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International Peacekeeping
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To cite this article: Martin R. Rupiya (1997) The Bakara market arms clearance
operation of 1993: The Zimbabwe national army in Somalia, International
Peacekeeping, 4:1, 115-121, DOI: 10.1080/13533319708413654
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533319708413654
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EYEWITNESS
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road and camel desert trails which linked Somalia to merchants in North
Africa, the Middle East and the world beyond. Tentacles of local and
external trade supplied arms of war which could easily be secured for cash,
including: machine guns of various types; 14.5mm anti-air guns with dual
ammunition to operate in an anti-tank or anti-air role; MILAN anti-tank
missile systems; shoulder-borne rocket projectile gun types (RPG2 and
RPG7) and vehicle-mounted 75mm recoilless rocket launchers (RCS);
Strella shoulder-borne anti-air missiles of the SAM series; anti-personnel
and anti-tank mines, complemented by a variety of grenades. Much more
important, however, was the complementary availability of ammunition, to
liberally replenish all the above weapon categories. These weapons and
ammunition were openly tested and on sale in the various stalls in Bakara
Market. Consequently, the availability of weapons and the inexhaustible
supply of ammunition in the centre of the capital had been taken advantage
of by the factions vying for the control of Somalia.
In seeking to re-impose law and order, UNITAF planned to seize the
strategic harbours, airports and major cities such as Mogadishu, Kismayo,
Baidoa, Mecca and Belet Huen, around which the political factions
exercised competing control. The next step envisaged opening the closed
lines of communications from the sea and airports to the inland towns for
the resumption of the delivery of relief aid to ordinary starving Somalis.
The international task force proceeded to implement a double-pronged
strategy. First, a political initiative involving all existing Somali political
factions was launched in early February, with the support of the
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its headquarters in Addis Ababa.
This forum was soon moved to recognize the authority of UNITAF's
international authority and mandate on 15 February. The Somali conference
participants were also prevailed upon to agree to a ceasefire which would
come into immediate effect, culminating in their subsequent endorsement of
the decision to surrender arms to UNITAF forces. It was also pointed out at
this time that factions violating the above agreements would be declared
bandits, and UNITAF would have the authority to descend upon the
recalcitrant parties and hunt them down.
The second route which sought to complement the political process was
to be made up of military efforts by UNITAF contingent forces in Somalia
itself. The military option focused on the rump of instability - the Bakara
(arms) Market in Mogadishu.
The above framework formed the basis of deployment of the ZNA
contingent in Somalia in the Bakara Market, for 16 weeks, from 12
February until 3 June 1993.
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to establish an Inner and Outer Cordon around the market, and where
necessary, call in assistance of other international forces;
to carry out high-profile vehicle and foot patrols in the cordoned zone.
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121
the gangs. Finally, on 3 June 1993, well after UNOSOM II had taken over
command of the Somali operation from UNITAF, the ZNA contingent was
re-deployed to Bakul to serve in a French area of responsibility, but its most
critical contribution had already been made.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Parts of this article were published in Martin Rupiya, 'Peace-keeping Operations: The
Zimbabwean Experience', in Mark Shaw and Jakkie Cilliers (eds), South Africa and
Peacekeeping In Africa, Vol.1, Institute for Defence Policy, IDP, South Africa, 1995, pp.111-25.
NOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Presentation by Maj. Vitalis Chigume to the Zimbabwe Staff College, Harare, Sept. 1995.
Ibid.
Interviews with Maj. Vitalis Chigume, Harare, Nov. 1995 and June 1996.
Ibid.
Ibid.