CASE DIGESTS IN PUBCORP

Chiongban vs. Orbos (1995)

Facts: Pursuant to Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed RA No. 6734, the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Mindanao. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16,
1989, four provinces Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi voted in favor of creating an
autonomous region. Article XIX, Section 13 of RA 6734 authorizes the President to merge existing
regions. On October 12, 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 429 providing for
the reorganization of the administrative regions in Mindanao.
Petitioners contend that Article XIX, Section 13, of RA No. 6734 is unconstitutional because it
unduly delegates legislative power to the President and provides no standard for the exercise of said
delegated power. In addition, petitioners challenge the validity of EO No. 429 on the ground that the
power granted by RA 6734 to the President is only to merge Regions IX and XII but not to reorganize the
entire administrative regions in Mindanao.
Held: The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of the county into regions is
intended to facilitate not only the administration of local government but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local
governments (Abbas vs. COMELEC).
The regions themselves are not territorial and political division like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than a redefinition or redrawing of the lines
separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local
government units by the President and ensuring the efficient delivery of essential services. Finally, the
reorganization of administrative regions in EO No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: 1) contiguity
and geographical features; 2) transportation and communication facilities; 3) cultural and language
groupings; 4) land area and population; 5) socio-economic development programs in the regions 6)
existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; and 7) number of provinces and cities.
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp. Inc (1994)
Facts: The opening of a branch of Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) in
Cagayan de Oro City was opposed by the different sectors of the community including the local
government through the mayor who brought a petition attacking, among others, gambling as intrinsically
harmful invoking the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and call attention
to the old case of U.S. vs. Salaveria (39 Phil. 102) which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the
playing of panguingue. Petitioners also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 which created the PAGCOR and
authorizing it to operate casinos.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting
the use of buildings for the operations of casinos and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of
casinos.
Held: The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. It is not illegal per se. The Congress may
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, LGU's are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among other, gambling and other prohibited games of chance. This provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but in fact permitted by law.
Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given
the same meaning of words, with which it is associated. Since the word gambling is associated with
1

and other prohibited games of chance, the word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling
which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed, contrary to
petitioner's view that it includes both legal and illegal gambling.
Petitioner's argument that the Code repealed PD 1869 is untenable. In case of conflict between
P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to
both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the present case. The proper resolution of the
problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and
indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed
by statutes like P.D. 1869.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal
and those authorized by law. Petitioners suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of
gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that
this is the will of the legislature.
The power to grant still includes the power to withdraw or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to
tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. The aforementioned ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and are therefore
ultra vires and void.
Alvarez vs. Guingona (1996)
Facts: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of R.A. 7720 entitled An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago. Petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual
income required under Sec. 450 of the Local Government Code by arguing that Internal Revenue
Allotments are not income but merely transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and
that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
Hence, the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance,
which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be Php 20,074,581.97 is inaccurate as the Internal
Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation.
Held: Petitioners asseverations are untenable because IRAs form part of the income of Local
Government Units. The funds generated by LGUs from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject
to specified modes of spending the same as provided in the Local Government Code and its implementing
Rules and Regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for
local development projects. As such, for purposes of budgetary preparation, which budget should reflect
the estimates of the income of the LGU, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national utilization
proceeds are considered items of income.
Income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or
received forming the gross accretions of funds of the LGU. The IRAs are items of income because they
form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the LGU. IRA regularly and automatically accrues to the
local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the LGU. They thus constitute income
which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
Ty vs. Trampe (1995)
Facts: The respondent court ruled that the schedule of market values and the assessments based thereon
prepared solely by respondent assessor are valid and legal, they having been prepared in accordance with
the provisions of Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160. It held also that said Code had effectively repealed the previous
2

law on the matter, Sec. 9 of P.D. 921, which required, in the preparation of said schedule, joint action by
all the city and municipal assessors in the Metropolitan Manila area.
HELD: Sec. 9 of P.D. 921 requires that the schedule of values of real properties in the Metropolitan
Manila Area shall be prepared jointly by the city assessors in the districts created therein; while Sec. 212
of R.A. 7160 states that the schedule shall be prepared by the provincial, city and municipal assessors of
the municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area for the different classes of real property situated
in their respective local government units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned . . .
It is obvious that harmony in these provisions is not only possible, but in fact desirable, necessary
and consistent with the legislative intent and policy. By reading together and harmonizing there two (2)
provisions, the Court arrive at the following steps in the preparation of the said schedule as follows:
1. The assessor in each municipality or city in the Metropolitan Manila area shall prepare
his/her proposed schedule of values, in accordance with Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.
2. Then, the Local Treasury and Assessment District shall meet, per Sec. 9, P.D. 921. In the
instant case, that district shall be composed of the assessors in Quezon City, Pasig, Marikina,
Mandaluyong and San Juan, pursuant to Sec. 1 of said P.D. In this meeting, the different
assessors shall compare their individual assessments, discuss and thereafter jointly agree and
produce a schedule of values for their district, taking into account the preamble of said P.D.
that they should evolve a progressive revenue raising program that will not unduly burden
the taxpayers.
3. The schedule jointly agreed upon by the assessors shall then be published in a newspaper of
general circulation and submitted to the Sanggunian concerned for enactment by ordinance,
per Sec. 212, R.A. 7160.
By this harmonization, the operative principle of decentralization provided under Sec. 3, R.A.
7160 encouraging local government units to consolidate or coordinate their efforts, services and
resources is fulfilled. Indeed, the essence of joint local action for common good so cherished in the
Local Government Code finds concrete expression in this harmonization.
Respondents claim that with the express repeal of P.D. 464, P.D. 921 being merely a
supplement of said P.D. cannot exist independently on its own is untenable. By harmonizing P.D.
921 with R.A. 7160, the former can exist outside of P.D. 464, as a support, supplement and extension of
R.A. 7160, which for this purpose, has replaced P.D. 464.
Since it is now clear that P.D. 921 is still a good law, it is equally clear that this Courts ruling in
the Mathay/Javier/Puyat-Reyes cases is still the prevailing and applicable doctrine. And, applying the said
ruling in the present case, it is likewise clear that the schedule of values prepared solely by the respondent
municipal assessor is illegal and void,
Javier vs. CA (1994)
Facts: Respondent Provincial Board of Antique abolishes the office of the Provincial Engineer. Petitioner
questioned the said action and contends that the abolition was a circumvention of the constitutional
mandate on security of tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who
opposed the Provincial Boards candidacy in the 1971 election.
Respondents argue that the abolition was motivated by an inadequate allotment for materials,
salaries, and operating expenses at the Office of the Provincial Engineer, and that the power of the
Provincial Board to create an office carried with it the power to abolish it.
Held: Section 18 of Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, empowered
provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial engineer. While the
law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that office, absent, however,
any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by implication from the power to
create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact expressed that an implied power of the province x x x (should) be
liberally construed in its favor and any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should
be interpreted in favor of local government and it should be presumed to exist.
3

The Court ruled that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in question did
exist at the time. The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the
provincial board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act
is done in good faith.
The abolition of the office in the present case could have well been justified except for the
convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process taken by the board. The Court is not
prepared, however, to conclude a clear case of bad faith on the part of respondents.
In lieu of reinstatement, the Provincial Government of Antique is ordered to pay the employees
back salaries equivalent to five (5) years.
Mariano vs. Comelec (1995)
Facts: Petitioners assail section 2 of R.A. 7854 as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not properly
identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, in violation of section 10
of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code
Held: The delineated area of the proposed city of Makati provides that: SEC. 2. City of Makati. The
Municipality of Makati shall be converted to highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory Municipality of Makati of
Metropolitan Manila area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the Municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.
The importance of drawing the precise strokes of territorial boundaries cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of
the local government unit. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Any uncertainty in the boundaries
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
peoples welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that
the land area be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical description.
Given the facts, the Court cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the description
made in section 2. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed
City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. The delineation did not change even by an inch
the land area previously covered. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide or multiply the established land
area of Makati.
Basco vs. PAGCOR (1991)
Facts: PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all
games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 13 par. 2 of the decree
provides exemption of PAGCOR from paying any tax of whatever kind or form, income or otherwise, as
well as fees, charges, or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local. Petitioner contends that
P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees and its
exemption clause violates the principle of local autonomy.
Held: Such contention is without merit for the following reasons. Firstly, the City of Manila, being a
mere Municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must always yield
to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent
power to tax. Secondly, the Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and
establish municipal corporations due to its legislative powers. If Congress can grant the City of Manila
the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even fake back the power. Thirdly,
the City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975,
the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchises, licenses or permits
was withdrawn by P.D. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Fourthly, local
4

governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a

government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter under P.D. 1869. Lastly, the
argument that P.D. 1869 violated the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution is pointless. The power
of local governments to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may
provide by law. Since P.D. 1869 remains an operative law, its exemption clause remains as an exception
to the exercise of the power of LGU's to impose taxes and fees.
Limbona vs. Mangelin (1989)
Facts: Petitioner Alimbuses P. Limbona was expelled from membership in the Sangunniang Pampook,
Autonomous Region XII, for filing a case before the Supreme Court in question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly. Presidential Decree No. 1618 which organized the
Autonomous government of Mindanao established internal autonomy in the two regions (Region IX
and XII ) within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines and its Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and
responsibilities. It requires the autonomous regional governments to undertake all internal administrative
matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government. In relation to the
central government, it provides that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over the autonomous regions. The basic issue is whether the autonomous governments of Mindanao are
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts.
Held: Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivision shall enjoy local autonomy.
Secion 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category (Sec. 15) is subject alone
to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of autonomy.
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class (Sec. 2) is under the supervision of the
national government.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades the Supreme Court that they were meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
i.e., in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. P.D. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that the President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Region. In the second place, the Sangunniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services. Hence, it is proper for the Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction.
Tan vs. Comelec (1986)
Facts: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of BP Blg. 885 An Act Creating a New Province in
the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, on the ground that the plebiscite
for its ratification was conducted only to the inhabitants of the territory of the proposed new province
Negros del Norte. Petitioners argue that the plebiscite must be conducted in the unit or units affected
which includes the inhabitants of Negros Occidental.
Held: The Constitution makes it imperative that there be first obtained the approval of a majority of
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected whenever a province is created, divided, merged and
there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. In the present case, the boundaries of the existing
province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing
5

boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. The Court
cannot agree that the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted
by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province thereby ignoring the
evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. Thus BP Blg. 885 is declared
unconstitutional and the proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte is null and void.
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac (1992)
Facts: Respondent enacted Ordinance No. 13 prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of
houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from
said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Resultantly, Resolution No.
29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and
operated by Tatel a public nuisance within purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent
municipal officials contend that Tatels warehouse was constructed in violation of the said ordinance,
affecting the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust
emitted by the machine.
Held: Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of
its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for
the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in
order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates
from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles
of a substantive nature. These principles requires that a municipal ordinance 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute 2) must not be unfair or oppressive 3) must not be partial or discriminatory 4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade 5) must be general and consistent with public policy and 6) must
not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13 meets these criteria.
Cruz vs. Paras
Facts: The municipal corporation of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibits the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses. It is
contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with a nullity, the municipality being devoid of
power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the license previously given to
them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. The issue is whether or not a municipal
corporation can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such as clubs employing hostesses?
Held: It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. All that petitioners would have to do is to
apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no businesses
could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to
allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance,
would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.
City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta (1983)
Facts: Quezon City council passed an ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation
of private memorial type cemetery within the jurisdiction of Quezon City. However, Section 9 of said
ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial
of deceased persons who are paupers and residents of the City.
6

Held: Police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent and always
one of the least limitable of the powers of government. It is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of property or liberty for the promotion of general welfare. Police
power does not involve the taking or confiscation of property except where there is necessity to confiscate
obnoxious properties in order to destroy and not to devote it to public use. Section 9 of the said ordinance
is an invalid exercise of police power, it is not a mere regulation but an outright confiscation, for it
deprives a person of his private property without dues process and just compensation.
Ortigas & Co. vs. Feati Bank & Tust Co. (1979)
Facts: When Ortigas and Co. sold two lots in highways Hills, Mandaluyong, Rizal, the original buyers
agreed to the stipulations that the lots shall be used exlclusively for residential purposes. Subsequently,
however, on February 4, 1960, the municipal council of Mandaluyong passed Resolution No.27 declaring
the area whwre the lots were located as a commercial and industrial zone. Two years later, the defendant
bank acquired the lots and in 1963 commenced the construction of a commercial building. Ortigas and
Co. filed action to enjoin construction. The issue is which shall prevail the restrictive covenant in the
purchase agreement or the municipal ordinance?
Held: Resolution no.27 was a legitimate exercise of police power the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. The Court
reiterated the PLDT ruling that police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social
conditions; it is not confined with narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it
must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. It took notice of the commercial and
industrial development along E. delos Santos Avenue and found the resolution a valid exercise of police
power.
On the non-impairment of contracts issue, the Court found the resolution a legitimate response
to a felt public need. The non-impairment clause may not bar the municipalitys exercise of police power.
The Court also reiterated the Phil-Am Life vs. Auditor General ruling that not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes
of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
Pilapil vs. CA (1992)
Facts: Private respondent Colomidas purchased a parcel of land and claimed a road right of way which
leads towards the National Road and ends at the portion of petitioner Pilapil's property where a camino
vicinal exists all the way to said National Road. The Colomidas tried to improve the road or camino
vicinal, but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them. The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino
vecinal.
Held: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces,
cities or municipalities. In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or
abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private
property can interfere with such a right.
Under Batas Pambasa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan had the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinance or regulations subject to the provision of existing laws,
and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the
construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is
also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the
Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and
7

adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the
municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road.
Macasiano vs. Diokno (1992)
Facts: The Municipality of Paraaque passed an ordinance which authorizes the closure of certain streets
and the establishment of a flea market theron. Through a resolution passed by the municipal council, the
mayor entered into a contract for the operation maintenance and management of a flea market with
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative.
Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command,
ordered the destruction of said stalls. Petitioner Macasiano wrote Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days
to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market stalls shall be dismantled.
The trial court however upholds the validity of the ordinance.
Held: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. (Art. 423, Civil Code). In the present case, the local roads are used for public service
and therefore considered public properties. Properties of the local government which are devoted to
public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. (Province of
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga.) Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Section 10 of the Local Government Code provides closure of roads A local government unit
may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian and in accordance with
existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street,
alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed.
However, such authority should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles
already established by law, that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to
the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local
government unit to private persons.
It is only when the property is already withdrawn from public use, that it becomes patrimonial property of
the local government unit concerned. (Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles) It is only then that the respondent
municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local
unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed in accordance with the last sentence of a Section 10
of RA 7160. In the present case, the roads and streets are available to the traffic in general, hence
considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use
it for another purpose or to dispose or lease it to private persons.
Heirs of Ardona vs. Reyes (1983)
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority wishes to expropriate 282 hectares of land for development into
integrated complexes of areas with potential tourist value. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on
grounds of Public Use. They contend that the land is already for land reform and that it should seek the
approval of the Court of Agrarian Relations. CFI granted writs of possession. Petitioners brought instant
petition before SC to enjoin execution. The basic issues are whether or not there is non-compliance with
the public use requirement under the eminent domain provision of the Bill of Rights; whether or not
there is disregard of the land reform nature of the property being expropriated; and whether or not there is
impairment of obligations of contracts.
Held: There is compliance with the requirement of public use. The states power of eminent domain
extends to the expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this specific objective is not expressed
in the Constitution. The policy objective of the framers can be expressed only in general terms such as
social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public interest,
8

and general welfare among others. To include specific programs like tourism as express constitutional
provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulk code and would require the framers to be
impossibly prescient. The particular mention in the Constitution of agrarian reform, among others, merely
underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not
preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like tourism and other
development programs. The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. The idea that
public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded.
On the second issue, there is no disregard of the land reform nature of the property being
expropriated. Land being developed into a tourism complex consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all
of which is not affected by the land reform program. The portion being expropriated consists of hilly and
unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn can hardly survive.
Only 8,970 square meters of 283 hectares affected is part of the operation land transfer. This 8,970 square
meters is not even within the sports complex proper but form parts of the 32 hectares resettlement area of
the 40 defendants, only 2 have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. Under
the facts of this petition, there is no need to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or inferior to
another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interests. Petitioners have failed to
overcome the showing that the taking of the 8,970 square meters covered by the Operation Land Transfer
forms a necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the development of the 808 hectares
tourism complex.
On the third issue, the invocation of the contracts clause has no merit. The non-impairment clause
has never been a barrier to the exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. Parties by entering
into contracts may not estop the legislature from exercising the power of eminent domain.
Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA (1993)
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of petitioner passed a resolution in 1988 authorizing the provincial
governor to purchase or expropriate private property contiguous to the provincial capitol for the purpose
of establishing a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and housing project for the
government employees.
The land sought to be expropriated belongs to the San Joaquins, which at the time the complaint
is filed, the governing law was BP 337 which authorizes expropriation by mere resolution of the
municipal council.
The Court of Appeals suspended the expropriation proceedings and requires petitioner to submit
the requisite approval of the DAR to convert the classification of the property from agricultural to nonagricultural. Hence, the present petition.
Held: The power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL or RA 6657) particularly Section 65 which requires the approval of the DAR before a parcel of
land can be reclassified. CARL does not intimate in the least that LGU's must first secure the approval of
DAR before petitioner can institute the necessary proceedings.
The authority of DAR to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural land cannot extend to
the exercise of eminent domain, otherwise DAR will have the authority to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public use or not. Ordinarily, it is the municipal council that determines whether the
use of the property sought to be expropriated is for public use, the same being an expression of legislative
policy. The courts will intervene only when no real or substantial relation is established between the
undertaking and public use.
Under the new concept, public use means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends
to contribute to the general welfare and prosperity of the whole community. In the present case, the
expropriation for the establishment of pilot development center is for a public purpose.
Limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law
conferring the power or in other legislations.
Patalinghug vs. CA (1994)
9

Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Davao City enacted ordinance number 363, for the expanded
zoning ordinance of Davao City. Section 8 of which provide that funeral parlors shall be established not
less than 50 meters from any residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings.
Petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor, but his permit to construct the
building was cancelled because the construction of the funeral parlor was within the 50-meter radius
measured from the nearest residential structure owned by Wilfred Teepot, which is leased by laundry
businesses. Petitioner argued that Teepot's building is for commercial purposes since a business was being
undertaken therein, and its classification as residential in tax declaration is not conclusive.
Held: Even if Teepot's building was declared for taxation purposes as residential, once a local
government has reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail.
Furthermore, a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning purposes. Under
Section 22 of the Real Estate Tax Code, tax declaration does not bind a provincial or city assessor. In fact,
a piece of land declared by the tax payer as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor
as commercial because its actual use is commercial.
More importantly, the declaration of the said area as a commercial zone through a municipal
ordinance is an exercise of police power.
Fortich vs. Corona (1998)
Facts: Bukidnon Governor Carlos Fortich requested the President to suspend the DAR order denying the
application for conversion of land from agricultural to agro-industrial use and to confirm the ordinance
enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao for converting the subject land from agricultural to
industrial land.
Held: The power of local government units to reclassify lands is not subject to the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, this having been decided in the case of Province of Camarines Sur vs.
CA.
Pilapil vs. CA (1992)
Facts: Private respondent Colomidas purchased a parcel of land and claimed a road right of way which
leads towards the National Road and ends at the portion of petitioner Pilapil's property where a camino
vicinal exists all the way to said National Road. The Colomidas tried to improve the road or camino
vicinal, but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them. The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino
vecinal.
Held: The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces,
cities or municipalities. In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or
abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private
property can interfere with such a right.
Under Batas Pambasa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan had the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinance or regulations subject to the provision of existing laws,
and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the
construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is
also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the
Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and
adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the
municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (2000)
10

Facts: On March 20, 1995, Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition w/ the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified for not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines. During the elections, Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes. Lee filed a
petition praying for his proclamation as the elected governor. At 8:30 pm of June 30, 1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor. Frivaldo filed a new petition w/ COMELEC seeking the annulment of the June 30
proclamation of Lee and his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00pm, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 w/c he
filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. The issue is
whether or not repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal?
Held: Repatriation is valid and legal. Under Phil law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Moreover, Frivaldos repatriation seasonably cures his lack
of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold office as governor. He possessed the citizenship
requirement on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Section 39 of Local Government
Code must be liberally construed. The law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence and age. Now, an official begins to govern or to
discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Furthermore, Sec 39 speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates.
Literally, such qualifications should thus be possessed when the elective official begins to govern, i.e., at
the time he is proclaimed. Lees argument that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the
time the candidate registered as a voter as under the law a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines is
untenable. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE
qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended
CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a
citizen first.
Grego vs. COMELEC (1997)
Facts: Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.(New LGC NOT yet in
effect then). Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor and won (New LGC already in effect).
After his term, Basco sought reelection twice and won on both reelections. Petition for disqualification
was filed against Basco, using section 40 (b) of the LGC but dismissed. The issue is whether or not the
petition for disqualification was correctly dismissed
Held: It was correctly dismisses. Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC does not apply retroactively to those removed
from office before it took effect on Jan. 1, 1992. Bascos election to office as city councilor in the 1988,
1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring
his eligibility for public office. It must be noted that there was nothing to condone in the first place. Basco
was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Sec. 40 (b) of the LGC, which applies only to those
removed from office on or after Jan. 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner,
there is no more reason to dwell on the matter.
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: The issue is whether or not intent to evade is a necessary element of the definition of a fugitive
from justice?
Held: Yes. A fugitive from justice includes not only those who, after conviction, flee to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular
jurisdiction. Obviously there can only be intent to evade when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject
11

of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. In the case at bar,

Rodriguez arrival in the Philippines (July 95) preceded the filing of the felony complaint in Los Angeles
(Nov 95). When he left the US, there was as yet no complaint & arrest warrant much less conviction
that he could run away from. The circumstantial fact that the charges against Rodriguez were filed 17days
after his departure cant overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. It is immaterial to determine
the exact time when Rodriguez was made aware of the charges against him, having established that he
was not aware of such charges when he left the US. His failure to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the
US authorities after he learned of the charges against him does not make him a fugitive from justice.
Going back to the US in the middle of his term would only violate the very functions of his office and
jeopardize public interest.
Marquez vs. COMELEC
Facts: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the
Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the
reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition
for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being
allegedly a fugitive from justice.
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge
against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending
before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California,
U.S.A.
Held: The core issue focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible
from holding on to, an elective local office.
The Solicitor General, taking the side of the petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes
that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly
finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno;
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes
vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be
so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente
(expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from
justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment." is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact,
private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of
the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the
petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the
case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.
G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzado got the highest number of votes
but his proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain
12

Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the
United States. COMELEC granted the petition and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Sec. 40 (d) of the LGC, persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration which motion. COMELEC en banc then rendered its resolution reversing its
first ruling and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City?
HELD: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. With respect to dual allegiance,
Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law." In including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of
Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States
follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. By declaring in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Municipality of Paraaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation (1998)
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque filed a complaint for
expropriation against private respondent, over two parcels of land to be used for a socialized housing
project. Respondent filed an answer and alleged that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
because the complaint was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as required by RA 7160 and
that the cause of action, if any, was barred by res judicata.
Held: A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere
resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code, particularly Section 19 expressly and
clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the
sentiment or opinion of the municipal council will not suffice.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in Congress, which may delegate the exercise thereof to
LGU's. The latter, when authorized by Congress, is subject to the legislature's control and restraints
imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
13

The principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the
same property when all the legal requirements for its valid exercise are complied with. The State or its
agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right of eminent domain by reason alone of previous
non-compliance with any legal requirement. The same is also true of the principle of law of the case.
Hence, the State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate
once all the legal requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain but also clearly defeat social justice. The petition is denied without prejudice to
petitioner's proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over the subject property.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. CA (2000)
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit, to which
Mayor Camilo Cabili issued subject to the following conditions: (1) that petitioner cannot put up an
optical clinic but only a commercial store and (2) that it cannot examine or prescribe reading and optical
glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics.
The Samahan ng Optometrist sa Pilipinas (SOPI) lodged a complaint against petitioner, alleging
that Acebedo had violated the conditions of the permit.
Held: The authority of City Mayor to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is
provided by law. However, distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do
business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is
granted by the local authorities while the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate
the particular profession. The first authorizes the person, natural or juridical, to engage in business or
some form of commercial activity. A professional license on the other hand is the grant of authority to a
natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his/her profession.
In the present case, what is sought by petitioner from the respondent City Mayor is a permit to
engage in the business of running an optical shop, and the city mayor cannot, through the issuance of such
permit, regulate the practice of profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
The contention that business permit is a contract and therefore the petitioner is estopped from
questioning the same is untenable. A license or permit is but a special privilege, it is not in any way
vested, absolute or permanent.
The fact that a party acquiesced in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in the
subject business permit does not preclude it from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or
beyond the ambit of the authority of the City Mayor. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give
effect to an act which is otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General (1965)
Facts: In October 1964, the President acting pursuant to Sec.68, RAC (granting the president the power
to create municipalities) issued a series of Executive Orders, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner Pelaez,
instituted this action to restrain the respondent from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
the implementation of said Executive Orders on the ground that they are null and void upon the basis that
Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A. 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except by an Act of Congress or of the corresponding
provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the area affected and the recommendation of
the council of the municipality in which the proposed barrio is situated. Accordingly, if the President
under R.A. 2370 cannot even create a barrio, it follows that the more he could not create a municipality
which is composed of several barrios since barrios are units of municipalities. Respondent answers in the
affirmative upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios such as
by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of a new municipality.

14

Held: The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature for municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of law, it is
essential that the said law: a) be complete in itself setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate; and b) to fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performances of his functions.
In the present case, Sec. 68 RAC does not meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power because
it fails to enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Furthermore, the 1935
Constitution gives only general supervision of local governments by the President. This provision
repeals SEC. 68, RAC. The Executive Orders are therefore unconstitutional. It must be noted also that
R.A. 2370 denies the president's authority to create a new barrio which implies a negation of the bigger
power to create a municipality which consists of several barrios. Whereas the power to fix a common
boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, as
provided in Sec. 68, RAC, may partake of an administrative nature, involving as it does the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipality.
Dacanay vs. Asistio (1992)
Facts: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating
certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the
Caloocan City mayor opened up to seven (7) flea markets in that city. However, Antonio Martinez, as
OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls. City Mayor Macario Asistio,
Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latters policy of clearing and cleaning up the city
streets.
Held: There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other
contract. Any existing leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the
public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should
not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order
and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. The Mayor cannot
infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve:
i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. Public respondents have the corresponding duty,
arising from public office, to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose.
Greater Balanga Development Corporation vs. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1994)
Facts: Greater Balanga Development Corporation applied with the Office of the Mayor for a business
permit which was granted. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed a Resolution annulling
the Mayors permit. Pursuant to the said resolution, Mayor Banzon issued Executive Order No. 1, s-88
revoking the permit insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market. Furthermore, the
Sangguniang Bayan resolution stated that the land subject of this case was earmarked for the expansion of
the Balanga Public Market.
Held: The Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the subject lot. The
resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for expansion of the public market adjacent
thereto. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of its
right over the land. While the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to
regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions for their revolution,
the anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the stallholders and traders cannot be a valid ground for
revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders and traders were doing business on property
not belonging to the Municipal Government. Thus, there is no legal basis for it to impose and collect
market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right to do so.
15

Knecht Imcorporated vs. Municipality of Cainta (2006)

Facts: Rose Packing Co., Inc. sold three parcels of land situated in Cainta, Rizal to United Cigarette
Corporation (UCC). On June 22, 1990, the Municipality of Cainta filed a complaint for expropriation
against PCIB (mortgagee bank) and Rose Packing. The expropriation complaint was based on
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Resolution No. 89-020 which sought to purchase the land as the site of the
municipal administration compound and SB resolution No. 89-021 which called for the condemnation of
said land if the negotiation for its voluntary sale failed. The negotiation did fail, hence, the complaint for
expropriation. On June 16, 1992, the trial court issued an order directing the Municipality of Cainta to
deposit 10% of the provisional value of the property. A writ of possession was subsequently issued to
respondent municipality.
Held: The exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit is now governed by
Section 19 of Republic Act 7160. For properties under expropriation, the law now requires the deposit of
an amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on its current
tax declaration. In the present case, there is no valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Roble Arrastre vs. Villafor (2006)
Facts: Petitioner filed with the RTC, a Petition for Mandamus on the ground of refusal by the municipal
mayor to issue business license for arrastre operations. Petitioner argue that said function is ministerial
after the applicant's satisfaction or payment of proper license fees, and refusal to issue license is a neglect
to perform official duty.
Held: Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, the Local chief executive has the power to Issue
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said
licenses and permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. Said authority is derived under
Section 16 or the general welfare clause which encapsulates the delegated police power to local
governments. License and permits are manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal
corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether
the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but certainly, not of
mandamus.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Bel-Air Village Association (2000)
Facts: Petitioner MMDA send a notice to respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), the
registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village, to open the said street to public
vehicular traffic and that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished. The basic issue is whether Metropolitan Manila Development Authority is
a political subdivision of the country authorized to order opening of private roads and demolition of
perimeter walls.
Held: A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs. The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government
unit as a body politic and corporate, one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. The MMDA is not a
political unit of government nor a public corporation endowed with legislative powers. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. It is not even a special metropolitan
political subdivision as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a
special metropolitan political subdivision requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of
Metro Manila in a plebiscite.
16

Moreover, the Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform
such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the
President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA.
The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and
police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance
or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal.
Province of Batangas vs. Romulo (2004)
Facts: President Estrada issues Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48 which led to the creation of Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization Fund, having an Oversight Committee authorized to issue the
implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of funds to the
LGUS. In RA No. 8745, otherwise known as the General Appropriation Act of 1998 (GAA), the program
was renamed as the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF).Petitioner questioned said
provision in the GAAs on the ground that it imposed conditions for the release of IRA of LGU's.
Held: The LGSEF is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its
distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines
and mechanics unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee, as sanctioned by the assailed
provision in the GAA, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and
statutory mandate that the just share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The
discretion and control of the Oversight Committee over the distribution and release of a portion of the
IRA is an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution.
Finally, the Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that
Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws. Any
amendments to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
Lagcao vs. Labra (2004)
Facts: Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 1843 passed by the provincial council
of Cebu authorizing the expropriation of certain properties including those belonging to petitioner for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters. Petitioner argued that said an endeavor is contrary to the concept of
public use contemplated in the Constitution.
Held: Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government
units the power to expropriate and Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160
which provides that:
SEC. 19 Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and the pertinent laws xxx (italics supplied)
However, while housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local
government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in seeking
solutions to this problem. There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
17

denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. In the present case, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all why petitioners
property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular
choice or selection as the site of a socialized housing project. The Ordinance is constitutionally infirm.
Rabuco vs. Villegas (1974)
Facts: The Congress passed RA 3120 converting the Malate Area into disposable and alienable lands of
the state for the purpose of subdividing the area into small lots for sale in installment to the occupants
thereof. Respondent city officials of Manila contend that RA 3120 is unconstitutional for it deprives the
City of the lots in question without due process of law.
Held: The lots in question are owned by the City in its public and governmental capacity, hence subject to
the absolute control of Congress. Only patrimonial properties of LGU's or held by it in its private or
proprietary capacity are those which cannot be deprived without due process or taken without just
compensation. RA 3120 is intended to implement the social policy of the Constitution and the
government's program of land for the landless. It is a manifestation of the legislature's right and power to
deal with state property including those held by municipal corporation in its public or governmental
capacity. RA 3120 is constitutional.
Javellana vs. DILG (1992)
Facts: City Engineer Divinagracia filed an Administrative case against Councilor Javellana for
continuously engaging in the practice of law without securing the authorization of the DILG Regional
Director and for being a counsel for Javiero and Catapang, who filed a case against City Engineer
Divinagracia for illegal dismissal.
Held: Atty. Javellana violated the prohibition against government officials from engaging in private
practice if it will represent interests adverse to the government. In the present case, the illegal dismissal
filed by Javiero and Catapang against Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government,
the real employer, of which Javellana is a councilor. Any judgment against Divinagracia would be a
judgment against the City government. Javellana, by serving as counsel for the complaining employees
and assisting them in prosecuting their claims is a clear violation of the above mentioned prohibition.
Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme (1991)
Facts: Morning of December 1965, collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney, a gravel and sand
truck and a dump truck of the Municipality. Several passengers of the jeep died. Private respondents
instituted a compliant for damages and a third party complaint against Municipality and the driver of
dump truck. The issue is whether the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee.
Held: It depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing
governmental or proprietary functions. SC notes that in permitting such entities to be sued (through
allowance in the municipal charter), the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. And in the case
at bar, the driver was indeed performing governmental functions.
The driver of the municipality's dump truck insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian River
to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." SC ruled in Palafox
vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 Phil 1186) that "the
18

construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident
are admittedly governmental activities".
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Hence, no liability.
Borja vs. COMELEC (1998)
Facts: Capco was elected Pateros vice-mayor of Pateros on 1988 for a term ending June 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, upon the death of the incumbent. Capco ran for and won as mayor
in the 1992 and 1995 elections. Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros for the 1998
elections. Borja who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco's disqualification on the theory that
the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms (counting 1989-1992 term).
The issue is whether or not Capcos service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 1992 is
considered as service for one full term.
Held: NO. To prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the
constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the
people. To consider only the stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office
would be to disregard one of the purposes of Article X, 8 of the Constitution. The first sentence speaks
of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such official[s]" from serving for more than
three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be
deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was
elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of
terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected
because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered
to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
David vs. COMELEC (1997)
Facts: Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 reads: The term of office of barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan shall be for 3 years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994. The issue is whether or not the law which governs the term
of office of barangay officials is RA 7160 (and not 6679)
Held: YES, RA 7160. In light of the historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limit
the term of barangay officials to only 3 years as provided under the LGC emerges. Furthermore the 3-year
term is not repugnant to the Constitution. (Liga ng mga Barangay posits that by excepting barangay
officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from the general provision fixing the term of "elective
local officials" at 3 years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from legislating a 3-year
term for such officers is untenable.) The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any
term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body,
without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such
term in accordance with the exigencies of public service.
Victoria vs. COMELEC (1994)
Facts: The basic question is how should the ranking of SP members be computed for the purpose of
succession? Petitioner argue that the ranking of the SP members should not only be based on the number
of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in
the district who actually voted therein (which will result in petitioner Victoria ranking first)
19

Held: Sec 44 of Local Gpvernment Code last paragraph provides: "For purposes of succession as
provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
votes obtained by each winning candidates to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election." The law is clear that the ranking in the SP shall be determined on
the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything about factoring the numbers of voters who
actually voted.
Farias vs. Barba (1996)
Facts: The basic question is this case is that in case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan
caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who can
appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
Held: The Governor upon the recommendation of SB concerned. Since the vacancy in this case was
created by a SB member who did not belong to any political party, the specific provision involved is par.
(c) of Sec. 45 to wit:In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian
concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. To be sure the President of the Philippines can
not be referred to as "local chief executive" in Sec. 45(c). It is apparent that the phrase is a misnomer and
that the choice of this phrase was simply dictated by the need to avoid, for stylistic reasons, interminably
repeating the officials on whom the power to appoint is conferred. Perhaps "authorities concerned" would
have been a more accurate generic phrase to use. The phrase "sanggunian concerned" in Sec. 45(c) should
more properly be understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in
keeping with the policy implicit in Sec. 45(a)(3).
[CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 45:
Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member belonging to a Political
PartySangguniang Panlalawigan and Sanguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon the nomination and
certification of the political party to which the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in
Sec. 45(b).
Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan The Governor upon the
nomination and certification of the political party to which the member who caused the vacancy
belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).
Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member Not Belonging to a Political
PartySangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized and independent
component cites The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon recommendation- of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod as the case may be.Sangguniang Panlungsod of
component cities and Sangguniang Bayan The Governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan as the case may be.
Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the Sangguniang Barangay City or Municipal
Mayor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay.]
[There is only one rule governing appointments to the Sangguniang Barangay. Any vacancy
therein caused by the cessation from office of a member must be made by the mayor upon the
recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not
allowed to have party affiliations.]
[Another issue raised in this case is whether the appointing authority limited to the appointment
of those "recommended" to him? The Court answered in the affirmative. The appointing authority is not
bound to appoint anyone recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of appointment
is a discretionary power. On the other hand, neither is the appointing power vested with so large a
discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned. Since the
20

recommendation takes the place of nomination by political party, the recommendation must likewise be
considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by analogy to the provision of
Sec. 45(b).IN CAB, since neither Nacino nor Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the SB of
San Nicolas. For while Nacino was appointed by Gov, he was not recommended by the SB of San
Nicolas. On the other hand, Palafox was recommended by the mayor and not the provincial governor who
appointed him.]
Espiritu vs. Melgar (1992)
Facts: Three similar complaints were filed with the DILG, Office of the Provincial Governor, and Office
of the President, accusing Mayor Melgar of physically assaulting and arresting complainant without any
reason. Sangguniang Panlalawigan, after evaluation, passed a resolution recommending the Provincial
Governor to preventively suspend him pending the administrative case so Mayor Melgar was suspended
by Governor Espiritu. Melgar filed petition with RTC which enjoined the Governor from implementing
the order of suspension.
Held: RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the governor from preventively suspending the mayor. Clearly,
under Sec63 of the (old) LGC, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the issues had been joined and any
of the following grounds were shown to exist: (1) When there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of; (2) When the evidence of culpability is strong;
(3) When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or (4) When the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
The rationale of preventive suspension is so that the respondent may not hamper the normal
course of the investigation through the use of his influence and authority over possible witnesses (Lacson
vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456).
Also, Melgar failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Since respondent mayor believed that his
preventive suspension was unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts. However, once the 60-day
preventive suspension has been served, the official is deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative investigation of the charges against him.
Bunye vs. Escareal (1993)
Facts: Petitioners Municipal Mayor, Vice Mayor and Councilors questions the resolution suspending
them from office for 90 days pending their trial for violation of Sec3(3) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Held: Suspension of petitioners was proper. Sec13 of RA3019 unequivocally provides that the accused
public official shall be suspended from office while the criminal prosecution is pending in court. Under
Gonzaga case, such suspension is mandatory. It is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty. It
is mandatory as soon as the validity of the information is determined. There is no merit in the contention
that their admission of the acts constituting the offense charged against them eliminates apprehension that
they might tamper with the records. It is not for the petitioners to say that their admissions are all the
evidence that the prosecution will need to hold up its case against them. The prosecution must be given
the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts for trial under conditions which would ensure non
intervention and non-interference for 90 days from petitioners camp.
The fear that the government will be paralyzed by their suspension is remote. There are 8
councilors left who can meet as the Sangguniang Bayan. The President or his alter ego, the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government will know how to deal with the problem of filling up the temporarily
vacant positions in accordance with the provisions of the LGC.
Garcia vs. COMELEC (1993)

21

Facts: On July1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of 12
municipalities of Bataan province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA) in the Bagac town plaza to initiate the recall election of Governor Garcia (elected governor of
Bataan in May, 1992 elections) for loss of confidence. COMELEC scheduled recall elections. Governor
Garcia asserts the unconstitutionality of Sec70, LGC.
Held: Sec70 of LGC is constitutional. The presumption of validity rests on the respect due to the wisdom,
integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief Executive, by
whom the law is approved. Garcia does not point to any constitutional provision that will sustain their
contention for surely, there is nothing in there that will remotely suggest that the people have the sole
and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.
The Constitution did not provide for any mode of initiating recall elections. It did not prohibit the
adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by Sec3 of Art X of the
Constitution is for Congress to enact a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum xxx
Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates. Power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall
elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate, and it was not straight jacketed to one
particular mechanism of initiating recall elections.
The Constitution requires only that the mechanisms chosen (one or many) be effective. Congress
deemed it wise to enact the alternative mode to supplement the former mode by direct action, and the
Court cannot supplant this judgment by Congress in respect of the principle of separation of powers.
Choice may be erroneous but the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative.
Initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives this act by the people through their elected representatives is not constitutionally
impermissible as seen in the task of drafting the Constitution which is delegated to their representatives
(either by constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly). Initiation of recall
process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the
elected representatives of the people.
PRA resolution of recall is not the recall itself. The PRA resolution merely starts the process
only a part of the process, and not the whole. This is self-evident because a PRA resolution of recall
that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject officials. Likewise, a PRA
resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect
whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to appear before the
tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people
render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office
is subject to question. This is clear in Sec72, LGC which explicitly states that the recall of an elective
local official shall be effective only upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall.
The fear expressed is that the members of PRAC may inject political color in their decision as
they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents especially those belonging to
the minority. Careful reading of the law will show that it does not give an asymmetrical treatment to
locally elected officials belonging to the political minority. The politically neutral composition of the PRA
under Sec70(b) where all mayors, vice-mayors, sanggunian members of municipality and component
cities are made members of the PRA at the provincial level-its membership is not apportioned to political
parties no significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. PRA at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned- considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority.
Sec. 69, LGC provides that the only ground to recall is loss of confidence of the people. The
members of PRAC are there not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
peoples. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political
party affiliation. The Constitution even encourages multi-party system to nurture the democratic system.
22

Fear that a PRA may be dominated by a political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall
of officials of opposite political persuasions is not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional.
Moreover, law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a PRA
will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. Its diverse and distinct composition guarantees that all the
sectors of the electorate province shall be heard. Following are required for the validity of resolution: (1)
Notice to all members is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings; (2) Law also requires
a qualified majority of all the PRA members to convene in session and in a public place; (3) Also, the
recall resolution by majority must be adopted during its session called for the purpose.
Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that the PRA members voted along narrow political lines.
Neither COMELEC nor SC made a judicial inquiry as to the reason that led the members of the said recall
assembly to cast a vote against Garcia. Pimentel in his book stressed that the substantive content of a vote
of lack of confidence is beyond any inquiry a political question (as held in Evardone vs COMELEC)The
proposal will still be passed upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan yet to be expressed. It is
premature to conclude that the will has been subverted. If electorate re-elects him, the proposal to recall is
rejected. If they do not, then he has lost the confidence of the people which he once enjoyed
[Conclusion: The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a PRA is an innovative attempt by
Congress to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check
the performance of their elected officials. The power to determine this mode was specifically given to
Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution.]
[SC Resolution: The requirement of notice is mandatory for it is indispensable in determining the
collective wisdom of the members of PRA. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to
recall Garcia as Governor of Bataan.
The due process clause of the Constitution requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable
and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. Need for notice to
all members of PRA is also imperative for these members represent the different sectors of the electorate.
Resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority
will can be genuinely determined only after all the members have been given a fair opportunity to express
the will of their constituents. In accord with the SC Resolution, Notice of Session was again sent to the
members of PRAC.]
Paras vs. COMELEC (1996)
Facts: Petition for recall of Paras as Punong Barangay (elected last 1994 regular barangay elections) was
filed by the registered voters of the barangay. COMELEC approved the petition and scheduled the
petition signing on October14, 1995 and set the recall election on Nov13, 1995.At least 29.30% of
registered voters signed the petition (above the required 25%). Paras opposed so recall election was
deferred by COMELEC to Dec16, 1995.COMELEC rescheduled recall election on Jan13, 1996.
Held: There can still be a recall election even with the four (4) months that separate the recall election
from the upcoming SK elections. Evident intent of Sec74 of LGC is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
2nd year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to Paras interpretation of the phrase regular local
election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the LGC on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.
If the SK election were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election (to
be held every 3years from May1996), then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the LGC. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution. Interpretation of Sec74(b), LGC should not be in conflict with the
constitutional mandate of Sec3, Art X to enact a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum xxx
23

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the LGU necessitating
additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election 1year immediately
preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election
for the office of the local elective official concerned. Electorate could choose the officials replacement in
the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall
election. Therefore, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective
official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. However, recall is no longer
possible in the case at bar because of the limitation under Sec74(b) the next regular election involving
the barangay office concerned is barely 7months away (scheduled on May1997).
[Davide Concurring Opinion: SK election is not a regular local election for purposes of recall under
Sec74, LGC. The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of local elective
officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials (President, VP, Senators and
Congressmen).The officials enumerated under footnote are the only local elective officials deemed
recognized by Sec2 par (2) of Art IX-C of Constitution (COMELECs power and exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by RTCs of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction).
A regular election (local or national) can only refer to an election participated in by those who
possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of
the requirements for exercise of suffrage under Sec1, Art V of the Constitution is that the person must be
at least 18years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the
rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sec113-118). Under the law, SK includes
the youth with ages ranging from 15-21 (Sec424, LGC). Accordingly, they include many who are not
qualified to vote in a regular election those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then may SK
elections be considered a regular election. SK is nothing more than a youth organization. Although fully
recognized in LGC and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained
the status of local elective officials.
Flores vs. Drilon (1993)
Facts: Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman/CEO of the SBMA pursuant to RA7277
Bases Conversion & Development Act of 1992 which provides that- The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by
the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of the
Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That
for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Petitioners filed an
original petition before the SC, challenging the constitutionality of the proviso above.
Held: The proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts. The proscription is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job. A public officer should be precluded from dissipating his effortsamong too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in inefficiency. Section 94 of LGC which permits the appointment of a
local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office is
untenable. No legislative act can prevail over the Constitution. This view ignores the clear-cut difference
in the wording between the two paragraphs of Section 7 Art. IX-B, w/c distinction was purposely sought
by the drafters of the Constitution.
Holding of multiple offices by an appointive official is permitted when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position is more stringent. It does not provide any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other government posts except as particularly
recognized in the Constitution itself, such as: President, as head of the Economic and Planning Agency;
24

Vice-President, who may be appointed as Cabinet member; Congressman, who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial & Bar Council. The exemption allowed to appointive officials cant be
extended to elective officials.
The contention that SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City,
hence, an excepted circumstance citing Civil Liberties v Exec Secretary where the Court held that the
prohibition in Section 13 Art. VII of the Constitution doesnt apply to additional duties & functions
required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio
capacity is also untenable.
Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City w/o need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed
shows the intent to make the posts appointive. In the Senate deliberations, Sen. Saguisag suggested that
they make the post ex officio so as not to contravene Section 7 paragrap 1 of Art. IX-B of the
Constitution, but Congress decided to have the controversy resolved by the courts instead. That the
proviso is NOT a legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the PresidentThe power of
appointment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. When Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only
one candidate, even on the pretext of prescribing qualifications of the officer (as in this case, where the
qualifications prescribed can only be met by one individual). Such enactment eliminates the discretion of
the appointing power [and encroaches upon his power of appointment].
[Solution: Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure
or during his incumbency, Gordon may resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionallyattached disqualification.]
[Conclusion: Gordons appointment pursuant to an unconstitutional legislative act is null & void. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City. His acts as SBMA Chair/CEO are not necessarily null and
void. He may be considered a de facto officer, whose acts will hold valid in so far as they involve the
interests of the public and third persons. Also, all emoluments received by Gordon pursuant to his
appointment may be retained by him.]
Salalima vs. Guingona (1996)
Facts: Petitioners, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, seek to annul and set aside
Administrative Order 153, signed by the President and by public respondent Executive Secretary Teofisto
Guingona, approving the finding of fact and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee and holding
petitioners administratively liable. The order meted out on each petitioner penalties of suspension of
different durations, to be served successively but not to go beyond their respective unexpired terms in
accordance with Section 66 (b) of LGC. Petitioners argued that the order is an oppressive and capricious
exercise of executive power.
Held: Section 66 (b) of LGC provides that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term
of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every Administrative Offense, nor shall said penalty be
a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meet the qualifications for the office.
An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to, or constitutes, any
of the grounds for disciplinary action. In the case at bar, there is no grave abuse of discretion in imposing
the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded the six months and the unexpired
portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each
administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive
service of suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term. The suspension
does not amount to petitioners' removal from office.
However, the petitioners cannot be administratively liable. This is so because public officials
cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term. The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and
25

that they disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. The Court cannot
practically overrule the will of the people.
The liabilities of the petitioners who signed Resolution 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to
enter into the retainer contract in question who were reelected in the 1992 elections are condoned. This is,
however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases.
Malinao vs. Reyes (1996)
Facts: Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of due
process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On August 12, 1994, members of the
Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found Red guilty, vote signed only by presiding chairman. On September
5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted Red of the charges against him. This vote was embodied in a
Decision which was signed by all the members. Malinao argued that the First Sanggunian Decision had
already become final and executory for failure of Red to appeal. The issue is whether or not the second
Decision is valid.
Held: Yes, the second decision of acquittal is valid. In any case, this issue is already moot and academic
as a result of the expiration of Reds term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed,
and further proceedings are barred by his reelection. [Sec 66(b) LGC]. Reelection abates any
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the local elective official.
[Under Sec. 66 (b) of the LGC, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the official
and any administrative disciplinary proceeding against said official is abated if in the meantime he is reelected because such re-election is a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed
during his previous term. In order to render a decision in an administrative case involving elected local
officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing, stating clearly the facts and the reasons for
such a decision.]
Garcia vs. Mojica (1999)
Facts: Garcia, as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for supply of asphalt to the city.
Contract covers the period 1998-2001 which was to commence on September1998 when the first delivery
should have been made by Zuellig.March1999, news reports came out regarding alleged anomalous
purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by Garcia which prompted Office of
Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry. Preventive suspension order was issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Garcia assails validity of the order.
Held: There can be no question as to the power and authority of respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica
to issue an order of preventive suspension against an official like Garcia to prevent that official from
using his office to intimidate or influence witnesses or to tamper with records that might be vital to the
prosecution of the case against him. However, the said office cannot hold him administratively liable for
acts committed prior to his present term of office. It has repeatedly held in a number of cases that a
reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his
prior term of office. The rationale is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that
it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such
knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.
That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to
eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking is
impossible. Rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct
was committed, reckoned from the date of the officials reelection, except that it must be prior to said
date.
[Salalima case applies that sound policy dictates it. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to
exacerbating endless partisan contests between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may
not stop to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts alleged to have been
26

committed during his previous term. In the case at bar, Garcia cannot anymore be held administrative
liable for an act done during his previous term (his signing of contract with Zuellig).]
Rabuco vs. Villegas
Facts: The "dominant and inextricable issue" at bar, as correctly perceived by the appellate court is the
constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 whereby Congress converted the lot in question together with
another lot in San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or
alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure
Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on
installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and expressly prohibited ejectment and
demolition of petitioners' homes under section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's certification
resolution.
Held: If the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for constituting deprivation of property without due
process of law and without just compensation as contended by respondents city officials, then the trial
court's refusal to enjoin ejectment and demolition of petitioners' houses may be upheld. Otherwise,
petitioners' right under the Act to continue possession and occupation of the premises and to the lifting
and dismissal of the order of demolition issued against them must be enforced and the trial court's
judgment must be set aside.
Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken down as unconstitutional for
depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale in subdivided small lots to
bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation is untenable and without basis,
since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are
therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due
process and without just compensation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal
property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale in small
lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the
courts.
Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of Republic Act
3120 must fail as the City was not deprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition with its private or
corporate funds either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the
Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as
prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition against their ejectment and demolition of their houses.
The Court holds that the Acts in question were intended to implement the social justice policy of
the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not "intended to
expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to
make it available for disposition by the National Government:
...The subdivision of the land and conveyane of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just
compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a
manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property."
Torio vs. Fontanilla (1978)
Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui managed the celebration of the town fiesta of the
municipality. They ordered a stage to be constructed foa a zarzuela. As the stage was not strong enough, it
collapsed during the zarzuela and the deceased was pinned to death. The Municipality argued that that
since it was performing a governmental function in managing the celebration of the fiesta, it is not liable
for damages.
27

Held: The celebration a town fiesta is an undertaking in the exercise of a municipality's government
proprietary character thus the municipality is liable.
The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental, or political on the
one hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised by
the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial, public, and political. Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised
for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private
and corporate.
In the CAB, Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code
simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty
to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event of
the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of
the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed,
was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a
conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town, nonetheless
it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which
are for public service. Easily, no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration
of a town fiesta. Since the injury was caused respect to the municipalitys proprietary functions, the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto if
found negligent, which the CA found and held that there was negligence.
The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the
subcommittee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted
merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned petitioner is
responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.
". . . when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a
cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints
or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove them, can hold
them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the
exercise of corporate powers, and are for the peculiar benefit of the corporation in its local or special
interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior
applies." (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol. IV, p. 2879)
Garcia vs. COMELEC (1993)
Facts: On July,1993 some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of 12
municipalities of Bataan province met and constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
(PRA) in the Bagac town plaza to initiate the recall election of Governor Garcia,elected governor of
Bataan in May, 1992 elections, for loss of confidence. COMELEC scheduled recall elections. Governor
Garcia asserts the unconstitutionality of Section 70 of the Local Government Code. The issue is whether
or not Section 70 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional?
Held: Section 70 of LGC is constitutional. The presumption of validity rests on the respect due to the
wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief
Executive, by whom the law is approved. Garcia et al, do not point to any constitutional provision that
will sustain their contention for surely, there is nothing in there that will remotely suggest that the
people have the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding. The
Constitution did not provide for any mode of initiating recall elections. It did not prohibit the adoption of
multiple modes of initiating recall elections. Mandate given by Sec3 of ArtX of the Constitution is for
Congress to enact a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum.
The Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates. The power given was to select which among the means and methods of initiating
recall elections are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate, and it was not straightjacketed to
28

one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. The Constitution requires only that the
mechanisms chosen be effective. The choice may be erroneous but the remedy against a bad law is to seek
its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
The requirement of notice is mandatory for it is indispensable in determining the collective
wisdom of the members of PRA. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to recall
Garcia as Governor of Bataan. The due process clause of the Constitution requiring notice as an element
of fairness is inviolable and should always be considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its
silence. Resolution to recall should articulate the majority will of the members of the assembly but the
majority will can be genuinely determined only after all the members have been given a fair opportunity
to express the will of their constituents
Initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives, this act by the people through their elected representatives is not constitutionally
impermissible as seen in the task of drafting the Constitution which is delegated to their representatives
(either by constitutional convention or as a congressional constituent assembly). Initiation of recall
process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot be entrusted to and exercised by the
elected representatives of the people. PRA resolution of recall is not the recall itself. The PRA resolution
merely starts the process only a part of the process, and not the whole. This is self-evident because a
PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject
officials.
Viola vs. Alunan III (1997)
Facts: Cesar G. Viola, filed petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art. III, 1-2 of the
Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers in so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors
for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters. The issue is whether or not Section 1-2 of the
Implementing Rules are valid?
Held: The creation of the additional positions is authorized by 493 of LGC which in fact requires and
not merely authorizes the board of directors to "create such other positions as it may deem necessary
for the management of the chapter" and belies petitioner's claim that 493 limits the officers of a chapter
to the president, VP, 5 members of the board of directors, secretary, and treasurer. Also, the creation of
these positions was actually made in the constitution and by-laws of the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted
by the 1st Barangay National Assembly. Congress can delegate the power to create positions such as
these. Section493 embodies a fairly intelligible standard deemed necessary for the management of the
chapters,". There is no undue delegation of power by Congress. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish or merge offices in
the executive department.
Victoria vs. Comelec (1994)
Facts: The basic question is how the ranking of SP members should be computed for the purpose of
succession. Petitioner argue that the ranking of the SP members should not only be based on the number
of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in
the district who actually voted therein (which will result in petitioner Victoria ranking first)
Held: Sec 44 of Local Gpvernment Code last paragraph provides: "For purposes of succession as
provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
votes obtained by each winning candidates to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election." The law is clear that the ranking in the SP shall be determined on
the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything about factoring the numbers of voters who
actually voted.
29

Masikip vs. City of Pasig

Facts: The City of Pasig notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of
her property to be used for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the
program of the municipal government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community is constitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the are of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable
to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community. Respondent reiterated that the
purpose of the expropriated of petitioners property is to provide sports and recreational facilities to its
poor residents.
Held: The power of eminent domain is subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local government have
no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.The
right to take private property for public purposes necesaarily originates from the necessity and the taking
must be limited to such necessity. Applying this standard, the Supreme Court hold that respondent City of
Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports
development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest park, available to all residents
of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Ong vs. Alegre
Facts: Private respondent and Petitioner were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte. Ong was then the incumbent mayor. Alegre filed with the COMELEC
Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify Ong. The petition was predicated on the three-consecutive termrule, Ong having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty
elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections. Ong alleged that he could not be considered as having served as mayor
from 1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as a
presumptive winner.
Held: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three 3 consecutive terms
in the same local government post, and; 2) that he has fully served 3 consecutive terms.
Such assumption of office constitutes, for Ong, service for the full term, and should be counted as
a full term served in contemplation of the 3-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than 3 consecutive
term for the same position. Being a presumptive winner did not make him less than a duly duly elected
mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term rule.
Lumbuan vs. Ronquillo
Facts: Petitioner is the registered owner of a lot located in Tondo, Manila. She leased it to respondent
Ronquillo for a period of 3 years. Respondent violated the agreement and despite repeated verbal and
written demands, the respondent refused to pay the arrears and vacate the leased premises. Petitioner
referred the matter to the Barangay Chairmans office but the parties failed to arrive at a settlement. The
petitioner filed a case for Unlawful Detainer in the MeTC of Manila, said court rendered its decision
against respondent. Upon appeal RTC rendered its decision setting aside MeTCs decision. RTC directed
the parties to go baack to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further proceedings and to comply
strictly with the condition that should the parties fail to reach an amicable settlement, the entire records of
the case will be remanded to MeTC of Manila. Respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals
30

through a petition for review. The appellate court ruled that when a complaint is prematurely instituted, as
when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in the barangar level had not been complied with, the
court should dismiss the case and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties may
go through the prerequisite proceedings. The issue is whether or not the Court of appeals gravely erred in
dismissing the complaint for the alleged failure of the parties to comply with the mandatory mediation
and conciliation proceedings in the barangay level?
Held: The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules is to reduce the number of court
litigations and prevents the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the
indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act 7160
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman as the precondition to
filing a complaint in court. Here the Lupon Chairman and Secretary signed the certificate to file action
stating that no settlement was reached by the parties. While admittedly no Pangkat was constitutes, it was
not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman for possible settlement. The efforts
of the Barangay Chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no Pangkat
was formed, in our mind, the was substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under the
aforequoted provision, the confrontation before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat is sufficient
compliance with the precondition for filing the case in court. This is true notwithstanding the mandate of
Section 410b should be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in
and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the Barangay Chariman or Punong Barangay is
herself the Chaiman of the Lupon under the Local Government Code.
Parayno vs. Jovellanos
Facts: Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline station in Calisiao, Pangasinan. In 1989,some residents of
Calisiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to
another location. Upon the advice of the Municipal Engineer, the sangguniang Bayan recommended to the
Mayor the closure or transfer of location of the said gasoline filling station. The issue is whether or not
the closure or transfer of her gasoline station by the municipality was a valid exercise of its police
powers?
Held: The Municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure or transfer of petitioners
gasoline station. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when
the following requisites are met; 10 the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State and 20 the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
Atienza vs. CA
Facts: M/V ACE was a mortgaged to Far East Bank and Trust Company but was released therefrom on
September 27, 1994 when petitioner sold it to privae resppndent Eulugio. It was the latter who settled the
loan with FEBTC. Sometime later, petitioner, notwithstanding the fact that he had sold the vessel to
private respondent, sought to transfer its homeport from from Manila to Batangas province. The records
do not show how he was able to do it but petitioner succeeded in registering the vessel in his name with
the Fifth Coast Guard District in Batangas City. Petitioner went to Batangas Maritime Regional Office
and asked for the issuance by MARINA of the vessels Philippine Coast Guard certificate. He claimed
that the certificates issued in Manila had been lost. When petitioners misrepresentation regarding the loss
of the certificate was discovered a case was filed against him. MARINA issued an order directing him to
show cause why he should be subjected to punitive action. Petitioner was found guilty of
misrepresentation and was imposed an administrative fine.
Held: The findings of MARINA are to be accorded great weight since MARINA is the government
agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical expertise. The
exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can be discharged by it, being
31

the government agency concerned. MARINA held petitioner liable under Memorandum Circular No.50A. Memorandun Circular 109, which deals specifically with misrepresentations relating to vessel
registration, licensing and documentation, did not alter or modify that finding of culpability but only
provided for a lower fine, that is, from P25,000 to p10,000. Since, Memorandum Circular No.109 was
more favourable to petitioner, MARINA applied it retroactively to him.

32