RAMOS v RAMOS

Facts: Spouses Martin Ramos and

Candida were survived by three
legitimate children: Jose, Agustin and
Granada. Martin was also survived by 7
natural children. A special proceeding
was instituted for the settlement of the
estate of said spouses. Rafael, brother of
Martin was appointed administrator. A
project of partition was submitted and
the conjugal hereditary estate was
appraised at P74,984.93. It consisted of
18 parcels of land, some head cattle and
advances to the legitimate children. It
was agreed in the project of partition
that Jose and Agustin would pay the
cash adjudications to their natural
siblings. Only the sum of P 37, 492.46 of
the P74k represented the estate of
Martin. 1/3 thereof was the free portion
out of which the shares of the natural
children were to be taken: each would
get P1,785.35. The project of partition
as well as the intervention of Timoteo as
guardian of the five minor heirs was
approved by the court. Later on, Judge
Nepomuceno asked the administrator to
submit a report showing that the shares
have been delivered to the heirs as
required which the siblings
acknowledged in a manifestation. The
Himalayan cadastre (8 lots) involved in
this case were registed in equal shares
in the names of Joses widow, Gregoria
and her daughter Granada.
The Plaintiffs (natural children)
contend that while they were growing
up, they had been well supported by
Jose and Agustin as they had been
receiving their shares from the produce
of the Haciendas in varied amounts over
the years. Even after the death of Jose,
Gregoria had continued giving them
money but had stopped in 1951 by
reason that lessee Lacson was not able
to pay the lease rental. No accounting
had ever been made to them by Jose

nor Gregoria. Upon the survey of the

land, they did not intervene, as Jose and
Agustin promised that said lands shall
be registered in the names of the heirs.
They did not know that the intestate
proceedings were instituted for the
distribution of the estate of their father.
Neither did they have any knowledge
that a guardian was assigned to
represent their minor siblings,
considering that Modesto and Miguel
who were claimed to be such were no
longer minors at the time of the
partition. They never received their
share in the estate of their father.
Plaintiffs later on discovered that the
property had a Torrens title in the name
of Gregoria and her daughter when
Modestos children had inquired from the
Register of Deeds. Petitioners now bring
the present suit for the reconveyance of
the subject parcels of land in their favor.
Petitioners claim that in effect, Gregoria
and daughter are holding their shares in
trust which was denied by defendants.
Defendants alledge res judicata and
prescription.
LOWER COURT: Dismissed the
complaint on the basis of res judicata as
their shares were already settled in the
intestate proceedings. No deed of trust
was alledged and proven. Plaintiffs
appealed saying that they were
grievously prejudiced by the partition
and thus res judicata should not bar
their action.
SC: The plaintiffs have not proven any
express trusts neither have they
specified the kind of implied trust
contemplated in their action. Either way,
such action may be barred by laches.
In the cadastral proceedings, Jose and
wife claimed the 8 lots of the plaintiffs.
After the death of Jose, the said lots
were adjudicated to his widow and

daughter. In 1932 Gregoria leased the

said lots to Yulo, who in 1934
transferred his lease rights over
Hacienda Calazato to Bonin and Olmedo,
husband of plaintiff Atanacia. Bonin and
Olmedo in 1935 sold their lease rights
over Hacienda Calaza to Consing.
Those transactions prove that the heirs
of Jose had repudiated any trust which
was supposedly constituted over
Hacienda Calaza in favor of the
plaintiffs.
The period of extinctive prescription is
10 years. Atanacia, Modesto and
Manuel, could have brought the action
to annul the partition. Maria and
Emiliano were both born in 1896. They
reached the age of 21 in 1917 and could
have brought the action from that year.
The instant action was filed only in
1957. As to Atanacia, Modesto and
Manuel, the action was filed 43 years
after it accrued and, as to Maria and
Emiliano, the action was filed 40 years
after it accrued. The delay was
inexcusable. The instant action is
unquestionably barred by prescription
and res judicata.
It was anomalous that the manifestation
should recite that they received their
shares from their administrator, when in
the project of partition it was indicated
that said shares shall be received in
cash from brothers Jose and Agustin.
Thus due to this irregularities as well as
those of the intestate proceedings, the
plaintiffs contend that the partition was
not binding on them (except for Timoteo
who considered himself bound by the
partition). They ask that the case be
remanded to the lower court for the
determination and adjudication of their
rightful shares.
However, due to the fact that the

plaintiffs slept on their rights, the courts

can no longer afford them relief.
Caragay-layno vs CA
Action to quite title imprescriptible
since petitioners are in possession
of land
Since Agne, et.al. are in possession of
the land in dispute, an action to quiet
title is imprescriptible. Their action for
reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to
quiet title to property in ones
possession is imprescriptible. Their
undisturbed possession for a number of
years gave them a continuing right to
seek the aid of a court of equity to
determine the nature of the adverse
claims of a third party and the effect on
her title. As held in Caragay-Layno vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., an adverse
claimant of a registered land,
undisturbed in his possession thereof for
a period of more than 50 years and not
knowing that the land he actually
occupied had been registered in the
name of another, is not precluded from
filing an action for reconveyance which,
in effect, seeks to quiet title to property
as against the registered owner who was
relying upon a Torrens title which could
have been fraudulently acquired. To such
adverse claimant, the remedy of an
action to quiet title is imprescriptible. In
actions for reconveyance of property
predicated on the fact that the
conveyance complained of was void ab
initio, a claim of prescription of the
action would be unavailing.
Mariano De Vera died in 1951. His widow
administered his property until her
death in 1966. De Veras nephew
(Salvador Estrada) took over as
administrator of De Veras estate. Prior
to the widows death, she made an
inventory showing that De Veras
property (located in Calasiao,

Pangasinan) measures 5417 sq. m

(more or less). Estrada however noticed
that the Torrens title under De Vera
indicated that his property measures
8752 sq. m. He learned that the
discrepancy is the 3732 sq. m. being
occupied by Juliana. Estrada sued to
evict Juliana.
Juliana averred that she and her father
have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
in the concept of an owner of the land
since 1921; that theyve been paying
taxes; that the title held by Estrada was
registered in 1947 but it only took them
to initiate an action in 1967 therefore
laches has set in.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed
portion should be adjudged in favor of
De Veras estate.

HELD: No. The inclusion of Julianas land

in De Veras title was erroneously done.
It was shown that Juliana, an unlettered
woman, agreed to have Mariano de Vera
borrow her title for the purposes of
Mariano obtaining a loan during de
Veras lifetime; that when de Vera
registered his portion of land adjoined to
that of Juliana, the latters land was
erroneously included.

The error is highlighted by the fact that

de Veras widow, in her inventory before
she died, attested that de Veras portion
of land is only 5417 sq. m. more or less.
The discrepancy approximates the
portion of land actually being occupied
by Juliana. By that, the only portion that
can be adjudged in favor of de Veras
estate is that which was being claimed
by the widow (in her inventory). A
recalculation must however be made to

specify the exact measure of land

belonging to each: 3732 sq m should be
retained by Juliana (portion which she
actually occupies) and 5020 sq. m.
should go to de Veras estate.
GONZALES v. IAC
Facts: The land in dispute is registered
in the name of Fausto Soy. In 1941,
Fausto sold 253 sq. m. to Francisco
Landingin. In 1954, pursuant to a Deed
of Donation executed by Fausto, Antonio
Soy (son of Fausto) and Gregoria
Miranda (wife) sold 240 sq. m. to
Juanito Gonzales and Coronacion
Ganaden. In January 1960, Fausto sold
another 240 sq. m. to Gonzales and
Ganaden and two days later, a TCT was
issued in favor of Gonzales, indicating
his share as co-owner of 480 sq. m. and
Fausto Soy, 240 sq. m. In 1965, Fausto
sold another 140 sq. m. to the Gonzales
and Ganaden.
April 1965, Respondents Rosita Lopez,
Gavino Cayabyab, Agueda and Felipa
Ubando, Pedro Soriano, Teosidia Lopez
and Federico Ballesteros (nieces and
nephews of Fausto) filed the instant
complaint for partition against Fausto
Soy. On the same day they filed a notice
of lis pendens and had it annotated on
the OCT. Fausto answered and contested
plaintiffs claims, asserting exclusive title
in his name. Fausto countered that the
questioned land was never registered in
the names of his parents Eugenio and
Ambrosia, and that he had been the
registered owner of the premises since
1932.
On the basis of evidence adduced exparte, the Trial Court held that
respondents and Fausto were co- owners
of the lot and ordered the partition
thereof. Parties were enjoined to
partition amongst themselves and were
to submit the same to the lower court

for confirmation. Upon execution, the

sheriff was unable to effect
apportionment due to a 3rd party claim
of Juanito and Coronacion Gonzales,
stating that they were registered owners
of 480 sq. m. of the disputed land. The
sheriff noted the various.
Held: It is proper to issue the injunction
sought by the petitioners to stop the
sale of the property at public auction, to
annul the levies made on the property,
to obtain the cancellation in the registry
of property of the annotations made,
and to secure a
improvements petitioners had
introduced (apartment, residential house
and piggery). Trial court allowed
petitioners to intervene as indispensable
parties, vacating its previous judgment
and granting a new trial.
Trial Court: There is no proof to show
that petitioners are co-owners of the
property in question because the land
has long been covered by an OCT since
1932 in the name of their predecessor in
interest, Fausto Soy.
CA: Resolved in favor of respondents,
declaring that the sale to intervenorpetitioners did not terminate the trust
relationship between the appellants and
the appellees. The sale in favor of
petitioners shall be enforced against the
14 share of respondents as heirs of
Fausto.
Issue: Was the disputed land held in
trust by Fausto Soy for his sisters,
Emilia, Cornelia and Anastacia (mothers
of herein respondents)?
Ruling: CA decision reversed, order for
partition dismissed.
Fausto, being predecessor-in-interest,
had appeared to be the registered owner
of the lot for more than 30 years and his

dominical rights can no longer be

challenged. Any insinuation as to the
existence of an implied or constructive
trust should not be allowed.
Even assuming there was an implied
trust, respondents attempt at
reconveyance is barred by prescription,
which in this case is 10 years, the period
reckoned from the issuance of the
adverse title to the property which
operates as a constructive notice.
The assertion of adverse title, which was
an explicit indication of repudiation of
the trust for the purpose of the statute
of limitations, took place when the OCT
was issued in the name of Fausto Soy in
1932, to the exclusion of his 3 sisters.
Even if there were no repudiation, the
rule is that an action to enforce an
implied trust may be circumscribed not
only by prescription but also by laches
in which case, repudiation is not
required.
Respondents had literally slept on their
rights presuming they had any and can
no longer dispute the conclusive and
incontrovertible character of Faustos
title as they are deemed to have
acquiesced therein.
SALAO VS. SALAO
Facts: After the death of Valentina
Ignacio, her estate was administered by
her daughter Ambrosia. It was
partitioned extrajudically and the deed
was signed by her four legal heirs
namely her 3 children (Alejandra, Juan,
and Ambrosia) and Valentin Salao, in
representation of his deceased father,
Patricio. The Calunuran fishpond is the
property in contention in this case. Prior
to the death of Valentina Ignacio, her
children Juan and Ambrosia secured a
torrens title in their names a 47 ha.
fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran,

Lubao, Pampanga. A decree was also

issued in the names of Juan and
Ambrosia for the Pinanganacan fishpond
which adjoins the Calunuran fishpond. A
year before Ambrosias death, she
donated her one-half share in the two
fishponds in question to her nephew,
Juan Salo Jr. He was already the owner
of the other half of the fishponds having
inherited it from his father, Juan Salao
Sr. After Ambrosia died, the heirs of
Valentin Salao, Benita Salao and the
children of Victorina Salao, filed a
complaint against Juan Salao Jr. for the
reconveyance to them of the Canluran
fishpond as Valentin Salaos supposed
one third share in the 145 ha. of
fishpond registered in the names of Juan
Salao Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
Defendants argument: Valentin Salao
did not have any interest in the two
fishponds and that the sole owners
thereof were his father and his aunt
Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles
and that he was the donee of Ambrosias
one-half share.
Plaintiffs argument: Their action is to
enforce a trust which defendant Juan
Salao Jr. allegedly violated. The
existence of trust was not definitely
alleged in the plaintiffs complaint but in
their appellants brief.
RTCs Ruling: There was no community
of property among Juan, Ambrosia and
Valentin when the Calunuran and the
Pinanganacan lands were acquired; that
co ownership over the real properties
of Valentina Ignacio existed among her
heirs after her death in 1914; that the
co ownership was administered by
Ambrosia and that it subsisted up to
1918 when her estate was partitioned
among her three children and her
grandson, Valentin Salao. It rationalized
that Valentins omission during his
lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of

Juan and Ambrosia signified that he was

not a co-owner of the fishponds. It did
not give credence to the testimonies of
plaintiffs witnesses because their
memories could not be trusted and
because no strong evidence supported
the declarations. Moreover, the parties
involved in the alleged trust were
already dead.
Judgment appealed to CA but the
amounts involved exceeded two hundred
thousand pesos, the CA elevated the
case to the SC.
Issue:
(1) W/N plaintiffs massive oral evidence
sufficient to prove an implied trust,
resulting or constructive, regarding the
two fishponds.
Held: SC affirmed lower courts
decision.
(1) Plaintiffs pleading and evidence
cannot be relied upon to prove an
implied trust. The trial courts firm
conclusion that there was no community
of property during the lifetime of
Valentina Ignacio or before 1914 is
substantiated by defendants
documentary evidence. There was no
resulting trust in this case because there
never was any intention on the part of
Juan, Ambrosia and Valentin to create
any trust. There was no constructive
trust because the registration of the 2
fishponds in the names of Juan and
Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or
mistake. This is not a case where to
satisfy the demands of justice it is
necessary to consider the Calunuran
fishpond as being held in trust by the
heirs of Juan Salao Sr. for the heirs of
Valentin Salao. And even assuming that
there was an implied trust, plaintiffs
action is clearly barred by prescription
when it filed an action in 1952 or after

the lapse of more than 40 years from

the date of registration.
GERONA v DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Petitioner Gerona heirs are the
legitimate children of Domingo Gerona
and Placida de Guzman. Placida was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de
Guzman and his first wife Teodora de la
Cruz. After the death of Teodora,
Marcelo married Camila Ramos. Their
children are herein respondents de
Guzman heirs. Marcelo died some time
in Septermber 1945 and respondents
executed a deed of extra-judicial
settlement of his estate. They
fraudulently stipulated therein that they
were the only surviving heirs of Marcelo
although knowing that petitioners were
also his forced heirs. They were able to
cause the transfer the certificates of 7
parcels of land each in their names. The
petitioners discovered the fraud only the
year before the institution of the case.
Petitioners seek to annul the extrajudicial settlement as well as have their
shares in the said properties reconveyed
to them.
Contentions: Defendants argue that
Placida de Guzman was not entitled to
share in the estate of Marcelo as she
was an illegitimate child and that the
action of the Petitioners is barred by the
statute of limitations.
Rulings:
TRIAL COURT: The trial court
dismissed the case after finding that
Placida was a legitimate child of Marcelo
and that the properties described herein
belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Marcelo and Camila. It also ruled that
Petitioners action had already
prescribed.

CA: affirmed ruling of the trial court

Contentions: Petitioners assert that
since they are co-heirs of Marcelo, the
action for partition is not subject to the
statue of limitations; that if affected, the
period of 4 years did not begin to run
until discovery of the fraud. They claim
that the fraud done by respondents took
place in 1956 or 1957 and that it had
not prescribed when the present action
was commenced.
SC: The rule holds true only when the
defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The
statute of limitations operates from the
time the adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property.
The defendants excluded the petitioners
from the estate of Marcelo when they
executed the deed of extra-judicial
settlement claiming that they are the
sole heirs thus setting up an adverse
title to the estate.
An action for reconveyance of real
property based upon a constructive or
implied trust, resulting from fraud may
be barred by the statute of limitations
and the action may only be filed within 4
years from the discovery of the fraud. In
the case at bar, the discovery was made
on June 25, 1948 when the deed was
filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the
names of the respondents exclusively.
Plaintiffs complaint was not filed until
November 4, 1958 or more than 10
years after.
Ignacio Gerona as well as Maria
Concepcion attained the age of majortity
in 1948 thus had 4 years from date of
discovery within which to file an action.
Francisco and Delfin attained the age of
majority in 1952 and 1954, thus had 2

years after removal of legal incapacity

within which to commence their action.

Fabian v. Fabian, G.R. No. L-20449, 29

January 1968, 22 SCRA 231, J. Castro.
While under Section 15 of the Friar
Lands Act, title to the land sold is
reserved to the Government until the
purchaser makes full payment of all the
required instalments and the interest
thereon, this legal reservation refers to
the bare, naked title. The equitable and
beneficial title goes to the purchaser the
moment he pays the first instalment and
is given a certificate of title.
The reservation of the title in favor of
the Government is made merely to
protect the interest of the Government
so as to preclude or prevent the
purchaser from encumbering or
disposing of the lot purchased before the
payment in full of the purchase price.
Outside of this protection the
Government retains no right as an
owner. Thus, after the issuance of the
sales certificate and pending payment in
full of the purchase price, the
Government may not sell the lot to
another, encumber it, occupy the land to
use or cultivate, nor lease it or even
participate or share in its fruits.
An action for reconveyance of real
property based upon a constructive or
implied trust, resulting from fraud, may
be barred by the statute of limitations,
and the action therefor may be filed
within 4 years from the discovery of the
fraud, such discovery being deemed to
have taken place when new certificates
of title were issued exclusively in the
names of adverse claimants.
FACTS: Pablo Fabian bought from the
Philippine Government lot 164 of the

Friar Lands Estate in Muntinlupa, Rizal.

By virtue of this purchase, he was issued
sale certificate 547. He died on August
2, 1928, survived by four children,
namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II,
and Silbina. On October 5, 1928 Silbina
Fabian and Teodora Fabian, niece of the
deceased, executed an affidavit. On the
strength of this affidavit, sale
certificate 547 was assigned to them.
The acting Director of Lands, on behalf
of the Government, sold lot 164 to
Silbina Fabian Teodora Fabian. The
vendees spouses forthwith took physical
possession thereof, cultivated it, and
appropriated the produce. In that same
year, they declared the lot in their
names for taxation purposes. In 1937
the RD of Rizal issued a TCT over lot
164 in their names. They later
subdivided the lot into 2 equal parts.
The plaintiffs filed the present action for
reconveyance against the defendants
spouses, averring that Silbina and
Teodora, through fraud perpetrated in
their affidavit aforesaid. That by virtue
of this affidavit, the said defendants
succeeded in having the sale certificate
assigned to them and thereafter in
having lot 164 covered by said
certificate transferred in their names;
and that by virtue also of these
assignment and transfer, the defendants
succeeded fraudulently in having lot 164
registered in their names. They further
allege that the land has not been
transferred to an innocent purchaser for
value. A reconveyance thereof is prayed
for.
In their answer, the defendants spouses
claim that Pablo Fabian was not the
owner of lot 164 at the time of his death
on August 2, 1928 because he had not

paid in full the amortizations on the lot;

that they are the absolute owners
thereof, having purchased it from the
Government, and from that year having
exercised all the attributes of ownership
thereof up to the present; and that the
present action for reconveyance has
already prescribed. The dismissal of the
complaint is prayed for.
The lower court rendered judgment
declaring that the defendants spouses
had acquired a valid and complete title
to the property by acquisitive
prescription, and accordingly dismissed
the complaint. The latters motion for
reconsideration was thereafter denied.
Hence, the present recourse.
ISSUE:
(1) Was Pablo Fabian the owner of lot
164 at the time of his death, in the face
of the fact, admitted by the defendantsappellees, that he had not then paid the
entire purchase price thereof?
(2) May laches constitute a bar to an
action to enforce a constructive trust?
(3) Has title to the land vested in the
appellees through the mode of
acquisitive prescription?
HELD: The judgment a quo, dismissing
the complaint, is affirmed
1. YES. Lot 164 was a part of the Friar
Lands Estate of Muntinlupa, Rizal; its
sale to Pablo Fabian was therefore
governed by Act 1120, otherwise known
as the Friar Lands Act. While under

section 15 of the said Act, title to the

land sold is reserved to the
Government until the purchaser
makes full payment of all the required
installments and the interest thereon,
this legal reservation refers to the
bare, naked title. The equitable and
beneficial title really went to the
purchaser the moment he paid the
first installment and was given a
certificate of sale. The reservation of
the title in favor of the Government is
made merely to protect the interest of
the Government so as to preclude or
prevent the purchaser from
encumbering or disposing of the lot
purchased before the payment in full of
the purchase price. Outside of this
protection the Government retains
no right as an owner. For instance,
after issuance of the sales certificate and
pending payment in full of the purchase
price, the Government may not sell the
lot to another. It may not even
encumber it. It may not occupy the land
to use or cultivate; neither may it lease
it or even participate or share in its
fruits. In other words, the Government
does not and cannot exercise the rights
and prerogatives of owner. And when
said purchaser finally pays the final
installment on the purchase price and is
given a deed of conveyance and a
certificate of title, the title at least in
equity, retroacts to the time he first
occupied the land, paid the first
installment and was issued the
corresponding certificate of sale. In
other words, pending the
completion of the payment of the
purchase price, the purchaser is
entitled to all the benefits and
advantages which may accrue to the
land as well as suffer the losses that
may befall it.
That Pablo Fabian had paid five annual

installments to the Government, and in

fact been issued a sale certificatein his
name, are conceded. He was therefore
the owner of lot 164 at the time of his
death. He left four daughters, namely,
Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II and
Silbina to whom all his rights and
interest over lot 164 passed upon his
demise.
In case a holder of a certificate dies
before the giving of the deed and does
not leave a widow, then the interest of
the holder of the certificate shall
descend and deed shall issue to the
person who under the laws of the
Philippine Islands would have taken had
the title been perfected before the death
of the holder of the certificate, upon
proof of the holders thus entitled of
compliance with all the requirements of
the certificate.
2. The assignment and sale of the lot to
the defendants Silbina and Teodora were
therefore null and void. To the extent of
the participation of the appellants,
application must be made of the
principle that if property is acquired
through fraud, the person obtaining it is
considered a trustee of an implied trust
for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
Laches may bar an action brought to
enforce a constructive trust such as the
one in the case at bar. Illuminating are
the following excerpts from a decision
penned by Mr. Justice Reyes:
But in constructive trusts, . . . the rule is
that laches constitutes a bar to actions
to enforce the trust, and repudiation is
not required, unless there is a
concealment of the facts giving rise to

the trust
The assignment of sale certificate was
effected in October 1928; and the actual
transfer of lot 164 was made on the
following November 14. It was only on
July 8, 1960, 32 big years later, that the
appellants for the first time came
forward with their claim to the land. The
record does not reveal, and it is not
seriously asserted, that the appellees
concealed the facts giving rise to the
trust. Upon the contrary, paragraph 13
of the stipulation of facts of the parties
states with striking clarity that
defendants herein have been in
possession of the land in question since
1928 up to the present publicly and
continuously under claim of ownership;
they have cultivated it, harvested and
appropriated the fruits for themselves.
3. it is already settled in this
jurisdiction that an action for
reconveyance of real property based
upon a constructive or implied trusts,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by
the statute of limitations. the discovery
in that case being deemed to have taken
place when new certificates of title were
issued exclusively in the names of the
respondents therein.
[A]lthough, as a general rule, an action
for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the
defendants do not hold the property in
question under an adverse title. The
statute of limitations operates, as in
other cases, from the moment such
adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property
Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul
the aforementioned deed of extra-

judicial settlement upon the ground of

fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four
(4) years from the discovery of the
fraud. Upon the undisputed facts in the
case at bar, not only had laches set in
when the appellants instituted their
action for, reconveyance in 1960, but as
well their right to enforce the
constructive trust had already
prescribed.
It logically follows from the above
disquisition that acquisitive prescription
has likewise operated to vest absolute
title in the appellees, pursuant to the
provisions of section 41 of Act 190 that:
Ten years actual adverse possession by
any person claiming to be the owner for
that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years
by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise, in whatever way such
occupancy may have commenced or
continued, shall vest in every actual
occupant or possessor of such land a full
and complete title.
Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold
not only that the appellants action to
enforce the constructive trust created in
their favor has prescribed, but as well
that a valid, full and complete title has
vested in the appellees by acquisitive
prescription.
NOTES:
Article 1456 of the new Civil Code, while
not retroactive in character, merely
expresses a rule already recognized by
our courts prior to the Codes
promulgation (see Gayondato vs. Insular

Treasurer, 49 Phil. 244). Appellants are,

however, in error in believing that like
express trust, such constructive trusts
may not be barred by lapse of time. The
American law on trusts has always
maintained a distinction between
express trusts created by the intention
of the parties, and the implied or
constructive trusts that are
exclusively created by law, the latter not
being trusts in their technical sense. The
express trusts disable the trustee from
acquiring for his own benefit the
property committed to his management
or custody, at least while he does not
openly repudiate the trust, and makes
such repudiation known to the
beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this
reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190) declared that the rules on
adverse possession does not apply to
continuing and subsisting (i.e.,
unrepudiated) trusts.