VILLEGAS vs. CA Sec.

16, Rule 3
G.R. No. 82562; G.R. No. 82592 (April 11, 1997)
FACTS:
This case originated from a libel suit filed by then Assemblyman Antonio V. Raquiza against then Manila
Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, who allegedly publicly imputed to him acts constituting violations of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act. He did this on several occasions (a) a speech before the Lions Club (b)
public statements in Manila which was coupled with a radio-TV interview; and (c) a public statement
shortly prior to his appearance before the Senate Committee on Public Works.
The Committee, however, observed that all the allegations in the complaint were based mainly on the
uncorroborated testimony of a certain Pedro U. Fernandez, whose credibility turned out to be highly
questionable. Villegas also failed to submit the original copies of his documentary evidence. Thus, after
thorough investigation, Raquiza was cleared of all charges by the Committee.
An information for libel was filed by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila against Villegas. After losing in the 1971 elections, Villegas left for the United States
where he stayed until his death. Nevertheless, trial proceeded in absentia, by the time of his death in
1984, the prosecution had already rested its case. Two months after notice of his death, the court issued an
order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserving the right to resolve its civil aspect.
Judge Obien rendered judgment dismissing the criminal aspect of the case but reserved the right to
resolve the civil aspect by ordering the estate of Villegas to pay plaintiff.
The heirs of Villegas (the Heirs), through their fathers counsel, Atty. Norberto Quisumbing, appealed the
decision on these three main ground:
Whether the trial court, three months after notice of the death of the accused and before his counsel could
file a memorandum in his behalf, could validly render judgment in the case?
Whether, in the absence of formal substitution of parties, the trial court could validly render judgment
against the heirs and estate of a deceased accused?
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial courts judgment.
ISSUE:
Did the death of the accused before final judgment extinguish his civil liability?

HELD:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the
civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensostrictiore.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action
The source of Villegas civil liability in the present case is the felonious act of libel he allegedly
committed. Yet, this act could also be deemed a quasi-delict within the purview of Article 33 in relation to
Article 1157 of the Civil Code.
The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction but a requirement of due process. The rule
on substitution was crafted to protect every partys right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly
appointed legal representative of the estate.
Arellano vs CFI of Sorsogon
The judicial controversy between petitioner Raul Arellano (Arellano for short) and
respondent Santiago UyBarreta(Barreta for short) started way back on February 4,
1967 when Barreta1 filed aforementioned Civil Case No. 2167 with respondent court
against Arellano and a certain Emilio B. Bayona for reconveyance, with damages, of
a certain parcel of land located in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, alleging as cause of action
that the defendants had successfully maneuvered in bad faith, thru a supposedly
false extrajudicial partition, to secure the issuance of a certificate of title No. T3670
which enabled them to ultimately have the cancellation thereof by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T3739 in the name of Arellano. After being served with
summons, Arellano filed on May 5 1967, instead of an answer, a motion to dismiss
based on the ground of failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, inasmuch
as on its face, said complaint seeks the setting aside of a torrenstitle by virtue of
nothing more than a claim of ownership through continuous adverse possession for
allegedly more than fiftythree (53) years. Simultaneously, pursuant to Rule 25 of the
Rules of Court, Arellano dispatched the following written interrogatories to Barreta,
which the latter received on May 9, 1967:
As nothing again was heard from Barreta as of April 7, 1969, on this date, Arellano
filed a motion reiterating his prayer for the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 29 and Section 3, Rule 17, alleging that Barreta had
failed to serve answers to the interrogatories sent to him despite the periods
previously given to him by the court. When this motion was heard on April 25, 1969,
once more Barretaasked for deferment and the court postponed its consideration
for new assignment, which came on August 6, 1969, on which date
Five days later, however, Arellano filed another motion for instant dismissal. The
motion was granted by the court on the ground that the plaintiff failed to gove his
answer to the written intergotorries. More than two years had already elapsed since
the said Written Interrogatories was sent to the plaintiff and now response has been
given
Issue: Whether the dismissal was warranted
To be sure, We can uphold the order of dismissal in question on the strength of the
basic principles of discovery procedure, more specifically, for failure of Barreta to
serve any answer to Arellanos interrogatories. The contention of respondent that it

was erroneous for the trial court to dismiss the action without first ordering Barreta
to answer the interrogatories of Arellano and waiting for his failure to do so has no
merit. Neither is there merit in the claim that the sending of the interrogatories in
question had not yet been given due course by the court. Leave of court is not
necessary before written interrogatories may be served upon a party. (2 Moran 90,
1970 ed.) In any event, if Section 1 of Rule 25 could be susceptible of the
construction suggested by counsel for Barreta, it is to Us a sufficient basis for the
discovery procedure of written interrogatories in this case to have proceeded in
motion after plaintiff had been given a period to oppose and had failed to do so.
Besides, the repeatedly unfulfilled promises of counsel to produce the answers of
his client render such objection academic. Withal, the order of dismissal of August
19, 1969, which counsel referred to in his motion of December 16, 1969, as having
been issued in view of plaintiffs failure to answer the written interrogatories was
virtually accepted as final in said motion, so much so that theartifice of moving for
the reinclusion of Arellano as anindispensable party was conceived. In brief, there is
here a case where the party served with written interrogatories has for unexplained
reasons failed altogether to comply with the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 25
that they be answered. Under these circumstances, the assailed dismissal finds
justification in Section 5 of Rule 29

RAYMOND vs. CA
166 SCRA 50, 54 (1988)
FACTS:
A complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo by Santiago
Bitera against Carlos Bell Raymond and Agustin Alba. The latter moved to dismiss the
action on the ground of improper venue. They argued that although Biteras complaint
gives his address as 240-C Jalandoni Street, Iloilo City, he is, and for many years has
been actually residing at the so-called UPSUMCO.
The Trial Court however denied their motion to dismiss. They then filed a special civil
action of certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. But, as above stated, they
fared no better in that court.
HELD:
According to Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, personal actions, such as Biteras,
may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. The term, where a person resides, or residence, may be understood as
synonymous with domicile: as referring to a persons permanent home, the place to
which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return,
The term may also be taken in another sense, and it is this which is germane to the

determination of venue, as meaning a persons actual residence, different and distinct

from his permanent one, or domicile, where he was born and reared. Thus this Court
has held that venue was improperly laid in a case where the complaint was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte by the plaintiff who was born and reared in that
province, but whose actual residence at time of suit was admittedly at Quezon City.
In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
It therefore clearly appears that both the respondent Judge and the Court of Appeals,
the former in the first instance and the latter on review, committed reversible legal error,
if not grave abuse of discretion, in not dismissing Biteras action despite the fact that its
venue had clearly been improperly laid, and had been seasonably objected to on that
ground by petitioners in a motion to dismiss.

ALTRES vs. EMPLEO

GR No. 180986 (2008)

FACTS:
Mayor Quijano sent notices of numerous vacant career positions in the city government to the CSC.
Petitioners and other applicants submitted their applications for the different positions where they felt
qualified. Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.

SangguniangPanglungsod issued a resolution addressed to the CSC of Iligan City Field Office requesting
a suspension of action on the processing of appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city
government until the enactment of a new budget. The SangguniangPanglungsod issued another resolution
enjoining all officers to put off the transmission of all appointments to the CSC, therein making it clear
that non-compliance would be met with administrative action.

The CSC Field Office for Lanao del Norte and Iligan City disapproved the appointments issued to
petitioners invariably due to lack of certification of availability of funds. Respondent Empleo did not
issue the required certification of availability of funds, which interfered the power of appointment of
Mayor Quijano.

Petitioners filed a Compliance Report to which they attached 18 copies of a) a verification and

certification, b) an affidavit of service and c) photocopies of counsels Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) official receipt for the year 2008. Respondents assail as defective the verification and certification
against forum shopping attached to the petition as it bears the signatures of only 11 out of the 59
petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was presented by the signing petitioners. They thus
move for the dismissal of the petition, citing Sec. 5, Rule 7.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the verification is already sufficient.

HELD:
Yes. The signing of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already sufficiently assures the
Court that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith and that the signatories are questionably real
parties-in-interest who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the petition.

With respect to petitioners certification against forum shopping, the failure of the other petitioners to sign
as they could no longer be contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not merit the
outright dismissal of thepetition without defeating the administration of justice. The non-signing
petitioners are, however, dropped as parties to the case.

PNB vs. PEREZ

16 SCRA 270
FACTS:
PNB filed a complaint for revival of judgment rendered on December 29, 1949 against
Perez, Pumuntoc and de Pumuntoc. It was alleged that said judgment was rendered
more than five years ago but since then less than ten years had elapsed, and that
judgment to pay jointly and severally the outstanding balance of P7,699.49 as of
February 9, 1961, with interest thereon of 10% per annum from February 10, 1961, plus
10% of the amount due as attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Defendants Pumuntoc failed to file their answer within the regelmentary period for which
reason they were declared in default. Defendant Perez who was summoned by
publication, also failed to file his answer, where he was also declared in default and
though he later filed an answer the same was stricken out from the record.
Plaintiff submitted its evidence but when the case was submitted for the decision, the
court a quo dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs cause of action
had already prescribed.

Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration contending that, since prescription is a

defense that can only be set up by defendants, the court could not motupropio consider
it as basis for dismissal, but this motion was denied.
HELD:
The instant case was filed with the court a quo only on March 22, 1961 thereby showing
that more than 11 years had already elapsed on the date of the filing of the action.
It is true that the defense of prescription can only be considered if the same is invoked
as such in the answer of the defendant and that in this particular instance no such
defense was invoked because the defendants had been declared in default, but such
rule does not obtain when the evidence shows that the cause of action upon which
plaintiffs complaint is based is already barred by the statute of limitations.

Republic vs Sandiganbayan
On July 17, 1987, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippine Commission for Good Government, filed before the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages. The
complaint alleged that defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the
Philippines, and his wife Imelda, in violation of the Constitution and in fraud of the
Filipino people, embarked on a systematic plan accumulating wealth during their
term as President and First Lady of the Republic
In June 1993, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave ToTake the Deposition of Rolando
C. Gapud Upon Oral Examination in the Crown Colony of Hongkong. Petitioner
alleged that Mr. Rolando C. Gapud, former financial adviser of President Marcos and
his wife, was willing to testify on matters relevant to the subject of the case that Mr.
Gapud executed three (3) sworn statements in Hongkong in 1987 setting forth the
various business activities of the former President, the manner in which these
businesses were conducted and managed, and identifying respondent Lucio Tan and
thirty (30) other principal business associates of the former President that these
affidavits were used by petitioner in filing civil and criminal cases against the
defendants that Mr. Gapudstestimony is indispensable to establish the intricate
unlawful business activities of the Marcoses and theirprincipal business associates
or cronies, including Mr. Tanthat in view of the nature of his testimony and the
personal risks Mr. Gapud was facing in assisting the government in
the recovery of illgottenwealth, his testimony would be given only by deposition
upon oral examination. Petitioner prayed that the court allow the taking of the
testimony by deposition upon oral examination of Mr. Gapud before the Philippine
Consulate in Hongkong, or in any other Philippine Foreign Office, and on such dates
and time as may be agreed upon by the parties.

Respondent Lucio Tan allegesand (3) petitioner has not shown special
circumstances or unusual circumstances demonstrating a necessity to take the
deposition in question
In the case at bar, petitioner alleges that the taking of Mr. Gapuds deposition in lieu
of his testimony is necessary because the allegations in the complaint are based
mainly on his disclosures regarding the business activities of President Marcos and
Lucio Tan that although Mr. Gapudwas granted immunity by President Aquino from
criminal, civil and administrative suits, he has been out of the country since 1987
and has no intention of returning, fearing for his safety that this fear arose from his
damaging disclosures on the illicit activities of the cronies and business associates
of former President Marcos which therefore renders him unable to testify at the trial.
Petitioner has not cited any fact other than Mr. Gapudscooperation with the
Philippine government in the recovery of illgottenwealth that would support the
deponents claim of fear for his safety. No proof, much less any allegation, has been
presented to show that there exists a real threat to Mr. Gapuds life once he returns
to the Philippines and that adequate security cannot be provided by petitioner for
such a vital witness. There is no question that the trial court has the power to direct,
in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if there are valid reasons for so
ruling.34 Petitioners reasons do not amount to an exceptional or unusual case
for us to grant leave and reverse respondent court
San Luis vs Rojas
The factual background of herein petition is as follows: On July 12, 2001, Berdex
International, Inc. (private
respondent) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC) a complaint3 for a
sum of money against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 68530 alleging that: it
is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the United States
of America with principal office in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. it is maintaining
the present action only to enforce its rights by virtue of an isolated transaction with
petitioner in June 1997, petitioner received from it certain amounts of money which
were meant partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in
both Seanet and SeabestCorporations, however, not a single share in those
corporations was transferred to private respondent by petitioner and the shares
were retained by the latter the parties then agreed to treat all the
payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner as the latters loan
petitioner proposed the payment of the loan within a period of three years, which
proposal was accepted by private respondent with the agreement that in case of
nonpayment of any installment on their due dates, the entire amount shall become
due and demandable petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of loan
petitioner confirmed such loan toprivate respondents auditors on August 8, 2000
and hehad only paid US$20,000.00 and no further payment was made despite
repeated demands. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the
amount of US$150,335.75 plus interest until fully paid and attorneys fees
On April 4, 2002, private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize DepositionTaking
Through Written Interrogatories)5 alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is

set on May 3, 2002 that however, all of its witnesses are Americans who reside or
hold office in the USA that one of the witnesses is already of advanced age and
travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous and there is a
perceived danger to them in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
20026 that written interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are
already very few that such mode of depositiontaking will save precious judicial and
government time and will prevent needless delays in the
case.\
In his Opposition and Comment,7 petitioner contendsTaking the deposition through
written interrogatories would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the
general bearing and demeanor of witnesses. Petitioners right to crossexamine the
witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to crossinterrogatorieswhich
will severely limit not only the scope but the spontaneity of his crossexamination. It
is doubtful whether the witnesses will give their deposition under sanction of the
penalties prescribed by Philippine law for perjury. It will not necessarily save
precious judicial and government time but may in fact lengthen the trial, as both
parties will have the right to review and to object to interrogatories submitted by
the other party. The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the
witnesses who are all Americans is frivolous, since respondent has not presented
evidence that the US government has prohibited its citizens from traveling to the
Philippines and if ever there was such prohibition, it was not binding on our own
legal system. Old age was not a valid reason.
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private
respondents MOTION (To Allow DepositionTakingThrough Written Interrogatories)
considering private respondents allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all
Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions for its
admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the
witnessresides at a distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the
place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.
We are not persuaded.
Depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court, where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge and the procedure is not on that account rendered
illegal nor is the deposition, thereby taken, inadmissible.34 It precisely falls within
one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open
court and without being subject to the prying eyes andprobing questions of the
Judge.35 Depositions areconsistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.36 Depositions are allowed
provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the
Rules of Court that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served,
without leave of court if an answer has been submitted and provided, further, that
a circumstance for their admissibility exists.37