FRANCISCO, ZESYL AVIGAIL P.

11384301
TRANSPORTATION LAW G03
ATTY. KERWIN GARCIA

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CASE 1: PLANTERS PRODUCTS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 226 SCRA 476, 1993
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FACTS:
1. Planters Products, Inc. (Planters) purchased from Mitsubishi International Corporation (Mitsubishi) of New York USA, 9,329.7069 metric tons (M/T) of Urea 46% fertilizer which the latter
shipped in bulk aboard M/V Sun Plum owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki
Kaisha (KKKK) from Alaska, U.S.A., to Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union, Philippines. A
time charter-party on the vessel M/V "Sun Plum" was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner.
2. The Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision of the
shipper, then the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with three (3) layers of
tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds and the hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage.
3. Petitioner unloaded the cargo its steelbodied dump trucks. Each time a dump truck was filled
up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin before it was transported to the consignee's warehouse located 50 meters from the wharf. Petitioner's warehouse was made of corrugated galvanized iron (GI) sheets, with an opening at the front where the dump trucks entered and unloaded
the fertilizer on the warehouse floor. Tarpaulins and GI sheets were placed in-between and alongside the trucks to contain spillages of the ferilizer.
4. It took 11 days for PPI to unload the cargo. A private marine and cargo surveyor was hired by
PPI to determine the outturn of the cargo shipped. Survey report revealed a shortage of 106.726
M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt.
5. PPI sent a claim letter carrier KKK for P245,969.31 representing the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods shipped and the diminution in value of that portion said to have been contaminated with dirt. Then they files an action for damages with Court of First Instance of Manila. Defendant carrier argued that policy governing common carriers does not apply to them because
they have become a common carrier by reason of the provisions of the charter-party.
6. CFI Manila ruled in favor plaintiff. CFI ruled that a common carrier is presumed negligent in
case of loss or damage of goods it contracts to transport, all that a shipper has to do in a suit to
recover for loss or damage is to show receipt by the carrier of the goods and to delivery by it of
less than what it received. Defendant failed to destroy presumption of negligence, hence liable.
7. Court of Appeals reversed lower court and absolved carrier from liability for the value of the
cargo that was lost or damaged. It ruled that the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private
respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common carrier by reason of the time charterer-party and that the Civil Code provisions on common carriers which set forth a presumption of
negligence does not apply in this case.

ISSUES:
1.Whether a common carrier becomes a private carrier by reason of a charter-party?
2. Whether the shipowner in the instant case was able to prove that he had exercised that degree
of diligence required of him under the law?

RULING: Petition Denied.

1. A Public Carrier remains as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the case of a
time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessels and its crew,
as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes a private, at least insofar as the particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.
A "charter-party" is defined as a contract by which an entire ship, or some principal part
thereof, is let by the owner to another person for a specified time or use; a contract of affreightment by which the owner of a ship or other vessel lets the whole or a part of her to a merchant or
other person for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight. While the term "common or public carrier" is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil
Code. The distinction between a "common or public carrier" and a "private or special carrier" lies
in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction, not a part of
the general business or occupation, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee, the person
or corporation offering such service is a private carrier.

2. Yes. respondent carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima
facie presumption of negligence. The Captain of the vessel testified that before the fertilizer was
loaded, the four (4) hatches of the vessel were cleaned, dried and fumigated; After completing
the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship's holds, the steel pontoon hatches were closed and
sealed with iron lids, then covered with three (3) layers of serviceable tarpaulins which were tied
with steel bonds; The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as
the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the
ship's boom.
The period during which private respondent was to observe the degree of diligence required of it as a public carrier began from the time the cargo was unconditionally placed in its
charge after the vessel's holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and
until the vessel reached its destination and its hull was reexamined by the consignee, but prior to
unloading. Such is clear from the limitation clause agreed upon by the parties, that the loading,
stowing, trim min and discharge of the cargo was to be done by the charterer, free from all risk
and expense to the carrier.
Respondent carrier showed that it was highly improbable for sea water to seep into the vessel's
holds during the voyage since the hull of the vessel was in good condition and the hatches were
tightly closed and firmly sealed, making the M/V "Sun Plum" seaworthy to carry the cargo it was
chartered for. If there was loss or contamination of the cargo, it was more likely to have occurred
while the same was being transported from the ship to the dump trucks and finally to the consignee's warehouse. The Court noted that vessel arrived in the month of July and it was also rain-

ing from time to time at the harbor area while the cargo was being discharge, hence the risk of
loss or damage considering the high soluble quality of fertilizer as it was unloaded to the dump
trucks and passed enroute to the consignees warehouse. Respondent carrier has sufficiently
proved the inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration; as
well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss.

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CASE 2: LOADSTAR SHIPPING VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 315 SCRA 339
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FACTS:
1. Petitioner Loadstar Shipping received for shipment on board its M/V Cherokee several boxes
and crates of wood amounting to P6,067,178, which were insured by Manila Insurance Co.
(MIC), while the vessel was insured with Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) for P4
Million.
2. Nov. 20, 1984, the vessel with its cargo sank off Limasawa Island, on its way to Manila from
Agusan del Norte.
3. LOADSTAR ignored the consignees claim. As the insurer, MIC paid P6,075,000 to the insured in full settlement of its claim, and subrogated the insured.
4. MIC filed a complaint against LOADSTAR and PGAI alleging that the sinking was due to the
fault and negligence of LOADSTAR and its employees. But LOADSTAR denied any liability for
the lost of the shippers goods and claimed that the sinking of its vessel was due to force majeure.
PGAI was later dropped as party defendant when it paid the insurance proceeds to LOADSTAR.
5. RTC Manila ruled in favor of MIC. LOADSTAR elevated the case to Court of Appeals, which
affirmed trial court decision in toto. CA ruled that LOADSTAR cannot be considered a private
carrier on the sole ground that there was a single shipper; As a common carrier, it is the Code of
Commerce not the Civil Code which should be applied in determining the rights and liabilities of
the parties; That the vessel was not seaworthy because it was undermanned; that the vessel sank,
not because of force majeure, but because it was not seaworthy; that when MIC paid the shipper
for the goods insured, it was subrogated to the latters rights as against the carrier, LOADSTAR;
and that there was a clear breach of contract of carriage when the shippers goods never reached
their destination. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUES:
1. Is the M/V Cherokee a private or a common carrier?
2. WON LOADSTAR observe due and/or ordinary diligence?

RULING:
1. LOADSTAR is a common carrier. It is not necessary that the carrier be issued a certificate of
public convenience and this public character is not altered by the fact that the carriage of goods
in question was periodic, occasional, episodic or unscheduled. There was no charter party in this
case. The bills of lading failed to show any special arrangement, but only a general provision to

the effect that the M/V Cherokee was a general cargo carrier. The fact that the vessel was carrying a particular type of cargo for one shipper is not reason enough to convert the vessel from a
common carrier to a private carrier, especially where, as in this case, it was shown that the vessel
was also carrying passengers.
Art. 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. LOADSTAR, fits the
definition of a common carrier.

2. No. The vessel was not seaworthy when it embarked on its voyage and it was not sufficiently
manned. A vessel must be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient
number of competent officers and crew to be seaworthy. Its failure to maintain its vessel in a
seaworthy condition involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in
Art. 1755 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the doctrine of limited liability does not apply where
there was negligence on the part of the vessel owner or agent. In this case, LOADSTAR was negligent in not maintaining a seaworthy vessel and in having allowed its vessel to said despite
knowledge of an approaching typhoon. The wind condition in the area where it sank was determined to be moderate, hence it did not sink because of force majeure.

Moreover, the stipulation in the case at bar, which effectively reduces the common carriers liability for the loss or destruction of the goods to a degree less than extraordinary, that is, the
carrier is not liable for any loss or damage to shipments made at owners risk. Such stipulation is
obviously null and void for being contrary to public policy. Hence, when MIC paid the shipper, it
was subrogated to all the rights which the latter has against the common carrier, LOADSTAR.

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CASE 3: JAPAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 295 SCRA 19
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FACTS:
1. Private Respondents Jose Miranda, Enrique Agana, Maria Angela Nina Agana and Adelia
Francisco boarded JAL from California to Manila. As an incentive for travelling with JAL, the
flights of said respondents were to make an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at the expense of
the airlines.
2. Private Respondents stayed in Japan on June 14, 1991. The following day, their flight to Manila was cancelled indefinitely due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the Ninoy Aquino International Airport was inaccessible to airline traffic.
3. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers and also paid for their hotel expenses for the
unexpected overnight stay. But when their June 16, 1991 flight was cancelled again, JAL informed the private respondents that it would no longer defray for their hotel accommodation expenses during their stay in Narita.

4. NAIA was only reopened to airline traffic on June 22, therefore, private respondents were
forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses from June 16 to June 21, and they
arrived in Manila June 22.
5. Private respondents filed an action for damages against JAL before RTC Quezon City, claiming that JAL failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to its stranded passengers.
But JAL denied this allegation and averred that airline passengers have no vested right to there
amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure.
6. Trial Court ruled in favor or private respondents and held JAL liable to pay for damages of
P1,246,936 to Aganas and P320,616.31 to Miranda as actual, moral and exemplary damages and
to pay attorneys fees of P200,000.
7. JAL appealed to CA but CA affirmed Trial Court, with modification of lowering the damages
awarded to P200,000 each to the private respondents and exemplary damages of P300,000 and
P100,000 attorneys fees. JALs Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON JAL, as a common carrier, has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination, even if delay was
caused by force majeure?

RULING:
NO, JAL has no obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination considering the delay was caused by force
majeure. But JAL is not completely absolved from liability.
There is no question that when a common carrier is unable to fulfil its obligation because
of force majeure, the general rule is that it cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. JAL was prevented form perfuming its obligation due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses incurred by the stranded
passengers cannot be charged to JAL. To hold JAL liable in the absence of bad faith or negligence by reason of fortuitous event is too much burden to assume.

But JAL cannot be completely absolved from liability because it had a duty to make the
necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available connecting flight
to Manila since they bought tickets from the United States with Manila as their destination. JAL
failed to do its obligation to look after its passengers when it declassifies them from transit passengers to new passengers and were placed on the waiting list from June 20 to June 24. The fortuitous event does not excuse JAL from its obligation to make the necessary arrangements to
transport private respondents on its first flight available to Manila. Since it had a contract to
transport them from the United States to Manila as their final destination. Therefore, an award of
P100,000 nominal damages each is awarded to the Private Respondents and P50,000 attorneys
fees.

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CASE 4: PAJARITO VS. SENERIS, JOSELITO AIZON & FELIPE AIZON 87 SCRA 275

FACTS:
1. Private Respondent Joselito Aizon was charged before the CFI Zamboanga City with Double
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence which caused the Isuzu Passenger Bus he was driving to
turn turtle and as a result Myrna Pajaritoa and Musa Baring, both passengers on board the bus
sustained injuries which caused their death.
2. When Joselito Aizon entered a plea of guilty, the court rendered judgement convicting him of
offense charged & sentenced him to indemnify heirs of Myrna Pajarito the amount of P12,000.
3. Writ of Execution was issued against Joselito Aizon but it was unsatisfied due to his insolvency. Therefore, Petitioner Lucia Pajarito, mother of Myrna, filed with CFI a motion for issuance of
Subsidiary Writ of Execution and served a copy thereof to Private Respondent Felipe Aizon, employer of Joselito. But Felipe opposed on ground that he is not the employer because he already
sold the vehicle to Isaac Aizon, father of Joselito, but the deed of transfer has not been executed
because the full price has not yet been paid.
4. CFI denied Petitioners motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution on the ground that Felipe
Aizon was not a party in the criminal case. CFI ruled that a separate civil action much be filed by
Pajarito against Felipe to enforce subsidiary liability. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the subsidiary civil liability established in Article 102 and 103 of RPC may be
enforced in the same criminal case where the award was made, or in a separate civil action?

RULING: Yes. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, a person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Hence, the institution of the criminal action carries with it the institution of the civil action
arising therefrom, except when there is a separate civil action or reservation of the latter on the
part of the complainant. Pursuant to Art. 103, in relation to Art. 102 of the RPC, an employer
may be subsidiary liable for the employees civil liability in a criminal action when: (1) the employer is engaged in any kind of industry; (2) the employee committed the offence in the discharge of his duties; and (3) he is insolvent and has not satisfies his civil liability.
However, the subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in
the criminal case.
The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary liable upon his drivers conviction and upon
proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employees
primary liability but also his employers subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence.
The decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer, not only
with regard to the civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of the employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee. To allow an employer to dispute the
civil liability fixed in the criminal case would be to amend, nullify, or defeat a final judgment
rendered by a competent court.
Considering that Felipe Aizon does not deny that he was the registered operator of the
bus but only claims that he sold the bus to the father of the accused. Therefore, it would serve no
important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the em-

ployer for the enforcement of the latters subsidiary civil liability. Such would only prolong the
litigation and would require the heirs of the deceased victim to incur unnecessary expenses. The
proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgement.

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CASE 5: HOME INSURANCE CO. VS. AMERICAN STEAMSHIP AGENCIES
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FACTS:
1. Consorcio Pesquero del Peru of South America" shipped freight pre-paid at Chimbate, Peru,
21,740 jute bags of Peruvian fish meal through SS Crowborough, covered by bills of lading
2. Cargo was consigned to San Miguel Corporation & insured by Home Insurance Company for
$202,505. It arrived in Manila & discharged into the lighters of Luzon Stevedoring
3. When delivered to SMC, there were shortages amounting to P12,033.85, so SMC claimed
against Luzon Stevedoring, Home Insurance & American Steamship Agencies, owner & operator
of SS Crowborough
4. Others denied liability, so Home Insurance Company paid SMC P14,870.71 as full settlement
of the claim
5. Reimbursement was refused by both Luzon Stevedoring & American Steamship, hence as subrogee, Home Insurance filed before CFI Manila complaint for recovery of P14,870.71
6. Luzon Stevedoring- alleged that it delivered with due diligence the goods in same quantity and
quality that it had received the same from carrier
7. American Steamship Agencies- denied liability, alleging that under provisions of Charter party
referred to in the bills of lading, charterer, not the shipowner, was responsible for any loss or
damage of cargo & it also claimed to have exercised due diligence in stowing the goods, that as a
mere forwarding agent, it was not responsible for losses or damages

CFI- Absolved Luzon Stevedoring because it merely delivered what it received; and Ordered
American Steamship Agencies to pay plaintiff P14,870.71 with legal interest, P1,000 attorney's
fees. Said court cited following grounds:
(a) The non-liability claim of American Steamship Agencies under the charter party contract is
not tenable because Art. 587 of Code of Commerce makes the ship agent also civilly liable for
damages in favor of third persons due to the conduct of the captain of the carrier;
(b) Stipulation in the charter party contract exempting the owner from liability is against public
policy under Article 1744 of the Civil Code;
(c) In case of loss, destruction or deterioration of goods, common carriers are presumed at fault
or negligent under Art. 1735 of Civil Code unless they prove extraordinary diligence, & they
cannot by contract exempt themselves from liability resulting from their negligence or that of
their servants; and
(d) When goods are delivered to the carrier in good order and the same are in bad order at the
place of destination, the carrier is prima facie liable.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the stipulation in the charter party of the owner's non-liability valid so as to absolve the American Steamship Agencies from liability for loss?

HELD: YES. CFI Reversed. American Steamship Agencies is absolved from liability to plaintiff. Civil Code provisions on common carriers should not be applied where carrier is not acting
as such but as a private carrier.

RATIO:
The bills of lading, provide that it shall be governed by and subject to the terms and conditions of
the charter party, if any, otherwise, the bills of lading prevail over all the agreements. On the bills
are stamped "Freight prepaid as per charter party. Subject to all terms, conditions & exceptions
of charter party
Charter party contract is one of affreightment over whole vessel. As such, liability of
shipowner for acts or negligence of its captain and crew, would remain in the absence of stipulation.
BUT Sec. 2, par. 2 of charter party, provides that the owner is liable for loss or damage to the
goods caused by personal want of due diligence on its part or its manager to make the vessel in
all respects seaworthy and to secure that she be properly manned, equipped and supplied or by
the personal act or default of the owner or its manager. Said paragraph, however, exempts the
owner of the vessel from any loss or damage or delay arising from any other source, even from
the neglect or fault of the captain or crew or some other person employed by the owner on board,
for whose acts the owner would ordinarily be liable except for said paragraph..

BUT provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-American law.
Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of its agent is not against public policy, and
is deemed valid.

Stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss due to the negligence
of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy governing common carriers is applied.
Such policy has no force where the public at large is not involved, as in the case of a ship totally
chartered for the use of a single party.
In a charter of entire vessel, the bill of lading issued by master to charterer, as shipper, is in fact
and legal contemplation merely a receipt and a document of title not a contract, for the contract is
the charter party. Recovery cannot be had thereunder, for loss or damage to the cargo, against the
shipowners, unless the same is due to personal acts or negligence of said owner or its manager,
as distinguished from its other agents or employees. In this case, no such personal act or negligence has been proved.

CASE 6: BATANGAS TRANSPORT VS. CAGUIMBAL, 22 SCRA 171

FACTS:
1. Batangas Transport Company (BTCO) bus was going south on its regular route from Calamba,
Laguna to Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez. The deceased Pedro Caguimbal was a paying passenger of BTCO with a destination at San Jose, Batangas.
2. The bus of Binan Transportation Company, driven by Marciano Ilagan was coming from the
opposite direction (north-bound), while a horse-driven rig (calesa) which was also north bound
was in front of the Binan bus.
3. When a passenger of BTCO requested the conductor to stop, as he was going to alight, and
when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed down his bus swerving
it farther to the right in order to stop. At this moment, the Binan bus, following the calesa,
swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the callesa, without diminishing its speed of about 70 km/h. The Binan bus passed through the space between BTCO bus and
the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then
bumped and struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; while the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed
and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open.
4. Two passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino. The heirs
of Caguimbal instituted the present action to recover damages from BTCO. While BTCO filed a
3rd party complaint against Binan Transportation Company and its driver Ilagan.
5. CFI Batangas dismissed the complaint against BTCO without prejudiced to plaintiffs right to
sue Binan.
6. CA reversed CFI decision, it ruled BTCO, Binan and Ilagan to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff the aggregate sum of P10,500. Hence, this appeal by BTCO.

ISSUES:
1. WON BTCO is liable to pay damages? Yes.
2. WON Attorneys fees should be awarded? Yes.

RULING: CA Affirmed.
1. The negligence of BTCO was a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which resulted
in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. When Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of
the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof, had he exercised extraordinary diligence, he
could have and should have seen to it that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion
of the road and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient
to accommodate the bus. It is true that the Binan bus should have slowed down or stopped, and
hence, was reckless in not doing so; but he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of
the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise utmost and extraordinary diligence for their
safety. Perez was thus under the obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his
passengers and make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Binan driver.
By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for

all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier as provided by Art. 1756 of the NCC. It is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence. In the case at bar,
BTCO has not proven the exercise of extra ordinary diligence on its part.

2. Award of Attorneys fees is also warranted, for the reason that the Caguimbals have already
been constrained to litigate for over 13 years to vindicate their rights and it is time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of
the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection and supervision of their drivers and conductors.

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CASE 7: YOBIDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 281 SCRA 1

FACTS:
1. Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children Ardee and Jasmin, boarded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido Liner bus bound for Davao City. Alon Picop Road in Agusan
del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded and the bus fell into a ravine around 3 feet from the
road and stuck a tree. The incident resulted in the death of 28 year old Tito Tumboy and physical
injuries to other passengers.
2. A compalaint for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees was filed by Leny
and her her children against Alberta Yobido, owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver,
before the RTC Davao City. The Yobidos raised the affirmative defines of faso fortuito.
3. RTC dismissed the action for lack of merit, ruling that the blowout was a caso fortuito which
is completely an extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the defendants who
should be relieved of whatever liability the plaintiffs may have suffered by reason of the explosion pursuant to Art. 1174 of the Civil Code.
4. CA rendered a decision reversing the lower court. The CA ruled that the explosion of the tire
was not in itself a fortuitous event. The fact that the cause of the blowout was not known does
not relieve the carrier of liability. Due to the statutory presumption of negligence against the carrier and its obligation to exercise the utmost diligence of a very cautious person to carry the passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It is the burden of the defendants to
prove that the cause of the blow out was a fortuitous event. It is not upon the plaintiff to prove
that the cause of the blow out is not caso fortuito. CA ordered defendants to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P50,000 for the death of Tito Tumboy, P30,000 in moral damages and P7,000 for funeral
and burial expenses. Defendants Motion for Reconsideration was denied by CA, hence the instant petition.

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ISSUE: WON the tire blowout that caused the death of Tito Tumboy was a caso fortuito? No.
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RULING: CA Affirmed.

As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the
mode of travel he has taken, because the a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passenger
and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury. However,
when a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes that the common carrier is
negligent. The disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier had
observed extraordinary diligence or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
A fortuitous event is the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or the failure
to comply with the obligation must be independent of human will; it must be impossible to foresee the event, to if can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; the occurrence must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfil his obligation in a normal manner; and the
obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Art. 1174 of NCC provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. There must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.
In this case, the explosion may not be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. An accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through
the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for
damages. For a common carrier to be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it must
still prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury from an accident. However, in
this case, no evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions or that precautions were taken by the driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. It was established that the road was rough, winding and wet due
to the rain, it is then incumbent upon the defense to establish that it took precautionary measures
considering the dangerous condition of the road. The common carrier failing to discharge its duty
to overthrow the presumption of negligence with clear and convincing evidence, they are hereby
held liable for damages. Award of damages was raised to P50,000 for the death of a passenger,
and exemplary damages of P20,000.

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CASE 8: SPOUSES LANDINGAN VS. PANTANRACO, 33 SCRA 284
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FACTS:
1. Spouses Landingin and Spouses Garcia filed for damages allegedly suffered by them in connection with the death of their respective daughter Leonila Landingin and Estrella Garcia, due to
the alleged negligence of the defendants and/or breach of contract of carriage. Their daughters
were along the passengers in the bus driven by defendant Marcelo Oligan and owned and operated by defendant Pantanco on an excursion from Dagupan to Baguio.
2. It was alleged that defendant driver caused the bus to stall and stop for a few moments, which
caused the motor to stop functioning and then resulted to the bus sliding back, swerved and
steered to the mountainside. That because of incident, Leonila and Estrella together with several

other passengers, were thrown out of the bus through its open side unto the road, suffering serious injuries and on the same day caused their deaths.
3. Defendant driver was charged with and convicted of multiple homicide and multiple slight
physical injuries. Plaintiffs prayed for award of moral, actual and exemplary damages.
4. Defendants contend that the driver was driving slow at a speed of 10 km/h and that while he
was steering the bus and after hearing a sound coming from the rear end of the bus, Leonila and
Estrella jumped out of the bus, disobeying the warnings of the driver, causing their heads to hit
the road/pavement. Defendant Pantranco insists that it observed the care and diligence of the
good father of the family to prevent the accident and in selection and supervision of its employees.
5. CFI Manila concluded that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act of God
brought about by some extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the Pantranco or
its employees. That there was a sudden snapping to breaking go metal below the floor of the bus
and that Leonila and Estrella were not thrown out of the bus, but they panicked and jumped out.
CFI rendered a judgement absolving the defendants from any liability on account of negligence
on their part but orders the defendant Pantranco to pay, not in payment of liability because of any
negligence on their part but as an expression of sympathy and goodwill for an amount of P6,500
and P3,500 respectively. Hence, this appeal by Pantranco.

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ISSUE:WON PANTRANCO is liable to pay for damages for breach of contract of carriage? Yes.
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RULING: CFI erred in absolving Pantranco from liability on account of negligence and/but ordering Pantranco to pay as an expression of sympathy and goodwill.
The defendants complain that since they were absolved from any liability due to fault or
negligence, the court should not have ordered them to pay any pecuniary liability.
The lower courts conclusion that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event or an act
of God brought about by some extra-ordinary circumstances independent of the will of the
Pantranco or its employees. is in large measure conjectural and speculative and arrived at without due regard to all circumstances, as required by Article 1755.
The Court held that an accident caused by defects in the automobile is not a caso fortuito.
When a passenger dies or is injured, the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault or that
it acted negligently as provided for by Art. 1756. Said presumption is rebutted only by proof on
the carriers part that it observed the extraordinary diligence required in Art. 1733 and the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons required in Art. 1755 (Art. 1756). The lower court considered
the presumption rebutted on the strength of defendants evidence that only the day before the incident, the cross joint was duly inspected and found to be in order. The mere fact that the bust
was inspected and found to be in order would not exempt the carrier from liability unless it is
shown that the particular circumstances under which the bus would travel were also considered.
The awards made by the court should be considered in the concept of damages for breach of contract of carriage.

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CASE 9: RAYNERA VS. HICETA, 306 SCRA 102

FACTS:
1. Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home, around 2:00 in the morning, riding a motorcycle
travelling on the south bound lane of the service road in Cupang, Muntinlupa, when his motorcycle crashed into the left rear portion of the truck trailer traveling in front of him, which was without tail lights.
2. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and was rushed to the hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival. He was manager of the Engineering Department of Kawasaki Motors. The heirs of deceases demanded form the respondent payment of damages arising from the
death of Reynaldo as a result of the vehicular accident. But the respondents refused to pay the
claims.
3. Petitioners filed with the RTC Manila complaint for damages against respondent owner and
driver arising from the death of Reynaldo caused by the negligent operation of the truck trailer at
night time on the highway, without tail lights. Respondents alleged that the truck was travelling
slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark portion of the road with no tail lights,
license plate and early warning device.
4. RTC held that Respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the victims
death. But the trial court also applied the doctrine of contributory negligence and reduced the responsibility of Respondents by 20%.
5. Respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA rendered a decision
setting aside the trial court decision. CA held that Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into the left rear
portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death and CA absolved respondents from liability.

ISSUES:
1. WON Respondents were negligent? No.
2. WON such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera? No.

RULING: Petition Denied; CA Affirmed.

1. Respondent was not negligent, despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, Respondent
truck was visible in the highway. It was travelling at a moderate speed of approximately 20 to 30
km/h. It used the service road instead of the highway because the cargo they were hauling posed
a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (RA No.
4136), respondent installed 2 pairs of light on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo extended beyond the bed to body thereof.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affair, would do, or the doing of
something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.

2. The direct cause or proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. He was
traveling behind the truck and had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of

him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable
him to see what was in front of him.
Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale for
said presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The victim had the last clear chance of avoiding
the accident.

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CASE 10: ZALAMEA VS. CA, 228 SCRA 23
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FACTS:
1. Petitioner Spouse Cesar and Suthira Zalamea with their daughter Liana purchased 3 airline
tickets from Manila agent of Respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) for a flight from New York
to Los Angeles. Tickets of Spouses were purchases at 75% discount while Lianas was a full fare
ticket.
2. On date of flight, they checked in 1hour earlier but were placed on wait list. Lianas ticket was
No. 13 while the Spouses were listed as No. 34. Out of 42 names in the wait list, first 22 names
were allowed to board. Those holding full fare tickets were given priority. Mr. Zalamea was
holding the full fare ticket & was allowed to board. The 2 discounted tickets were denied boarding.
3. The next TWA flight was also fully booked, hence Mrs. Zalamea and daughter were constrained to book another flight & purchases 2 tickets from American Airlines (AAL) at a cost of
$918. Hence, Zalameas filed action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage.

RTC- Ruled in favor of Zalameas; ordered TWA to pay:

1. US$918 or Php equivalent representing price of ticket bought from AAL
2. US$159.49 or Php equivalent of Mrs. Zalameas ticket
3. Php8,934.50 representing price of Lianas ticket
4. Php250K Moral damages
5. Php100K Attorneys Fees and cost of suit.

CA- Modified RTC; Moral & Exemplary damages eliminated because there is no fraud and bad
faith from the breach. Since overbooking is common & accepted practice of US airlines. Ordered
TWA to only pay:
1. US$159.49 or Php equivalent each for Spouses Zalameas ticket; and
2. Php50K Attys fees; Hence this case.

ISSUES:

1. WON CA erred in ruling that there was no fraud or bad faith on part of TWA because it has a
right to overbook flights? YES!
2. WON CA erred in eliminating award of exemplary damages? YES!
3. WON CA erred in not ordering refund of Liana Zalameas TWA ticket and payment for American Airlines tickets? NO!

HELD: Petition Granted; CA decision Modified with regards to payment of damages; TWA is
ordered to pay:
1. US$918 or Php equivalent representing price of ticket bought from AAL
2. Php50K Moral damages; Php50K Exemplary & Php50K Attys Fees

RULING:
1. There was fraud or bad faith on part of TWA when it did not allow Petitioners to board their
flight in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law allegedly authorising over booking has never
been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can courts take judicial notice of them.
Reliance on statement of Ms. Lather(Customer Service Agent) that Code of Federal Regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking cannot be the only basis. Said law is also not
applicable because of principle of Lex Loci Contractus which require that law of the place where
ticket airline was issued should be applied by court where passengers are resident & nationals of
the forum & ticket is issued in such State; applicable law is Philippine law.

Jurisprudence states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling passengers to an award of
moral damages. For indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last
minute, a passenger is entitled to moral damages.

Even assuming that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its
passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even of they confirmed tickets
if there was overbooking. TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the
tickets issued or properly inform its passengers about these policies. TWA was also guilty of not
informing passengers of alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets.

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2. To deter breach of contracts by TWA, SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary damages.
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3. CA erred in not ordering refund of 2 American Airlines tickets. Purchase of the said 2 tickets
was the consequence of TWAs unjustifiable breach of its contract of carriage.
In accordance to Art. 2201 NCC, TWA should be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non- performance of its obligation. Instead of being refunded for unused
TWA tickets, Zalameas should be awarded actual cost of their flight from NewYork to Los Angeles. BUT award for payment of both American Airlines and TWA tickets, as ruled by RTC cannot
be granted. To grant such would have enabled Petitioners to fly without any fare being paid.

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