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A Test of the Joint Model of Causal

Attribution
ARTICLE in EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MARCH 2001
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European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 27, 221236 (1997)

A test of the joint model of causal

attribution
FRANK VAN OVERWALLE

Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brusssel,

Belgium

Abstract
The joint model integrates Mill's methods of difference and agreement for making
causal attributions, and introduces a novel type of context attributions which reflect the
opposite categories of the standard attribution responses provided in previous
covariation research (external versus the person, general versus the stimulus, and
stable versus the occasion). The joint model predicts that attributions to standard
causes require Mill's method of difference and that attributions to context causes
require Mill's method of agreement. Two empirical studies demonstrated that the joint
model fitted adequately with all of subject's standard and context attribution responses,
in contrast to earlier theorizing and data involving only the method of difference (cf.
Cheng & Novick, 1990) or only the method of agreement (cf. Hilton, Smith & Kim,
1995) which received less empirical support.

INTRODUCTION
Since Kelley (1967) first introduced the principle of covariation to explain causal
attribution, there has been considerable disagreement about the basic processes of
causal inference. Hilton, Smith and Kim (1995) distinguished the various conflicting
theories that have emerged from Kelley's principle on the basis of Mill's (1872/1973)
methods of difference and of agreement. Essentially, the method of difference reflects
the notion that a cause is a condition that `differs' from a normal background or
Addressee for correspondence: Frank Van Overwalle, Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, B 1050 Brussel, Belgium, e-mail: fjvoverw@vub.ac.be.
This research profited substantially from the comments of Francis Heylighen, Dennis Hilton and Dirk
Van Rooy on earlier versions of the manuscript.

CCC 00462772/97/02022116
#1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 24 February 1994

Accepted 16 February 1995

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F. Van Overwalle

context1. Theories and research based on this notion of difference (e.g. Cheng &
Novick, 1990; Forsterling, 1989; Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; Hilton & Slugoski,
1986; Hilton & Jaspars, 1987; Hilton, Smith, & Alicke, 1988; Jaspars, 1983; Jaspars,
Hewstone, & Fincham, 1983) predict that low consensus information is used to infer
attributions about the person (Does the effect occur when this actor is present, but
not when others are?), that high distinctiveness information is used to make
attributions about the target stimulus (Does the effect occur when this stimulus is
present, but not when others are?), and that low consistency information is used to
make attributions about the target occasion (Does the effect occur at this occasion,
but not at other occasions?)
On the other hand, the method of agreement reflects the notion that a cause is a
relatively invariant background condition that is always present together with the
effect. Theories and research based on this notion of agreement (e.g. Alicke & Insko,
1984; Bassili & Regan, 1977; DiVitto & McArthur, 1978; Ferguson & Wells, 1980;
Hansen, 1980; Hortacsu, 1987; Major, 1980; Medcof, 1990; Orvis, Cunningham, &
Kelley, 1975) predict that high consensus information is used to make attributions
about the stimulus (Does the effect occur across many different people whenever the
target stimulus is present?), whereas low distinctiveness information is used to make
attributions about the person (Does the effect occur across various stimuli whenever
the actor is present?)
Most recent studies have supported Mill's method of difference for inferring
causal attributions (e.g. Cheng & Novick, 1990; Forsterling, 1989; Hewstone &
Jaspars, 1987; Hilton & Slugoski, 1986). However, the neglect of the method of
agreement may be explained by recent findings of Van Overwalle and Heylighen
(1995), which demonstrated that the method of agreement is clearly revealed when
subjects are given other, more appropriate attribution response options. Specifically,
it was found that high consensus was attributed to something external to the actor,
that low distinctiveness was attributed to something general across many stimuli, and
that high consistency was attributed to something stable or permanent across many
occasions. Each of these causes reflect a relatively invariant context or background
given a focal set of observations, against which the standard factors (person,
stimulus or occasion respectively) are compared; they are therefore denoted invariant
or context causes in opposition to the standard factors which are denoted contrast
causes. Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1995) argued that the method of agreement is
preferred for generating context attributions, because information indicating that the
effect generalizes across conditions is highly diagnostic of an invariant background
factor. This novel prediction for the method of agreement was combined with the
earlier predictions derived from the method of difference (e.g. Cheng & Novick,
1990) in what Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1995) termed the joint model of
attribution.
Although context causes have received little attention in past research on the
attribution process, more applied studies on the content of spontaneous explanations
using free response formats has confirmed that laymen's explanatory repertoire
1

It would be more accurate to define this as the indirect method of difference (or joint method of agreement
and difference), because most attribution theories assume that the target event is compared to sets of
comparison events rather than just one single comparison event. However, since this distinction is of less
relevance here, for the sake of simplicity we will use the term method of difference to indicate also the
indirect method.

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223

includes not only Kelley's contrast attributions, but also context attributions (see
Weiner, 1986). To name a few examples, in the achievement domain students often
attribute low performance to low general aptitude (a personal factor, but also a
stable and general context factor) or bad teaching (an external, stable and general
context factor). In interpersonal relations, attributions are frequently made to
interpersonal traits or skills (personal factors, but also stable and general context
factors; Anderson, Jennings, & Arnoult, 1988). Moreover, it can be easily seen that
the proposed contrastcontext pairs correspond very much to the three standard
dimensions of locus (personal versus external), globality (stimulus-specific versus
general) and stability (occasional versus permanent) which capture many everyday
explanations (cf. Weiner, 1986; Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).

Alternative Predictions
Given that contrast and context causes are mutually exclusive by definition, the
present prediction that if causality cannot be attributed to the contrast factor, it will
be attributed to the corresponding context factor seems intuitively plausible and not
very surprising. What is perhaps more surprising is that this proposal has never been
empirically tested before the studies by Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1995), and
more importantly, that existing theories of attribution leave little room for it. I will
illustrate this latter point with two alternative predictions from recent models which
incorporate either Mill's method of difference or of agreement.
The first alternative prediction that instantiates the method of difference comes
from Cheng and Novick's (1990) probabilistic contrast model. This model specifies
that attributions are only made to contrast factors when there is a contrast or
difference in the information pattern, and explicitly rejects the possibility that
attributions can be made to context factors within a given focal set of observations.
Only when observations are made outside this focal set can a factor be identified as
an `enabling condition'. Although Cheng and Novick (1990) specified that perceivers
may activate prior knowledge to fill in missing information from alternative focal
sets to make an inference to enabling conditions, this suggestion is quite problematic.
Because individuals may differ very much in the sort of prior knowledge they may
consider relevant, the contrast model is essentially unable to predict which
attributions will be made when there is no contrast in the focal set information2.
The second alternative prediction exemplifying the method of agreement is derived
from recent work by Hilton et al. (1995), which demonstrated that the method of
agreement is typically used to make dispositional inferences rather than causal
explanations. These two judgments are not necessarily the same thing. In
dispositional inferences, `we learn more about the general characteristics of some
2

Cheng and Novick's (1990) probabilistic analysis of attribution can easily be extended to include also
context factors. Briefly, they defined the strength of a contrast factor as the probability of the effect when
the contrast cause is present (or P [E/C ] ) minus the probability of the effect when the contrast cause is
absent (or P [E/*C ] ). Given that the context is always present, this formulation can be interpreted as
disentangling the influence of the contrast factor (where both the contrast and context are present) by
subtracting from it the influence of the context factor alone (where the contrast is absent). Following this
logic, the strength of the context factor is simply the probability of the effect when the contrast cause is
absent (or P [E/*C ]; see also Van Overwalle, 1996).

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F. Van Overwalle

person or entity', whereas in causal explanations, `we resolve a puzzle as to why a

particular event happened' (Hilton et al., 1995, p. 378). Consider, for instance, the
event that Paul helped Mary. The high consensus information that everybody helped
Mary might generate dispositional inferences involving Mary's popularity or
attraction; whereas the low distinctiveness information that Paul helped everybody
might produce the inference that Paul is helpful. Hilton et al. (1995) further predicted
that when consistency is high, such dispositional inferences to the person and the
stimulus would be even stronger.
Although Hilton et al. (1995) drew a sharp distinction between dispositional
inferences and causal explanations, it seems quite obvious that dispositional
inferences may also be used as causal explanations. For instance, Paul's helpful
disposition may explain why he helped so many people. I refer to this suggestion as
the agreement hypothesis. Although this hypothesis is not contradictory to Hilton et
al.'s (1995) proposal (but rather extends it), it is limited because it focuses only on the
actor or the stimulus, and neglects other potential causal explanations that follow
from Mill's method of agreement. For instance, the high consensus information that
many boys helped a sick woman cannot only be explained by the woman's attractive
disposition, but also by a variety of other external factors such as the fact that the
boys participated in a medical training programme, a cultural norm that one should
always help ill people, and so forth. Likewise, the low distinctiveness information
that Paul helps many persons cannot only be explained by Paul's helpful disposition,
but also by other factors that are general (i.e. not specifically tied to the person
helped), such as Paul's intention to earn money by doing chores for people, a penalty
forcing Paul to help others, a cultural norm, and so forth. Hence, it seems reasonable
to expect that when given the opportunity to make causal attributions to external,
general and stable context factors, attributions will not be exclusively made to person
or stimulus dispositions, but also (and perhaps even more) to context factors which
have a larger explanatory breadth.

STUDY 1
In a series of studies, Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1995) found substantial support
for the joint model using dimensional ratings or everyday explanations as responses.
Prior research, however, typically used standard contrast responses and did not
invite subjects to make context attributions. Thus, no data has yet been collected to
compare the joint model with prior models. Therefore, in this study, subjects were
asked to make causal attributions to both contrast and context factors so that the
models discussed in the Introduction could be directly compared.

Method
Subjects
Subjects were 78 male and female freshmen who participated as partial requirement
of an introductory psychology course at the Brussels Free University. The majority
of the subjects completed the material during the regular class hour, while a few

Joint model

225

other subjects completed it individually. The whole procedure took about half an
hour. One subject was omitted because she did not follow the instructions, leaving 77
subjects overall.
Material
Eight positive and eight negative target events were used and combined in two
random versions with eight information patterns. Each subject read 16 stimuli
created by randomly pairing two of the target events with one of the patterns. One
event appeared on one page of a booklet. In each of the two versions, the stimuli
(pages) were presented in one random order and its reverse.
The information patterns were structured so that `complete' information was
available on the outcome of all persons for all stimuli during all occasions. That is,
all possible combinations of covariation variables (i.e. all cells of Kelley's cube) were
described, so that subjects' focal set was completely defined (see Cheng & Novick,
1990). High (low) consensus information indicated that the outcome of the target
person and the comparison others was identical (different); low (high) distinctiveness
information indicated that the outcome on the target stimulus and the comparison
stimuli was identical (different); high (low) consistency information indicated that
the outcome on the target occasion and earlier occasions was identical (different). As
an illustration, take the low consensus, low distinctiveness, and low consistency
information pattern of the following story:
Peter lost to the Conches chess computer at a friendly tournament
At this tournament, Peter lost to all chess computers
At previous tournaments, Peter always beat all chess computers (including
Conches)
Everybody, except Peter, won at all tournaments against all chess computers.
Causal attributions were measured after the description of each stimulus event and
covariation information. Subjects were instructed to carefully analyse the
information given and to `try to infer the cause of this event'. There were three
main response categories. The first response category was: there is no cause. The
second response category involved one or more factors that explained the event
`independently (they can explain the event without any other factors being present)'.
These independent factors involved the standard causal explanations used in many
previous investigations: (1) something special about [the actor], (2) something
special about [the stimulus], (3) something special about this occasion (this
[occasion]). In addition, each standard contrast factor was followed by its
complementary context factor as defined in earlier applied attribution research
(e.g. Weiner, 1986; Abramson et al., 1978): (2) something external (resides outside
[the actor] ), (4)something general (plays a role with many [stimuli] ), (6) something
permanent (unchangeable over many [occasions] ). Subjects were asked to circle all
factors that explained the event in question.
The third response category involved `a combination of some factors (they must be
present together to explain the event)'. Subjects were asked to note each combination
of factors on a separate line, using the numbers (1 to 6) of the independent factors

226

F. Van Overwalle

listed above. This open response format was chosen because there were over 50
different combinations of factors possible. All instructions and an example were
printed on the first page of the material, and if subjects had any questions, additional
clarification was given until the instructions were understood.
Results and Discussion
The frequencies of causal attributions in function of the eight information patterns
are shown in Table 1. There were 2500 attribution responses overall. (Note that
subjects could give more than one answer for each information pattern.) At a first
glance, it is immediately evident that subjects not only made attributions to the
standard contrast factors, but to the context factors as well. Moreover, the pattern of
attributions for both types of responses was very close to the predictions of the joint
model. For each row in the table, the predicted frequencies of the joint model
(underlined) were always higher than in the other cells. As expected, the contrast
model (in boldface) was only supported for the standard contrast responses, and the
agreement hypothesis (indicated by a for the stronger predictions involving high
consistency, and by b for the weaker predictions involving low consistency) received
least support.
Some additional findings from Table 1 are also noteworthy. First, it is clear that
more attributions were made to single factors (1527/2500=61.1 per cent) than to
conjunctions (36.1 per cent). Although this finding seems to contradict the joint
model, it may simply be due to the more demanding open response format for the
conjunctions (see also Hilton & Jaspars, 1987, p. 195), or due to the fact that single
factors were assessed before the conjunctions. Also, it may take some extra time and
cognitive effort to identify conjunctions of factors, leading to fewer responses.
A second interesting finding is that fewer attributions were made to context factors
than to contrast factors. For instance, for single factors, there were twice as many
attributions to contrast factors (40.0 per cent) than to context factors (21.0 per cent).
It thus appears that the method of difference is used more often relative to the
method of agreement. This may also be seen from the fact that when contrasts were
absent in the information, a noticeable number of subjects indicated that no causal
explanation was possible (HLH pattern:26/270 or 9.6 per cent). The proportion of no
cause responses increased monotonically the more contrasts were absent in the
information, from 0.9 per cent (three contrasts) to 9.6 per cent (no contrasts),
w2 (3)=54.84, p50.0001. This latter finding seems consistent with the contrast model
only, although an alternative explanation will be offered after the next analyses.
The data were then analysed using an hierarchical log-linear method
recommended for attributional choice data by Iacobucci and McGill (1990). Like
analysis of variance, a log-linear analysis tests for the main effects of each
(independent) information variable on each (dependent) response variable.
According to Iacobucci and McGill (1990), log-linear analysis is more sensitive
and powerful for the present attribution data than analysis of variance or w2- tests.
Higher-order interactions are also possible in log-linear analysis (Iacobucci & McGill,
1990, p. 432), but are incompatible with all models under consideration because the
information variables should generate both single causal responses and their
conjunctions. For example, it is assumed that low consensus information

Joint model

227

Table 1. Frequencies of causal attributions in function of consensus, distinctiveness and

consistency information: Study 1
Cs-Di-Cy
Contrast
P
E
S
G
O
F
P*S
P*G
P*O
P*F
E*S
E*G
E*O
E*F
S*O
S*F
G*O
G*F

HLH
---

HLL
--O

HHH
-S-

HHL
- SO

LLH
P--

LLL
P-O

LHH
PS -

LHL
PSO

9a
18
15a
50
11
53

11b
42
25b
33
89
2

12
17
95a
14
7
39

9
38
69b
12
62
4

106a
6
8
29
3
46

102b
11
14
20
40
11

81
10
51
11
6
33

78
16
48
5
50
6

5
3
1

5
1
5
1
7
8
23

7
1
2
1
12
1
20

9
11
1
42
1

12
16
46
13
2
1
3

30
2
6
23
2
2
2
1
3
6
1

25
2
23
3
1

1
20

4
1
8
5
1
1

2
15
1

23
1
1

1
2
1

1
8
3
10
3
4
2
20

18

31

3
2

3
2
1

2
4

3
2

2
7

24
1
2

2
1
2
4

23
2

1
3
12

No cause
Other

26
8

10
10

11
16

5
8

5
13

2
12

9
19

3
19

270

317

292

320

311

332

320

339

6
1

2
1
3
1

P*S*O
P*S*F
P*G*O
P*G*F
E*S*O
E*S*F
E*G*O
E*G*F

Totals

3
1

3
5
12
3
2
5
3
24

Note. H and L denote whether consensus, distinctiveness and consistency are high or low; on the right of
the Contrast label are the corresponding factors for which a contrast is present. P=person; E=external;
S=stimulus; G=general; O=occasion; F=fixed/stable. Predictions (1) of the contrast model are in
boldface, (2) of the joint model are underlined, and (3) of the agreement hypothesis are denoted by a and b
for the stronger and weaker effects involving high and low consistency respectively. The maximum possible
frequency in each cell is 154.

produces person attributions, in single explanations as well as in interactions with

other factors.
Iacobucci and McGill (1990) report two major ways for testing attribution data:
an exploratory analysis for testing the significance of each individual effect in a
model, and a confirmatory analysis for testing the fit of the model as a whole. I will
describe the results of each method in turn.

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F. Van Overwalle

Exploratory Log-Linear Analysis

In an exploratory log-linear analysis, main effects between information and response
variables are tested by the partial association measure DG 2. As recommended by
Iacobucci and McGill (1989, p. 431), to reflect the design properly all log-linear
analyses in this article included all possible interactions between the information
variables. Furthermore, because there are 23 cells of independent variables (two
levels, high versus low, for each information variable) and 26 cells of response
variables (two levels, cause versus no cause, for each attribution response), there are
29 or 512 possible effects in total. To avoid chance capitalization, the significance
levels for DG 2 were corrected using a Bonferroni method, that is, the original
significance levels were divided by 512.
Table 2 shows that all predictions of the joint model were confirmed. Consensus
information significantly determined person and external attributions;
distinctiveness information generated stimulus and general attributions; and
consistency information produced occasion and stable attributions, all p s50.005
(corrected). These results clearly indicate that subjects applied both of Mill's
methods in making causal attributions, although it can also be seen that the effects
for the method of difference (DG 2=217.74521.71) were generally stronger than
those for the method of agreement (DG 2=48.32196.05).
Table 2 further shows two small unexpected main effects. First, there is an effect of
consensus information on stimulus attributions predicted by the agreement
hypothesis, DG 2=19.64, p50.005 (this effect was not found in the next study). It
Table 2.

Partial associations DG 2.

Information

Attribution

Study 1

Study 2

Consensus

Person
External
Stimulus
General
Occasion
Stable

521.71**
48.32**
19.64*
7.24
6.10
51

105.01**
24.37**
51
1.01
51
9.08

Distinctiveness

Person
External
Stimulus
General
Occasion
Stable

10.27
2.56
217.75**
96.73**
51
10.02

51
3.07
47.64**
12.16*
1.03
51

Consistency

Person
External
Stimulus
General
Occasion
Stable

51
18.26*
51
8.14
281.77**
196.05**

51
11.62*
51
2.42
90.95**
71.84**

Note. The partial association DG2 reflects the strength of each main effect tested. Attributions predicted by
the joint model are underlined.
*p50.05; **p50.005 (after Bonferroni correction).

Joint model

229

was expected that such stimulus attributions would become less attractive than
external attributions, which provide a more inclusive explanation. Although they did
not disappear completely, it can be seen that, as expected, the magnitude of the effect
was much weaker on stimulus attributions (DG 2=19.64) than on external
attributions (DG 2=48.32). The second unexpected main effect suggests that
external attributions are given less often when consistency is high, DG 2=18.26,
p50.05. Subjects seem to refrain from blaming factors outside themselves when an
effect tends to recur. This effect was not predicted by any of the three models (but it
reappears in the next study).
Further log-linear analyses showed that there were no significant higher-order
interactions, consistent with all models. This compares favourably with many earlier
studies using only contrast attributions (see Iacobucci & McGill, 1990, Tables 7 and
8) in which many of such unexpected higher-order interactions were found. It also
indicates that the increase of no cause responses in the absence of contrastive
information is not reliable, because otherwise the effect should show up in the loglinear analysis as a significant higher-order interaction between the three
information variables and the six response variables (which it did not). The
greater use of the no cause response seems therefore to appear only when tested in
isolation (i.e. w2-test above), but not when tested within the model as a whole. Most
probably, it is simply due to the general tendency to make more contrast attributions
than context attributions.
Confirmatory Log-Linear Analysis
To verify more directly whether the models under consideration can explain all
variance in the data, confirmatory log-linear analyses were conducted. These
analyses include all the main effects between information and response variables as
predicted by each model. To test the effects of interest properly, in addition, these
analyses also include all possible interactions between the information variables (as
in the explanatory analysis), as well as all possible interactions between the response
variables (to control for whatever differences exist in subjects' use of the response
variables). Because the frequency table contained several cells with low or zero
frequencies, the constant delta (0.5) was added before it was submitted to the actual
analysis (see Goodman, 1970, p. 229).
The models were tested by the overall fit statistic G2. Only when G2 is not
significant, then the model provides an adequate description of the attribution data.
The results revealed that both the contrast model, G2 (438)=786.77, p50.001, and
the agreement hypothesis, G2 (437)=1997.09, p50.001, deviated significantly from
the data, even when their predictions were combined, G2 (434)=766.85, p50.001.
Most importantly, however, the joint model showed an excellent fit with the data,
G2 (435)=447.34, p=0.331.
STUDY 2
Athough the results of the first study strongly support the joint model, it is possible
that the results are due to an experimental demand effect. That is, the inclusion of

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F. Van Overwalle

response options which explicitly invited context attributions may have led subjects
to use these response categories more often than they would have done otherwise.
(In fact, the same objection holds for the standard contrast attributions.) To rule out
this possibility, we asked the subjects in the next study to write down causal
explanations in their own words so that these experimental demand effects were
minimized. From their written responses, subjects then categorized its content using
both contrast and context attribution categories. This procedure is a compromise
between totally constrained and unconstrained response formats that gets around
the problem of experimenters imposing their own interpretation for coding
responses (as subjects themselves may differ substantially in this interpretation,
cf. Weiner, 1986).
Method
Subjects
Subjects were 103 male and female freshmen who participated as partial requirement
of an introductory psychology course. The material was distributed and completed
during a regular class hour. The whole procedure took about 1 hour.
Procedure and Material
All booklets in this study had a (randomly chosen) individual number so that the
material from each subject could be kept together. In the first booklet, the same
material (stories and information variables) as in Study 1 was presented. After
reading a story and the information, subjects wrote down the most likely cause in a
second booklet which repeated only the story (without covariation information) and
left sufficient blank space for subjects' responses.
As soon as subjects finished this part of the experiment, the first booklet was
removed (so that the covariation information was unavailable) and a third booklet
was given. Subjects were asked to categorize features of their written attributions by
circling one or more attribution categories which were defined in the same way as the
independent (contrast and context) factors from Study 1. If subjects had not given an
explanation during the first part of the experiment, they should circle the category:
(0) there is no cause.
Only single attribution categories were provided in this experiment, because a
preliminary pilot study showed that subjects had difficulties in discriminating
between single and combined attributions. This is not surprising given that the task
was to categorize causes rather than to judge causality from covariation information.
Consider, for instance, the following fictitious written responses: `John has low IQ
and maths is easy' (i.e. a single person attribution and a single stimulus attribution)
as opposed to `John is poor at maths' (i.e. a combined attribution to the person and
the stimulus). Although these responses might well follow from different information
patterns, it is almost impossible to discriminate between them during categorization
because the definition that combined factors `are present together' applied, in fact, to
both responses.

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231

Eliminating Non-Causal Responses

While perusing the data, it was noted that the covariation information was
sometimes copied without any additional causal explanation. Thus, subjects' ratings
may represent an overestimate of the real frequency of causal explanations. To
correct this bias and to provide a stronger test of the joint model, two coders went
through the written reponses and indicated if subjects had simply repeated or
paraphrased the covariation information only, without adding a causal explanation.
If this was the case, the response was coded as a no cause category (this occurred for
7.44 per cent of the free responses in the second booklet). The judges evaluated only
the presence or absence of an explanation, and did not judge the plausibility of the
explanation itself. Intercoder agreement was high (95 per cent), and disagreements
were resolved by the author. This procedure effectively avoids that non-causal
responses were tallied as attributions, but it cannot eliminate the possibility that
some subjects copied covariation information in addition to their written
explanations, so that their attribution judgments were in part based on this
information also. However, our attempts to eliminate such responses were futile
because it was amost impossible to distinguish the pure covariation information
from the causal explanations, as both included very similar ideas (e.g. `people very
often buy perfumes' as an explanation for the high consistency information that
there were `always' high sales).
Results and Discussion
In total, 3219 causal categories were ticked. Table 3 shows the frequencies of the
causal categories in function of the eight information patterns. The bottom line
shows how often the no cause category was ticked by the subjects or coded by the
judges. It is clear that explanations were given most of the time, and that the no cause
category appears quite seldom (133/3219 or 4.1 per cent). Nonetheless, there was a
significant tendency for the subjects to withhold a causal explanation the more
contrasts were absent, from 2.0 per cent (three contrasts) to 6.7 per cent (no
contrasts), w2 (3)=11.84, p50.008. These proportions are quite similar to those of
the previous study.
Table 3 further shows that the categorizations of subjects' own written responses
closely conform to the predictions of the joint model. For almost each row in the
table, the predicted cell frequencies are higher than in the remaining cells of that row.
In contrast, the contrast model was supported only for the contrast attributions, and
the agreement hypothesis received not much support either. Moreover, as in Study 1,
there were generally more attributions to contrast categories (1960/3219=60.9 per
cent) than to context categories (34.9 per cent).
Exploratory Log-Linear Analysis
The data were then analysed using an hierarchical log-linear analysis. Because
subjects were not allowed to indicate conjunctions of causal categories, the
corresponding cells in the design were relegated to the status of structural zeros so

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F. Van Overwalle

Table 3. Frequencies of causal categories in function of consensus, distinctiveness and

consistency information: Study 2
Cs-Di-Cy
Contrast

HLH
---

HLL
--O

HHH
-S-

HHL
- SO

LLH
P--

LLL
P-O

LHH
PS -

LHL
PSO

Person
External
Stimulus
General
Occasion
Stable

46a
59
58a
114
26
88

27b
107
38b
67
145
7

38
66
141a
39
25
77

30
98
115b
24
138
4

175a
10
28
52
13
93

181b
17
24
32
100
16

163
22
76
23
13
69

150
22
118
11
92
9

No cause

28

22

12

20

15

10

18

419

413

398

429

386

380

384

410

Totals

Note. H and L denote whether consensus, distinctiveness and consistency are high or low; on the right of
the Contrast label are the corresponding factors for which a contrast is present. Predictions (1) of the
contrast model are in boldface, (2) of the joint model are underlined, and (3) of the agreement hypothesis
are denoted by a and b for the stronger and weaker effects involving high and low consistency respectively.
The maximum possible frequency in each cell is 206.

that they were not entered in model estimation and testing (see Iacobucci & McGill
1990). Results for confirmatory analyses are not presented, because the many
structural zeros made this analysis problematic. (Specifically, confirmatory analyses
with perfect simulation data fitted at a level too close to significance, p=0.1750.001,
to allow some reasonable variation in the real data.)
Table 2 shows the partial associations DG 2. The significance levels were again adjusted
using a Bonferroni method. Because there were 23 (covariation patterns)66 (single
categories) or 48 possible effects, the significance levels for DG 2 were divided by 48. As can
be seen in the table, all predictions of the joint model were clearly confirmed and closely
parallel those of the previous study. Consensus information reliably determined person and
external attributions, distinctiveness and generated stimulus and general attributions, and
consistency produced occasion and stable attributions. Except for one, all effects were
significant at 0.005 (after correction). The effects were generally stronger for contrast
categories (DG 2=47.64105.01) than for context categories (DG 2=12.1671.84). There
was again a small unexpected effect of high consistency on external categories, DG 2=11.62,
p50.05, which was not predicted by any of the models. Unlike Study 1, however, no
support was found for the agreement hypothesis. None of the higher-order interactions
yielded significance, which is consistent with all models, and which again suggests that the no
cause response is not a reliable individual effect, but rather due to the general tendency to
make more contrast attributions than context attributions.

Do Context Attributions Refer to More than Dispositions?

To explore to what extent the method of agreement generates causal explanations
other than dispositions of the person or stimulus, two coders went through all
subjects' written responses and rated whether the explanations involved an `enduring

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233

disposition or quality (talent) of the person which indicates what sort of person this
is'. This was done for all conditions involving low distinctiveness or high consensus,
and a person (rather than object) as actor or stimulus. Intercoder agreement was
adequate (94 per cent) and inconsistencies were resolved by discussion.
The results showed that, overall, only 17 per cent of the responses referred to
dispositions. This low incidence of dispositional inferences supports the existence of
additional context attributions. In line with Hilton et al. (1995), subjects generated
most dispositions given high consistency combined with either high consensus (51
per cent stimulus dispositions) or with low distinctiveness (43 per cent person
dispositions). However, given high consensus and low distinctiveness combined, the
number of dispositional attributions dropped markedly below 2 per cent. This latter
result seems to imply that generalizations to both the actor and the stimulus together
invited causal attributions other than dispositions. To provide some idea on the
content of the context attributions made by our subjects which do not include a
disposition, I list some examples: compliments to a guest were explained as a typical
habit at parties; pay raise was attributed to periodic salary increases; a person's
irritation with all participants at a meeting was explained by an earlier quarrel; a
girl's admiration for an artist was attributed to her being a fan, and so on. Clearly,
all these attributions seem intuitively plausible, but none seem to involve enduring
person or entity dispositions.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overall, the results provide clear support for the assumption that both Mill's method
of difference and agreement are applied in causal thinking, and that both standard
contrast factors and context factors are invoked as causal explanations. In
accordance with the joint model, contrast attributions were made to factors which
clearly `contrast' with the background (requiring Mill's method of difference),
whereas context attributions are made to an `invariant' causal background (requiring
Mill's method of agreement). These results further support earlier work on the joint
model by Van Overwalle and Heylighen (1995). Although the present findings may
not seem particularly original, by applying a methodology used in earlier research,
they reveal that recent models exemplifying either Mill's method of difference (e.g.
Cheng & Novick, 1990) or of agreement (e.g. Alicke & Insko, 1984; DiVitto &
McArthur, 1978; Hilton et al., 1995; Hortacsu, 1987) seem to capture only a part of
subjects' attributional thinking.
The agreement hypothesis that person or stimulus dispositions can serve as
context explanations, received little support because our subjects clearly preferred
the broader context explanations, and referred to dispositions in, at most, half of the
cases given disposition-inducing information. Cheng and Novick's (1990) contrast
model was confirmed only for the standard contrast attributions, because the model
excludes context factors as irrelevant. Proponents of the contrast model may,
however, argue that because alternative focal sets were not provided, our subjects
activated their own prior knowledge after observing invariant information, and so
inferred that the context factor showed contrasts in other focal sets. The problem
with this reasoning is that our subjects may have activated many different memories.

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F. Van Overwalle

Because they predominantly made attributions in line with the joint predictions, one
would have to assume that most subjects had invoked a similar type of alternative
focal set. This is very unlikely, and largely rules out an explanation in terms of
alternative focal sets. Although alternative information is not necessary to make
attributions to context factors, the present results do not deny the possibility that
perceivers invoke such information to further identify the features of the cause more
precisely (e.g. What sort of external context is this?). In this latter sense, the contrast
model may be correct. Future research should explore more directly to what extent
prior knowlege might be spontaneously activated and how it might influence causal
inferences to context factors.
Implications and Limitations
The present finding that people make attributions to context factors in addition to
the standard contrast factors is consistent with earlier investigations which
documented the important consequences of causal attributions (including context
factors) on emotions, depression, marriage, consumer behaviour and many other
aspects of psychological well-being. For example, Weiner (1986) reported that
external attributions have an hedonic function in that they minimize blame to oneself
after negative life events and so protect people's self-esteem. It has also been
demonstrated that stable and general attributions strongly determine people's
expectations and feelings of hope and hopelessness (Weiner, 1986), and also may
exacerbate symptoms of depression (Abramson et al., 1978; Abramson, Metalsky, &
Alloy, 1989). In the domain of marriage, Bradbury and Fincham (1990) reported
that attributions of marital conflict to stable and general factors within the spouse
decreased marital adjustment and satisfaction. To our knowledge, the joint model is
the first theoretical attempt to address the question of how people arrive at context
attributions; a question which may be quite important given the severe psychological
consequences these types of causes may have.
The present research also has limitations. One of the most obvious shortcomings is
that information was provided through summary sentences, and that responses were
given by means of predetermined categories. Hence, the question remains, to what
extent can the present results be generalized outside the laboratory. There is some
evidence indicating that they can be. Our findings from Study 2 suggest that the same
or at least a very closely analogous process operates when using less constrained
response formats.
Another limitation was the finding that context attributions were made less
frequently than contrast attributions. This is consistent with Mill's (1872/1973)
suggestion that the method of agreement is `inferior' to the method of difference in
causal explanation, because the method of agreement cannot assure that the inferred
cause is the only factor that co-occurs with the invariant effect. Many other context
factors may remain undetected. Given that various events in real-life occur against a
relatively unchangeable background, these can all be invoked as a possible context
explanation. Although the potential infinity in causal explanation may be
subjectively experienced as more compelling for context causes than for contrast
causes, it is in principle equally problematic. For example, a person attribution may
be due to an abundance of possible factors, including traits, genetic make-up,

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235

somatic elements, psychological capabilities, personal histories and memories, and so

on. Hence, there is no such thing as the ultimate cause, and for both contrast and
context causes the perceiver may infinitely regress to deeper explanatory levels on the
basis of information from other focal sets.
Although this study demonstrated that Mill's method of agreement is involved in
making context attributions, it did not address the more specific question of exactly
how perceivers apply it. Therefore, it is possible that subjects' context attributions
did not result from a direct application of the method of agreement, but rather
resulted from a sort of second order decision after it was decided that the contrast
factor was not the cause. However, if the present extension of Cheng and Novick's
(1990) probabilistic analysis is correct (see footnote 2), this seems unlikely because
the probabilistic formulation assumes that the influence of the context must be
estimated before the influence of the contrast factor can be judged. Moreover, some
researchers have recently argued that, at a more fundamental level, causal inferences
may result from a totally different process, akin to associative theories of learning
and feedforward connectionist models (see Allen, 1993, for a review). This proposal,
if correct, has the advantage that Mill's two methods naturally follow from one and
the same learning algorithm which incorporates both contrast and context
attributions (see Van Overwalle, 1996).
In conclusion, although this study clearly demonstrated that context attributions
are used given invariant information patterns, there remain some unresolved
questions about when and under which conditions their use is preferred, what their
precise content is besides person or entity dispositions, and what the underlying
process is that gives rise to them.

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