ARGUMENTS

I.

The Trial Court committed reversible error in ruling that

respondents-appellee(Corpuz) has a better right over the
subject properties, on the ground that he is the registered
owner.

Ownership is not a proper subject in a case for unlawful detainer. Citing

David v Cordova, it was held:
The facts upon which an action for forcible entry can be brought are
specially mentioned in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Said
section likewise defines an action for unlawful detainer. In forcible entry
(desahucio), one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by
means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer (detentacion), one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right
to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of
action is the termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.
It cannot be said that the Spouses Agustin was a possessor in bad faith. Their
possession was allowed by Francisco D. Corpus who subsequently sold the
property under a Deed of Absolute Sale. There being no instance which
would warrant the unlawful possession of the spouses, the unlawful detainer
is not proper. Further, the spouses claim their possession not merely based
on tolerance but as absolute owner thereof as evidence on the executed Deed
of Absolute sale.(kailangan ta magmention nga naa sa appendix?)
II.

The Trial Court erred in admitting the Deed of Quit Claim and
not taking into account the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
purporting the sale of the subject properties by the
respondents father to the petitioners-appellants.

(it was said in the CA decision that corpus jr. has knowledge of the DOAS,
but there was inaction. Pwede ba nga mumention ta nga during the trial, it
was established nga there was knowledge on the part of corpus jr?)
As early as 1973, Ruben Corpuz has been aware of the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale towards the Spouses Agustin.
It was ruled in the case of Rigonan v Derecho (2005), laches is defined
as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon
grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims
for the peace of society.
It was established during trial that Ruben Corpuz has knowledge of the
sale between his father, Francisco Corpuz and the Spouses Agustin.
However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner failed to initiate any
action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject properties.
III.

The Trial Court erred in giving credence to the testimony of

the respondent that petitioner were only allowed to occupy the
said subject properties.

The possession of the Spouses Agustin of the parcels of land spec Lot
No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners
cannot be said to be by mere tolerance. The trial court did not err in
ruling otherwise. It was established that a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of the spouses for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P11,150.00). It was duly notarized and testified to by the notary
public who caused the notarization therein.
IV.

The Trial Court erred in not considering the length of time

that the petitioners-appellants have been in possession, as
owners, of subject properties, and have been continuously
exercising their rights of ownership thereon.

The Spouses has been in possession and exercised ownership over the
subject parcels of land since the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on
June 5, 1971. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the
spouses have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which,

as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of

petitioners father. Under these circumstances, Ruben Corpuz cannot simply
oust the spouses from possession through the summary procedure of an
ejectment proceeding.
In the case of Heirs of Maningding v CA (1979), prescription has been
defined as a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights
through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either
ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for 10 years. Without good faith
and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character
which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years.
Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be
for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title. Possession is in good
faith when there is a reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing
is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his
ownership. (Art. 1127, NCC). There is just title when the adverse claimant
comes into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized
by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is
neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the right. (Art. 1129, NCC).
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant

to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Based on the above, it can be said that Ruben Corpuz has not complied
with the requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful
detainer Complaint against respondents.