In the case of National Housing Corporation v.

Jucov, the Supreme Court held that

by reason of the nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the
public service, public employees and civil service employees, may not enjoy the
same rights as other private individuals.

Your Honors, Good Afternoon. As beneficiality speaker, I will be emphasizing

the point that the subject provision prevents undue influence and promotes
government impartiality, credibility and integrity.
Anent this issue, no less than the Constitution emphasizes that public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times serve
the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Given this nature, it is clear that a public officer does not enjoy the same
rights as an ordinary private citizen. For holding office is not a right but a
privilege accorded only to those who meet certain qualifications such as age,
education or civil service eligibility. Those who voluntarily enter the service
may be validly denied some of these rights.
In Chavez vs Gonzalez and a line of other cases, the Supreme Court stressed
that freedom of speech, just like all other rights, is not absolute and may be
subjected to restrictions as clear public interest may require demanded by
the peculiar circumstances under which it is exercised.
This public interest is best exemplified in the mandate to ensure the integrity
of the public office and to guarantee integrity of the elections. An opinion
delivered by a civilian takes on a different meaning when expressed through
the figure of a public servant because such opinion becomes associated with
his public office.
Just imagine a judge or a regional director blogging about his preferred
candidate or encouraging his friends to vote for a certain candidate. While
this may be an exercise of a persons freedom of expression, the same can
affect public perception to the prejudice of the specific branch of government
the official represents. Due to the authority reposed in their corresponding
offices and the peculiar character of the public service, it becomes very
difficult to delineate between personal opinion and the position of the office.
This is precisely why restrictions the free speech of government officials
involving partisan political activity have constitutionally-set limitations since
a public officer may use government machinery and resources to further
political motives. This tendency is exactly what the provision addresses.
Two concrete benefits can be had from the foregoing:
1. The danger of employees from being coerced by the party in power and
forced to work for the candidates of the administration is minimized. The
restriction on political activity gives employees firm legal basis to resist any
form of political pressure from their superiors; and

2. An attitude of political neutrality promotes efficiency in the service where

political loyalty has no room in the promotion of employees.
What the subject provision thwarts are the use of government resources
taken from the hard-earned money of our tax payers intended provide
services to the public just to further private or personal causes, the tendency
of appointive government employees to campaign for the appointing
authority, and the use of public office to give undue advantage to those
already in the government.
Duque vs Veloso also reminds us that prejudice to public service is not only
through blatant wrongful disbursement of public funds or property. Greater
damage comes with the publics perception of corruption, incompetence and
partiality in the government.
Therefore, we stand firm that by upholding the constitutionality of this
provision, we can preserve the credibility and impartiality of the government
and give life to the constitutional and statutory mandate of ensuring equal
access to public service.