Bagongahasa vs.

Romualdez Digest
FACTS:
Respondents are absolute and lawful owners of separate parcels of
lands situated in Sitio Papatahan, Paete, Laguna. However, sometime
in 1994 and 1995, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform declared the
property to be part of the public domain, awarded the same to the
Defendants and forthwith issued Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) to the respective petitioners.
As absolute and lawful owners thereof, the respondents also maintain
that they have not been notified of any intended coverage thereof by
the DAR; that to the best of their knowledge, there is no valuation
being conducted by the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DAR
involving the property; that there was no compensation paid and that
the DAR-CENRO Certification shows that the landholdings have 2432% slopes and therefore exempt from CARP coverage. Petitoners
defend that they are farmer beneficiaries of the subject properties,
covered by Proclamation No. 2280 which reclassifies certain portion
of the public domain as agricultural land and declares the same
alienable and disposable for agricultural and resettlement purposes.
The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled in favor of
respondents. Upon appeal, however, the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB) held that the complaints filed were virtual protests against
the CARP coverage, to which it has no jurisdiction. The DARAB
further held that, while it has jurisdiction to cancel the Certificate of
Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), which had been registered with the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Laguna, it cannot pass upon matters
exclusively vested in the DAR Secretary. Moreover, the DARAB ruled
that the assailed CLOAs having been registered in 1994 and 1995
became incontestable and indefeasible. The CA reversed then
partially amended its decision. The CA, invoking Section 1 (1.6), Rule
II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure held that the DARAB has
the exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate cases
involving correction, partition, and cancellation of Emancipation
Patents and CLOAs which are registered with the Land Registration
Authority (LRA), as in this case. The petitioners appealed, arguing,
among others, that the CA erred in undermining the issue of
jurisdiction as the case is cognizable by the Regional Director and not
by the PARAD and/or the DARAB.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the DARAB has
jurisdiction over the petition of the CLOAs
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL & CIVIL LAW: Jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of
Certificates of Land Ownership Awards.
InHeirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, the Court ruled
that under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure,the
DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA.
However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must
relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom
CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. In Spouses Teofilo
Carpio and Teodora Carpio v. Ana Sebastian, et.al., this Court held
that even if the parties therein did not have tenancy relations, the
DARAB still has jurisdiction. However, the said case must be viewed
with particularity because, based on the material allegations of the
complaint therein, theincident involved the implementation of the
CARP, as it was founded on the question of who was the actual tenant
and eventual beneficiary of the subject land. Hence, this Court held
therein that jurisdiction should remain with the DARAB and not with
the regular courts. However, this case is different. Respondents
complaint was bereft of any allegation of tenancy and/or any matter
that would place it within the ambit of DARABs jurisdiction.
However, this Court refuses to rule on the validity of the CARP
coverage of the subject properties and the issuance of the assailed
CLOAs. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from
resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction was initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. The Office of the DAR
Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of nonissuance of a notice of coverage, being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.
Petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the CA is REVERSED.

Case Digest: Nestle & Nestle Waters v. Uniwide Sales, et al.

FACTS:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative law; doctrine of primary

administrative jurisdiction

Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)

a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and
appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation
plan.

In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the
SEC approved the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the
present petition was filed on 3 November 2006, any determination by
this Court as to whether the SARP should be revoked and the
rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature.

The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a

rehabilitation plan in the SEC. The plan was anchored on return to
core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and
dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges;
freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers,
contractors, and private lenders.

Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the

factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the
competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the
supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of
implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be
terminated as a consequence.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended

Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned
entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion
in fresh capital. SEC approved the ARP.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not

determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second

Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino
Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC approved the SARP.
Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the
SEC praying that the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a
new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in
consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms and
conditions of the SARP.
SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals
denied for lack of merit the petition for review filed by petitioners.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the
rehabilitation proceedings terminated?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the

expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative
body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within
the latter's proper jurisdiction.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some
question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding
before the court.
Petition for review is DISMISSED.