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Contents
01 Adong v Cheong Seng Gee (1922).....................................1
02 People of the Philippines v. Mora Dumpo...........................1
03 Wong Woo Yu v. Vivo..........................................................2
04 In Re Mays Estate.............................................................3
05 Lazaro Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee......................................4
06 Tenchavez v. Escano..........................................................4
07 Van Dorn v. Romillo...........................................................5
08 Pilapil v Ibay- Somera........................................................7
09 Quita v. CA.........................................................................9
10 Republic vs. CA..................................................................9
11 Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen vs Republic.........................10

CFI-Zamboanga held that evidence did not sufficiently establish the

Chinese marriage, but because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to PH
as son of Cheong Boo, he should share in the estate as a natural child.
Marriage was proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter.

01 Adong v Cheong Seng Gee (1922)

ISSUE & RULING: WON the Chinese marriage is valid
FACTS:
Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga in 1919. His
estate was claimed by: 1) Cheong Seng Gee, alleged legitimate child by a
marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit in China in 1895; and 2) Mora
Adong, alleged wife by marriage in 1896 in Basilan who had daughters by
Cheong Boo.

NO. Under Sec IV of the Marriage Law (General Order 68): All marriages
contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the
country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands. To
establish a valid foreign marriage under this comity provision, it is
necessary to: 1) prove the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact; and then 2) prove the foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

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As ruled by SCOTUS in Sy Joc Lieng v Encarnacion (1910), a case directly in
point: A Philippine marriage followed by 40 years of uninterrupted marital
life should not be impugned and discredited after the death of the husband
and administration of his estate through an alleged prior Chinese marriage,
save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral
conviction of the existence of such impediment.

WON Dumpo should be held criminally liable for bigamy. NO. CFI judgment
reversed, Dumpo should not be held guilty for bigamy.

RATIO
Substantive (relevant)

In this case there is no competent testimony what the laws of Amoy, China
on marriage were in 1895. As in Encarnacion there is lacking proof so clear,
strong, and unequivocal to produce a moral conviction of the existence of
the alleged prior Chinese marriage.

02 People of the Philippines v. Mora Dumpo

/ G.R. No. L-42581 / October 2, 1935 / J. Recto

The Court stated that for the crime of bigamy to exist, the alleged second
marriage should have all the essential requisites for a valid marriage, and
would be valid if not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

The Court refused to take judicial notice regarding the requisites necessary
for the validity of a marriage between Muslims according to Islamic rites,
stating that the requisites for a valid Islamic marriage, being considered as
having different or additional requirements to civil marriages, must be
subject to proof in every particular case.

FACTS
Hassan and Dumpo, both Muslims, were legally married in Zamboanga
according to Islamic rites. Subsequently, it was alleged that Dumpo
contracted another marriage with Sabdapal, another Muslim man, after
which they both lived as husband and wife. Dumpo was then prosecuted
for bigamy in the CFI Zamboanga, and was held guilty by the CFI.

Records of the case also show that it was established by the defense that
the alleged second marriage with Sabdapal was null and void according to
Islamic rites on the ground that Dumpos father did not give his consent
thereto, hence there was no bigamy in the case.

ISSUE / HELD

The case at bar presented the testimony of Tahari, an Imam or Islamic

priest who was authorized to solemnize Islamic marriages. Imam Tahari
stated for the record that the consent of the brides father, or in the
absence thereof, the tribal chief where the bride belongs, is an
INDISPENSABLE requirement for the validity of a marriage contract. The
Court stated that it was easy for the prosecution to refute the testimony of
Imam Tahari by presenting their own Imam or other witnesses to contradict
Taharis testimony of the requirement of the brides fathers consent, but
the prosecution failed to do so.
Furthermore, it was argued by the prosecution that, granting the absolute
necessity of the requisite of the brides fathers consent for a marriage to
be valid, tacit or implied compliance must be presumed because it did not
appear that Dumpos father had signified his opposition to the alleged
marriage after he had been informed of the celebration of the second
marriage.

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second ceremony lived openly with her second husband, this with her
father's full knowledge and at least tacit consent, for many months.
However, the Court stated that the affirmative presumption should NOT be
established because Dumpos father, Jalmani, stated in court that he did
not give his consent to his daughters alleged second marriage as he was
not informed thereof, and that in any case, he would have vehemently
disapproved of the same considering that he is aware that Dumpos first
marriage was not yet dissolved.

Upon these findings, the dissenting Justice held that the testimonial
evidence of Tahari should not have been given serious consideration, and
that there was enough evidence for a successful prosecution for the crime
of bigamy to have taken place.

DISSENT (J. Hull):

Under the then-effective Marriage Law (Act No. 3613), marriages between
[Muslims] may be performed in accordance with the rites or practices of
their religion, and it was affirmed that the Court cannot take automatic
judicial notice of such matters, as it was subject to proof, as is any foreign
law.

However, Justice Hull took notice and put doubt on the credibility and
credentials of Imam Tahari, a person supposedly learned in the law,
considering the fact that Tahari did not know his age, was an illiterate
fisherman, and stated that he has performed [only] two marriages.
Furthermore, it was stated that Tahari was not asked any questions as to
whether there was a difference between the marriage of a young woman
living with her parents or a woman who had been emancipated.
Meanwhile, the prosecution presented evidence to the point that the
alleged second marriage was solemnized by a 70-year old Imam living in
the vicinity of the contracting parties, lending credence to the [potential]
validity of the second marriage and the fulfillment of the requisite of the
crime of bigamy.

Furthermore, it was noted that the Quran, the Islamic holy book, had no
quotation regarding the essentials of a valid Islamic marriage ceremony.
Also, if consent were in fact necessary, it can well be presumed from the
subsequent actions of the father of Dumpo. She left his house and after the

03 Wong Woo Yu v. Vivo

WONG WOO YIU alias NG YAO, petitioner-appellee, vs.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ETC., ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Doctrine: Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Facts:
The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to
be legally married to Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a
non-quota immigrant, which was later on affirmed by the Board of
Commissioners.
However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed
BSI No. 3 and ordered petitioner to be excluded from the country.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of
merit. She then filed the instant petition formandamuswith preliminary
injunction (considered as certiorari) before the Manila CFI.
After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a
written stipulation of facts, the courta quodeclared valid the original
decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner from the
country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.
It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came
to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time to join her husband Perfecto
Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China onJanuary 15, 1929;
that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader;
thatthe new set of Board of Commissioners found that petitioners claim
was without basis, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of Perfecto

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Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared thathe first visited China in
1935and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim
that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated August 9,
1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941,
although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China
in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto
Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when
he wasmerely four years old so that computed from his date of
birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.

clear that petitioners marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized in this

jurisdiction.

Issue: W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her

marriage and can thus be admitted as non-quota immigrant in the
country?

FACTS
Petitioner Alice May is one of six children of Sam and Fannie May. Upon
Fannie's death, Alice petitioned for letters of administration over the estate
of her mother, which was opposed by Sam as he is the surviving husband.

Petitioner and her sisters contended that Sam is not the surviving spouse
of their mother because although their marriage was valid in Rhode Island
where they got married, it was not valid in New York because Sam and
Fannie were uncle and niece. When they got married in a Jewish ceremony
in RI (the couple were Jews), there were statutes in RI prohibiting the
marriage of an uncle and niece, but excluding Jews.

The Surrogate's Court granted the letters of administration holding that

marriage was void in New York as opposed to natural law and subdivision 3
of section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law.

At the Appellate Division, this was reversed, on the ground that the
relationship between uncle and niece was not so close to be repugnant to
natural law and the statute lacks express language which gives it
extraterritorial force.

ISSUE / HELD
W/N the marriage is valid in New York. YES

Held:
No.A lot of discrepancies werefound in the statements made by petitioner
and her alleged husband in the investigations conducted by the
immigration authorities. Also,the only basis in support of petitioners claim
that she is Blas wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of
substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family
rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in
order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be
solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a
justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any
denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public
Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of
petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the
same is not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as
reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our
new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is
valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in
the Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no
proof was presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being
the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of
the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as
our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the
officers mentioned therein, and a village leader is not one of them, it is

Decision appealed from reversed.

04 In Re Mays Estate
305 NY 486 (1953); Court of Appeals of the State of New York

RATIO
The said statute does not expressly regulate a marriage solemnized in
another State where the marriage was legal. Both parties to the marriage
were adherents of the Jewish faith, and according to Jewish tradition which
was proved in this case, an uncle and niece may marry.

Had the Legislature been so disposed it could have declared by appropriate

enactment that marriages contracted in another State - which if entered
into in New York would be void - shall have no force in the State.

The general rule is that a marriage valid where performed is valid

everywhere. The two exceptions are

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Express prohibition in a statute

Offensive to natural law

Dissent
The marriage is against public policy as incestuous and is illegal in 47
states of the Union.

05 Lazaro Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee

(1966) GR-L18176
FACTS
Lazaro (PH citizen) was allegedly married to Chae Kyung Lee (Korean) in a
marriage that was solemnized in Pusan, Korea on March 15, 1953.
Lazaro seeks the annulment of said marriage on the grounds that Chae
Kyung Lee was already previously married.
Evidence presented by Lazaro:
Marriage Certificate Exhibit D
Unsigned Police Clearance Exhibit A (translated into English
Exhibit B). [Symbol] He discovered in 1958 that said Police
Clearance indicated that she was previously married.
Alleged testimony of Chae Kyung Lee that she had lived with three
other men prior to Lazaro.
Lower court dismissed the action for annulment on the grounds of (a) lack
of jurisdiction (b) there was insufficient evidence to prove the fact of her
prior marriage.
ISSUES: (1) Do PH courts have jurisidiction (YES) (2) Was her incapacity to
marry proven with sufficient evidence (NO)
SC: RE Jurisdiction
Subject matter is annulment of marriage which is within the jurisdiction of
the CFI.
They acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff when he filed the
action.
Personal status is an action in rem. The res in the present case is the
relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over
the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not
the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis. Indeed,

marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein
involves and affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a
vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the
marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another
and the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly,
that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for
annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is
domiciled in, or a national of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino,
domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction
over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the
parties.
IN THIS CASE: Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled
therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts.
True that defendant was a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not
deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her
marriage to plaintiff herein.
RE evidence
Evidence was insufficient to prove that she was incapacitated to marry:
Police clearance was unsigned and the record does not show who prepared
it and that he had personal knowledge of the truth of the entry concerning
defendant's status on February 15, 1953. Defendant was also a native of
Seoul and not Pusan, so Exhibit A could, at best, be no more than hearsay
evidence.
Also: based on plaintiffs testimony regarding the alleged confession of the
defendant, it can only be concluded that she lived with several other men
but not that she was necessarily married to any of them.

06 Tenchavez v. Escano
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

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Vicenta Escano coming from a well to de Cebu family exchanged marriage
vows in secret with Pastor Tenchavez, an engineer and ex army officer of
undistinguished stock. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Her parents found out and a priest suggested a recelebration to validate

what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. It did not
however took place because Vicenta through a letter was told that Pastor
had a relationship with Pacita Noel, their go-between.

As a result, Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape

from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.
She went to the United States without informing her husband and in the
same year, she filed a verified complaint for divorce in Nevada, on the
ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October
1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by
the said tribunal.

Thereafter, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada

and has acquired American citizenship.

Tenchavez filed thus a case gainst Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto
and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages.

WON the marriage was valid? Yes

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage

shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several
of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed,
the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person
who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so,
and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

WON the marriage can be dissolved? NO

At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law,
and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386),
already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition

and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.

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For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a
foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a
patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:

decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery"

(Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

07 Van Dorn v. Romillo

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign

divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad
and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez

should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the
policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary

consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is
technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a

07 Alice Reyes Van Dorn v. Hon. Manuel Romillo, Presiding Judge,

RTC Pasay City and Richard Upton / G.R. No. L-68470 / October 8,
1985 / J. Melencio-Herrera
FACTS

Alice Reyes Van Dorn a Filipino citizen, married Richard Upton, an

American citizen, in Hong Kong in 1972. After their marriage, they
established their residence in the Philippines and had two children
here. However, they were divorced in Nevada, US in 1982. After that,
[the presumption was that Alice stayed in Nevada for some time]
Alice remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed a suit against Alice in the RTC Pasay City,
stating that the Galleon Shop, Alices business in Ermita, Manila, is
conjugal property of the parties. Richard therefore asked that Alice
be ordered to render an accounting of the business and that Richard
should be declared as having the right to manage the Galleon Shop.
Alice, on the other hand, moved to dismiss the petition, stating that
Richards cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the court of Nevada, which held that
Richard acknowledged that Alice and Richard had no community
property as of June 11, 1982.

RTC: DENIED MTD, held that the property involved is located in the
Philippines, therefore the divorce decree in Nevada has no bearing in
the case. Hence, the resort of Alice to the remedy of certiorari.

ISSUE / HELD

WON Richard should continue to be considered as one of Alices

heirs, disregarding the foreign divorce decree obtained in Nevada.
NO. Petition of Alice granted. It would be unjust for Richard, who is
considered to be divorced from his wife Alice according to Nevada
law, to continue being Alices husband and heir in the Philippines on
account of the stated public policy and laws of the Philippines.

RATIO

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Procedural
Generally, the denial of an MTD in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. Certiorari and prohibition should not be the usual
remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the RTC.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the
lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, the Supreme Court may
choose to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
Court held therefore that prohibition would lie in the case at bar since it
would have been useless to proceed with the proceedings. We consider the
petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due
course.
Substantive (relevant)
Alice argues that Richard is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property (i.e. the Galleon Shop) because of the representation
that he made in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada court that they
had no community of property, and that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds. Hence, Richards claim was barred by
prior judgment.
Richard argues, however, that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada
court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its
declared national policy. The acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot,
especially if it is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

therefore binding to Richard as an American citizen. However, the

contention that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to the laws and public policy of the Philippines.
Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage pursuant to the national law of the United States,
Richard is no longer Alices husband. He would therefore have no standing
to sue in the case below as Alices husband. As he is bound by the decision
of the Nevada court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.
According to the Court, to maintain that Richard is still Alices husband
under Philippine laws, and is still subject to the obligations of a wife under
Article 109 of the Civil Code despite Richard not being Alices husband
under Nevada law cannot be considered just. Alice should not be obligated
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to a
non-existent husband in this case, Richard. As a result, Richard should
also not continue to be one of Alices heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. Alice should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

The Supreme Court, however, stated that it is not necessary to determine

WON the property relations after the marriage of Alice and Richard were
absolute or relative community property, complete separate of property, or
any other property regime. The pivotal fact for the Court to determine was
the enforceability of the Nevada divorce of the parties.
It was found by the Court that the Nevada District Court, which decreed
the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over Alice and Richard during the
trial of the case. It was also shown that Richard gave his authorization to
his legal counsel to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility,
understanding that there was neither community property nor community
obligations.
There was no question, according to the Court, that the Nevada divorce
was valid in any of the 50 states of the United States of America, and it is

08 Pilapil v Ibay- Somera

Imelda Pilapil v Hon Corona Ibay- Somera (RTC Judge); Hon Luis Victor (City
fiscal of Manila); and Erich Geiling
June 30, 1989
J. Regalado

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Topic: Divorce and Separation FC 26

Facts:

In 1979, Imelda Pilapil (Filipina) and Erich Geiling (German) were married in
Germany. They lived together in Malate. In 1983, Geiling initiated a divorce
proceeding in Germany. Pilapil, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation and support in the RTC of Manila.

On January 15, 1986, the German court promulgated a decree of

divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
records show that under German Law, the court was competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of the marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the law of Germany.

On June 27, 1986, more than 5 months after the divorce decree,
Geiling filed 2 complaints for adultery, alleging that while still married,
Pilapil had an affair with 2 different men. The city fiscal recommended the
filing of 2 complaints for adultery.

Pilapil filed a petition with the Sec of Justice asking for the resolution to be
set aside. SoJ gave due course to both petitions. Respondent judge merely
reset the date of arraignment and thereafter ordered the arraignment of
the two accused. Pilapil refused to be arraigned and she and her lawyer
were held in contempt. Later, she pleaded not guilty.

On Oct. 27, 1987, Pilapil filed this civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for TRO. The petition is anchored on the ground that the court
is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint.

Issue: WON Geiling had capacity to institute a criminal complaint for

adultery after obtaining a divorce decree No. He is no longer the offended
spouse.

Ratio:

Under RPC 344, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. In prosecutions for
adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse and nobody else. It necessarily follows that
such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and such status or capacity
must exist at the time he initiates the action. He must still be married
to the accused spouse at the time of the filing of the complaint.

After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer

has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where
the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been commenced, a divorce subsequently

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granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion.

Since private respondent is no longer the husband of Pilapil at the

time he filed suit, he had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case. Since respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned, in view of the nationality principle.

Complaints dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

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09 Quita v. CA
G.R. No. 124862
22 December 1998
Facts:
Fe D. Quita (Fe) and Arturo T. Padlan (Arturo), both Filipinos, were married
in the Philippines on 18 May 1941, but did not have any common children.

In the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, it was held that aliens may obtain
divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they
are valid according to their national law.
In the present case, it was established that at the time Fe obtained the
divorce from Arturo, she was already an American citizen.
Consequently, the divorce was valid and at the time of Arturos death, she
was no longer his spouse.

On 23 July 1954, Fe obtained a final judgment of divorce from Arturo in San

Francisco, California, USA and thereafter, remarried two (2) more times.
On 16 April 1972, Arturo died intestate.
On 31 August 1972, a certain Lino Javier Inciong filed a Petition with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company.
Blandina Dandan (Blandina), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo,
and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida, and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, children of Arturo, opposed the Petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which opposition was
granted.
On 7 October 1987, Fe moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of
Arturo and the distribution of the estate.
Ruling of the Trial Court: The heirs of Arturo are Fe and his children.
Pursuant to the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao, a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the New Civil
Code is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
Consequently, the marriage between Fe and Arturo subsisted until the
latters death. Accordingly, Arturos second marriage to Blandina is void.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA): The CA nullified the ruling of the
trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Blandina should have been considered the heir
instead of Fe.

10 Republic vs. CA
October 26, 1993
J. Vitug
Facts:

James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States

of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who
herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.
On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma.
Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and
nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior
to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents,
gave consent to the adoption.
RTC: granted petition. Review on Certiorari was filed with SC
SC referred the case to CA
CA: affirmed RTC

Issue: Whether or not spouses are qualified to adopt under Philippine Law?
Anthony cannot. Lenita can but the spouses should adopt jointly.

Held:

Held: Yes. The divorce between Fe and Arturo is valid since at the time it
was obtained, Fe was no longer a Filipino citizen.
Ratio:

Husband Anthony Hughes clearly cannot adopt based on The

Family Code

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Private International Law Digests (Day 7)

Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt :

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to

the approval of the final accounts rendered upon
the termination of their guardianship relation;

(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime

involving moral turpitude;

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to

adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate

child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen

and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter.

Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions

may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided
by law.
o Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under
any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3)
of the aforequoted article
Lenita can qualify pursuant to 3(a). The problem however is Article
185 of the same Code:
o Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:

(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own

illegitimate child; or(2) When one spouse seeks to
adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint
adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be
read along together with Article 184.
Court went into the history of the law:
o PD 603, old law on adoption, exactly adopted Art 336 of
Civil Code which uses the word may in jointly adopting
thereby not obligatory.
o Amended by EO 91 Pres Aquino wherein it is mandatory to
jointly adopt when one of them is an alien. It was silent
when both were of the same nationality.
o Family Code resolved the uncertainty by providing for
Article 185 quoted above.
o On parental authority Art 186 provides:

Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt

or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the
o

other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by

the spouses in accordance with this Code.
Other arguments:
o Anthony should be considered merely a nominal or formal
party

SC: Cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status

that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity
and filiation with corresponding rights and duties
that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but
not necessarily confined to, the exercise of
parental authority, use of surname of the adopter
by the adopted, as well as support and
successional rights. These are matters that
obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to
the parties.
Final note of SC: We are not unmindful of the possible benefits,
particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring not so
much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted
children themselves. We also realize that in proceedings of this
nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral,
social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on
adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the
law is clear and no other choice is given, we must obey its full
mandate.

11 Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen vs Republic

11 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE MINOR CHARLES
JOSEPH BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN and
ERLINDA G. BLANCAFLOR vs. Republic
G.R. No. L-21951
November 27, 1964
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Facts:
1) Petitioners-appellants Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen and Erlinda G.
Blancaflor are husband and wife. They filed an application for the
adoption of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks in the
Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.

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Private International Law Digests (Day 7)

a.

Charles, born on February 16, 1960, is Erlindas natural

child. His father abandoned mother and child after the
latters birth and allegedly went back to the United States.
b. Uggi is a Danish citizen who has been granted permanent
residence in the Philippines. A former employee of
Scandinavian Airlines System, he is now Manager of M. Y.
Travel International Hongkong Ltd., with a monthly salary
of P1,200.00 plus allowances.
c. It does not appear that either Uggi or Erlinda has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
d. Charles has been living with Uggi and Erlinda ever since
their marriage on June 2, 1962. Uggi has treated Charles as
his son, and the latter calls him Daddy. The court noted
that although Uggi and Erlinda may have their own
children in the future, the adoption may strengthen, rather
than disrupt, future domestic relations.
2) The court denied Uggi and Erlindas application.
a. The court cited a previous case before it (Sp. Proc. No. D00011, adoption of Benigno Lim) wherein it ruled that a
Filipino cannot adopt an alien (Chinese) minor. The
adoption would not confer Philippine citizenship on the
Chinese (though it could legalize his stay in this country). It
was also stated that conversely, an alien cannot adopt a
Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a
citizen of the aliens country.
b. The court concluded that as Uggi is a Danish subject, he
cannot legally adopt Charles, whose holds Philippine
citizenship, following that of his natural mother Erlinda.
3) Uggi and Erlinda appealed to the SC.

Issue:
Should Uggi and Erlindas application for adoption be granted? YES.
Held:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and
the court a quo is directed to allow the adoption sought. Without costs.
Ratio:
1) Uggi and Erlindas application for adoption should be granted.

a.

b.

The Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court

seemingly denied Uggi and Erlindas application for
adoption solely because the same would not result in the
loss of Charles Filipino citizenship and the acquisition by
him of the citizenship of his adopter (Danish).
Unfortunately, the court did not expound the reasons for its
opinion. But it is clear that, if pursued to its logical
consequences, the appealed judgment would operate to
impose a further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens
beyond those required by law.
The criterion adopted by the lower court would demand, as
a condition for the approval of the adoption, that the
process should result in the acquisition, by the person
adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent.
This finds no support in the law.
i. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief,
Art. 335 of the Civil Code only disqualifies from
being adopters those aliens that are either: (a)
non-residents or (b) who are residents, but the
Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic
relations with their government. Outside of these 2
cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a
foreigner from adopting a person under our law.
ii. In Ching Leng v. Galang (1958), the SC held that
the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political,
and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it
should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the
Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil
law to determine how or when citizenship in a
foreign state is to be acquired.
iii. The disapproval of the adoption of an alien child in
order to forestall circumvention of our exclusion
laws does not warrant, denial of the adoption of a
Filipino minor by qualified alien adopting parents,
since it is not shown that our public policy would be
thereby subverted.