Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FAMILY LAW-II
ROLE OF CO-PARCENERS IN
HINDU JOINT FAMILY
ANKIT TRIPATHI
201214
IV SEMESTER
ACKNOWLEDEMENT
Firstly, I would like to thank the Vice Chancellor, Mr. R.G.V. Bhagawath Kumar, for giving me
this opportunity of doing a project.
Secondly, I am grateful for my Family Law lecturer, Mrs. Sudha k., for guiding me during
the making of this project on the topic ROLE OF CO-PARCENARS IN HINDU JOINT
FAMILY
Last but not the least; I am thankful for my seniors and friends help in the editing and
formatting the content.
ANKIT TRIPATHI
201214
IV
SEMESTER
CONTENT
ABSTRACT
TABLE OF CASES
ABBREVIATION USED
INTRODUCTION
WHAT ARE THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF COPARCENERS
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A MITAKASHRA COPARCENARY
PROPERTY AND JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY
ABSTRACT
A Hindu undivided family, popularly known as a joint family consists of coparceners. They are
joint owners of the property which may be managed by the eldest coparcener known as Karta.
When a coparcener transfers assets to other coparceners, there cannot be any gift-tax liability on
such a transaction. This is because the division of the property merely gives to the coparcener an
independent share in the property which they jointly own.
A coparcener becomes owner of the ancestral property by birth. Under the Hindu law, a karta is
not the absolute owner of the property. Each coparcener is the owner of every bit of the property
till a partition takes place. The karta of the Hindu undivided family cannot make a gift of a
property to another coparcener who is already a owner of that property.
Ankit Tripathi
201214
IV SEMESTER
TABLE OF CASES
1) Radha Ammal v. IT Commissioner, AIR 1950 Mad 538
2) Yekeyamian v. Agniswarian, 1870 4 Mad HC 307
3) Sugalabai Vs Gundappa A. Maradi and Ors, ILR 2007 KAR 4790
4) Sri. Govind Reddy v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Kant 150, AIR 1958 Mys 150, 1958
CriLJ 1489
5) C.G.T v. Tej Nath 986 I.T.R. 96
6) Katama Natchair v. Rajah of Shivagunga 1893 9 M.I.A. 539
7) Anani v. Gopal, AIR 1895, 19 Bom. 269
8) Ganpat v. Annaji, AIR 1899 23 Bom. 144
9) Appaji v. Ramchandra, AIR 16 Bom. 29
10) Malak Chand v. Hira Lai, AIR 1936 11 Luck. 449
11) Shrinivas v. Narayan, 1955 S.C.R. I
12) Srinivas Kango v. Narayan Kango, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 379
13) Reoti Devi v. Bhagwan Dayal A.I.R. 1954 All. 801
ABBREVIATION USED
1) AIR..All India Report
2) AllAllahabad
3) HC...High Court
4) ILR. Indian Law Reports
5) KARKarnataka
6) BomBombay
7) LuckLucknow
8) S.C.R..Supreme Court Report
9) S.C. Senior Counsel
10)
MadMadras
11)
MysMysore
12)
CriLJ.Criminal Law Journal
INTRODUCTION
HINDU JOINT FAMILY
A Hindu undivided family, popularly known as a joint family consists of coparceners. They are
joint owners of the property which may be managed by the eldest coparcener known as Karta.
When a coparcener transfers assets to other coparceners, there cannot be any gift-tax liability on
such a transaction. This is because the division of the property merely gives to the coparcener an
independent share in the property which they jointly own.
A coparcener becomes owner of the ancestral property by birth. Under the Hindu law, a karta is
not the absolute owner of the property. Each coparcener is the owner of every bit of the property
till a partition takes place. The karta of the Hindu undivided family cannot make a gift of a
property to another coparcener who is already a owner of that property.
COPARCENARY
Within the joint family there is a narrower body called the Coparcenory. This includes the eldest
male member + 3 generations. For eg : Son Father Grandfather Great Grandfather. This
special group of people are called coparcenors and have a definitive right in ancestral property
right since the moment of their conception. Earlier only a Son/Sons son/Sons sons son were
coparcenors now daughters are equally coparcenors after 2005. They can get their share culled
out by filing a suit for partition at any time. A coparcenors interest is not fixed it fluctuates by
birth and deaths in the family.
In one case, A and were members of a joint family. A prevented from using a door which
was the only means of access to the rooms which were in Bs occupation. It was held that, in the
circumstances, the Court could, by injunction, restrain A from disturbing in the use of the door.
(Anani v. Gopal, )1
In another case, A and were members of a joint family, which owned a shop in Poona. A
prevented from entering the shop, inspecting the account books, and taking part in the general
management of the shop. sued A for an injunction, restraining A from excluding from the
joint possession and management of the shop, and the Bombay High Court held that was
entitled to succeed. (Ganpat v. Annaji, )2
5. Right of maintenance and other necessary expenses:
Every coparcener is entitled to be maintained out of the estate of the family. For this purpose, he
is entitled to receive, from the coparcenary property, maintenance for himself, his wife and
children, as also for those whom he is bound to maintain. Besides such maintenance, a
coparcener is also entitled to get money from the coparcenary property for the purpose of the
marriage of his children and for the performance of the sradha and upanayana ceremonies.
6. Right to restrain improper acts:
Every coparcener has the right to restrain improper acts on the part of other coparceners, where
such acts cause substantial injury to his rights as a member of the family. Thus, if a coparcener
erects a building on land belonging to the joint family, so as to materially alter the condition of
the property, he may be restrained by an injunction from doing so.
Secondly, there is no presumption that just because a family is joint, it therefore possesses joint
property or even any property at all. (Shrinivas v. Narayan,) 5. In a suit for partition, if a party
claims that a particular item of the property is joint family property, the burden of proving this
rests on the person asserting it to be so. Thus, mere proof of the existence of a joint family does
not lead to the presumption that property held by any member is joint; the burden rests on the
person asserting it to be joint, to establish this fact. (Srinivas Kango v. Narayan Kango,)6
Similarly, the mere fact that some members of the family lived together and dined together
would not raise the presumption that the property acquired by them was joint family property.
(Reoti Devi v. Bhagwan Dayal)7
If, however, it is established that the family possessed some joint property which formed the
nucleus from which the property in question was acquired, the presumption will be that it was
joint property, and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition, to establish that the
property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property. But a mere existence of a
nucleus is not sufficient to raise a presumption that property purchased by a member of a joint
family is the property of the joint family. Only the existence of an adequate nucleus will give rise
to such a presumption. It must be shown that the nucleus was such as could have reasonably
formed the basis of the acquisition.
Thirdly, a member of a joint family who engages in trade can make separate acquisitions of
property for his own benefit, and such acquisitions remain his self-acquired property; unless it
can be shown that the business grew from a nucleus of joint family property or that the earnings
were blended with joint family estate. Once, however, it is proved that the old family firm was
joint or that it was started with a nucleus of joint property, it is for the person who alleges it to be
separate to prove that it is so.
5 1955 S.C.R. I
6 A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 379
7 A.I.R. 1954 All. 801
Fourthly, where it is proved that a partition has already taken place the burden will lie on him
who alleges that a portion of the family property is still joint.
Lastly, onus, as a determining factor of the whole case, can only arise if the Court finds the
evidence on both sides so evenly balanced that it cannot come to any definite conclusion. In
other words, the question of onus becomes important only if the circumstances are so ambiguous
that it is not possible to arrive at a definite conclusion without resorting to it.
Mitakshara
2.
Dayabhaga
Mitakshara law, has been more discriminatory of the daughter's property rights as against
Dayabhaga School.
According to mitakshara law, each sons acquires at his birth an equal interest with his father in
all ancestral property held by the father, and on the death of the father, the son takes the property,
not as his heir, but, by survivorship. The son along with his father and two of his descendents are
regarded as coparceners' of the Joint Family Property. But, according to dayabhaga law, the sons
do not acquire any such interest by birth. Their rights come into question for the first time only
on the death of their father. On the death of the father, they take such property as is left by him,
whether separate or ancestral, as heirs and not by survivorship. Since the sons do not take any
interest in ancestral property in their father's lifetime, there can be no coparcenery in the strict
sense between a father and a son.
In the Mitakshara school, daughters had no right to be coparceners (till 2005). Their right was
limited to maintenance' as long as they were unmarried, and marriage expenses' to be met out
of the joint family property. They had no right in the property and hence could not demand for
partition. Coparcenery was a concept specific to male heir; and coparceners had a right unique
from the other members of the joint family, in the sense, that they had the exclusive right to ask
for partition. The eldest of the male member (who's the first coparcener) also held the post of the
karta or the manager of the joint family property. His position did not make him eligible for any
greater benefit than the other three coparceners; each of the four linear descendents (coparcener)
had equal Rights.
However, Dayabhaga law was little more sympathetic towards daughters. There was basically no
difference between a female or a male; i.e., to say there was no coparcenery in the absolute
sense. In this form of school, no one had a right to the property, till the person from who he/she
is supposed to inherit died. This will become clearer with the following example. If X (father)
dies leaving his widow and his son; both would acquire equal right over the property. Now if the
widow dies, leaving her son and the son's daughter, then the latter two would inherit the property
together as coparceners. Here the son's daughter has the same right to ask for partition as the son
has. Therefore, under Dayabhaga law, every adult coparcener male or female is entitled to
enforce a partition of the coparcenery property unlike in the Mitakshara law.
When the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 was passed, it didn't really bring about any substantive
transformation in the way succession operated in the past. The Act, just put the operative law in
black and white. Hence, it documented with it, all the discrimination that was practiced in
ancient India against the daughters without any change. This continued to debar the
constitutional mandate enumerated under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Section 6 of the un-amended Act, states that when a Hindu male dies after the commencement
of this act, having at the time of his death an interest in the Mitakshara coparcenery property, his
interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship.....' . There was no such mention of the
property right of the females.
Fortunately, with the amendment of Section 6 in the year 2005, daughters rights were
acknowledged eventually. It now stands as: On and from the commencement of the Hindu
Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law,
the daughter of a coparcener shall,(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a
son;
(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,
and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a
daughter of a coparcener.
Hence, a lot of things have changed.
It is a principle that one who is not a coparcener cannot become the karta of the family; but post
this amendment, since the daughter also has a right to be a coparcener, she has a right to be the
manager of the family and subjected to the same rights and obligations as that of the son.
In the case of Radha Ammal v. IT Commissioner8, it was held that the right to become a manager
depends upon the fundamental fact that the person upon whom the right devolves was a
coparcener. It was held that the right was conferred upon the male members, as the female
8 AIR 1950 Mad 538
members were not treated as coparceners. but, now, on reading the above position held by the
court with the amendment in 2005, a daughter, who can now be a coparcener (according to
Section 6) could also become the karta or manager.
There are certain questions that need to be answered. They are as follows:1.
What happens if a daughter is begotten at the time of partition but is born after it?
2.
Section 3 of the Kerala act state removed the Right by birth' clause. No person, whether female
or male could claim right in the property by the mere instance of his or her birth. This in a way
did not do away with the discrimination that the daughters were subjected to for years; because it
was wholly prospective and fails to confer rights on daughters in the existing coparcenary
properties.
On the other hand, the Andhra Pradesh legislature conferred the right by birth on daughters who
are unmarried on the date when the act came into force.
Thus the classical mitakshara coparcenary could no longer operate in these States even prior to
the Central Amendement. In the states following Dayabhaga law; like West Bengal, Orissa
(barring areas of Southern Orissa), Assam and Tripura, situation wasn't as worse, because
Dayabhaga treats females and males on the same pedestal. In states of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka, though retained the skeleton of the Mitakshara law, it
substantially removed its discriminatory features by conferring quality on daughters (unmarried).
These amendments raised the daughters' position in the joint family in leaps and bound. Not only
does she continue to be a coparcener even after her marriage she also gets to be the part of her
husband's joint family.
However, nothing good comes without problems. The researcher wishes to discuss the following
problems:1.
What's the difference in the daughter's right if she is married as against her right if she
were a spinster.
2.
What is the difference in the Right of a natural daughter and that of an adoptive daughter?
3.
What happens when a partial partition with respect to some coparceners, had taken place?
4.
With state legislature legislating on the same issue and providing contradictory answers
to the ones answered by the Central Act, which one would prevail and why?
5.
Answer 1
If the daughter was born in Karnataka and was married prior to 1990, then she would not be
granted any rights vis-a-vis her father's property. However, after the 2005 Central Amendment,
the difference between married and unmarried daughters is not recognised any more.
In the case of Sugalabai Vs Gundappa A. Maradi and Ors,10 the question concerning the right of a
married daughter to be treated as a coparcener irrespective of the marriage happening before the
Karnataka Amendment Act, 1990 came into force , where the share of the plaintiff/appellant was
modified from 1/4* to 1/8* on the ground that the appellant being one of the daughters was not
entitled to claim partition as she was not a coparcener.
The court held that the lower appellate court was in error in reducing the share of the appellant
and stating further that the daughter was a coparcener by birth, by virtue of the Karnataka
Amendment Act of 1990, and therefore, on partition of the joint Hindu family coparcenery
property shall have to be so divided as to allot to a daughter, the same share as is allotted to a
son.
It was further submitted that as the amendment Act was passed during the pendency of the appeal
before the lower appellate court and hence it was the duty of the lower appellate court to have
taken note of the said changes in the law.
Yet, another submission was made, that the appellant though was married prior to 1990, yet by
virtue of amendment brought to the Principal Act by the Central Government by way of the
Hindu Succession Act (Amendment) 2005, which removed the distinction between a married
daughter and an unmarried one, entitles the appellant to be treated as a coparcener and hence the
view taken by the lower appellate court in reducing the share of the appellant cannot be sustained
in law.
Answer 2
Section 29-A of the Acts (6-A of the Karnataka Act) states: That in a joint Hindu family which is
governed by Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener by birth' shall become a coparcener in
10 ILR 2007 KAR 4790
her own right. It seems that the phrase by birth is a pre-condition for the Right on the
coparcenary property. If so, whether the distinction between a natural-born daughter and an
adopted daughter can be upheld as a reasonable classification? To the contrary it may be argued
on the basis of section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which states that
every adopted child is to be treated as the real child to the adoptive parent(s) for all purposes; and
hence, this logically should give the adoptive girl (or boy) the right to inherit her/his parent(s)
ancestral/self-acquired property. This however, does not debar the adoptive child from inheriting
from her natural family also she will be having a vested coparcenry right by birth there.
Another reason why the adoptive child should not be treated differently from that of natural child
is because the policy of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act is to treat an adopted child and an
after born natural child similarly.
One can only surmise the reasons for the exclusion of the married daughter. First, the legislature
might have taken into account the sociological fact that dowry was given at the time of marriage
in the case of married daughters. Second in some cases property or jewellery might have also
been given at the time of marriage to the daughter in the name of dowry. But they failed to take
note, that there might also be certain circumstance where both these assumptions might not be
relevant in which case such married daughters might lose out.
But the Karnataka legislation has failed to take note of that taking and giving of Dowry is an
offence and that more than 60 years of independence this evil practise has reduced substantially.
Hence there may be many cases where nothing has been give. Besides, barring one the right to
inherit her father's property merely because of the chance of dowry, in a way encourages the joint
family members to give away a certain amount to her in-laws at the time of her wedding and in
turn bar her successfully from gaining rights over property of greater value. This i'm sure was
certainly not the intention of the Legislation; it sought to ensure equality amongst all people, be
it between sons and daughters or between married and unmarried daughters.
Answer 3
When a partial partition with respect to some coparceners, has taken place the interests of
undivided coparceners may suffer significant reduction in the value of their shares with the
introduction of daughters as coparceners.
Further there are some practical difficulties that the Amendment brings about. On the demise of
the father, the daughter of the coparcener is entitled to act as karta of the joint family in
preference to her stepmother thought she may lack experience and with it, shall belong to another
family after her marriage. The mother cannot take on the job of a Karta, because coparcenership
is a necessary condition to being a karta.
Answer 4
Another problem was recognized in the case of Sri. Govind Reddy v. Union of India, 11 where a
question had arisen as to which of the two Acts would be valid-the Central Act enacted in 2005
or the Karnataka Act, which had already bestowed some right to the daughters from 1994. The
court held, that the latter would prevail over the former; as provided for under Article 254(1) of
the Constitution of India which enunciates the normal rule that in the event of a conflict between
a Union and a State Law, in the concurrent field the former prevails over the latter - irrespective
of the time of the Union Law is passed.
Answer 5
The other issue discussed in this case was with regards to the validity of S.6(1)(c) of the 2005
Act; which restricts the right of the daughter of a co-parcener from questioning any alienation of
the coparcenary property that had taken place before 20.12.2004. the problem cited by the
legislature was that if they granted the daughter the right to question any alienation of the
coparcenary property that had taken place before 20.12.2004, would lead to a wave of cases
thrashing against the door of the Judiciary and cause the chaos of unsettling the cases that had
already be decided and disposed off. However, the court held in a certain case, that if this was the
mandate, then the same rule should be applied to the son's power to question such alienation;
cause the problem cited by them would the same, irrespective of the petitioner's gender.
11 AIR 1958 Kant 150, AIR 1958 Mys 150, 1958 CriLJ 1489
CONCLUSION
Since the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 gives coparcenary right to a daughter equal
to the right of a son and she can also demand partition in respect of the assets of the joint family,
it should logically follow that the amounts so received by her on partition should be treated as
belonging to the Hindu Undivided Family under her management, if not as karta, so that the
income from such assets so received need not be clubbed with her personal income.
As otherwise, there is no real equality between her and her brother. She can claim a separate
status for assets received from the Hindu Undivided Family distinct from her personal status. I
believe that it is possible for her to claim a separate status for property inherited from joint
family under the new law.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS REFERRED
1.
2.
Gandhi B.M., Hindu Law, Eastern Book Publication; Lucknow, 2nd Edition, 2003
3.
Diwan Dr. Paras, Modern Hindu Law, Allahabad Law Agency, 20th Edition, 2009
4.
5.