DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

Adjudication by the Application of Article

142 of Indian Constitution
Interpretation of Statues

Shivam Kumar
V Semester Section- B
Roll No. 123
BA.,LLB. (hons.)

Duly submitted Final Draft under the supervision of Mr. Manvendra Kumar
Tiwari for the fulfillment of the Sessional Assessment (2015-16) of
Interpretation of Statues.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I owe a great many thanks to a great many people who helped and
supported me during the writing of this project.
I would like to express my special thanks and gratitude to my teacher
Mr. Manwendra Kumar Tiwari who gave me the golden opportunity to
do this project which also helped me in doing a lot of research work and
I came to know about a lot of new things.
I am really thankful to them.
Secondly I would also like to thank my friends who helped me a lot in
finishing this project within the limited time. I am making this project
not only for marks but also to increase my knowledge. Thanks again to
all who helped me.

-Shivam Kumar

Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................4
II. RESTRICTED, BROAD AND HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION OF
ARTICLE 142(1).......................................................................................................7
A. Restricted Interpretation.....................................................................................7
B. Broad Interpretation...........................................................................................8
C. Harmonious Interpretation.................................................................................9
III. RECONCILING ARTICLE 142(1) JURISPRUDENCE......................................9
IV. COURTS AND ITS VENTURE TO DO JUSTICE............................................11
V. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................13

I. INTRODUCTION
Today, when we live in a time where the lawful frameworks are exceptionally built up that
administration of rights and liabilities rely on law and its standards as opposed to value, despite
everything we discover the premise of such laws from the acumen of Justice. Justice has been the
focal topic of the considerable number of developments on the planet. What is justice, asked
Plato1. Justice is an appropriate, concordant relationship between the warring parts of the
individual or city. Justice is the demonstration by which the Society/Court/Tribunal provides for
a man what he is unlimited to, rather than securing against damage or off-base. Justice is an
understanding of what is correct and fair towards one who has endured an off-base. Hence, while
treating the justice with mercy, the Court must be exceptionally cognizant that it needs to do
Justice in definite adjustment to some compulsory law for the reason that human activities are
observed to be just or unreasonable as they are in consistence with or contrary to the law 2. Justice
is a dream as the significance and meaning of "justice" shifts from individual to individual and
gathering to party.

It is in these circumstances that the court needs to assume a part of a go between as

opposed to a routine adjudicator and guarantee that complete justice is done. The Founding
Fathers of the Constitution, discerning of the realities of life, carefully engrafted rights,
obligations and pragmatic methods in the country's Constitution for an equitable lifestyle. While
Chapters managing the rights and liabilities have been incorporated, the drafting committee
additionally engrained parts on their enforceability by including establishments of Union and
State legal inside of the Constitution itself. Articles 32, 136, 142, 226, and so on of the
Constitution fortify the yearnings of conferring complete justice. These procurements are a piece
of optional ward of the courts and have frequently been summoned in matters requiring the court
to intercede and guarantee that rights and privileges of persons are appropriately secured.
1 Plato, The Republic, Book-I,331 BC.
2 Delhi Administration v Gurudeep Singh Uban AIR 2000 SC 3737

Ofthese,Articles136and142aremoreimportantandoftengotogether.Article136
providesdiscretiontotheSupremeCourttograntaspecialleavetoappealagainstanyjudgment,
decree,determination,sentenceororderofacourt.Suchrighttoappealisnotanautomaticright
andonlyiftheCourtisoftheopinionthatthematterissuchasrequirestheinterferencebythe
apexcourtistheleavegrantedwhereasArticle142empowerstheSupremeCourttopasssuch
decreeororderasmaybenecessaryfordoingcompletejusticebetweentheparties.Article
142isconceivedtomeetthesituationswhichcannotbeeffectivelyandappropriatelytackledby
existingprovisionsoflaw.Thusitappearsthatwhereexistingprovisionsoflawcanadequately
dealwiththeissueathandanddojusticebetweentheparties,theSupremeCourtwouldnot
normallyexerciseitspowersunderArticle142.
Article 142 also lays down no limitations regarding causes or the circumstances in which the
power is to be exercised. The exercise of such power is left completely to the discretion of the
highest court.3
Moreover, such power of passing any order or decree in the interest of justice has been
conferred upon the Supreme Court only vide Article 142 and in the absence of analogous
provisions, the High Courts or the tribunals do not have similar powers. 4 Therefore the Supreme
Court, being the sole repository of such wideranging power, can pass a range of orders under this
article. It has been held that the wide powers given to the Court can be used for adding parties to
the proceedings pending before it, or in admitting additional evidence, or in remanding the case,
or in allowing a new point to be raised for the first time.5
Furthermore, under Article 142, the Supreme Court can grant relief even to a party which is not
before the Court and has omitted to challenge the impugned order before the Supreme Court. 6
The Court has also exercised its power under Article 142 to order a CBI inquiry without the State
3 M.P. Jain: Indian Constitutional Law, (5th Edn. Vol. I) p. 306
4 Sanchalakshri v Vijaykumar Raghuvirprasad Mehta, (1998) 8 SCC 245 (para 8).
5 D.D. Basu: Shorter Constitution of India, (13th Edn. 2001) p. 685
6 Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking v Basanti Devi, (1999) 8 SCC 229 (paras 15 and 16).

Government's consent where such consent was required by the statute 7 and did not remove clerks
even though their appointments were held invalid, as they had put in ten years of service and thus
deserved "justice by mercy".8 The object of Article 142(1) is that the Supreme Court must not be
obliged to rely on upon the official for the implementation of its pronouncements and requests.
Such reliance would abuse the standards of autonomy of the legal and partition of forces, both of
which were held to constitute the essential structure of the Constitution. The interpretation of
complete justice by the Apex Court has given it an alternate measurement which was not planned
by the founding fathers. The interpretation of complete justice has not been consistent. From
1963 to 1989, the interpretation of complete justice was that it cannot be adverted to, to defeat
statutory provisions.
A praiseworthy provision, Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India visualizes that the
Supreme Court in the activity of its ward may pass such enforceable pronouncement or request
as is essential for doing 'complete justice' in any reason or matter pending before it. While the
statute encompassing different procurements of the Constitution has created complex, rendering
them more concrete and stable understandings, Article 142(1) is a long way from following this
pattern. The nature and extent of force mulled over in Article 142(1) has kept on being mooted
innovatively. Most as of late, the Supreme Court struggled with following the forms of this
procurement in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathneni9 and University of Kerala v.
Chamber of Principals of Colleges, Kerala.10 The requirement for concretising the import of
Article 142(1) has emerged out of choices which have neglected to exhibit a bringing together
logic of the Supreme Court in doing 'complete justice'. The provision was pressed into aid for
making once more reason for a choice in Leila David v. Condition of Maharashtra 11 and Anil
7 Mohd. Anis v Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 145.
8 H.C. Puttaswamy v Honble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, 1991 Supp(2) SCC 421
9 (2009) 8 SCC 785, at 786.
10 (2010) 1 SCC 353, at 362.
11 (2009) 10 SCC 337.

Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain.12 On the other hand, comparable requests summoning Article 142 for
waiving a statutory prerequisite were rejected in Manish Goel v. Rohini13 and Poonam v. Sumit
Tanwar14. An unprecedented, yet undefined procurement, Article 142's summon has been loaded
with instability which demonstrates the requirement for looking at its actual import.

II.

RESTRICTED, BROAD AND HARMONIOUS

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 142(1)

The open-finished interpretation of Article 142(1) rendered by the Supreme Court has raised a
huge inquiry of the likelihood of summoning Article 142 in circumstances where a choice may
fall foul of substantive procurements of a statute. The Supreme Court's way to deal with this
issue can be recognized as sequentially falling into three periods of limited, expansive and
congruous interpretations given to Article 142. Each of the three stages contains element case
law attempting to legitimize its methodology and conceivable span. The accompanying areas
review the methodologies created in these three stages.

A. Restricted Interpretation
Article 142 of the Constitution received its first significant interpretation in a restricted,
more balanced light. In Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissoner, U.P.15 a Constitutional bench
was confronted with the subject of whether the Supreme Court could outline a principle or issue
12 (2009) 10 SCC 415 (In this case, the apex court granted a decree of divorce by mutual consent to the spouses
even when the wife had withdrawn her consent. The fact that the wife did not intend to live with the husband
prompted the Court to invoke Article 142 for granting a divorce decree in order to do what the justices saw as
complete justice.).

13 (2010) 4 SCC 393.

14 (2010) 4 SCC 460.

15 AIR 1963 SC 996 [hereinafter PC Garg].

a request which would be conflicting with any of the essential rights. GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.
addressed the inquiry unambiguously as:

Though the powers conferred on this Court under Article 142(1) are exceptionally wide, and
the same can be exercised for doing complete justice in any case, this court can't even under
Article 142(1) make a request obviously conflicting with the express statutory procurements of
substantive law, a great deal less, conflicting with any Constitutional provision.

This perspective was embraced by a nine-judge Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v.

State of Maharashtra16 and was reiterated by a seven-Judge Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak.17 This apparently unambiguous and down to business affirmation was revised and
questioned in later judgements which mean an alternate way to deal with deciphering Article 142
of the Constitution.

B. Broad Interpretation
One of the first signs of a wide interpretation can be followed back to K.M. Nanavati
v. Condition of Bombay.18 Even as the case did not specifically examine the current issue, certain
preparatory perceptions are adroit. SINHA, C.J. representing the lion's share held that Article 142
is the ability to pass requests coincidental or subordinate to the activity of the force under Article
136, which gives the Supreme Court optional energy to permit unique leave to advance from any
judgment. In an eminent decision of a three-judge Bench decision in Delhi Judicial Service
Association v. State of Gujarat19 the Supreme Court extolled its power to new heights by
declaring Article 142 as a part of basic structure of the Constitution. K.N. Singh, J. held that, "
This Courts power under Article 142(1) to do complete justice is entirely of different level and
16 AIR 1967 SC 1, at 14-15.
17 (1988) 2 SCC 602.
18 AIR 1961 SC 112.
19 (1991) 4 SCC 406, at 452 [The Supreme Court, inter alia, for the first time held that the power under Article 142
is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution).

of different quality. Any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws cannot act as a
limitation on the constitutional power of this court. No enactment of Central or State Legislature
can limit the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution though while exercising
power under Article 142, the Court must take into consideration the statutory provisions
regulating the matter in dispute.
Importantly, Delhi Judicial Services observed the restricted interpretation rendered in
Prem Chand Garg and A.R. Antulay as obiter dicta and the principle of inconsistency with
statutory provisions or fundamental rights as a limitation to the Constitutional power under
Article 142 was said to be unnecessary.

C. Harmonious Interpretation
A watershed development in Article 142 jurisprudence came with the five-judge bench
decision in Supreme Court Bar Association v. U.O.I.20 The Court in this case rectified the error of
In Re, Vinay Chandra Mishra21 by holding that the suspension of an advocate can only be done
by the Bar Council of India under the Advocates Act and the Supreme Court cannot usurp this
statutory power to suspend an advocate by invoking Article 142. This indicates that Article 142 is
available to supplement the salutary substantive law and not to supplant it. This interpretation of
Article 142 (1) highlights the notion that although Article 142(1) is not abated by the statutory
provisions, the same is an ancillary power and can be used when it is not expressly in conflict
with the substantive provisions of law and when the Supreme Court is of the opinion that
circumstances merit its invocation to avert miscarriage of justice.

III.

RECONCILING ARTICLE 142(1) JURISPRUDENCE.

20 (1998) 4 SCC 409 [hereinafter Supreme Court Bar Association].

21 (1995) 2 SCC 584.

As has been held by the Supreme Court, Article 142 is a force of value which is wielded by the
Court in fitting circumstances i.e. where inflexibility is considered inappropriate.32 This
adaptability in Article 142 is not on account of the amazingness of the Court, but rather because
of the reality, that regardless of how innovative or cautious administrators may be, it is not a
sound desire that it will outline a statute which is equipped for noting all the future debate. It is
when hard cases emerge that the requests of justice go more distant than what is now precisely
settled by law or convention. The soul of our dynamic Constitutionalism guarantees that the
Supreme Court is not compelled to crease its hands in sadness, arguing its failure to pass
fundamental requests where the current laws can't handle a question adequately.
Basically, it can be said that Article 142 is that uncommon bolt in the quiver of the
Supreme Court, which is to be taken out, when alternate bolts (forces) neglect to determine the
question or the pertinent statutory procurements give no direction in such manner. However,
when the Supreme Court is confronted with terrible law or clashing laws, it must overrule those
on legitimate and existent grounds as opposed to just summoning Article 142 to render a sought
result. Despite the fact that Article 142 keeps alive the common law component in our
Constitution, if this helpful procurement is squeezed to help where opposite lawful grounds exist
and the Court neglects those without clarifying its method of reasoning, Article 142 will be
decreased to a self-serving standard. Now and again, the pinnacle court has passed requests
citing expressions like "in light of a legitimate concern for justice" or "to finish justice", without
making a reference to Article 142. In such cases it is not clear whether the Supreme Court had
conjured its characteristic forces under Article 142(1) intentionally or impliedly.22 It turns into a
situation for the resulting seats managing a matter emerging out of such requests, as it is hard to
determine that in compatibility of which power was the request made.23 This undercover summon
of Article 142 is neither understandable nor just. Subsequently it is unassumingly presented that
at whatever point the Court considers fit to summon its energy under Article 142 the same ought
to be made patent and lawfully perusable.

22 See RAJU RAMCHANDRAN & GAURAV AGARWAL, B.R. AGARWALAS SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 264 (6th ed. 2002).

23 M.S. Ahlawat v State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278, at 284

Thus, a word of caution needs to be formulated that Article 142 cannot be pressed into service to
achieve something which is against the cardinal principles of well-settled law or the substantive
law.24 The judicial process is well developed to allow for overruling or disagreement but this
must be done through the process itself and not by fiat of Article 142. For example, Article 142
cannot be used by a judge sitting in a two-judge Bench to pass directions, when the other judge
disagrees to the same. It has to be exercised in concurrence by a majority of judges in a Bench.25

IV.

COURTS AND ITS VENTURE TO DO JUSTICE

It is to be noticed this article utilizes the word `complete justice` as opposed to the term
`justice`. This is on account of complete justice voyages much past the idea of offering justice
to a gathering. Complete justice endeavors at conferring justice for one side alone, as well as
for all. Regardless of the possibility that a gathering has wronged another, the court can't turn
into an instrument to sustain wrong upon him. The expression `complete justice` engrafted in
Article 142 is of wide sufficiency "framed with flexibility to meet heap circumstance".
Complete justice is justice as indicated by law and the Supreme Court would be well inside
of its energy to try and form the alleviation so looked for by the gatherings to guarantee that
no wrongness is perpetuated.26 The principle motivation behind Article 142 and the attempt to
24 Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corpn., (2009) 8 SCC 646, 707
25 Gaurav Jain v Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 270, at 275-276 (Article 142 cannot be inconsistent with
Article 145(5) which says that no judgment of the Court will be delivered save with the concurrence of
the majority of judges).
26 Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v Umadevi (3) & Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1806

finish justice has been clarified by this court in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Essential Secy and
Ors27 wherein the summit court held that `the Supreme Court has been consulted with wide
powers for appropriate and compelling organization of justice. The Court has inalienable
force and locale for managing any extraordinary circumstance in bigger open interest which
fabricates trust in the guideline of law and reinforces vote based system. The Supreme Court
as the sentinel on the qui vive has been contributed with the forces which are versatile and
adaptable and in specific regions the unbending nature in activity of such powers is viewed as
wrong. In Shahid Balwa v. Union of India and Ors.,28the court said that Article 136 read with
Article 142 of the Constitution of India empowers this Court to pass such requests, which are
vital for doing complete justice in any reason or matter pending before it and, any request so
made, should be enforceable all through the domain of India. The ability to finish justice
under Article 142 is in the way of a restorative measure whereby value is given inclination
over law to guarantee that no foul play is caused.29
Furnished with such incredible optional forces, the Supreme Court has frequently taken up
the errand of guaranteeing that legitimate gatherings are not a definitive endures and that the
blameworthy/or the wrong is eventually rebuffed. Power under Article 142 is wide and can be
utilized to pass any request which the court believes is important for doing complete justice
between the gatherings. There can be no straight coat recipe for its activity nor there can be
any chains or constrained extent of use for the forces under Article 142 is whole in nature. It
tries to guarantee that no treachery is brought about by the rigors of law or because of the
perversity of discoveries recorded by the courts underneath or such cases. It goes about as a
value locale without losing the qualities of being an activity as per law. Article 142 is utilized
as a device to adjust the clashing hobbies of the gatherings and to guarantee that eventually,
the upright succeeds. It is a natural force and purview for managing any exceptional
circumstance in the bigger hobbies of organization of justice and for keeping any show bad
27 (2014) 2 SCC 532
28 (2014) 2 SCC 687
29 Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of India & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 1895

form being finished. Be that as it may, the force is to be practiced just in remarkable
circumstances for facilitating the finishes of justice and not in an easygoing furthermore, a
mechanical way. The motivation behind Article 142 is to do successful, genuine and generous
justice, coextensive and similar with the needs of justice in a given case keeping in mind the
end goal to meet any exigency that may arise. However, it is not to be practiced for a
situation where there is no premise in law which can frame a structure for building up a
superstructure. Remembering these standards, the peak court has not faltered to practice its
energy under Article 142, however completely mindful of the limitations in legal choice
making procedure, keeping in mind the end goal to finish justice.

V.

CONCLUSION

Our Supreme Court in quest for justice knows no limits, however in such interest it must not
dismiss standards of institutional respectability and legal procedure. Obviously, the utilization of
law with pompous strictness is neither just nor legitimate, yet the legal procedure must be aware
of the current lawful standards while conjuring standards of value to strike a symphonious
harmony between the two. The nonappearance of any Constitutional Assembly Debate on Article
142 (Article 112 of the Draft Constitution) shows that the establishing fathers needed the forces

under this article to stay open-finished, to empower the Supreme Court to build up its own law. It
is then auspicious for the judges to test, clear up and amend the overall law on Article 142 which
introduces it as a shapeless, liberated force. No rescue, other than an internal looking activity by
the summit court and restorative case law can do justice in recovering a purposive development
of Article 142.
Along these lines, to close, the Supreme Court has been given wide optional energy to finish
justice between the gatherings under Article 142 of the Constitution. It can pass any request
which it considers fit in the truths and circumstances of the case. However a request which the
Court goes to finish justice between the gatherings must not just be reliable with the crucial
rights ensured under the Constitution, yet ought to likewise be steady with the substantive
procurements of the pertinent statute. At the end of the day, this Court can't out and out overlook
the substantive procurements of a statute. This Court ought to be moderate in practicing this
incredible optional force and it ought not pass any request which would add up to supplanting the
substantive law. Further, the court must practice legal restriction in connection to conjuring
Article 142 and it ought not practice the force on the ground of sensitivity or on negligible
inquiring. This is on account of this awesome whole power is additionally an optional and
additional normal force which is not to be practiced in a mechanical way. There must be solid
and apt purposes behind practicing this optional locale for the forces under Article 142 are
intended to be practiced so as to further the needs of justice and to fill in lacuna or vacuum in law
and not as a component of customary activity of ward of the court.