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A. World War I
1. Also called First World War or Great War, an international conflict
that in 28 July 1914 11 November 1918, embroiled most of the
nations of Europe along with Russia, the United States, the Middle East,
and other regions.
2. The war pitted the Central Powersmainly Germany, Austria-Hungary,
and Turkeyagainst
the
Alliesmainly France, Great
Britain, Russia, Italy, Japan, and, from 1917, the United States. It ended
with the defeat of the Central Powers. The war was virtually
unprecedented in the slaughter, carnage, and destruction it caused.
B. World War II
1. World War II (WWII or WW2), also known as the Second World
War, was a global war that lasted from 1 September 1939 to 2
September 1945, although related conflicts began earlier. It
involved the vast majority of the world's nationsincluding all of
the great powerseventually forming two opposing military alliances:
the Allies and the Axis.
2. It was the most widespread war in history, and directly involved more
than 100 million people from over 30 countries. In a state of "total
war", the major participants threw their entire economic, industrial, and
scientific capabilities behind the war effort, erasing the distinction
between civilian and military resources.
3. The Empire of Japan aimed to dominate Asia and the Pacific and was
already at war with the Republic of China in 1937, but the world war is
generally said to have begun on 1 September 1939 with
the invasion of Poland by Germany and subsequent declarations of war
on Germany by France and the United Kingdom.
C. American Civil War
1. The American Civil War, fought from 12 April 1861 to 9 May 1865 to
determine the survival of the Union or independence for the
Confederacy. Among the 34 states in January 1861, seven
Southern slave states individually declared their secession from the
United States and formed the Confederate States of America.
2. The Confederacy, often simply called the South, grew to include eleven
states, and although they claimed thirteen states and additional
western territories, the Confederacy was never diplomatically
recognized by any foreign country. The states that remained loyal and
did not declare secession were known as the Union or the North.
3. The war had its origin in the factious issue of slavery, especially the
extension of slavery into the western territories. After four years of
combat, which had left around 750,000 Americans, Union and
Confederate, dead and had destroyed much of the South's
infrastructure, the Confederacy collapsed and slavery was abolished.
Then began the Reconstruction and the processes of restoring national
unity and guaranteeing civil rights to the freed slaves.
D. Covenant of the League of Nations
Francisco Peace Treaty, mostly between Japan and the Allied Powers,
was officially signed by 48 nations on September 8, 1951, at the War
Memorial Opera House in San Francisco, California, United States.
2. It came into force on April 28, 1952. According to Article 11 of the
Treaty of San Francisco, Japan accepts the judgments of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied
War Crimes Courts imposed on Japan both within and outside Japan.
3. This treaty served to officially end Japan's position as an imperial
power, to allocate compensation to Allied civilians and former prisoners
of war who had suffered Japanese war crimes during World War II, and
to end the Allied post-war occupation of Japan and return sovereignty
to that nation.
N. Nuremberg Charter and Judgment
1. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annex to the
Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axis(usually referred to as
the Nuremberg Charter or London Charter) was the decree issued
on 8 August 1945 that set down the laws and procedures by which
the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted.
2. The charter stipulated that crimes of the European Axis Powers could
be tried. Three categories of crimes were defined: crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Article 8 of the
charter also stated that holding an official position was no defense to
war crimes. Obedience to orders could only be considered in mitigation
of punishment if the Tribunal determined that justice so required.
3. The criminal procedure used by the Tribunal was closer to civil law than
to common law, with a trial before a panel of judges rather than a jury
trial and with wide allowance for hearsay evidence. Defendants who
were found guilty could appeal the verdict to the Allied Control Council.
In addition, they would be permitted to present evidence in their
defense and to cross-examine witnesses.
4. Principles:
a. Principle I: "Any person who commits an act which constitutes
a crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to
punishment."
b. Principle II: "The fact that internal law does not impose a penalty
for an act which constitutes a crime under international law does
not relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility
under international law."
c. Principle III: "The fact that a person who committed an act which
constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of
State or responsible government official does not relieve him from
responsibility under international law."
d. Principle IV: "The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility
under international law provided a moral choice was in fact possible
to him".
e. Principle V: "Any person charged with a crime under international
law has the right to a fair trial on the facts and law."
f.
interest of the enemy and to impede their war efforts. All enemy controlled
assets can be used to finance propaganda, espionage, and sabotage in these
countries or in countries friendly to their cause. It is presumed that Japan, in
sequestering and liquidating China Banking Corp., must have acted in
accordance, either with her own Manual of the Army and Navy and Civil Affairs
OR with her Trading with the Enemy Act, and even if not, it being permitted to
the Allied Nations, specially the US and England, to sequestrate, impound, and
block enemy properties found within their own domain or in enemy territories
occupied during the war by their armed forces, and it not being contrary to
Hague Regulations or international law, Japan had also the right to do the same
in the Philippines by virtue of the international law principle that "what is
permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to the other."
Taking these into consideration, it appears that Japan did not intend to confiscate
or appropriate the assets of said banks or the debts due them from their debtors.
The fact that the Japanese Military authorities failed to pay the enemy banks the
balance of the money collected by the Bank of Taiwan from the debtors of the
said banks, did not and could not change the sequestration by them of the
bank's assets during the war, into an outright confiscation thereof. It was
physically impossible for the Japanese Military authorities to do so because they
were forcibly driven out of the Philippines, following the readjustment of rights of
private property on land seized by the enemy provided by the Treaty of Versailles
and other peace treaties entered into at the close of WWI. The general principles
underlying such arrangements are that the owners of properties seized are
entitled to receive compensation for the loss or damage inflicted on their
property by the emergency war measures taken by the enemy. Since Japan war
notes were issued as legal tender, Japan was bound to indemnify the aggrieved
banks for the loss or damage on their property, in terms of Phil. Pesos of US $.
Since the Japanese Military Forces had power to sequestrate and impound the
assets of China Banking Corp. and to appoint Bank of Taiwan as liquidator, it
follows that payments of Haw Pia to Bank of Taiwan extinguished his obligations
to China Banking Corp.
2. Banaag VS. Singson Encarnacion G.R. No. L-493
1949
April 19,
FACTS: Santiago Banaag prayed for a declaratory judgment under the provisions
of Rule 66, upholding validity of a contract of lease executed in his favor on June
3, 1943. Petitioner then contends that said contract should be declared valid for
the whole period of five years therein stipulated, from July 1, 1943, to June 30,
1948, while respondents maintain the theory that the contract or concession
should be declared terminated as of the date of the liberation of the Province of
Batangas or that at least, subject to suspension or cancellation at the will of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce or of any person who may competently
act in his behalf.
Petitioner advances the theory that the Executive Commission during Japanese
occupation, upon whose authority the concession and adjudication of the Pansipit
fisheries were granted to him was a de facto government and under certain
limitation, obligation assumed by it in behalf of the country, will in general, be
respected by the government de jure when restored.
Respondent allege that the deed of lease granted to petitioner on July 3, 1943,
even if valid at its inception, cannot bind the Government of the Philippines, not
only because it was not a party thereto, but because the Executive Commission
was merely an instrumentality of the Japanese forces of occupation and as such
must be regarded only as administration and usufructuary of the public building
real estate, forest, and agricultural works situated in the occupied country, and
that the deed of lease in question should be deemed terminated with the
establishment of the Commonwealth upon the principle that a government of
occupation can let lands and buildings and make contracts in reference to them
only for such time as it is in occupation "may be suspended or cancelled at any
time as the circumstances demand and it should be presented upon the demand
of competent authorities."
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Banaag has the right to continue in occupying the
fisheries.
HELD: NO. The said deed of lease having expressly provided that the concession
"may suspended or cancelled at any time as the circumstances demand" and
no one question the authority of the municipality of Taal and Lemery, to which
the Pansipit fisheries belong, to suspend or cancel the deed of lease in behalf of
the Philippines Government and it appearing that said municipalities have
actually demanded from petitioner the return of the administration and
occupation of said fisheries since August 17, 1945, it is evident that petitioner
lost since then his right to continue administering and occupying said fisheries.
The deed of lease executed on June 3, 1943, by Florencio Tamesis, Director of
Forestry and Fishery, in favor of petitioner Santiago Banaag is declared cancelled
and without effect since the liberation of the Province of Batangas or, at lease,
since August 17, 1945.
Yamashita vs Styer G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945
FACTS: Petitioner Tomoyuki Yamashita, the commanding general of the 14th
army group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, after his surrender
became a prisoner of war of the United States of America but was later removed
from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war criminal charged
before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant
General Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western
Pacific.
Filing for habeas corpus and prohibition against respondent, he asks that he be
reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military
Commission be prohibited from further trying him. He questions, among others,
the jurisdiction of said Military Commission.
Issue/s:
1. Should the petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition be granted in this case?
2. Was the Military Commission validly constituted by respondent, therefore
having jurisdiction over the war crimes?
Ruling: 1. NO. 2. YES.
1. A petition for habeas corpus is improper when release of petitioner is not
sought. It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his
restoration to his former status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined.
The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter
of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil
courts. Prohibition cannot issue against one not made party respondent. Neither
may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The
Military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it
may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these
case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
The Court further ruled that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition even if
the commission be joined as respondent. As it has said, in Raquiza vs. Bradford
(pp. 50, 61, ante), . . . an attempt of our civil courts to exercise jurisdiction over
the United States Army before such period (state of war) expires, would be
considered as a violation of this countrys faith, which this Court should not be
the last to keep and uphold.
2. Under the laws of war, a military commander has an implied power to appoint
and convene a military commission. This is upon the theory that since the power
to create a military commission is an aspect of waging war, military commanders
have
that
power
unless
expressly
withdrawn
from
them.
By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, the Congress of the United
States has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military
tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the laws of
war in appropriate cases.