Consti 2 Outline (Bill of Rights Sec 1-4)

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)
Instructor: Atty. Ria Lidia G. Espina

III. Bill of Rights
A. Definition/scope
1.
2.
Civil rights - Those rights that belong to every

citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense,
to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with
the organization or administration of government.
They include the rights to property, marriage, equal
protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc.. They are
rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship
in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its
general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.
Political rights - They refer to the right to
participate,
directly
or
indirectly,
in
the
establishment or administration of government,
e.g., the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right to petition and, in general the rights appurtenant
to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government
Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights,

G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
Doctrine: Civil rights are those rights that belong to
every citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider
sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with
the organization or administration of government;
political rights refer to the right to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of
government.
FACTS: On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to desist from
demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the
resolution of the vendors/squatters complaint before the
Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and supplemental
motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that
Commissioners' authority should be understood as being
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and
political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this
case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to
engage in business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying
petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to dismiss. And
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an
Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction. Petitioner also
prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating
CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Ferno, et.al vs. Quimpo, et.al".
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of an "order to desist" is within the
extent of the authority and power of the CRH.
HELD: No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within
the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article XIII,
Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any part, all forms
of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in
character but an adjudicative power that it does not possess.
The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of
injunction, for it were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of
preliminary injunction may only be issued by the Judge in any
court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or
of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No.
90-1580.
B. Due process of law

A law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial [Darmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518],
Responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice [Ermita-Malate Hotel
& Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849].
The embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play
[Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, pp 3233 ].
1.
Who are protected
Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.) vs. Joaquin Natividad,

Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, 40 Phil 163
Doctrine: Universal in application to all persons, without
regards to any difference in race, color or nationality.
Artificial persons are covered by the protection but only
insofar as their property is concerned.
Facts: This is a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by the
petitioner to compel Natividad to issue a certificate of
Philippine registry in favor of the former for its motor vessel
Bato of more than fifteen tons gross, built in the Philippine
Islands in 1916.
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands whose majority
stockholders are British subjects. The Bato was brought to Cebu
in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was
made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of
Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector
refused to issue the certificate on the grounds that all the
stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. were not citizens either
of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant
action is the result.
Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell &
Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect,
prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or
more of their stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761
deprives the corporation of its property without due process of
law because by the passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of
ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it
could not use .
Issue: W/N the Government of the Philippine Islands, through
its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its coastwise
trade to corporations having alien stockholders
HELD: YES. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a
certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the
collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel
that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade
and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is
defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this
Code.
Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a
vessel of domestic ownership, and of more than fifteen tons
gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued for it. If
the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or
less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine register shall be
optional with the owner.
While Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the dueprocess of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as
Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the
Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious
species of class legislation which must always be condemned,
but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the
purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the
constitutional provision.
Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275
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Doctrine: The guarantee extends to aliens and includes
the means of livelihood
FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens
from being employed or engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing
an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying
the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai
Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the
enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same
null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the
petitioner, hence this case.
ISSUE: W/N said Ordinance violates due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process
of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a
person before he can be employed to get a permit from the
City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the
Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens
within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens.
2.
Meaning of life, liberty or property
Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its

completeness, free from dismemberment, and extends to the
use of God-given faculties which make life enjoyable [Justice
Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 320321]. See: Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200.
Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude, x x x (It) includes
the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways x x x [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660]
Property is anything that can come under the right of
ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents more
than the things a person owns; it includes the right to secure,
use and dispose of them [Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197].
i)
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
(PBMEO) vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 50 SCRA 189
Doctrine: The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the
ideals of liberty, equality and security against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing
hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn
and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles
FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed the
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of their decision to have a
mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police. The company respondent pleaded to
exclude the employees in the first shift to join the mass
demonstration; however the petitioners still included them. As
a result, the company respondent filed a case thru the city
prosecutor and charged the demonstrating employees of
violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the respondent company, and the petitioners failed to file a
timely motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a
procedural fault violates due process.
HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition
based on technicality (being 2 days late) was rendered null and
void. (The constitutional rights have dominance over
procedural rules.) And, the company was directed to
reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of
separation minus the one day's pay and whatever earnings
they might have realized from other sources during their
separation from service. (The removal from employment of

the officers were deemed too harsh a punishment for
their actions)
Nunez vs. Averia, 57 SCRA 726
Doctrine: Public office is not property; but one
unlawfully ousted from it may institute an action to
recover the same, flowing from the de jure officers
right to office. It is nevertheless a protected right.
Facts: Petitioner CONSTANTINO A. NUEZ, is the protestant in
Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting the
November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the
mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud,
irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the
proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo Morales, who was ambushed
and killed on February 15, 1974 in a barrio of Tarnate and
hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon
(respondent) who as the incumbent mayor is now substituted in
this action as party respondent. Respondent court had in its
questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted protestee's
motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground "that
this court has lost its jurisdiction to decide this case for the
reason that the same has become moot and academic," citing
the President's authority under General Order No. 3 and Article
XVII, section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove from office
all incumbent government officials and employees, whether
elective or appointive. Upon receipt of respondent's comment
the Court resolved to consider petitioner's petition for review
on certiorari as a special civil action and the case submitted for
decision for prompt disposition thereof.
Issue: W/N public office is a property right protected by the
Constitution.
Held: No, public office is not considered a property; but to the
extent that security of tenure cannot be compromised without
due process, it is in a limited sense analogous to property.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's dismissal order of January
31, 1974 is hereby set aside and respondent court is directed
to immediately continue with the trial and determination of the
election protest before it on the merits.
Crespo v. Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66
Doctrine: An order of suspension, without opportunity
for hearing, violates property rights
FACTS: Gregorio T. Crespo was elected Municipal Mayor of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On January
25, 97, an administrative complaint was filed against him by
private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of
authority and oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written
explanation as to why he should not be dealt with
administratively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in
accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. However, on
February 15, 1971, without notifying Crespo or his counsel, the
board proceeded with the hearing and allowed private
respondent Pedro Wycoco to present evidence, and thereafter,
the board issued Resolution No. 51 ordering a preventive
suspension against petitioner mayor Crespo. This was assailed
by petitioner arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and
grossly violative of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which
requires a hearing and investigation, and grossly violated the
due process.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner mayor was deprived with due process.
HELD: Yes, the order of preventive suspension was
issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be
heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not
fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial
Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M.
Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a
request in writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board
his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of
the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent
Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed
for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested
by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial
Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence
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to support it. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis
of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco, and
nothing therein can be gathered that the written explanation
submitted by petitioner was taken into account.
Republic vs. Rosemore Mining and Development
Corporation,
G.R. 149927, March 30, 2004
Doctrine: A mining license that contravenes a
mandatory provision of law under which it is granted is
void. Being a mere privilege, a license does not vest
absolute rights in the holder. Thus, without offending
the due process and the non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution, it can be revoked by the State in the
public interest
Facts: Petitioner Rosemoor Mining and Development
Corporation after having been granted permission to prospect
for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of
high quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which
forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain range.
The petitioner then applied with the Bureau of
Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the
issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said
marble deposits.
License No. 33 was issued by the Bureau of Mines in favor
of the herein petitioners. Shortly thereafter, Respondent
Ernesto Maceda cancelled the petitioners license stating
that their license had illegally been issued, because it violated
Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more public
interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the
license. The latter reason was confirmed by the language of
Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest
would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was
excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the former status of that
land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park.
Issue: Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 84 is valid.
Held: Yes. We cannot sustain the argument that Proclamation
No. 84 is a bill of attainder; that is, a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without judicial trial. Its declaration
that QLP No. 33 is a patent nullity is certainly not a declaration
of guilt. Neither is the cancellation of the license a punishment
within the purview of the constitutional proscription against
bills of attainder.
Too, there is no merit in the argument that the
proclamation is an ex post facto law. It is settled that an ex
post facto law is limited in its scope only to matters
criminal in nature. Proclamation 84, which merely restored
the area excluded from the Biak-na-Bato national park by
canceling respondents license, is clearly not penal in
character.
Also at the time President Aquino issued Proclamation No.
84 on March 9, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative
powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986. Section 1 of
Article II of Proclamation No. 3, which promulgated the
Provisional Constitution, granted her legislative power until a
legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution.
The grant of such power is also explicitly recognized and
provided for in Section 6 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 53 Phil 123
Doctrine: Mere privileges, such as the license to
operate a cockpit, are not property rights and are
revocable at will
FACTS:
Petitioner Gregorio Pedro assails the validity of

Ordinance No. 36, series 1928 which was approved by
the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial
governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval.
Petitioner contends that the ordinance should be declared

null and void on the following grounds:
1. It impairs his acquired rights;
2. It was enacted on account of prejudice considering
that the ordinance is purposely enacted for a special
purpose, namely, to prevent, at any cost, the
opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the

cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and
3. It provides for special committee composed of
persons who are not
members of the council.
Hence, they are not accorded with the power to act
like the other Councilors.
Pedro further asserts that having obtained the proper
permit in order for him to maintain, exploit and open to
the public the cockpit in question, and having paid the
license for the same, he was able to fulfill all the
requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of
1928. Hence, Pedro sticks firm to his belief that he already
acquired a right which cannot be taken away from him by
Ordinance No. 36.
ISSUE: Whether or not a license authorizing the operation and

exploitation of a cockpit falls under the property rights which a
person may not be deprived without due process of law.
HELD: No; a license authorizing the operation and exploitation
of a cockpit does NOT fall under the property rights which
a person may not be deprived without due process of law.
The Court held that a license authorizing the operation
and exploitation of a cockpit is a mere privilege which may be
revoked when the public interests so require. The special
committee composed of persons who are not members of the
council are NOT performing a legislative act. The work
entrusted to them by the municipal council is only
informational. Further, the ordinance, which was approved by a
municipal council duly constituted, that suspends the effects of
another which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a
cockpit license, is valid and legal.
G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004 (431 SCRA 534)
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES
EBDANE
Doctrine: The license to carry a firearm is neither a
property nor a property right. Neither does it create a
vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside ones
residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a
property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as
to be placed beyond the reach of police power
FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of
firearms outside of residence in order to deter the rising
crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation
of his right to property.
Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition

and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the
Carying of Firearms Outside of Residence issued by PNP
Chief Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo
delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public
places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed PNP
Chief Ebdane to suspend the issuance of permits to carry
firearms outside of residence (PTCFOR). Thus, Chief
Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines. Chavez contends
that such guidelines was a derogation of his constitutional
right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-abiding
licensed gun-owner is the only class subject to the
implementation
while
leaving
the
law-breakers
(kidnappers, MILF, hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched.
Petitioner also averred that ownership and carrying of
firearms are constitutionally protected property rights
which cannot be taken away without due process of law.
ISSUES:
1.
WON the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional
right
2.
WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the
assailed Guidelines is a violation of right to property
3.
WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of
Police power
HELD:
1.
SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the
provision on bearing arms as a constitutional right.
The right to bear arms, then, is a mere statutory
privilege unlike in the American Constitution which was
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2.
3.
the law invoked by petitioner. Right to bear arms is a mere

statutory creation as was observed by the laws passed to
regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importation of
firearms; it cannot be considered an inalienable or
absolute right.
The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a
person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property
nor property right. A license is merely a privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the granting authority and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property right nor does it create a
vested right. Such license may be revoked anytime when
the authority deems it fit to do so, and such revocation
does not deprive the holder of any property, or immunity.
The test to determine the validity of police measure
, thus:
The interests of the public generally, as

distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the exercise of the police power; and
The means employed are reasonably necessary

for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. It is apparent
from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its
issuance was the need for peace and order in the
society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes,
particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to
disturb the peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo
deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban.
Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of
guidelines is the interest of the public in general. Such
means of revocation is, thus, a valid exercise of police
power.
Petition is hereby dismissed.
Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163

Doctrine: The mandatory suspension from office of a
public official pending criminal prosecution for violation
of RA 3019 cannot amount to deprivation of property
without due process of law
Canlas vs. Napico Homeowners, G.R. No. 182795, June 5,
2008
Facts: Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land
situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings
have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the
petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court
judgment. Petitioners claim that respondents hold fraudulent
and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The
rule on writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extra legal killings or disappearances.
Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the
petitioners.
Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the
cause of the petitioners. The threatened demolition of a
dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not
included among the enumeration of rights covered by the writ.
Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the
land in question is not alleged at all in the petition
Luque vs. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22545, November 28,
1969
Facts: Petitioners (who are passengers from Cavite and
Batangas who ride on buses to and from their province and
Manila) and some public service operators of buses and jeeps
assail the validity of Ordinance 4986and Administrative Order
1.
Ordinance 4986 states that PUB and PUJs shall be allowed
to enter Manila only from 6:30am to 8:30pm every day except
Sundays and holidays.
Petitioners contend that since they possess a valid CPC,
they have already acquired a vested right to operate.
Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public

Service states that all jeeps authorized to operate from Manila
to any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila,
shall carry the words "For Provincial Operation".
Issue: W/N Ordinance 4986 destroys vested rights to operate
in Manila
Held: NO! A vested right is some right or interest in the
property which has become fixed and established and is
no longer open to doubt or controversy. As far as the
State is concerned, a CPC constitutes neither a franchise nor a
contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or
privilege.
The holder does not acquire a property right in the route
covered, nor does it confer upon the holder any proprietary
right/interest/franchise in the public highways.
Neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be
transported directly to Manila. The alleged right is dependent
upon the manner public services are allowed to operate within
a given area. It is no argument that the passengers enjoyed the
privilege of having been continuously transported even before
outbreak of war. Times have changed and vehicles have
increased. Traffic congestion has moved from worse to critical.
Hence, there is a need to regulate the operation of public
services.
3.
a.
Aspects of due process

Substantive due process - This serves as a
restriction on government's law- and rulemaking
powers
The requisites are:

1. The interests of the public, in general, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the intervention of the State.
2. The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive on individuals
US vs. Toribio, 15 Phil 85
FACTS: Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the
violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating
the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle.
Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human
consumption, the carabao described in the information, without
a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where
it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a
permit to slaughter the animal but was not give none because
the carabao was not found to be unfit for agricultural work
which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place
other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails
the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that
only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.
ISSUE: W/N Act No. 1147 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The provision of the statute in question being a
proper exercise of police power is not a violation of the terms of
Section 5 of the Philippine Bill; a provision which itself is
adopted from the Constitution of US; and is found in substance
in the Consititution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil 580
FACTS: Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal
Province "quite a distance from the road and strongly built".
Someresidents (German and British Consuls) find it offensive.
Act # 2339 allows the defendent, the Collector of
InternalRevenue, to collect taxes from such property and to
remove it when it is offensive to sight. Court of first
Instanceprohibited the defendant to collect or remove the
billboard
ISSUE:
1. W/N the courts may restrain by injunction the collection of
taxes
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2. Is Act # 2339 unconstitutional because it deprives property
without due process of law in allowing CIR to remove it if it
is offensive
HELD:
1. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy and not to be used
if there is an adequate remedy provided by law; here there
is an adequate remedy, therefore court may not do so.
2. Unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight
are not dissociated from the general welfare of the public,
therefore can be regulated by police power, and act is
constitutional.
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660
Doctrine: Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases
FACTS: Petitioner
Rubi
and
other
Mangyanes
were
recommended by the Provincial Governor of Mindoro to take
their habitation on an unoccupied land of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
run. The Mangyanes had to stay there for a reason of
cultivation under certain plans. Over 300 Mangyanes were
confined on a 800 hectares whereas the land is under the
resolution of the Provincial Board. Then Dabalos, one of the
Mangyanes, was taken by the provincial sheriff and imprisoned
him at Calapan solely because he escaped from the
reservation. Habeas Corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and
the Mangyans for an application that alleged the virtue of the
resolution of the provincial board creating the reservation
whereas they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. The
validity of Sec.2145 of the Administrative Code was challenged.
ISSUE: WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives
a person of his liberty of abode.
HELD: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and
does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section
does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The
Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts
for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating
the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing
civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that
the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the
Philippines.
Binay vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial
assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income
does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken
out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal
treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the
resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2)
government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only;
and, (3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only
benefit a few individuals.
Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police

power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause
1.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in
municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may
exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such
power by the legislature which is the repository of the
inherent powers of the State. Municipal governments exercise
this power under the general welfare clause.
2.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because
it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
"the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards
state policies to provide adequate social services, the
promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as
human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for
the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support
for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good.
3.
There is no violation of the equal protection
clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts
of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare
of the paupers
Agcaoili vs. Felipe, 149 SCRA 341
Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848
Facts: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees,"
to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy.
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing,
conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any handout, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer,
lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days
immediately preceding every examination day including
examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to
the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and
Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees
preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like
them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for
injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the
latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21,
1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution
In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared
that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the
respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10,
1986, filed with the Court of Appeals
Issue: Whether or not the PRC resolution violates substantive
due process
Held: Yes. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and
arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should
prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They
cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to
assure the fulfilment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their
faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should
be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge
that will promote their personal growth
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 5

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182
FACTS: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the
validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969,
penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or
corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to
require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay
full payment for tickets intended for adults but should
charge only one-half of the said ticket. Petitioners who are
managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a
Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on
June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. The
Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the
City of Butuan constitutional and valid.
ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal
Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and was
the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power
HELD: NO. Ordinance No. 640 is declared unconstitutional. The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless
it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in
derogation of a common right. For being unreasonable and an
undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of
exercising police power, be upheld as valid.
BANAT vs. Comelec, 595 SCRA 477
Facts: The case is a Special Civil action filed by BANAT
(Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency) party-list, a duly accredited multi-sectoral
organization, assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9363 and
enjoining the COMELEC and from implementing the statute.
R.A. 9363 is a consolidation of Senate bill and House bill passed
by the Senate and signed by the President.
Issue: W/N R.A. 9363 constitutional?
Ruling: The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Topic related discussion:
STATUTES It is settled that every statute is
presumed to be constitutional. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law.
Those who petition the Court to declare a law unconstitutional
must show that there is a cleared and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or
argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail.
TITLE OF BILLS The constitutional requirement
that every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
shall embrace o0nly one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof has always been given a
practical rather than technical construction. The requirement is
satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include
subjects related to the general purpose which he statute seeks
to achieve. A title which declares a statue to be an act amends
a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the
amendatory ct need not be further stated.
People vs. Siton, 600 SCRA 476
FACTS: Siton et al. were charged with vagrancy pursuant to
Art. 202(2) of theRPC.1 They filed separate motions to quash
on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being
vague and overbroad. The MTC denied the motions and
declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the
States police power and justified by the maximsalus populi
est suprema lex. The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of
the arresting officer it was stated that there was a
prior
surveillance conducted on Siton et al. in an area
reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who
solicited sexual favors. Siton et al. thus filed an original petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC, directly challenging
the constitutionality of Art. 202(2). Siton et al.s position:(1)
The definition is vague. The definition results in an arbitrary
identification of violators (the definition includes persons who
are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts) (3) Art. 202(2)

violated the equal protection clause because it discriminates
against the poor and unemployed The OSG argued that the
over breadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free
speech cases. It also asserted that Art. 202(2) must be
presumed valid and constitutional. Siton et al. failed to
overcome this presumption. The trial court declared Art. 202
(2) as unconstitutional for being vague and for violating the
equal protection clause. Citing Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, it held that the void for vagueness
doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal
statutes.3 The court also held that the application of Art.
202(2), crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs
afoul of the equal protection clause as it offers no
reasonable classification. Since the definition of vagrancy
under the provision offers no reasonable indicators to
differentiate those who have no visible means of support by
force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and
bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy
legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its
constitutionality.
ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional.
OSGs position:(1) Every law is presumed valid and all
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality(2) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
have special application to free-speech cases only and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes (3) Siton et
al. failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute(4)
The State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of
public welfare in the exercise of its police power
Siton et al.s position :(1) Art. 202(2) on its face violates the
due process and the equal protection clauses (2) The due
process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the
free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Art.
202(2) unconstitutional and void on its face(3) The presumption
of constitutionality was adequately overthrown
HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. The power to define crimes and
prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature
and inherent in the sovereign power of the state as an aspect
of police power. Police power is an inherent attribute
of
sovereignty. The power is plenary and its scope is vast
andpervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
As a police power measure, Art.202(2) must be viewed in a
constitutional light
White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila, 576 SCRA
416
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed
into law and ordinance entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Shorttime Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992,
the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO)
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9 and prayed
that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On
December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation,
Titanium Corporation and Sta. Mesa Tourist Development
Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by
the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also
granted by the RTC. On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO
directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision
declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City then filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
However, the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of
Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code
and the Revised Manila charter. The Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the
Ordinance.
Issue: Whether the Ordinance is constitutional.
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 6

Held: No, it is not constitutional. The apparent goal of the
Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly
fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means
for their achievement. However well-intentioned the Ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into
the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The
Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses
of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons
without sufficient justification.
b.
Procedural due process This serves as a

restriction on actions of judicial and quasijudicial
agencies of government
Requisites: (Judicial Due Process) IJHJ

1. I Impartial and Competent Court clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it
2. J Jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of
the defendant and/or property
3. H Hearing (defendant must be given opportunity to
be heard)
Cases in which notice and hearing may be
dispensed without violating due process:
1. Abatement of nuisance per se
2. Preventive suspension of a civil servant
facing admin charges
3.
Cancellation of passport of a person
sought for commission of crime
4. Statutory presumptions
4. J Judgment rendered upon lawful hearing
G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan
Doctrine: when the Court cross-examined the accused
and witnesses, it acted with over-zealousness,
assuming the role of both magistrate and advocate, and
thus denied the accused due process of law
Rivera vs. Civil Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43
Doctrine: A public officer who decided the case should
not be the same person to decide it on appeal because
he cannot be an impartial judge
FACTS: Petitioner was the manager of Corporate Banking Unit
of LBP and was charged with dishonesty, receiving for personal
use of fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official
duties, committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft Laws,
and pursuit of private business vocation or profession without
permission required by CSC. Rivera allegedly told Perez that he
would facilitate the processing, approval and release of his loan
if he would be given 10% commission. Rivera was further
charged having served and acted, without prior authority
required by CSC, as the personal consultant of Lao and
consultant in various companies where Lao had investments.
LBP held Rivers guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial
to the best interest of the service in accepting employment
from a client of the bank. The penalty of forced resignation,
without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon
imposed on Rivera.
Issue: Whether the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion
in composing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of
unsubstantiated finding and conclusions (violation of
substantive due process)
Ruling: Yes. Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it
should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit
herself totally from any participation in resolving Riveras
appeal to CSC to give full meaning and consequence to a
fundamental aspect of due process. CSC resolution is SET
ASIDE and the case is remanded to CSC for the resolution, sans
the participation of CSC Commissioner Gaminde, as she was
the Board Chairman of MSPB whose ruling is thus appealed
People vs. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26,

2001
Doctrine: even as the transcript of stenographic notes
showed that the trial court intensively questioned the
witnesses (approximately 43% of the questions asked of
prosecution
witnesses
and
the
accused
were
propounded by the judge), the Supreme Court held that
the questioning was necessary. Judges have as much
interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious
presentation of evidence, and have the duty to ask
questions that would elicit the facts on the issues
involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and
address the points overlooked by counsel.
Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught
for illegal possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of
shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of 4
transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal
Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to
the arrest are conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust
operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and
seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not
guilty. The judge therein, for the purpose of clarification,
propounded a question upon a witness during the trial. On 26
November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262)
found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA
6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory
questions.
Held: YES. A single noted instance of questioning cannot
justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. The Court have
exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and
determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in
presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is
not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a
witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just
determination of the case. The trial judge must be
accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions
to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts
to make the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken
against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy
the theory of one party.
G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001
Cruz vs. Civil Service Commission,
The Court rejected petitioners' contention that they
were denied due process ostensibly because the Civil
Service Commission acted as investigator, complainant,
prosecutor and judge. The CSC is mandated to hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by it or instituted
before it directly or on appeal. Neither can it be denied
that petitioners were formally charged after a prima
facie case for dishonesty was found to exist. They were
properly informed of the charges. They submitted an
answer and were given the opportunity to defend
themselves
FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil
Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan
took the non-professional examination for Cruz after the latter
had previously failed in the said examination three times.
The CSC found after a fact finding investigation that a
prima facie case exists against youfor DISHONESTY, GRAVE
MISCONDUCT
and
CONDUCT
PREJUDICIAL
TO
THE
BESTINTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a
general denial of the material averments of the "Formal
Charge." They also declared that they were electing a formal
investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed
a Motion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will
continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process
because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the
Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November
16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and
Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty"
and ordering their dismissal from the government service.
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative case.
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 7

Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle
A, Title 1,Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is
vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all administrative
cases where the penalty imposed is removal or dismissal from
the office and where the complaint was filed by a private
citizen against the government employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to due process was
violated when the CSC acted as investigator, complainant,
prosecutor and judge all at the same time.
HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC
itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As
an administrative body, its decision was based on substantial
findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme
Court. The records clearly disclose that the petitioners were
duly investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of the
records, the Commission finds respondents guilty as charged.
The photograph pasted over the name Gilda Cruz in the Picture
Seat Plan (PSP) during the July 30, 1989 Career Service
Examination is not that of Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the
signature over the name of Gilda Cruz in the said document is
totally different from the signature of Gilda Cruz.
G.R. No. 76761, January 9, 1989
Assistant Executive Secretary vs. Court of Appeals,
Facts: On April 15, 1948, Jesus Larrabaster applied with the
National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) for a home lot
at the Marbel Settlement District, Cotabato. Larrabasters
application was granted on July 10, 1950 with a Home Lot
Number 336 (later known as 335) with an area of 1,500 square
meters.
Larrabaster then leased the lot to private respondent
Basilio Mendoza and tolerated Jorge Geller to squat on the
portion thereof. On November 25, 1952, the Land Settlement
and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) took over the
functions of NLSA.
On June 29, 1956, Larrabaster and his wife assigned their
rights and interests over the Disputed Property to Jose Pena.
Pena allowed Mendoza and Geller to stay on the lot. On
September 1956, a supplementary Deed of Sale was executed
by the same parties defining the boundaries of the disputed
property.
On June 18, 1954, R.A No. 1160 transferred the custody
and administration of the MarbelTownsite to the National
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). Pena requested NARRA
to approve the transfer of rights that the parties indicated but
the latter did not approve such request in view of Proclamation
Number 336, series of 1956, returning to the Bureau of Lands
the disposition of lands which remained unallocated by the
LASEDECO at the time of its abolition.
The Bureau of Lands did not act on Penas request either,
prompting him to bring up the matter to the Board of
Liquidators (BOL). Pena must have realized that the Disputed
Property contained an area bigger than 1,500 sq. meters, he
request to BOL that the area be adjusted from 1,500 to
3,616.93 sq. meters to conform to its actual area. Pena moved
for reconsideration stressing that the land should be entitled to
him, but BOL again denied the request under its Resolution No.
439, series of 1967. Pena then appealed to the Office of the
President. The Office of the President asked the BOL to conduct
investigation on the disputed property. BOL then recommended
that Pena be awarded the Lot. No. 108 instead of the whole
former Lot Number 355. Pena alleged that the lot transferred to
him contains 3,616.93 and not 1,500 sq. meters. Upon Penas
motion for reconsideration, the same office modified its
decision awarding to Pena of the original Lot Number 355 is
hereby maintained.
On August 1, 1969, private respondent Basilio Mendoza
addressed a letter of protest to the BOL, to which the latter
responded by advising Mendoza to direct its protest to the
Office of the President.
Mendoza did so and on September 28, 1971, said office
rendered its letter-decision, affirming its previous decision of
May 13, 1969, having found no cogent reason to depart
therefrom. In the meantime, on January 17, 1970, and while the
protest with the office of the president was still pending,
Mendoza resorted to Civil Case Number 98 for certiorari before
then the Court of First Instance of Cotabato against petitionerpublic officials and Pena. On June 23m 1978, Mendoza followed
up with a Supplementary Petition to annul the administrative

decision of September 20, 1971 denying his protest. On May
10, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil Case no.
98, dismissing Mendozas petition for Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not private petitioner Basilio Mendoza was
denied with the due process of law
Ruling: Although there was a procedural defect because there
was an absence of notice and opportunity to be present in
administrative proceedings, the defect was cured when
Mendoza was allowed to file his letter-protest with the Office of
the President.The foregoing observations do not justify the
conclusion arrived at.
After the Office of the President had rendered its decision
on May 13, 1969, Mendoza filed a letter-protest on August 1,
1971 with the BOL. The latter office directed him to file his
protest with the Office of the President, which he did.
On September 28, 1972, Mendozas request for
consideration was denied by the said Office. So that, even
assuming that there was an absence of notice and opportunity
to be present in the administrative proceedings prior to the
rendition of the February 10, 1969 and May 19, 1969 decisions
by the Office of the President, such procedural defect was
cured when Mendoza elevated his letter-protest to the Office of
the President, which subjected the controversy to appellate
review but eventually denied reconsideration.
Having been given a chance to be heard with
respect to his protest there is a sufficient compliance
with the requirements of due process.
Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, May 28,
2004
Doctrine: Where a party was afforded an opportunity to
participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.
Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista,
Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles filed a complaint
against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc. for
quieting of title. This complaint was later amended to implead
respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo
and Nelly Javellana. fter several delays spanning more than two
years, the case was finally set for trial. However, on May 2,
2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to
cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg,
the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United States
attending to an important matter. The trial court denied
petitioners motion for postponement and considered them as
having waived the presentation of their evidence.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation to due process.
Ruling: No, due process is not violated. Petitioners contention
that they were denied due process is not well- taken. Where a
party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as
the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not
availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating
the constitutional guarantee. Mariveles Shipyard vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 144134, November 11, 2003
Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 33
Doctrine: Denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of
wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo and they
begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate
in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and
administration over the persons and properties of the two
minors.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to
be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged
that at the time of the decedents death, Davao City was his
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 8

residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the
proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented
the following documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage
contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989
issued at Davao City indicating that he was married and was
born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and
1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was
stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying
that he was married and his residence was Davao City.
Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is
not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a
pretender to the estate of the latter since the deceased never
contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to
file the motion not having proven his status as a wife of the
decedent. The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in
favor of herein respondents. The petioner elevated the case to
the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred in not
nullifying the orders precipitately issued ex- parte by the public
respondent Regional Trial Court in the intestate proceeding
without prior hearing or notice to herein petitioner thereby
depriving Antonietta Garcia Vda de Chua of the due process
and opportunity to be heard.
Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner was denied of the due
process?
Held: The petitioner was not denied of the due process.
Due process was designed to afford opportunity to be heard,
not that an actual hearing should always and indispensably be
held. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard. Here, even granting that the petitioner was not notified
of the orders of the trial court inclusive, nonetheless, she was
duly heard in her motions to recall letters of administration and
to declare the proceedings of the court as a "mistrial," which
motions were denied in the Order dated 22 November 1993. A
motion for the reconsideration of this order of denial was also
duly heard by the trial court but was denied in its Order of 13
December 1993.
Suntay vs. People, 101 Phil 833
Facts: On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia
Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against
Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City,
alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took
Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd
design and took her to somewhere near the University of the
Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to
have carnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an
investigation, an Assistant City Attorney recommended to the
City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the
complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon
City wherein he took exception to the recommendation of the
Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint
for seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955,
Suntay applied for and was granted a passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20 January
1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California,
where he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955,
Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to a complaint charging
Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had
been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955
the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue
an order "directing such government agencies as may be
concerned, particularly the National Bureau of Investigation
and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of
having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law." On 10 February
1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7 March 1955 the
Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States
instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to
cancel the passport issued to Suntay and to compel him to
return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against
him. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in
view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that
the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955,
Suntays counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that the
action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal

case a motion praying that the Court reconsider its order of 10
February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretary denied counsel's
request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for
reconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Issue: Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing
before his passport may be cancelled.
Held: Due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer
vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the
filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport
holder, hearing may be dispensed with by such officer
as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport;
lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of
law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the
discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical
and capricious because of the absence of such hearing.
If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the
due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the
said clause. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if
the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport
were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport
is facing a criminal charge in our courts and left the country to
evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in
the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG
1400) to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to
have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and
cancelling such passport. Suntays suddenly leaving the
country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be
interpreted to mean as a deliberate attempt on his part to flee
from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to
complain if the strong arm of the law should join together to
bring him back to justice.
Co vs. Barbers, 290 SCRA 717
Due Process in Extradition Proceedings
G.R. NO. 139465, January 8, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE V. JUDGE LANTION
Parties of the case:
Petitioners: Secretary of Justice
Respondents: Hon. Ralph C. Lantion, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Manila, Branch 25, and Mark B. Jimenez
Facts: On January 13, 1977, then President Marcos issued PD
No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of
Persons who has committed crimes in a Foreign Country. The
decree is founded on the doctrine of incorporation under the
Constitution.
On November 13, 1977, then Secretary of Justice Franklin
Drilon, representing the Philippines, signed in Manila the
Extradition treaty between the Philippines and the United
States of America (RP-US Extradition Treaty).
On November 13, 1944, the Department of Justice
received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing as request for the extradition of
private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. Mr. Jimenez
committed five (5) violations against the provisions of the
United States Code (USC). When the panel of attorneys began
with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition
documents, they found out that the official English translation
of some documents was not attached. The respondent
requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well
as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner
denied the request as it alleges that such information is
confidential in nature and it is premature to provide such
document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but
a mere evaluation. Thus, the constitutional rights of the
accused are not yet available.
On August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the RTC
of National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 9

Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of NBI, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to
furnish him the extradition documents, to give access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose the
extradition request.) The lower court granted the petition in
favor of Jimenez.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent was deprived by due
process of law.
Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish respondent the copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant
him reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
Ratio Decidendi: We have ruled repeatedly that this Courts
equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as justice
outside legality, may be availed of only in the absence
of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements. The constitutional issue at bar does not
even call for justice outside legality, since private respondent
due process rights, although not guaranteed by a statute or
treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a
clear and present danger of loss of property or employment,
but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible
banishment to a foreign land. The basic principles of
administrative law instruct us the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one
side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or
ruling complained of. The essence of procedural due process
refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. In
the absence of law or principle of law, we must apply the rules
of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights
of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the
implementing law. Neither the treaty nor the Extradition
Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extradite.
Government of US vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,

September 24, 2002
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the

United States Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597,
0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the
Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez

sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.# The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with
the RTC a petition for his extradition. The SOJ was ordered
to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a
reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.
The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the

right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the

United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition
In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition

prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate
arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent
Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte

Motion,# which prayed that petitioners application for an
arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the
Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5,
2001.
In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard
prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer:
that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000.
The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash.# After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4,
2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House

of Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant
his request for provisional release on bail.
HELD:
After
being
taken
into
custody,
potential
extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants
have a history of absconding, they have the burden
of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
danger to the community; and (b) there exist
special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances.
The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting
state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,
under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the
peculiar facts of each case.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a

question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person

be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means
that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
organs of government may not show any undue favoritism
or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice
shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties

by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly [from] prison. The duties imposed by the
mandate of the people are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in
the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members.
A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has

the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained
by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,]

wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made
in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The

necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of

Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office
are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Government of Hongkong vs. Olalia, G.R. 153675, April
19, 2007
Doctrine: Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt
or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a fullcazgo/ 03.06.16 / 10

blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative
in character.
FACTS: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the
Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1)
(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong
Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong
Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each
charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong
Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was
opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued
an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited
himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above
Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a
potential extraditee.
HELD: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition
proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of
flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the
assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice.
Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the
onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
Facts: President Ferdinand Marcos issued various presidential
decrees, letters of instruction, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative
orders. The petitioners, Taada et al, wanted the respondents,
Tuvera et al, to publish these presidential directives.
The petitioners sought mandamus as publication is
essential to the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern and to the principle that the laws to be
enforceable must be published.
The respondents contend that the publication of the laws
including presidential directives is not necessary for their
effectivity especially since the laws themselves set their own
effective dates.
Issue: Whether or not the publication of presidential directives
is necessary
Held: Yes, publication is a necessary requirement of due
process.
Before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The
Court hereby orders the respondents to public in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all. Its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. The mere mention of the number, title or supposed date
of effectivity does not satisfy the publication requirement.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light
of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets.
Tropical Homes vs. NHA, 152 SCRA 540
Doctrine: Appeal is not a natural right nor is it part of

due process; generally, it may be allowed or denied by
the legislature in its discretion. But where the
Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, e.g., in
the cases coming under the minimum appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court [Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII],
denial of the right to appeal constitutes a there is a
statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that
remedy also constitutes a denial of due process.
CONSOLIDATED CASES January 28, 2003
G.R. No. 148468, G.R. No. 148769, G.R. No. 149116
Serapio vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January
28, 2003
Doctrine: The Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of preliminary
investigation.
The
Ombudsmans
findings
are
essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts.
FACTS: Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees
and the Legal Counsel of Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. This
foundation was established to help provide educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving
Muslim youth and students. Donations came pouring in from
various institutions, organizations and that of Chavit Singson.
However, on the latter part of 2000, Chavit accused then
President Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in the illegal
number game jueteng as protector, beneficiary and recipient.
The Ombudsman took the necessary steps and find probable
cause, thus the case of plunder before the Sandiganbayan.
The accused, herein petitioner took all legal remedy to
bail but consequently due to numerous petitions and motion to
quash, the same was suspended and counter petitioned.
Petitioner also prayed for issuance of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner should be arraigned first before hearing his
petition for bail;
2. WON petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended
information during pendency of his petition to bail; and
3. WON petitioner should instead be released through a writ of
habeas
corpus.
HELD:
A. Although he was already arraigned, no plea has yet
been entered thereby rendering the case moot. Nonetheless,
the court takes cognizance and held that arraignment is not a
prerequisite to conduct hearing on petition for bail.
B. The court finds no inconsistency between an
application of an accused for bail and his filing of motion to
quash. Bail, is a security given to release a person in custody of
the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
filed against him for insufficiency of its facts in posits law. This
tow has objectives not necessarily antithetical to each other.
C. In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted by
the court even when the person is detained pursuant to a valid
arrest or his voluntary surrender. However, in the case at bar,
there is no showing of any basis for the issuance of the writ.
The general rule is that the writ does not apply when the
person alleged to be restraint of his liberty is in custody of an
officer under process issued by competent court; more so,
petitioner is under detention pursuant to a valid arrest order.
The petition was partly GRANTED on motion to quash. The
petition for habeas corpus and bail was DISMISSED.
Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138
Doctrine: But where there is a statutory grant of the
right to preliminary investigation, denial of the same is
an infringement of the due process clause
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a
one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle.
Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the
other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was
able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for
petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented
himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 11

police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was
brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed
the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial
without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as
bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner
has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.
Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure
and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to
preliminary investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v.
Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as
valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the
offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e.
subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc.
There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule
113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually
there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge
and their information regarding petitioner were derived from
other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the
police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any
statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a
complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation
should have been scheduled to determine probable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to
preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge,
where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted,
prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial
for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon
posting a bail bond.
c. Due process in administrative proceedings
Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil 635 (1940)
FACTS: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the
National Labor Union Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the
supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the
members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired
to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of
Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR,
decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a
motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay
filed a motion for opposing the said motion.
ISSUE: W/N NLU was deprived with due process.
HELD: The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, but this not mean that it can in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental
and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
REQUISITES: (Administrative Due Process) HEDSPIK
1. H Right to a HEARING, which includes the right to
present ones cause and submit evidence in
support thereof
2. E Tribunal must consider the EVIDENCE presented
3. D DECISION must have something to SUPPORT
itself
4. S Evidence must be SUBSTANTIAL
5. P Decision must be rendered on the evidence
PRESENTED at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected
6.
I Tribunal, body, or any of its judges must act on

its or his own INDEPENDENT consideration of the
facts and law of the controversy
7. K Decision is rendered in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can KNOW the various
issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the
result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and
the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the
case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and
otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth.
d.
Due process in school proceedings
Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 699

FACTS: In 1984, Diosdado Guzman and two others complained
that the National University (NU) barred them from enrolling in
the said university. NU argued that their failure to enroll was
due to the students fault. It was alleged that Guzman et al
spearheaded illegal mass actions within the university
premises; that such mass actions were violative of school
policies; that due to their mass actions, Guzman et al incurred
bad grades; that Guzman et al hated NU anyway so why should
they be allowed to enroll; that it is in the best interest of both
parties for the students not to be enrolled.
ISSUE: W/N Guzman et al were deprived of due process.
HELD: Yes. Guzman et al were deprived of due process.
In the first place, NU never showed which school policies or
duly published rules did Guzman et al violate upon which they
may be expelled from. NU failed to show that it conducted any
sort of proceedings (not necessarily a trial type one) to
determine Guzman et als liability or alleged participation in the
said mass actions.
Under the Education Act of 1982, Guzman et al, as
students, have the right among others to freely choose their
field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. Guzman et
al were being denied this right, or being disciplined, without
due process, in violation of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools which provides that no penalty shall be
imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in the
Manual and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly
promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been
conducted.
Therefore, in effect, NU, by barring the enrollment of
Guzman et al imposed sanction upon the students without due
investigation such act is illegal.
The Supreme Court also emphasized the minimum
standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process; and these are:
1. That the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. That they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. That they shall be informed of the evidence against
them;
4. That they shall have the right to adduce evidence in
their own behalf;
5. That the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Gonzales vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 125735, August 26, 1999
Doctrine: There was a violation of administrative due
process where the teacher was dismissed by the
university without having been given full opportunity to
confront the witnesses against her
FACTS: Lorlene Gonzales, petitioner, has been a schoolteacher
in the Elementary Department of private respondent Ateneo de
Davao University since 1974. Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J., Ateneo Grade
School Headmaster, sent a letter dated 11 April 1991 informing
petitioner of the complaints of two (2) parents for alleged use
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 12

of corporal punishment on her students. Petitioner claimed that
she was not informed of the identity of the parents who
allegedly complained of the corporal punishment she
purportedly inflicted in school-year 1990-1991. She likewise
claimed that she was not confronted about it by private
respondent Ateneo in 1991 and that it was only two (2) years
after the complaints were made that she discovered, through
her students and their parents, that ATENEO was soliciting
complainants to lodge written complaints against her. On 31
March 1993 she wrote a letter to Fr. Oscar Millar, S.J.,
demanding that she be formally informed of the complaint and
be duly investigated.
On 9 June 1993 petitioner was informed of the
composition of an investigative committee organized by Fr.
Oscar Millar, S.J., to look into the alleged use of corporal
punishment by petitioner in disciplining her students. She was
duly furnished with the rules of procedure, informed of the
schedule of the hearings, and given copies of the affidavits
executed by the students who testified against her. Petitioner
refused to take part in the investigation unless the rules of
procedure laid down by the Committee be revised, contending
that the same were violative of her right to due process.
Petitioner specifically objected to the provision which stated: x
x x 3) Counsel for Ms. Lorlene Gonzales shall not directly
participate in the investigation but will merely advise Ms.
Gonzales x x x
The Committee did not revise the rules. Respondent
claims that the rules of procedure to be applied were
substantially the same rules that were used in the investigation
of a former Ateneo employee and therefore we are under legal
advice not to change these rules. Over the objection of
petitioner the Committee commenced with its investigation
without petitioners participation. On 10 November 1993 private
respondent served a Notice of Termination on petitioner
pursuant to the findings and recommendation of the said
Committee. Thereafter, petitioner received a letter from the
president of Ateneo demanding her voluntary resignation a
week from receipt of the letter, otherwise, she would be
considered resigned from the service.
On 29 November 1993 petitioner filed a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal. The Executive Labor
Arbiter found her dismissal illegal for lack of factual basis. In
the decision, it was explained that although petitioner was
afforded procedural due process respondent institution failed to
establish substantial evidence as to the guilt of the
complainant of the offense charged. Both parties appealed to
the NLRC which on 25 March 1996 reversed the decision of the
Executive Labor Arbiter by declaring petitioners dismissal valid
and legal. Petitioner now seeks the reversal of the NLRC
decision.
ISSUE: Was the petitioner, Ms. Gonzales, afforded due process
HELD: NO. The Court notes that the NLRC ignored the
important issue raised by the petitioner, which is primarily the
absence of due process. Upon being notified of her termination,
Ms. Gonzales had the right to demand compliance with the
basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the
twin requirements of procedural and substantial due
process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the
employee to defend herself either personally and/or
with assistance of a representative; to know the nature
of her offense; and, to cross examine and confront face
to face the witnesses against her. Likewise, due process
requires that the decision must be based on established
facts and on a sound legal foundation.
It is precisely to demand compliance with these
requirements that petitioner at the very onset of the
investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down by
the Investigative Committee. The refusal of the Committee to
accede to this demand resulted in her failure to confront and
cross-examine her accusers. Ateneo failed to prove by
substantial evidence that petitioner had inflicted corporal
punishment on her students. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, the Court set
the measure of evidence to be presented in an administrative
investigation when it said, substantial evidence is more than
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
evidence of private respondent did not measure up to this
standard. It relied solely on the witnesses affidavits with
questionable veracity. Petitioner adequately proved, by means
of affidavits, letters of petition and manifesto made by her
students and co-teachers, that she was a competent and

dedicated teacher having spent seventeen (17) years of her life
in the service of the very institution which is now seeking her
dismissal.
The NLRC decision was reversed and set aside, and the
decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter was reinstated, affirmed
and adopted.
C. Equal Protection of the Laws

People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil 12
Doctrine: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
law prohibiting members of non-Christian tribes from
drinking foreign liquor, on the ground that their low
degree of culture and unfamiliarity with the drink
rendered them more susceptible to its effects.
Facts: On or about January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, the
above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the nonChristian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under
his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which
the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves
to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Issue: Whether or not Act No. 1639 is unconstitutional for
being discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the
laws, violates the due process and improper exercise of the
police power of the State.
Ruling: Act No. 1639 is valid and unconstitutional. The
Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from
a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against
a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture is not an argument against the equality of its
application. The law, then, does not seek to mark the nonChristian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." When the
public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of
a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the
Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its
discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some
members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such
members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation.
Mirasol vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793, June 08, 2006
Doctrine: The Supreme Court held that there is a real
and substantial distinction between a motorcycle and
other motor vehicles. Not all motorized vehicles are
created equal real and substantial differences exist
between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways.
Facts: On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial
court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of the
following administrative issuances for being inconsistent with
the provisions of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access
Highway Act" enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH Administrative Order
No. 1, Series of 1968; (b) DPWH Department Order No. 74,
Series of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on
Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH
thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB).
Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 1 introduces an
unreasonable classification by singling-out motorcycles from
other motorized modes of transport and violates the right to
travel.
Ruling: No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right to
use the limited access facility. They are merely being required,
just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on how to
use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners right to
travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of
traveling along limited access highways. There exists real and
substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other
forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among
those prohibited from plying the toll ways. A classification
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 13

based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not
unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely theoretical
or scientific uniformity.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon
163 SCRA 386
Doctrine: Filipino female domestics working abroad
were in a class by themselves, because of the special
risks to which their class was exposed
Facts: The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in
the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of
Labor
and
Employment,
in
the
character
of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or
females," that it 'does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills," and that it
is violative of the right to travel. It was likewise held to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3,
of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law." In
addition, it was contended that Department Order No. 1 was
passed in the absence of prior consultations. It was claimed to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in
addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent
Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
Issue: Whether or not deployment ban for female domestic
helpers is valid under our Constitution.
Held: Yes. It is a valid exercise of police power. The
concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It
has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore
its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the
times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits.
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men
in
organizing
the
state
and
imposing
upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did
not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace,
safety, good order, and welfare." Significantly, the Bill of
Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty
of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according
to one's will." It is subject to the far more overriding demands
and requirements of the greater number.
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs. POEA, 243
SCRA 666
Doctrine: there was found substantial distinctions
between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas
workers,
because
of
dissimilarities
in
work
environment, safety, danger to life and limb, and
accessibility to social, civil and spiritual activities
Ichong vs. Hernandez, supra
Doctrine: The Court upheld the validity of the Retail

Trade Nationalization Law despite the objection that it
violated the equal protection clause, because there
exist real and actual, positive, and fundamental
differences between an alien and a national
Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286
Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.
The subpoena ducestecum was issued in connection with the
investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled
positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and
Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the
EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena ducestecum.
They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of
the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget
and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena ducestecum
was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen,
was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of
the Ombudsman.
Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the
subpoena and the subpoena ducestecum. In his Order dated
June 15, 1990, 6 respondent Ombudsman granted the motion
to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no
affidavits filed against petitioners. But he denied their motion
to quash the subpoena ducestecum. He ruled that petitioners
were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves,
since the subpoena ducestecumwas directed to the Chief
Accountant,
petitioner
NerioRogado.
In
addition
the
Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the
EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator
"all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year
1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the whole
plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof."
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman investigation on the
basis of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal
protection clause.
Ruling: The court dismissed the petition. It was held
that the fact that the Ombudsman may start an
investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter does
not violate the equal protection clause. Petitioners
complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via
their verified complaints or sworn statements with their
identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before
the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice
to start an investigation.
In the first place, there can be no objection to this
procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In
the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the
people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office
of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject
to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations held against them.
People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3,
2000
Doctrine: The SC ruled that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable basis for valid
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 14

purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to
the same class
FACTS: Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in
the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Issue: Whether respondent should be given since he is a public
official
Ruling: The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favouritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential
lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made
in favor of or against groups or types of individuals. Election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification
in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane tothe purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. Premises considered, we are
constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that
re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or
interest, including the police power of the State. WHEREFORE,
the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000
International School Alliance of Educators vs.
Quisumbing,
Doctrine: There was no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign hires" and local
hires as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to these
teachers
FACTS: International School (IS) pays its teachers who are
hired from abroad, or foreign-hires, a higher salary than its
local-hires, whether the latter are Filipino or not (most are
Filipino, but some are American). It justifies this under the
dislocation factor that foreigners must be given a higher
salary both to attract them to teach here, and to compensate
them for the significant economic disadvantages involved in
coming here. The Teachers Union cries discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in
bargaining unit of local- hires.
HELD: Discrimination exists. Equal pay for equal work
is a principal long honored in this jurisdiction, as it rests
on fundamental norms of justice
1. Art. XIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution (Social Justice and Human
Rights) exhorts Congress to give the highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right od
all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalitites. The Constitution also provides that
labor is entitled to humane conditions of work.. These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace, but
include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
Lastly, the Constitution directs the State to
promote equality of employment opportunities for all,
regardless of sex, race, or creed. It would be an affront to
both the spirit and the letter of these provisions if the State
closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.
2. International law, which springs from general principles of
law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of
law include principles of equity, i.e., fairness and justice, based
on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and numerous other international Conventions
all embody the general principle against discrimination, the
very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through

its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14,
2008
Facts: Petitioners question the Attrition Act of 2005 and
contend that by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives when they exceed their revenue targets, the law (1)
transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters; (2) violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection as it limits the scope of the law
to the BIR and BOC; (3) unduly delegates to the President the
power to fix revenue targets without sufficient standards; and
(4) violates the doctrine of separation of powers by creating a
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the laws
implementing rules.
Issue: W/N R.A No. 9335 is constitutional
Held: YES. R.A. No. 9335 is constitutional, except for
Section 12 of the law, which creates a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to review the laws
IRR.
That RA No. 9335 will turn BIR and BOC employees and
officials into bounty hunters and mercenaries is purely
speculative as the law establishes safeguards by imposing
liabilities on officers and employees who are guilty of
negligence, abuses, malfeasance, etc. Neither is the equal
protection clause violated since the law recognizes a valid
classification as only the BIR and BOC have the common
distinct primary function of revenue generation. There are
sufficient policies and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets as the revenue targets are based on the
original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and
the BOC.
However, the creation of a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee for reviewing the IRR formulated by agencies of the
executive branch (DOF, DBM, NEDA, etc.) is unconstitutional
since it violates the doctrine of separation of powers since
Congress arrogated judicial power upon itself.
Nicolas vs. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith &
BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
FACTS: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed
the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said
crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment.
Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our
penal laws and the crime was committed within the countrys
jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US
and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over
Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed
before the SC assailing the validity of the VFA. Their contention
is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same
way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it
is self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the
parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and
undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a
matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed,
with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce
Smith before the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch
as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that
executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days
from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC
noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need
implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As
regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and
this can only be done through implementing legislation. The
VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 15

Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City, 22 SCRA
603
Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City
passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and
all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one
per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of
America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax
were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on
March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,
000, or a total of P12, 087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon
the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as
well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that
the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]),
Art. VI, Constitution).
Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax
ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the
Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and
submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First
Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld
the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing
power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local
Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or
fees not excluded in its charter.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III,
Constitution.
(2) Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of
taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI,
Constitution.
Held: In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection
clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing
ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true,
was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company,
Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the
refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected
(Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of
collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude
arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional
until declared otherwise.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby
reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional
and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the
P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So
ordered.
D. Arrest, Searches and Seizures

Sony Music vs. Judge Espanol, G.R. No. 156804, March
14, 2005
Doctrine: The absent the element of personal

knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of the search warrant may be
justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable
cause and is a nullity, the issuance being, in legal
contemplation, arbitrary.
Facts: In 2000, Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. sought
the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
agent Lavin as they complained:
a. that Solid Laguna Corporation, together with its officers were
engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of
Sony videograms without license and authority from the Video
Regulatory Board (violation of P.D. 1987);
b. that Solid Laguna was manufacturing, selling, and
distributing various titles of CDs in violation of Sony Musics
copyrights (and a violation of RA 8293). Agent Lavin, in
applying for a search warrant, stated before Judge Dolores
Espaol that an unnamed person provided them information as
to the presence of pirated CDs in the premises of Solid Laguna;
c. that Lavin and other witnesses were accompanied by
unnamed persons to enter the premise and conduct further
investigation.
The judge then issued two corresponding search warrants;
one for probable violation of PD 1987 and the other for
probable violation of RA 8293.
The search warrants were subsequently enforced and
items were seized from Solid Laguna on the strength of the two
warrants.
Solid Laguna thereafter presented a certification that they
are actually authorized to manufacture and sell CDs by the VRB
at the same time it asked the court to quash the search
warrants and return the items seized. Judge Espaol then
quashed the search warrant issued for probable violation of PD
1987.
Judge Espaol later quashed the other warrant because of
the fact that the items seized as a result of the two warrants
were commingled hence they cannot be examined properly.
Judge Espaol also ruled that the issuance of the warrant
stemmed from the intimation made by petitioners that Solid
Laguna was not authorized to manufacture and sell CDs but in
fact they were authorized by the VRB. This being, the warrants
are of no force and effect because of the lack of probable
cause.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Espaol is correct
HELD: Yes. The issuance of the search warrant in
question did not meet the requirements of probable
cause. Judge Espaol did not accordingly err in quashing the
same, let alone gravely abuse her discretion. It is also within
her authority to quash the said warrants based on her findings
which were found to be valid by the Supreme Court. Further, it
cannot be overemphasized that not one of the applicants of the
warrants testified seeing the pirated discs being manufactured
at Solid Lagunas premises, they merely relied on unnamed
persons which is at best are hearsays.
The Supreme Court also noted that the lack of supporting
evidence and documents in applying for the search warrants on
this infringement case does not mean that the master tapes of
the alleged copies being pirated should have been produced. It
is true that the Supreme Court, in 20thCentury Fox Case,
underscored the necessity, in determining the existence of
probable cause in copyright infringement cases, of presenting
the master tapes of the copyrighted work.
But, as emphatically clarified in Columbia Pictures vs CA
such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use
of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions,
admissions or other classes of evidence xxx especially where
the production in court of object evidence would result in delay,
inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary
value.
What the Supreme Court is saying is that any
evidence presented in lieu of the master tapes, if not
readily available, in similar application proceedings
must be reliable, and, if testimonial, it must, at the very
least, be based on the witness personal knowledge.
People vs. Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991
Doctrine: The Bill of Rights embodied in the
Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 16

private individuals. Its a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. It could only be invoked against
the State to whom the restraint is imposed.
"Package of marijuana to be sent abroad"
Andre Marti and his wife Shirley wanted to send packages
to their friend in Switzerland and contracted the services of
Manila Packing and Export Forwarders.
When asked by the forwarder if they could examine and
inspect the packages, Marti refused, assuring that the
packages simply contained books and cigars.
However, the proprietor opened the boxes for final
inspection as part of their SOP. Upon opening, they
suspected that the contents were illegal drugs.
The proprietor reported the incident to NBI which confirmed
that the suspected content were marijuana.
In the presence of the NBI agents, the boxes were opened
and found dried marijuana leaves inside.
After Marti was traced by NBI, he was charged with violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Marti assailed the admissibility of the drugs as evidence
against him, which, according to him, is obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication.
ISSUE: W/N an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation
of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State? NO.
HELD:
When a private individual violates another persons
right to privacy, the evidence obtained therefrom is
admissible; however the violator could be held civilly
liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
The Court ruled that in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties granted by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. The constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure refers to the immunity of
one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by
government. Its protection is directed only to governmental
action.
This right do not require exclusion of evidence obtained
through a search by a private citizen.
In this case, the evidence was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention of State authorities. Therefore, there is
no reason why it should not be admitted to prosecute him. The
Court pointed out that: a) It was the proprietor who made a
reasonable search of the packages in compliance with SOP AND
b) the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonable search effected into a warrantless search and
seizure. Merely to observe and look at that which is in
plain sight is not a search.
G.R. No. 113271, October 16, 1997
Waterous Drug Corporation vs. NLRC,
Doctrine: The Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches
and
seizures
perpetrated
by
private
individuals. (In this case, petitioners officer opened an
envelope addressed to the respondent and found
therein a check evidencing overprice in the purchase of
medicine; the check was then deemed admissible in
evidence.) PRIVATE PERSON
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corp.YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to
Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per
unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP,
Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the
cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.YSP, Inc. Accounting
Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference
represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Vorentablets
per sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico.
Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to
Catolico.Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana,
the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an
open envelope with a check amounting P640 payable to
Catolico.Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of

Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents
(check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the
constitutional right invoked by complainants.
The petitioners contended that in the light of the decision
in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
ones person from interference by government and cannot be
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to
bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Issue: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence
Ruling: Yes. The court finds no reason to revise the doctrine
laid down in People vs. Marti. It is not true, as counsel for
Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Requisites for a valid warrant
1.
Probable cause
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, G.R. NO. 140946,

September 13, 2004
Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, July 15, 1985
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984
Webb vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
2.
Determination by the judge
People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999
Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
People vs. Bolasa, G.R. NO. 125754, December 22, 1999
Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board 9 SCRA 27 (1963)
Morano vs. Vivo 20 SCRA 562
Mr. Averongonzado Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
112708-09, March 29, 1996
3.
Personal examination
Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 8287, November 14, 1988

Kho vs. Makalinta, G.R. No. 94902-06, April 21, 1999
Alvarez vs. Court of Appeals, 64 Phil 33 (1922)
People vs. Mamaril, G.R. NO. 147607, January 22, 2004
Lim vs. Felix, G.R. No. 94054-57, February 19, 1991
Cruz vs. Judge Areolo, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1642, March 06, 2002
Okabe vs. Judge Gutierrez, G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004
4.
Particularity of description
Bache and Co. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)

People vs. Tee, G.R. Nos. 140546-47, January 20, 2003
People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil 169 (1925)
Pangandaman vs. Casar, 159 SCRA 599 (1988)
Microsoft Corporation vs. Maxicorp, supra.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, supra.
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 17

Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320
People vs. Asis, G.R. No. 142531, October 15,
2002
Frank Uy vs. BIR, G.R. No. 129651, October 20, 2000

Allowable warrantless searches
Allowable warrantless arrest
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

People vs. Estella, G.R. No. 138539-40, January
21, 2003
People vs. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22,
2007
People vs. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 645
People vs. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, April 13, 1998
People vs. Malmstedt, 196 SCRA 401
People vs. Chua Ho San, G.R. No. 128222
People vs. Hindoy, G.R. No. 128277, November
16, 1998
Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558
Seizure of evidence in plain view
People vs. Musa, 217 SCRA 597
People vs. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292,
January 15, 2002
People vs. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22,
2007
People vs. Salanguit, G.R. No. 133254-55, April
19, 2001
Search of vessels and aircraft
Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336
People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402
People vs. Saycon, 236 SCRA 325
Search of a moving vehicle
Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211
Cabales vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292,
January 15, 2002
People vs. Libnao, G.R. No 136860, January 20,
2003
People vs. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, January
20, 2004
Customs search
Stop and frisk
Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139,
August 2, 1990
People vs. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September
20, 1996
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595,
December 12, 1997
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447,
October 7, 1997
People vs. Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67,
February 4, 2003
Exigent and emergency circumstances
People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716
Guanzon vs. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623
Umil vs. Ramos 187 SCRA 311

People vs. Sucro 195 SCRA 388
People vs. Recepcion, G.R. No. 141943,
November 13, 2002
People vs. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA 791
People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 133917, February 19,
2001
People vs. Sy Chua, G.R. No. 136066-67,
February 4, 2003
People vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999
Go vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138
People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997
People vs. Abriol. G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001
Exclusionary rule
Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 373
People vs. Diaz, G.R. No. 110829, April 18, 1997
E. Privacy of Communications and

Correspondence
Gaanan vs. IAC, 145 SCRA 113 (1986)
Ramirez vs. CA, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995
Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)
Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005
In Re Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987)
People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
Zulueta v. Court of Apeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
Waterhouse Drug Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113271.
October 16, 1997
F. Freedom of Expression, Assembly and Petition

1. Scope
Dichotomy between print and broadcast media
Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
2008
2. Aspects
Freedom from censorship or prior restraint
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800
UNIDO vs. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17, April 3, 1981
Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31, 1998
National Press Club vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992)
Adiong vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000
Social Weather Station vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5,
2001
Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529
Mutuc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-32717, November 26, 1970
Movie Censorship
Gonzales vs. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717
Searches of passenger at airports

People vs. Gatward, 267 SCRA 785
People vs. Susan Canton, G.R. No. 148825,
December 27, 2002
Waiver
People vs. Omaweng, 213 SCRA 462
People vs. Correa, 285 SCRA 679
People vs. Barros, 231 SCRA 557
Lui vs. Matillano, G.R. No. 141176, May 27, 2004
People vs. Damaso, 212 SCRA 457
Lagunzad vs. Sotto Vda. De Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476

FACTS: Lagunzad and de Gonzales entered into a licensing
agreement for the former wasfilming The Moises Padilla
Story. Manuel Lagunzad was a newspaperman and,through his
MML Productions, began the production of the movie. The
movie wasbased on the book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.
entitled- The Long Dank Night inNegros.
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life
of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 18

private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes,
of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent
herein, and of one "Auring" as his girlfriend.
The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on
October 16, 1961. Thirteendays prior to it, Moises half -sister,
Mrs. Nelly Amante, objected to the movie as itexploited Moises
life and demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections
and deletions in the movie.
Petitioner contended that the episodes in the life of
Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were matters of public
knowledge and was a public figure; that private respondent has
no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing
Agreement was without valid cause or consideration and that
he signed the same only because of the coercion and threat
employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for
the nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of speech
and of the press.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favour of
the private respondent.
Article 353, Revised Penal Code

Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals
Flor vs. People, G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005
U.S. vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil 352
Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2Nd 419, 431 (1973)
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159751, December 6,
2006
5. Assembly and Petition
B.P. Blg. 880 (Public Assembly Act of 1985)
J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L-65366, October 25, 1983
Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 126183, March 25,
1999
Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233
Bayan vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 23, 2006
Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
Issue: Whether or not the Licensing agreement infringes his

right to freedom of speech and the press.
HELD: No. From the language of the specific constitutional
provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of
any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of
speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at
all time and under all circumstances it should remain
unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values
that press for recognition.
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present
danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for
permissible limitation on freedom of speech and of the press,
which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio,
television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test."
The principle requires a court to take conscious and detailed
consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given
situation or type of situation."
In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right
to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations
assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner,
the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld
particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are
reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially
private concern.
Ayer Productions vs. Judge Capulong 160 SCRA 861
Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 529
Viva Productions vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123881, March
13, 1997
MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 155282, January 17, 2005
Freedom from subsequent punishment
2. Content-based and content-neutral regulations
Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
2008
Newsounds Broadcasting Network vs. Dy, G.R. No. 170270,
April 2, 2009
Soriano vs. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009
3. Test of valid governmental interference
a. Clear and present danger rule
b. Dangerous tendency rule
c. Balancing of interest test
People vs. Perez, 45 Phil 599 (1923)
Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152
Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628
4. Unprotected speech
cazgo/ 03.06.16 / 19

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University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Instructor: Atty. Ria Lidia G. Espina

Civil rights - Those rights that belong to every

Simon vs. Commission on Human Rights,

B. Due process of law

Who are protected

Smith, Bell & Company (Ltd.) vs. Joaquin Natividad,

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Meaning of life, liberty or property

Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its

separation from service. (The removal from employment of

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Petitioner Gregorio Pedro assails the validity of

Petitioner contends that the ordinance should be declared

opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the

ISSUE: Whether or not a license authorizing the operation and

Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

the law invoked by petitioner. Right to bear arms is a mere

The interests of the public generally, as

The means employed are reasonably necessary

Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, 233 SCRA 163

Administrative Order 1 issued by Commissioner of Public

Aspects of due process

The requisites are:

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts) (3) Art. 202(2)

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Procedural due process This serves as a

Requisites: (Judicial Due Process) IJHJ

People vs. Medenilla, G.R. No. 131638-39, March 26,

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

up with a Supplementary Petition to annul the administrative

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Government of US vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571,

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez

The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the

Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the

In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent

Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte

ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a

The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties

A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The

We, therefore, find that election to the position of

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

Doctrine: Appeal is not a natural right nor is it part of

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

I Tribunal, body, or any of its judges must act on

Due process in school proceedings

Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA 699

University of Cebu College of Law (Constitutional Law 2 Course Outline 2)

students and co-teachers, that she was a competent and

C. Equal Protection of the Laws