Kingship and the problem of international law in the ancient

Near-East
Law is conflict resolution (Peters, 2011, p. 59). Conflicting parties appeal to some higher authority, which
ranges from a god, a king, a judge, a universal principle of justice, precedent, to even just plain common consent, to arbitrate their troubles. To this it must be added that it is often the case that only one such party is a
willing participant in this submission, yet I would argue that it is a defining characteristic of law that the party
applying the force views the process as submission to that external arbiter. Even ammu-Rabi, who seems to
think primarily in terms of his own judicial brilliance rather than amas, is proud of his justice, not his power
to impose his will (see Figure 1: ammu-Rabi receiving justice from ama ). Where this is not the case, there
is a negative judgement on the ruler:
81

[t]ul5-tab-i-ma-a
ri-ma
kd-ra [i-n]a uruk[ki] su-pr

Have you bred, indeed, a

savage wild bull in Urukthe-Sheepfold?

82

ul i-u -ni-nam-ma t[eb]u- gi|kakk(tukul)me-|

He has not any equal, his

weapons being ready,

83

[i]nab pu-uk-ki u-ut-bu-

ru---

his companions are kept

on their feet by the ball.

84

u-ta-d[ir elti urukki

in]a ku-kit-ti

He has wrongfully vexed

[the young men of Uruk,]

85

ul -ma-ar dGI-gim-ma
mru(dumu) ab(ad)-

Gilgame lets no son go

free to his father.

86

ur-ra u m[a(gi6) i-kd-dir

e-ri

Day and [night he behaves] with fierce [arrogance,]

87

u- rm(sipa)-ma urukki
su-p-ru

he who is shepherd of
Uruk the sheepfold!

88

GI-gim-[ma arru? ()
ni? rap-]-|a|-ti

[King] Gilgame, [who

guides the] numerous
[people,]

89

u- re---i-na-ma
i]

X[-

he is their shepherd and

their []!

90

[g]a-ru u-pu- mu-du-

[XX]

Powerful,
pre-eminent,
expert, [,]

91

ul -ma-ar dGI-gim-ma
f
batlta(guru.tur) a-na m[u?ti-?]

Gilgame lets no girl go

free to [her] bride[groom.]

Text 1: Gilgame, tablet I, lines 81-91 (George, 2003, p. 542f.)

The idealised model of law is, then, voluntary submission of conflicting parties to an arbiter, personal or impersonal. Yet, the application of this model is somewhat eased by authority figures representing that arbiter, such
as ammu-Rabi representing justice. If one habitually and in no passion of conflict submits to a higher authority, one may take more readily to this submission in times of conflict. This may not show itself in the case of a
murderer facing execution, but would, I think, hold true for the murderers friends and family. Indeed, it can
regularly be seen that representatives of higher authority are required or requested in cases in which one party

refuses to submit; be it an appeal to the king or the

Supreme Court. Imputations of unfitness to represent the arbiter halt judicial proceedings unless
dismissed, but no representative can pass lawful
verdict while such questions remain open.
In such a model, supreme monarchy in the ancient
Near-East earns its legitimation as the representative of justice to whom all subjects might easily
submit. Preserving the absolute authority of the
states highest arbiter was so important as to sanction royal authority over parties outside the context
of particular conflicts. The perfect representative of
justice could not be unjust in his own decisions. On
such an understanding, the kings legal authority
stems from the principle of legal philosophy termed
epistemic-guidance (Peters, 2011, p. 39). C. Peters, using the example of Platos Republic, describes this idea as All the citizens of the Republic
would be made better offwiser, happier, more
virtuousby obeying the Guardians than by acting
according to their own inferior moral judgments
(Peters, 2011, p. 39). This, I believe, is the intended propagandistic message behind Figure 1: ammu-Rabi receiving justice from ama . Two furFigure 1: ammu-Rabi receiving justice from ama (Louvre, ther examples of the connection between just rule
and superhuman wisdom may be readily cited:
n.d.)
First, the passage from Gilgame detailed above is
intended to demonstrate a lack of wisdom, in direct
apposition to (I.1f.). Second, Solomon, king of United Israel, asks God:
8

Now your servant is in the midst of your people, whom

you chose to be a numerous people, beyond count, be yond number.

So give to your servant a discerning heart to judge your

people, to distinguish good from bad. For who can judge
this great people of yours?

The request is duly granted:

13

See, I am doing for you as your words, giving to you

a wise and discerning heart. None could stand with
you, before or after.

Text 2: I Kings 3:8f., 20

But the important thing is the only concrete example with which we are provided is the infamous court scene
with the baby: a legal scene. In both royal ideology and literature, the kings rule is legitimated as him being
(superhumanly) better at ruling. Arbitration stops at the king not because of an a priori necessity that what a
king thinks is right, but an a posteriori authority as the epistemic guide.
But what of a kings conflict? Who may act as representative of people whose direct relationship with justice is
so lauded? According to Charles I, no-one could stand between him and the arbiter acknowledged by both parties; God.

Figure 2: P222532, inscribed cylinder from Laga (CDLI, 2014)

I would know by what power I am

called hither... I would know by what
authority, I mean lawful [authority]
(Charles I, 1649)
It is hard to see ancient Near-Eastern
kings viewing the situation differently;
in fact it would undermine their role in
society if it were otherwise. Of course,
a king in conflict would happily and
readily submit to trial in amas court,
but, accepting the authority of no lackey, could never see that day.
Some workarounds are perhaps visible. Take, for example, the UmmaLaga conflict:
1

en-ll

10

lugal kur-kur- king of all

ra
the lands,

11

ab-ba diirdiir-r-neke4

father of all
the gods,

by his rightinim gi-na-nieous comta

mand

Enlil

nin-gr-su

for Ningirsu

ar-bi

and ara

12

14

15

demarcated
the (border)
ground.
16

me-silim

Mesilim
17

lugal kiki-ke4 king of Ki 18

19

20

struck the 21
-GN b-ra measuring
line upon it, 22

13

ki e-ne-sur

by the
inim ditarancommand
na-ta
of Itaran,

and on that
place he
ki-ba na b-r
23
erected a
stele.
u

ens

governor
25
ki

umma -ke4

of Umma,

e-ak

he did.

na-r-a-bi

That stele

-bux(PAD)

he tore out,

24

edin lagaki

and into the

plain of
Laga

-kux(DU)

he entered.

Ningirsu,

nin-gr-su

ur-sag den-ll- the hero of

l-ke4
Enlil,
by his (Eninim si-s-nilils) just
ta
command,

ki
umma -da

with Umma

26
battle
dam-a-ra
something
nam inim-ma greatly be- 27
did.
e-da-ak
diri-diri-
yond words
Text 3: AO03004, surface A, column I, lines 1-27,
(?)

inscribed cylinder from Laga (CDLI, 2014)

There is a conscious effort here to place the conflict in a legal context. The connection between line 11 and
Figure 1: ammu-Rabi receiving justice from ama may serve here to reinforce that association. To the extent to which the conscious effort had genuine psychological effect, we may say that, for at least one side, the
conflict was a prosecution under international law. The defendant may either have disputed the charges, levelled some in return, or poured scorn upon the propagandistic legal spin, but law can never be considered inoperable or absent solely on the grounds one party denies it.
Yet, to be truly international law, and not merely national law impelling international action, the key question is
to what extent the relationships between states in conflict parallels those of private litigants in conflict. It seems
safe to assume all national entities would readily submit to that one arbiter, justice. Justice I place on the top of
the tree rather than gods because, in all the texts considered, the gods are just and not justice. Whether other
national entities would have recognised Laga as an agent of the mutually agreeable divine representatives is
critical to our understanding here, but unfortunately not something that can be easily determined.
If we cannot say Laga was endowed with international authority, there may be more substance behind the reference to the king of Ki. Some kind of political authority in Laga is borne out in the material archaeology

(Van De Mieroop, 2007, p. 50) (see Figure 2: Mace-head of

Mesalim, King of Ki, found in Laga ). In later periods,
kingship is Kish is seen as the postdiluvian prototype of all
kingship (Levin, 2002, p. 362):
40

egir ama-ru
ba-r-rata

After the flood

had
swept
over,

41

namlugal anta e11d-a-ba

and the kingship had descended from

heaven,

42

kiki
namlugal-la

the
kingship
was in Ki
(ETCSL, 1999)

Text 4: P384786, kingship descends to Ki (CDLI, 2009)

Figure 4: Mace-head of Mesalim, King of Ki, found

Whether the title of an early arbiter or later tyrant, kingship in Laga (Louvre, 1881)
of Ki seems to be associated with authority over states and
their leaders. For example, Sin-Ae-Eriba, (surface a, column 1 (CDLI, 2013)), can freely appoint
without impinging upon his absolute authority over the empire. I think in this way one can explain the
tension in Assyrian royal ideology identified by K. Radner:
the wider world, from an Assyrian point of view, could simultaneously be seen as under the exclusive sovereignty of the Assyrian king and as ruled by various other kings operating as allies, enemies
or subordinates of the king of Assyria
(Radner, 2010, p. 25)
Authority over other actually increased Assyrian royal authority, for it demonstrated the king to be
. Yet, in claiming to arbitrate supreme arbitrators, the King of Kiati seriously undermined his vassals. Any king disagreeing with him would be a deficient representative of justice, and therefore not a king.
Accustomed as we are to equating ancient Near-Eastern conflict resolution with , it is not all so
bad. Sometimes in international relations, where one party is
shown by force to be dominant, the other concedes defeat and
claims, and may in return be granted some small concessions, in
just proportion to the relative stations established. In such cases,
the prior struggle may be conceived much like a trial by war.
Yet, for many conflicts, no ordeal is undertaken and so no order
made plain. Neighbours who argue over the upkeep of a fence
do not undergo the river ordeal, but may seek a representative to
arbitrate. Kings, however, usually cannot.
What I am trying to highlight here is a disconnection between
international law and national law. The supremacy of the national head of state as highest representative of that arbitrary
principle justice is fundamental to the latter, though detrimental
to the former. A great many times, this had unfortunate consequences. Looking at the ancient Near-East, who would not
agree that, alas, La mesme raison qui nous fait tanser avec un
voisin, dresse entre les Princes une guerre (Montaigne, 1580
(1906-1933), p. 476).
Figure 3: P384786, kingship descends to Ki
Yet there are also occasions of surprising amity, where brothers
(CDLI, 2009)

co-operate and compromise in deference to the law of justice.

This situation has strong parallels in the legal discourse of today. One modern legal commentator writes, International law did not and still does not have an effective means of enforcement and has relied essentially on
the cooperation of States to this effect (Orrego Vicua, 2003, p. 222). Both then and now, this co-operation is
rooted in shared ideology, even religious ideas. However, it is equally important both then and now not to let
our recognition of these ideological frameworks obscure motivations less formally constructed.
As a case-study, I will explore the relationship of ammu-Rabi and Zimri-Lim. According to M. Van De Mieroop, their early relationship was cordial, though dogged by tension (2005, p. 66f.). The sticking point was the
city of it in the border territories, an asset to both rulers, and the subject of a fierce legal battle. Though this
dispute lasted many years, it never boiled over. Zimri-Lims ambassadors could illicit some pretty strong conciliatory affectations from ammu-Rabi:
Among the allied kings there is indeed no one who has treated me as well and has honored me like Zimri-Lim.
For all the good he has done for me, I will give him satisfaction, and an eternal bond will be established between
us (Van De Mieroop, 2005, p. 69).
There is a strong case to be made that both the legal and fraternal niceties were concessions to the political domination of Elam. The Elamite had indeed ruled that it should be a Marian possession (2005, p. 69), and
military hostilities between Zimri-Lim and ammu-Rabi began soon after Elams fall (p. 74). Yet I would rather emphasise the continuity in the relationship: reluctant co-operation against Larsa (p. 72f.), political
manoeuvring of potential allies (p. 73f.), and ongoing gift exchange (p. 75). The two were not held obedient
under the watchful gaze of the Elamite , but behave towards the , and whatever law he represented, as
they would later behave towards each other.
The wrangling over co-ordinated troop movements or ownership of it was accompanied by seemingly more
trivial concerns. Itur-Asdu, for instance, the governor of Mari and makeshift ambassador to ammu-Rabi in
Babylon, wrote back to Zimri-Lim about a slight in court protocol:
9

|i-na| na-a-pa-ar-ti be-l-u k[i-aa]m i-[a-la]-an-ni um-ma-a-mi ina ka-a-ta l tu-ru-uk-ki-im

[Then] he* questioned me according to the message of his

lord, Between you and the
Turrukean,

ma-ah-ra-tam
u-ul-ma-am-ma
[a-na ma-an-ni-i]m |a|-a-a-al ana-ku li-ib-bi iz-zi-iq ki-a-am a
pu-ul-u

whom am I to announce first?.

My heart hammered, and I answered him,

um-ma a-na-ku-ma l tu-u[r-ruuk-ke]-em it-ti be-l-ia tu-u-tama-a-a-ar

You hold the Turrukean equal to

my lord?!

10

11

* The herald of ammu-Rabi.

Text 5: Itur-Asdu to Zimri-Lim, A.2968+, lines 9-11, c. 1769 (Guichard, 2004, p. 18)

The incident was in fact not a trivial matter. Every political nicety took on great significance. There seems no
boundary between the personal relationship of the two rulers and the relationship of the two states. In the absence of a legal foundation, the co-operation of brother states proceeds by the same principles that govern the
relationships of brothers. Thus, moving ahead as far as the Amarna period, we find the same gift culture having
genuine political significance (Westbrook, 2000), and the same personal focus:
1

[a-n]a mka-_-a-ma-an-arbe r
KUR ka-ra-DIIR du-n[i-i]-a[]

To Kadaman-arbe, king of
Karadun[i]a[],

E-ia ki-b-ma um-ma

my brother, say:

Text 6: L 29784, Amenhotep III to Kadaman-arbe (Knudtzon, 1915, p. 60f.)

In conclusion, kings in the ancient Near-East presented themselves as the ultimate, empirically validated epistemic guides to a universal moral law. This meant that their kingship was undermined by any imposition of
international law. The King of Ki was the only higher human authority. A king claiming this title claimed the
right to arbitrate kingly conflicts. For others, in the absence of international law, brotherly international cooperation was the chosen alternative; tying international relations to a few personal relationships.

Texts:
Text 1:
Text 2:
Text 3:
Text 4:
Text 5:
Text 6:

Gilgame, tablet I, lines 81-91 (George, 2003, p. 542f.) ........................................................................... 1

I Kings 3:8f., 20 ........................................................................................................................................ 2
AO03004, surface A, column I, lines 1-27, inscribed cylinder from Laga (CDLI, 2014) ....................... 3
P384786, kingship descends to Ki (CDLI, 2009) .................................................................................... 4
Itur-Asdu to Zimri-Lim, A.2968+, lines 9-11, c. 1769 (Guichard, 2004, p. 18) ........................................ 5
L 29784, Amenhotep III to Kadaman-arbe (Knudtzon, 1915, p. 60f.).................................................. 5

Images:
Figure 1:
Figure 4:
Figure 3:
Figure 2:

ammu-Rabi receiving justice from ama (Louvre, n.d.) .................................................................... 2

P222532, inscribed cylinder from Laga (CDLI, 2014) ......................................................................... 3
P384786, kingship descends to Ki (CDLI, 2009) ................................................................................. 4
Mace-head of Mesalim, King of Ki, found in Laga (Louvre, 1881) ................................................... 4

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