interpretation of Aristotelian
physics, and to that extent it was more likely to appeal to the artists than
the theologians.
Third, Dominicans and Franciscans were not evenly distributed in
favour of Aquinas and the condemnations respectively, in a way that
could suggest a partisan reading of the events. It is a matter of fact
that already at the time of the 1277 condemnation there were Dominicans
at important posts who happened to favour Aquinasbut whether they
subscribed to his views, or were rather attempting to prevent a partisan
development of the aVairs, is uncertain. On the other hand, there were
also in uential Dominicans, notably Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of
Canterbury, and William of Hothum, prior of England, who explicitly
rejected the unicity of substantial form thesis. In Williams case, the defence
of Aquinas seems to have responded either to a desire to safeguard the
Orders dignity, or to theological priorities. 32
31
In Pechams letter of 7 December 1284, we read how the repercussions on theological matters (as the numerical identity of the bodies after resurrection) prompted him above
all to detest the error propounded by Aquinas. Most interestingly, it is upon hearing this
(i.e. the theological repercussions) that William of Hothum is purported to have acquiesced
to Pechams cause. See Chartularium, I, 624-26, n. 517. Cf. Thijssen 1997 (op. cit., above,
n. 15), 83-5.
32
In this respect, Pechams letter of 7 December 1284 is of particular interest in what
it reveals of William of Hothums attitude towards the censured Thomistic theses. In that
letter, Pecham reports on an earlier conversation he had entertained with William regarding Pechams attitude towards the Dominican Order. But apart from Pechams reassuring remarks on how his renewing Kilwardbys 1277 prohibition does not bear ill will
against the Dominicans, it is Williams response to Pechams allegations which are of interest. Upon hearing about the theological repercussions of the unicity thesis, William replies
to Pecham that he may surely condemn this error with his knowledge and consent (hunc
errorem secure de mea conscientia condemnetis), Chartularium, I, 624-6, n. 517.
263
Closely connected to the bipartisan view of these events, is the handling of authorities, in particular Aristotle and Augustine. Aristotle has
been traditionally considered as the main in uence for the unicity of substantial form thesis, while the pluralists are seen as primarily indebted to
Augustine. As will be seen, however, the sources behind the unitarian or
the pluralist thesis are much less clear-cut and often overlap.
Based on the revised view of the Paris and Oxford condemnations,
the purpose of this study is to reexamine the statement that, as a result of
the condemnations, a Thomistic school had emerged by the end of the
thirteenth century. This examination will be carried out in three stages.
First, it will attempt to give a de nition of school according to what
the term could have signi ed by the end of the thirteenth century. Second,
focusing speci cally on the question of the unicity of substantial form,
the main tenets of the unitarian and pluralist outlooks will be outlined.
The purpose is a fairer assessment of the sources and authorities behind
Aquinas thesis and the pluralist view. Third, and inasmuch as the unicity thesis was perceived as entailing problematic theological consequences,
we will concentrate on the speci c theological issue of the numerical identity of Christs body living and dead. This was perceived as perhaps the
most crucial theological question in relation to the signi cance of the
unicity thesis. The development of this theological issue will be followed
rst in Aquinas, then in William de la Mare as a negative reaction to
Aquinas view, and nally, as positive reactions to Aquinas thesis, in two
members of the Dominican Order, namely Richard Knapwell (from
Oxford) and Giles of Lessines (from Paris). The way in which Richard
and Giles handle the full implications of the unicity theory in contrast to
William de la Mares, might prove relevant for an assessment of the
nature of the Dominican defence of Aquinas which emerged at the end
of the thirteenth century.
2. The Denition of a School 33
By school we generally understand a school of thought, as a body
of people or pupils adhering to a certain set of principles, doctrines, methods, or authorities. The cohesion of this group of people is based on their
xed allegiance to that doctrine or set of principles, an allegiance which
33
For the senses in which we can speak of schools before the fourteenth century,
this article will be mainly based on W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century
England, Princeton, N.J. 1987, 171-5.
264
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is clearly diVerentiated from simple prejudice in that it is not motivated

by unreasoned opinion. Thus, the adherence to a school should presuppose a speculative awareness of the doctrine which the school represents, in the sense that the members of the school should understand the
full implications of the doctrine and according to that choose to adhere
to that particular view.
By the end of the thirteenth century, however, the term school was
never understood in this sense as a school of thought attached to an
abstract ideological current, but it was always personi ed in the doctrine
of a leading gure in a way still too individualistic. Just like Peter Abelard
in the twelfth century, Aquinas attracted both followers and critics. It was
the way in which these individual gures exercised reason within a theological question, which aroused either censure or adherence. What the
late thirteenth-century scholar associated with the term school was a
place of study and its standard curriculum of teaching, rather than a
speci c philosophical commitment. Thus, a Dominican school did not
necessarily imply a particular doctrinal credo, but more immediately referred
to the masters that belonged to the Order. In this sense, Kilwardby was
no less a member of the Dominican school than enthusiastic defenders
of Aquinas such as Knapwell and John of Paris.
By the same token, a school was not necessarily constrained by
geographical factors, as it was not determined by membership to one
particular university. The terminology and sources used by the late thirteenth-century masters reveal the close connection between the learning
in Paris and Oxford. Indeed, it would be futile to draw diVerences between
the approach and methods of the Oxford and Parisian masters in an
attempt to delineate two separated schools. By the end of the thirteenth
century intellectual gures such as Robert Kilwardby, John Pecham, and
William de la Mare belonged to the Parisian world as much as to Oxford
and many of them had in fact been sent to Paris to obtain their doctorate. 34 Oxford theologians were concerned primarily with issues of
Parisian origin, and Aquinas theses were seen as one of these imports.
There was a unity in the intellectual traditions of the two universities
which was expressed in the same methods, terminology, and subjects of
discussion, as the correctoria literature testi es. Both Oxford and Paris produced treatises as well as defensive works. Giles of Lessines handled the
34
For the Parisian in uence in English education, cf. Courtenay 1987 (op. cit., above,
n. 33), 147-51, where he questions the notion of a school of thought in thirteenthcentury scholastic landscape.
265
matter under discussion as soberly as did Thomas Sutton, and Richard

Knapwells Quare served as a reference to John of Paris35 own reply to
William de la Mare.
Therefore, the centripetal force that was at work in the Dominican
Order between 1280 and 1305 conferring some uniformity of teaching
into it was not necessarily indicative of a school of thought. Rather,
this force partly responded to a defensive move against the condemnations of 1277, and partly to a rivalry with the Franciscans for intellectual
superiority. This correspondence between a religious order (Dominicans,
Augustinians, Franciscans) and a particular teaching tradition (Aquinas,
Giles of Rome, Scotus) was however temporary and began to disappear
by the rst half of the fourteenth century. It is signi cant in this respect
that already at the beginning of the fourteenth century there was a shift
in intellectual interests as Oxford began to de ne itself independently of
Paris. Followers of Aquinas never reached the stature that later Franciscan
gures such as Ockham achieved. Franciscans became a decisive presence in Oxford when they began to send their students there rather than
to Paris, and the exclusive reference to Aquinas in Oxford remained as
a trend peculiar to the last part of the thirteenth century. The aYnitive
connection between Oxford and Paris was, therefore, a temporary feature determined by the events surrounding 1277. It was the theological
consensus which reigned outside the Dominican Order which acted as
one of the principal corrosive forces on the adherence to Thomistic teaching, particularly in Oxford. As we shall see, this theological consensus is
particularly manifest in the debate over the unicity of form thesis.
3. Unicity and Plurality of Forms: Basic Principles and Sources
Both the pluralists and the unitarians were agreed that the origin of the
intellectual soul was creation. The con ict between them rather consisted
in de ning the relation between the intellect and other faculties of
the soul. Aquinas avoids the issue altogether by discarding one of the
terms. To the question Is it possible that a composite be essentially one,
if there co-exist many substantial forms? he states that the rational soul
suYces as the source of mans existence, and that once it arrives, the
sensitive soul and the forms which precede it will disappear. It is super uous
35
John Quidort of Paris wrote the Correctorium Circa sometime before 1284, and after
Knapwells Quare. Cf. Le Correctorium corruptorii Circa de Jean Quidort de Paris, ed. Mller
1941 (op. cit., above, n. 19).
266
isabel iribarren
to assume a plurality of forms in a single composite substance. The

real unity of being requires the unicity of the formal principle: ens et unum
convertuntur.36
Essentially, the doctrine of the unicity of substantial form is an interpretation of Aristotelian physics, and is deeply rooted in the theory of
hylemorphism.37 The quali cation of form as substantial is of great
importance and must not be overlooked. The substantial form, according to Aquinas, is the absolute determining principle, the sole source of
perfection and activity in the composite. Consequently, it is not possible
for a composite substance to have more than one substantial form. This
is held on the grounds that the existence of one composite is due to the
presence of one form: substantial form and one form are therefore
equivalent terms. In the case of human beings, the intellectual soul (and
not the vegetative or the sensitive soul) is ultimately mans substantial
form in that it is the principle which accounts for man being a human
and not an animal substance. What makes a human being such is the
intellectual soul. Therefore, the intellectual souland not the sensitive
is what makes man a human substance and what diVerentiates him from
an animal. The vegetative soul (or power) and the sensitive soul (or power)
are also principles of actuality in a human composite in that they are
also forms. But they are not be substantial forms because although they
can explain how a human being belongs to the wider realm of living
beings which includes plants and animals, they are not what de nes a
human being as such. What it is to be a human being is only ultimately
explained by the intellectual soul.
This tenet responds to Aquinas belief that in all corporeal beings, apart
from the matter-form composition, there is composition between essence
and existence (esse). In introducing the notion of an act of being (esse)
For the main passages containing the metaphysical premises of the unicity of substantial form and the principles that follow, cf. Aquinas, Ia, q.76, a.3; Contra Gentiles,
II, c.57; In De anima, II, lect.1.
37
The theory of hylemorphism constitutes the basis of Aristotelian physics. Physics, as
Aristotle understood it, is the science of nature as a whole. Natural objects are those which
have a capacity for change or movement within themselves, and physics is therefore the
science of such natural changes and of the objects themselves which change. Hylemorphism
is the doctrine of matter and form as the principles of change. Every living being is
composed of matter and form, matter (identi ed with the body) being what possesses potentiality and form (identi ed with the soul) what possesses actuality. Change, in these terms,
is the gradual acquisition of a form and the bringing to actuality of potential matter. The
doctrine of potentiality and actuality thus draws attention to the continuity of natural
change.
36
267
which even actualises the form, Aquinas was making a plurality of forms
unnecessary. For if form is understood as the proper receiver of the
act of being, the composition of esse with several forms would necessarily
entail several substantial forms, and hence several actually existing beings.
It is a feature of the unicity thesis, therefore, to identify form with actualitysomething which is not necessarily the case in the pluralist view.38
Since for Aquinas the one and only being (esse) a substance has comes
entirely and immediately from the actualising form, all preceding forms
must disappear.39 Whatever is posterior to this actualising form is consequently accidental (and not substantial) to the composite. In other words,
non t motus in substantia. The distinction between an accidental form and
a substantial form is crucial for Aquinas, and is one of his main reasons
for not accepting a plurality of forms. Whereas the recipient of a substantial form is something which is pure potentiality, an accidental form
arrives in something which is already an actual existent. If, following the
pluralist claim, there is more than one substantial form in a composite,
already the lowest form would satisfy the conditions for a substantial form.
Moreover, any higher form would be characterised as an accidental form,
since it would arrive in an already existing substance. The diVerence
between a substantial and an accidental form, then, would no longer hold
unless we accept a unitarian principle.
One of the consequences of this teaching is to deny universal hylemorphism. Defenders of this theory generally held that all beings, apart
from God, are composed in that they include potentiality (i.e. matter). It
was believed that in man there are two instances of matter, one which
is intrinsic to his soul and inseparable from the form of his soul, and
another which is extrinsic to the soul and is the corporeal matter of the
body.40 According to Aquinas, by contrast, the presence of matter within
38
See Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c.5; De potentia, VII, 2; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, c.54;
ST Ia, q.3, a.4; q.5, a.3.
39
See Aquinas, ST Ia, q.118, a.2, ad 2 (this had particular consequences on embryology). The superior form replaces the inferior one and produces the eVects that the latter
was capable of causing. There are no intermediate forms; being pure actuality, a form
cannot pre-exist or be virtually contained in another. Consequently, the union between
prime matter and substantial form is immediate. See also Aquinas, De spiritualibus creaturis,
a.3; SCG, cc.57 and 58.
40
Aquinas traced this doctrine back to the Fons Vitae of Avicebron (see Aquinas De ente,
c.4). Defenders of this position, notably Bonaventure, attempted to show that it owed its
origin to Augustine. See Bonaventure, Commentarius in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi,
in: Opera omnia, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi) 1882-1902, II, d.17, a.1, q.2. William de la
Mare, for example, was aware of the support which Augustine could provide for the doctrine of spiritual matter, and in this spirit William pro ts from texts such as Confessions
268
isabel iribarren
an intelligence is incompatible with the latters capacity to perform intellectual operations. 41 Prime matter 42 has no actuality whatsoever unless
united to a form; it is pure potentiality, it has no properties, and is therefore unintelligible.
Thus, Aquinas main tenets concerning the unicity of substantial form
were also accompanied by basic principles of Aristotelian physics, not
necessarily deduced of themselves from the axiom of convertibility of
being and unity. Two instances of such an incorporation of Aristotelian
physics by Aquinas are the potential character of prime matter and the
unintelligibility of prime matter of itself. Note, however, that the conception of prime matter as pure potentiality and unintelligible does not
of itself form part of the debate over the unicity of substantial form.
However, such an understanding of prime matter did contribute to give
rise to the debate, insofar as the denial of all actuality in matter at least
calls for a union of matter and form where the latter plays an exclusive
actualising role in the composite as the sole source of perfection. Moreover,
a prime matter which had no positive value whatsoever was problematic
in accounting for continuity in natural change.
As for the pluralists, they rarely agree in their accounts of matter and
form and the relation between the two, beyond an acceptance of certain
degree of actuality in mattersomething strictly connected to their
theological and doctrinal concerns. The general pluralist view de nes matter in terms of accounts of change whereby matter stands independently
from the form.43 However, a double conception of matter is generally
XII, 6, and the Literal Commentary on Genesis 5, 5, in which Augustine had tentatively attributed matter to all living beings. See William de la Mare, Correctorium, ed. Glorieux 1927
(op. cit., above, n. 1), 49-50.
41
See Aquinas, Le De ente et essentia de s. Thomas dAquin, ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin,
Paris 1948, 31-2.
42
Note that prime matter is not necessarily the same as matter. Matter is described
by Aristotle (Metaphysics VII, 3, 1029a20-21) as that which in itself is neither a something
nor a quantity nor any of those other things by which a thing is determined. This led
some thinkers such as Aquinas, Albert, and Giles of Rome, to view matter as pure potentiality, that is, as completely devoid of actuality and of itself apart from its corresponding
substantial form. Matter in this sense was called prime matter, in that it is not understood within the composite. Matter (and not prime matter), on the other hand, is usually described as the principle of potentiality in a composite, that which subsists under the
change of form and is therefore actualised by form. For the notion of prime matter as
it was propounded by Aristotle and its later interpretations, see Arthur Hymans article,
Aristotles First Matter and Avicennas and Averroes Corporeal Form, in: H.A. Wolson and L.W.
Schwarz (eds.), Harry A. Wolfson Jubilee Volume, Jerusalem 1965, vol. 1, 385-406.
43
For the common metaphysical principles of the pluralist view in the thirteenth cen-
269
maintained, where we nd rstly a simple matter, that is, the subject of

substantial form, and secondly, matter as the subject of change. Avicenna
and Averroes, attempting to harmonise the two accounts, set out to show
how rst matter could also be said to be a substance. As part of this
attempt, they introduced the notion of corporeal form to show that
rst matter was a substance in the sense of having some sort of form.
Thus, matter can be seen either as pure potentiality, or as an active
potentiality, and it is in the latter sense that one could speak of a forma
corporeitatis.44
Henceforth, the commentators accounts of corporeal form became
an element of medieval discussions about rst matter. The notion of a
corporeal form was then conceived as an inchoatio formae.45 Those who
in the thirteenth century admitted in nature an inchoatio formae held that
matter possessed an active potentiality translated in an initial activity, so
that the distinct and complete form to be achieved at the end of the generative process existed already, if incomplete, within matters active power.46
The notion of an inchoatio formae, therefore, supposes the development of
an imperfect form into a more perfect one, thus excluding the possibility of a succession of forms. For this reason, the notion of an original
form as some sort of material principle remains irreconcilable with the
unitarian thesis.
As the pluralist thesis saw it, closely related to the notion of a corporeal form were two principles, mainly identi ed with Augustine: universal
tury, see R. Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralit des formes, in Louvain
1951, 310-4.
44
For the tracing of the connected notions of prime matter and corporeal form
and their introduction to medieval discussions, see Hymans article (op. cit., above, n. 42).
For the relevant passages in Avicenna, see Al-Shifa, Metaphysics IV, 2, 85v, 2; II, 2, 75r,
2; On Denition, translated to the French by A.M. Goichon, Introduction Avicenne, Paris
1933, 60, 394-5. For Averroes, see De Substantia Orbis I, V, 320r, B; Long Commentary on
Physics I, com. 63, IV, 29v, D; com. 70, IV, 32r, C; Long Commentary on Metaphysics VII,
com. 9.
45
The term inchoatio formae appears for the rst time in Robert Grosseteste, De luce seu
de inchoatione formarum, ed. L. Baur, in: Die philosophische Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs
von Lincoln, Mnster/W 1912, 51 V. Grosseteste sees life as the rst form, which impresses
spatial dimensions in matter. This rst form Grosseteste explicitly identi es with Avicennas
forma corporeitatis. The term, therefore, of inchoatio formae, appears only in Scholasticism.
However, as will be seen, the conception behind the term was traced back by scholastics
to denote Augustines doctrine of seminal reasons.
46
For those scholastics who supported this view, see Peter of Tarantasia, Sent. II, d.18,
q.1; Bonaventure, Sent. II, d.18, q.1, a.2. For those against the notion of an inchoatio
formae, see notably Giles of Rome, In De Physico auditu, II, lect.1, dub.9: Sent. II, d.1,
p. 1, q.2, a.4; d.18, q.2, a.1; Quodlibet II, q.22.
270
isabel iribarren
hylemorphism47 and the rationes seminales.48 According to the rst, if the

soul, too, is a compound of matter and form, then it must be understood
as a substance susceptible to intrinsic change and not as the only and
immutable principle of all being in the composite. The vegetative and
sensitive souls can coexist with the intellectual soul, all playing a part in
the composites being and perfection.49 According to the second principle, matter is believed to contribute in the constitution of a new substance in virtue of an actual set of properties of which it has been endowed
in its own right. Matter, it is argued, has some degree of actuality, that
is, it is a positive entity which is capable of being perfected by the intel-
47
The question of whether the theory of universal hylemorphism was as such pronounced by Augustine or whether it was at least inherent to Augustines natural philosophy, is much debated. Thomas of York, for example, believed that such a theory formed
part of Augustines thought (see Thomas of York, Sapientale, Vat.Lat. 6771, fol. 88d, quoted
by Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 443). Some passages in Augustine, however, could
support the view that he attributed some matter-form composition to the soul. See Augustine,
Literal Commentary on Genesis, VII, c.6, PL 34, col. 359, n. 9: Fortasse potuit et anima,
antequam ea ipsa natura eret, quae anima dicitur, cuius vel pulchritudo virtus, vel
deVormitas virtium est, habere aliquam materiam pro suo genere spiritualem [De genesi ad litteram,
ed. J. Zycha, Prague-Vienna-Leipzig 1894, 224-5]. My italics. See also ibid., VII, c.27, PL
34, col. 369, n. 39 [ed. Zycha, 206]. The attributions of the theory of universal hylemorphism in the thirteenth century make up a rather heterogeneous lot. Aquinas attributes it to Avicebron in his De ente et essentia, c.4; Sent. II, d.3, q.1, a.1. See also A. Forest,
La structure mtaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas dAquin, Paris 1931 [2e d. 1956], 109-10.
Bonaventure tends to identify it with Augustine, in his Sent. II, d.17, a.1, q.2; II, d.18,
a.2, q.1; II, d.17, a.2, q.2, ad 6. Among modern scholars, F. Van Steenberghen, La philosophie au XIII e sicle, Louvain 1966, 46-7, 150, 245-46, 249, sees universal hylemorphism as
Avicebrons in uence. Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 422, 442, on the other hand,
rather stresses the Augustinian in uence.
48
The conception of a corporeal form, and for that matter of an inchoatio formae, was
seen as akin to Augustines notion of seminal reasons in that in both cases we nd the idea
of principles of (material) production, the nature of which is potentiality. As we nd it in
Augustine, seminal reasons are latent germs which contain all the creatures which are to
be gradually developed in time. See Augustine, De Trinitate, III, c.9, PL 42, col. 877,
n. 16 [ed. W.J. Mountain, Turnhout 1968 (CC 50), 143]; Literal Commentary on Genesis, VI,
c.11, PL 34, col. 346, n. 18 [ed. Zycha (op. cit., above, n. 47), 183-5] Seminal reasons
have their own nature and eYciency, on account of which a human being engenders
another human being and not an animal of another species. See Augustine, Literal Commentary
on Genesis, IX, c.17, PL 34, col. 406, n. 32 [ed. Zycha, 290-2]. The latter supported the
view which identi es seminal reasons with an inchoatio formae, and the eYcient principle of
seminal reasons with a certain actuality in matter. However, the notion of a corporeal
form was, as we have seen, most likely introduced into the West through two decisively
Aristotelian authors, namely Avicenna and Averroes.
49
Examples of this view are found in Bonaventure, Sent. II, d.17, a.1, q.2, ad 6; Matthew
of Aquasparta, Quaestiones de anima XIII, q.4 (Aedil. 164, fol. 80v), ed. A.-J. Gondras, Paris
1961, 51-73. Cf. Zavaloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 311.
271
lectual soul.50 Once separated, we can still refer to a cadaver as the same
body because it preserves an actuality of its own which is independent
from the soul. Form is only a determining principle which prepares the
composite for subsequent determinations. In this context, then, potentiality and actuality are understood in a way unintelligible under the
unitarian principles. Whereas Aquinas and his followers clearly distinguish
actuality from potentiality and assign them separately to form and matter respectively, the pluralists believe in a materia universalis and a forma
universalis. Form in this context can be said to possess a certain potentiality in that a pre-existent form can be superseded and intrinsically perfected by a new form.51 There is, therefore, a subordination of forms
a claim which immediately clashes with the unitarian belief in the immutability of form.
As far as the sources go, mainly Augustine and Aristotle have been
alternatively claimed as authorities for either the unitarian or the pluralist view. There is a general consensus among modern scholars, however,
in identifying Augustine as the main pluralist in uence, and in seeing
Aristotelian physics as be tting the unitarian thesis.52 Avicebron, as another
main source, has enjoyed more unanimity in being identi ed as the
50
In support of this claim, pluralists have appealed in particular to a passage of
Augustines Confessions, XII, 6 (PL 32, col. 828, n. 6 [ed. L. Verheijen, Turnhout 1981,
CC 27, 218-9]), where he states that matter is something intermediate between form and
nothingness ( propre nihil ), and that matter is in fact a nihil aliquid. The aliquid was
enough to argue for some form in matter. This is furthermore supported by Augustines
statement that matter informs insofar as it can receive a form (De vera religione, c.18, PL
34, col. 137, n. 36 [ed. J. Martin, Turnhout 1962 (CC 32), 209]).
51
This entails that to each essential perfection corresponds a diVerent substantial form.
By the same token, every being implies a diVerent form for each of its operations. This
multiplicity of forms in a substance, however, expresses a hierarchy which accounts for
the unity of the composite. For expressions of this tenet in scholastics, see Peter John Olivi,
Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, ed. B. Jansen, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi) 192226, 50; Richard of Mediavilla, De gradu formarum, ed. Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43),
140; Bonaventure, Sent. II, d.15, a.1, q.2, ad 3. Cf. Zavalloni 1951, 310.
52
See for example G. Thry, Laugustinisme mdival, in: Acta Hebdomadae AugustinianaeThomisticae, Turin-Rome 1931, 140-200, on p. 146; E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy
in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed., London 1989, 416-20. In other cases (which to our judgement
do not fundamentally disagree with the previous), the con ict is not seen as one of
Aristotelianism versus Augustinianism, but of unequally developed forms of Aristotelianism,
where Aquinas is often considered the more authentic. See Van Steenberghen, Siger de
Brabant daprs ses uvres indites, vol. 2: Siger dans lhistoire de laristotlisme, Louvain 1942, 719;
Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 422, where he ascribes a direct and decisive in uence
of Augustine over the pluralist view; pp. 472-73, where he speaks of a contaminated
Aristotelianism; M. De Wulf, Le trait De unitate formae de Gilles de Lessines, Louvain 1901,
13, where he speaks of peripattisme fauss in referring to the pluralist understanding
of the philosopher.
272
isabel iribarren
primary forerunner of the pluralist view.53 In assessing these sources, however, a main distinction should be made between what can be attributed
to each of these authorities as part of their doctrinal principles, and what
has been claimed from them by unitarians or pluralists for the sake of
polemical argument against the opposite view.
To start with the least controversial, the fundamental principle leading Avicebrons doctrine as shown in his Fons Vitae is the conception of
universal matter and universal form. Except for God, all substances are
composed of matter and form.54 What distinguishes one creature from
another is the addition of a single or many complementary forms, according to which each creature is determined as a simple mineral, a plant,
an animal, or a human being. This represents a clear propounding of
universal hylemorphism, and to that extent it seems fair to state that
Avicebron is at least one of the sources behind the pluralist view.55
R. Zavalloni,56 on the other hand, has identi ed Philip the Chancellor
as a more proximate in uence of the pluralist doctrine. 57 Philip appeared
to have propounded a plurality of forms in connection with universal
hylemorphism approximately forty years before the rst condemnations.
Although admitting that Avicebrons in uence upon the pluralist conception is remarkable, Zavalloni holds that he must not be considered as
the theorys exclusive or preponderant forerunner. For that matter, more
53
In The condemnation of St Thomas at Oxford (op. cit., above, n. 3) Callus aYrms that
there can be no doubt that the pluralist theory is the oVspring of the Jewish philosopher
Avicebron, through his Fons Vitae. And De Wulf, in his study of Giles of Lessines De
unitate formae (op. cit., above, n. 52), 20: Linterpretation franciscaine de la matire et de
la forme est pleinement contenue dans le Fons Vitae dAvicebron . . . Avicebron est le corrupteur de la theorie hylmorphique.
54
Avicebron, Avancebrolis Fons Vitae ex Arabico in Latinum translatus ab Johanne Hispano et
Dominico Gundissalino, ed. Cl. Baeumker, Mnster 1892-95, I, c.5, p. 7; II, c.24, p. 69;
III, 23, p. 133; III, 26, p. 142, V, 18, p. 290; III, 32, pp. 154-155 (Formae substantiae
compositae multae sunt); IV, c.1, p. 211; IV, c.5, p. 220; V, c.12, p. 278. See also
Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 421.
55
In this respect it is important to note that, although universal hylemorphism could
well be seen as implying a plurality of forms, the converse is not equally true. If we admit
that the soul is composed of matter and form, the union of soul and body does not consist in the union of correlative principles, but of two substances to some extent determined, if incomplete. However, to hold that form is a dispositive principle and matter
somehow a positive entity (as the pluralist doctrine has been more or less characterised),
does not necessarily entail that all beings apart from God are composed of matter and
form. Insofar as the pluralist thesis is seen as implying universal hylemorphism, the
connection between the two could be considered a legitimate one.
56
Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 422.
57
See Philippus Cancellarius Parisiensis, Summa de bono, ed. N. Wicki, Bern 1985.
273
than to Avicebron, the pluralists are indebted to Avicenna whoas we

sawdeveloped the notion of a corporeal form from Aristotles physics
and metaphysics.58 Avicenna (and for that matter also Averroes) sets out
to show how Aristotles prime matter could also be said to be a substance. As part of this attempt, he posited the notion of corporeal form
to show that prime matter was a substance in the sense of having some
kind of form.59
In the case of Augustine, mainly two pluralist principles are claimed
to have derived from his doctrine: one, that there is some actuality in
matter, or more precisely, the notion of a corporeal form; the other, universal hylemorphism. As for the rst principle, it has been clearly stated
that it was introduced into the West by two decisively Aristotelian authors,
namely Avicenna and Averroes. In fact, it is doubtful whether Augustine
ever spoke explicitly of a forma corporeitatis. However, the notion might
have been perceived as possessing an Augustinian character inasmuch as
some passages in Augustine appear to describe matter as a positive entity.
The theory of matter in Augustine is closely connected to the doctrine
of creation, and hence the relation usually found between the notion of
a corporeal form and Augustines ratio seminalis. The latter at least calls
upon a pluralist thesis inasmuch as it admits the perfectibility of substantial form. Indeed, the rationes seminales execute the simultaneous creation of all creatures, and as such have some formif incomplete
which develops into something complete and more perfect. Moreover, in
his Literal Commentary on Genesis, Augustine speaks of an informis materia,60
the nature of which has been interpreted from other passages in his works
as possessing some positive value.61 In the Confessions we nd matter being
58
For Avicenna and the notion of corporeal form, see Hymans article 1965 (op. cit.,
above, n. 42), 395-403.
59
Avicenna, Al-Shifa, Metaphysics II, 2, 75r, 2; IV, 2, 85v, 2; On Denitions, trans. to
French by A.M. Goichon, Introduction Avicenne, Paris 1933, 60, 394-395.
60
Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, I, c.15, PL 34, col. 257, n. 29 [ed. Zycha
1894 (op. cit., above, n. 47), 21, 7-15]: Non quia informis materia formatis rebus tempore prior est, cum sit utrumque simul concreatum, et unde factum est, et quod factum.
Sicut enim vox materia est verborum, verba vero formatam vocem indicant [. . .] ita creator Deus non priore tempore fecit informem materiam. Also Lit. Comm. on Genesis, V,
c. 5, PL 34, col. 326, n. 13 [ed. Zycha, 146, 6-8]: Non itaque temporali, sed causali
ordine prius facta est informis formabilisque materies, et spiritualis et corporalis, de qua
eret quod faciendum esset. Cf. De Gen. Contra Manich., II, c.3, PL 34, col. 198, n. 4.
61
In what follows, we will be referring to speci c passages in the following works by
Augustine: Confessions XII, 6, PL 32, col. 828, n. 6 [ed. Verheijen 1981 (op. cit., above,
n. 50], 218-9]; Literal Commentary on Genesis, lib. imperf., IV, c.12, PL 34, col. 224 [ed. Zycha
274
isabel iribarren
described as something intermediary between form and nothingness ( propre nihil ) in the sense of a nihil aliquid, which has served as support for
asserting in matter some kind of form. This statement has been seen as
further con rmed by a passage of De vera religione were Augustine holds
that matter informs insofar as it can receive a form.62 There is, then, an
Augustinian resonance to the notion of a corporeal form (which in
Scholasticism was also identi ed to the idea of an inchoatio formae), inasmuch as in some passages in Augustine matter is found described as possessing some degree of formality. The notion of a corporeal form as such,
however, is of a clear Aristotelian background.
As for the doctrine of universal hylemorphism, which also pro ted from
Augustines authority, it is closely related to the pluralist doctrine of form
as dispositive principle. For if the soul is constituted of matter and form,
the union of body and soul, rather than signifying a pure potentiality
being entirely informed by an active principle, entails somehow two substances in some way determined although incomplete. Some advocates of
the pluralist thesis have maintained that universal hylemorphism is
inherent in Augustines natural philosophy. 63 Again, it is a matter of
interpretation, and even believers in the unicity of substantial form have
found support in Augustine.64 There are clearer cases in Augustine, however, which seem to suggest some composition in the soul.65 At least in
what concerns universal hylemorphism, therefore, it seems that Avicebron
( pace Zavalloni ) is a more direct source for the pluralist view. Augustine
1894 (op. cit., above, n. 47), 466, 5-21; De vera religione, c.18, PL 34, col. 137, n. 36 [ed.
Martin 1962 (op. cit., above, n. 50), 209].
62
Augustine, De vera religione, c.18, PL 34, col. 137, n. 36 [ed. Martin 1962 (op. cit.,
above, n. 50), 209]: Matter is of itself some thing independently of form, and to that
extent its (matters) reality also preexists in the divine ideas.
63
See for example Thomas of York, Sapientale, Vat.Lat. 6771, fol. 88d. Cf. Zavalloni
1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 443.
64
In De immortalitate animae, c.15, PL 32, col. 1033, n. 24 [ed. Verheijen 1981 (op. cit.,
above, n. 50)], Augustine states that the whole being of a living body derives from the
soul. The unitarians could well have seen there at least a denial of the development of
substantial form. To this the pluralists retorted by quoting from Augustines Retractationes,
I, c.53, PL 32, col. 591 [ed. A. Mutzenbecher, Turnhout 1984, 16, 28-17, 3], where he
withdraws his former statement. William de la Mare, for example, refers to the latter passage in his Correctorium, a.31 (Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 131).
65
Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, VII, c.6, PL 34, col. 359, n. 9 [ed. Zycha
1894 (op. cit., above, n. 47), 206, 1-4]: Fortasse potuit et anima, antequam ea ipsa natura
eret, quae anima dicitur, cuius vel pulchritudo virtus, vel deformitas vitium est, habere
aliquam materiam pro suo genere spiritualem. My italics. See also, Lit. Comm. on Genesis, VII,
c.27, PL 34, col. 369, n. 39 [ed. Zycha, 225, 4-12].
275
seems to have operated more noticeably over the pluralist thesis in what
concerns the notion of matter as a positive entity, rather than regarding
the perfectibility of form.
Apart from the notion of a forma corporeitatiswhich has been already
established as of clear Aristotelian origin, Aristotle equally served for
explaining the idea of continuity in change (in favour of the pluralist
view), and the relation of the intellectual soul to other forms (used alternatively by pluralist and unitarians).66 The rst idea is closely connected
to the doctrine of the embryonic development.67 The pluralists believed
that they were legitimately entitled to appeal to the philosophers authority insofar as they could show that Aristotles natural philosophy implied
a continuous progress in substantial form, thus suggesting the idea of a
gradual completion. In De generatione animalium,68 Aristotle says that the
animal and the man are not made at the same time, but the sensitive
soul comes rst and is generated from our parents. Following this line,
the pluralists contended that the sensitive soul is gradually perfected (to
Aquinas this would mean alteration, not generation proper)69 in accordance with the temporal development of the embryo. Further on the intellectual soul arrives and constitutes a substantial unity with the sensitive
soul, the most perfect form in the natural order. It is a true metaphysical union and not a mere juxtaposition of forms.70 Aristotles doctrine
of the development of the embryo, however, does not necessarily entail
a plurality of forms. Aquinas theory of the succession of forms can be interpreted as an eVort to adapt the principles of hylemorphism to his
own formulation of matter and form. Indeed, the thesis of the gradual
perfection of substantial form culminating in the intellect shares some
aspects with the Aristotelian account of change. However, as will be
Cf. Zavalloni 1951(op. cit., above, n. 43), 463-8.
See Aristotle, De generatione animalium, II, 3, 376a35-b5 (in: The Complete Works of Aristotle,
ed. J. Barnes, Princeton 1984, vol. 1).
68
Aristotle, De generatione animalium, II.3
69
See Aquinas, Quodlibet I, q.6. This is one occasion on which Knapwell supplies, at
least prima facie, a more satisfactory argument than that of Aquinas. See art. 32 of Knapwells
Correctorium Corruptorii Quare (Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 143).
70
William de la Mare adopts this general pluralist argument in his Correctorium, in the
solution to the question of the embryo. To the objection that generatio unius est corruptio
alterius (Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione, I, 4, 17), William maintains that the principle
only applies to the simple elements, which cannot coexist among themselves. In the composite, however, there is a hierarchy of forms in virtue of which there is a true essential
subordination of the forms, thus guaranteeing the substantial unity of the composite. See
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1): Correctorium Quare . . ., a.102 (Quod impossibile est
plures formas substantiales esse in eodem), 395-6.
66
67
276
isabel iribarren
subsequently seen, the pluralists often overlooked the fact that Aristotle
considered the intellect, however ambiguously, as a superior and separate substance created directly by God. To that extent, the doctrine of
the intellect does not directly aVect the continuity of natural change.
The second of the Aristotelian loci classici then, concerns the muchdebated doctrine of the intellect. The pre-existence of previous forms in
the composite poses the question for the pluralists of the hierarchy of
souls. As a response, the pluralists mainly appealed to a passage in
Aristotles De anima II, 3,71 where he explains the relation between the
vegetative and sensitive souls using the example of geometrical gures.
The sensitive soul is said to contain the vegetative soul as the pentagon
completes and perfects the quadrilateral. This image served the pluralists
as an argument in support of their thesis of the progressive evolution of
substantial form. However, Aristotle never mentions the intellectual soul
in these passages, and the comparison with the geometric gures could
well have referred to the vegetative and sensitive souls only.
On the other hand, some other texts found in Aristotle could support
a unitarian thesis. In what concerns the pure potentiality of matter,
a particular passage in De generatione et corruptione seems to suggest that
prime matter is of itself completely devoid of form.72 Likewise in the
Metaphysics, matter is described as lacking all positive characteristics.73
Furthermore, as the unitarians saw it, it is once such an (Aristotelian)
understanding of prime matter and its corresponding relation to substantial form is established, that the plurality of forms becomes a non
sequitur. If matter is by nature pure potentiality, the soul is necessarily
united to the body as a form, and is therefore in the whole body and in
each of its parts as a unity. Any other way of conceiving the relation
between body and soul is not substantial but accidental, such that the
composite would be seen as a juxtaposition of parts with no unifying
principle.74 By the same token, the Platonist thesis 75 that man is an aggregate of two complete beings where one moves the other, is a position
that could logically entail a plurality of forms without contradiction. For
Aristotle, De anima, II, 3, 414b28-32.
Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione II, 1 (329a, 24-26): Our doctrine is that there is
a [ rst] matter [. . .], but it has no separate existence.
73
Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 3 (1029a, 20-21): [. . .] by rst matter I mean that which
is neither a particular thing, nor of a certain quantity, nor assigned to any other category
by which being is determined.
74
See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, cc.57 and 58; ST Ia, q.76, a.8.
75
See Plato, Timaeus, 69e.
71
72
277
the diverse operations of one and the same being could emerge from
diVerent sources while leaving intact the substantial independence of the
thing moved. As Aquinas would retort, if the soul were united to the
body merely as a mover, we could say that it is not in the body as a
whole but only in one part whence it could move the remainder.76
Whether or not Aquinas understanding of Aristotle was less contaminated than the pluralists, it seems clear that Aquinas was primarily
acting as a natural philosopher when interpreting Aristotle. This is not
to say that the pluralists were by contrast acting as theologians, but their
connection of Aristotelian physics to an Augustinian view of creation
(hence the connection between a forma corporeitatis and the rationes seminales) certainly contributed to safeguard a continuity with theological
dogma. On the other hand, the (metaphysical) disagreement between the
two interpretations of hylemorphism resulted in an incommensurability of
the unitarian and the pluralist principles. Given their exclusive attribution of actuality to form and its total absence in matter, the supporters
of a unitarian view understood the notion of a forma corporeitatis as necessarily linked to the existence of a certain type of actuality in matter.
However, it is important to note that the belief in some sort of actuality in prime matter, although widespread among the pluralists, did not
necessarily imply the positing of a corporeal form as equivalent to an
intellectual soul. Unlike the unitarians, the pluralist view does not make
actuality and form interchangeable in value. These led to a series of confusions on both parts the consequences of which were acutely revealed
in a theological context.
4. A Theological Problem: The Numerical Identity of Christs Body
Perhaps the most crucial of the theological issues regarding the controversy over the unicity of form was the numerical identity of Christs body
living and dead. For, if matter does not oVer a disposition of its own, if
the body is what it is wholly in virtue of the soul, then, in the separation of body and soul, Christs death leads to one of two possibilities.
Either his dead body ceases to be identi ed with his living body, or Christ
would have had to assume another body in the resurrection. Both tenets
were contrary to dogma.
76
See Aquinas, ST Ia, q.76, a.3.
278
isabel iribarren
4.1. Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of Christs Body

In the third book of his Commentary,77 Aquinas argument about the numerical identity of Christs body is based on his de nition of man as a unity
of body and soul (Videtur quod Christus in illo triduo fuerit homo). Unlike Hugh
of Saint Victor, who identi es human nature wholly with the soul,78
for Aquinas the separation of body and soul at death signi es a substantial change entailing corruption and not just alteration. Consequently,
Christ as a man can be said to be the same living and dead only
equivocally.
In the Quodlibets the discussion is presented in a more explicit theological sense (Utrum in Christus in triduo mortis fuerit idem homo numero).79 In
Quodlibet II (1269) Aquinas aYrms the identity of the dead and living
Christ only as an identity secundum quid and not as an identity simpliciter.
He reasons as follows. In Christ, body and soul are united not only in
one person but also in one nature. His divinity, however, is united to the
body and soul of Christ in person but not in nature. That is why in the
separation of body and soul Christ can still be referred to as idem numero
simpliciter, that is, in virtue of the hypostatic or personal union. As human
nature, on the other hand, there are two ways of understanding the death
of Christ. If we consider Christs death as referring to his humanity as
a whole (quantum ad totam naturam), there can be no identity between Christ
living and dead, given the separation of body and soul. Considering, however, the parts that compose his humanity, his soul can be said to be the
same because the substantial form itself does not suVer changes, and it
is to the substantial form that the person of Christ is united. His body,
on the other hand, is the same not simpliciter but secundum quid, that is,
according to matter. Aquinas is very careful not to attribute any kind of
actuality to the remaining matter after the bodys death. 80 However,
Aquinas often resorts to the category of quantity in order to supply a
guarantee of continuity in change, given the impossibility of a forma
corporeitatis. As in the question of transubstantiation, the accidents of
Aquinas, Sentences III, dist. 22, q.1, a.1.

See Hugh of St Victor, De Sacramentis, Book II, part 1, chapters IX and XI (ed.
Migne, PL 176, 393D-399B, 401B-411D).
79
Aquinas, Quodlibet II, q.1, a.1.
80
The remaining matter could perhaps be here understood as quantitas, the three-dimensionality of which would permit us to refer to it as a body, but where strictly speaking
there is no individual composite (hoc aliquid) anymore. However, there is no evidence that
Aquinas actually puts it in those terms.
77
78
279
the bread that our senses still perceive after it has become the body of
Christ inhere in dimensive quantity as their subject.81
The unicity of form thesis, Aquinas believes, is capable of oVering a
satisfactory account of change. However, there is some diYculty in explaining continuity from the corruption of one form to the generation of
another, thus appearing as if every change entailed transubstantiation.
The pluralists have the opposite problem, where what remains after change
always has some kind of actuality and the simple advent of a superior
form determining the previous ones sounds more like mere alteration
than a true generative process.
In Quodlibet III.2, a.2 (Easter 1270), Utrum oculus Christi post mortem fuerit
oculus aequivoce, Aquinas applies the same principle to individual parts of
the body. If the body of Christ as man is the same only equivocally, then
his eyes and any other part of his body which suVered substantial change
after separation from the soul are thereby the same only equivocally. The
grounds of this argument are found in the Summa Theologiae, q.76, a.8:
Whether the whole soul is in each part of the body. According to
Aquinas, the relation of the soul to the whole of the body is not the
same as its relation to the parts. For the soul is related to the whole primarily and essentially as to its object, whereas its relation to the parts is
secondary inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole. Consequently,
just as the soul bears the form and identity of the body, in like manner
the parts of the body, inasmuch as they participate in the body as a
whole, are substantially aVected by the souls departure.
In Quodlibet IV.5 (Easter 1271) there appears to be a change in Aquinas
stance,82 or at least in the way in which he expressed his view. In response
to the question Utrum corpus Christi in cruce et in sepulcro sit unum numero, the
81
By dimensive quantity it is meant the three-dimensionality which material bodies
possess on account of their being aVected by the accident of quantity. Material bodies are
extense because they are seen under the category of quantity. In the Eucharist, however, Aquinas holds that Christs body is under the accident of quantity without being
aVected by it, that is, per modum substantiae. (ST IIIa, q.76, a.1.) It is ultimately dimensive
quantity, therefore, which accounts for Christs real presence in the sacrament. For Aquinas
account of transubstantiation and his account of the real presence of Christ in the
Eucharist, see ST IIIa, qq.75-77. Cf. A. Kenny, The Use of Logical Analysis in Theology, in:
A. Kenny (ed.), Reason and Religion: Essays in Philosophical Theology, Oxford 1987, 3-20. For
the problems Aquinas account of the real presence entailed for Aristotelian philosophy,
see E. Sylla, E. (1975), Autonomous and Handmaiden Science. St Thomas Aquinas and William of
Ockham in the Eucharist, in: J.E. Murdoch and E. Sylla (eds.), The Cultural Context of Medieval
Learning, Dordrecht-Boston 1975, 349-96.
82
Cf. Zavalloni 1951 (op. cit., above, n. 43), 267-8.
280
isabel iribarren
solution given is est idem numero corpus Christi appensum in cruce et iacens in
sepulcro. There is, then, a stronger stress on the identity between the dead
body of Christ and his body when living. Aquinas argument no longer
rests on metaphysical considerations of the composite nature and on the
de nition of a human being, but on purely Christological reasons. In
trying to avoid Arianism (whereby the Word in Christ takes the place of
the human soulso that the hypostatic union is consequently dissolved
at death)83 it is necessary to state the identity secundum suppositum84 (that
is, according to the divine person, the Son) of Christ living and dead.
On the other hand, there is the risk of the Gaianite85 heresy, which contends that Christs body is incorruptible because his divinity is united to
him in nature and not only in personin which case we must diVerentiate
his body living and dead. Aquinas concludes in favour of the identity
between the cruci ed Christ and the dead Christ, because prima unitas
maior est quam secunda diVerentia.
Aquinas does not resort in this last passage as he had done in his last
two Quodlibets to a diVerence between Christ as the Son of God and
Christ as a man. Perhaps the condemnation of 10 December 1270 and
the opposition of the Paris masters86 to the unicity theory in uenced the
83
Distinctive of Arianism (from Arius, d.336) is a denial of the full divinity of Christ,
holding that he was not God by nature, but a creature. Consequently, rather than stating that the Son assumes a human nature, Arianism identi es the divine person of Christ
with his human soul.
84
The term suppositum comes from the Greek pstasiw , which means literally substance. In christological and trinitarian discussions, however, the term substance usually signi es the divine esence or nature, as opposed to the three persons, which are more
commonly quali ed as supposita in the sense of a substantial individual reality. It was mainly
under the in uence of the Cappadocian Fathers that the terminology was clari ed and
standardized, so that the accepted formula for the Trinity became Three Hypostases
in one Ousia. Likewise in Christology, Christ is the union of two natures (osa), human
and divine, and one suppositum, that is, the Son as the second person of the Trinity. The
hypostatic union refers therefore to a personal or supposital union whereby the person
of the Son assumes a human nature. Accordingly, an identity secundum suppositum of Christs
body living and dead, is an identity not according to Christs human nature (for this one
disappears at the separation of body and soul), but according to his divine person, who
indeed withstands the bodily death.
85
Gaianites: monophysite sect at the beginnings of the V century. The name is derived
from Gaianos, who rst developed the doctrine of the incorruptibility of Christs body.
86
Tempier condemned thirteen propositions on 10 December 1270, all more or less
related to a radical or Averroist interpretation of Aristotle. There is a letter (c. 12731276) written by Giles of Lessines to Albert the Great containing a list of fteen errors
which were being taught by leading masters of the arts faculty at that time, thirteen of
which coinciding exactly with Tempiers condemned propositions. The additional propositions listed by Giles were defended by Aquinas. Prop. 14 is based on Aquinas Quodlibets
281
theological tenor of Quodlibet IV. If this is certain, however, then it is only

a parenthesis in the course of Aquinas line of argument, since we see
him going back shortly afterwards (around 1272-1273) to his earlier
distinction of the divine and human natures in Christ in the third part
of the Summa Theologiae. In questions 25 and 50, the identity of Christ
the man is understood as existing only secundum quidthat is, according
to his soul. And although aware (as seen at the beginning of q.50, a.4)
that Christs death is an article of faith, Aquinas nevertheless maintains
that Christs identity can be said to exist simpliciter only regarding the
hypostatic union.87
Although the debate over the unicity of form adopts a theological character, Aquinas doctrine follows a sustained metaphysical line which puts
forward such neatly determined principles that there is little for his
followers to add. Accordingly, subsequent works on this issue seem to
provide little more than circumstantial elaboration.
4.2. William de la Mare and the Pluralists Corrective
William de la Mare, the accuser in Knapwells Lament,88 can be
seen as one of the rst links between the doctrinal interventions of
Kilwardby and Pecham. His corrective inaugurates the philosophical
debates later developed by masters such as Richard of Middleton, Peter
John Olivi, and most signi cantly, Duns Scotus. Williams Correctorium
fratris Thomae (c. 1278) 89 is the result of an examination of a number of
II, III and IV, and reads Quod corpus Christi jacens in sepulcro et positum in cruce
non est, vel non idem fuit idem semper, sed secundum quid. As for the other proposition, 15, it concerned the simplicity of angelic substances: Quod angelus et anima sunt
simplices, non absoluta simplicitate nec per accessum ad compositionem, sed tantum per
recessum a summo simplici. If these propositions were not originally targeted for
condemnation, it is at least very signi cant that they were included in Giles list. For the
list and Alberts response to Giles letter, see F. Van Steenberghen, Le De quindecim
problematibus dAlbert le Grand, in: L. Nol e.a. (Eds.), Mlanges A. Pelzer, Louvain 1947,
415-39.
87
Aquinas, ST III, q.50, a.5, ad 1 seems to want to ll the hiatus between Quodlibets
III and IV resorting to the diVerence between the body of Christ and the body of ordinary men.
88
Knapwell begins his defence of Aquinas in the Correctorium corruptorii Quare by quoting Job, 6, 25-31 (ed. Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 5): Quare detraxistis
sermonibus veritatis cum e vobis nullus sit qui possit arguere me? Ad increpandum tantum eloquia concinatis, et subvertere nitimini amicum vestrum. Respondete, obsecro, absque
contentione, et non invenietis in lingua mea iniquitatem, nec in faucibus meis stultitia personabit.
89
Williams Correctorium should not be confused with the abbreviated work Declarationes.
282
isabel iribarren
Aquinas works and the extraction therefrom of 118 objectionable propositions deemed erroneous or pernicious from the standpoint of orthodox Christian dogma. Thirteen of those propositions were condemned by
Tempier in 1277a fact which William is only too quick to point out
in order to strengthen his case. In its second, and standard, version, dating from around 1278, the text assumed some of the character of an
oYcial document after its adoption by the Franciscan General Chapter
in Strasbourg in 1282. 90 Williams Correctorium thus came to be a qualifying statement of Aquinas texts and the Franciscan Orders oYcial view
of them.
The standard version of the Franciscan Correctorium is transmitted in its
entirety by Richard Knapwells Correctorium Quare, in which William de
la Mares arguments are incorporated and followed by a counter-reply
from Knapwell. As a methodical criticism of Aquinas arguments, Williams
arguments are, by necessity, driven to operate at a metaphysical level.
And although he is keener in refuting the unicity theory than in constructing a positive pluralist doctrine, we can still perceive in Williams
arguments common elements of pluralist presuppositions.
Thus, on the one hand, William maintains that prime matter is conceived as an entity possessing some actuality, if very imperfect; on the
other hand, that substantial form is seen as the determining principle in
the sense of creating disposition for further determination. 91 Just as the
pentagon contains the quadrilateral in potency, the rational soul presupposes the sensitive soul as an incomplete being. However, the vegetative
and the sensitive souls are not of the same species as the intellectual soul.
They are, on the contrary, three diVerent essences bearing among them
an essential relation. The intellectual soul does not give the composite its
whole being (non dat illud esse totum), but it completes and perfects the
being given by the preceding forms.92 Indeed, the vegetative, sensitive and
The latter consists of a rejection of sixty propositions by Aquinas, thirty-two of which are
found in Tempiers condemnation. The Declarationes was mistakenly attributed to William
(see F. Pelster, Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare O.F.M. de variis sententiis S. Thomae
Aquinatis, Mnster 1956).
90
Item minister generalis imponit ministris provincialibus, quod non permittant multiplicari Summam fratris Thomae nisi apud lectores rationabiliter intelligentes, et hoc
nonnisi cum declarationibus fratris Wilhelmi de Mara, non in marginibus positis sed in
quaternis; et huiusmodi declarationes non scribantur per aliquem secularem. Quoted from
F. Ehrle, Der Kampf um die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fnfzig Jahren nach seinem
Tode, in: Zeitschrift fr katholische Theologie, 37 (1913), 266-318.
91
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1): Correctorium Quare, art. 31: 134.
92
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 134.
283
intellectual souls constitute three forms which are nonetheless related in

degrees of potentiality, and in that way they converge towards the essential unity of being. The rational soul is the actualising and completing
form, whereas the other two are incomplete and account for the potentiality of the body. Thus, in man there is not so much one substantial
form but rather one soul which comprehends many (quod plures concedunt).93
To the standard unitarian objection that in a plurality of forms
any power of the soul which is in act would not necessarily impede the
operation of another power, William responds that there is in fact an
essential connection between soul and body which would impede the
simultaneity of operations. Their connection is not on account of an essential single source, but by reason of their mutual relation as perfection
and perfectible.94 Each form does not imply an actuality, although there
is a certain degree of perfection in every one of them. This is re ected
in the modes of predication95 where man is an animal is understood
as a substantial predication and not merely a predication per accidens.
Animal is part of the de nition of the subject man, and thus meets
the conditions of substantial predication, just as more imperfect forms
refer to the rational soul as their suppositum. This, furthermore, reveals
how the pluralists, unlike the advocates of the unicity thesis, did not necessarily identify actuality with form. The presence of many forms in a
composite does not have to entail a plurality of supposita or individual
beings. There is a subordination of imperfect forms in respect to the most
perfect form, which alone responds for the creatures speci c nature.
On the speci c issue of Christs identity, Williams main objections
regard Aquinas view as shown in his Summa Theologiae 96 and in his II,
III and IV Quodlibets. As was seen, in both instances Aquinas tries to
defend the identity of the living and dead body of Christ by appealing
to the hypostatic union. All that remains after the death of created substances is matter, which is not suYcient to guarantee the identity between
93
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 132. Again, for a very lucid account of the introduction of a notion of a corporeal form (or in that case some sort of form previous
to the substantial form), see Hymans article 1965 (op. cit., above, n. 42), 385-406.
94
95
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 133. As Aquinas saw it, if there is more than
one substantial form in the composite, they must necessarily relate as act does to portentiality. Otherwise, the conditions for substantial predication, which must manifest the unity
of the subject, cannot be met. See Aquinas, ST Ia, q.118, a.2.
96
Particularly Aquinas, ST Ia, q.50, a.5.
284
isabel iribarren
the living and the dead body. When Christ dies, however, not only prime
matter but also the divine suppositum remains the same. The hypostatic
union thus constitutes the grounds for arguing in favour of the numerical identity of Christs body.
Williams understanding of Aquinas view was Quod corpus Christi mortuum in triduo quoad aliquid non fuit idem quod prius.97 It is interesting that
William should include the term aliquid in the phrasing of Aquinas proposition. For it is a legitimate objection for anyone to ask that, if prime
matter can survive the bodys death, then why is it not prime matter the
real substance?98 However, the objection itself already presupposes in
prime matter some kind of actuality susceptible to being a particular thing
of its own right. Aquinas denies that prime matter could be considered
as a hoc aliquid in the sense of being some individual thing we could point
to. Matter does not have any actuality per se, but is called a being only
in terms of its potentiality to the substantial form. By the same token (a
pluralist would gather) Christs dead body would not correspond to the
same hoc aliquid that was living. Pluralists, in fact, would like to think that
Christs body preserves its numerical identity simpliciter, that is, by reason
of the metaphysical nature of the body itself and not only on account of
the divine suppositum. According to Aquinas, if we are referring to the
human Christ, we cannot ignore that being animated constitutes a substantial diVerence in man and that, conversely, being unanimated entails
true corruption. The body of the composite gets its being from a single
substantial form, so that the dead body would be another form, the form
of a cadaver. We are not dealing then with the same bodyat least not
simpliciter. Consequently, regarding Christs human nature as a totality,
that is, as the union of body and soul, we cannot but speak of an identity secundum quid (that is, according to the divine suppositum).
William responds to this based on a particular notion of the human
body.99 Christs dead body is the same body simpliciter as the living body
was, not only on account of the hypostatic union but also due to the
union and identity of the substantial form and the body in quantum corpus. To be animated is not a substantial diVerence of the body as body,
but of the body as a living thing. Corruption, then, is a substantial change
that happens to the life of the body, not to its intrinsic nature, which is
97
98
99
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), Correctorium Quare, a.107: 407.
Cf. M. McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols, Notre Dame, Ind. 1987, vol. 2, 637.
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), Correctorium Quare: 407.
285
independent from the soul. The form by which a body is a body is

diVerent from that by which it is animated. Referring explicitly to the
terminology of Porphyry ( privatio, habitus, diVerentia, divisio),100 William contends that if we take inanimatum in a privative sense, we can speak
of Christs body as having numerical identity. For if privation does not
entail a constitutive diVerence for the body (that is, a diVerence that
would produce a substantial de nition) nor does it divide it so that it
would become two bodies.101 Likewise, being unanimated can follow animation in Christs body. Et catholice est tenendum quod non secundum quid fuit
idem sed simpliciter quia eadem habuit materiam et formam substantialem scilicet corporalem.102 The diVerentiation between being and life here understood
could constitute a very strong pluralist argument. For if we grant, with
the unitarians, that being is altogether conferred by a sole substantial
form, then there is no question about the non-identity of the body living and dead. If we consider life as a property entailed by being itself,
however, we could argue in favour of a continuity of the body where its
being dead would not signify a substantial change but a privation of some
quality. As will be seen, even a rigorous unitarian as Giles of Lessines
would accept the validity and truth of this argument.
4.3. Knapwells Reply
The Dominican reaction to the censures against Aquinas was initially manifested in two ways: by treatises concentrating on the problem
of the unicity of form,103 and by the sarcastically entitled Correctoria corruptorii,104 that is, works composed in answer to William de la Mares crit-
100
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), .408. For Porphyry, see Isagoge et in Aristotelis
Categorias commentarium, ed. A. Busse, Berlin 1887.
101
One of the pluralist principles that the unitarians explicitly deny is that privation
can be identi ed to an inchoatio formae. To the unitarians privation cannot signify a form,
however imperfect, because it does not bear any actuality.
102
Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), Correctorium Quare: 407.
103
For example, Tractatus de formis, under the name of Herveus Natalis; Contra pluralitatem formarum, by Thomas Sutton (ed. P. Mandonnet, in: S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula omnia,
5 vols, Paris 1927, V, 308-46); Contra gradus, Giles of Rome; De unitate formae, Giles of
Lessines (ed. M. De Wulf 1901) (op. cit., above, n. 52). Although we nd manifestations
of this type in Dominicans at Oxford, they were a more typical result of the Paris condemnation of 1277.
104
Although we nd Parisian polemical monographs against William de la Mares
treatise, it was primarily at Oxford that the reaction adopted this shape. We know of
three Oxford Correctoria corruptorii, which appeared between the years 1279 and 1284, each
286
isabel iribarren
icisms of Aquinas teaching. These twin lines of defence were closely connected, as we can see from passages in Knapwells Correctorium Quare,105
where he borrows extensively from Thomas Suttons Contra pluralitatem formarum106 in his account of the introduction of substantial form in matter.107
In a rst phase,108 ranging more or less between the 1277 condemnation and Knapwells excommunication by Pecham in 1286, earlier
Oxonians such as Knapwell had no share in broader intellectual questions
that developed later. They seemed to be driven by loyalty rather than
by abstract enquiry, and were no less incited by authoritarian discouragement. Hence the defensive character of Knapwells Quare and its rather
ad hoc replies. However, for all its limitations, this kind of work does
provide an approximate idea of the polemical character of the times.
We know very little about Knapwells life before the controversy, and
in fact the turning points of his career seem to have been marked rather
being identi ed by the opening word, namely Quare, Sciendum and Questione. For
the authorship of Quare see below n. 105. For the authorship of Sciendum see Ehrle
1913, (op. cit., above, n. 90), 37; Glorieux 1947 (op. cit., above, n. 3); Mandonnet 1913
(op. cit., above, n. 3); and Roensch 1964 (op. cit., above, n. 2). Ehrle leaves the possibility
open for it being Durandellus, and refers to it as the ruhigere Correctorium corruptorii
due to its rather carefree and unforced response. Glorieux presents the hypothesis of
William Maccles eld, whereas Mandonnet seems comfortable with the possibility of Hugues
de Billom, in Paris. Roensch is certain it is Orfords work. The incomplete Questione
is less straight forward and its exact date is not known. Ehrle simply leaves it as das
Correctorium des Anonymus des Merton MS 276. Glorieux forwards the uncertain possibility of Hugues of Billom. According to Mandonnet the author could be Robert of
Hereford, another English Dominican who composed around the same time a defence of
Aquinas against Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome. Roensch takes the author as being
William Maccles eld.
105
There has been much discussion about the authorship of the Correctorium Quare.
Ehrle calls it rather sceptically das dem Aegidius de Roma zugeschriebene Correctorium . . .
and aYrms that in fact the author is most likely to be a Dominican. Glorieux 1927
(op. cit., above, n. 1) discards possible contenders such as Giles of Rome, John of Paris,
Hughes of Billom, and Durandellus and arrives to the conclusion that we are dealing here
with an English Dominican. Further resemblance between Quare and passages condemned by Pecham leads him to assert that the author is Knapwell (Roensch follows
this opinion in 1964). Later on, in his revision of 1947 (op. cit., above, n. 3), Glorieux
con rms his former conclusion and the explicit references in Quare to Suttons Contra
pluralitatem formarum. Mandonnet seems to take it, too, as being Knapwells work. This is
the view adopted here. For the purposes of the present paper it is enough that it can be
attributed to an English Dominican.
106
Thomas Sutton, Contra pluralitatem formarum, ed. Mandonnet 1927 (op. cit., above,
n. 103).
107
Correctorium Quare, art. 32. See also art. 85, where there is an analogous utilisation
of Suttons treatise.
108
For further detail on the two phases of the Oxford movement and a thourough
elaboration of the other masters, see Kelley 1977 (op. cit., above, n. 2).
287
by academic con ict and authoritarian interventions. From his Quaestio

Disputata De Unitate Formae,109 in which he determines the orthodoxy of
the unicity of form thesis, we can infer that he probably incepted around
1284, that is, after writing his response to William de la Mare. We also
know that Knapwell experienced a change in his intellectual outlook from
his early days at Oxford, when he was still inquiring openly on metaphysical matters, to his later work, largely apologetic. In Quare Knapwell
himself declares having evolved in this manner: Et ecce coram Deo quia non
mentior, si scirem argumenta quae hoc [the unicity of form] ostendunt dissolvere
ut quandoque credebam, responsionem per singula posuissem.110
Well aware of the pluralists theological worries, Knapwells main point
as seen in his reply to Williams Correctorium, is to establish the theological neutrality of the unicity of form thesis. As the opening paragraph to
his reply in article 31 says: Nostrum autem in proposito erit ostendere quod nullum inconveniens vel haeresis sequitur ex illa [circa unitatem] positione, et quod isti
[William et alii] per suas responsiones, argumenta fratris Thomae non evadunt.111
In this spirit, Knapwell refutes Williams corrective and establishes that
the gradual perfection and completion of the forms in the composite until
the nal substance does not imply true generation. The following argument112 constitutes, perhaps, Knapwells most comprehensive statement of
principles, gathering together the main unitarian premises. The nal
substantial form, he says, does not confer a maius perfecta existence to the
previous one, for there cannot be more and less in the same genus.
It is a diVerent substantial form altogether, perfect in itself, and the principle of all existence and perfection. Consequently, where there is more
than one form, there are in fact two beings,113 which is impossible. Being
(esse) is the actuality itself of a thing, so that every complete being distinguishes itself from all others. It is therefore contradictory for two fully
actualised beings to constitute one essence. For no other form gives being
substantially except the substantial form. And if we came upon (inveniatur)
some substantial form that is not actual in this way, such a form would
participate very little, or not at all, in the principle of perfectionso that
when nally the act of subsistence arrives, that form would not be substantial but accidental. In that case, the nal form would be introduced
109
110
111
112
113
Edited by F.E.
Glorieux 1927
Glorieux 1927
Glorieux 1927
Glorieux 1927
Kelley,
(op. cit.,
(op. cit.,
(op. cit.,
(op. cit.,
Richard
above,
above,
above,
above,
Knapwell. Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, Paris 1982.

n. 1), 206.
n. 1), 135.
n. 1), 142-3.
n. 1), 143.
288
isabel iribarren
as actualising an imperfect form, and the subsequent change would be

alteration rather than true generation.
Following the same tone of his opening paragraph, Knapwell closes
the argument with conciliatory words: Unde quidquid sit de veritate in hac
parte, impossibile est omnino, per modum quo isti ponunt, pluralitatem formarum
substantialium in eodem sustinere. Ergo modus alius, si quidem possibile est, inveniatur; quo invento nihil amplius erroris in de vel philosophia ex positione quae ponit
unitatem formae concludi poterit.114 It is signi cant that Knapwell should allow
so much exibility to rational argumentation (modus alius, si quidem possibile est, inveniatur) in order to meet a desired metaphysical conclusion.
Whether this attitude was really driven by a (partisan, perhaps) motivation to preserve the integrity of the unicity thesis is not certain. In any
case, the circumstances in which Knapwell wrote this reply, and its apologetic tone, seem to suggest that it was more a matter of loyal sentiment
than a true understanding of Aquinas doctrine.
In article 31,115 Knapwell borrows his argument from Aquinas when
he (Knapwell) starts by diVerentiating two ways of understanding simpliciter for the identity of Christs body living and dead. Christ is the same
simpliciter only in terms of the hypostatic union. That is, Christ is the
same absolutely because no other body has been added. Christ is not
the same simpliciter, however, if we refer to the composite of body and
soul that is his humanity (for the presence or absence of soul indeed
implies a substantial change). Knapwell is very careful not to suggest relativity by explicitly using the secundum quid. Instead, he cunningly adds
that to say that Christ suVered change after death is heretical. Although
the body suVers change with death, this does not imply that Christ assumes
a new nature, for mainly two reasons. On the one hand, what remains
at death (i.e. the cadaver) is not assumable per se, for if it has no form
it cannot be quali ed as a (human) nature. On the other hand, the human
nature assumed by Christ, although transformed by death, rises again in
virtue of the unscathed hypostatic union, just as wine, Knapwell adds
(in not the most suitable illustration), turns into vinegar without a new
liquid being poured in. Thus Christs body was one and the same body
living and dead on account of the divine suppositum. We must not infer
from this that Christ incarnated again, even if his body is said to have
adopted a substantial form in life and another one at death (licet corpus
114
115

289
illud benedictum in vita et in morte formam substantialem aliam et aliam dicatur

habere).116
In other words, Christs body, as a body, is the same only secundum
quid. Again in article 107 117 (Quod corpus Christi in triduo quoad aliquid non
fuit idem quod prius), Knapwell makes a similar paraphrase of the secundum
quid. William de la Mares objection had appealed to a logical diVerence
between being animated and unanimated, in a way that death does
not entail any change for the body in quantum corpus but is to be understood only as a privation of life. In his reply, Knapwell is quick to
reprove Williams argument as contra philosophiam et contra omnem, ut creditur, veritatemperhaps too quick considering that the problem of substantial form was believed by other unitarians to be a metaphysical one and
thus not necessarily a threat to the integrity of any truth beyond it.
According to Knapwells reasoning, the conception that a change in the
substantial form is a matter of privatio is a complete ction. Whereas states
of habit or privation are categories that refer to accidents and hence can
be referred to the same subject, being unanimated has to do with the
substance and therefore entails a change in the subjects very identity.
To be unanimated can be seen as a privation only from the standpoint of primary matter, which is pure potentiality. Therefore, in other
words, Christs body, as being part of a composite, cannot preserve its
identity after death.
Knapwells intention to reconcile the plurality and the unicity theses
on the grounds of theological neutrality is made explicit in his later disputed question De Unitate Formae. There, Knapwells main concern is to
show that the unicity of form does not prevent some degree of numerical identity existing in the substance before and after corruption. As a
statement of the main diYculty entailed by the unicity doctrine, the
disputed question ran as follows: Utrum secundum dem de essentia humanae
naturae verbo oporteat ponere plures formas. Delivered some time in 1285 (and
certainly after Pechams 1284 condemnation), Knapwell did, then, make
a public stand of determining that the unicity of form was a safe thesis
to uphold as far as faith and reason are concerned. There is indeed a
note of moderation and a search for an agreement: it is of chief importance, therefore, to consider those aspects on which one and the other
position necessarily agree.118
116
117
118

Quoted from Kelley (op. cit., above, n. 1), 138.
290
isabel iribarren
However, Knapwells attempts to bring reconciliation between the pluralist and unitarian standpoints back red, thus provoking an unfavourable
reaction on the part of the authorities. In a letter dated 1 June 1285 and
addressed to the bishop of Lincoln,119 Pecham mentions a sarcastic pamphlet written against himself, which he believed to have come from
Knapwell. This incriminating booklet, together with the former disputed
question, was Pechams direct target in the 1286 excommunication and
it marked the end of Knapwells career. At the urging of William Hothum,
his provincial superior, Knapwell refused to accept Pechams actions as
having any validity on canonical grounds and travelled to Rome in order
to appeal his case. On the way he stopped in Paris and discussed the
situation with Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfreys Quodlibet III testi es to his
reaction. In such questions, Godfrey argues, one need not heed the
authority of the Pope or the Fathers of the Church or any other master.
The only correct guides are the Holy Writ or rational argument. 120
Godfrey regarded Pecham to have exceeded his authority, and his action
to have been mirum, and grande periculum.121
Although the legal interpretation that Pecham gave to Kilwardbys prohibition was more openly hostile, Pecham was certainly following the
spirit of his predecessor. The action taken in 1277 was not supposed to
be tantamount to eradicating heresy. It was rather a veto for teaching
certain doctrines in the schools, either because they were deemed to
be philosophically false, or because they could entail opposition to
theological dogma. Like Pecham, Kilwardby also received his own call
for moderation in the gure of the Dominican Peter of Con ans, at that
time Archbishop of Corinth. In a letter to Kilwardby, Con ans discusses
the reasons for the prohibition. He examines diverse theses on natural
philosophy, subscribing to some and thus criticising Kilwardbys disapproval. The archbishop of Canterbury, in his turn, replied with a pice
justicative122 explaining the motives that incited him to intervene. In 1278 123
Registrum epistolarum fratris Johannis Pecham, ed. C.T. Martin, 3 vols, London 1885,
III, 862.
120
Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. De Wulf A. Pelzer,
Louvain 1904, 2, p. 198.
121
Ed. De Wulf-Pelzer 1904 (op. cit., above, n. 120), 207-8.
122
Cf. Robert Kilwardby, Littera ad Petrum de Coneto, ed. F. Ehrle in: Beitrge zur Geschichte
der mittelalterlichen Scholastik, II: Der Augustinismus und der Aristotelismus, in: Archiv fr Literaturund Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, 5 (1889), 603-35. The letter from Peter of Con ans
to Kilwardby is not extant.
123
Although Giles of Lessines directs his objections to the archbishop of Canterbury
and in 1278 Pecham had already been appointed, it is still believed that the person
119
291
Giles of Lessines, a Dominican master in Paris, wrote a treatise against

Kilwardby based on the latters letter to Con ans. This treatise came to
be known as the De Unitate formae.124
4.4. The Intervention of Giles of Lessines
It was to Kilwardbys formulation of the unicity doctrine that Giles of
Lessines reacted. Although Giles of Lessines was predominantly in Paris,
the way he treats the issue in his treatise De unitate formae and the fact
that he writes explicitly against Kilwardby, rather make him a witness of
the situation at Oxford. However, his intervention is prompted by a
diVerent turmoil than that of Knapwells and the other Oxford masters.
The defensive literature written in support of Aquinas as a particular
product of William de la Mares declaration had not yet taken place as
the characteristic agent which bound Oxford Dominicans together. By
the time Giles was writing his treatise, radical Aristotelian masters such
as Siger of Brabant were at the peak of their in uence, and internal disputes between secular theologians and the mendicant orders had just
started. It is in this atmosphere that Giles decided to devote himself to
a strict elaboration of Aquinas thesis of the unicity of substantial form.
The in uence that Kilwardby exercised on the Franciscan Pecham
tends to make us overlook the fact that Kilwardby was in fact a Dominican.
If it was a matter of Order rivalries, we might well ask ourselves why
he did not exercise more (episcopal) ascendancy amongst his brothers. It
would be too easy to say that Kilwardbys philosophical point of view
was an out-dated one from the middle of the century and that it
remained isolated for lack of touch with Aquinas innovations. In fact,
Kilwardbys in uence at the time of the 1277 ban did provoke a whole
campaign against the Thomistic doctrines, translated into works and
treatises where those theses were clearly attacked. It was not until the
general Chapter in Milan in 1278 that some change was brought about.
In that year, two Dominican brothers, provided with full powers, were
sent to Oxford to enforce Aquinas doctrine. 125 By 1279, at the General
refered to in his treatise is Kilwardby. Giles wrote in the years of 1277 (years of turmoil
when Tempier and Kilwardby were the protagonists) and Pecham did not actually assume
his oYce until 1279. Before that, he was in Rome. Cf. De Wulf 1901 (op. cit., above,
n. 52), 81.
124
Ed. De Wulf 1901 (op. cit., above, n. 52).
125
See Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ord. Fr. Praed., ed. B.M. Reichert, vol. 1, RomeStuttgart 1898, 199.
292
isabel iribarren
Chapter in Paris,126 there was no mention of any speci c hostility against

Aquinas and an expansion of the Thomistic theses against all opposition
was advised.
Kilwardby subscribes to the common pluralist view and maintains that
each form determines matter in an incomplete way, and that it is the
functional convergence of all forms through a dispositive subordination
that guarantees the unity of substantial form in the composite. Thus,
Kilwardby holds the essential independence among the determining principles, where the intrinsic nature of the inferior form is not involved in
the perfection of the superior.127 On the other hand, the diverse origins
of the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual souls proves that man
is indeed composed of three substantial forms.128 The rst two are a product of natural operation, whereas the intellectual soul is created by God.
To the objection that two realities in act cannot constitute one single
being, Kilwardby responds that the vegetative and sensitive souls are not
completely in act and that it is nally the intellectual soul that perfects
matter. In other words, and despite Kilwardbys ambiguous terminology,
the soul is composed of three essences meaning by these three incomplete substances.129
Kilwardbys concern to eradicate the unicity theory is clear in several
propositions contained in the 1277 Oxford prohibition:
2)130 That the previous forms completely disappear at the advent of
the superior form (Item quod forma corrumpitur in pure nihil ).131
3) That there is no actuality whatsoever in matter (Item quod nulla potentia activa est in materia).
12) That the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual souls constitute one simple form (Item quod vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva sint una
forma simplex).
See Reichert 1898 (op. cit., above, n. 125), 204.
De Wulf 1901 (op. cit., above, n. 52), 93.
128
129
Chartularium, I, p. 277.
130
The numbering of Kilwardbys banned propositions adopted in the present paper
corresponds to the Chartularium. De Wulf uses the same numbering in his Le trait (op. cit.,
above, n. 52).
131
That is, if the forms that precede the nal substantial form disappear completely
(corrumpitur in pure nihil ), what is then left is one and only principle of being: the intellectual soul. In the question of the evolution of the embryo, for example, a unitarian would
not accept that the previous vegetative and sensitive souls can coexist with the nal intellectual soul. The other forms have to disappear, they cannot survive the advent of the
nal form as less perfect principles.
126
127
293
13) That the body living and dead is the same body only equivocally.
Moreover, that the dead body, as a body, is the same as the living body
only secundum quid (Item quod corpus vivum et mortuum est equivoce corpus, et corpus mortuum secundum quod corpus mortuum sit corpus secundum quid ).132
In response to Kilwardbys position, Giles is rst of all concerned in
giving a true assessment of Aquinas metaphysical terminology in order
to clarify all possible ambiguities. Potentia, Giles explains, has two very
distinct senses in Aquinas thought. 133 It can be understood as the opposite of actus, and as such it signi es receptivityin this sense it is the aptitude in a subject to be determined through change. It can also mean a
proximate principle of the substances activityin this sense it belongs to
the Aristotelian category of quality. It is the latter meaning, Giles believes,
which brought so much ambiguity in de ning the presence of the elements in the composite. For the pluralists it was inconceivable that the
elements should disappear once the composite was completed by the nal
substantial form. In order to give a coherent account of the physical
changes within the body and to maintain a clear distinction between the
spiritual species of the soul and the material body, the elements had to
be potentially present in the nal composite. The superior substantial
form is a mediated perfection of previous forms that still function potentially. Aquinas, on the other hand, cannot accept the coexistence of a
plurality of forms in act. The elements remain potentially in the composite once the intellectual form arrives, but this potentially does not
mean less perfect or incomplete. The quality of the elements is always
present in the composite, and this is not to say that the substantial form
(soul) adopts a material quality, but that it is capable of performing the
functions of the previous forms once these have disappeared as forms. Thus
the elements are in the composite potentially, that is, in quality.
After giving a brief exposition of the general notions of matter and
form as viewed from a unitarian standpoint, Giles deals with the question of the numerical identity of Christs body. Giles approach to this
question proceeds134 through a distinction between matter as the generic
concept of the living and sensitive substance, and form as the speci c
concept of the rational being. Although the general Christological conclusion attained by Giles coincides with Aquinas, Giles argumentation
132
133
134
Chartularium, I, 559.
De Wulf 1901 (op. cit., above, n. 52), 79, c. IV.
294
isabel iribarren
is still driven by an original approach. Aquinas account was determined135

by two ways of considering Christs bodyeither in respect to the human
nature or in respect to the divine suppositum. In the rst case it was necessary to conclude that Christs dead body was the same only secundum
quid, by virtue of the separation of the soul as the substantial form. In
the second sense, Christ retained his numerical identity by reason of the
hypostatic union. Giles, too, poses two diVerent ways of considering Christs
body, but his is a more logical than purely Christological consideration. 136
Christ can be seen as the subject of death (that is, from the standpoint
of matter) or as an individual (from the standpoint of the substantial
form). In the rst instance, as a subject his body suVered privation in its
separation from the soul. Habits and privations, however, as Aristotle
taught, are predicated of the same subject. Therefore, Christs dead body
is the same as the body that was the subject of life, the lack of which
signi es the loss of an important quality of being but not the loss of being
itself. Et hoc modo loquuntur omnes, et vere tamen, quod illud corpus Christi, quod
pependit in cruce, iacuit in sepulcro et fuerat in utero virginis [idem numero fuit].137
Interestingly enough, William de la Mare, following Porphyryan terminology, arrives at the same conclusion.
In the second instance, as an individual, the form of Christs dead
body is not the soul any more. For an individual to be so, it has to be
constituted of matter and form, the latter of which conferring its whole
being and individuality. Thus the bodies diVer not so much in number
but in genus. Giles insists that the view of the pluralists, who phantastice
naturas rerum considerant,138 would lead to the absurdity that bodies diVering
in genus (animated and unanimated) are the same numerically. The identity of the body is guaranteed, not by a forma corporeitatis, but by the same
and only subject (matter) that in one way suVered the determination of
the substantial form, and in another way suVered privation in death. It
is to the composite of matter and form that Christs divinity is united,
and it is on account of matter as it is deprived of life that we speak of
the generic identity of the body. Moreover, another union was not necessary for the resurrection, since the intellectual soul remained always
attached to Christs divinity. 139
135
136
137
138
139
See Aquinas, Quodlibet II, q.1,

De Wulf 1901 (op. cit., above,
a.1.
n. 52),
n. 52),
n. 52),
n. 52),
85.
85.
86.
87.
295
5. Responsio secundum Thomam

There is no doubt that Aquinas solution of the unicity of form attracted
many followers, not only for its novelty but also for its internal strength.
However, it is more likely that secundum Thomam (which was surreptitiously read as Thomism) represented a label of convenience against
which some masters would place other solutions. Thus, in the oftendebated question of the numerical identity of Christs body, Thomism
referred to Aquinas solution rather than to a school of thought in its
own right. The groups xed allegiance revealed by these disputes does
not seem to have gone beyond a faithful and ad litteram aYliation to a
particular way of determining a question.
As far as the evidence of the correctoria alone goes, all we can say is
that certain reactions from the traditional theologians prompted an ad hoc
defence of the teachings and the person of Aquinas, which at best resulted
in lucid clari cations of important theories such as the unicity of substantial form. The in uence exercised by Aquinas teachings upon
Dominicans at the end of the thirteenth century did not manifest itself
in any homogenous way. Not all Dominicans welcomed Aquinas innovations (recall Kilwardby, or William Hothum), and even if some of them
still acted in the defensive, they seem to have been prompted more by
a certain esprit de corps than by philosophical conviction. Moreover, there
were quite a few non-Dominican manifestations in favour of Aquinas.
Some of these were driven by philosophical aYnity with Aquinas theses
(like Giles, an Augustinian), others were simply outraged at the spirit of
the censures (like Godfrey of Fontaines, a secular master).
As for those who wrote critical pieces in defence of Aquinas, they
display heterogeneous intellectual tempers and their reactions reveal to
be far more individualistic than has been believed. Some of them seem
to have been punctuated by methodical considerations, others were clearly
responding to external intervention. Thus, Richard Knapwell was driven
not so much by the signi cance of an attack that came from the Franciscans (Kilwardby, for that matter, set the standard), but by his personal
confrontation with Pecham. Knapwell had been busy replying to William
de la Mares direct attack, thus overlooking the prohibition launched by
Kilwardby, not only an episcopal authority, but also a Dominican. Knapwells piece of defence transpires the urgency of the events surrounding him, so that he is initially quite belligerent and only after Pechams
condemnation does he reveal contrition. He dedicates little time to a
speculative elaboration of the unicity thesis, and his writing contributes
296
isabel iribarren
little more than a gesture of comradeship. Giles of Lessines, on the other

hand, appears as a more conscientious scholar in his elaboration of
Aquinas thesis, and certainly displays an awareness of its full import.
However, although testifying to an intelligent and (seemingly) unprejudiced
adherence to Thomistic principles, isolated cases like Giles can hardly
account for a general, pervasive and uniform emergence of a Thomistic
schoolthey were just responding according to Thomas.
Furthermore, the signi cance of William de la Mares corrective should
not be underestimated, not so much because he was a Franciscan, but
because the correspondence of some of his articles with Tempiers condemnation (which William was careful to point out), retrospectively added
a whole new meaning to Tempiers 1277 intervention. The latter had
indeed involved Thomistic theses, but only indirectly and somewhat
camou aged by the general character of the condemnation. Now, with
Williams polemical piece, the correspondence between the two lists served
as a sort of highlight of the Thomistic theses previously only hidden
amongst the morass of Tempiers articles. This dialogue between a
Franciscan reaction and an oYcial, episcopal, condemnation is more likely
what triggered a Dominican response and tinged the whole controversy
with a partisan tone.
Aquinas theses therefore certainly spurred some cohesion among
Dominicans, but this seems to have been more circumstantial and nominal, as it were, than a profound intellectual movementat least not at
the end of the thirteenth century. Aquinas had left a mark in his Order
and indeed in the learned worldas a profound and original theologian.
It was then understandable that the blemish of his name could have been
seen as having a direct negative impact in that of his Orders. Hence the
reactions from Dominicans (and non-Dominicans) from all quarters and
positions up to the Roman Curia, the latter perhaps incited (we do not
know) by more mundane reasons than we want to believe.
Oxford
Balliol College

Iribarren2001 Responsio Secundum Thomam' and The Search For An Early Thomistic School

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Responsio secundum Thomam and the Search for an Early Thomistic School

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001

the search for an early thomistic school

Tempier, supported by the Papal Legate Simon de Brion, summoned a

the search for an early thomistic school

According to Thijssen, the testimonies put forward by Wielockx, namely

the search for an early thomistic school

On the other hand, and more to our purpose, Thijssen connects

part of Oxford members. That they happened to be Dominicans is

the search for an early thomistic school

is clearly diVerentiated from simple prejudice in that it is not motivated

the search for an early thomistic school

matter under discussion as soberly as did Thomas Sutton, and Richard

to assume a plurality of forms in a single composite substance. The

the search for an early thomistic school

the search for an early thomistic school

maintained, where we nd rstly a simple matter, that is, the subject of

hylemorphism47 and the rationes seminales.48 According to the rst, if the

the search for an early thomistic school

the search for an early thomistic school

than to Avicebron, the pluralists are indebted to Avicenna whoas we

the search for an early thomistic school

the search for an early thomistic school

See Aquinas, ST Ia, q.76, a.3.

4.1. Thomas Aquinas on the Numerical Identity of Christs Body

Aquinas, Sentences III, dist. 22, q.1, a.1.

the search for an early thomistic school

the search for an early thomistic school

theological tenor of Quodlibet IV. If this is certain, however, then it is only

the search for an early thomistic school

intellectual souls constitute three forms which are nonetheless related in

the search for an early thomistic school

independent from the soul. The form by which a body is a body is

the search for an early thomistic school

by academic con ict and authoritarian interventions. From his Quaestio

Knapwell. Quaestio disputata de unitate formae, Paris 1982.

as actualising an imperfect form, and the subsequent change would be

Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 143.

the search for an early thomistic school

illud benedictum in vita et in morte formam substantialem aliam et aliam dicatur

Glorieux 1927 (op. cit., above, n. 1), 136.

the search for an early thomistic school

Giles of Lessines, a Dominican master in Paris, wrote a treatise against

Chapter in Paris,126 there was no mention of any speci c hostility against

the search for an early thomistic school

is still driven by an original approach. Aquinas account was determined135

See Aquinas, Quodlibet II, q.1,

the search for an early thomistic school

5. Responsio secundum Thomam

little more than a gesture of comradeship. Giles of Lessines, on the other

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