Review

Author(s): Edward S. Malecki

Review by: Edward S. Malecki
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), pp. 969-970
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963074
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1982 Book Reviews: Normative Theory 969

Mendel's basic conclusions are interesting even

ing scholarly literature in English on Bakunin and

if essentially unconvincing. In order to undershould be read by all serious students of revolu-

stand Bakunin's political behavior and thought,

Mendel says we should primarily examine the man

tionary politics in general and Bakunin in par-

ticular.

himself rather than his social and political en-

CURTIS STOKES
vironment. Despite his public image as a defiant,

virile, and powerful revolutionary, Bakunin, in

University of Michigan, Dearborn

truth, was a weak, withdrawn, and very sensitive

boy who never grew up. Why did his public

behavior appear to be so different from his

private feelings? Mendel says that despite the fact

Marx's Theory of Ideology. By Bhikhu Parekh.

that Bakunin's public views and actions were

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982. Pp. iv

often taken seriously by both his supporters and

+ 247. $24.50.)

opponents, they were in reality "largely fantasy

revealing the reverse of what they seemed to say"

or designed "for his own therapy" in that

What did Karl Marx mean by the concept of

ideology? In a systematic attempt to clarify the

Bakunin "was merely performing a part to con-

meaning of this slippery concept, Parekh has writ-

vince himself that he was other than he was" (pp.

ten a tightly argued book that examines why Marx

343, 423, and 432).

Furthermore, Mendel concludes that the ulti-

mate source or roots of Bakunin's apocalyptic vi-

sion of the coming struggle between good and bad

needed the concept and how the concept relates to

Marx's views on truth and objectivity.

Parekh begins by making a strong case for the

view that ideology for Marx meant both idealism

-so as to introduce his nonstatist socialist society

(treating consciousness as an autonomous entity)

-are the oedipal and narcissistic patterns in

and apologia (presenting ideas of a particular

Bakunin's life. Finally, Mendel maintains, how-

ever much Bakunin's theory and practice was "all

rhetoric and theatrical act performed mainly for

his own catharsis" (p. 425), that there is an ob-

vious contradiction between Bakunin's professed

antiauthoritarianism and the actual authoritarian

character of his organization, movement, and

even some of his ideas concerning the future

society.

class, group, or nation as universally valid).

Parekh asserts that Marx used the term ideology

in his early works primarily to refer to idealism

and in his later works primarily to refer to

apologia. While virtually all idealism leads to

apologia, not all apologia entails idealism (p. 14).

Parekh then uses this relatively narrow view of

ideology to analyze Marx's comments about

"base" and "vulgar" writers (ch. 3), Hegel as the

The overall conclusions of this book are essen-

tially unconvincing, in large part because of the

flawed methodological assumptions of the

author. How do we really determine the "uncon-

leading representative of philosophy (ch. 4), and

the classical economists as the epitome of bour-

geois science (ch. 5). While Parekh argues that

ideology and science are mutually exclusive con-

scious motivations" of individuals? Is it really

cepts for Marx, he nevertheless thought specific

possible to determine the origin of ideas-whether

works could be both scientific and ideological (p.

through a primarily economic analysis or psycho-

analytic analysis? For example, Mendel claims

131). For example, although Ricardo and other

classical economists were primarily scientific, they

that Bakunin's The Reaction in Germany, un-

were also ideological because they were uncritical,

doubtedly a very important early work, is "one of

ahistorical, and analyzed economic relations from

his most revealing" in that its abstractness makes

the bourgeois viewpoint.

it easier to "appreciate the deeper undercurrents

that motivate it." This is unlike Bakunin's later

The central theme of Parekh's argument is

developed in the final chapters. Marx's theory of

publications which tend to be more "realistic"

ideology neither totally rejects Western

and "thereby more effectively conceal their sub-

philosophy nor that tradition's commitment to

jective source" (pp. 3, 169). How can Mendel

really verify these assertions? That Bakunin was

sexually impotent and expressed an incestual love

for his sister Tatiana are no great revelations-as

Mendel rightly acknowledges. But how do we get

from here to his conclusions? His claim to have

provided the reader with "ample, even excessive"

(p. 2) evidence to support his psychohistorical

case is unfounded.

objective truth. Thus, contrary to Lenin, Lukdcs,

Althusser, and other Marxists, Parekh does not

believe that Marx thought capitalism could only

be studied from one of two class viewpoints and

had adopted the proletarian point of view himself

(p. 164). Instead, Parekh argues, Marx studied

capitalist society and human history from the

standpoint of the social whole, which he critically

constructed out of all the standpoints available to

Still, the above reservations notwithstanding,

Mendel's book is a welcome addition to the grow-

him, including, but not exclusively, the prole-

tarian (p. 175). Rather than being a conceptual

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970 The American Political Science Review Vol. 76

framework useful only to Marxists, Parekh inter-

and to do so in such a way as to demonstrate its

prets Marx's theory of ideology in a way that per-

revolutionary character." The second purpose is

mits it to be used by philosophical analysts of all

bound to stir more controversy than the first, and

persuasions.
how well Sandoz makes his case will have to be

Parekh notes, however, that despite its general

judged by each reader. Given Voegelin's well-

utility, Marx's theory of ideology does have prob-

known and sharp criticism of recent intellectual

lems of clarity and overstatement. The solution to

positions that claim revolutionary status as actual-

some of these problems will require substantial

ly "spiritual diseases" (pp. 27 and 59), it is

work, for example, the determination of precisely

curious even to apply the term to him. But Sandoz

how the standpoint of the whole should be con-

deliberately uses the word revolution in a special

structed by the social theorist. Others, such as

sense. Obviously, Voegelin has not-at least not

Marx's excessive concentration on class as a

yet-produced a revolution in political science.

source of systematic bias, can be readily corrected

Sandoz does not imply he has, but argues that

by recognizing that Marx did see the social rele-

Voegelin's thought is itself a revolution.

vance of other groups and did define class quite

Assuredly, Voegelin has given political science

broadly.

one priceless gift-the gift of a theoretical vision

While Parekh's role in the first 8 chapters is

that both abandons political philosophy as a

that of a sympathetic interpreter of Marx's

history of political opinion and embraces his-

theory, in the last chapter he shifts to the role of

torical philosophy; that rejects recent positivism

critic. As an interpreter of what Marx really

and behavioralism and yet preserves empirical

meant to say about ideology, Parekh is plausible

research. He has shown the inadequacy of the

but hardly definitive. For example, his arguments

unholy marriage between the behavioralists and

that Marx did not analyze capitalist society from a

the old students of political opinion-a marriage

proletarian viewpoint and that he did not reject

kept together only as long as the two remained

the Western philosophical tradition depend more

irrelevant to each other.

on Parekh's own logical derivations from Marx's

"The order of history emerges from the history

premises than on textual support in Marx's

of order." With these dramatic words Voegelin

writings. As a critic and as a contributor in his

opened his monumental multivolume thesis

own right to the theory of ideology, Parekh is

(Order and History, Louisiana State University

more creditable. Because he has a habit of not

Press 1956) on order and history and identified

specifically identifying the commentators whose

the core ideas in the breakthrough Sandoz calls

positions he is critiquing (e.g., pp. 10, 33, 41, 50,

the "Voegelinian Revolution." Order is the cen-

61, 127, 132, and 162), however, Parekh has un-

tral concept. The theory runs that the visible and

fortunately limited the usefulness of his book to

empirical order of society is the outcome of, and

nonspecialists, who certainly could benefit from

is continually nourished by, a vision of order.

reading it.

Thus, starting with the experience of a natural,

cosmic order, societies are founded on successive-

EDWARD S. MALECKI

ly more clearly conceptualized or "differen-

California State University, Los Angeles

tiated" views of order. The human being, more

particularly, human consciousness, becomes the

core and center of the "new science." To under-

stand the various historical forms societies take, it

The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Intro.

duction. By Ellis Sandoz. (Baton Rouge: Loui-

siana State University Press, 1981. Pp. xiv +

371. $19.95.)

is necessary to understand the experience of order

they are based on. The heart of the "new science"

is the experiential rather than the experimental; it

focuses on the experience of peoples past and on

the experience of the political scientist present.

With Ellis Sandoz's work, a new chapter in Eric

Voegelin's political thought begins, and for the

student of political theory The Voegelinian

Revolution joins The New Science of Politics and

Anamnesis as indispensable. Perhaps because

Voegelin himself cooperated with him in com-

pleting this book, Sandoz has been preeminently

successful in capturing the essence of Voegelin's

thought in a comprehensive vision.

The opening sentence of Sandoz's introduction

presents the work's double purpose: "to provide a

general introduction to Eric Voegelin's thought

This formulation rejects political theory as the

history of opinion and also rejects it as the accep-

tance of the methodology of the natural sciences.

It accepts the view that both ideas and facts are

unwarranted abstractions from actual social life.

At the same time, the "new science" assigns an

important role both to traditional political

philosophy and to empirical research as long as

they are centered and focused on the experience of

order. If carried off successfully, Voegelin's for-

mulation would indeed constitute a breakthrough

in political theory of the first order. It would

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