This edition 1 is a shortened version of a thesis for the degree of Ph. D.

, Epi
curus, On Nature: Book XXVIII: Text, Translation and Commentary, submitted
to the University of London in 1973. The thesis presents papyrological informa
tion in what I believe to be the only satisfactory way for a Herculaneum papyrus.
That is, every ' edited ' column of text is accompanied by both apographs (where
these exist), by a diplomatic transcript of the letters which survive in the papyrus
today, and by a papyrological commentary in which every uncertain trace iE<
analysed in terms of all the possible letters which it could represent, even ii
some of these might appear to be ruled out on philological grounds. If anything
less than this information is given, the reader has no reliable basis on which to
propose new conjectural readings.
Regrettably the exigencies of space make such a system of presentation impos
sible in this article. I have also found it unsatisfactory to condense my papyro
logical apparatus by restricting it to those lines whose reading I consider to be
open to doubt, for an editor cannot b expected to distinguish ' certain ' from
' uncertain ' conjectural readings in his own text with sufficient objectivityl and
may well be totally unsuspecting of his most serious errors.2 Therefore, rather
than give a partial papyrological apparatus which pretends to completeness,
I have chosen to dispense with it almost totally and to present simply an edited
text. At the same time I stress that my full papyrological commentary, even if
unpublished, will at any rate remain available in the above-mentioned thesis.:{

My thanks are especially due to Dr. A.

A. Long for his constant guidance during
my work on this text; to the ' Centro Inter

21-8; L"opera

naziona1e per lo studio dei papiri ercolanesi '

and Epicurus (Oxford 1928); Epicurean Frag

ments, Class. Rev. J) XLIII (1929), pp. 2224; BrGNONE, E., Epicuro (Bari 1920); ELAN
co, L. Saggio della semiografia dei volumi
ercolanesi (Napoli 1842); CANTARELLA, R.,

for the award of a ' borsa di studio' from

1 st January to 30 th September 1971, during
which period the bulk of this research was
carried out in Naples; and to Prof. M. Gi
gante for his hospitality and assistance during
the same period.
2 Cf. E. G. TuRNER, Greek Papyri, An Intro
duction, Oxford 1968, pp. 70-1.
3

Bibliography. (a) Modern Works [usually

cited simply by the author's name; but if

two or more works by the same author appear
in the bibliography, the title, or an abbre
viated form of it, is included in the citation]:
AMUNDSEN, L., Fragment of a Philosophical

Text,

({

Symbolae Osloenes

JJ

1966, pp. 5-20;

ARNIM, H. von, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

(Lipsiae 1903-5); AR!UGHETTI, G., Sul valore

di 'EITIAOriZOMAI, '-EIIIAOrUMOl:, E
IIIAOril:Il:, nel sistema epicureo, ((PdP))1952,
pp. 119-144; Epicuro, Opere, Torino 1960
(1973 2); La struttura dell'Epistola di Epi
curo a Pitocle, ((SCO XVI (1967), pp. 117

11

<

Sulla natura'

di Epicuro,

JJ

1 (1971), pp. 41-56; BAILEY, C.,

Epicurus (Oxford 1926); The Greek Atomists
<<CEre

ARRIGHETTI, G., ll libra 'Sul tempo ' (PHere.

1413) dell'opera di Epicuro

<<CEre

JJ

<

2 (1972), pp. 5-46;

Sulla natura,
CASTALDI, F.,

Epicurei genuini ed epicurei sofisti,

,,

Nuova

Cultura >J 1928, pp. 1-30; CosATTINI, A., Epi

curi <De Natura ' liber XXVIII, ((Hermes JJ
XXIX (1894), pp. 1-15; Per una edizione dei
frammenti del lisp(. cpUo&w d'Epicuro, (<Riv.
Class. )
XXXIII (1905), pp. 292-308;
)
CRONERT, W., Memoria Graeca Herculanensis

Fil.

( =MGH), Leipzig 1903; Kolotes und Mene

demos ( = K.u.M.), Leipzig 1906; review of
von Arnim's Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta
voL IV (M. Adler's index), (< Gnomon JJ 1930,
pp. 142-157; DAHLMANN, H., Varro und die

hellenistische Sprachtheorie

(Berlin

1932);

DE LAcY, P. and E., Philodemus: On Methods

of Inference. A Study in Ancient Empiricism

(Philadelphia 1941); DE LAcY, P., Epicurean
u

128 (reprinted, in French, in Assoc. G. Bude,

Actes du Vf/lme Congres, Paris 1968); ll

'EIIIAOril:MOl:,

nuovo frammento di Epicuro presso Didimo

Cieco, in Studia Ronconi (Roma 1971), pp.

Particles (Oxford 19542); DIANO, C., La psico

logia di Epicuro e la teoria delle passioni,

DAVID SEDLEY

Am. Journ. Philol. ))

1958, p. 179-83; DENNISTON, J.D., The Greek

EPICURUS, ON NATURE
BOOK XXVIII

DAVID SEDLEY

<(Giorn. crit. Filos. it. JJ 1939, pp. 105-45;

!940, pp. 15!-65; 1941, pp. 5-34; 1942, pp.
5-49, 121-50 ( =DIANO, Psicologia, + year and
page); Epicuri Ethica (Firenze 1946); DIELS,
H. -KRANZ, W., Die Fragmente der Vorsokra

tiker, Berlin 1934-7 5 (=D.-K.); FEHLING, D.,

lwei
Untersuchungen
zur
griechischen
Sprachphilosophie, ((Rhein. Mus. JJ 1965, pp.
212-29; FRITZ, K. von, Megafiker, RE, Suppl.
V (1931), cols. 707-724 (=FRITZ, Megariker);
review of VoGLIANo's Scripta, (( Gnomon ''
1932, pp. 65-84 (=FRITz); FuRLEY, D.J., Two
Studies in the Greek Atomists, Princeton
1967 (=First Study or Second Study); Know
ledge of Atoms and Void in Epicureanism, in
Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. J.
P. ANTON and G.L. KusTAs (Albany 1971),
pp. 607-19; GIGANTE, M., Diogene Laerzio.
Vite dei filosofi (Bari 1962); Ricerche Filode

mee (Napoli 1969); GIUSSANI, C., Studi lu

creziani (Torino 1896); GQMPERZ, T., Neue
Bruchstiicke Epikurs 'Ober die Natur ',
( Zeitsch. Oster. Gymnas. 867, pp. 207 ff.,
669 ff.; Neue Bruchstiicke Epikurs, insbeson

dere iiber die

Willensfrage,

c(

SB., Wiener

Akad. Wiss. ) Phil.-hist.. Kl. LXXXIII (1876),

pp. 87-98; GUTHRIE, W.K.C., A History of

Creek Philosophy, Cambridge, 1962-9 ; HAY

TER,]., Manuscript edition of Pap. Here. 1479,
with Latin translation) written in Italy bet
ween 1806 and 1811: in the Bodleian Library,
OxfoLd (MSS. GL Class. c. 9, 188-2!1);
HuBBELL, H.M., The Rhetorica of Philode
mus, <(Transactions Connecticut Academy of
Arts and Sciences JJ vol. XXIII (1920), p. 243
ff.; KLEVE, K., 'E-'PP'J!l-a: / SilipyTjjJ-a, (( Sym
bolae Osloenses, XLVI (1971), pp. 90-5;.
KNEALE, W. and M., The Development of Lo

gic (Oxford 1962); KUHNER, R., GERTH, B.,

Aus/iihrliche Grammatik der griechischen
Sprache (Hannover 1955 4); LLOYD A. C.,
Grammar and Metaphysics in the Stoa, in
Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.A. LONG (Lon

don 1971), pp. 58-74; LoNG A.A., Aisthesis,

INTRODUCTION

'!psis and Linguistic Theory in Epicurus,

" _,CS, 18 (1971), PP- 114-133; MAU , l,
1. The Papyrus - (a) Condition.
Vber die Zuweisung zweier Epikur-Fragmente,
(( Philologus ,, IC (1955), pp. 93-111;
MAY
The Herculaneum _papyrus roll containing our text is one of those broken in
SER, E., Grixmmatik der Griechischen Papyri
two, with each half being mistakenly numbered as a separate roll. Thus the
aus der Ptolemiierzeit (Leipzig and Berlin. I i,
upper halves of the columns are contained in PHerc. 1479, unrolled in 1804
19061; I ii, 19382; I iii, 19341; II i, 1926 1;
under the superintendence of the Rev. John Hayter, while the lower halves are
II ii, 19331; II iii, 19341 (= MAYSER); ed.
H. ScHMOLL, vol. I i, Berlin 1970 (= MAYSER
in PHerc. 1417, unrolled in 1808. The central lines of each column are missing.
ScHMOLL I i); MULLER R., Sur le concept de
The general condition of the papyrus is poor, but the final columns nevertheless
Physis dans la philosophie epicurienne du
give us a longer stretch of continuous argument than is to be found in any
droit, Actes V/lfe Congres Bude (Paris 1969),
other papyrus of the Ilspi :pucrsw,;.
pp. 305-318; MURRAY, 0., Philodemus on the
The Oxford and Naples apographs ( 0 and N respectively), the pencil-drawn
Good King-According to Homer, << Journ. Rom.
Stud.,, 1965, pp. 161-182; PAGLIARO A., Il
facsimiles of the papyrus, are discussed below.4
Cratilo dt Platone, << Dioniso '' N.S. 15, 1952,
pp. 178-198; PHILIPPSON, R., Neues iiber Epi
kur und seine Schule, << Nachr. Gesells. Wiss.
(1\ls. Clar. Press. d.44), containing facsimiles
C. DrANO, Epicuri Ethica (Firenze 1946), pp.
GOttingen ,, 1929, Phil.-hist. Klasse, pp. 127.
of fragments of some of the Herculaneum
24-51 ( = ARR.2 [34]); Letters preserved in
14.-9 ( = PHILIPPSON 1929); Platons Kratylos
Papyri, unrolled by Sir H. DAVY in 1819-20.
Philodemus, IIpayf-1-a'tei:ctL C. DIANO, Lettere
und Demokrit, <<Phil. Woch. '' 1929, col. 923
di Epicuro e dei suoi (Firenze 1946); PHerc.
Reproduced photographically togeLher with
ff. (= PmLIPPSON, PhiL Woch. ,, 1929);
1413 conjecLurally attributed to Epicurus.- Text
the other Oxford facsimiles, see above; (ii)
Epikurs Buch 28
fit;pt tp6asOJ\,'",
Phil.
in CANTARELLA-ARRIGHETTI, art. cit. in Biblio
Individual
writers:
Anonymous,
PHerc.
177.
Woch. ,, 1932, cols. 1458-1461 (= PHILIPP
graphy (a); Hermarchus. Fragments, ed.
Apographs in Herculanean Inscriptions (see
SON 1932); RrsT, J.M., Epicurus, An Intro
K. KROHN, Der Epikureer Hermarchos (Inau
above, (i)); PHerc. 831. Text in KoERTE (see
duction (Cambridge 1972); Ross, D., The
gural Dissertation, Berlin 1921); Metrodorus.
belo w, Metrodorus); Demetrius Lacon. V. D E
Date of Plato's Cratylus,
<<Rev. Intern.
Metrodori
Epicurei fragmenta (ed. A. KoERTE,
FALCo,
L'epicureo
Demetrio
Lacone
(Napoli
Philos." 9 (1955), pp. 187-96; ScHMID, W.,
(<Jahrb. fiir class. Philol. )> (Fleckeisen),
1923); Diogenes of Oenoanda ed. C. W. CHIL
,.., ,,:kur, RAG V (1962), cols. 681-819; ScoTT,
SuppL XVII (Lipsiae 1890), PP- 531-97; Philo
TON (Lipsiae 1967); new frr.l-4 in M.F. SMITH,
Fragmenta H erculanensia (Oxford 1885);
demos: Adversus [s'ophistas], PHere. 1005,
Fragments
of
Diogenes
of
Oenoanda
Disco
STECKEL, H., Epikuros, RE Suppl. XI (1968),
ed. F. SBORDONE (Naples 1947); De dis I ed.
vered and Rediscovered, c( Am. Journ. Ar
cols. 579-652; TAYLOR, A.E., Varia Socratica,
H. DIELS, Abh. Preuss. Akad. Wiss. J) Philos ..
chaeol. )
) 1970, pp. 51-62; new frr. 5-16 in
First Series (Oxford 1911); UsENER, H., Epi
Kl. 1915- (Berlin 1916); De dis III ed.
hist.
New
Fragments
of
Diogenes
of
Oenoanda,
curea (Leipzig 1887); Glossarium Epicureum,
H. DrELs, lb. 1916 (Berlin 1917). Cf. G. AR
ibid. 1971, pp. 357-389; Diogenianus: A.
and Index Grammaticus: in ms. in Bonn and
RIGHETTI, PdP " 1955, p. 322 ff . ; SCQ
GERCKE, Chrysippea, Jahrb.
fiir class.
Naples. Shortly to be published (= UsENER
VII (1958), P- 83 fL, and X (1961), P- Ill fL;
,
Philo! , SuppL XIV (1885) pp. 748-55 - Dio
Gloss., or Index Grammaticus); VLASTOS, G.,
De
ira. Ed. WILKE (Lipsiae 1914); De signis.
geniani
Epicurei
fragmenta;
Epicurus:
H.
On the Prehistory in Diodorus, Am. Journ.
Ed. P. and E. DE LAcY, op. cit., in Bibliogra
UsENER, Epicurea, Leipzig 1887 (= UsENER,
Philo!.)
) 1946, pp. 51-9; VoGLIANO, A., Epi
phy (a) (=Sign.); llspi. nOL"IJf-1-&:rwy Book II.
or Us.); Epicuri epistulae tres et ratae sert
curi et Epicureorum scripta in Herculanensi
Ed. A. HAusRATH, Jahrb. fiir class. Philol."
tentbae ed. P. von d. MUEHLL (Leipzig 1922);
bus papyris servata, Berlin 1928 ( = VoGLIA
(Leip,ig), SuppL XVII (1890), PP- -211-76
G. ARRIGHETTI, Epicuro, Opere, Torino 1960,
NO, or VoGLIANO Scripta); WIDMANN, H., Bei
(= Poem. II); llspl- xaxu:Uv X ed. C. JEN
1973 2 (ARR.2); A. VoGLrANO, I resti del II li
triige zur Syntax Epikurs (Stuttgart and Ber
SEN (iJpsiae 1911); Ilepl nrxppYJOi.al,'" ed. A.
bra del llspL tp6asOJ\,'" di Epicuro, (( Prolego
lin 1935); ZELLER, E., Philosophie der Grie
OLIVIERI (Lipsiae 1914); Volumina Rhetorica
mena, II (1953), PP- 59-98 ( AJm_2 [24])
chen, vol. II i (Leipzig 1889 ).
ed. S. SuoHAUS (Lipsiae, vol. I, 1892, vol. II,
I resti dell'XI libro del Ilspi tp6aem di Epi
1896; vo1. HI (supplementum) 1895 ( = Rhet.
(b) Epicurean Texts: (i) Collections : Hercu
curo, Cairo 1940 (= ARR.2 [26]); I frammenti
+ volume, page and line); PHerc. 1003 (title
lanensium voluminum quae supersunt, Col
del XIV libro del IIspl- tp6asW di Epicuro,
missing) ed. W. CRONERT, Hermes" 1901,
lectio Prior, Naples 1793-1855 ( = VH1);
(( Rend.
Accad. Scienze Bologna )
) Classe

H erculanensium voluminum quae supersunt,

Collectio Altera, Naples 1862-76 (= VH2);
Herculaneum Papyri: Facsimiles. In Bodleian
Library, Oxford (MSS. Gr. Class. c. 1-7}. Also
reproduced photographically, at the expense
of Lhe Oxford Philological Society, by Messrs.
Kingsbury and Notcutt, London 1890 (= Ox
ford Apographs, or 0); Herculanean /nscri-

. ms. Ms. voL in Bodleian Library, Oxford

Scienze Morali, Serie terza, vol. VI (1931-2),

pp. 3-46 (= ARR.2 [29]); I resti del XV libra

del IIep tp6osw di Epicuro (postumous; ed.

B. HAsLER), {( Philologus )) 100 (1956), pp.
253-70 (=ARR.2 [30]); G. ARRIGHETTI, Un
papiro inedito del IIepl rpUosW\,'" di Epicuro
(Papiro Ercolanese 1431, ( <SCO" VI (1956),
pp. 175-93 (= ARR.2 [36]); IIcpl q.>Uoem li
ber incertus, PHerc. 697, 1056, and 1191 in

pp. 5726 (cited by page number in Oxford

apograph + line number); Polystratus, IIspl
&A6you 'X.O:.'t-q.>pov"l}osw.;: ed. WILKE (Lipsiaf'

1905)_
See Introd. 1 e.

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

( b) The Editions.
Hayter himself prepared, in manuscript, an edition of PHerc. 1479 (he never
saw Pap. 1417), consisting of text and Latin translation. It was not published,
but is Still preserved in the Bodleian Library. Hayter's Greek was poor, and
his text gives no coherent sense, but occasionally he spotted the correct reading
where others have since missed it.
The Naples apographs were engraved and published in VH2 VI ( 1866) 37-54.
The engravings are not always accurate, and should be used with caution.5 Photo
graphs of the Oxford apographs were published in 1890.
The first serious scholar to tackle this text was T. Gomperz, who in 1867, and
again in 1876, published some of the better preserved passages on the basis
of 0 and the published engravings of N.6
H. Usener did not include the papyrus fragments of Epicurus in his Epicurea,
recognising that the engravings of N - the only textual source available to
him - were an insufficient basis for their decipherment. But privately he pro
duced many conjectural readings for the surviving books of the IIspl cpVcrsW)
including Book XXVIII, and these are preserved in his unpublished Glossarium
Epicureurn.
The first attempt to publish a full text of Book XXVIII was made by A. Cosattini,
with the assistance of H. von Arnim, in <( Hermes )) 1894. Cosattini based his
edition on 0 and N, making no use of the original, although this was available
to him. The result is a text of little accuracy or worth.
It was not until 1928 that an edition based on the papyrus emerged. This was
published by A. Vogliano in his important book Scripta. It is a concise and
scholarly work, and has been invaluable to m:e in the preparation of this new
edition. Considering the poor light conditions in which Vogliano had to read
the papyrus, and the fact that he did not use a binocular microscope but only
a magnifying glass, he managed to extract a commendable amount of material
from it. Nevertheless, his edition is deficient in several respects. Many workable
fragments are omitted, many readings are incorrect, and many sovrapposti and
sottoposti are incorporated in the text. Also, he often assumed the correctness of
a reading given by one of the apographs where even a glance at the papyrus
would have told him that it was false. He devised a complex system of bracketing
to distinguish letters still preserved in the papyrus from those which while
preserved in the apographs are now lost in the papyrus itself, but proceeded
to use this system with a high degree of inaccuracy.
Vogliano managed on the whole to restrain himself from supplementing the text
with extravagant conjectures. Most of the cases where he failed in this restraint
can be traced back to the influence of his friend R. Philippson. Philippson
himself published in 1929 an article based on Vogliano's text.7 It is a work
more of imagination, than of scholarship, proposing the most outrageous sup
plements on the flirrisiest of textual evidence. At best such extravagances will
be ignored, at worst believed. In 1932 K. von Fritz published his review of Voglian's edition, making a sincere attempt to stay within the bounds of the
evidence. He recognises the faults of Philippson's approach, but is not totally
successful in avoiding them himself. He battles valiantly with the argument
contained in the final columns of the book, but fails to unravel it. This failure
stems largely from his acceptance of Philippson's mistaken hypothesis that the

DAVID

SEDLEY

See Introd. 1 e.

These are 12 III 3-12; 13 IV l-7 sup., IV

3 inf.,-V 13 sup., VI 1-8 sup., IX 1 sup.-X 19
sup., XII 1 inf.-XIII 6 sup.; and the annota
tions below the title in 13 XIII.

Neues Uber Epikur und seine Schule.

((

Phil. Woch.

({

C.R.

>>

1932.

1929.

10 An. (1973 ') [31.1], and [256] p. 619.

n 8 V 1-10; 12 III 1-12; 13 IV 3-10. These

have now been published and discussed in
his article Aisthesis, Prolepsis and Linguistic

Theory in Epicurus.

Megarian riddle of the Covered Father is virtually the sole topic from fr. 13
col. V to the end of the book. But in many instances he is also the victim of
Vogliano's misreadings of the text. In the same year Philippson published a
reply, 8 defending himself against Fritz's criticisms.
C. Bailey also reviewed Vogliano's edition,9 with some brief and occasionally
useful comments on the text.
After this -initial burst of interest in Book XXVIII, it fell back into obscurity
until 1960, when G. Arrighetti included it in his edition of the works of Epicurus.
His text is based on Vogliano's readings, and incorporates a few conjectureF
of Philippson and of Arrighetti himself. It is accompanied by a translation and
a brief commentary. He adds one new fl-agment from his own personal exami
nation of the papyrus, and one further fragment in the second edition.l0
\Vhen I received the opportunity to study the papyrus in Naples between
January and September 1971, I was fortunate in having the use of the binocular
microscopes with which the Officina dei Papiri Ercolanesi is now equipped,
and was thus able to make many corrections and additions to Vogliano's text.
Iu April of that year I was joined for two weeks by Dr. A. A. Long, who took
readings of several fragments of the papyrus.l1 Our collaboration has been of
great value to me, although there are a few readings and points of interprtation
on which we disagree.
(c) The Order of Fragments.

12

13

Cf. 0. MuRRAY, (dRS 1965, p. 163.

See lntrod. 1 d.

The papyrus is preserved in 12 cornici, but is broken up into 29 separate pieces.

of which 15 contain the upper parts of columns and 14 contain- the lower parts.
By ''fragment >> is meant any single stretch of papyrus within which an unbroken
sequence of columns can be guaranteed. Fr. 13 is broken up into three upper
and three lower parts, but nevertheless constitutes a single fragment because lt
contains the last 12 columns of the book in unbroken sequence. No reliance can
be placed on the arbitrary order of columns adopted in either 0 or N, y.rhich
anyway contain only a small proportion of the total preserved text.l2
Fragments containing the upper parts of columns I label in sequence with the
Arabic numerals l to 13, omitting two fragments which have intruded from
other papyri.l3 Those containing the lower parts of columns I label with the
letters A to L ( omitting I), with the exception of those which can be matched
with the top parts of the columns in fr. 13, on which see below. We have no
r
basis on which to match up frr. 1-12 with th more meagre frr. A-L, and in
my text I simply give the contents of each cornice in turn - first all the upper
parts of columns contained in it, then all the lower parts.
The columns within a fragment are numbered in sequence with Roman
numerals.
If in my text I use more than one layer out of a single column, I label the
lowest (i.e. the earliest) layer ''a)>, the next b >>, and so on. In fact, layer
( a) is likely to belong up to four columns earlier than layer ( b). This labelling
of layers applies only within a single column. Thus it cannot be taken for granted
that, for example, fr. H col. I a belongs to the same layer as fr. H col. II a.
In fr. 5 the situation is a little more complicated, for two different layers are
involved. Superficially there appears to be a simple sequence of -four columns,
but on closer inspection- col. III, which Arrighetti's text represents as a unity,

CRONACHE ERCOLANES!

'

turns out to be composed of two layers. Of these, col. III a is on the same
level as col. I, and col. III b is on the same level as col. II and col. IV. Thus
the correct sequence is probably I, III a, II, III b, IV, with one column lost
between I and III a, and maybe another lost between III a and II.
In fr. 13 the upper and lower parts of the columns correspond, and I therefore do
not number the lower parts as constituting a separate fragment.
I have been compelled to abandon Vogliano's numbering of the fragments and
columns, since it does not allow for the existence of the many passages which
he does not include in his own edition.
(d) Genuine and Spurious Fragments.
Two small fragments belonging to other papyri are accidentally included among
those of our own papyrus: one on cornice 1, between fr. B and fr. C, and one
on cornice 6, before fr. 7. This is clear not only from the different hands in
which they are written, but also from the different texture of the papyrus itself.
Other than these, all of the fragments preserved in the twelve cornici belong
to the one roll.
The fragment which appears as fr. 5 in my text was said by Vogliano 14 and
F. Castaldi 15 to be misplaced from PHere. 1431, which contains another book
of the Ilspl 'flUcrew. Indeed, Arrighetti includes in his edition of PHere. 1431
not only the four columns of this fragment, but also one column of another
fragment 16 which happens to be preserved on the same cornice. Vogliano's
arguments for the re-allocation of the fragment in question are based on its
handwriting, orthography and column-width. Yet in all these respects it turns
out on close examination to match our papyrus exactly, and to differ considerably
from Pap. 1431. Furthermore, disegni of the fragment are included among the
Oxford apographs, which Hayter brought away from Naples in February 1806;
whereas Pap. 1431 was not even unrolled until 1808. The fragment can thus be
confidently restored to our papyrus-.

14 Scripta p. XV.
15

In two ms. notes, one on cornice 5 of our

papyrus and the other on cornice 1 of PHere.

1431.
16

Fr. 6 in my text.

(e) Apographs and Detached Fragments.

Both the 0 and N apographs of our papyrus were drawn by the Neapolitan draughts.
man C .. Orazi, in 1804 and 1808 respectively. The lower halves of the columns are
not included in 0, since PHer:c. 1417 was not unrolled until 1303, after Hayter:;;;
departure from Naples. Neither has been altered by the later correttori whose
knowledge of Greek tended to impair their objectivity.
0 in its margins shows a total of 24 fragments broken off from the main body
of the papyrus: the fragments themselves have now been lost. In every case
but one, 0 places them with great accuracy alongside the lacunae in which they
belong; and sometims also copies them into their original position. The one
exception is 10 I l6cl9, where the fragment preserved by 0 in the right.hand
margin cannot be fitted into the text. I therefore adopt the hypothesis that it
was a sovrapposto, removed by the disegnatore in order to read the text under
neath. I label it 10 I b.
In the margins of fr. 13 col. VIII sup., 0 preserves two fragments alongside
11. 14-18, of which Vogliano 17 writes: << His nullus locus in ll. 15-17 dari potest,
sed fortasse II. 17-20 vindicandae sunt )). This is a surprising j udgment, for,

DAVID SEDLEY

17 Scripta p. 105.

"

as can be seen in my text, they fit well into the lacuna in the lines beside which
they stand.
In 13 IV 14-17 sup. 0 gives a fragment which Vogliano wrongly takes 1' to be
another detached one shown in the margin of 0 but now lost. In fact -it is still
today attached to the main body of the text in the same position in which 0
shows it. But the letters which appear on it in 0 belong to a sovrapposto layer .
A few letters of the cor:rect layer can be discerned, and I include these in my
text of the column.
When N was prepared, the detached fragments depicted in 0 had already been
lost. But a new set of fifteen such fragments, detached from the lower parts
of the columns, had come into being; and these were all drawn in N's margins,
and again ( though not always by Orazi himself) in their original position in
the text.
The engravings of N, published in VH2 VI 37-54, are one step further from
the original. Partial traces of letters in particular are often inaccurately copied,
and fragments depicted by N in the margin are shown in position in the text
with no indication that they are detached. Unfortunately these engravings are
at present the only reproductions of N generally available to scholars; but they
should be used, if at all, with great caution.

Scripta p. 10.

(f) The Dimension.s.

19

Scripta p. XV.

2.0

Cf. Introd. 1 L

21

{{

" X

Riv. Fil. Class.

1000, rH

1905, pp. 307-8.

500, H

100.

The text is written in columns with an average width of 4.5 ems. Since the roll
broke in half before it was opened, a central section of each column is lost, so
that the number of Jines to a column is a matter for guesswork. Vogliano 1 9 gives
the number as 32 or 33; and this seems to me to be a reasonable guess, since
the lacuna in fr. 13 col. VIII apparently requires a minimum of four lines to
complete the sense, but that in fr. 13 col. XI occurs in the middle of a sentence
whose sense and structure seem scarcely affected by it, suggesting that not more
than a few lines are lost. The space between columns averages just over 1 em.
The margin left blank at the head of the text seems to have measured a little
over 2.5 ems., that at the foot about 3 ems. The intention of this layout was
probably to leave space for scholia to be added not betWeen columns but at head
and foot.20
The remains of the papyrus contain fragments of at least 68 columns. They do
not include the outermost layers of the roll, which had become hardened by
carbonisation and damp into a solid crust arrd had to be removed before the
less damaged central part could be unrolled. Consequently, it is unlikely that
the entire roll contained much less than a hundred columns, which, .allowing
33 lines per column, would make some 3,300 lines. This compares well with
I!Bpi cpvcrBw' Book XV (PHere. 1 151), which according to the stichometric indi
cation at the end of the text contained 3,200 lines. It also disproves Cosattinl\;
theory that a text of this length must have filled two roils. 21 Less certain is the
stichometric indication at the end of PHerc. 1 148 containing lle:pl cpUcre:w
Book XIV. This has been variously misread by Bassi, Vogliano and Arrighetti.
My own reading of the papyrus gives it as -XXXIHHIHH [ . This appears to
be corrupt, probably through dittography of IHH, but the number of lines
would anyway be between 3,500 and 3,999,22 which again compares well
with the length of our text.

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

10

(g) Orthography and Handwriting.

I here list all our text's divergences from the standard orthography found ln
the codices of Epicurus' three LetterS, KUptetL 06a.t, and Gnom. Vat, although
I do not mean to imply that the orthography of the codices is necessarily closer
to Epicurus' own.
v final, followed by a labial, without exception becomes p.; followed by a guttural,
it in about 30% of cases becomes y : 23 v medial, 'follOwed by a guttural, in one
case remains unassimilated: 2 4 8 II 9npo1,ve:v[xa. 'X. medial, followed by 0 or A,
becomes y : 25 13 IV 2 in. eyoeG<CVO; ll v 1 (not printed in text) ]oyAo[.
e:t frequently becomes t; 26 once even in the augment of a verb, 13 V 9 sup.
Uhcr1-1Evwv. The termination -rJL sometimes becomes -st, both as a first de
clension dative singular and as a third person singular active subjunctive ter
mination_27 t is never subscript, always adscript; it is sometimes incorrectly
omitted,28 and often incorrectly added after a long voweJ.29
Other divergences include yiyvof''" ( for yivoftc<C), ycyvwaxw (for ycvwcrxw),
the optative termination -W[YJY (for -O[YJv), and oUOds;, [.-LYJOds; and cognate
forms ( for oU&ds;, p.lj.&ds;, etc).3 The aspirated form o:J&ds; is standard
Attic orthography after 330 B.C. Our scribe has systematically reverted to the
unaspirated form, perhaps as an intentional archaism, and in the process he
seems in one case ( 1 I 10) to have accidentally altered f'Y)ii' ou"w' (
ftYI"'
olh:ws;) to p.YJO o[hws;, mistaking it for an aspirated form of !J.r]Ods;.
As in the other works of Epicurus there is little or no effort to avoid hiatus.
.
Even olh:w, withOut final s;, is found once with a vowel following ( 13 XII 12
sup.)'H Crasis is common. Elision is comparatively rare (only monosyllables and
disyllables are elided, and even these only when the following word is. closely
linked with them in sense), a fact which casts doubt on many of Vogliano's and
Philippson's proposed readings.
The paragraphus is the only form of punctuation used. The end of the book
is marked by a paragraphus accompanied by an embellished T (for tAo,)
resembling that at the end of PHerc. 157152 ( Philodemus De dis).32
The papyrus is written in a small, plain, irregular, rectilinear hand, with few
letters joined and few seriphs. The size of letters varies considerably, with the
number per line varying from 17 to 25, and with their breadth and spacing
decreasing considerably towards lineends.. Where most scribal hands appear to
rest their letters above an imaginary straight line, it is characteristic of ours
to suspend them below a line, with only ' cp and <jJ extending above it.

2a CRONERT, MGH 61-2; MAYSER-SCHMOLL I

2035.
" MGH 578.
2-5 MGH 53-5, MAYSER-SCHMOLL 201-2.
26 MGH 26, MAYSER-SCHMOLL 60-4.
27 MGH 36-7, MAYSER-SCHMOLL 102; this or
thography is standard in Attic inscriptions
from IV to II century B.C.
28 E.g. 13 IV 4 inf. (kr)poUrsv.
2S E.g. 3 V b 9 bf-1-0drtY)n:Cl.
so

MGH 155-8, MAYSER-SCHMOLL 148-9.

31 Cf. MGH 142, MAYSER-SCHMOLL 214, USE

NER pp. XLI-XLII.

sz

See BLANCO, pp. 56-7.

(h) Provenance.
The exemplar from which our papyrus was copied contained about 20 letters
to the line, to judge from the two errors in the text caused by homoeoteleuton
in the archetype." I( the words ]"iiiv clpxdwv[ below the title in fr. 13 col.

33 4 IV 1, a scribal omission of 20 or 22 let

XIII have been correctly interpreted,34 this archetype may well have been an
Athenian one dating back to Epicurus' own lifetime, in which case our papyrus
is more likely to have been copied from it in Athens than in Italy. This lends
some support to the thesis of V ogliano 35 and CrOnert 36 that some of the texts
of Epicurus found at Herculaneum are copies made in the Garden itself perhaps, they suggest, as early as the third century B. C.

ters; 13 VII 8 in., a scribal omission of 19

ll

DAVID SEDLEY

letters : see Introd. 1 i.

34 See commentary ad loc.

35

Tisp cp6ozW" XIV, Introduction p. 8, note l.

36 ((Gnomon

1930, p. 144.

CrOnert himself bases this contention on the first declension feminine dative
termination -e used in some of these papyri of Epicurus ( including ours), which
is standard orthography in Attic inscriptions. Strictly, however, the most that
this could prove would be that the text was written in Athens at some stage in
its transmission, and this we already know to be the case. Furthermore, the
111

In Jntrod. 1 g.

orthography of our papyrus is not entirely Attic, for as we have seen 37 it does
not follow the Attic practice of using oU&e[ and cognate forms, but instead
uses the unaspirated form oUOd. Orthographic evidence of provenance should
be treated with caution.
(i) Corrections and Scholia.
All the interlinear corrections of which traces survive are written by a second
hand in a darker coloured ink. Two occur in passages not included in my text :
1 V a 15 fl"]P"upsTcr[ilixL; and K II b 5 inf. e<]lcr&e<vo [. The others appear

HS

in my text: 4 IV 1; 12 II 15; and 13 VII 8 inf. In 4 IV 1 the correction

starts near the end of the line, and is consequently written in a minuscule hand.
The letters which spill over into the margin are accompanied by the sign IZI
Underneath the last line of fr. B col. I, and again under fr. D col. I a, after
a gap of about 2.5 ems. there are traces of three further lines of writing which
I take to be the remains of scholia. The hand is not that of the scribe who
wrote the papyrus, nor do I believe that it is the hand of the corrector 38
although it resembles it in some ways.
That under B I is indecipherable, but that under D I a yields the following
traces:

See above.

ou&el, [
n]spl "[wv
]fl"P"UP[crowv
39 See _ Introd. 1 g.

'0 Mus. Helv.

>)

1954, p. 194.

Note that unlike the scribe of the papyrus the scholiast uses the aspirated form
oU%d. 39
The only other scholion that has so far been discovered in a papyrus of Epicurus_
is the one in Ilepl 'fHJcrEWI Book XIV ( Plferc. 1 148), the possible authorship of
which is discussed by Vogliano.40 The hand in which it is written .appears to be
different from that of our scholion, although so few letters of the latter are
preserved that it is hard to be certain.

2. The Work. (a) The Literary Form.

41

&:x.[po]lioew.;

'tfl" Sfi" 7CSpctv[o]J-!.8V'l')<;;",

13 XIII 7-9.
42 ,, CEre))], p. 41-56.

4.3

Cf. ARRIGHETTI, art. cit., p. 47.

'' ' IV 4 ff.; 13 V 2 in. ff.

Epicurus refers to the llspl c.pVcrsw in Book XXVIII as (( our lesson delivered
in sequence )),41 meaning that the work attempts to set out his doctrines in their_
natural order. The general question of the contents of the ll;.pl -:pVO sw has been
well discussed by G. Arrighetti.42
Book XXVIII deals extensively with epistemological questions relating to language,
and refers frequently to past discussions of the same theme. It cannot be as
sumed 43 that these past discussions were in an earlier book of the Il;.pl -:pUcrew,
especially as the text contains references to two other works of Epicurus on
related topics.44 Nevertheless, the revision of past doctrines on language is

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

12

clearly a primary aim of the book. This book should not be seen as polemical
in character. Two or three unfriendly references are made to Megarian doctrines,45
but we have. the specific testimony of 1 3 IV l inf. ff. that a drawn-out anti-Mega
rian polemic would be inappropriate .
The text is addressed to Metrodorus, in the presence of other members of the
school,46 and makes frequent references to Metrodorus' own views, both past
and present. To judge from the surviving portions of the text, Metrodorus has
no speaking part, but his views and comments are relayed .to us by Epicurus.
Diano 47 has proposed that this pseudo*dialogue form is what -is meant in Epi*
curean terminology by Ot a.Aoytcr[16 .48 This term can -certainly be translated
<< discussion ll ;49 but against Diano it must be said that .there is only one case
where Ot a.AoytcrJ-o [ are expressly said to involve more than one participant c;n
that Epicurus uses the term to label such monologues as his letters to Herodotus
and Pythocles,51 and that his dialogue the Symposium was. called by the normal
name Ot&:Aoyo. 52
There are several passages in our text which can be adjudged to represent, though
sometimes fragmentarily, the views o f Metrodorus.53
The literary style of Book XXVIII is certainly odd by the standards of the
surviving Attic prose from the previous two centuries. But it should be borne
in mind that this is a Hellenistic work, and that we have comparatively few
Hellenistic prose texts with which to compare it.
Typical features are the non-avoidance of hiatus, the careless use of moods and
and tenses 54 and anacoluthon.55

(b) The Evolution of Epicurean Canonic.

45 13 IV 3 in.fl., IX 11 sup.fl.; perhaps also

8 Il7fl.

46 13 XII 8 in. ;:otaae, XIII 2 sup. Uf1et;,

6 sup. Uf1tv.
47

Lettere p. 38.

's Gnom. Vat. 10; Us. 219; p. 169,5; D.L.

X 22; Ep. Hdt. 68; Ep. Pyth. 84-5; Philo
demus IIpuyJ-1u;:ecn XXIV 2
Arr.2 [137];
id. Rhet. II 38,2, 39,10, 49,1; id. llspl &u'Jci:
=

'ou

XXXIV 14; id. De di> I, XV 21).

9 Cf. SCHMID,

Epikur col. 716).

50 D.L. X 22, Epicurus' final letter to Ido

meneus.

" Ep. Hdt. 68, Ep. Pyth. 84-5.

52 Us. 64.
"11 II l-13; K I 9-1 in!.; 13 II 1 sup. III
4 inf., IV 8 inf..V 12 sup., XIII 26 sup.
H

E.g. 13 VIII 13 sup., X 10 sup., XI 7 sup.

55 E.g. 13 VIII 6 inf.-IX 9 sup. I discuss many

of these linguistic and grammatical oddities

in my commentary; but there can be no full

discussion o_f the style of the Tispi. 6aswt:

Little use has been made of the fragments of the IIepl. cpUcrew as a chronological
source for the development of Epicurus' thought. Yet Ilepl <pucrEW XXVIII
itself allows us to glimpse the processes of discussion and revision which were
still going on behind the school's confident exterior ten years after its foundation.
In what follows, I attempt a brief chrollological analysis of the evolution of
certain aspects of Epicurus' Canonic.
Our dating criteria for the IIzpt cpUcrew are as follows, Since it is styled an
axpoXcrL ( 1 3 XIII '/), Epicurus is unlikely to have started writing it before he
founded his school in 306 B.C. Nor can he have started it long after 306, since
we know that in 300/299 he had already reached Book XV (from the archon
year given below the title in PHerc. l l5l). Book XXVIII was written in 296/5
(from the archon year given below the title in our papyrus). His output between
300/299 and 296/5 therefore averaged two and a half books a year, assuming,
as the closing sentence of Book XXVIII suggests, that they we. re written in the
order of their numerical sequence.
The Letter to Herodbtus claims to be a resume of the TiepL tJUcrew t;;,s6 but l
believe that it is actually based only on the first twelve books. Arrighetti 57 has
compiled all the evidence that bears on the contents of the IIzpt cpUcrsw, and
his results make it appear probable that Books I-XII contained the principal physical
doctrines which also appear in the Letter to Herodotus. More interestingly, the
themes touched on in Books XI and XII seem to have been very similar to
those treated in the final sections of the Letter ( 73 ff.) - both relate in one

13

DAVID SEDLEY

until all the papyrus fragments have been

re-edited.

56 Ep. Hdt. 35.

s1

((CEre, 1, pp. 41-56.

ss

59

Ep. Hdt. 40.

4.3-4; compare the long detailed passage

on the theory of perception, 46-53.

so

61

62

Fr. 12 col. HI, see commentary ad loc.

Us. 255.
See especially D.L. X 33.

hO

See further, Introd. 2

pp. Jl9-22.

61

Ep. Hdt. 37-8, 50-2.

(ii), and LoNG,

way or another to the different shapes of worlds, the rise of human society,
celestial phenomena, mankind's belief in divine powers, and its association oi
these with the movements of the heavenly bodies. Books XIII, XIV and XV,
on the other hand, find no obvious reflection in the Letter. Book XIII is be
lieved to have discussed the relationship of men and gods - a theme not
treated in the Letter to Herodotus. As for Books XIV and XV, they are said
by a scholion on the Letter to Herodotus 58 to have contained a discussion of
atoms and compounds. In fact, the surviving fragments of Book XIV contain a
polemic against various rival physical theories, which is not reflected in the
Letter. The scanty surviving fragments of Book XV go a little way towards con
firming that it dealt with atoms and compounds; but, even if this is correct,
Epicurus was in Book XV returning to a topic which had certainly already
received attention in Book I, and probably elsewhere. Compounds do not receive
much attention in the Letter, with only one short section to themselves 59 and
this suggests that the topic was not particularly fresh in Epicurus' mind at
the time of writing. As for Books XVI-XXXVII, the evidence for their contents
is extremely flimsy, with the exception of Book XXVIII, which is certainly not
reflected in the Letter. It is at any rate worth noticing that the scholia on the
Letter draw no parallels with any of them, although they draw many with the
earlier books.
From all this I conclude that the Letter to Herodotus was written shortly after
Book XII of the Ihpl 'f'UOsw;, about 301/0 B.C. Furthermore, I believe for
a quite separate reason that it cannot be dated much later than this. This is
because it was apparently written before Epicurus had developed two of the
key concepts of his Canonic, namely npOAY)r.Jlt and E.ntAoytcrO, both of
which feature in works which he wrote in subsequent years._
We learn from Book XXVIII 60 that Epicurean terminology now - includes npO
),,YJr.!Jt1 but did not include it at some time in the past. Ancient doxographical
tradition records that Epicurus was the first philosopher to use the term, and,
makes it an essential element of his Canonic.61 An allusion to npOAYJr.JlL is often
seen in the 'fundamental meanings of words ' in Ep. Hdt. 37-8. Strictly, however,
this contains only the germ of the notion of np6A1)<j;''' which in its fully developed
form 62 con'Ibines with this simple semantic function a central role in all acts of
recognition performed by the human mind.63
The word np6Ai']y;L does not occur in any of the survivillg identifiable fragments
of the first fifteen books of the IIepl Uasw. Nq,r does it occur in the principal
epistemological passages of the Letter to Herodotus.64 Its only appearance in
the Letter is in 72-3, where, having explained the nature of the properties of
objects, he goes on to his highly polemical analysis of time, with the startling
words, -rbv y&p OY] xp6vov oU i;.'Y]-ti']-;;Eov Wcr1tsp xed 11X Aotmi, Oart. E.v 6no
xstEvcp i;.Y]'tOO!J.SV dv&yovts E.nl 1:1X Asnop.Evrt. rtrt.p fJ!J."tY cdrco"f npoAYj
<j;s's ......
I say startling because npoAYjy;st, which up to this point have received no
mention at all in the Letter, are here suddenly proclaimed as being the standard
point of reference for identifying the properties of an obje9t.

'

Equally remarkably, this passage goes on to recommend the process of empirical

reasoning called E.n:tAoytcr-tO, which similarly does not occur elsewhere in the
Letter to Herodotus or in any of the surviving identifiable fragments of the

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

14

Ilspl UcrEW prior to Book XV, but first occurs in Book XV,65 features prom
inently in Book XXVIII, and becomes an integral part of Epicurean Canonic
in its final form.66
The Letter to Herodotus, although principally a work on physics, has a great
deal to say about epistemological questions. If, when he wrote it, Epicurus had
already developed these two important epistemological concepts, it is surely
unlikely that he would have included them solely in a paragraph dealing with
;:.:uch highly specialised subject-matter as the nature of time.

liJ

Fr. 2,2; but the reading is not certain.

6li Its

function

is

more fully

analysed

in

lntmd. 2 d (v),

I therefore suggest that this section on the topic of time was not included in

original version of the Letter, but was added at a later date, following a
ct'' roversy in which Epicurus perhaps replied to the charge that his theory
of :roperties could not account for our understanding of a term like 'time'.
Sc'
such controversy certainly took place, to judge from the fragments of a
di;J ::.ue on the subject preserved in PHerc. 1413 and now confidently attributed
:_;urus.67
tu
t!;,,

Lr,:
n:

b..
if:.

th,
f.
tl

t
)
p

1\

h
u,

i,
r
s-

t'

]'
t

oi
nl
j;,,

ily, Canonic 1 s prior to physics, but historically Epicurus seems to have

d the order." Between 306 and about 301 B.C. he wrote the first twelve
1 the Ilspl 'flicrEW In about 301 he wrote the Letter to Herodotus epitom11.e system of physics which he had evolved in these preceding years. But
sternology upon which this system was founded was still in an embryonic
He recognised that enquiries, whether they concern the perceptible or
'perceptible, must always revert to word-meanings, mental acts of conion, perceptions and feelings as the ultimate criteria; but he had not
1sidered fully the mental operations involved in the handl-ing and inter
, 1n of sense-data. Between 301 and 296/5 he must have worked extens'tl epistemological questions of this kind, for at the end of this period
'">roaeh had altered considerably. He had concluded that the ability to
and what is perceived and felt, an ability which he termed mA6ytcr 6 9
:uacteristic of the wise man. And in analysing 'this process by which non! sense-data are converted into a rational pattern of knowledge, he asa central role to general conceptions, which he termed
npoAt!JE.t. To
'iod may belong the unnumbered book of the IlE.pl cpUaE.W contained in
697, 1056, and 1191, the surviving part of which discusses the motivation
'<lll action and various epistemological questions, with many allusions to
(:':ij-16. He also during these years formulated views on the cognitive
of language, and in 296/5 he wrote Book XXVIII, presenting the results
s work and also outlining the usefulness of ntAoytcrJ-i6 for testing the
ty of opinions by an examination of their practical consequences.

XVI-XXXVII probably included many further topies related to Canonic

psychology, as well as others which receive sccmt treatment in the Letter
!; Herodotus, such as the gods, and the evolution of animals and men.7 The
J dter to Menoeceus muSt also be dated later than 301 B.C., containing as it
.,,oes allusions both to l:rnJ.oy'ofL6' ( 133) and to npoJ.>)tj!e'' ( 1 24). The Letter
to Pythocles, whose authenticity has sometimes been doubted, contains neither
of these terms, but in view of its hjghly specialised subject matter this may
not be significant. Arrighetti 71 proposes for it a date of composition later than

67 Cf. ARRIGHETTr, art. cit., p. 42 note 7. The

passage on time in the Letter includes a

scholion according to which cp'l)crl OE -r;oll1;o
xa:t 5v 'ti) llau-r;ep Uept q;Uaaw" xo:t Sv fi
Mey&A17 57Ct"COf-L'fl If the scholion is correct,
it is necessary to assume that there was some
account of time in Book II, a summary of
which may have been incorporated in the
original draft of the Letter, but that the
passage in Ep. Hdt. 72-3 is a later revision
based on the dialogue. However, the prevail
ing view (most recently CANTARELLA-ARRI
GHETTI, p. 7) has been that Epicurus could
not have reached the topic of time as early
as Book II, and that the number given by
the scholiast is corrupt. If this is so, then no
problem arises. On either explanation it re
mains plausible that the passage in Ep. Hdt.
72-3 did not appear in its present form in
the original version of the Letter.
6& Cf. D.L. X 30:aici>&cxo J.18vtoL 'tO xcxvon

xQy 6[-LOfJ 'tip CfUO"LXip 1;ti't't6LY.

69 See Introd. 2 d (v).

,;

r:--

295 B.C. on the basis of some biographical evidence for Pythocles.

Since the period 301-296/5 was a crucial one for the evolution of Canonic, it

15

DAVID SEDLEY

70 On the scanty evidence for the contents of

the later books, see ARRIGHETTI, art. cit.,

p, 43.

11 La struttura dell'Epistola di Epicuro a

Pitocle, p. 127.

'

72 D.L. X 30.

73 Luc. 1 42 : ' omne iudicium in sensibus et

in rerum notitiis et in voluptate '.

74

Second Study p. 202.

75 p. 18.

16 RrsT supports his case by quoting Philo

demus Sign. fr. 1,11-15, but omits to mention
that the reading is almost entirely conjectural.

17 Ep. Men. 129 ; IIepl cpUaew" XXVIII, E I

4 inf., 13 XII sup.; IIepl cp6a8W' PHere. 697.
XIII 3, and PHecc. 1056, 7 Xlll 7.
18

Cf. DIANO, Psicologia 1939, pp. 140-1,

note 5; BAILEY, Greek Atomists pp. 573-4;
RrsT pp. 32-7.

" Ep. Hdt. 38, 51, 62.

80

Sl

Ep. Hdt. 37-8.

See Introd. 2 d (i).

82

See commentary on 13 IV 8 in.-VI 15 sup.

and on 13 IX 1 1 sup.-X 14 sup.; and cf. com
mentary on 8 II.

may well have seen the composrtwn of Epicurus' chief work on the subject,
the Canon.12 The chronological scheme outlined above offers a possible solution
to an old problem concerned with this work. According to Diogenes Laertius ( X
31), the Canon gave the three criteria as being sensations, 1tpoA-fJ tfisc;; , and feel
ings. Cicero's translation of this phrase '3 shows that there is no significance;
except perhaps a grammatical one, in Diogenes' omission of the article before
1tpoAtflsc;; ' . I mention this because Furley 74 and Rist75 have deduced from it
-that 1tpoA1Jtflc.tc;; were lumped together with sensations as constituting a single
category.76 Its inclusion of npoAf]tflsc;; as truth-criteria dates the Canon at any
rate later than the Letter to Herodotus, according to the principle established
above. It may well also be significant that the metaphor of xcx.vWv, meaning a
truth-criterion, does not occur in the fragments of llepl t;pUcrew Books I-XV,
or in the Letter to Herodotus , but is found frequently in the writings which
we have already established to belong after 300 B.C.71

This should help dispel the mystification 78 created by Diogenes Laertius' observ
ation that the Epicureans add tpCX.V't!Xcrnxo:.l bnoArxl 'tfjc;; Otcx.vo[ac;; as truth
criteria, which has appeared to many to conflict with Epicurus' own acceptance
of these 'image-making mental acts of concentration ' as virtual truth-criteria
in the Letter to Herodotus 79 and in KL1 XXIV. If we assign an early date not
only to the Letter to Herodotus but also to K.6. XXIV, the most satisfactory
solution will be that when he came to develop the notion of npolcqt)n in the
following years he subsumed under it certain truthcriteria to which he had
previously granted an independent validity. We have already observed that the
' fundamental meaning of a word ' 80 became .an element in the broader concept of
np6AijtPc;; ; and the same goes also for the cpetv'ta.O'ttx-Yj E1ttoA1) 'tf)c;; Otavo[etc;;,
without which we could not visualise things at will,81 and consequently could
have no generalised conceptions at all. Thus when he came to write the Canon
he had downgraded t;pa.V'tfXO'tXal E1ttoAal 'ti)c;, aa.voac;; in favour of rcpoA
tfletc;,. And if later Epicureans chose to upgrade them once more to the status
of criteria, they had good authority in their master's early works for so doing.
It would be a mistake to imagine the Epicurean school as completely shut in
on itself during this period. Athens was still the philosophical centre of the
Greek world, and a philosopher was hardly likely to come to Athens to set up
school unless he hoped to make contact with the leading schools of the day. If
Epicurean doctrines on epistemology underwent an upheaval between 301 and
296/5 B.C., it is reasonable to look for .external as well as internal influences
that may account for it. In this case, I believe that a major stimulus on Epicurus'
thought is to be found in the persons of two Megarian philosophers, Diodorus
Cronus and his pupil Philo.
Book XXVIII of the Ilspl rpucreW, written in 296/5, affords ample evidence
that Epicurus had recently been involved in clashes with the circle of dialecticians
led by Diodorus and Philo, not only on the cognitive value of language, but
also on the even more fundamental question of the knowability of the physical
world,82 against which they used to argue by the provocative use of dialectical
riddles. It was in this very same period, 301298/5, that Epicurus developed
the basic notions of 7tp6Ajtflc;; and EntAoytcr!J-6-;:, by which he explained and
justified the link between perception and knowledge. This is surely not a
coincidence. The Megarians' methods of argument could hold Epicurus' theory

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

16

of knowledge up to ridicule, and in self-defence he was compelled to tighten up

his doctrines and to analyse in full a process which he had hitherto taken
for granted.83

gj

A notable parallel is to be found in the

young Zeno, who was active in Athens during

these same years shaping the new doctriii.e
of Stoicism. Like Epicurus he had consider

(c) The Philosophical Content. ( i) The Theme.

able contact with Diodorus and Philo (D.L.

Of the overall theme of !Iepl 'f'UOEW' Book XXVIII, little can be said with
certainty beyond the obvious fact that it concerns epistemology. Two recurring
topics ar error (<j;eOoo;, nAaV1J, &p.o:ptco:, 1J f'-"'P"1J f'-ivov, 0<1J f'-"'P"1J f'-EYOY) and
language ( )''''' o v o p.o:,o:, 'f'%6yyo<, 'f'WVO:c, Pf'-1)Ydo:, pi]cre<;). The later
sections deal with the use of empirical reasoning ( EntAoywp.6) in detecting
error ; and the closing remarks imply that a particular species of error ha.s
been the subject of the whole book." Perhaps then the stated theme of the
book was the kind of error that can arise through language.
The later part of the book, where E.nAoycrJ-6 is discussed, is well enough
preserved for the argument to be discussed stage by stage in the commentary.
But the earlier part of the text is extremely fragmentary and gives little consecu-
tive sense; and rather than discuss all the possible interpretations of each fragw
ment individually in my commentary, I offer here a general account of the
Epicurean theory of language in which I try to give a context to the more
inte1ligible of the linguistic fragments of our book.

VII 16, 25), and like Epicurus he went to

great lengths, against the bulk of his own
philosophical antecedents, to defend the value
of sense-evidence. All this lends support to
Fritz's judgment (Megariker col. 724) that
much of the Megarians' importance lies in
their stimulating effect on other schools.
84

See commentary on 13 XI 4 inf.-XII 1 in.

'

( ii) The Epicurean Theory of Language.

Our major source is Ep. Hdt. 75w6, for which I propose some changes in the text:

&J),C p.Tj v 6no):rpt'tov xed Tlj v

Ucrv

noAAC xal no:.v"tota UnO cx.UTWV

'tWV npaycb:wv OtOcx.x&fJva Te xed &vayxacr{H'j va., 'tOY OE Aoywp.Ov -ri

UnO 'to:.ln:')jr;; napeyyuijlHV'ta. Ucr1:epov

naxptoi) Y

xo:.l

n:pocreeupcrxeL Y,

EY p.Ev "ttcrt {h:X:nov, v OE nm paOthepov, xa.l v j-LEV 'ttm nept60otr;

Y.c<l XPOYO" &no "WV [ana 00 &ndpou)

em06cr<G >, ev Oil

" '"' xM'

XPO<WY XO:'<X f'-ECOUG

iJ&ov xo:l "" OVOf'-0:"0: &pxfi G

Ha'"OVG.

< co[wv

p.TJ &Ecret yevEcr&at, &AA' aUTCr;; 1:ir; Ucret 't&V &v&pilinwv xa&' Ex.acrTa
e&v') tlita naaxouOO:G na&1J xo:l tow

Ao:p.aVOU<JO:G

'f'O:YHZOf'-0"0:

COCWG

'tOY &Epa Exn:Ep.n:etv cr'teAA6JleVov

10

1J

Ucr-cepov OS xotvW<;; xa& Exa.cr-ca E&v"Y] 1:i tOa 1:e&fjvat npb 1:b -cir;
'"ov

OijAoup.Eva<;; .

&p.'f'<OAOUG

yevEcr&e<,

&AJ.Ae<<'

xa\

crunop.wtipWG

'ttYi as xal oU cruvopili!J.EYGt nplfyJ.Let'tO:. E:lcrcpEpov'tO:. .'t oO<;

cruvet06'ta. napeyyuf)aa[ n v a<;; cp&6yyou.;

-toUr; < p.Ev oUv > &;yayxo:.cr-

&Ev'tiX &vacpwvf)cro:.t, 'toUr; O S 't l{l Aoytcrp.if) EAo!J.EVour;, xa'tCG 'tljV rtAscr't"Y]Y
rxl'to:.v oU'tW,: E:pjJ-1]YE.Dcrat. '

' You must understand that even nature was educated and constrained in many
different ways by actual physical circumstances, and that her lessons were later
made more accurate, .and augmented with new discoveries, by reason. Among
some people this process moved faster, among others slower, and in some ages
and eras by greater leaps, according to the needs of the occasion, in others by

17

rowed from von der Muehll's edition).

(5) &:1t6 'tillY &:1t6 'toU &:1tsCpou

DAVID SEDLEY

deL von der

Muehl!, &:1t6 1:WY restitui; &:1C6. 1:oU d:'lts[pou

ad 74 post Bi)Aov oUv ill' !Xl fortasse trans
ferendum.
(5-6) ct1:&. p.eOU' ma6oiH' }a.
cunam expl. Leopold, tBC(l)V XPEWv addidi.
(ll) iJ u,., et Q.
(12) <HJ.J.a,, PBCoZ!
&:Hrj).. ou' F &:U.rjAo; Meibom. (14) < p.Sv

oi'i-v> supplevi, 't"Ot'l' del. Us., < c.d > 1:0U'

<- f.LSY > Gassendi, < iliv > 1:0Uh < 1-1Sv >
Meibom, 1:0U" - < p.Sv >
Giussani, ' nihil

6-:p: Ex&cr'tWY 1:Wv n:a&WY xat 'tWV

cpav'tacrp.&'twv, Wr; &v 7to't xa.t 1; napa 'toUr; 't6nou<;; 1:Wv E.&vwv Otacpopi ,. mutandum ' von der Muehl!.

01)AWOE<G

15

Apparatus criticus (the abbreviations are bor:

85 Cf. Proclus In Plat. Crat. XVII

sTos p. 54 note 16.
81i

Us. 336;

Cf. Plato Crat. 385 d, Aristotle De int. I,

Diodorus 1.8.2. Reasons of space compel me

to omit a general acCount of Greek theories
regarding language.
87 Cf. Crat. 383a-b, 390a, 409d.
88

89

Us. 226.
K:l XXXVI. The Epicurean Demetrius La

con also seems to have referred to racial

differences of language as proof that names
are natura for in listing the various grounds
on which the Epicureans will call something
natural he remarks (PHere. 1012, col. 45,
9-12 ; I have checked the reading in the ori
ginal and correct De Falco's text accordingl y ;
for a fuller discussinn o f the passage, see
MUller, pp. 309-l'l):
cptJost OS 'tti nplil,;a
'tillvl C..voj.1ri'twv rivw:pwv-rjost yqovEvat A.

yop.sv r xa.$-6

S&v(

...

Joa[' (on &.vo:.cprDv-rjcrst ,

see commentary on 10 I b 18).

Sl

Some

modern

scholars

(e.g.

GIUSSANI,

Stud. lucr. p. 280; _VLASTOS p. 54 note 17;

and by implication DAHI.MANN p. 6 note 1,
and P. and E. DE LACY, Philodemus On Me

h.ods of Inference, p. 140) have understood

last five words of this sentence as de
scribing the later (itSost) stage of language,
which would mean that it was only the -&5ost
stage that animal-like sounds (sonitus) be
came words (norriina). This completely mis
represents the &5oet stage, which Epicurus'
description shows to have been nothing more
than a process of clarifying and simplifying
methods of reference (O'YjA.Wosto;:;) which al
ready existed. Furthermore, Lucretius is ex
plicit in calling the earliest sounds ' nomina
rerum ' (Lucr. V 72), and describes their use
as ' res voce notare ' in direct contrast with
animal noises (ib. 1087-90),. There is no reason
to think that the adoption of instinctive ut
terances as names is too deliberate and ratio
nal a procedure to be described as natural,
for Lucretius is at pains to explain to us
in this regard that ' everyone can feel the
extent to which he can make use of his re
sources ' (ib. 1033), a principle which he
illustrates by describing infants, unable to
speak, instinctively pointing at objects, and
the young of animals anticipating the growth
of their horns and teeth. In the same way,
we are to understand, it was instinctive for
human beings to make use of sounds as labels.
92 Us. 334-5; Demetrius Lacon loc. cit.; Lu-

etius V 1026-88; Diogenes Oen. lO II-IV.

smaller leaps. Thus names did not originally come into being through deliberate
coining, but men's own natures underwent feelings and received images which
varied peculiarly from tribe to tribe, and each of the individual feelings and
images caused them to exhale breath peculiarly according to the racial dif

ferences from place to place. Later, particular forms were fixed by consensus
within the individual races, so as to make their references less ambiguous and
more concisely expressed. Also, the men who shared knowledge introduced
certain unseen entities, and brought words for them into usage. Hence some
men gave utterance under compulsion, and others chose words rationally, and
it is thus, as far as the principal cause is concerned, that they came to use
language '.
In Epicurean doctrine, av-ciap.a.tcet. are images of external objects, and even
the basic n:cf&Y] result in part from experiences of the outside world. Hence
primitive language is seen largely as an instinctive reaction to environmenLl5
So far as we know, this was the first theory to give language a completely
material origin.
It had always been the trump card of the 'conventionalist ' 86 to cite the
lang-uage differences that exist between races. This point was something of an
embarrassment to the 'naturalist ' school, and in the Cratylus both Cratylus
himself and Socrates skirt round it and never come to grips with its implications.oi
Epicurus' theory is triumphant on this score, for i.t is able not merely to explain
language differences in naturalist terms, but even to make them part of itE.
proof. Aristotle had said that language varies while tO: n:p&.y!J.O:'.'CC( remain constant,
but for Epicurus it is precisely because -cO: n:p&y a-ca vary from region to region
that language also varies. If two races live in different physical environments,
he would argue, and if their vocal articulations also differ, it is reasonable to
attribute this latter fact to the differences of feelings and sense-impressions
brought .about by the environmental differences. There may also be some implic
ation in Epicurus' words E&v&v Otwpopa that physiological differences between
races contributed to their different vocal reactions. Elsewhere Epicurus cites
these same environmental and physiological factors to explain his belief that
philosophy is an exclusively -Greek activity 88 and the fact that standards of
justice vary from people to people.89
In the Epicurean theory, the early stage of language proceeds as follows. Men
utter sounds instinctively in reaction to objects and feelings, and, noticing _that
they have one sound to correspond with ea-eh object or feeling, they find it
useful to employ the sounds as labels. This is summed up by Lucretius in the
two lines,9a 'at varios linguae sonitus natura subegit j mittere et utilitas ex
pressit nomina rerum'_91
The second stage of language, which introduces the element of convention, is
outlined in the passage of Epicurus quoted above, but goes unmentioned l n
o u r other Epicurean sources o n the origin o f language.92 This omission probably
reflects the stress placed by Epicurus himself on the natural aspect of language.
The role of convention is described as twofold: where the_ naturally created
language is ambiguous or excessively long-winded, men agree to rationalise it ;
and thinkers, who introduce new concepts which lie beyond the range of direct
perception and therefore have not received names naturally, choose names
for them.

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

18

The deliberate attempts to simplify language are perhaps_ introduced to account

-for cases where it has clearly lost its exact one-to-one correspondence with nature.
For example, if the names 'oak ', ' fir ' and , alder' are sounds naturally provoked
by the sight of these respective species, the additional application to all three
of the generic name ' tree ' may be seen as a deliberate simplification.
The role ascribed to ' the men who shared knowledge' is the naming of all
kinds of abstract concepts, but chiefly, we can scarcely doubt, the introduction
of philosophical terminology. There is no speciftc statement that they invented
new words, merely that they brought names for these new concepts into currency,
and we may guess that Epicurus sees the process as including the metaphorical
application of words already in everyday usage, such as xsv6v, to philosophical
concepts.
According to my emendation of the text of Ep. Hdt. 76, the final words " 'toG
oDv > X'tA ' sum up the whole foregoing section, in order to stress that
language is a product partly of necessity and partly of reason. I am not especially
confident that my reading is the correct one - the corruption may be more
extensive and other words may be lost. But the general sense must nevertheless
be as I have indicated. The cruvet06:e.; cannot be described as &:vo::y xo:.cr&v1:a
&:vacpwvijcm,t, since it is made quite clear in the opening sentence of Ep. Hdt. 75 that
d:.vO:.yxY) belongs to the early, natural stage,93 by contrast with AoytcrJ-6 which in
the later stage led men to improve upon the work of nature. This is confirmed by
Lucretius' words ' natura subegit ';94 and the words of Demetrius Lacon quoted
above, 'tCl npGnCx. 1:Wv Ovop.ct1wv & vacp wv'ljcrct, suggest that dvacpwvijcrat is
especially appropriate to the primitive, instinctive kind of utterance.95 Thus
the mention in the final words of ' those who were compelled to utter ' must
somehow be construed as referring to the primitive men who first used language.
My emendation accomplishes this, and also gives a clearer function to the phrase
xa1:D: 1:1}v 7tAdcr'tY)Y d1:[av ,96 which led Giussani 97 and Bignone 98 to some
far-fetched interpretations of this -passage.
< p.Ev

Having considered this important text, we can now consider Epicurus' pos1t1on
in the cpUcrct-&Ecret debate. Both doxographical tradition 99 and Epicureans
like Demetrius Lacon, Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda treat the Epicurean
doctrine on language as being firmly on the naturalist side of the fence. Admitt
edly the stress placed in our sources on the natural origin of language can be
een as directed against all past philosophical opinion on the subject, which
appears to have assumed unanimously that language had originated as a
deliberate creation either of men or Of gods. For the Epicureans a fundamental
principle is at stake here: the preconception ( np6AY)!.J;t, ' notltie-s ') of a thing
cannot exist unless the thing already exists.100 Therefore sounds corresponding
to individual objects and feelings must have already been in existence before
anyone could have realised the usefulness of names.
However, Epicurus' other writings, and especially Ilept q?Ucrsw Book XXVIII:
show that .also on the more important question of the epistemological value of
language his sympathies lie with the naturalist view. Throughout our text we
see the fundamental principle of the naturalist that to apply a name to an object
is to express an opinion, and that language can represent' true or false opinion.101
W'e also find polemical references to the conventionalist -doctrine of the school

19

DAVID

SEDLEY

93 On the virtual equation of qJUot. and li:vci:

yx17 in Greek thought, see GuTHRIE III pp.

99-!01.
94 Lucr. V 1028.
g;,

Cf. commentary on 10 I b 18.

ss

' As far
as the main cause is concerned ' :
for this use o f xa;-cci: cf. LSJ s.v. ;unci: B I V 2 ,

97 Stud. Lucr.
98

pp. 276-7.

Epicuro pp. 1078.

gg us. 334-5.

tno

1o1

Lucretius V 181-6, 1046-9.

6 J 5-13; 8 IV 4-9; II II 5-10; 13 II 4-2

inf., VI 2 inf.-VII 13 sup.

102

103

13 IV 8 in. ff.

PHILIPPSON,

(( Phil. Woch.

1929; ARRI

GHETTI, p. 476; DURING, Aristoteles, p. 67.

104 FURLEY, Second Study,

p. 121.

p.

205;

LONG,

of Diodorus Cronus.102 Epicurus has no doctrine comparable to that discussed

in the Cratylus and taken up by the Stoics, that the name of a thing is an
abbreviated list of its properties. His naturalism lies rather, as we shall see
below, in the belief that within a language each name -can only be correctly
used to denote the one particular class of object with which it was associated
in its natural origin.
It has often been suggested that Epicurus' linguistic theory is -derived from
that of Aristotle,1 03 or at least that the two theories resemble each other .14 But
the contrasts between them are much more striking than any similarity. We
know that, for Aristotle in De int. I, people in different countries have exactly
the same mental affections (7tcx.& ct./tcx.), but represent them with different words.
For Epicurus it is precisely because the mental affections (mf&1] and -:pcx.v't&ap.a'to:.,
both of which are included in what Aristotle means by no:ltf1"""') differ that
languages also differ. That variations of environment are accompanied by
variations of language is an additional proof that language has a natural
relatiollship with the world.
Aristotle goes on in De int. I-II to assert two further conventionalist principles:
that an individual name is in itself neither true nor false, and that a name is a
-:pwv'l) 0'1JP,IXVn'X:l) xa'td: cruv.&xY]V. This latter claim he elaborates as follows:
' I say (( conventional )) (XIX"Cb: cruv.&1pt1] Y) because no name exists by nature
(:pUcret) but when it becomes a symbol. For even inarticulate noises like those
of animals mean something ( Or(Aoucr y8 'tt), but none of them is a name '.
Epicurus, on the other hand, holds that individual names do convey truth and
falsity, and that a noise can come naturally to be used as a symbol without any
element of cruvit"'l

ws

Cf. Crat. 42ld, 435c.

Epicurus' theory has, if anything, more in common with that of Plato. Although
they disagree radically on the form of the original natural relationship between
words and objects, with Plato seeing the earliest words as deliberate and almost
onomatopoeic dl;fpictions of the properties of objects they both hold that names
originally had a cognitive value but that this has been partially obliterated by
changes in language over the years.1os
Epicurus seems in Ep. Hdt. 15-6 to suggest that the original natural words had
a close relationship with perceptible objects, which has been somewhat obscured
by the metaphorical application of some words to abstract concepts or invisible
entities. This should help us to understand the cognitive value which is attrih
uted to language in Ep. Hdt. 37-8: ' First oi all, Herodotus, it is necessary to
grasp the underlying meanings of words ( "COC 6rto'te'tcx.yp.E.va 'tot; cp.&6yyot),
so that we may have them as a criterion to which to refer opinions, enquiries
and problems, and not give endless proofs which leave everything undetermined,
or use empty words. For the first meaning (npfu1:ov E.v v6Y]p.1X) of every word
must be seen and require no further proof, if we are to have a point of
reference for enquiries, problems and opinions '.
Is ' first ' here to be understood in a chronological sense? He is unlikely to be
recommending the very earljest word usages as being more accurate than those
of contemporary language, for according to his analysis early language was
ambiguous and clumsily expressed, and it was for this very reason that men
eventually got together to fix standard usages. More probably the ' first ' meanings
are those which even after conventional usages were fixed continued to be

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

20

'

current until 'men in the know ' gave certain words metaphorical meanings. For
.
up to this stage .every name could be said to correspond with a particular kind
of perceptible object.
The 'first meaing ' is an embryonic concept which Epicurus later elaborated
into that of np6AY)1>t-; - a preconception, based on sense-evidence, with the
help of which a perceived object can be recognised by name.106 Thus a word
used in a secondary non-perceptual sene ean have no np6AY)1>t-; of its own, and
the intention of Ep. Hdt. 37-8 may be to insist that such words be traced back
to the preconceptions associated with them in their primary, perceptual senses.
Take, for example, the use of xev6v to denote ' void ' in physics. To grasp
this derived sense you must form a 7tp6A1J1>t-; by picturing how the word is
used in its primary, perceptual sense. You may perhaps picture an empty
{xev6v) box. What distinguishes it from a full box is that you can move your
hand around inside it without hindrance. Thus when using the term xev6v
in physics you will know, without requiring any further proof, that it always
presupposes the possibility of movement. In this way language can act a vehicle
for analogy between the visible and the invisible: provided that the philosopher
has a correct understanding of its history.
How does Epicurus' attitude to language compare with those of contemporary
Megarians? 107 The view that a fixed meaning naturally underlies every word puts
him much closer to the extreme naturalist standpoint of Stilpo than to the
extreme conventionalism of Diodorus Cronus, to which polemical references
are made in !Ispl cpucrew,; Book XXVIII. As for Stilpo's theory that only identical
predication is admissible, the obvious Epicurean objection to it is the practical
one voiced by the Epicurean Colotes,108 ' How shall we live witho1.1t saying that
a man is good or a general, but only that a man is a man, good is good, and
a general is a general... ? ' On the other hand, Epicurus himself is no great
defender of predication as a tool of the philosopher. He wants concepts to be
clarified by referenee to the data of perceptions and feelings, not through
mere verbal predication. Thus he shows strong doubts about the usefulness of
definitions,109 and, when dealing with the special case of the concept of time,
he specifically rejects the view that anything else should 'be predicated of it as
sharing the same essence as it '.no This attitude falls far short of the dogmatic
denial of predicability expressed by Stilpo. but may nevertheless be thought to
show the influence of the Antisthenean school of thought, and in general of the
naturalist's quest for one and only one name for every object.
The foregoing discussion is intended to set the scene for the argument contained
in Ilspl qUcrswr; Book XXVIII, which in itself is so fragmentary and obscure
that little can be gleaned from it with certainty.
One question with which our text is concerned is whether, and how, ordinary
language (oJ AEEl) is to be used in the exposition of philosophy. Reference
is made both to the'past and to the present views on the subject both of Epicurus
and of his pupil Metrodorus.ll l By the time of writing, Epicurus seems to have
arrived at the view of which there are already signs in the Letter to Herodotus,
that the philosopher may base his usage on common conventional usage.l12 Accord
ing to Diogenes Laertius,m Epicurus ' uses ordinary language (Aes -x.upq:)
to refer to things'. Epicurus himself sometimes defends his use of a word as
being in accordance with regular usage.114 And Plutarch, having accused Epicurus

21

DAVID

SEDLEY

1o6

See In trod. 2 b. On the linguistic function

of n:p6A't)tP, see LONG, pp. 119-22, 124.

107

B y Epicurus' day the debate had been

polarised into two extreme viewpoints by Me

garian dialecticians. Diodorus Cronus' doctri

ne is discussed in my commentary on 13 IV
8 inf.-VI 15 sup. Stilpo's theory is an extreme
form of the naturalist

thesis. Antisthenes

had already maintained that an object's es

sence can be defined only by the one logos
that can be correctly predicated of it (Gu
THRIE

III 209-19). Stilpo seems to have gone

on from there to the much more extreme no

tion, shared by the Eretrian school of his
pupil Menedemus (Simplicius Phys. 91, 28 ff.),
that all but identical predication is inadmissi
ble (Plutarch Adv. Col. 1119 c ff.): you cannot
say that x is y, but only that x is x and that
y is y.
los

Plutarch Adv. Col. 1119d ff.

109 Us. 258; and anon. commentary on Plato's

Theaetetus, published in Berliner Klassiker

texte 1905, col. 22 11.39 ff.
BIGNONE, Epi
=

curo fr. 61.

110

Ep. Hdt. 72.

111 O n whom see In trod. 2 a.

nz
113

13 IV 3 sup.-V 12 sup.
D.L. X 13.

114 Ep. Hdt. 67

"tOU 0Y6f1lt:tO j
'f'Opli.v.

xcn& 1:-Y)v nAEO't'Y) V 6f1tAtav

Xa:'tti 't'i)Y n:As[O't'I'JY

ib. 70:

of being guilty of a certain ambiguity, puts into his mouth the excuse that
( this is a conventional kind of word usage ' : vsv6f.LCI't!X OE TCW f] 'tow.. U-c"lj
1:Wv Ovop.r:h:wv Op.tAla. 115 We may guess that the frequent occun;ence of the
participle dJfHA1Jpvo, - the Greek for ' colloquial'? - in the early part of
our text represents a discussion of this subject. In 13 IV 3 sup. ff., .although
the text is far from certain, he seems to say that, on his present view, the
philosopher may use words from ordinary language provided that he .always
keeps in view the distinguishing characteristics from which they draw' their
meanings, so as to avoid the pitfalls involved in completely changing' the class
of object referred to. If this is the correct interpretation of these lines,116 the
argument ties in closely with that of Ep. Hdt. 37-8, for in both cases he will
be saying that a word is only useful insofar as its underlying meaning is
kept in view.

'' Plut. Adv. Col. 1112 f.

liS

Cf. commentary ad loc.

In earlier years the attitude to language had been different in the Epicurean
school. We have the evidence of 8 V 2-8 that in the past they had altered the
names of things if they adjudged them on an empirical basis to be false, and
the possible evidence of 12 III 2 ff. that they had regarded the inexactness of
common parlance, and the consequent difficulty of identifying perceived objects
with the correct name, as the source of all human error. This attitude, summed
up by the phrase ' i'iL<X 'ou, TioAu,p6Tiou' l[lh]opou, 'wv J.eeewv ' ( 12 III ll-12),

117

Cf. LoNG, p. 126. On Antiphon, see Gu

THRIE

ns
119

120

III, pp. 202-4.

Viz. 'tc'G ckO't)Act ?

13 III 4-1 in.

In those early days, while Epicurus had been seeking to improve upon the accur
acy of ordinary language, Metrodorus had - been promoting a typical convent
ionalist view -- not unlike that of Diodorus Cronus which he later came to
attack 120 - that a thing can be referred to by any name at all .and that no
name iS better than any other.121 In building up a private terminology he had,
according to Epicurus, chosen some words on the basis of ordinary language,122
and ' without adapting ce'rtain linguistic conventions '.123 His object, Epicurus
says,124 had been to hide the fact that in assigning a name one expresses a
particular opinion, and to shut his eyes to the ' undiscriminating view ( &;]Ot(a.
A]1Jo/(e<[v)
of words and objects '. This latter . phrase looks like a reference

13 V 3-12 sup.

121 13 III 2 sup. ff.

"2

11 ]] 5 fl.

123 13 II 7-5 inf.

124

13 II 4 inf.-III 2 sup.

12>

We may safely assume from Epicurus'

closing remarks (13 XIII 2-6 sup.) that by
the time when this book was written Metro
dorus had moderated his vi-ews. And in many
ways the doctrine which the school finally
adopted can be seen as a compromise between
Epicurus' naturalism and Metrodorus'
ventionalism.
''' 6 I 5-13; 8 V 2 ff.; l l II 5 fl.
127

13 VI 2 inf.-VII 13 sup.

probably represents the young Epicurus, still under the influence of the Democritean school which made these very same conventionalist claims - but like
Antiphon hopeful of reforming language into a viable tool for the philosopher117
By the time of writing Book XXVIII Epicurus had given up this quest for an
entirely accurate philosophical vocabulary, admitting ' I now see, as I did not
then, the particular difficulties, with regard to this class,118 of having correct
names for individual things '.119

con

to the inaccuracy of ordinary language, which it had been Epicurus' hope to

counteract.l25
Despite his eventual provisional acceptance of ordinary language as a philo
sophical medium, Epicurus did not drop his view that it can represent false
opinion. In discussing his and Metrodorus' former opinions, he refers to the
error which had been contained in popular usage at the time.126 Later on he ex
presses his fear of giving the impression that in former times language contained
false opinion but that now ( ? Epicurean) terminology has been ad.ipted to
exclude it_l27 He also implies that he still believes in the existence of the form
of error that arises ' in relation to preconceptions and appearances through the

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

22

manifold conventions of -language '128 a phrase which suggests, as Long has

argued,129 that he sees error as arising from the misfitting of sensations to
npoAtJls. Since npoAf]s-; are very closely linked to the meanings of words,130
it is natural that inaccurate and confusing word-usages should be seen as
contributing to such misidentifications. In ll II 5 ff. Epicurus suggests that
Metrodorus' former method of compiling vocabulary, which included choosing

128
129
130

12 III 8,12, see commentary ad loc.

LONG, p. 123.
D.L. X 33.

names on the basis of ordinary language, led him to represent in it 'the error
of most men with regard to what they actually perceive (1:-?)v XO:'t alm:X 'ti:l
alcr{}crs-; rci-<XY"f)V 1:Wp. noA[AW]v) '. Once again here a connexion is implied
between inaccurate word-usage and failure to identify perceived objects correctly.
Epicurus' ,conclusion that the philosopher may, for want of a better medium,
use ordinary language, is therefore necessarily qualified by the demand which
he was .already making when he wrote the Letter to Herodotus, that the resulting
linguistic inaccuracies and ambiguities should he evaded by always seeing
beyond the present conventional meanings of words to the natural first meanings
which underlie them, and by that which he makes in lisp( 'f'UOUl Book
XXVIII, 13 VII 13 sup. ff., that error should so far as possible be identified by
reference not to language but to the behaviour in which falsity manifests itself.
( d) The Epicurean Categorisation of Thought-Processes. (i) smpl')ttxc.
The meaning of 7ntUstv and smoA is for the most part well explained
by Bailey 131 and Diano, 132 and I shall not go back over all the source material
which they examine. An E.noAYj 'tfuV acr&rj'tY/P lwv is an ad of p'erception
involving deliberate concentration
looking rather than merely seeing, and
listening rather than merely hearing. Analogous to this is an E.noAY) 'ti'j
Qayo[o:.t;;, sometimes ad-ditionally termed cprx.V'tO:O"'tX, by which the mind
pictures something at will by drawing on the immense stock of stray dOwAa
of very fine texture which are ever present around us. All this is clear from
Epicurus' usage of these terms in the Letter to Herodotus 133 and from Lucretius'
full account in Book IV.l34 lmagesl whether received by the sense-organs or
directly by the mind, are always &Aij{}'i), in that the dOwAa that create them
really exist. It is up to the intellect to decide what interpretation to place on
them, and it is here that error, as well as correctness, can arise.l35
The chief function of the bnoA'ij ti) ot"'voloo must be in the field of memory.
If Epicurus were to regard memory as an event purely internal to the mind,
the whole empirical foundation of knowledge would crumble, since our ' meroM
ories ' might be nothing more than our own inventions. The objectivity of memory
is superficially rescued by the assurance 136 that the mind, like the sense-organs,
draws its images from outside.
Of course, the ZnoAi] 'ti'j oavoCa is not in itself sufficient to explain the
phenomenon of merriory, for it does not enable us to distinguish acts of memory
from acts of mere imagination. However, it should not be supposed that Epicurus
did not attempt a solution to this question. A new fragment of Diogenes of
Oenoanda 137 tells us that ' after the impingements .of the first images, passages
are opened up in us 138 in such a way thatl even when the objects which we
originally saw are no longer present, our mind takes in likenesses of the original
objects'. This brief account, which usefully complements Lucretius IV 973-7,
-

23

DAVID

SEDLEY

131 Greek Atomists, pp. 559-68.

132 Psicologia 1939, pp. 133-4.

133
134

Especially Ep. Hdt. 49-52..

Lucr. IV, 722-822, and especially 779-817

135 Ep. Hdt. 51.

'" Ep. Hdt. 49-51.

m

18

New fr. 5 III 6-14.

noponost-ccu 'f)fiiii v
1) cptJo.;; : on the
movements of images through n6po in the
mind, which in Epicurean doctrine account
for mental events, see DIANO, Psicologia 1939,
P- 132

suggests that the images of memory have easier access to the mind, and thus
occur to it with greater clarity and consistency, than those of mere imagination;
and perhaps also that the original visual image of an object imprints its pattern
in the atoms of the mind in such a way that memory-imaes of the same object
immediately 'lock in ' to it and are thus identified.
\Vhat we might call 'empirical data ' are in Epicurean terms images ( cpo:.V'tctcr!ca)
furnished by application (l:moAo:l) of all the faculties (xp"-.jpco:), not only,
that is, of the sense-organs ( cdcr&r)<-.jpwo) but also of the intellect ( oc&vocu).
The adjective bttA1)'W>t6<:;, which occurs frequently in our text, is most
conveniently summed up by PhHippson's translation ' empirical ', although
much of its force is better conveyed by 'objective'. The etymological similarity
of -mA'l)'tl'X-6 and ' objective' may be purely fortuitous, but objectivity j s
precisely what Epicurus' theory o f knowledge seeks. B y contrast, subjectivity
could be sa,id to characterise the internal x{v'l)crt in which Epicurus locates
error.139

H\1

Ep. Hdt. 50; cf. Ilgpl cpUogill XXVIII, 13

VII 5"9 sup.

HO

Two recent discussions of this subject by

FURLEY (Second Study, pp. 206-12; and Know

ledge of Atoms and Void, p. 608 ff.) argue

hat the &m@oAij d) Oavoa; plays I'.O
important part in Epicurean psychology. His
only basis for this view is his misunderstand
ing of ' SnoAci: -tij<;; OtavoCa -Yj 't"Wv Aot
nillv xpto'l')ptwv

in Ep. Hdt. 51 as apprehen

sions of illusory images, simply because they

are said to include dream-images. In fact Epi
curean epistemology is explicit in denying
the Stoic distinction between veridical and
illusory images, and regarding all cpanet.oar..
as being equally ' true ' (Us. 253, 254). It is
precisely on the resemblance of both ordinary
sense-images and dream-images to real objects
that Epicurus' argument hangs. Furley also
dismisses Lucretius' use of the eim@oA'l] -tij<;;
Or..o::v oc,_o;; , to explain how we can visualise
things at will, as a ' very limited use' (Se
cond Study, p. 212). From what I have said
above it should be obvious why I disagree
with this.
Hl

Op. cit., p p 568-72.

If there were any truth_ in this account, it would be fatal to my explanatio of

MttA1]nx6c;; as ' empirical'; but fortunately there is none. Bailey bases himself
chiefly on the section of the Letter to Herodotus 142 in which the motion of atoms
in a moving body is discussed. A distinction is made between the ' smallest
period of continuous time' and ' perods of time imaginable in thought ',143 aml
we are told that although within the former kind of time-unit the atoms in a
moving body move in one direction, within the latter kind they move in _,all direc
tions, but bounce off each other at such a high rate as to give the visual impression
of moving in one only. He adds the explanation : 'CO ydtp npocr0oa.S6p.Evov
1tEpl "CQ() &opchou, w eXpo:. xed 0 aa A6you %EW(J1)'tOl xpOvot 'tb OUVEXE 'tf}c;
opa Eeoucrtv, oUx ciA1)-&i E.cr1:tv E.nl 1:Wv 'totothwv Ensl 't6 yE %EwpoUp.Evov
ntzv fJ -xa't' ntoA"ijv Ao:.p.av6p.evov 't Cha.vo[q; &A1J&e Ecr'ttY ' Bailey's
-&ewpoUp.evov alludes
interpretation of this final phrase ( < End . ... ) is that 1:0
back to the observed fact that in a continuous period of time the parts of a
moving body move in one direction only, and that xo:.1:' .ntoA1jv ActtJ.av6tJ.E-YOY
't1j Otavo[q; ' refers to the correct discovery that this same rule does not
apply in an atomic period of time. Thus he makes these words explanatory not
just of the immediately preceding sentence ( '1:0 yli-p npucrOoeaSOttcvov . . '), but
of two separate points in the whole argument that goes before.

'

..

'

'

..

Ep. Hdt. 62.

w ' ot Otd: /.. O yol) &ewp'YJ'toi zpOvot ,

In our text, this 'empirical ' thought is distinguished from ' theoretical' thought
about invisible entities ( especially in 13 VIII 5-3 inf.); is characteriEed as thought
about particulars by contrast with inductive thought about universals ( 13 X 9
inf. ff.); and is included in a list of all the chief thought-processes recognised
by Epicurus ( 13 VI 1 inf. ff.). It is antithetical to all abstract forms of thought.140
Bailey 141 argues that an E-moA"ij TYj Ow:-voLa. can be UEed to apprehend not
only the objects of perception, but also scientific concepts. This is done, -he
suggests, by juxtaposing already established facts about atoms and void and
then ' intuitively' drawing from them an inescapable conclusion. The EntoA
'ti]t; Otowo(o:. is thus the ultimate criterion in the investigation of the invisible.

i.e.

atomic units of time; for the interpretation,

see FURLEY, First Study, p. 124.

144 Knowledge of Atoms and Void, pp. 614-6.

Any reader will, I believe) testify that the text as it stands cannot be under
stood in this way. The clause beginning End . . ' can only be explanatory of
the clause that immediately precedes it. Furley 144 comes closest to what I believe
to be the correct interpretation of the passage. If what Epicurus has stated about

CRONACHE ERCOLANES!

24

the mot:on of atoms in a moving body is correct, it follows- that either appear
ances deceive when they tell us that the parts of a moving body all move in one
direction, or that appearances do not deceive but that in this particular case
analogy between the visible and the invisible is invalid. The object of his remark
Ls thus to affirm that it must be in analogical inference ( ( 'tO .. . n:pocr0ocx.6p.cvov
ncpl 'toG ciopchou' ),not in appearances, that the error- lies. Error cannot lie in
appearances, 'since everything that is seen, -or grasped by the mind through
apprehension of an image, is true )).145
Bailey also cites a passage of Clement of Alexandria 146 in which Epicurus' use
of the term npoA')yn, is defined: np6A')ynv ol. ano0i1iwat moAi)v n( "
E:vcx.. pyE xcx..L E:nt 't'l) V Evcx..p yf) 'toG np&yp,cx.'to.; E:nvotcx.v. This, argues Bailey,
shows that an E.n:toA"ij can have an E.n:Lvotcx.. as its object. But we have no
guarantee that these are Epicurus' own words, and even if they were, the
deviation from the strict meaning of E:moA-Ij outlined above would be a
small one.
Besides, if we are to go beyond Epicurus' own writings and pin so much faith
on doxographical tradition, we cannot ignore a passage of Aetius 117 which
contradicts Bailey's account: ' Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus say that
both perception and thought work through the entry of dOwAJ. from outside,
since neither can concentrate (E:tt&:AAcv) on anything independently of the
dOooAov which makes contact '. This firmly restricts the E.ntoA"i] 'tf) Ow.vorx.
to the visualisation of perceptible objects.

AnE.ntoA"ij 'tf) Otrx.vocx.., then, regularly involves an image (q;av'tacrrx., q;&:v'tcx.

crttrx., q;cx.. v 'tcx..cr!l-6) 148 caused by external ciOooAcx.. . On occasion it is specifically
labelled 'P"'"cw""-1]. 149 In Ilspl 'J'UOeW' XXVIII, 13 VI l inf. ff.,there is a
list of the various thought-processes through which error might be considered
to arise, and in it xcx..'t tX 'tOY nlA1j'tVY..bv 'tp6n:ov
is listed separately from
cpcx.. Y 'tcx..crnxiil . The difference between the two expressions is likely to be one
of emphasis only, since both must include the presence of a cpav'trx.crLa. Probably
the n:tA'Yj'ttx0.; 'tp6n:o is restricted to the deliberate apprehension of an
image, while the q;cx.Y'tCX..O''ttxbr; 'tp6n:o.; is broader and can include in addition the
unintentional apprehension of an image - for instance, seeing without looking,
hearing without listening, and the random entry of c!Qlt)Aa. to the mind.l50
The adjective >:p CX.. V'tCX.crnx6.; is used frequently in fragmentary contexts in the
earlier part of IIopl 'J'UOSUl' XXVIII ( see Index Verborum), mainly in the
expression oU cpcx.. v'tcx..cr'tvx6.;, which presumably designates the entire class of
thought which proceeds without the presence of sense-images, prominent in which
are the following two processes.

H5 The expression

t:O

..

&wpoU[-tSVOil na;

here must mean ' everything that is seen '

not ' everything that is studied ', as Furley
maintains. For in technical passages Epicu
rus uses &ewpetv, unaccompanied hy /,6ycp
or Gltti A6you , exclusively in this sense (see
below, Ov)) ; and Furley does not explain
what Epicurus inight mean by saying that
' everything that is studied ... is true '. Similarly,

xcct' 6mo/..:Yrv Acq.La.Y6f18YDV c'Q Gcwotq: '

can only refer to our knowledge of the per

ceplible world, if the argument as a whole
is to make any sense.
1<!.6

Strom. II 4 = Us. 255.

IV 8-IO = Us. 317.

148 There is no good evidence for a difference

in meaning between these terms.
"" D.L. X 3 ! ; Ka

XXIV.

'

'

150 However, even dreamimages can be the

'result of deliberate apprehension, cf. Ep. ll11t.
51, Lucretius IV 777-822.

I51 Cf. DIANO, Psicologia 1939, pp. 136-7.

152

Epicurus uses ne:ptAcx.. p. &vH v and cognate forms 152 in the regular sense of
' to grasp with the mind', ' to conceive', ' to imagine', which goes back at least
to Empedocles.153 He clearly recognises the ' conceptual ' method as a thought
process to be ranked alongside those discussed above, for it is listed with them

25

DAVID SEDLEY

neptA'Y)nt:6o;; ,

nepLA'Y)t/Jtr;,

nepA"')1tt:tx6o;;1

&neptA"')n:,;oo;; : Ep. Hdt. 40, 42, 46, 47, 56.

I53 B 2, 7-8, D.-K. :

'triG\'

&vGip&.crtv

neptAr;n't&..

olh'

oli'tW o\h'
6ne<.xouot:O:

6mGiepx,;d:
oUce votp

Ilspl 'f'Ucrsw XXVIII, 13 VI 1 inf. ff., and there are further allusions to a
7ttp'A'J7'"'"o 'P01tO in 5 II 12-13, possibly in 5 III a 3-4, and in 8 V 9-10.
The best clue to the meaning of this expression is found in Ep. Hdt.- 42, where,
in restricting the composition of everything to atoms and void Epicurus argues
that 'beyond these nothing can be conceived, either 7tcpA1pt-cW or through
any similar process ', in the category of independent existence.154 This reference
of opinions to the test of conceivability is probably what is meant by the
neptArpt1:t'x..O 'tp6no . Epicurus frequently has recourse to such arguments, dis
missing as inconceivable the notion of, for example, .a visible atom,155 a finite
body with an infinite number of parts,l56 or the mind continuing to perceive
when detached from the body.l57 These are questions which cannot be referred
to the simple test of sense-evidence, or analogy with the perceptible, but on which
the human intellect is nevertheless capable of prDnouncing. By and large he
seems to regard inconceivability as sufficient proof of falsity. This may not always
apply to number and size, for he is prepared to assert that atoms have more
differences of shape than the mind can conceive,15B and that e:tOwAa cover 'any
conceivable Jistance in an unthinkably short time '.159 However, it may be that
we have in this latter case a mere turn of phrase rather than a doctrinal point,
since, as we have seen, even the shortest unit of time is ' imaginable in thought m

IH
1tctpt't as 'tctf3ct oU&Sv oi)B' E1WW"fj&ijvctt
Mvcnct) oU'ts. neptA'l')1t'tffiG" o1he tiva.A6yioG"
'totr; nepA"fjn'totr;, Wr; xct&' OActr; cpUoslf
Act!-J.Gt'li6!-J.8Vct.

155 Ep. Hdt. 56.

156 lb. 57.
151 Ib. 66; c. also ib. 60, 67, 68, 70, 7 1 ; Ep.

Pyth. 97;

Ilept qJ6oew-; XXVIII, 8 V 9-10;

Philodemus Sign. XII 14-36, XXI 22-9.

1ss Ep. Hdt. 42; cf. Us. 270, 275.
159 Ep. Hdt. 16 : nav f.VYjxo-; nepA"fjn't6v Ev
tineptVO'/j'tql XP6V<p.

160 I have checked the reading in the original,

and alter Diana's text accordingly.

161 In the papyrus 1.8 is written ' x&. tctv[ . . . J

sp[ . . . ' It is not clear whether the

ris

cr

..

In Ilspt cpUcrsw, PHere. 1056, 5 I l ff., there is a passage potentially of great

interest in this connexion : I60
't& 7toAA&. 'tWY xovwv xalw-.Aevn:6Y'tWY [cr]Uv 'tot; U17toxe t-t-Evm\:' , O[&Jev E'tspa

7tpocr[ooo:6nwv,

,a,

f'EY [ "'" ' slowl.wv Efl['f'tl]icrso nva, ocr' a1tsp,[A][".

. .

"w[ oJoetlsoucr'[ y f) ]I ""' &v [aA6Jyw ' ; ' &1tsp['), ][7t'o'[ . . . ....

l6!

ended to replace the a, or to be added

before it - both forms of correction are em

ployed _in this papyrus. If the former is
.
correct, we must read Ooa nept[A'l'l]lnW[r;

a]o\:ooa<[v ] I xa\ &v[aAo]rw' IIJ[nep

[tA'l'/]lnot[-; . . . . . This uncertainty devalues
what might have proved an important source
on the meaning of the 1t8ptA'l')1t'ttXO" 'tp6no.;; :
the passage seems to connect either
conceptual '

or

conceptual '

non

thought with

the cognitive process in which Epicurus else

where locates error -("CO npocrBoct6J.Levov,
Ep. Hdt. 50).
162 And similarly
162

&ewp't"OG" and &s.wpa:: .

Ilepl cpUoewr; II, G V, 2-3;

Ep. Hdt. 41,

56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 71, 73, 74, 78; Ep. Pyth.
passim.
'"' Ep. Hdt. 35; Ep. Pyth. 86, 1!6; Ep. Men.

128.
165 Ep. Hdt. 47,

59, 62 ; cf. Us. 270, 291;

Philodemus De dis III col. 10, 20, fr. ll,2 ;

Rhet. I 140,2.
Hili

Ib. VIII 3 in., IX 4 sup., XI 16 sup.

Epicurus uses &ewpdv 162 in its primary . sense of ' see ', " look at ',163 and some
times in the slightly looser sense of ' study '.164 In addition, he uses various
forms of the metaphorical phrase oa. A6you -&swpstv, 165 meaning 'to see by
pure reason ', ' to contemplate with the mind '. This is always appliea to know
ledge of atoms and void and of everything thclt lies beyond the range of direct
perception. It appears among the thought-processes listed in Ilpl .Ucrsw XXVIII,
13 VI 1 inf. ff., in the form ' o[' ]a ).6you o-1) 0swp'l)"'"iil ', and elsewhere
simply in the form &sw pY]n x6 166 which approxirriates to the English ' speclative'
or 'theoretical '. While the process of n sp t A a p. & vs t v provides a negative
check ori opinions regarding both the visible and the invisible, by putting
them to the test of conceivability, that of Otb: A6you &ewpstv offers positive
understanding of the invisible, chieflly, one supposes, by analogical reasoning
from the visible.
Our text also contains the form ll-swp'l) f'"' ( 5 III a 3 ; lO I a 7), but only in
mutilated contexts. The one possible clue to its Epicurean meaning is a passage
of an unidentified Epicurean work ( PHerc. 831, col. VIII 10), quoted below
in my commentary on XII 1415 sup., which suggests that its meaning is
related to that of ll-swp'/)H%0 rather than to that of ll-swpsTv - perhaps
'speculation '

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

26

The verb EmAoyCeo.&at and cognate forms (EtnAoytcrp.6, E:ntA6ytcra, Etn

A6ytcrt, EntAoytcr'tt x6, & vemA6yw'to<;, &vent Aoytcr'tE.w, Oucrent A6yto'to)
occur frequently in Epicurean texts, and have long been recognised to designate
an epistemological process rated highly by Epicurus.167
An examination of the texts will show that mAoytcr!J.6 is the name of a
process of reasoning, and that the prefix Em- carries the same connotation of
empiricism and objectivity that we have found in En t& AA et v and cognate
but not
forms. It is a process of reasoning based on practical experience
necessarily involving analogy or induction, as De Lacy maintains. Perceptions
and feelings are the -only incontrovertible sources of data about the world,
but since they are irrational 168 a process of reasoning is necessary whereby
they can be systematised into a rational pattern of knowledge.l69 Epicurus has
no time for the logical categorisation of processes of inference, but neverthe
less recognises the importance to the philosopher of reasoning in general
(Aoy'ofL6,, o uU oy oo fLO ), of the kind of reasoning that provides an under
standing of the data supplied by the sensations ( emAoy'afl6,), and of the
kind of reasoning that uses this understanding as a basis for speculation about
that which is beyond perception ( &v o:), oyto p.6) . For the sake of brevity, in
what foiiows I translate nAoycrp.6 with phrases like ' empirical reasoning ',
' empirical calculation ', although a more accurate expression would be some
thing like 'reasoning based on empirical data '.
I begin my examination of the texts with a passage in which Epicurus argues
against determinism: I70

'tO t[al)'t]Y] n:A&:VYJ<;. nsptit&.['tw] yO:p 6 't OtOO't O A6yo 'tpE.ns'tat, 'X.al oUOE.
7tO't OllVtX'tat satWcrat & Ecrnv 'tmaO'ta n&v'ta o1a 'tCl 'X.a't' &.v&.yxYJV
xaAoU-t eva . &:AACl -t&xe'ta[ 'ttVt nspl. aU'toO 't06'tOU W Cit ' eau'tOV &:e A-

'tEpCUO!J.EV(J)t. x&v Sl &nstpov g;i'j ncfALV 'XIX't &.v&:.yx"fjV 'tOiJ'tO npcf't'tEtV

<XnO Aoywv &d, OU'X em!.oyi<;nat, Ev " "" d, au,bv "YJY cd,(av &vcl[7t]-

167 Cf.

))

1932,

ARRIGHETTI, (( PdP ))

1952;

PmLIPPSON,

1458-60;

Phil.

DIANO, Psicologia

FRITZ, pp. 70-4;

P. DE LAcY, (( AJP

Woch.

1939,

144;

von

1958. Diano and Arri

ghetti see it as a non-rational, almost intui

tive, mode of comprehension. De Lacy comes
close to the interpretation oullined below.

16s D.L. X 31.

169 Lucr. IV 379-85.

170

ll&pt cpUoeW": PHere. 1056, 7 IX 1 ff.; the

text which I give here is an _amalgamation

of my own readings of the three papyri in
which it is preserve d ; Diano's text, with the
misreading of qJfjt as

*'

is incomprehens1ble.

1 C Pap. 1191, om. Pap. 1056

2 'tow:U-cct
nlinu o't"a 'r.X xa-c &vayx'Y)Y Pap. 1056, 'tO"
aiJ'tct na[ . . .Jvriyx"l(y Pap. 1191

3 xctA[oU}"

J-1SYOC Pap. 1191, xaAOUJ-1SY Pap. 1056

7 e( oe

)l-f) &:noi\."fjyot Pap. 697, et {OS 11-fJJ &no[ . . . . ]

oA'lj yo t Pap. 1056. [&jvtiy[:x.'YlvJ Diano.

"''v 'oil xa[""' ']p67toV A<AoyCa&cu, <1 oe "ov &fL'f''01J'OilV"" ,oo flYJ
'XMa "P07tOV. El oe flYJ &7toA>j yo t (ejL, au,o(vj & U ' e1, 'YJY [&jvcly(x1JY]
[t ]&d1J, [o]u o ' av o[.. ]xa[

"

'For this is a self"refuting kind of argument, and can never prove that every
thing is of the kind called << under compulsion ll. , In fact, in disputing this
very question he treats his opponent as if he Were speaking nonsense by his
own choice. And even if, as far as mere words go, he keeps on ad infinitum
always saying that he is on the contrary doing it under compulsion, he is not
reasoning it empirically, sirice he imputes to himself the responsibility for
having reasoned correctly, and to his opponent the responsibility for having
, reasoned incorrectly '.
The determinist is here accused of faiEng to use E:ntAoylcrp.6, on the grounds
that what he says 171 does not take into account the attitude which he adopts
in practiceY2 When invoked in an ethical context, EnAoytop.6 essentially
involves, as here, the study both of one's own behaviour and of that of others.

27

DAVID

SEDLEY

111

<:pfj L

. . . &nO A6yw11.

172 Namely etr;; ao1:6v cijv ctldo;-. d:v& [r.:]'tstv

x-tA.

I discuss this more fully in my commen

tary ad Joe.

115

.-oU "C'ij oocpxO; .-SAou x.oct n&pct"CO' Act

oUoa; .-Ov f!mAoyof16V.

176 I here amalgamate my own readings of

the two papyri, 1056 and 1191, in which the

passage appears : O&ev x.a:l. ,;oU .-[BJAou;; aiJ

-c:oU 8nA6yotJ.a s!xs tJ.&v xed f) &.px1J 1Jv

at-ttCGv, S!XOfJ.SV ?J'i) xal 1JtJ.Si'".
117

'EmA. p. 123.

178 lb. p. 125.

179 Us. 397-9.
18

Cf. DE LACY, art. cit., pp. 179-80.

181
lb. 130: Ti ... O'UfJ.J-lS'tpoa xat OUJ-l'f!S
p6V'tWV x.o-;l &.oup.cp6pwv BABtfis 'tctiha nci.na
:Kpvsv :Ka&rjM.
18

Rhet. I 218,4 ff. Other Epicurean passages

which associate 87nAoytof16-;:; with the for

mation of utilitarian judgments are: Hermar
chus fr. 24 Krohn ( Porph. De abst. I 8,
10), where we hear of its superiority to mere
=

irrational perception in the days when men

were studying expediency in order to establish
the first legal principles;

and Philodemus

Rhet. I 254, 25 ff., where we are told that

the Epicureans use it in arriving at moral
values which others hold by merely following
their emotions. In both passages it is said
to

make

the

principles,

once

In several ethical texts, Epicurus employs variants on the phrase 0 'tOO 'tEAour;;
E.ntAoytcrOr;; , which he seems to regard as the correct basis for all moral
activity. In Ep. Men. 133 we are told that no man is better off than he who
reveres the gods, is unafraid of death, and has calculated by E.ntAoytcr-t-L6t;; the
end laid down by natureJ74 In K XX it is asserted that happiness is possibb
without eternity, and a man's life is said to be complete if his intellect has
taken mAoyocrf10' of the end to which the flesh must aspire and the limits by
which it is bound.175 In Ilepl 'f'UcreW PHerc. 1056, 7 XII 8 ff. 'mA6yocr[10: of the
end' is mentioned as a possible motivating force in human behaviour.176 In
K-6. XXII we are advised to bnAoyccr-&w not only the ' end ' but also every
thing that is plain to see.
Arrighetti 177 notes that the -cEAo for Epicurus is pleasure, and takes 6 -coG
-cEAou En:tAoytcrp.-6:;; to mean 178 awareness of the nature of pleasure as the
absence of sorrow. But the passages quoted above show that 6 -coG -cEAou
EntAoytcrp.6 is regarded by Epicurus as an activity which distinguishes the
wise man from the unwise ; whereas the fact that pleasure is to be sought and
sorrow avoided he does not even consider to be in question, since it is pre
s-upposed in all animal and human behaviour.179 More probably, 6 -c:oCi 'tEAout;
EntAoytcrt-t6 is Epicurus' name for the hedonistic calculus.I80 In Ep. Men.
128-30, having stated 1'i) v f)liov'i)v <Xpx7Jv xo:l 1Ao, .... <lvo:c wil fLO::>eo: p(w
i'jv, he goes on to stress that while all pleasures are in themselves good, some
must be avoided because of their unhappy consequences; and that while all
sorrows are in themselves had, some must he pursued because of their happy
consequences. Making the correct choice is an empirical matter.1 81
The equation of this hedonistic calculus with EntAoytcrp.6 is confirmed by a
passage in which Philodemus discusses the apportioning of praise and blame : 132
ou f''iJV an' btd I 1Cpii;yf10: xo:%' EO:U10 10t, l OAOO' ou&[<]v [cr]"v ETCo:oj[ve]
o v lj <j!%10V, aH/t I [y<j(Ve1CU b f1Sv xo:&O[crov OfLOAOy<t 1ii>L n ee- I (i)y
<Xy o:&w v , b 01: xo:[&Ocrov wo wv xo:xwv,l b f''iJ 10:il' eyvwxw, m[AeAoyccr[1E
YW ouos xo:[l< 17Jv cXYO:'f' Opltv 7Jv I ETC' o:u11< li[c]op(eov liuvf)[crs"o:' 11<
Actp.cxv6p.cva I npb -coU Enatvou ...... ' Nevertheless, since nothing is in
itself universally commendable or blamewbrthy, but becomes commendable
insofar as it conforms to 'the end of the good, and blameworthy insofar as it
conforms to the end of the bad, the man who has not by an empirical calcul
ation obtained this knowledge will not be able to use it as a standard of
reference for analysing that which is under consideration for commendation .. . .
"

established,

easier to remember.
183

In Ilepl 'f'UOeW' Book XXVIII, 13 VII 13 sup. ff., the fullest survlVlng passage
on bn Aoyccrf16,, this is expanded into the bold principle that the truth of
any opinion must stand or fall on the advantageousness or otherwise of the
behaviour to which it can be seen to 1ead.173

PHerc. 163, the last nine lines of col.

XIV = Us. 45; the text given here is my own,

based on a reading of the papyrus.

In defence of moral evaluations the Epicureans sometimes employ arguments

which they call EntAoycr!-Lo[, and which are essentially appeals to experience.
In a fragment of the Ilcpl nAoUwu 1ll3 Philodemus quotes an EntAoytcrp.6 from
Epicurus himself: Jw[v li'] 'Em[x]oups[wv Uyovl1o:i [1]ovs, 01es[p ) :oil

XO:>LOV el[vo:[o] 1Y 1tevio:v EmAoyocr[llot, xpi)cr&o:o 10 0 01J O , ,

>--

'E7t(

xoupo, [v "" &Uoo 1 7to [Ao]t, 'f'lJcr' 'i)v TCYio:v I [x]o:[x]bv dvo:o, xo:l v

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

28

' Some Epicureans are said to employ, as evidence that poverty is an evil,
empirical arguments of the following kind: Epicurus says that poverty is an
evil for many reasons, but especially because it is unendurable when combined
with these other afflictions (sc. d-cuxatr;; ?) ... '
Similarly in the De ira Philodemus quotes three arguments which he believes
prove that a moderate degree of anger is permissible in a wise man. He terms
them bn),oytcrp.o 184 or A6yc.t bnAoytcr'Cvx.o 185 and once again they takr
the form of appeals to experience : the first 186 argues from the fact that wise
men are grateful for good turns; the second 187 from the fact that even wise
men get -drunk; and the third,188 if I have understood it correctly, from the
fact that people are only angered by what they already believe to be had,
however enraged they may become.
Another ethical fragment which clearly implies that MttAoytcrp.6r;; is the process
of interpreting the data supplied by the sensations is PHere. 831 XIV 3 ff.: 189

Y)( o ) o ' [a]v I < O 7tA pUlf'CO <WY ciyco&wv I "'' ilv Of'f'""'Y <O&ij<coo, ""' I e7tO
Aoy[/;'1'"' tivoo ts lixso I >ecol 1tocrco >ecol 7t'JA[>eco, t[voo [!-'e]v I lho &ya&&,
1t6croo o lho 7toH&, I 7tY) Ai>eoo o lho f'<y&).a

oeo>evuwf'<V I S7tLAoyLcrn>ew' lito 7tOA[AwY ""' X<XAWY

oui5Ev

18'

XLIV 38.

180

XLVI 18-40.

"' XLVI 40 XLVII 16.

188

XLVII 16-39.

189 KORTE, M.E.F., p. 587; the author is an

unidentified Epicurean. I have checked the

reading in the papyrus, and adjust KOrte's
bracketing accordingly.

>e

190 Contra Ep. beat. 1089d

Us. 68.

102 lb. 1091b Us. 423.

193 Adversus [sophistas], IV 1 ff.

194 The best reconstruction is that of GIGANTE,

Ricerche Filodemee, pp. 144-5.

195 Fr. 38 col. I, 8,

[CJucreJLAO-(o'to ;

col. III, 1 1-12, CJuosmAOyo'tov.

195

Gnom. Vat. 63.

197 De lib. die. fr. 28, l-8.

cpoA[a, I 7tEpLyoyvo

crn <'JAO>COO,ov "'' '0 lifxeo< v > '"' '"[y]>eapo[o]& "''

A[ oy]ov<o, &xoucrel'"' This ethical use of e7tOAOyLcrf'O' appears

also to occur twice in a sentence of Philodemus, De ira ; 198 I have not succeeded
in understanding the sentence as a whole, but the two relevant phrases are
&vs!n:tAoycr-cour;; aU-coVe; ysyovEvat -cWv mx&Wv 1 9 9 and -c'l)v dAtxpqvstav Ent
[pet ""'

Aoycracr&at -coU 1 xaxoO.

200

This concludes the series of passages in which En:tAoytcrp.6r;; is invoked as a

basis for making ethical judgments. Cumulatively they leave little room for

29

XLVI 16-18.

.........

This is one of many Epicurean fragments in which the ability to appreciate

the benefits -of something morally good or the harmfulness of something bad
is said to be a matter of EtnAoytcr!--L6r;; . Plutarch 190 attributes to the Epicureans
the view that ' for those who are capable of 2nAoytcrtt6r;; 191 the highest and
securest joy lies in the ' stable condition of the flesh ' and in the well.founded
confidence that thi will c-ontinue. He also 192 quotes Epi,curus as saying that
good arises E cxl>tijr;; tfjc; cpuy17r;; toU Y,ctxoU xcxt 1:fjr;; tJ-V1JtJ-1Jt; xal bttAoy[crswr;;
Y.at x&:pt1:or;; On 'COU'tO cruttE1J%V xl>'ttfl. Philodemus 193 appears to invoke
bt:tAoytcrp.Ot;; in this same sense, the appreciation of one's own past good
fortune in the lines in which he introduces the Epicurean tetrapharmakos;
hut the text is somewhat insecure.194 In Gnom. Vat. 35 we are urged not to
let desire for what we have not make us regret what we have, but to ' learn
from experience that what we have is also desirable ( &:AA EntAoyscr&at
O'tt xa.l 'tctOto:. 1:WV el>t'ta[wv i]v) ' . Diogenes of Oenoanda tells us that for
most people the superiority of mental to physical feelings is - hard to appreciate
by EtttAoytcrtJ-6t;; 195 because they never occur simultaneously in their most
intense forms and direct comparison is therefore impossible. Epicurus mentions
the purity that is to be found in a life of moderation, and implies that it is
to be appreciated by 2tttAoytcrtt6t;; : 1% Ecr1:t. xd Ev Asn-c6t1J'tt xo:.&apt61:1Jr;;, -ljr;;
6 &vstnA6ytcr1:ot;;
Philodemus 197 suggests that the great value of free
discussion between friends can be d.emonstrated by 2n:tAoytcr6r;; : xav n[ s]pt
f'EYUlY,

IM

DAVID SEDLEY

198 VII 6-20; cf. CRONERT, K.u.M., p.

89.

199 lb. 79.

20

I b. 1618.

ib.

"'1 KL

202

XXII.

See Introd. 2 b.

203

It is unnecessary to see hre, as does Ar

righetti ( ' E-rn/... p. 135), a strong contrast
between O:n6aet and &nt/..oytoj-16". The
implication is rather that the latter suffices
without the former, cf. Ep. Hdt. 38: A8ne

a&ctt xoct t.t"IJ&Sv 6:?-coaeCewf npoaaeta&ct.

204 De ira XLV 24 ff.

9115

lb. 36-9.

doubt that it is a rational process, and that in ethics it draws its data from the
study of human behaviour and feelings.
However, E.n:Aoytcrpi. is used not only in this ethical sense, but also in a
simple epistemological sense to designate the process by which the mind sorts
out and understands the data of perceptions and feelings. We have already
noted above Epicurus' assertion that we must ' assess empirically ( EmAoy[
scr&o:.t) ...... everything that is plain to see ' in order to avoid ' incomprehension
and confusion '.201 In Ilsp!. cpUasw XXVIII, 8 V 8, En:AoytcrjJ-6<;; bears a
similar meaning when we are told that certain word-me,anings, originally
assigned by a ' non-perceptual ' process, later came to be changed when their
inappropriateness was ' seen by an act of empirical reasoning ' (cruv 06v'tE
oO ["o ' "]u"" [x "YO em A[ oy ].of'[o ju ).
In Ep. Hdt. 72-3 Epicurus has apparently inserted into the Letter a condens
ation of a highly polemical account of the nature of time.202 He s-tarts by tell
ing us that there is no preconceptjon (np6A'l/tP) of time to which it can be
referred for identification like other phenomena, but that ' the plain reality,
in virtue of which we articulate the words '' a long time )) or a Short time )),
which are on our ljps from birth, must itself be arrived at by analogical
reasoning '.
This must be understood as an intentional paradox: time is an E.v&py1jp.a, some
thing whose existence is clear to all, and yet it cannot be directly observed and
_
identified, but can only be understood through analogy ( v " Aoyw,oov ), For
what we perceive directly, and identify with the help of npoAl]tf;e, are the
phenomena like ' day, night, motion and rest, with which we associate the word
' time ' ; and it js only by a sort of analogy with these that we can indirectly
arrive at the nature of time itself. We only know the meaning of ' length of time '
insofar as we know what we mean by ' the length of an illness ' or ' the length
of the day '.
Thus, having stated that analogical reasoning . is necessary, and rejected verbal
definitions of time, he goes on: d:AA&. !J-Ovov c{) crunAh.O!J-EV 'tO tOov 'tOO'to'
'X.O:l napaE'tpoOJ-eV !J-&Auno: E:ntAoytntov. xo:l y&:p 'tOO'to oUx &noOdeto
npocrOehat dAA' nAoytao01 On 'tCGt fwEpo:t xo:t 'tCGf vut auttnAExottev xo:l
'WL 'tOU'ttoV [pecrt_v, cbao:Lnw:; OS xal 'tOt 1t&&eat xal 'taL &na&eCO:t Jto:l xt
vYjaeat xal a1:&cremv1 t'Ot6v n crtJ!-ln'tto!J..CG, 1tepl 'taO'tCG n&Atv afnb 'toOw tv
vooO v'tE xo:&' 0 xp6vov Ovov.&oj.teV. ' But all that is necessary is for the most
part to calculate empirically with what it is. that we link this -characteristic:
and measure it. For it requires no additional proof but simply empirical reason
ing, to find that with days, nights, and fractions thereof, and likewise with the
presence or absence of feelings, and with motion and rest, we associate a
certain peculiar attribute, and that the meaning of this attribute, which we
express with the word ' time ', is itself in turn related to these phenomena '.
The question ' With what classes of phenomena do we link the word (( time )) ? '
demands an empjrical solution with no additional proof: " oUx &n:oOdeto
npocrOet'ta, &AA' EntAoytcrttoO '.203 The question which bttAoycrtt6 is to
solve here is essentially one of word usage. Similarly Philodemus 20'* stresses
the difference in meaning between Opy and &up.6, and mentions the errors
of those who have not made a proper empirical study to establish when both
words are applied to the same _thing and when they are not: 205 of OS p.1) xa-

CRONACHE ERCOLANES I

30

I
I

AW "*' E1tL "'"ho ""' no"' oox E1tL I ""O"o 'J'Epn' (sic) opy ""' %ulfl0
EmAsAoyapivot
..

The translators of Ep. Hdt. 72-3 206 usually treat &vaAoytcn:eov and bttAoy
tcr-cE.ov as virtual synonyms meaning ' one must take into account '. Yet it
surely inconceivable that in such a highly technical passage these two key
terms should be casually j uxtaposed in non-technical senses. Epicurus' argument
is founded on the approach, implicit in KL). XXII, and explicit, as we shall
now see, in several passages of Philodemus, On Signs, that the correct basis
for analogical inference IS an understanding of phenomena by means of
mAoytcrp.6r; . 207
Philodemus,208 defending the Epicurean method of analogical inference against
the Stoic objection that some arguments by analogy patently do not work, replies
that one cannot make inferences about the invisible from chance similarities in
the visible world, but only from similarities which occur with total consistency
throughout the whole range of our experience. It is invalid to argue that because
there are figs within our experience there must be figs outside it, for our know
ledge of the world tells us that vegetation varies from region to region. Thus
the Stoic argument is ' easily refuted, contradicted by the facts, and not
even based on empirical study of the actual similarities and differences that
exist in the things which we perceive ' : oUO' cx.U'ti)Y 'tYJY 0!-1[o]6)'tlj'tCX. xcx.l
liw:popi<v "y s[v "]Ol 'J'C<lVOftEVOl S7tlAo[y]t(6[fl8]vo,.209 P. and E. De

20B

An exception is GIGANTE, Diogene Laerzio,

p. 506.

207 Cf. also the phrase used by Philodemus

(Rhet. II 47, 10-13): -cWv -ce d:Gl[1)AwvJ at:cti&1-L [r/Jcrew" xctl -ctli'>' UnXpxOvj"tWV BmAoya-c
xi') &cwp[IIX.
2os

Sign. XII 36 ff

"' lb. Xlll 302.

Lacy, in their edition of this work, translate this last phrase as ' nbr is his
argument based on inductive inference from the similarity and difference in
appearances... '. They are driven to this interpretation by their belief that
EmAoycr-16 is equivalent to , ' inductive inference ' ; but it is surely not possible
in Greek for a compound of Aoy!t;ecr.fkt followed by an accusative to mean
' to infer from '.
In a similB:r passage from the . same work, Philodemus, dealing with another
Stoic objection, which argues that analogy with visible objects would prove that
atoms are destructible, offers very much the same retort : 210 oU yap < & >d bd
tlVWV [xv[ou]fflEYP eo"[t]v 6 ""'" " "y OflO[tJio"l"" "P01tO, 1t8ptoosu6v-

210 lb. XVII 30-7. The text given here is my

own, based on an examination of the original.

t[wvJI -!iflWV "'"' sm:l.oytcrft<ill oe6[v][,w[ "]it 6flo'6"1J""' otOI "oil [flJ i
xa.t xcp iliv huxs :x.m V O't'tw[vJI OY)!-1.LW'tov nsp Wv 'tuxs. ' For there are

certain cases where the method by similarity is not always admissible; and we
make a proper empirical study of similarities, since it is wrong to make inferences about simply anything -on the basis of chance common properties '.
Later 2ll he rejects the Stoic claim that the existence of a similarity (e.g. that
in respect of mortality all men resemble men within our experience) can only
be affirmed in the conclusion of an argument if it is also stated among its
premises, and explains": XCX.'tr:t.Y't'l)crw OE. Ota 'tOO ! 'tWY cpcx.L vop.ivwv emAoyLcr!J-Lo[Ci
btl] 'tO xcx.l xa't' cx.lnO Oetv 'tY)v ) Op.oOnp:cx. Urc&pxstv. En:sl yap 'tOt j reap'
-l)fllY 6\;%p01tol "oDf"o [n]ap11t<te<l "o O"Ufl1t"Wfl<X, mnw f &twow n&crtv
&v%pw1tol "oilf"o 1te<pe<xo:l.ouif<Iv, em:l.oytcrfl<ill I cruvt&(wv 8n xe<l ""'""
'tOO'to j Ost '"CY)V 6p.ot6'tY)'t' dva.t. ' Through empirical assessment of phenomena
I shall reach the conclusion that similarity must exist also in this respect. For
since men in our experience possess this characteristic, I shall deem all men in

31

DAVID SEDLEY

211

lb. XXII 28 .ff.

general to hold it, by concluding through empirical reasoning that also in this
respect similarity must exist '.
In all three of these passages it is argued that an empirical assessment ( E.rt Ao
rcrp.6) of the similarities that exist within our experience shows us which of
them are universal, as opposed to fortuitous, and therefore constitute a basis
for inference about that which lies beyod our experience.
Further details of this process are revealed in XXIII 7 ff. First he states that
' the man who infers correctly will, insofar as things which lie beyond our
perception are different, allow them to be different ; nOr, insofar as they resemble
what we perceive, will he deny them this resemblance '. He then, in a badly
mutilated passage,212 takes the example of fire, and shows that within our ex
perience some characteristics of fire are invariable, whilst others are variable.
He concludes 213 by elaborating on his original principle: o&sv ""&' ll I [1-'s]v

"' XXIII 13 - XXIV ! .

213

XXIV 1-8.

li [,] w f'"'" ,a,, 7ta[p]G<UG<y0:, I """"Ad<i;s' 'WY 'f'G<LYOfdvwv /; 7tpooJxo""'

7tcWufLsvo, smAoy,crlfL6v, %["]' & os ,a,, "P"' 'b 'f'"'v6ifLEYov o'"'f'u),c<s'
xov6'tYj'ta, I Wv Chsp oUOE Y01]-&1)va nupO ! E.xov-ro:. Ucr'" Ecr'tt. Ouva-r6v.
' Therefore in respect of some characteristics the man who makes the correct
empirical. assessment will grant differences from what we perceive, but in respect
of others, without which the very nature of fire is inconceivable, he will maintain
the resemblance to what we perceive'.

2u

VIII 32 . JX 3; cf. ARRIGHETTI,

p. 138.

215
216

'EmA.

PHerc. 1003, 428 0, 513.

PHerc. 1056, 7 XIII, 8-11.

21
7 lb. 6-8: &"tJpe:Uev 'tY[v &:.pxi)" 'ltcd. xc.:tv6vo; xa;t Xf'H'trj'ptoil [[xctt]] xcc't [li] j.t'ltp6v.
21s

lb. 8-1 1 ; the text is my own, based on

an examination of the originaL

219

The next one and a half lines are badly

mutilated, and the slight traces which I have
read in the papyrus at any rate rule out
Diana's reconstruction (he also makes I. 11
much too long). But the general sense of
11. 11-14 would nevertheless appear to be
roughly as Diano indicates, namely that the
whole preceding investigation is itself founded
on these t1tLAoycrer;;: .
200

Contra

above.

Ep.

beat.

109lb = Us. 423, see

Here again it is clear that the role of E1n AoyLcrp.Oc; is to distinguish uni
versal from mere chance characteristics, since only the former provide a valid
basis for analogical inference. There may exist, outside our experience, fire
which is brighter than any known to us; for we learn empirically that fire
varies in brightness. But there cannot exist outside our experience fire which
does not burn ; for we know empirically that burning is a universal characte
ristic of fire, and cannot even conceive of fire which does not burn.
In one further passage of this work 214 this same role is probably assigned to

EntAoycr!-L6c;, but it does not -count .as evidence since the reading En[ Aoyt ]
cr&p.cvot, though plausible, cannot be guaranteed. Again in another passage
e

of Philodemus 215 the text is somewhat uncertain, but the implication seems to
be that the Epicurean school makes ntAoyat6 the basis of at any rate the
kind of analogical inference that argues from common properties, but possibly
not of all other kinds.
A passage which illustrates the importance of lntAoytcr!-'-6 in the Epicurean
theory of knowledge occurs in one of the unnumbered books of the licpf.
cpUcrcwc; .216 Epicurus is describing the factors which led human beings to build
up knowledge. After apparently enumerating the motives which caused men
'step by step to seek the starting-point and yardstick and criterion' 217, he
continues: 21' '"" '" 'E yO:p d, 'ov 1 E7t[,]Aoy<crfLOV ,oo >epnrwiou 'ljysv, I

xa(t s]x ['Jou xpm)ptou G<tna(tj EfLGtvl&&(vo"o s]mAoy[[crsJ,;. 'For these

led men to make an empirical calculation of the criterion, and from the criterion
met4ods of empirical calculation were themselves learnt '.219
The first point to clarify here is that while EntAoycrt.t4 denotes the activity
of mAoy[scr&a,. emAoy<cr'' denotes the faculty. The form smAoy'o' occurs
in IIspl 'f'UOEW' XXVIII, 13 VII 18 sup. where the context is uncertain, and
once in Plutarch,220 where it apparently denotes the activity rather than the

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

32

faculty. However, there is no reason to suppose that Plutarch, writing four

centuries after Epicurus, understood the nuance intended by the latter in using
the -crt<; termination. This leaves two further instances of bttA6ytcrt-;, both in
the writings of Epicurus himself. One is in the passage quoted above, the other
in Ilspt cpucrsw XXVIII, 13 VIII 13 sup. In both cases the close juxtaposition
of the forms in -p.O<; and -crt<; shows that a difference in meaning is intended,
and both contexts reveal unambiguously that while En:Aoytcr6<; means an act
of empirical reasoning, ntA6ytcrt<; j,.; a much more generalised term, suggesting
the ability to reason empirically.221 This distinction between -p,6<; and -crt<;
corresponds with the usage of Epicurus' own day, many examples of which are
listed by Mayser.222 Arrighetti's attempt 223 to explain En:tA6ytcrt<; as the name
of a different cognitive process is unnecessary and unsupported in Greek usage.
To return to our passage, I take it that what Epicurus means here by the
xpt'tf]pwv is something resembling the recognition that perceptions, npoA-I]tJlet<;
and feelings are the standard point of reference for all j udgments.224 The
discovery that this is so is an empirical one, presumably because belief in the
truthfulness of sense-impressions proves in practice more useful than distrust
of them. But only when we have learnt their reliability do we have .a firm basis
for making further empirical discoveries. Hence .arises the paradox in our passage
that the criterion is both the product and the star6ng-point of empirical reasoning.
The scanty fragments of PHerc. 1003 contain the remains of a work by Philo
demus dealing with the variouf: kinds of reasoning recognised by the Epicureans. Two passages in addition to that cited above 225 are of some interest. In
one 226 Philodemus states: o'iiletftSY "'" f'SY omJ.o[ycoftoO] I OSOfteYX E7t[L]AsAo
yco[fteYoc], " " as cruH[oyc]crftOO cr[uHs]iJ.oyccrftEYOL, In the other 227 he refers
to people who 1:&<; bnAopcr'tvx&<; aoiTost[<; E:Jxoucrtv, and appears to say,
or to quote someone as saying, that such people's knowledge does not include
certain kinds of concepts (the text is deficient here) but that it does include
the apprehensions of the sense-organs and the image-making thoughts of the
[mind] ' ("'"' fuv a1cr&'I"['I]P(wv av'L A<j;<[c, x]a[l] ""'' tpa:Yte<o'Lxa, q[,
<J;uxij'] I occcvocrsc,) . This close association of omJ.oyLcrfi6' with alcr&rJcr''
is found in another fragment of Philodemus: 228 acr&crt'ta 'tt<; EntAoytcr[J-Wt
"fuv] oYtwv .
One practical application of E:rctAoytcrp,O<;, as an aid to the orator, is mentioned
by Philodemus, who describes the good politician as making an empirical study
of ways of arousing various emotions: 229 ErnAeAoytcrJ.dlvov tbv Ckya&bv noA'"L il<ilY '"' l<LVSTY o[py]'ijv [7tstpu]lx6w ""' EASOY .. . ....
In all the preceding examples we have seen an entirely consistent technical use
of EntAoytcr-L6<; and cognate terms. I have found only one apparently non-technical
use in an Epicurean text. This occurs in a passage where Philodemus 230 quotes
Demetrius Lacon as listing five errors of the Stoics. Two of these errors 231 and
possibly a third 232 are said to take the form of failure to notice ('tO p,1) nt AeAo
ylcr&C<.t) certain facts about Stoic and Epicurean methods of inference. It may be
that if we could study the context in which Demetrius made these remarks we would
find that a deliberate joke was involved: not only do the Stoics not use
mAoycrp.6<; in their system of inference, but they do not even take into account

221 Cf. ARRIGHETTI, art. cit., p. 133.

222

I i 435-9; I iii 61-71: nouns in iJ-6<; are

' nomina actionis ', those in -atr;; ' Verbalab

strakta ' ; cf. also Epicurus' variation between

Tia:l.. iJ-6<;;, Ep. Hdt. 43, and n:riAcrt"1 ib. 50.

223 Art. cit., pp. 129-31.

"' Cf. D.L. X 3 1 ; KLI XXIV.

225

428 0, 5-13.

226
227

429 0, 4-7.
430 0, 6-12.

<

33

DAVID SEDLEY

22S

De dis III, fr. 48.3.

\
229

Rhet. I 65, 14-15.

'"" Sign. XXVIII !5 ff

"' lb. 15 ff., 37 ff.
M'

fb. 25 ff.

(EnAoyl'ea&cu in its nontechnical sense) certain points. Or it may be that it

had become so customary in the Epicurean school to accuse opponents of
failure to use E.nAoyLcrp.6 that Demetrius applied the slur a little indiscrimi
nately. Indeed, two philosophers who show the influence of Epicurus without
seeming to be fully-fledged members of the school
the author of the
pseudo.Platonic Axiochus, and Diogenianus - are guilty of this very same
inconsistency, frequently using E7nAoyC1;;"ecr{h:xt, yet treating it as a virtual
synonym for Aoyi(scril-"' Thus in Axiochus 365d and 369e, emAoyi(wil-"' and
&vemAoylcr-cw are superficial echoes of Epicurean terminology, yet the context
rules out any connotation of empiricism. Similarly Diogenianus233 retorts .to one
of Chrysippus' arguments for determinism: n:&:Atv oUv x&v'to:.O&o:. &au-t&:crstE H
-cXv&pWnou 'tO d&silip1J'tOY xcx.l d:ven:tA6ytcr-cov xo:.l -cwv Evo:.pystWY xo:.l 't1) -cWv
1oiwv Aoywv aV<XY,OAOUil-ioo,. Up to ev:xpysowv the words could have been lifted
straight out of a work by Epicurus; but the addition of the last six words,
implying as they do that logical inconsistencies can be detected by En:tAoytcrp.O,
is entirely unEpicurean.
These writers' judgment seems to be swayed by the general philosophical usage
of En:t Aoycrp.O;, as found for example in the writings of Plutarch and Sextus
Empiricus and defined by Galen. 234 It seems to denote any kind of direct and
uncontroversial deduction (by contrast with &vaAoytcrp.6), but with no empi
rical connotation.
I have argued 235 that two key terms, n:pOA"f/tP and En:tAoytcrJ-6, came to feature
prominently in Epicurus' .theory of knowledge only after about 300 B.C. Why
then do the doxographers record Epicurus' adoption of the former term/36 but
not of the latter ? The answer may be that .n:p6A1]r.!JL is easily recognisable as
a technical term, whereas the Epicurean usage of n:tAoycrp.6 is, as we have
seen, easily confused with the weaker meaning which the word carries outside
the school.
For the sake of completeness, I end up by listing all the further occurrences of
E.ntAoySecr{}o:.t and cognate forms which I have found in Epicurean texts, where
the surrounding text, as it stands, s either incomprehensible or too conjectural
to count as evidence
although I can see nothing in any of theffi to conflict
with the interpretation outlined above. In Epicurus, IIepl <pUcrw) PHerc. 1431,
6 I 3-4, the text gives oux a7te<V('a] emA[o]y,o&f'EYO,, but the context is lost.
Another passage of Epicurus (Ilspl qn\osw, PHerc 1056, 6 I 4 ff.) is cited as
evidence by Arrighetti.237 My own reading of the papyrus rules out both his
and Diano's reconstructions, but provides nthing -comprehensible in their place:
n&v-ca yap I olhw y' &.v &au:Wv xo:.]-cCG rc&v-ca :p6n:ov &vatcr!.&Y]'toOv:a

234 ARNIM II 269.

zas

236

In trod. 2 b.
Us. 255.

2S7

233

Art. cit., pp. 126-7.

Other passages where I have failed to

understand the context are Epicurus, llept
(f'Uoew XV fr. 2,2; IIept cpUoew.; PHerc.
1 191, fr. 2 N, l. 4 ; Philodernus, Sign. fr.
IV, 5 ; De i>a lii 9-II, IV ll-12; Rhet. I
168, 1-2, II 45, 1-4; Poem. II !r_ 48, 16;
PHac. 1003, 433 0, 13, 435 0, 7 ; Anon.,
PHere. 177, fr. I. Passages where the reading
enLAoy is itself conjectural I do not even
trouble to list

""'Yx"v(s]v

[>.]"-'< 'Oihwv emAOY'Of'OV I (o]u% ( ..... ]ovov AC<ELV I

oux W(o]7t<p (o]uv e7te<,oil-[cr]s(cr,]v I O')fJ-eOO[

'.

The same goes for Philo

demus, De dis I, XV 7-8, where my reading of the papyrus confirms ev &Uo[']'

Ent) Aoyw&ijcre.:at :[O]n:6L<; En:-c[Y/O]sto-cEpot, but makes little consecutive sense
of the surrounding text, while ruling out Diels' reconstruction. In col. XIII, l-2,
of the same work, Diels' text makes Philodemus say that animals act without
en:Aoytcrp.6, but the reading is too conjectural to carry weight.238

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

34

 3. The Edition.
(a) Table of Concordance.
For the terms used, see Introd. l c. The
references to Vogliano relate to his edition

of PHere. 1479/1417 in Scripta. Those to Ar-

marked N are included in the Naples apo-

righetti relate to his Epicuro, Opere ( 19732).

graphs. Those marked S are included in my

For each cornice I list, column by column, the

printed text. If my text uses two or more

surviving portions of both the upper and the

layers from a single column, the layers- are

lower parts of the scrolL Columns marked 0

named (a, b, c).

are included in the Oxford apographs. Those

I NF.

s up.

Cornice

frag.
l

col.
I

ARR.

II

Ill

IV

c
D

v
II

frag.

col.
I
II
5

2
II
lil
rv
v

Ill

3
Il
Ill
rv
v

[256] (p. 619)

VI
IV

[3!] [ ! ]
E

4
II

Ill
IV
v

G
H

Ill

O, S
S (a, b)

IV

O, S

I
II
III

[36] [8]
[36] [9]
[36] [10]
[36] [Ill
[36] [12]

VI

II
s up.

frag.

VOGLIANO

col.

35

DAVID SEDLEY

S (a, c)
S (a, b)

III
o. s

II

s
s

I
I
II

VI
v

II
Ill

O, N, S

1 I

O, N, S

1 II

IV

O, N, S

J ill

O, S

1 IV

VI

INF.

SUP.

Cornice

frag.

VII

VoGLIANo

col.

frag.

VoGLIANO

col.

I
II
III
IV
v

10
VIII

11

O,N, S (a, b)

N, S

fr. 2

O, N, S

3 I
3 II

II
III
IV

O,N, S

3 IV

IX

II
lii

13

s
s

12

X-XII

III
I
II
III

v
VI

I
II

0, 5

II
4 III

III

IV
v

IV
v

VI

VI

I
II sup.
III sup.
IV sup.

O, N, S

5 I sup.

0, 5

5 II sup.

O,N, S

5 III sup.

13

II inf.

N, S

III inf.
IV inf.

N, S

5 II in.

N, S

5 III inf.
5 IV in.

5 I inf.

O, N, S
O,N, S

5 IV sup.

V in.

N, S

VI sup.
VII sup.

5 V sup.

VI in.

N, S

5 V inf.

O, N, S

5 VI sup.

VII in.

N, S

5 VI in.

VIII sup.

O, N, S

5 VII sup.

IX sup.
X sup.

O, N, S

5 VIII sup.
5 IX sup.

VIII in.
IX in.
X inf.

N, S
N, S
N, S

5 VIII in!.

5 IX inf.

XI inf.

N, S

5 X inf.

V sup.

O, N, S

5 VII inf.

5 X sup.

XII sup.

O, N, S
O, N, S

5 XI sup.

XII inf.

N, S

5 XI in.

XIII sup.

O, N, S

5 XII sup.

Xlll in.

N, S

5 XII in.

XI sup.

(b) The System of Presentation.

The text printed here amalgamates my readings of the papyrus with those of

0 and N. The regular Leiden system of editorial signs is used, with two ad

ditions:
r "Y1

letters conjedurally altered by the editor (in the text this

only for alterations to the readings of the apographs in cases where the
itself can no longer be read ; but in the critical apparatus it is used
for cases where previous editors have chosen to alter a reading of the
itself).

"Y

paragraphus lost

in used
papyrus
equally
papyrus

the papyrus and apographs, and conjecturally

restored by the editor.

The following abbreviations are used: Arn.
H. von Arnim;Arr.
G. Arri
C. Baile y ; Co.
ghetti; Bai.
A. Cosattini; Fri.
K. von Fritz; Go.
T.
=

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

36

Gomperz; Ha.
Vogliano; Wil.

A.A. Long; Phi.

J. Hayter ; Lo.
U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff.
=

R. Philippson ; Vo.

A.

P
PHerc. 1479/1417; 0
Oxford Apographs of PHerc, 1479; N
Apographs of PHerc. 1479/1417.
=

Naples

Wherever some continuous sense seems discernible in the text, an English

translation is added.
In supplementing lacunae I have tried to err on the side of caution, largely as
a reaction against the extravagant textual restorations of Philippson and others.
In fr. 13 the argument can be followed fairly closely, and even in the lacunae
of several lines that occur in the central part of each column there is often a
reasonable chance of recovering the approximate sense. In order to avoid
marring the text with several gratuitous lines of my own Greek, I have adopted
the system of leaving such lacunae blank in the text, but of supplying what I
take to be the missing sense inside square brackets in the translation.
The critical apparatus accompanying the text omits those conjectures of previous
editors which are now ruled out on palaeographical grounds.

37

DAVID SEDLEY

5 '<ofcr[li aJXPWftelte< ['or;

Fr. 1 col. I
. . .

. .

J "f'" """ on rr;ii.y

crcv

oltev Iii;. 'b xoov[ovcxof'

,).,[ov xrpov &v[sAeAoyC

10 . . . . . co]O'[o F [1')1i ' o5"1l

.

"f'"lt", noA/.ooxoo [ FP'l'"'t .

e!') n ajvvoiii v , <il 1i[crjn ,6 " '

<-/jv !Uoov Hooov, &H[cl n1 vs.;

xa.-cb: 1:0U'tou (

'itO:.!.

. .. . .

cr]wp.rx:tvx.Ov xo:.l 'tO x.svbv e13

. . . . . . . ] [ 1')lt' OU'Ol, <il 6

.

. .

. . llAJ "" ij1i[') . . . . . .

. . . . . . 1 ecrnv ij t [ . . . . . . .

. . . .J on oo nspt A')[ttnx-lj

'<iiiV <hOftWY yviii(cr[ ecru

Fr. 3 col. V b
5 .

. . .

. . . . . . . ]v 6f1ot6'1]"cl nvoo . . . . hjspel nvoo Gl[1 tA')

f1e voo, !'v ']t ncrt q>Myyot
. . . . . . . . .

][1"[ .

. rr;p]ocr'lyopeuf1evov [[o]] 'ilit

hsp6v

. , , , ,

til[1tA')[1EYOY o' (vo)[10:

. ..
.

. . . .

. ]too'<[. .

. ]'/ &voo[ . . . . . . . .
.

. . . . . . . ] tilf1tA1](f'eYOV . . .

. . . . . . . . ]" &eta[ v n ]v o,

. . . . . . <]&:, 6f1ot6<['1""'

. . . . . . . . ]to:t '"'U'1]Y '-/jv

5 .

o:!j,[o;y emJ.eyof'EY . nclv-

. . . . .

.J ht 10 oo[.

. .

. .

. . . . . . . .Jn[. ]t < v[ . . . . . . ,
Fr. 5 col. I

entA8yO!J-SY.

3 'f'IZY'<IZ<J'<"tiii e1te0 ( . . . . .
Fr. H col. I

f'eY 000' urr;apxaV'<O [ . . . .

9 .Joocrtv o[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.,a,

. . . .

Jnxiii vocr0t [ . . .
.

. . . . . N. eJn evcwv [ . . . . . .
. . . . . ]o. l[crjw; ouv ijo')

npost A['If'f'Ov"' . . . . . .

rr;[ o ]'<s ""'"- '<[ . . . . . . . . .

y[ .]v aHou[ . . . . . . . . . . .
.

. . . . . . . . ot ]e<q>opO.v &no

5 emft"P"[u]pcrst[ . . . . . . .

'<uyx & vs[t] wy y[ . . . . . . """'1-

'"U'') '<ii o)u'<W 00 'f'OO Y

10 '""""ii'l ooe'l' oo 'f'"v'tO:.O'tVXW]

IJs[ . ] no's [ . . . . . . . . . . . &v.

5 .

a_ V xa.:t0: 'toU-cw( V

. . . . . . . ]s[ !Jnerv x[ . . . . . ]u[,

l U1<stf1EVOY [ . . . . . . . . . .

3-4 {vooU] ' fHY Arr.

Fr. H col. I c
5 VOV 'tOU'tl

7 SpJltium post o-;;

'XO:.'t[ , .

, , , fu.

fttA1][10vO[v . . . . . . . . . .
.]'lv e!x[. . . . . . . ; . . . .
.

Fr. 5 col. III

1 xoucrt '<OU'<O em[. . . . .

2 '<OV . s[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

.xno. Ae<f1cl[ voucrt . . . . .

2 spatium post suatv.

. . .

. . . . . . . . . .Ju[ . . . . . . . .

. ]ov'<[ . . . . . . . .

'

1 . BUE
' V . 'tO'tE

. . . . . . . . '-/j jv '"P"X-/j v
. . . . . . . . . . ]tv[. . . . J &f1"
. .

. . . .

yopoO ft"f' npo[ .. . . . . . . .

Fr. 4, col. IV

..

. . . . . . . . . .]' E v '<Ot

. . . ]'o 1i-lj s['i ] n ltoou

. . . . . . . ] npoioucr'l "ii

2 spatium post

. . . . . . JouAOf1s[Scl cr]ot As

.dl

9 ..

Fr. F col. I

Fr. D col. I c
4

Fr. H col. II b

. ]; lteWp 1] f'[" . . . . .E f' nept

Fr. H col. II

Fr. E col. I
8

""

[ . . . . ]vo"" !crx[upw

oo" !crxupiii 1iso[Cxo:f1<Y

.

'-iJf' mxpo:Hooy[-ljv xoolt' l)v

Aj')m"<iii[ t] '[p6nwt '<-/jv <poov-

7 . Jot "" yO.p o<[t . . . . . . .

.

5 '<e<cr[oov oo[. . . . . . . . . . . .
.

. . . . , ].,.,oucroo <il[e . . . . .

IZY')1<[ . .

5 <10f'eV en( . . . jiJe [ . . Jo o(. .

.

. . .

. .

. . .

vov st .[ . . . . .
.

. .
. .

. . . . .

CRONACHE ERCOLAN E S I

38

il <e v[. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
no[.] il ' oux [ .
10 -coO-co [ .
.

]-cov[.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . hf'" iU-

. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] P fL"f/
v i-x c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ],;

. . . . . . . .

Fr. 5 col. II

11 spatium post Y!-Lct

. .

. . . . . . .

]ccrfLOY
Fr. 5 col. IV

]o,; -cs il6o:v

. . . . .

3 ucr-c[ spov . . . . . . . . . . . .

. ]ch6[fL]w[v . . . ] nspl

. . . .

. .

A D\ . . . . . . . . . . . . . ] XPW fL E

. , .

. . . . . . .

]po0fLEY [

-col(,; <lvj<tXEGf'EV[oc,; . .

j 'f'O:V-

5 -co:o<ex]ol,; yysy6[cr]c d

5 OCGfLEV ( j aAAit xa[ . . . . .

]ov oux EAO:fLC<

"'' -cij,; a[']crll->)crsw[,; . . . .

. . .

. . . . . .

<i.A]A' e[crj-cov -coooO-co en[. .

. . . .

. .

'"iJ v ""'-IJ fL [ 'P]ucrc v s[.

. . . . .

craw,; E'f'Oe<fL[ sv . . . . . .

. .

d:fLeAEG n( -c[ _ . . . . . . . aA-

<exwc] -cp6[n]wc ilco:vo[>)cr]swv

Aa [nclcr]e<,; -cO\,; e<.[ .

. . .

. . . . . . . . . . . ]au-ca[ ]a 'v'

'f'&crxzcv e!ve<[c . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . .

]sx. [

. .

]xe<

posto

5 ev 0 : sottoposto

pasta.

11

[cpu]on<.DY

2 -cwv 0:. sotto

'II

il6Yf1" fL[ . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .

. . .

]c[.]acr[ . . . . . ] . c

. . . . . .

. .

. .

,jp( j 'f'<XV"iG

. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]sp ay yc
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]o h -coO
. . . . . .

. . . .

. .]u[. Jc4.]ooo

DAVID SEDLEY

. .

cb,; [ . . . . ]u-co n[ . . . . . . . . .

cr

(ante 1:tiOa) 0 : sottoposto

tyotO 0 : sovrapposto erat super ot'l')&'l]V

wpetvOw; 0 : sovrapposto erat, cuius par

. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]e< l)fL nAV

. . .;

. . .

tern sustuli

. . .

nvt Ucr't[epov . . . . . . . .

. . .

0 : sotta.

18

. . . . . . . . . .

e'"pov ""'[ .

e!( Ve<c j "tWV d"t[ _ . . . . . . .

.
.

Fr. 5 coL III b

1 -cs,; am[ .

ilolJ-(i:jv ou 'f'C<Y"t( C<O<LXOV

12 e1-1 m.[pt]A'Yj-

Co.

1 5 "tO[_ . . . . . . ] OVOfL(o: . . . . . .

[eac Arr. e[mp<]A[swv 1] Co.

39

. . . . rp]ucrcxoy xo:pccx-cijpcc
.
. .
. . . . ]-cov -cwv E fL nsp[c]A [n-

1 Atrxv8toc't 0: sottoposto

10

. .

mfmo['s n]ocY]ll-ijv[o:c . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]w,;

1 0 o<,; ucr"tEpov [iiAI.]Y][,; <evo,; 'f'O

]o:c n[ cl v]twv -cwv

. . .

15

sr v"' '[ . . . ] ,&ils o:u[-cd\ 11Y]il<-

]'I v ""'"' -coO

] OUX [).]cffLC<YOY [ . .

10

Fr. 6 col. I

l VWfL fL elJ-' 07to[ _ . . . . . . ; 7tp0:

Y [fL ] cl-cwfL rp [ . . . . . . . . . . . .

-cw OfL'f'"'v[6]v[-cw]v en( -cij[,;

OfL\j,; 7tapl ilco:Mcrzw,; 1.6. .
.
.
5 y[ou],; YU fL VC<
o:,; . ou["tw y]itp

[Ji

For it was so necessary

to point

dv yxatov i]v 'WU"Co i u1:o(

out

evil[xvu[cr]ll-o:c "to il-l) lh[c] A-

those who Epeak the same language

that

we,

by

observing

that

nove ['o]u 6f10'f'wvou[G 1if1TV

as us were, in contrast to our own

o[v]"'*] d:[vjnxe'fl[ljv[w]G alG 1)

use of words, assigning some un-.

1 0 fie[') 'f'WWT<; XP[Wf']e[&aj <J;su

oi[<; n &A]1-o un[oJx"ona[<;

suspected false connotation in addition

to those meanings . . . . . . . . . .

d:vun]o1n6[v '"] e[n]' ext( vet,]<; et[T<;

e[vvoj[a[,]<; , d:Ha fllvo[vNe
npo[<; a]tlou<; . . ecr[. . oeoo-

1 5 &:a&et, 'I) a,a, 'b n[ . . . . .

wv xet'["'f'"']nxov [ . . . . . .
f10'[1.]1-ov enn[ . . . . . . . . . .
.

fle&et y ap [ .

. . . . . . . . .

. .

Fr. 8 col. II
1 .

. . . .

] 6oe n b ""P'[

. . . . . ] el vet' xe<l flY) sv o!ov

"ilv ['"] &v,o:iJ&o: f'n[&:&e
a' xo:[l] ou OOYf16:""f1 'f'O: Y -

5 -cacrn>tfuv, 'tfu[L j-!lY'to ot'J

-=pav-cacr'txwv xed OoywX4

oU t Phi. 6 xa.i. <Aoyvxfuv > Vo. 7 spa-

tium post 'tWV

10 post rpa.v-t[
4-6 litteras
spatium tenebat.
11 &[va]ywyO: Bai. &[na}ywyO: Vo.

'tWv. oU 1-11Jv &AA' hep& y' IJ.. v

Nevertheless, it is clear that they would

nvo: 01)Aov6n EL"IJ' hivo,[<;

.
ec f'1i &yw npo1)vev[xo: xo:l

have additional ones, had I not cited

10 en' &H' lh[Jo: & 'f'"Y[o:a,&:

ocev '"' d:[vo:]ywyi<G [ . . . .
. jMo:[ . .
.

. . . .

. . . . .

appeals which they made ro other

opinions which they asso(ciated with
images . . . .

Fr. 8 col. III

2 spatium post xev6v.
19 post
vestigia 0, N: sottoposto

v&e alia

1 xevbfl f11JOSV f)"ov elvo:i

y n 'flOW!-L8Y xev6v . 'toO
[o ou]v o1) 'f''l [f''
y[oucr]'v [.]x[

Jou 1J f1[I]v Ai

] ,oo&' eup&"1) o[u

5 '[o,]ou,ov o[v o!]ov IOoaoflEV ev[. . . . . . . . ] OU 'f'G<V,G< . . . . . .

. .

]' d:H' en' ootl-

'oo [ . . . . . . . . ]"'"' ,o.[

y[ . . . . . . . . . ]o <; npo[ . . . . .

CRONACHE ERCOLANES!

40

10

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

]a np[ .

. ]<n[ . . . . . .
.

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . e] hope< e
. . . . . . . . . . ov]<w <'ii xe<. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]1h

15

. .

. ]'1 OEOfLOYYj
.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]l t'ij npo
. . . . . . . . . . . J ' f . Jo f . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . lYflf
.

. . . . . . . . . ]v lre[

. .

. . .

. . . . . .

Fr. 8 col. IV
l

] cpUcrtc; Ev-caU-&a xo::t &

. . . . . the nature [ of void is] here,

j8

t-ljvj oo[e<v tj-ljv [e<tnouj toO np&

2 'tl7v] OO(;[a:v 't}'l7v Co.

7 Vo.;

AB(;[sovi'J Vo.

6 Ex]bcn 't[ettJ
N: aut sotto

w;

according to the opinion of the first

posto

aut sovrapposto

't:OY oio11]vou xo:.l &p.o:.. xed no-

man to think of void in terms of

9-10 o:U![-coiJ 1:]0 []u;uov ijxp[wcro:v

'til xo:.l] Ev-cao&a 't O xev6v

immediacy and time and place. Con

Vo
Vo.

oU-

5 <W o]uv xe<l <[o]u<o [v]oeT<al

sequently

void

too

is

given

this

ev exj[Ye<l <e<[l] H[ecr lY] il E Y

meaning in those expressions which

<&l] 7t epl [<&fl] np&[<oy] Y'YY W.

.
crx]ov<w[ v au ]tou yeyp&<jle<-

we have written in our work concerning the men who first had knowledge

fleY . el]te< o' &vo;Ae<OV% d>-

of them. We subsequently

1 0 &l t]b [HArov i}otpl[wcre<f!EY

. . .

8 crx]6nw['>' aO]-coO.;;

resumed

that book and made a study of . . . .

. ]c<cre<[ . . ]elcr[ . . . ]c<<e

.

]fL<[ . ] ""'' fL<XXpo[<ep]w ilv

Aoy[ . . . . Jcr[. .Joq te&e< [

.

. .

]'[ .
.

na:v[ ] ylyv[. . . ]crOlf!e[.J "tlto

15 enl[ . . . . . . . . . . . . ]x"[ . . ]ou

.]'Jl[

. . . .

. . .

]o[ . . . . . . . . ]v

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]wv
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]OYj

Fr. 8 col. V
[otlx eon 7tOl1jcrM noU&v]
l ""' ne<no[[jw[v] oVOfLcl<Wf'
.
.
.

fL<<a:lr[cr]<[,]

aHy" y ap [-

anv 1:il>[v cr]Uv 'to:.Tc; ala&aea v

41

2 f.LS't"OC&so.;; Ha.
3 fu[v
6 p[6nov] Co.
7 olhw
'tc:tfh:a Ha., oliv 't:Cd)'t"o: Co., oU[wo;:; a]ln&
Lo., oU ['tot]aiha Vo., 8 8[n]tA[oy] tcrJ.1[o]U
1 no:nowv Ha.

DAVID SEDLEY

It is not possible to alter many diffe

rent kinds of names. It is possible
to alter a few of those which entail per
ception - the ones which we previ-

Arr., fu]t

Vo.

Vo. 9 ffi[v 8[1 Vo.

12 x[a-e]axa[A]Ur.J.Ist
15 vao
Yo.
13 [o]vo[a p]< Vo.
(post noAAol[) 0; sottoposto

& np6,epov [ 0]5""'' o[ t ]o[p ( j t;ov

ously defined in the non-image-making

a[

.) te xat!X tbv .o U cpavtacrt-

manner, but which we altered when

Yf1[

x[o ]v "P[ 6no11] f1<" ' &rf 11<&t<

by some act of empirical reasoning

auvt06v'te oU [tota]U,;a Ex

we saw that they were not of this

"vo; ontA[oy]tcrf1[o]u

"" [11

n).ercr""'

"" ile

ne]pt[A]>pnt-

10 xiiit "p6nwt [<]'-[yxo]f1hwv &v

. . .

]1'-'J [.]v[

kind. But as for the majority of names

pov 1j oVof1[a; . . . . . ]a 11

g,.

""'"[t&e]f1<[vot . . . . . . . ]stv
" '").[ . .

f1EVou[ . .
.

y at p "[ .

. .

. .

. .

. . .

. . . . . . . . . .

. .

. ]"t[ ]na; v"'[

.

]v[

].,[

111 np aw[ .

. .

] &crnep [ . . ]uvet

n]P"YI'-"'""iii v

"Jill'- nep[ ( A'J tjl ]t f1 7t[,

"* 06 1;') [ "]1) .[
.
.

. .

. .

&e]wpw[chw]v ovil(l;et ""''

<-

. . . .

. . .

]"' 8&[ev

. . . . .

1j x[ t<')t<xt<[ ).jotjlet 6xA[er]

1 5 o1 no Hot [ . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

. .

] mt

. . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . ]x[ . . ] a &"' """[

by a conceptual process . . . , . . . .
.

]w; scr[

Fr. lO col. I a

which might have been found false

.

. . . . .

. . . . .

10 .]. "or; " P"Y[. . . . . . . . . .

. . ]"[ . . ]cre 7tsp[t "" ""1'1 ["'] "1l

d; "ou'o Ef1[]a;Uoucr')

. . .

ono).-ljtjlew;. ov,wv o' obv

Fr. 8 col. VI

'
.
'
[ , .l 'tOU'tWV
'tOtOU'tWV
OlOV

1 ""' ""'' 11'lL . . . . . . . . . . .

rpepm .[ .

1 5 ""'' "' "TJV [o:!p]ecrtf1 7t[pM]6v

. . . . . . . . . . . .

""'v et x[ .]"( ]w ""'' <[ . . . . .

.

f1lpo; [.].[, . . ; . . . . M'J"P6owpe [ .

. . . . . . . .

5 "WY "iii( V

YU y/.tp [ .

. "oo-

. . . . . . . . . . .

m:f

"1l[] ono;ywy1)[] ycyv[ecr]&w

"1l np"Y fl""[ tx]1) [. . , . ]m

. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. O" "L . . . . . . . . . . . .
E
.]av""[ .

]V ') [

. . . . .

, jil t

5 ev {post &cr7t:.p)_ 0, N : sottoposto

. . . . . . . . . . .

n[t]f1EVetV [ .

. . . . . . . . . .

7 &e)w

P"')P,[cb;w]v Vo.
13 spatium post UnoA1jo/eto

15 [a;p]ecrtl.1: &EoTY Co., [ox]Satp. Vo. n[prx]

-.6v[.&wv : np&J-cov 'tffiV Co.

16 st[6],[wv] Vo.

Fr. 9 col. I a
12 a;thor; 6v611acrt XPWf1SVo[ t

16 0.7to,s]""'Yf1[vo.

Fr. 9 I b

]'JY "iii v [

4 ') V[ . . . . . ] Mao[ . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
5 netv,[o]ila7tiii[ v
.
.

&]vetq>til[ V ')crt v

. . .

. .

v a;v"6"'J'""'[. . . . . . . . . &7toAlnone; [

Fr. 10 col. I b

. . . . . . . . .

<-

1'1 !1[
Hoc fragmentum ex apographo 0 legi:

v.

In trod. 1 e.

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

42

Fr. l l col. I

Fr. l l coL IV

1 e<[lcr&jcrEWV oeuaspXtrX 1]
. .

. ].(.]EfL( .

]o1a Ov an( 0

p]fL ""' vsv[61]xe i)] xat[e<]xo:

J.u<jlscro . aoa[crtov yap aYj

5 ex t(&]fL 'fG<<VOfLEVWV (iine<-

l cruUoyo\;6fLs&a oufL[

one should rely on] sharpness of per

ception [ in order to c}:leck notions] of

XEO ttOV ( : . . . . ]fLU&o(-

the kind which one conceives with dif-

1] e<utoo [to ol1J J.syo11s-

ficulty or obscurity. For it is fron'l

what is plain for all men to see that

5 to t(o]y X"P""'[']iiP" ""[l <1

opinions can be formed about that

&v to AG<V&olv["'l'] ainoi[

B&sv xG<ta tov tow[O]toy tpo

which awaits an analogically-reasoned

to evavn[o]Aoywv, wcrnsp

rcov to 'P "'v[ofLsvov

proof. Hence it is in such a way that

cr<V av(&jpWnOO tO a1JA(W&1]00fLeVOV <iVG<AoytcrfLe<t(f] e(cr]"'v.

10 tnt twv e<u[twv

tnt t[ .

. . .

. . . . .

ooG<[ .

. . . . . .

. . .

. . . .

] " '

xcxl bd toO err( . . . . I!]Asyov

hivo o f. . . . . li ]Hw; ou
.

the perceptible . . . . . . . . . . .

1 0 ou[ ).

. . . .

t[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

cr&"' t"Y] [ .

A<X O

. . . . . . . . .

6 vov Vo: sottoposto.

(..............

olAJ.wv (toO n]spl tWV oux e

"'fL"ptupcrEWV XG<(lj ,iy"'-

...

In your search for verbal] individua

y(J. 't&v Ovo&-cwv cU

M aoa til autij ).eEw,

cr&crSO n).,Zy1]Y t&fL noA1 0 J.w]v &rco[cr]"'lfL"tvwv, ou fLO
v[ov] t-ljv <v[vocG<v

. . . . . .

" tij evt[s]u[sw . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

cr &na. ooa J.oy[ou

fL1]IJ J.es o[

lity you were in conflict [ as much]

by including nothing about lack of

11 Sv[votocv Phi.

12

SnsU[tHtl" Vo.

DAVID SEDLEY

. . . . . .

of counter-evidence. You fixed some of

Fr. K col. I
9

. .

. . .

] I.e[ e'

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

]cxH[. . . . . . . . .

your vocabulary directly with the same

toI) 'f"( o jVOfLEVOO croqJOO

language, also representing the error

""' fLYJ [cro]epoO. EfLOOyE o-1)

of most men with regard to what they

actually perceive . . . . . . . . . .

5 ooxs]I XG<t nolAG<O xat vOv (

. . .] exm til(] J.i yeo (.Jpou(.

. . . . ><G<]te<voei Bto vO v [. .
. . . .

] " v fLEl t[a] A <[eo

. . . . . . . . ] of
5 spatium post 1Jcrswv

. . . .

with the wise man as with the unwise,

confirmatory evidence and the presence

ne<p[

8 e : aut cr ; proximam

Fr. ll col. VI

1 1awtno two ooepwo ""t fLY!

ooepwo oos[epw]vs, ouiJfL nG<ps[fL

'tt

litteram n legi, sub Tj (sovrapposto) quae

in apographa N apparet.

Fr. ll col. II

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 spatium post vov

5 [&n:a;]low Vo

43

. .

.. . . . .

6 spatium post cpou

Fr. K col. II
j spatium ante xaL

9 .

. . . . .

. .] '["]O m [ . . . . .
.

<11jft]e<(YOftY '" " [ . . . .

. .

'"'] dcrilcr"' xe<l '-!)v [ . . . .

. Jw[. '>j]o il w vo (e<c emA--

5 n. .

. .

. .

. . .

] . xe<l ou ft6-

vov . . . . . . . ] ooe<rpopi<' o[. .

Fr. 12 col. II
15 litterae '1!1!.1 super
a correctore scriptae sunt; cf. Introd.

10 spatium post -coov

wt

1 .

. . .

. .
.

. . . . .

. ] cru liAe. .

ye, . . . . . . . . . . ,],e[ . ]'1jY

1 i

. . . . . . . . . . .

en]oo[Aj-!)v

'[ . . . . . . . . . ]vwo ""'" '-IJY

5 iloil[e<]cr[xe<A(je< v wo XOftESe< btl
'[or, . . . . . . J e<1cril1j'O'' 16(o[ o . . . . . ] n).&;v'lj' il[1j Aj oilv'[ E, . . . . . . . . 'jo &.'{JC<YE'
, , , a[ . . , . . . , . J Y E.7t CW't'Y)
.

&.U' e[,u xo f' ]y ye o oile [x]e<

xw, E7t[OYY01j1<]0'' '-/jY 00.
.
o[e<cr]xe<A[(e<v . . . . Joy yi<p v [ . . ]ep
.

np[o]rpe<voilcre< [ . . . . . . . . .
.

15

J ' 1j ft ft'[

]oo,[ . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fr. 12 col. III

3 ['a]u'o Vo.
l l [O&<]Ioou> Go. 12-15
atrce, -cwuv, U'tct1 v in versuum finibus 0:
sottoposti

17

(post Be ) 0 : sottoposto

l vao enl nAdw cru[vjoo[><C]oilv

ilH e<O,ol OUAOft<[ile<j. d oe
'0"0 ['e<]U'O " OOC<Y[ojoUftE

YOO EAEYOftY ""'" ['j-/jv [ejx5 xsq.L[YYJY E:pp.Y)vtav 'tliH

lho 7tii'.crcx; 1j &ft[e<]p<(cx; ecr,lv
'tWv &v-&pWnwv oOOEv hs
pov xoucre< crx\Jf'" f) '" enl
'Glft npoA<j;Ewv yoyv[o-

If in those days we used to express

an opinion equivalent, in the termino
logy which we then employed, to sayin
that all human error is exclusively of
the form that arises in relation to
preconceptions and appearances because
of the manifold conventions of language, and .

.. .
.

_._ .

. .

CRONACHE ERCOLANES!

44

10 f'<Vov ;w.l 'fill' cpat v[of']evwv

cpeu yeo, '"f' [ i ov 6no] '[fill'

1!<0: 'OU 1tOAu,po1tOU e( %t-

noAAWV d!.Y)(f'f'OYOV . . .

Of'OU ,fijy AEswv, Ml r . . .

o< "' '"u['"' . .

. ]Of'EY o(tjil: *']Om oso i (X"f'EV

. . . . . . . . ]npoA<J;wt [
15 ..

. .

1 crocpou [ .

. .

5 ps. clHil: f'cX Ma 'fill' f'OV

""' noHctl '[ . . . . . . . . .

] cl H' & youo[t

xa%' gxao[cr]'" oox ii[1 cpcrat

. .

cl]o

5 AW' nsAEAcrf'[E]%oo '"'"'" '

'11 061) xal '[ 0; E v ]em("' -/]['LV a!J,ot, A( ct ]Of'S V,

wonsp [x]d iHAot n[o]Hol Ef'
noUor[,], Ef'EfLV-/][1E%e<
10 f'Ev, oo[U]v oe oooe ["o] cl vo.[y

l'[' ']6's ys cruHoytcrf'6v, e-

Aou' f'<i slvc<O [n6J,spao 15-

'O' " [w,J J.<ys,,, M'J'p6o[w-

1 x emf'"P'u[p]crEt yiy[vov-

En:e:1nnt[ . . . . Jou'tor; 'toU-

. .

xo.tov [ ],ou ex[

. . .

ov[. ]m[ . . . . . . <J; ]suost[

. . . . . .

[oo-]

..

1 ' "'[ . . . . . . . . . . . . ][' o[ . . .

Fr. 12 col. V

ao[

. . .

. . . .

Fr. 13 col. I I sup.

. . . . . . ,jEt OUOC<( . . . . . . .
o>J'L . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

] miv post n[ . . . . .

. . . ]ovoE[ . . Jo:o[

. . . .

. . .

cp' iln Ecr"l) f']a[(jvof'Ev n, Eli5Evat

. . . . . that it is unclear whether we

completely forgot this opinion and took
the standpoint opposed to ourselves, as

. . . . . . .

10 . . . .
.

E]v6er; 1:6-ce:

].cr[.]:0 %[ . .], slvat

. .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]wcrau,w[,

many others have also done in many

. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]wv & V'[ . .

cases, or remembered it but. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . Jot[ . . Jon

. . . . . . . . . . ] '<x[.;] AEet<;
15 . . .
.

. . . . .

. .

N. Jav XPW-

. . . . . , . . . . . , . . ]Wf'EVW(t

]sv[ . . .

5 spatium post ps

Fr. 12 col. VI
1

..

. ']i%1)' '" naopo.%stvo.t '"

.

1: ]aU 1:p6n:ou 'toU n:z.pl

'"'' oux] b"f'"P'" Pcr

xed &.vn ]f'"P'upcre< nw,
5 .

. . . . . .

. . . .

] f'<XVMVE<V o( . .ju

Eva]v1:wr; n:epl :oU

. . . . . . . npo]crooai;ov. . . . . . . . . .Jte: xed I.jJa[ ve:'"" . . . . . . . ]wv oos!.[<Jyou

10 .

. . . . . .

. . Jopcha, ecpsps

Fr. L col. V
5

45

. .

]'o[. . . . . . . ]x,a[ . . . . .

DAVID SEDLEY

7-8

c1t Vo.

a.[cp"

50'fJfl] {t:Jvop,b : AatJ.-

Bci;]vo!J.Sv Vo. n:spJo:f)voJ-18Y Lo.

Fr. 13 col. I I inf.

" L

. . . . . . . . . . .

[ .
.

. .

. .

. . .

. .

. . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

. . .

. . .

. . . . . . . .

. . .

. . . . . .

[..

..

10 L. . .
.

. . . . . .

. . .

......

. .

....

..
. .

...]

. . .

. ]

. . . . . . . .

. ]

..

..

. . . . . . . . .

..

. . .

. . .

.]

.. ]
.

. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . ]W['EV '"L' ( .
.

. . . . ,

, . . )p.lf'tWV

&ttct-

. . . . . . . . ] 1iS 1<[d ii]vw "1i

. . . . . and you also used in those days

"'vul]v Wtcrfi[Glv cru]votxw;,-

to assign [names] without adapting

5 creW e]mcpopw[v "6"s ""luxe,

certain conventional usages, in order

f'-1)] o1jAOf' 7tOtWt'l) "b mxv

that you should not make plain the

"" '1'&6yyov b-;t'J'Epo'"o:

principle that by assigning any name

oo&l;eov ,6os "' xo:[l] "-lj v

one expresses a particular opinion, and

1 ""'v ovofi&"[w]v xa[l 7t]po:w&-

minate

Fr. 13 col. III sup.

1 "w[v <i] ot[aA]'I)tjica[v 6p]6lfL

2 spatium post oci.H'Y)"

5 't[ffil} a[Y) Vo.

6 e[A'tto]v' etva: Vo.

7tep[tv]o<ilt'l) . 1<<i[yw] o ' eAe-

A8ye]v Phi.
9-10 nctl[mv : n<i1[Av Vo.
&ns]8l-x.v6ou Co., Phi.

10 Bvs]l.lvx.vUou :

see and

reflect upon the. indiscri

treatment

of

words

and

too

to

notice

that

objects.
And

used

you did not establish a difference

7t0V o["]' oc 7tOLljcra OL'l'J'O

between two sets of wOrds and then

pa ,&[o]e f) ,&oe elva' ).oystv

say that you chose one set because it

5 ,&oe ('J']1j a(pefcr&o:L "(6JLj o(-lj

was better than choosing the other;

e).[,[o]v elvaL '!) "xoe

,X).).' o

instead, by saying that it was possible

VOf'acrtv ol olj7to"e XPW

to use any name at all in speaking of

f'<[v]ov ol6v "" 'J'[f;]cra [o]!vaL

things, you demonstrated to everyone,

Ayet]v "" "P&Yf''""'"' 7t&-

both to us and to those who have a

1 0 OtV EVOjOt%VUOU ">jfitV "< "Ot

share of wisdom, merely ,that it is more

"" crocp[e<] f'""""X'IJ"Ocrt f'

suitable . . . . . . . . . .

fLOvov o"' ol]xet6<ep6v eo"[']

y . [. . . . . . . . . ]oL[. . . . . . .
.

"'[

. . . .

..

. . . . . . .

)'I)V

15 ile[ . . . . . . . ) "6oe "[' ).jeye[t

,X).[

]a,o[
.

. .

]"'ov
.

""[ . . . . . . . . . . ]""'' e v "otlFr. 13 col. III in.

[....................l
[....................l
[....................l
[ . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .l
[ ....................l
[....................l
10 L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
[ ....... .......... ... l
. . .

. . . . . . . .

]e 'b "X>i f''"

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

46

. . .

;] & v x A oy top.oO '00

1 spatium post

. . ]w:[ . . )TI[ . . . ]><e< "P"".

. . . . . . . what] you were doing .in .those

5 ] t6o, vu[v] ouvopiii t6

days I now see, although I did not at

0 ' oU

xed 'tO& Xlxt&; v.Epo<; 0

the time. And I also now see, although

7tEO'!-!OU<; 'toO Op{hO<; ttx.acrta

I did not at the time, the particular

A iy ea &cu 7t c pl 'toCh;o 'tO e!Oo<;

difficulties, with regard to this class,

l v U v cruvopW 'tOte 0' oU . xa.l

oU .

of using the correct names for indi.

vidual things. And nothing would be

Fr. 13 col. IV sup.

1 oiJ 'cru.crtrx('l}

&.v

consistent with them < . . . . . . . . . . . . .,

n

rtpb<; aU't&:

<

>

which

instead

of

ignoring

>

or

doubting it, I now think I see vividly.

'I) lhe<7topf)oe<t 7totx(Au> vilv

For, as I have said, a person would

e m AiTiw, fi> eycl"f'"' e1to[l

be correct to make the same choices

xal 'tO Aey6[.1EY6p.

1tou,

{ Op &W<;

5 <C<L e<[Jte<t ctf picro[crt] [ iil]f' rpw-

of vocabulary in the exposition of

philosophy, provided

that we could

vW[v] xo:'t&; 't'l)Y OtO(o:.JcrxaA!av

count on his seeing that these are classes

XP-cra.t-c6 't &v, Stnep 'ta.\}tcx.

resulting from the same distinguishing

>l f'If' Ae7tot ex o[u oo]lnoO fyl [<

characteristic, in order that he should

loioo e[t]li'], p.Y) noJ.u ""P'JA[Aa-

avoid the pitfalls of major qualitative

1 0 y p.e V ctt [] rpuooot 7tept[7t]ecrot. [1:0

changes. The fact that there was no

o' on ou """ ta np[&]yf'""

Y)]Ai[yxsJo o1 7toAu ""P'JAh

yp.ivctt <pucrocr]tv [
. .

15

. . . . . . . .

] &v[ctA6y ]wp.[ct ya]p >)p.et

Jet """ ou[] rp[%6]yy[ou

.
]u[
.

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . ] >tct[ .
. .

. . . .

Fr. 13 col. IV inf.

[. .
.

. . . .

... ...
.

. . . . .

.l

[....................l
[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . l
[.................... l
[.................... l
[

. . . . .

. .

..

10 [ . . . . . . . .
.

.l

. . .

..

. .

. . . . .

..

. . .

[....................]

47

DAVID SEDLEY

factu8.1 refutation of someone who

[ was ensnared] by major qualitative
changes . . . . . .

3 spatium post yWq.tat 4 [Op&Wo;; : [v On

Wil.. [crxfi!-Lo: Lo. 6 v (ante o;) 0, N :
sovrapposto
8 ry' : vestigium incertum

( o ?) 0 ; P, N
vacant.
10 spatium post ncpt[n]Eaot 0; P.
N vacant; -cO Ha.

crov[ .

]o:.[

. . . . . . . . . .

]o[. . .

] 6n6

. . . . .
.

['ot,;

o:u [']ot[,;] 'P[6no ',; '&]f' nsp'-

1 spatium post -co

5 7t?t't6Y't[wv] -co[Lrt]ot<;, 7t7tst-

. . . . I am., convinced that I see them

"f'"' o'o:Aens' v &,; oi1j p 00-

clearly in the way in which we used

p.sv, ell<; cro[!. Evo]dto, xo:.l oO xo:-

to distinguish them, as you took the

&&:nep 'tt.. V S &v EyOE.o:t..v

meaning, and not in the senses in which

l 'tO. dJ.. A1k yap Lcrw<; oUx st'rxrx.tp6v

certain people would understand them.

Perhaps, though, you might say that

Fr. 13 col. V sup.

1 -caO]-c[a Go. 2 [ys W Vo. 6-7 [nd:v[l'["]
Vo.
12 spatium post ow 13 o Go.

it is inappropriate to lengthen the

l ecr"(' "o:Oj,(o:j npO'f'Ep OV'O:

:><UVE,[v

['1)

discussion by citing these cases. Quite

otjo:l [iO:A' op&&,; (ys, w

so, l\!Ietrodorus. For I do not doubt

mivu yap olp.o:.[

that you could cite many cases, from

l\ll1j-cp60wpe

cre noAACG &.. v Exeq..t. 7tpoe[v]y-

your own past observations, of certain

5 xo:cr&oa & E&e et<; yeAo{w; {7t]W [;

people taking words in various ridi-

n{vo:]; EyOeo:p.i.vou; xed n[&v-

culous senses and indeed in every

1:[o:.] p.aAAov f) 'tO vooUp.svov

sense in preference to their actual lin-

x.ata 'ta; AEet<;, aUx. Ew 1:Wv

guistic meanings,

t&,crp.vwv AEEWV 1)p.&v

usage does not flout linguistic conven

10 XPWf1EVWV ouo f''""'&v

tion, nor do we, alter names with regard

'

whereas our

own

'CWV 6v6p.o:.-ca Enl 'tfu{J.. tprx.ve

to the objects of perception. Fqr another

p]&v. :><Mo:y <Ao:cr,oy y<xp

absurdity is when

15

]o[. . ] <J!s[Ooo,;

. .

. .

. ]o.[
. ] o:[
1l [

]oo1t( . . .

][1EV0f1 p.('i) '*EpO(V

. .

. .

J,o:. [ .

. . . . . . .

J v[ Jcr[
.

. .

]o[

. . . . . .

Fr. 1 3 col. V inf.

[ .. -...............l
.

[........'...........l
[ .. . . . . ...
.

[..
[

10 [ .

. .

..

. .

. . .

. .

. . . . . . . .

. ... ]
.

. ...l
.

...-.-........ l

.. ... . .
.

. . .

... l

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

48

 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

'o[

. . . . . . . . .

xw[cr '
Ao[ " '

]ft [. J'" w

. . . not because ] others transfer words

from the class of that which is knowable

] fio""'l' op <X ,

to denote that which is unknowable,

5 1tO,[erv 'I'Wviil]v E1tt ""' ayvw

but because of their own errors, which

cr"a] 6[1to ""'Y yv ] wcr,w v , &A

we point out in our work On Ambi-

Alt. 1;,1!. ,,x a6[,] iilf1 7tA&Va

guity.

rSA.w'Ca rcw]et'tCGl Phi. 5 7tot[oup.S

vw ?]v Us. (Gloss.) rccn[ci.f, &, Srcr)yo]v Vo.
4 cr-c a]U[-tfuv Om' &yv]Wo'twv Vo.

9 st'

]ey[ . . . ] o[ . J aA

. . . . .

. . . . .

Jet'" '

&, Hy [o] ft<V ov 'o[tj, lhpl tXfi

l 'l']'oA(a >J fttV &vayeypa ft-

Fr. 13 col. VI sup.

l spatium post 1.1svotc;;

,wv >'iftlV ""'v &vSpw

nwv ; noAAtXxou y&p OW
pcr'Ca 1.1Exp 1t6crou -:p p ov5 'tlcr't Eov cx.U1:&v & 7tO't &v
lixwcr' y,cd}' >)fiiilv 1i6a, xal
1-1Exp nc5crou 'tE ted E.fJ- no(wt
AOyov oUOEva Ex'tEov. aEl ] QE 'tWY Etirw:yWv E:vsxa
}Q 1tp0 OUO"'flOV(aV >ted "WV

xa'tacrxsuao[i.vwv 'toll
A6you ':'[OD'J J: Eov, eneo1i1}1t]o p 'l' epe[ . . . . .] "Of' [(jo
. . . . . . . . . . . . . ] y,yv [ . . .
15

. .

. . . . . . . . . .

] crft[

. .

Fr. 1 3 col. VI in!.

[

. . .

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. .

. . .

..

. ...
.

l
]

..

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . .

..
.

. .

..

. . .

.................]
. . . . . .

l.

.. ... . . .

. .

. . . . . . .

...

[ ..
.

[....

49

. . . .

.. .. ..

...

. . . . . .

. .

.....

.. . .. .

DAVID SEDLEY

But,

you might say, why concern

ourselves with these people ? For we

have frequently elsewhere defined to
what extent we should heed whatever
hostile opinions they hold towards us,
and to what extent, and in what sort
of circumstances,

we should ignore

them. We ought always to aim our

discussions at the benefit of those who
are sturdy disciples in the pursuit of
happiness since life . . . . . .

8-9 o:.t [el} Vo.

12 n[ot"'(}'tSov Vo.

10

.....

] 06"' [ . . ] e[ .

] xal [btr

. . . .I also frequently reflected that if,

v o oywye 1tOAArh: eVEU

when I raised difficulties which someone

fl:tJ11Y 'b Bn [d, E] fL oO npoq>e

might have turneo against us, he should

pov'o &nopfL[e<]ta & ' '

claim that what used to he assimilated

li. fL 7tp0 f} fLX it[, pej7t EV , rX1tO

from ordinary language was the same

5 15:1iW:11 il bt 'iilv [H]ewv cruv

as used to be practised in the written

o:xe[wOv] W 1ainb cru vea:ve

work, many might well conclude that

fL EA;'1[a v j enl 11) y pa :pi) ,

in those days false opinion was re

noHo[lJ &v low ooe :E 10-

presented in that language, whether

. .

through
Fr. 13 coL VII sup.
1 A111L>tOV 1p6nov 'I) 1tep:l.11"""-W 'I) q><>V1e<crnx[iil] YJ

15[' ]it l.6you 151) ewp11n Xiil

<j;su151) 01t01E1c;\X"' 1cx.T[
5 Heo[ c v ] ExtVClOC Ma, lj1or

xa1it 1ov oux l.1t:l.[111]:xbf1

. .

an

empirical

process,

an

image-based process, or a theoretical

process, or through a non-empirical
process, not following one of our cur
rent divisions, but simply arising from
an internal movement; but that now,
because the means of expression is
adapted to additional ends, discrimina
tion provides a lead towards the truth.

XECf'EVWV (osiilv 1. e[aju1oO

DE v-Ovov 1UV iJ'txOv, vflv

10 oo 11) epfLYJVIa[;] _ itq>ClOpf'01-

-coUcriJ xr:d. Zn , ().).. A &-c-ca Ena

ywy " itx 11) o:Cl0cr10A1)
13 spatium post 'tO:/.."f)&S<;;
sovrapposto erat super

16

npo

0, N :

yiyva[cr]"' d ,&J.11E. &l.-

A. OfLW oo c f1110E1tO'E f'"

15 cruMr<AEX]hw f1110E[ v 1]r ne:pill
p.cvo E.] cro 0cr%rt. crot -co:.U-

111] 11) 61to<J;I" an' l o[l.YJ]v

1 v] bnl.j6]y:jcr]:v [.]n[ . . . . .

However, let no one ever try to get

even with you by linking with you any
trace
of this suspicion ; but [ turn ] to
"
the entire faculty of empirical reasoning [ . . . . . . . . . . .

Fr. 1 3 coL VII in.

[ . . ...... . ..... .. .... l

[ ..... ..... ......... .l

[....................l
[ ............. ...... .l
[ . . . . . . . . . . . ..

0a v ill,s- ]

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

50

10

pjoy yiyvw[{i<xo av <OV <ou<o

0 tpe<Vepbf1 1WWUV<a [>jv[""

changed its meaning: always bear in

[1)] Et-cpa<'<e "' <ou<i 1) oox

mind that] the man trying to prove

[ttp]a<''<v, ttEp >)vixa

this would have been more persuasive

oox Yjv >) oo&A7J<)n, &:vaAoyo

at a time when someone was either

cr<[o]x &, <woo nvo My "' <ou-

acting, or riot acting, in a certain

5 <a, <O EVO:V<(OV [ejoo<iE<O.

stinction, that by using a certain word

J-]CGL j.t6YWY av 6non:'tcUcra

he means one thing but used to hold

f1 )' <oy y' &cr<lof1 f11J tto e-

the opposite opinion, was not analo

l <O 1) oAw, [crotpw)<epov ll1tEAaf1

cxve <[o ex <]fuv &:[v]n><eo f1[e]vwv,
ettd ooxi tt[ap6v)<wv o[!O] a em
P7Jn><v ex[eo] ooav EV '"'
5 OTCo'tE 'tp6n:wL. cl 'tOUtov

ou)v o>) 'J'7J f1' <bv opov &tto

A tte{<w ttc<cra) liOa i](') <bv em
Aoyocrf10V [J:[o f1] ttpocrt<it7)

oU yCGp naaav ol-

IO f1"' eo&b[,] ecrn o oav xai 1, e

mAoyocrjLbv i<y<Ov

&:U' fxa vbv

av ouVa f1iV " ' X "' f1 f1 0

vov <i)' rr[o]Aoyicrew[,] tp&'ljcre
<]ao o<av [o] xo:opb[, tt]apa[ilo]owo.
15 o y)ap &v[o]mAoyicr<w' [ou]<w'

ttpb' <au<7Jv Aia[v ] <c:<[tn] vwo

<pottwo [ttpocrexwv o11w' e
mAoy[icrcxcr&cxo iluv'ljcre<cxo
Fr. 13 col. VIII inf. .
[ . ...... ... ... ... ... . ]
[....................]
[....................]
[....................]
[....................]

DAVID SEDLEY

n[Wt;;} l xa:.[t) Vo.

litterae -c -ct- 'x.'t.A.
super versum a correctore scriptae sunt; cf.
Introd. 1 i
3-2 Onontstn:nt[L s]v Vo.

gically reasoned. For it is only, I think,

on grounds such as these that I would

Fr. 13 col. VIII sup.

x6'tE fJL-tEY

10 1: N: sovrapposta- ,r
ll-10 J.1&AfAJor Vo.
,
-c
N : sovrapposto
9-8
[f1vLJ!xet [1)] :

manner, than at a time when the di.

etti y&p. o <fuv <OWu<w[ v J ol

. 1 vav<iw, <'f1ttpocr&e eoocit;e-

51

When it is suggested that a word has

suspect that the clever fellow held a

contradictory opinion before he ac
cepted some opposing belief as being
in general wiser; for the opinion which
he holds is, I know, by no means em
pirically based -on current evidence.
I am saying, then, that every opinion

to which we had not yet at that time

applied an empirical assessment should
be referred to the following rule: it
is nof possible, in my view, to subject
every opinion immediately to an em
pirical assessment ; but it is sufficient
that a man will be ready merely to
display a capacity for reasoning em
pirically when the opportunity allows.
For someone who examines it with this
lack of empirical reasoning, and in
an

utterly inadequate fashion, will

nevertheless b e able to assess it em

pirically, [if it is an opinion that con-

Ha., Co., [o0Cl8'tjepov Phi

d:vn f&x 'tJ Wv Vo.,
d:ve'tfo 'tj&v Arr.; &[nJxeLJ.1[8vJwv Vo.
3 n[a.p6vj'tWY : y[pan't}iilv Ha., rfvwo]'tfuY
[np6't]epov

2 a.ve 't[oth]wv Ha.,

Vo.; fortasse nfpe<x]-ciilv ? 5 spatium post

7 ?J:.y 'tt:< Oj6ct1' 1:0v Sm -cp61tWL
Co., Vo.
12 Sxst J.1 t (= Exii) Vo., 8xrwv1
Fri.
14-18 Hue rettuli duo fragmenta l1l
marginibus apographi 0 servata, quae Vo.
falso ad versus 17-20 transponere voluit; v.
Introd. 1 e 14 n]o:po:[OtO]cp Ha.,
15 ob
y]Q:p Ha., xo:&Jo:;:.&v V . , .

Jovl : po N ; P vacat.

8 [xa.l] 'tCdrnjv

Vo., [xa.'tOC] u6't"f/V Bai.

6 spatium post &ou N ; P vacat 5 Oo!;rw1v
Co. 2-1 &:JJ-[a.p,;ci:vou] 'cra.1 Arn., Vo. 1
'x alufAAl : wuv fragmento separato apogret
phum N servat

10 .]v ><EXP'Y/"[rt.L] "[rt.rh]<[ L] '"' ><[L]v crzt J

xed, oUOtv f]'t1Jov 1 UnO 'ti)P,

cerns actions, when he has the opportunity to observe someone who pro-

'f' UYV f) rt.tp<crLV [><rt.]"' rt.tnv

ceeds to action on the basis of it; he

ciyop.sVO "SU<'CGL "OU op-

wilJ see with what result the person]

performs this action, and under its

5 dcrlv "(i)y ool(ijly - AEYW 00 "(i)y

orlx empA>J<L><fuv ciA[ A ' e]x ,oa

just as much in the category of avoid

ance as in that of choice.

&ztupr]'ttxoU p.Epou oUao:.t - aU

As for those opinions yvhich do not

"' oo &Awcrov''" i<p. [.J;wo<t

concern actions (by which I mean those

1 WOL ""'' f) [ciA6yw f) e]'x crluiHI [o-

which are not included_ among empi

'

Fr. 13 col. IX sup.

11 spatium post OsG: 0 ; P vacat
17 [na.};;Epct Arn., [&:a],;Epa Ha., [n6]'tspct
Go.
18 (,;o}a.U,;a Ha.; [,;olh)o Vo.

guidance he will arrive at the truth

rical opinions, but belong to the theore

1 yLcrp. [o]u xwcr [L] "o oL p.rt.p

tical side), these will be confuted, if

"1Jf'-EY [ojv, ev 'fu' f) I<Ho

they are false and whether the cause

'tt Xo:.'t&. 'tO:.Uto:. AEyscr&at

of their error is irrational or rational,

tWv &stup1)1:txWv 8 oUx &AYJ-

either because some other than theore-

5 & ecr" v , f) ]jL (li v ) 2p. nwp[ pw]&p.

tical opinion expressed on the basis of

rco&sv el npasW cruvrt.-

them is untrue, or, if they become

'f'-IJV rt.oit;wcrLv dcraywcrLv

jndirectly linked up with action, where

sO "-IJv [ci]vm"owp. rcpii-

ver they lead to disadvantageous action.

Lv. i<v i'Jo p.1Jov 'ou,wv,

If none of these consequences ensues,

1 0 eUcruv&s.Wp1J'tOY ea'tat W; oU-

it will be correct to conclude that opi

nions ar'e not false.

W &rcrt.V'e x[rt.),rt.y<Afucr(L]Y
lhrt.v " 6p.[oA]oycrrt.n6
"YO f'-')0 EVOEXSO'CGL ""'"
1 5 'tO n[crto:.cr&o:.[ 't xed p.ij EnL

rno:cr&rt.L rcpo'f'EP['J L ] 'bv cruyx<

l<rt.Aup.p.hop. [nrt.], pc< xrt.l
""' [,o,]rt.u""

["ou,]o yap ou

For this reason, everybody can easily

laugh when somebody gets another to
assert that it is impossible to know
and not know the same thing, and
then cites the riddle of the Covered
Father, and others of the same kind.
For this will not [ defeat anybody who

Fr. 13 col. IX inf.

[....................]
[....................]

r.................... J
[....................]
[....................]

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

52

] 'ii i' &yj v wo<e' e 1 &pxlJ

replies that the question is about actions

alnoil Of'[o)Aoy{a, Of'W AE

and therefore cannot immediately be

nwv ecp' "'' &fLoA6ye['] <oil<o

decided by mere empty words. By con

yo!-&' en[l] '"*l aocpiof'""

trast) someone who is forced to con-

W oU crup.n:epAo:.Wv Ev bt-

tradict ] the assertion which he blindly

5 vet 'tEL &:n:oxpcret xed 'tO oU'tW

made at the outset nevertheless laughs

i2v ecpapf'oo&ev h "vo; e;r,_

at the sophism when he sees the con

crp.. oU Aew<;; , Wcr1:s nht'tSLY

ditions under which he was making

d 'tO AEyev EvOex6p.evov e1-

this assertion, and says that he did

10

1:0 atnbv rf!l('rtcrj txcr&cd 'tE

YIXL

1 xal f''!J en{a,aaa['), oco' apYYj

&[ij va'] <oil<o, [o,&.) <oO 'Po

nou o[lij 6 crotp'o'Yj npoqJepC.
OtO xo:.l rc[&vu] &:v-cvx.etp.bw<;;
5 bfLoAoy1)aa; [']' e &pxlJ ;

dated to it in consequence of a certain

linguistic convention, and that he is
thus being tricked into asserting, in
stead of denying, that it is possible
to know and not know the same thing,
because of the way the sophist cites
the riddle.

<o W01tp nv[e;j <iiJY OO'Jl'

So a man who at the ptart made quite

cr'GJY oth o'(e,["') "P"'Y f'"

the opposite assertion, and does not

uxbv nsyxov Aaf'tXYSOY.

display the wariness on this score shown

10 xa{"*) ys otlx ensAsAoyocr<o

On ttAYjv tWv 'tOtothwv
wv 6 crotp'o'Yj npoqJeps' &ou-

by certain of the sophists, . does not

consider the refutation which he under
goes to be one that concerns actions.
His mistake is that he did not work
out empirically that apart from the
sort of case cited by the sophist it is

1 5 f'0'6v u liv eoos nsnov&e

same thing.

'ti)Y Ow:cpopCGv Wcrnep &v' 'tt

However, people not reasoning out the

xal xa&6!-ou <oO[<]o &fLoAo-

difference might think that he has

YYjXE va' J 'b [ o.6]cp' 'olf'[a] &[ vayx]ao-

suffered a fate similar to that of so

. .

. . . . . .

.]

Fr. 13 col. X in!.

. . .

[ .
.

53

impossible to know and not know the"

va' 'ol; f'-lj cruUoyoi;of'EvO'

. . .

. . .

. . . . . . . .

. .

. ..
.

a o;'jv npill 'tOV EmjW'.I Phi.

not include in his answer the example

xed [o)Gx dl-a[ou]f's'o; <oO

20 [&ij, . . . . .

[0

which could in this way be accomo

Fr. 13 col. X sup.

lllO

. . . . .

. . . .

DAVID SEDLEY

. ]
.

109

't'l)[t &y]vcilo"tZL 8 [hvoiJ)I cdrcoti Op.[o]

y[a Vo.

14 spatium post tv
1 819 cbf.LOAo [pptWG"] Go., Vo.
0 ; P et

N vacant.

[....................]

meone who is forced to assert this

10 [ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J
] xa%' EV hacr(,o]v,

sophism as being also universally true.

. . .

an'

'X.O:.-

is that the man who expresses a uni-

%6Aou 6!J.oA.oyst-ca, oV'X. Em-

versal opinion does so, possibly by

x[ vw ys 'tGH 'tp6ttwL Wt

&Hov'o'

,oo 6f1oAoyoOv-

5 'tO<; cp, gy E:xacr'tOV 't0tJ- n:po:.

empirical

cases, but at any rate in the

man who concedes the sophism does

l) <ipv')MVo 'f'')-

not

empirically

examine

individual

factual cases, and dos not make any

generally

oUno[:e) )-W:[p:u}lpstrv1 rxU<:O' cdJw

'tii'n Vo. (corrigenda)
4 {01:rxv 1:]s Ha.; w
super versum 0, N : sovrapposto 5 [x&]p. :
[&J Phi.
8 xal [oJo[vj Ha.
15
spatium post et
19-20 BnLI.1[o:p-wp11J,tt'l'Jw
cro.[p.Svou Ha.; enq.1[rxp'tupl'l'J&'l'Jcrol[p.Svou 1)
oU, 'Yj'tot 'tOiJ &nL p.ap'ttl p'l'j&'l'jcrop.Evou f) oU]
Phi.; rul : 'l'J N; P et 0 vacant.

manner

'tWt 1:p6nwt 'tb E.nl. n&v1:wv

1 ,o,. EOOsv oov fi.v

&).).'
.

of] individual

of a universal assertion ; whereas our

Fr. 13 col. XI sup.

3-4

examination

yp.ci't wv, o.UO' E:.v 'toU1:w

OJWAoyae<no,
l spatium post <:O"

[ The difference which they do not see

applicable

affirmation

or

denial in the manner of a universal

1 t-H 'tGH w (cr]uvopfuvn 'tYj V

assertion. So, I repeat, anyone blind

OtacpopO:v 'tothw[v] Op.ot6v

to this difference might have supposed

'tt n:oLctv. ciA A oU n:o[tct], a[p1:u-

our man to be acting in a similar way.

per o rxU'tb rxtS'tWL O('tO:.Y 't]

But this is not how he acts ; and he

5 xe<%oAou " OftOA[o]yoso, (xi'i.]ft

bears witness for himself (a) whenever

f'UP'""'' f'YJ 7t<Xp ' hao,[o]v

he makes a universal assertion (even

emA'J """*l &pv>J%drJ

if he should make fen thousand state

m v suos[,], ""' lhG<f1 f' [y{)a

ments of its truth for fear that by

f'Ej yit.p <Xo(s' so%u, d

empirical examination of an individual

0 7tpli[,v] ,O , G<U'') Y

Ot<XY

s( xd

case he might admit its falsity), and

x<X%' [v] exe<cr,ov "''A')"

(b) when he does not. For in case (a)

xW-; &1-ioAoy-Yjxc 'tot6v0s

he

" elva' l) -ljpYrJ 'o, lif17t8P sl

action such as if he had also accepted

" P "Yft"""YJ 1) ooa, EY-

empirically that in a particular instance

1 5 %o: o' ou aoi"' &o "u'w

something was or w<is not of a certain

OE xo:.l E.nl 1:Wv &cwp7]-ctxWv,

v%a f1 Y

" &no,piw,

""

'" 'bv [e]mp'l'"'bv 'P6-

embarks

immediately

upon

an

kind ; whereas in case (b) he does not.

This is if the opinion is of the kind
that concerns actions. But so too in the

7tov 'ou lmft(ctp]''u1prJ%rJ oo-

20 [ftvou su%0,

dlftOAOj')Oej

Fr. l3 col. XI inf.

[.... ........ ......l
.

[.... ........... ...l

.

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

54

[.............. .....l

theoretical field, in case (a) he at once

10 L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l

goes outside his subject and asserts in

'o[r x]o:&[o]Aou &x6!.ofu&o]fL

empirical terms the truth of some

o]uAOfLSYO '' nocslv, xo:l

opmwn which awaits positive confir

Tic li ft no's npa{ " o:u

mation, [and which in fact turns out

'"" ouvatt'>)'"'' lkiJ fLO:p-

to be false, ] through a desire to do

5 ts:v, v&a 0' o00Sv 'tOtoO-cov

1t0{1JOSV. O! 0 oEf 01JfL{OC X P WfLSYOY ouvopav 'v

Oo:::p op&v. x&v 'tOO'to n:p&-c1 'l:WP,.S:V nl 7tcYttUV 'tfuY

1 !.6ywv, ou lluown1J&1Jcr6[fLs-

&o: '6 ffL]epo 8 npo[sjlp1Jxo:. x[al

'ii ' ll' [il.v] oB'w [ Ti c ']6 >l fL "P'1J fLE
vov, [,&, ycyv6fLsYo: llsr o]uvo:c5 o&avsoSo:c x[ch] np[w],ou, wonsp

d -cva de; Ev[&J.pysw:.v alrwo

e!.&srv, 'life] "'"' su& - fL &&p6o:c
-cc; OccrxupLcrst bt, alnb nopsU
YJ [']o:c, &U' suAo:otlfL[s]Yo1 xo:l
1 0 &AA1JY xo:l liAA1JY '6 <j!sOilo

EfLttspchp.avwv [,&,] xo:&6Aou

lle fL oo[a]l;;w v oB,w, & Ua
n v ' EXWfL [no:]p' e[o:Jutfii c Y.O:VO
vo: ou, fLEXp[c ']11 oEovl evsp1 5 y1)nx1) 11leo: f) &vo:!.6you

'taU-c1jt xsqtevYJc;, oU 1%(het

t]o:c enl tWfL <jleuofii v . xilv

neralisation, and wherever some action

linked with the assertion occurS he
acts wrongly ; whereas in case (b) he
does nothing of this kind.
These are the indications which you
rence. And if we follow the same pro
cedure in examining all utterances, we
shall have no cause for shame with
regard to the field of study of which
I have spoken.

And so too wherever there is error of

this kind it is necessary right from
the start to observe events, as if to
come to some sort of clear picture of
it, so that a person can immediately
approach it not with a generalisation,
but with caution, encompassing the
falsehood this way and that, and not
forming a universal opinion m the
manner which I have described, but
keeping at his side a yardstick with
the help of which, until he forms the
so-to-speak activating notion, or one of
similar stamp, he will not proceed in

1J f'"' P'1J fLEYov, os! ouvopciv

the direction of falsehood.

[....................]

DAVID SEDLEY

And so I say that if there

2 spatium post PY)"1:et.

2-3 x[al]

! * a

IS

some

error of this kind we must see. . . . . . . . .

[&v]

0, N; P vacat
Phi

YOV

{nr; ).1"1]

6 ev[cip]ystav Vo.
17 spatium post l}wOWv ; { x&v Vo.

Sx.Y)t cr]uvet.t Phi.

xa[t f1'i) rtpci1:]<:stv s "CO:

8mJ.1p1:upsL'tat]

oBtW ouv o 'l''l f'' Yjc n lic-

Fr. 13 col. XII inf.

55

something in accordance with his ge

must heed in order to ee the diffe

Fr. 13 col. XII sup.

20 xo:[. . . . . . ]tsc v scto:[.]v [

9 -ro[t.; : 'tfWl[ Vo.; &:x6Ao[u-&o]j.t Co., d:xo

Ao[u&oi3]f.!. Us. (Gloss. s.v. &:II.'JAou&Sw), cbto
Ao[u&et]j.t Vo. 4 spatium post erto!"'JcrEv

Vo.

[8]v[vo !Y).SSna

20

j.t'l}

L. ........... . .... ..l

[ ............... .....l
10 l . . . . . . ... . ... .. . . . . .l
9 fortasse as n ? (1-XIII 1 sup.) [t:x]a:.vW[]
Co.

f) 1i' h 'owu['o f]p.]tv l.cn(v,

.

. . . . . . . Nor shall I hesitate to cite

oux oxvcr[w cr]of " xe<[l] 'oocr1is

repeatedly, to you and to these others,

noAJ.&x npoflE.pctv , xa.l 1:Ct

cases where there is still error of this

AotnCt OE., tCt p.-fj f}L toa.Ota, 66-

kind among us; and so too all other

5 "v'" 1i' av OGYJfL"P'i)[cril-Jw .

cases, which are not of this kind, but

&AA' oU oUAop.at Enl 1:00 na-

which we would nevertheless consider

pov'o' npoepscril-e<' ""'" f'

to involve error. For the present, howe

<ipxf' nOGY)OWfLSil-e< fL;'jXO.

ver, I do not wish to cite them, to

1 l.x6nwv [xowov Aoywv. [fx]e<-

avoid making a new start in a dis

cussion whi-ch has already reached (
sufficient length.

Fr. 13 col. XIII sup.

3

(post

a::xt)

So let the words which we have prattled

suffice for the present. And you others,

0 : has litteras in apo

grapha 0 ipse Hayter scripsit, non e papyro

sed ut coniecturam suam
'f!]iJ[A]ct:xt['Y/'tE
5 e:.tp ]'Y/)Jbct Go.
6
(sic !) meditaretur.
spatium post p.Bva: ; o[t]p.[ctt] Vo.
6-7 [Or
ao]lov Ha.
7-8 rix[po]ct!crswt;; WiL

try ten thousand times Over to commit

fLJu[p ] &x[ f' VYJ fLO] veue{ ']f'

to memory what I and Metrodorus

n[epa]cril-s '"' l.fLo( ' " xal MYJ-

here have just said.

5 'P[o]owpw ,w,1ie v[ewcr'l d]p>J

And now I think I have finished

p.evo:. olp.w 1i' up.ov o[y1ioov ""' dxocr,ov slilo &x[po]GL

crsw ; 'rj[;] l:rj; nspa v [o]p.E

prattling to you this twenty-eighth in

stalment

of our

consecutive lecture

series.

V>J ; 'ou'l v[u]v 1ioAs[crJ xii lO cril-a.

Fr. 13 col. XIII sup.

14 sup. h] Vo.

l l 'En[x]oupou

IIspl ucrsw;

Epicurus
On Nature
Book XXVIII
(from the old exemplars. . . . .

Fr. 13 col. XIII in!.

1 l.y [p]&:p>] l.nl Nx(ou 'ou fL[s,JiG

'Av["']'f'&'YJY

. written

the

archonship , o

Nicias the successor of Antiphates)

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

56

Fr. I col. I. Cf. 8 IV 1 ff. IO. p.')1i ' is probably a mistake for f''l'; see Introd.
1g.

COMMENTARY

Fr. D coL. I c. 2 inf.rcspLA')[rcnx : see Introd. 2d (iii). There is no means of

telling whether somebody's view is being quoted here, and, if so, whose. But
the meaning of the phrase ' oo nspLA')[rcnxYj] -!) "iiJY <hop.wv yviil[crL oon is
'

presumably that the knowledge that atoms exist does not depend on the rejection
of all alternative theories as inconceivable. Cf. Ep. Hdt. 42.
Fr. 4 col. IV. I Cf. 3 V b 10-ll. Strangely the correction itself seems to contain
an error - haplography of ov.
Fr. E col. I. 5 inf. ["ol pp.o:][crcv would !it. But there is insufficient context
to warrant printing a supplement in the text. 4 inf. CHh: v : the comparatively rare
use of a relative pronoun to introduce an indirect question. See commentary on
13 XII 9 inf. "o x"'v[ovcxop. : cf. D.L. X 30, Us. 242; and Introd. 2b.
Frr. 5 and 6. On the authenticity of these fragments, which has been wrongly
doubted, see Introd. 1d. On the order of columns in fr. 5, see Introd. 1c.
Fr. 5 col. I. 3, et al. 'f'"'Y"MnXiil1 etc. : Inlrod. 2d (ii).
Fr. 5 col. III b. I3. Pf'lJ[Yio:c : cf. commentary on 12 III 5-6.
Fr. 6 col. I. Sff. This would appear to allude to the time when the Epicureans
were still attempting to reform ordinary language ( see Introd. 2c ( ii)). The
fact that other people were meanwhile using the same words ambiguously, by
unwittingly assigning various false connotations to them in addition to the correct
meanings identified by the Epicureans, is perhaps mentioned here as one of the
drawbacks of that attempt. 7. ,b
lh[cj: see commentary on 12 III 5-6. I0-11.
. . .

e"JO[: this ne-uter singular form of tJ;euO is elsewhere found only in much

later writers.
Fr. 8 col. II. This is clearly a small extract from a very complex argument.
In the first sentence the Greek is baffling, and I can offer little by way of elu
cidation. Epicurus may possibly be insisting that a distinction be made between
' the absence of opinions which involve images ' and ' the presence of opinions,
which do not involve images '. His object in doing so is obscure, beyond the
fact that the distinction is relevant to some past controversy with certain unnamed
opponents ( 1 .8 Sx[vo[-;;;) . The second sentence seems to say that in this controversy Epicurus scored a point by citing ' further ' cases where his opponents
relied on -:.po::v'Ccr[rxt for proof. From this it may be gathered that the op
ponents in question denied the reliability of sense-evidence. They could well be
the Megarian circle of Diodorus Cronus, the target of Epicurus' attack in
13 IV 8 in!. - VI 15 sup. and IX 11 sup. - X 14. sup. (see commentary ad loc).
3. Sv'trxU-&a : cf_ 8 IV l, 4. The word clearly has some special significance in
Epicurean terminology, perhaps designating that which is present before one, 'CO
hapye. p.n[&o]cr< : cf. commentary on 8 V 2. 10. ore' &U' <h[,]a : cf. 13 VII
II sup. -:pa.v-c[a.crt&]osv : cpav'ta.crt&cv occurs elsewhere only in Philo 1.4.64

57

DAVID SEDLEY

'

but LSJ quote the adjective cpa.. v-cacrw.crnx6 once -from Plierc. 1393, conjeCturally
attributed by Cronert to Epicurus ( " Rhein. Mus. " 1901, pp. 609 ff.), and three
times from Plutarch. cpetv-cam&:stv is presumably not merely a synonym for
-:pav-c&st v ; it suggests something like ' to link with a cpav-caa(a ' . 11. d[va]rwy&.r; :
cl. KL'. XXIII.
Fr. 8 col. IV. The exact significance of this fragment is hard to fathom, but the
discussion concerns the meanings given to words by the earliest men to use them,
and as in fr. 1 coL I the example taken is the notion of xcv6v. 1-4. v-caO&a : see
commentary on 3 II 3. 6-9. Epicurus refers us to a work o.f his own on the
subject of primitive language - perhaps the ,Avacpwvcrstr; ( see commentary on
10 I b 18). If al>]-coUr; is correct, its reference must be to a noun that preceded
l. 1 - perhaps Cf&Oyyoo? To read o::SJ,ou, would be even less intelligible. 9. s1J'"'
0' dvaAa6v-csr; x-c A . : this suggests that after Epicurus had completed a work
he was not averse to adding a new book to it at a later date.
Fr. 8 col. V. In this passage ( cf. Long pp. 124-5) the possibility of changing
the names of things is discussed, with referenc.e to the former Epicurean attempt
to improve upon the accuracy of ordinary language ( see Introd. , 2c (ii)). Epi
curus' present position seems to be that names can only be changed if they refer
to directly perceptible objects and misdescribe them in some way. 1 . [noHwv] j
xal rcry;v-co[L]w[v]: a favourite expression with Epicurus; d.' IIe:pl cpUcrcw II,
B 6 3 2, 2 VI 5-6; ib. XIV, 14 II 8; Ep. Hdt. 75. 2. fi<To:%[cr]s[o; : cf. below,
1.6, t>nsilsfiE'IX ; 1.13, fiS'IX'[oils]fi<(voo ; l3 V 10 sup., otlll e fiSTe<10MV<wv

cpavspWv . The expression 6v61-La-ca J-lE.'Co:.n -&Eya or p.s-cx-c!-&scr-&ca

means ' to change names ', that is ' to call the same things by new names ' ( never
' to change the use of words ', as LSJ claim, s.v. J-lS-ca-c(-&rau 4). This is how it
is used by Herodotus ( V 68), by Plato ( Crat. 384,d), by Aristotle (fr. 549 Rose),
and by Epicurus himself ( IIspt <ptlcrsw, PHere. 1191 fr. 9, 3-4 Arr. [ 34] [28 ]
22-3). I therefore differ from Long, who sees this passage as a discussion of the
re-application in metaphorical senses of words which in their primary senses
denote perceptible objects. 3. Tiil[v cr]uv TIXO o:1cr%crscrov ( s. oVOfichwv t's"z.
.
.
-c[&scr-&cu ) : ' names which entail perception ' are presumably those which are
still used to denote perceptible objects. 4-8. To define a word in the ' non-image
based manner ' is perhaps to associate it with an object without referring to a
cpav-caa[a of the object to check that the 'Word is suited to it. From 11.7-8 it
seems that ' empirical reasoning ' ( eml.oyocrf'O ; see Introd. 2d (v)) can show
that a name is not suited to an object. If we knew how it could do so, we
would know a great deal more about Epicurus' linguistic theory. The proces:s
may involve tracing a word back to the single primary connotation which it
bears naturally. 8-10. For the nsptArpnxO -cp6rcor;, a process by which ideas are
discounted as being inconceivable, see Introd. 2d (iii). [e]l.[syxo] f'EvWV : what
I now read as [ . J ), I previously read as w, and Long's critical apparatus still
Ov6p.cna nl -cW p.

gives my former conjecture W[p.-tAYj]p.Evwv. I - have since re-examined the papyrus

several times, and have concluded that the illusion of a large w was created by
the j uxtaposition of some sovrapposto traces with a A. 11 ff. The mutilated ,line5
which follow must have explained why most words cannot be altered. The reason

CRONACHE ERCOLANESI

58

seems to have something to do with ' obscurity ' xa-cax\u<jn, , 1.12; cf. ll I 3)
and o[ ttoUoi ( 1 . 15).
Fr. 8 col. VI. I print this pitifully small fragment merely as an indication that
the views of Metrodorus were probably cited at this stage ( 1 .3, M1]-c p o] [ owpe ;
cf. Introd. 2a).
Fr. 10 col. I a. 6. tt[petyftetl:Lxiilv, and 1.13 "P'"Yft<X1:[tx]1j': see commentary on
13 VII 13 sup.
IX 11 sup. The references to proofs ' that concern actions ',
and to people ' acting .in accordance with choice ' ( 1.15) may represent a discussion
related to the theme of the final columns of the book, the way in which false
opinion manifests itself in action. 17. En:: tJ, ywyi/[]: see commentary on 13 VII

1112 sup.
Fr. 10 col. I b. 18. &:va::pwvst:v is a term especially associated with natural or
instinctive utterance; cf. Ep. Hdt. 76, and Demetrius Lacon PHerc. 1012, col. 45,
9-12 (both passages quoted and discussed in Introd. 2c (ii)). Some similar
implication may underlie Ep. Hdt. 72, where Epicurus refers to 11 the plain reality
in virtue of which we utter (clvacpwvoOsv) the words ' a long time ' and ' a short
time ' which are on our lips from birth JJ. Epicurus wrote a work called 'Ava
q>WVcrEl (Philodemus De ira XLV 5), which it is tempting to think may have
been a study of the natural or original meanings of words. Of its contents, we
know only that in it Epicurus explained the difference between moderate ancl
excessive anger. A discussion of the original meanings of words would be likely
to contain - an account of the various emotions, since Epicurus relates the forms
of words partly to the tt&'f] of the men who first uttered them (Ep. Hdt. 75).
Fr. 11 col. I. If I have reconstructed the text correctly, these lines reassert the
fundamental Epicurean principle that knowledge of the invisible should be obtained
by analogical reasoning from the data of perception (Ep. Hdt. 33, etc.). 3.
xa,[a]xa!.U<j;ecrt : cf. 3 V 12. 4. ooa[cr-c6v : cf. D.L. X 33, xat ,b ooacr-cbv

&ttb ttpo,epou nvo voopyo0 P'"'''"'

Fr. 1 1 col. If. Here Epicurus criticises Metrodorus' former attempt at creating
a philosophical vocabulary, on which see Introd. 2c ( ii). Metrodorus had not
minded what words he applied to what ' objects in the creation of a private
terminology; and in the process, Epicurus argues in this column, he had included
in his vocabulary some names from common parlance which contained false
opinion, and had attached no weight to the evidence of this falsity. Of course
( cf. Introd. 2c ( ii)), Epicurus had himself by the time of writing the Letter to
Herodotus and Book XXVIII concluded that the philosopher may follow common
usage; but he qualified this with a demand for a critical attitude whereby the
one true underlying maning of a word would always be kept in view. 1 .
t06't1]Vto : I take thl to be the tail-end of a phrase describing 1_\..Ietrodorus'
quest for a private terminology. Cf. the use of LOto in Ep. Hdt. 75-6 to express
the individuality of each of the different languages uttered by primitive men;
and LO!ct- used in Plato Crat. 385a to distinguish a personal from a public
{O'f]flOaiqo) terminology. 1-2 'GJ' croq>iilt xal 11-iJ croq>iil t : for this turn of phrase, d.
K I 7-6 inf. ; also a phrase from the new fragment of Epicurus quoted by Didymus
the Blind ( Arrighetti, Il nuovo frammento, p. 21): ii.AAw' XP'""'" 6 croq>O -coT'

59

DAVID SEDLEY

" P '*YflOOO C Y ""' dlAAW o fl'IJ crocpo. 3-4 o!nc E7nfl"P"UP"I)crt, lack of confirmatory
evidence, is what is needed in Epicurea doctrine to falsify an opiniOn about the
perceptible world ; civ-cq..tap-cUp1jCH, counter-evidence, is needed to falsify an
opinion about the imperceptible ( cf. commentary on 13 VII 13 sup. - IX ll
sup.). Their role here is apparently to expose incorrect word-meanings, j ust as
em!.oyccrfl6 is said to do in 8 V 7-8. 7. "ii o:ihij Aoow; : the context strongly
implies that ' the same language ' is Epicurus' way of saying ' regular language ,
' ordinary language '. Cf. 13 IV 5 sup., "GI.T o:(no:t dpocro[crc] "[iil]fl cpwvw[v],

where this meaning is also appropriate. AE:t, or more commonly the plural'
form cd AEst, is Epicurus' nearest equivalent for ' ordinary language ' ; cf.
12 III 12; 13 V 8 sup., IX 3 inf. 8-10. ' The error of most men with regard to what
they actually perceive ' does not mean that their perception is itself delusory,
but that they misidentify what they perceive, probably ( as in 1 2 III 8-12; d.
Introd. 2c ( ii)) by fitting it to the wrong 1tpoA1j<jloc.
Fr. K col. I 7-6 in/. cro oQ xo:l fl'IJ [cro]cpoO : see commentary on ll II 1-2.
Fr. 12 col. II. 6-7. o:(cr%"I)"Ol tli(o[c : in Aristotelian terminology an o:1cr%"1)"bv
tOwv is someth-ing resembling a ' sense-datum ' - the element of perceptioh
which can be apprehended only with one particular sense (e.g. colour, sound,
taste) and about which it is impossible to be mistaken (Aristotle De an. II 6).
The fragmentary context prevents us from saying here whether Ef;iurus is using
the expression in its Aristotelian sense.
Fr. 12 col. III. See Introd. 2c (ii), and Long p. 123. We caimot say whether
d . . . . Hoyofl<Y (1!.2 ff.) represents the protasis of a fulfilled or an unfulfilled
conditioll - ' if we used to say ', or ' if we had said '. However, ll.7 ff. imply
that Epicurus used to hold and still holds that there is a form of error that
arises in relation to preconceptions and appearances because of the manifold
conventions of language, and the topic of this sentence is whether in the past
he used to say that this was the only form of error. I. cru[ Y]o<[?<tl]ouv : this
verb probably refers, here and in 13 II 6 inf. and VI 5 inf. ( cL 13 III 12 sup.
oqxc6tc:pov), to the adaptation of conventional language to the- Philosopher's
ends. 2. c:L OE : my removal of a sovrapposto confirms Long's conjecture z[L O]E.
36. ["Jln6 " ' . . . """"' ["]v [e]?<XCf'Ev"I)V l:pft"I) Y(o:v ,;;,, iS"' : ' the equiva
lent, according to the way in which we then expressed ourselves, to saying
that. . . . '. 4-5. [E]xxsq.uiV!jV in the con,text of a historic main verb must mean
' current at that time ', as in Philodemus Sign. XIX 7, not ' present ' as Voglianu
and Arrighetti take it. Cf. also PHerc. 1413, 5 V 2-4, <1 i.<po: oin [7tspl] ""[u]'"'
h "ii hxzcrc[oY"I)] AEW b Aoyo ' . . . . 5-6 pfl"I)Yto:v : l:pf'"I)Yslo: is ' means
of expression ', or sometimes ' language ' in general. Cf. 13 VII 1 0 sup.; Ep.
Hdt. 76; Xenophon Mem. III 12; Diodorus I 8,3; Aristotle De an. 420b 19.
Here it must refer not to ordinary language but to EpiCurean terminology.
Epicurus' point is that at the time referred to he might have expressed the same
thought, but did not have the same terminology with which to express it. In
saying this, he must be thinking especially of the term 7tpoA"I)<\J<, which a few
years earlier when he wrote the Letter to Herodotus he had not yet introduced
( see Introd. 2b). , ;;,, lhc : cf. 6 I 7 ; 13 Vl 8 inf. ; Ep. Hdt. 80. 68. lh\ - 1) :
Vogliano in his note ad loc. quotes Uscner's criticism of this phrase in hls

CRONACHE ERCOLANESJ

60

unpubl:shed Index Grammaticus, where it appears under the heading ' conlocatio
verborum neglegentissima '. 1 1 . noAu'tp6nou-; : cf. II s pt cpUcrEW PHere. 1056, 4 I
6-7. 11-12 s[ih]crf'OU 'fuv Hewv: cf. 13 IX 4-3 in.; llspl 'f'Ocrsw PHere. 1056
7 VI 6-9, 7ta[f1]1tOAAO: 01. ouils "'"" '""' S lOfl[ou] livEU YOU H., f1<
'"'"[ocrf1]0Uf1EY ; PHere. 1413, 3 I 1-2.

Fr. 12 col. V. This fragment reveals nothing of philosophical interest, but contains
an endearing note of self-criticism, so lacking in Epicurus' shorter w-orks.
Fr. 13 col. II 1 sup. - Ill 1 7 sup. This passage deals with Metrodorus' past
attempts at creating a terminology ( see lntrod. 2c ( ii)). II 5.9 sup.: perhaps
' But I would not say that in those days you were familiar with reasoning about
individual things, which was the basis on which we assigned meanings '. Cf.
13 III 4- 1 inf. II 8-5 inf. If my reconstruction of the text is correct, the charge
is that Metrodorus in assigning names did not bother to ' adapt certain conven
tional usages '. Combining the evidence of these lines with that of 1 1 I I 5 ff.,
I take the meaning to be that he used to borrow words from common usage
without concern for the fact that they represented opinions contrary to his own.
What exactly would be entailed by the ' adaptation of conventional usages ' ( cf.
12 III 1-2; 13 VI 5-6) is not clear. II 4 inf. : for f'-!J introducing a fmal clause,
see commentary !'m 13 XI 3 sup. ff. The sense here seems to require a negative.
II 4-2 inj. -cO n&'V1:a cp &O y yov en:pE pov-ca aoe&sv 1:60s n, ' the principle that
in assigning any name one expresses a particular op=nion ', seems to repreEent
Epicurus' own view. II 2 inf. - /Il l sup. '-iJ v ""v iiYof1'hwv xo:[l 7t]P"'I f1 'hw[v
a]il, [o:lc]')<J;Io:[v : outside this passage, &1i,o:lc')<J;Io: is found only in the works
of Philodemus, who uses it and cognate forms ( &OuA 1pno, clOux.A rpneUffi) some
twenty-two times in his surviving fragments. It is clearly a regular Epicurean
term. In our_ passage it might mean ' the failure to distinguish ' or ' the difficulty
of distinguishing '. On the role of Ot(U,ijt.};t in Epicurean epistemology, cf. Long
p. 118. I take the whole phrase to be a reference to the lack of an exact one-to-one
correspondence between words and objects in ordinary language. Ill 2 sup.
1tsp[' v]ooH ') : cf. llepl 'f'Ucrsw XI, I IV 4.
Fr. 13 col. Ill 8 inf. - IV 1 7 sup. Epicurus now admits to seeing three things
which he did not see before. The first, III 8-4 inf., cannot be understood from
the fragmentary context, beyond the fact that it had to do with Metrodorus'
former procedure (6-5 inf., E7tpc"[ts] ,6,e). The second thing, III 4-1 inf.,

"

is ' the particular difficulties, with regard to this -class, of having correct names
for individual things ', on which see below. The third, III 1 inf. IV 3 sup.,
,
is obscured by a textual corruption. He then goes on to explain his present
view: a philosopher might correctly use the terminology of ordinary language,
provided that he did not change the distinguishing characteristics that mark
off one class of thing from another. This is obscurely expressed, but may,
( cf. Introd. 2c (ii)) imply an attitude similar to that which we see in Ep. Hdt.
37-8, that one is safe in using any word provided that one keeps in view its
underlying meaning. Ill 3-2 inf. iipirfu . . . . . J.yso{}o;, : I take this phrase to
be synonymous with the old sophistic ideal of Op&6-ci] Ovo1-1(hwv. Epicurus sees
obstacles to ' having correct names for individual things ', and is prepared to
a greater extent to tolerate the ambiguities of ordinary language. Ill 2 inf.

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DAVID S EDLEY

rcepl 'toth:o 'tO etOor; : he probably means the sphere of philosophical enquiry and especially, perhaps, the invisi-ble, since ' analogical reasoning ' has just -been
mentioned ( 1.7 inf.). Ill 1 inf. IV 3 sup. There is no grammatical sense in
the tet as it stands, and I can only suppose that one or more lines are lost.
IV 1 sup. [cr]ucrt()(t'7' iJ.v n was misread by Vogliano as [cr]ucrt()(to[u]vt[()(J ,
.
.
and on the strength of this LSJ list the otherwise unattested verb crucr'to:.'tE:W.
IV 4 sup. A parenthet1cal 'tb Aey611evov usually means ' as they say ', ' as
the saying goes ' ; but here the sense must be something like ' as we say ', or
' as I have been saying '. IV 5 sup. 'tcdr; o:.U'tcx.t<; ex. pEas.[crt} : see commentary

on 1 1 II 7 - ' tbe regular choices ' of vocabulary. IV 7 sup. '""'" probably

refers to the ' choices of words ', the neuter plural arising by attraction to
lt]Orj in 1.9 sup. Alternatively: a case might be made out for reading w.. U'tcX ' the same things '. IV 8 sup. Yjf'Yf' is perhaps, as Long suggests (p. 133 note
60), to be construed as an ethic dative. IV 9 sup. [ o ( o u e['i]o1) 1-' ; this is
the only reading that I have found to fit the very difficult traces in the papyrus,
although if it is correct the Greek of the whole sentence is exceptionally awkward.
IV 9-10 sup. tJ-"iJ
neptnEcro : a final clause, see commentary on 13 IX 3
sup. ff. The optative must arise by attraction to the mood of Abt in 1.8
.

sup. (cf. Kuhner-Gerth II 382 ff.). IV 10-11 sup. [co] o' il<c : cf. commentary
oo l2 lll 5
c
Fr. 13 col. IV 8 inf. VI 15 sup. In this passage Epicurus impugns the linguistic
practice of a group of philosophers - apparently without naming them, since
at first he simply refers to them as ' certain people ' (IV 2 inf., V 6 sup.),
conftdent that his audience will recognise the allusion. With regard to the identity
of these opponents, the text affords the following clues. Mtrodorus had attacked
certain divergences from conventional meanings i n their use of language ( V
3-.8 sup.) ; Epicurus had attacked them in a work On Ambiguity ( V 4 inf. VI
1 sup.), and elsewhere (VI 3 sup ff.); and they were a contemporary school,
inimical to the Epicureans (VI 5-6 sup.). Arrighetti's identification '?f them a:::
the Megarians is, as far as i t goes, plausible. Epicurus is known to have written
a work Against the Megarians ( D.L. X 27); and Metrodorus' work Ilpo 'ou
OetAE'X'tVXoU.;;; seems also to have been an attack on the Megarians ( Koerte p;
539: the later Megarians were known as Oo:.Ac-x:ttxo[ because of their method
of arguing by means of question and answer (D.L. II 106), so that it must
be to them that Philodemus is referring ( Rhet. II 45, 5-8) when he speaks of
Metrodorus as ' tou '""P'[Jecr,opov Yjyouf'evou; [']ov ""'' E[p]tin'7cr'v 'P67toY
1i'"YeAacr" ').
However, the two leading Megarian factions of Epicurus' day, those of Stilpo
and Diodorus Cronus, were divided in their theories on language. We have
seen in lntrod. 2c ( ii) that Epicurus and Stilpo belong broadly on the same
side of the fence in the debate on language, both holding that names have a
natural relationship with objects; and there is no apparent reason why Epl
curus should in our passage be attacking exponents of Stilpo's theory for in
correct wordusage. Such a charge stands up better if applied to the linguistic
philosophy of Diodorus, which represents the opposite extreme in the debate
as to whether language is natural or conventional. Our chief source for his

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S!

62

l
I

doctrine is Gellius XI -12. Diodorus went beyond the usual conventionalist view
as represented by - Hermogenes in Plato's Cratylus, and asserted that the meaning
of a word :is - determined solely by the intention in the mind of the speaker on
any occasion on which the word is uttered. As a corollary to this he claimed
that ambiguity is impossible; for, provided that the speaker intends one par
ticular maning in employing a word, the word can only have that one meaning,
and if listeners understand the_ word in differing senses the speaker is to be
blamed not for ambiguity but for lack of clarity.
Hermogenes in the Cratylus ( 384 d) had defended his conventionalist thesis by
pointing to the common Greek practice of changing the names of slaves. Diodorus,
at heart a great showman, went one better and actually gave his slaves ridi
culous names. One unfortunate slave, for instance, was named with the
conjunction ' ' AAA& J-'lJ Y , and was no doubt actually produced during debates
as a kind of walking argument ( Ammonius De int. 33, 17 :ff. ; Simplicius
Cat. 27, 18-21 ; cf. Stephanus, De int. 9.20-4). Diodorus' object in doing
this, according to Simplicius (Ioc. cit.) was to prove that any word can be
used to denote something; another purpose, he adds, was to poke fun at
the grammarians' definitions and at those who maintained that language IS
natural.
This theory concurs perfectly with that atta:::kecl by Epicurus in our pas
sage. His description of the opponents as ' yEAOlW [n]w[]
yoE<XfLEvOU '""'

n[&vNaJ fL&Uov f) 'b VOOUfLEVOV

xad ''" AESt '

( V 5-8 sup.) im

mediately remind$ us of Diodorus' subjectivist theory of meaning .and of

anectode of his slaves. Epicurus' remark ( V 3 inf. ff.) that he has already
exposed these opponents' errors in his work On Ambiguity is especially
appropriate if the opponents in question denied the possibility of ambiguity.
And Simplicius' description of Diodorus as Ciet7tct[Sov'to . . . . 'toUr; gJUaet AEyov
-co:.r; e:! vcu 1:& 0Y6jJ.-o::t a.
suggests that Diodorus may have attacked the Epi
cureans, j ust as the opponents in question are shown to have done by' Epi Curus'
words ' &; no"' il.v exwcrt xcdt' -l}f1wv 06" ' (VI 5-6 sup.).

The only problem is one of chronology. It is not certain that Diodorus was
still alive in 296/5 B.C. when Epicurus wrote Book XXVIII. He is said to have
died after being defeated by Stilpo in a dialectical skirmish while ' staying
with ' Ptolemy Soter ( D.L. II 111-2). This occurred either in 307, when Ptolemy
captuied Megara, or during a visit to Egypt at any time up to Ptolemy's death
in 283/2. Zeller ( p. 247 note 7, p. 248 note 2) suggests the former occasion,
citing D .L. II ll5 as evidence that Stilpo never visited Egypt. But all that
Diogenes says there is that Stilpo refused to return to Egypt with Ptolemy in
307, with no implication that he never went there even subsequently. The date
of Diodorus' death thus remains an open question (for further doubts about
Zeller's date, see Furley First Study, p. 131).
However, even supposing that Diodorus was dead by 296/5, we must not forget
that the target of Epicurus' polemic is not a single philosopher but a schooL
And in all probability Diodorus' school continued to flourish after his death
under his pupil Philo. Since Chrysippus, who was opposed to Diodorus' theory
of meaning and ambiguity ( cf. Gellius XI 12), is known to have written an
attack on Philo's work On Meanings ( D.L. VII 191, Chrysippus wrote a work

63

DAVID SEDLEY

IIpo; b IIapt Ol')f1<XO ,fuV <l>[Awvo;), we may guess that at least a part of Dio
dorus' linguistic doctrines lived on in the teachings of Philo, even though Philo
is known to have revised some of Diodorus' logical theories ( Zeller II i, 270-l).
It would seem, then, that the school attacked in our passage is the circle of
Diodorus and Philo. Cf. commentary on 13 IX 1 1 sup. - X 14 sup., where I
argue that the same circle is' again Epicurus' target, and that Epicurus may
have had personal contact with them in debate. See also Introd. 2h for their
stimulating effect on Epicurus as an epistemologist. IV 8-1 inf. The object of
Otcx.AEn:s.t v is probably Ov6p.a.1:a1 or some other neuter plural with a similar

meaning; for o:O]"(o: ( V 1 sup.), if it is correct, and 1toH&. ( V 4 sup.) seem

to refer to something in this sentence. We seem to have here the tail end of
the section beginning at 13 III 8 inf., in which Epicurus explains how he has
revised his earlier linguistic doctrines. IV 3 inf. cro[l E voJ st-co : this, if correct,
may refer to a work in which Metrodorus aired his criticisms, mentioned below
in V 3-8 sup., of the meanings which the school of Diodorus assig:qed to certain
words. For voaTcr&w in this sense, cf. V 7-8 sup. IV 1 inf. taw; (n[w]; Go.,
Vo.; row\: Us.): the reading of the papyrus here confirms the shrewd guess of
Usener ( Gloss. s.v. raw), who comments 1t.os; Neap. ; 7t[&Js; Gomperzius contra
sententiam '. For &:AAIX. y&.p Icrw\; introducing an imaginary objection, see
Denniston p. 105. V 8-12 sup. This represents Epicurus' rnatre doctrine on
the correct use of language, namely that the philosopher may draw his voca
bulary from ordinary usage. See Introd. 2c (ii). V 10-11 sup." fthan&Evtwv
6v6!J-o;'to; : see commentary on 8 V 2. V 11 sup. lStaJ-1Evwv: on this unusual
orthography, see Introd. lg. V 12 sup. - 7 inf. The content of these fourteen
or so lines seems beyond recovery. Vogliano reconstructs 11.12-17 sup. as
follows: xo:to:yi.Ao:crtoy yap I [il>)] n xo:t toOt' crn v, o<<Xf1 I [f'EY y p&]<l! w[a[
1tou Jo[v cruyxalxo:Auf1]f1eYof1, f'[wpo]n:polv il 1 1t]oc[v"l ta[uo: crorpJcrf'"'""
auv]l&[ye<]Y [ . . . . Leaving aside the many grammatical and palaeogra
phical objections to this reconstruction, it is _founded on a :inisapprehension
about the use which Epicurus makes of the Covered Man sophism in 13 IX 1 1
sup. ff. According to Vogliano and Philippson, the sophism fs there used to
illustrate the way in which the Megarians play upon ambiguities in order to
produce paradoxical conclusions. In fact Epicurus' motive in citing the sophism
there is the opposite (see commentary ad loc.) ---.- to reject the linguistic solution
and to argue for a practical one. Thus a -discussion of it in our passage, where
the subject is word-usage, would be quite inappropriate. V 9 inf. - VI 1 sup.
The purpose of this sentence may be t4? argue that certain false wordusages
employed by the Megarians do not arise from any inaccurate metaphorical
usages in ordinary language but from the Megarians' own false doctrines on
meaning. Up to V 3 inf., however, the text is quite insecure. V 6 inf.
!!E'to:.cpop&, given the context must bear its Aristotelian meaning ' metaphors ',
not ' analogical inferences ' as Usener maintains ( Gloss. s.v. p.E:to:.q;op& : '"sic
videtur usurpare ut J-lS'to;&cret'). V 4 inf. 6[1t6 : this may seem hard to accept;
but 6[nEp would give no apparent sense, and Vogliano's t 1tL -ca. &yvwl[cr-c'
o:.]U[1:Wv &1t' &:yv]Wcr-cwv ' contains an elision (&yvw[cr-c') which goes against the
rules for elision observed elsewhere in this papyrus ( see Introd. lg), and
involves an odd use of a1U[,;Wv. UnO with the dative regularly means 'under
the heading of ', ' in the class of ', so that with a genitive it ought to be intel<

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

64

ligible in the sense ' from the class of', although I have found no parallel. Cf.
13 VIII 9 inf., where Epicurus uses 6n:6 with the accusative in an unusual sense.
V 2-1 inf. Ilepl clf1l['f']'oAh : this work is otherwise unattested. Its possible
contents are discussed by Steckel (col. 616); but it may simply have been a
polemic against Diodorus Cronus. VI 1 sup. IJ. As I understand the passage,
' &AAtX yap ' in VI l sup. is used to repeat the imaginary objection of Metrodorus
( in 13 IV 1 inf. V 2 sup.) that a protracted antiMegarian polemic is irrelevant
to the discussion.
13 VI 10 inf.
VII 13 sup. Epicurus here expresses his fear that an
opponent might give rise to a misunderstanding, the exact nature of which
is by no means clear. He is afraid that the opponent might equate ' what used
to be assimilated from ordinary language ' with the practice followed in some
written work (whether a specific work, and if so by whom, is not stated), and
that as a result of this misunderstanding many Epicureans might come to believe
mistakenly that a particular set of expressions formerly represented false opinion
but that now some change in (Epicurean ?) linguistic practice provides guidance
towards the truth. The argument could run roughly as follows. Epicurus has
raised certain problems of inaccurate word-usage (VI 7 inf., &n:opf/J-[a.]'tor.: ; cf.
13 III 3 inf. 7tt8cr1-1oU). An opponent (perhaps, as in the precedlng section, a
Megarian), he fears, might use these problems as ammunition against the school
by pointing to Epicurean works written in earlier days and claiming that thes.e
co-ntain usages borrowed from ordinary language which Epicurus now acknow
ledges to involve false opinion. In this event, he suggests, some Epicureans
might be tempted to defend their position by arguing that the expressions in
question formerly represented false opinion, but that the school now follows
ordinary language with .a discriminating approach which excludes falsity.
The Epicurean work upon which it is suggested an opponent might seize s
presumably one written by Metrodorus, who has already been stated in 1 1 II
to have, in the past, drawn his vocabulary from ordinary language without
regard for the false opinion contained in it (see Introd. 2c (ii)). This explains
why, in replying to the opponent's hypothetical charge in the following section
(13 VII 13 sup. ft.), Epicurus treats it as being a slur on Metrodorus (VII
14 sup., 16 sup., cro[). His reticence about specifying the work in question in
VI 3 inf., then, may simply be a matter of tact.

VI 8 in/. to on : see commentary on 12 III 5-6. VI 6 5 inf. &.7toil,iltiH : used

of an opponents claim also in IlEpl 'f'60EW XIV, 14 III 7, 1 5 ; 15 II 4 ; Ep.

Pyth. 1 13. VI 54 inf. h tfuv [M]EWY cruvoLXE[touv] : see commentary on
12 III l . VI 2 inf. 7toAAo[')<; iXv law<; 06e,E : the theory imagined here is
apparently seen as coming from within the Epicurean school, as in 13 X 14
sup. fl. Nobody oUtside the school would be imagined as using the technical
terminology of VI 1 inf. . VII 9 sup. VI 2 inf. VII 13 sup. The concession
which Epicureans might mistakenly make to their opponent is to argue that
certain expressions formerly ( VI 2-1, -r6-re) represented false opinion : but thc_t
now (VII 9 sup., vUv) the truth can be obtained owing to some change in the
use of language. Epicurus' objection to this concession is, to judge from his
reply in VII 13 sup. - VIII 5 sup., that concrete evidence in the form of human

65

DAVID SEDLEY

"

action is required before it can be established that somebody held a false opinion
in the past. See commentary ad loc. VI 1 inf. Vll 9 sup. These lines are among
the most interesting in the book. - They list all the processes through whiCh
false opinion might be considered to have arisen in the ASE.tt;; under discussion.
The first set of terms (VI l inf . . VII 3 sup.) covers the chief divisions (LoEe<L)
of the thought-process as recognised by Epicurus. I have tried to analyse them
in lntrod. 2d ( i)-( iv). In VII 5-9 sup. an alternative process is suggested
not one of thought at all, but one ' simply arising from an internal movement
(t &[a]u,oO . . . . f10YOV Y.LY')'Lx6v). This must surely (cf. Diano Psicologia
-

1939, pp. 135-6) be ident'cal with the ' ii.AA1JY ccvb. dv')aLV EY -!J f1TY au,or, '
to which Epicurus himself elsewhere attributes all error ( Ep. Hdt. 51). To have
said, without further qualification, that the source of error lay in Tational
thought-processes, which while themselves taking place in the mind must always
make reference to external data, would have been to leave room for the pos
sibility that the cause of error was something in the outside world. There is
no reason why the xVY]crtt;; should not, at least on occasion, be _ part of one of
the thought-processes ; but if it is, it is a purely internal and subjective part.
The listing in our passage of some thought-processes as themselves being possible
sources of error suggests that some Epicureans did not share their master's
cautious view. VII 4 sup. 6rcoceta xil-G<L : d. 6 I 1 1 ; Ep. Hdt. 37; D.L. X 33.
Vll l0-11 sup. 'ii spf11)Yce<[] E'f'e<pf1onoucr1J' xal ore' &H' l.hcG< : on spf10y,o;[CL
in the sense ' means of expression ', ' language ', see commentary oo. 12 III 5-6.
This phrase can be understood as another reference to the waY in which the
Epicureans try to adapt ordinary language to the philosopher's ends; cf. com
mentary on 12 III l. Vll 11-12 sup.Enaywy-1} : this term can hardly here carry
its full Aristotelian sense of ' induction '. Its basic meaning, as used by Hippo
crates, Plato and Xenophon, and in the anonymous Llcrcrol A6yo, is the backing
up of an argument by an appeal to independent testimony ( see Tayler, Varia
Socratica, pp. 105, 112-3), and it is in this sense that it should be taken here
( cf. 10 I a 17). Vll 12 sup. h "ii' OLe<crtoA'!i : it is not at all clear what sort
'
of ' discrimination ' is intended - perhaps that between the primary and me
taphorical meanings of words ( see lntrod. 2c (ii)).
13 Vll 13 sup . . IX 11 sup. Epicurus now offers his reply to the attack
imagined in the preceding section, and reco,mmends the process which he calls
En:tAoytaOt; as a means of tackling it. in Introd. 2d (v) I have examined
the use of E.ntAoylccr{hxt and cognate forms in Epicurean writings, and have
concluded that they regularly carry the connotation of reasoning from observa
tion or experience in such a way as to minimise the pitfalls of false deductive
logic In our passage En:AoytcrO is invoked as a method of judging the
correctness of opinions, and the use of it is divided according to the distinction
between two types of opinion. Group (1) seems to include all opinions which
have a direct bearing on human activity. Group (2) covers the kind of spe
culative physical theory about 1:&: &OY)Act. contained in the Letter to Herodotus.
These two groups are specified not only in our passage but also in XI 8 sup. '
in. A 06a in group ( l ) is variously distinguished as being "P"Yf'"""-1} (XI
14 sup.; cf. X 8-9 sup.) and m:pl rcpxewv ( by implication from VIII 6 in!. ) ;
-

CRONACHE ERCOLANESJ

66

and it is plain from the context that the two expressions are intended as
synonyms. Opinions in group (2) are ex "ou lieWP1JHXOU f1Epou, . (VIII 4-:l
inf.; cf. XI 16 sup:). On the term lieWp1JHXO, see Introd. 2d (iv). The use of
em),oy<Of10' proceeds as follows. If an opinion belongs to group ( l), you will
he able to see whether it is true by observing the advantageousness or disadvan
tageousness of the actions that .are based on it. If the opinion belongs to group
(2), you will apparently not, if it is true, be able to observe its truth directly;
but if it is false you will see its falsity (VIII 6 in. - IX 2 sup.) either (a) when
it leads to the assertion of .a nontheoretical opinion which you know to be
false (IX 2-5 sup., XI 17 sup. - 8 in.), or (b) when it leads indirectly to an
action which you can see to be disadvantageous (IX 5-9 sup., XI 8-5 inf.) ;
and if neither ( a) nor (b) occurs, you will be able to infer that the opinion
is correct ( IX 9-ll sup.).

How far does the truth-criterion described here in group ( 1 ) resemble the
process of Enq.tap'tU pi]crtt; as conceived by Epicurus? In the example of Epi
curean ETCtf'O:P"UP'lJO'' given by Sextus (Math. VII 212), the opinion that the
man now approaching is Plato is confirmed o ' aln:1)t; t1)t; Evrxpye[IX when the
man draws close enough to be recognised; whereas according to the method
outlined in our passage it would presumably be necessary to wait and assess
the practical consequences of the assumption that the man is Plato (e.g. ' Does
he respond if I say ' Hello, Plato '?). However, this example given by Sextus is
nothing more than a simple illustration of the everyday reliability of sense-per
ception, and is not meant to exemplify the solution of the questions which Epicurus
classifies a's ncpl. np&cwv. For him, as for most Greek philosophers, the most
important questions about the sphere of human activity are in some sense
ethical - the causes of human behaviour, how men are capable of behaving,
how they ought to behave, and so on.
The recommendation in our passage that opinions ncpl np&;cwv should be
judged by an examination of their practical" consequences accords well with
Epicurus' utilitarian principles, according to which moral doctrines are largely
derived from empirical observations of What Is, and what is not, advantageous
and productive of happiriess, and something which is good or just in one situa
tion can be bad or unjust in another, depending on whether or not it can be
seen to be advantageous at the time ( Ep. Men. 130; KL'. XXXI-XXXVIII ;
Hermarchus fr. 24 Krohn
Porph. De abst. I 7-12). That he regards this
method of assessing ethical opinions as a kind of Ettq.trxp-cU pi]m is clear fr0m
K6 XXXVII: ' Among those actions which are legally sanctioned as just,
whatever the evidence shows to be advantageous ('tO . . . . Snq.tap-cu poUp.evov 0-t
cru.cppc) in terms of men's social needs is guaranteed as being just, whether
or not it is the same for all people. But if someone makes a law which turns

out not to accord with what is socially advantageous, it eases to be essentially

just. And even if what proves advantageous in the field of j ustice is subject
to variation, but fits our preConception (npOAf)tJ; v : viz. of advantage) for a
time, those who instead of confusing themselves with empty words simply look
at the facts cannot say that it was, during that time, any the less just '.
This ethical kind of lnq.taptUpi]O" corresponds with method (l ) in our passage.
However, the category ncpl np&;swv covers not only moral evaluations but
also opinions about what it is possible to do, as is shown by the example of

67

DAVID SEDLEY

'

the Covered Man riddle which he goes on to discuss (see below, IX ll sup. fl.,
and commentary ad loc.). In fact, it is quite probably intended to embrace all
opinions which can be said to have a direct bearing on human behaviOur. For
instance, Epicurus would expect belief in astrology, or in divine retributio,
to affect a man's actions adversely ( cf. Polystratus, quoted below). He does
not appear to distinguish specifically between descriptive and evaluative sta
tements.
We now move on to the theoretical opinions dealt with in group (2). These
are the opinions about the invisible, for which Epicurus does not assign
to the senses any power of Snq.to:.p'tUpJ7CH, but only of &v'tqtetp1:Up1Jcr-;; ,
in the absence of which a theoretical opinion may be accepted as true.
This principle, as outlined by Sextus ( Math. VII 212-6), is followed m
our passage, with the modification that liv-cq.lo:.p'tUpi]O to an opinion is to be
supplied by a resulting incorrect statement or action. Elsewhere it is said to be
supplied by direct observation of physical phenomena, such as the visible fact
of motion, which testifies against the Stoic denial of void (Sextus loc. cit. ; cf.
also Ep. Hdt. 47, 48, 55 ; Ep. Pyth. 88, 92; IIopl '!"!crow<; II, C I 23 - G I 2
Vogliano
[24.] [41] 1.18 [42j 1.2 Arr.; Philodemus IIP"W"'''"'' col.
XXIX 16, Diano Lettere p. 15
Us. 212
[137] Arr.).
The chief novelty in our passage is method (2b), according to which a false
theoretical opinion may indirectly lead to a manifestly disadvantageous action
which will show it to be false. Someone holding a false theoretical opinion
may, instead of stating the nontheoretical consequences of it, proceed to tran
slate these con:::equences into action ; and then it will not be, as in method (a),
his words, but his actions, that give him away. For example, an atq_.mist who
does not believe i n the Epicurean swerve of atoms may proceed ,from this to
the visibly false opinion that all human actions are predetermined. But instead
of stating this opinion, he may go o far as to act on the assumption that it ls
true, perhaps by refusing to make decisions for himself on the gr0unds that the
future is already fixed. Thus the theoretical opinion will be exposed as false
by the visibly disadvantageous action to which it indirectly leads.
The significance of the set of criteria prescribed in our passage is that they
shift the emphasis from the objective value of truth, as being whatever account
accords with th e phenomena, to its ethical value as the bas for happiness,
correct action, and, ultimately, the good life. This presupposition of a direct link
between knowledge of the truth and the good life is the unstated raison d'etre
of much Greek philosophy, however elliptical it may seem in :niodern eyes.
The most explicit Epicurean examples of this utilitarian concept of truth occur
in the work flspl &AOyou xa'to:.-:p povcrE.W by Polysratus. In attacking belief in
the supernatural and in the unreality of the physical world, he states that the
rOle of cpp6Yijcr is to dispel empty fears, and that this cannot be done &vsu
-coO s1:&.crav-ca yv fuvcx.L Ou 1:2t rcxplxov-c:x 1:[7Jv 1:]apax11 v .Scr'tt tPwO[iJ . . . . '
(Ia 3-7). Throughout the surviving part of the work, and especially in XXb
3 XXIIIa 13, he takes as his ultimate criterion the bad life which results from
being deceived by the doctrines of his opponents. Clearly the critical method
advocated by Epicurus in Book XXVIII became incorporated into the mainstream
of his school's doctrines.
=

VII 13 sup. VIII 5 sup. Epicurus here urges Metrodorus to defend himself

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I '

68

against t4e imputation imagined in 13 VI 10 inf. VII 13 sup. ( see commentary

ad loc.), and recommends him to turn to EmAcycrJ.16 for support. He has argued
in that passage against regarding certain words as having formerly represented
false opinion but as no longer doing so. To take this view, he may feel, is to
accede to Diodorus Cronus' subjectivist theory of meaning (attacked in 13 IV
8 inf. VI 15 sup.; see commentary ad loc.),_ which equates the meaning of a
word with the intention in the mind of the speaker whilst uttering it. Epicurus
himself relates the meaning of a word more to its form than to its usage ( cf.
Introd. 2c (ii)), and is therefore reluctant to accept any claim that the words
under discussion have changed their meaning, in the absence of incontrovertible
evidence. This seems to be why EntAoyLcrj.i6; is now brought in. Epicurus demands
evidence in the form of observed human action as proof of changes in opinion.
The text, however, is a little obscure, and the interpretation must remain que
stionable. VII 18 sup. ml.[6Jyt[o]c v : the faculty of empirical reasoning, see
.
Introd. 2d (v). Vl!B-5 inf. ljnsp -i;vixa '"A.: the whole clause is very obscurely
expressed. The asyndeton in 1.5 inf. makes improbable Greek, and the text may
well be corrupt. If it is to be taken as it stands it may, as my tentative tran
slation suggests, be intended to express the contrast between the former and
current senses of a word. I am quite unclear as to the rOle in it of the term
&.val.oyto[tjx1) VII 5 inf. (]8oal;;no : for Epicurus' use of oocl(of'"' as a

middle deponent, cf. VII 1 inf., and Ep. Men. 126. Vll 4 inf. wv owvw[v] :
i.e. evidence in the form of observed action, as in VII 8 inf. V1/ 2 inf. -rOy y '
.
&cr'Cto!J- : presumably the opponent first mentioned in 1 3 VI 7 inf. ( Diodorus or
one of his followers?) is seen here as claiming to have altered the usage a word.
Vll 1 inf. VII! 1 sup. 8oas"o : see commentary on VII 5 inf. VI!I 3-5 sup.
Epicurus now apparently gives a reason for demanding unmistakeable proof of
an opponent's claim to have altered an opinion : the opinion itself is not an
empirical one related to current circumstances, and cannot therefore be assumed
to have changed as the circumstances themselves have changed. E:ntAY]'tDt V :
see Introd. 2d (i). VI!l 5 sup. IX 1 1 sup. Epicurus now approaches in more
general terms the question of whether it can be reliably said that false opinion
was held in the past. He seems to feel that EntAoytcrp..6 must always be the ultimate
test of truth and falsity, and that if it has not in the past been possible to study
the practical consequences of an opinion one must wait until the opportunity
does arise ( VIII 5-14 sup.). He then proceeds to his analysis (discussed above
in commentary on 13 VII 1 3 sup. - IX ll sup.) of the appl'cation of omAoyw6
to opinions. VI!I 7-9 sup. The text gives f; . . . . fjq.tsV where f;t . . . . Yjov would
be the correct orthography
a strange confusion. Perhaps in the archetype
a corrector had added a missing l in the wrong place. Vlll 8 sup. [s]'(t f.t]Y)

should strictly, like !J-Y]Xn, mean ' no longer ' ; but if the two words are not
taken too closely togther they ought to be intelligible in the sense 'still . . . -. . not'
In Ilpl cpUcrew XI 'v, 16 II 12, Epicurus extraordinarily seems even to use oUxnt
in the sense ' not yet '. VI1/ 13 sup. see above, commentary on VII 18 sup. VIll
12-14 sup. i1 y ( ,X y ) . . . . . '!'ihjcrs[t]at : this construction of el< y + future
=

indicative, dismissed by Philippson as .a ' grammatical impossibility ' ( 1932, col.

1458), is in fact attested in Hellenistic prOse. Mayser (II i, 285 ; iii, 91) gives
two certain instances of it from Ptolemac papyri and two more from Greek

69

DAVID

SEDLEY

fables, as well as (II i, 284-5) many Ptolemaic instances of E.Xv with other tenses
of the indicative. There is a possible parallel in Epicurus lizpL cpUcrcw) PHere.
1056, 7 X 3ff. (Piano Ethica p. 43), where I read ' O.v oe p.oj "' "ou"o chcoods\r
p.1)o ' EX<' "-"A. ' (p.-i) < o u >o ' [[ x]sc Diano). Here however, as often, the official
explanation is that c is a variant-- spelling of the subjunctive termination r]t
( Croner! MGH p. 37; Diano ad Joe. ; cf. Mayser II iii, 91 ; Mayser-Schmoll I i,
02). In our passage the future tense is integral to the argument, a contrast
being intended between sUihl[ ] ( 1 0 sup.) and lhe< v [ 6] ""' po[ n]xpc<[oc ]owe
( 14 sup.), and is in fact maintained throughout the lines that follow, right
down to IX ll sup. VIII 16 sup. """"1JV = ooc<v. VIII 10-9 inf. ><iXP'l"[ac]
"["6"]s[c] "sl ><[c]voj[crcc] :
cf. Ep. lidt. 66. On the orthography, see lntrod.
1g. VIII 9-6 inf. The language is awkward, but the sense is apparently that
the man who uses EnAoytcrp,O will, when the correct opportunity arises, discover
the truth by looking at the actions which result from the holding of a given
opinion. The Aristotelian formula that all action consists of choice and avoidance
is fundamental to Epicurean psychology and ethics ( Aristotle De motu an. VIII;
Epicurus Ep. Men. 128, 1 29, 132 ; Kll XXV; ap. D.L. X 27; ap. Cicero Fin. I 7;
22
Us. 243). VIII 9 inf. This use of uno + accusative is unusual. Aristotle
often uses 'tcb:'tccr-&a.t UnO + accusative in the sense ' to be placed in the category
of ' (e.g. Cat. 1 b 16), and I take it that UnO carries a similar sense here. VIII
8 inf. e<u,ojv = "-iJv "XtV"Y)oL'I. VIII 6 inJ. IX sup. Up to this point the discussion
has applied only to 06a rccpl npricwv, as must have been specified in the missing
lines following VIII 18 sup. ( cf. XI 13-14 sup.). For Epicurus, ooe<L 1tLP1Jn><ctt
( see lntrod. 2d ( i)) include all opinions which concern the visible world, by
contrast with 06ca -&ewp7Jnxcd, which concern that which lies bey-2nd the rarige
of perception. They thus cove.t both purely descriptive opinio.ns, su-ch as that
the man now approaching is Plato, and opinions nepl ttp&swv) which are, broadly
speaking, ethical ( see above, commentary on 13 VII 13 sup. IX l l sup.). Now,
simple descriptive opinions are extraneous to the current 'discussion, since they
require nothing more elaborate than direct confirmation by the senses: hence
the -need for Epicurus' parenthesis in VIII 53 in., without which the phrase
8'Jat . . . . !J.Y) 1te:pl npiewv elcrl.v 1:Wv Oof6J1v might appear to include this ir
relevant class of opinions as well as that of 06"' &swp"Y)nxat. VIII 5-3 inf. The
grammatical construction of this parenthesis is a little confused. The genitive,
1:Wv oUx. &nAr]'txWv) seems to arise b y attraction to th case of 'tOOY OofWlv in
5 in., wlrile the nominative oUcro:.t is in apposition to OcraL in 6 in. ( cf. KUhner=

Gerth I 283-4). VIII 2 inf. For this resumptive use of oi;c see Denniston 182-3.
VIII 1 inf.

IX 1 sup.

Ejf"Xo1uH[o]ycop.[o]il :

th surviving letters indicate

either Aoytcr!J.OO or some compound thereof, which in the context would most
probably be &ve<Aoyoop.oil or cruHoyoop.oO. Although for Epicurus auHo y t:;ca&ao
and cruAAoycrf-1-6 seem to denote reasoning in general, and not any specific
form of deduction or induction ( cf. 13 X 16 sup., and commentary ad loc.),
they do sometimes act as a non-technical variant for &vaAoy[ ecrit-at and &vr:xAo
"(tcr!-16, in the sense of inference from the visible to the invisible (Ep. Pyth. 1 1 2 ;
llspl cpuocw XIV, fr. 1 col. IV, 1 7 ; cf. Philodemus Sign. XVI 32, XXXVI 35),
and are thus terminologically appropriate in our passage. IX 25 sup. CA),o

CRONACHE ERCOLANE I

70

n . . . . . . tWV &swp1)txWv. With some hesitation I side with Diano (if I have
correctly understood his paraphrase of this passage in Psicologia 1939, p. 136)

against Vogliano, Philippson, Von Fritz and Arrighetti, in taking this phrase
to mean not ' something else belonging to ta &swp7]nx& ', but - , something other
than tO: &cwp)jtxti'. Grammatically such a construction is possible ( Ki.ihnerGerth
I 401; cf. Xenophon Men. 4.4.25, do ilcxo:'" . . . . f) &Ua '"JV il':><o:cwv'), even J
ambiguous. This interpretation is borne out by the phrase 1:
'toO Entj.l[ctp]
'tru1p1)&7]cro[p.-.vo in 13 XI 17-20 sup., which occurs in a sentence whose sense clo

sely parallels that of ours. It clearly suggestS ' a non-theoretical opinion ' (see com
mentary ad Joe.). IX 2-9 sup. v "" " Y) &Uo n . . . . . Aiy<o&a,
Y) ' < &v >.. . . . Elo
&ywm v . . . . . : an anacoluthon, noted by Usener in his Glossarium Epicureum
(see Vogliano's commentary ad Joe.). IX 9-11 sup. av ill: 1-'>Jill:v "ou,wv (sc.
yEY7]'tO:. ?) refers back to the two kinds of counterevidence to theoretical opinions
listed in IX 2-9 sup..IX 10 sup. ::: U cruv&sWp)j'tOY is a hapax-legomenon.
. . . .

13 IX 11 sup. - X 14 sup. The use of End.oytcrp,6; in exposing false opinions

is now illustrated with the example of the famous Megarian sophism usually
entitled ' 6 Eyxcxo:.Au!l-jtE:vo A6yot;:; ,, which claims to prove that it is possible
to know and not know the same thing, by getting an opponent to concede that
he knows his own father but does not know the veiled man before him (who
happens to be his father).
The riddle is attributed to the Megarian philosopher Eubulides of Samos, but
without any specific statement that he invented it (D.L. II 103). It was already
wellknown by the mid-fourth century, since Eubulides' contemporary Aristotle
discusses it in his work On Sophistical Refutations ( 179a 39 b4) . Later on
we find it associated with another Megarian, Diodorus Cronus (D.L. II Ill),
a pupil's pupil of Eubulides ; and later still with the Stoics (D.L. VII 82),
especially Chrysippus (Lucian Vit. auctio 22-3), who wrote a work on it
( D.L. VII 198).
According to Vogliano (Scripta p. 105) Epicurus' discussion of the riddle is
directed against Eubulides. But this cannot be right, since the present tense
(IX 12 sup., 16 sup.) indicates that he has a contemporary, or contemporaries,
in mind. If any particular Megarian grOup is intended, it is likely to be that of
Diodorus. Epicurus has already polemicised a few columns earlier against the
do-ctrines of Diodorus' circle ( 13 IV 8 in. VI 15 sup.; see commentary ad
loc.) ; and moreover this riddle was so closely associated with Diodorus that
some sources even anachronistically assigned to him the invention of it (-D.L.
II 1 1 1).
Epicurus has reached a point in his argument where he needs to give an example
of a false opinion which can he exposed by EnLAoycrJ-.16-.;. For such a purpose
any of a thousand false opinions would do. Yet what he picks on is once again
one of Diodorus' arguments. Now why did this seemingly trivial riddle rouse
Epicurus to such indignation, instead of merely amusing him? I do not believe
that Diodorus used riddles purely for the sake of entertainment. Much that we
know of his arguments suggests that, like Zeno of Elea, he hoped to bring the
skill of the dialectician to hear in defence of the doctrines of Parmenides. For
example, he had four arguments for the impossibility of motion which usefully
complemented those of Zeno ( Zeller II i 266-9). And another sophism which

71

DAVID SEDLEY

came traditionally to be associated with him can also be seen as Eleatic in its
intentions. This is the Sorites (Cicero Acad. pr. II 49, 92; Persius Sat. VI 78;
D.L. VII 82), which attempts to show the self-contradictory nature of the concept
.
of a ' heap ', and thence presumably of all pluralities. Another Megarian version
of this paradox is the Bald Man (D.L. II lOS; Horace Ep. II 1, 45), which asks
how many hairs a man can have and still be bald.
In addition to the seemingly Eleatic function of these dialectical puzzles, there
is the general weight of doxographical tradition, which represents the Megarian
school as a whole as the heirs of Parmenides and Zeno, subscribing to the Eleatic
tradition of dialectic, and to the denials of motion, change, plurality, and the
value of sense evidence (Cicero Acad. pr. II 129 ; D.L. II 106; Aristocles ap.
Eusebius Praep. ev. XIV 17).
Surely the riddle of the Covered Father, and the others which claimed to prove
the same paradox that it is possible to know and not know the same thing (see
commentary on IX 18 sup.), were used not simply to baffie opponents (the view
of Zeller, II i 265), or to illustrate a point of logic (the view of M. Kneale,
pp. 114-5), but to back up the Eleatic thesis that there can be no true knowledge
of the physical world, by demonstrating that such knowledge does not preclude
ignorance. A realist like Epicurus, belonging as he did to that minority which
defended the reliabilily of ordinary sense-evidence, was easy prey for such an
attack. See further, Introd. 2b. This supposition would also help explain why
in his discussion of the riddle Epicurus uses the verb EnCa't:GGa{hx. In the sense
of knowing a person it is rare; but it regularly, like the cognate noun bncr1:-f]p.1),
bears the connotation of ' scientific knowledge '.
The riddle is better suited to oral than to written exposition,' and indeed Epicurus'
description of it in our passage implies that he has recently witnessed its use in
debate, perhaps in a direct confrontation between Epicureans and Megarians.
Such a clash must almost certainly have occurred in Athens. We" may assume
that Diodorus and Philo ,spent much of their time in Athens, for the young
Zeno, who had made his home there, had frequent contact with both (D.L.
VII 16, 25).
Epicurus starts by offering his own solution to the sophism. The text breaks off
at the crucial point (IX 18 sup.), but since the sophism has been brought in to
illustrate the importance of EntAoytap.6.; in examining opinions, and since' the
man who is defeated by the sophism is later (X 4-9 sup.) criticised for failing
to see that the riddle is about actions, thea- general sense of the lost lines ought
to be roughly as I have indicated in the translation. Epicurus cannot be saying,
absurdly, that the man confronted with the sophist's paradox that it is possible
to know and not know the same thing should immediB;tely look at the practical
consequences of believing the paradox to be true. Since the sophist presumably
does not base his every action on the assumptiOn of it truth, such evidence is
hardly likely to be immediately available. The correct. Epicurean retort to the
sophist must be to say, ' You have asked me a question about actions, and a
purely verbal argument can never answer it satisfactorily. The only proof- that
I will accept is an empirical one (EntAoytcrf.LO). Only when I see how one can
lead one's life well according to the principle that it is possible to know and
not know the same thing will I believe that the princ'ple is true '. (Cf. D.L.
.
X 34: 1:Wv u:. t;,YjT.crcwv ( sc. AEyoucrL v of 'EntxoUpctot) E.! VGGt 1:&.; p.E:v ncpl -cGJv
'

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I , 72

ttpXYft'hwv, "'" lie nepl <j;LAV "v 'f'WVV ' . Cf. also the retort of the Epicurean
Colotes to the Megarian Stilpo's denial of predicability (Plutarch Adv. Col.
ll19d ff., quoted above in Introd. 2c ( iil. ' nw; yit.p (O)OOftO{}G< . . . . . ; '.
When the text resumes after the lacuna, he is describing ( IX 10 inf. ff.), by
way of contrast, the reaction of someone who does not employ bttAoycr[J-6,
and is thus tricked by the sophist into retracting his original assertion that
it is impossible to know and not know the same thing. The man laughs, and
claims that he has been tricked by a mere linguistic convention into the para
doxical concession that it is possible to know and not know the same thing.
This reference to a linguistic convention (IX 4-3 inf.) is not, as others have
taken it ( Philippson 1932, col. 14.60; Fritz p. 74; Arrighetti p. 622) Epicurus'
own solution to the riddle (i.e. ' The word (( know )) is ambiguous '). On the
contrary, he puts it as an excuse into the mouth of the man who does not use
EnAoycr[J-6, as proof of what he says in the next sentence (X 4-9 sup.): that
this man is fooled because he does not realise that the sophist's question is about
actions ( npay[.Lcx;-nx6v, 8-9 sup.), Le. not about mere words. He then sums up
the error of the sophist's victim as failure to work out by Emoyw[J-6 (oiJ.x
EnsAeA6ycr'to, 10 sup.) that in normal circumstances it is impossible to know
and not know the same thing, and that the sophist has merely played upon an
exception to this rule.
IX 16-17 sup. 'ov cruy>tExe<AUftfteVOft [tte<],ip<:<: the usual title of this riddle
uses the form Eyxsxo:.Au[.Lp.Evot;. The covered man is a ' father ' also in Lucian,
Vit. auctio 22-3. IX 18 sup. 't& [to]aU'tC C other riddles which set out to prove
that it is possible to know and not know the same thing are the Electra (D.L.
II 108; Lucian Vit. A uctio 22), and the Approaching Man (6 npocr L w v , Aristotle
Soph. el. 179a 33 ff. ; ps. Alexander In soph. el. 161). The latter, however, may
be Aristotle's own example. The Hidden Man (6 OwJ,av&&vwv, 0 oaAe),YJ%W,
D.L. II 108, VII 82, 198) is usually taken to be another version of this riddle,
although our sources tell us nothing beyond its title. IX 10 inj.;6-5 inf. &y]vwcr"'
Ex vet -est &noxpcre : on the orthography, see Introd. lg. IX 4-3 inf. Bx 1:Yot;
{}Lof100 AEeW : cf. 12 III ll-12, and commentary ad loc. X 1 sup. oM', fol
lowing Wcr-cs in IX 3 inf., shows that we are now in oratio obliqua, w.ith oUO'
&pvl]-&[ijvcu] standing for oU with the indicative in oratio recta. Otherwis we
should expect ftli'. See Kiihner-Gerth II 188-9. Epicurus uses &pvoOft"' only as
a passive deponent ; cf. X 2-1 inf., XI 7 sup., 13 sup. X 3 sup. OO'f'W' :
cf.
IX 7 inf. cro'f'lcrft""' ; X 7-8 cro'f''cr'wv, 12 crG'f'W' ; Ilepl 'f'licrsw, XIV, K II 18,
O"Of'O"'teUov'ta. ; D.L. X 7 croqncrnxv. Epkurus' use of crOtJa't and cognate
forms maintains the usual pejorative connotation found in Plato (see Guthrie
III 27-34), anrl has no bearing on the later use of the word within the Epicurean
school (D.L. X 26), on which see Koerte pp. 552-4; Hubbell p. 255; Castaldi,
Epicurei genuini ed epicurei sofisti. X 4 sup. &:v-cxE. [.LEYW : i.e. in contradiction
to what he is later forCed to assert. This sense can be gathered from the contrast
between the man's first and subsequent assertions which Epicurus is making
whtm the text resumes at IX 10 in., and which I have tried to indicate in my
translation of that passage. X 7-8 sup. The phiase ' Wcrnsp 'tv[E:] 'tWY OOiJcr'tWv'
is translated ambiguously by Vogliano (Scripta p. 106) and Philippson ( 1 929,
p. 145), but is taken, correctly in my opinion, by Fritz ( p. 74) and Arrighetti

73

DAVID SEDLEY

( p. 622) to refer not to [o]lnt sno.[ot\]fLsvo;

but just to

sGAo:p[ou]f1EVo;.

X 8-9 sup. npayp.a'tt'XOv Asyxo v : npa.yt-tanx6: here bears the same meaning as
'
in XI 14 sup., and is used interchangeably with 1tepl 1tpciswv (VIII 6 in!.), ' concerned with actions '. D.syxo has its full technical sense of a .' dialectical refuta
tion ', as in Aristotle's llepl crotcr'ttxWv E.AE>rxwv . X 10-14 sup. To say, as Philip
pson ( 1 932, col. 1459) and Arrighetti ( 'Em!.. p. 136) do, thatS"ItEAEAoyco"o is used
here in a non-technical sense ( ' considered') is to miss the whole point of the argu
ment. It is precisely because he did not recognise the need for E.n:tAoytcrtJ.6,;, in the
technical sense discussed in Introd. 2d ( v), that the sophist's victim was fooled
by the riddle. 'itetb:ot here serves its regular function of introducing the speaker's
own objection to an opponent's point of view. With EtteAeA6ytcrw Epicurus
carelessly pases from a primary to a historic sequence, and continues to fluctuate
between the two right up to XI 4 inf. It is not clear whether the past tenses are
intended in a gnomic or historic sense.
13 X 14 sup. - XI 4 inf. Having shown that m!.oycafL6' can expose the falsity
of the Megarian fallacy, Epicurus considers another possible solution to the
same fallacy, and uses bnAoytcrp.6 to demonstrate that it is an invalid solution.
The solution under consideration, which could seem to follow naturally upon
Epicurus' explanation (X 10-14 sup.) that the fallacy plays upon an exception
to a general rule, is that the sophist's victim, having conceded that in one par
ticular instance it is possible to know and not know the same thing, is forced
.into the false inductive inference that the same is also universally ( 'X.Cd xcdM Aou,
X 13 sup.) true. It is clear from what follows that Epicurus taught that genera
lisations are a frequent source of error (XI 9-5 inf. ; XII 7-12 sup.), and we
may therefore guess that this solution in terms of invalid generalisation is one
which had been thrown up in discussions within the Epicuren school.
Epicurus' reply to the proposed solution is that a man who is persuaded that
some proposition is universally true is bound immediately to reflect this belief
in his behaviour; whereas we know from our own experience i cf. XI 3-4 sup.,
fLO:[p'v ]pso o' au'o' o:6,wc) that people who are tricked by sophists into making
paradoxical assertions do not immediately act according to them. It is no n:lore
likely that the man who is forced to concede that it is possible to know and not
know the same thing will adjust his behaviour to fit this priciple than, for inStallce,
that the man who cannot refute Zeno's paradoxes of the impossibility of motion
will immediately stop moving.
Although strongly reminiscent of Aristotle's so-called ' practical syllogism (e.g.
De an. 434a 16-21; De mot. an. VII; E.N. 1147a 24ff.) whih supposes a quasi-lo
gical sequence between the acceptance of a universal {xa%6Aou) principle and
action in accordance with it, Epicurus' theory is, in terms of lo-gic, inferior. For
Aristotle correctlY -demands the recognition of a minor premise - the prin
ciple's applicability in a particular instance (xa&' Exaa'tov ) - before an action
can follow. Epicurus, with his usual distaste for logical niceties, seems specifi
cally to reject this proviso (XI 8-13; see commentary ad loc."). He perhaps assumes
too readily that a ' universal ' opinion is by definition appliCable in all situations,
and that therefore recognition of its applicability in a particular instance is
superfluouS. Aristotle himself is prepared to admit that we do not waste time
reflecting on obvious minor premises: for example, if we hold that ' walking

CRONACHE ERCOLANES I

74

is good for a man ' we do not pause to reflect ' I am a man ' (De motu an.
70la 25-8). But strictly he would still insist that a minor premise, even if
presupposed rather than consciously Iecognised, is essential before action can
ensUe. Epicurus' attitude on the other hand, is one of common sense rather
than of strict logic : for all practical purposes, he feels, a universal opinion is
one that can affect our behaviour at any time. While Aristotle's examples of
' universal ' premises are sometimes as restricted as ' I need something to cover
me', Epicurus clearly has in mind opinions of much wider significance, such as
' All actions are causally necessitated ', or ' All perception is illusory '. If someone
expresses such an opinion, but does not act in a particular instance as if it
were true, it cannot be said to be a 'universal ' opinion, since here is one
situation in which he manifestly does not believe that it applies. This attitude,
taken, at its face value, leaves many important questions unanswered, in parti
cular with regard to such factors in human behaviour as weakness of will in
sincerity ; but it cannot be assumed from the brief and elliptical discussion in
our text that Epicurus did not tackle these elsewhere.
X I4 sup. I inf. The difficulty of previous editors in understanding 14 sup. ff.
(witness Fritz p. 75) stems partly from a failure to see that this is not
a continuation of the preceding argument but the beginning of a new one,
and partly from a failure to construe 14-20 sup. intelligibly. The difficulty
vanishes if we construe "tot; p.Yj cru),Aoyd;op.Evot 1:Yjv Ow.cpopci.v as depending
on Cl.v e.oo;s ( ' he would have seemed to those who did not reason out the
difference '), and the clause introduced by Wcrnep as depending on Op.ot6v n
( ' a fate like that of someone who ': for O!J.OLo followed by a relative clause,
see LSJ s.v. OfJ-OLO BS). Thus l!.v llooe becomes the apodosis of a conditional
clause, the protasis of which is represented by 'to1 p.Yj cruAAoytop.Evot.; 'tY}Y
Oto:cpopliv ; and 't'l)V Otatpop&v has a clear reference ( see below, commentary on X
9-1 inf.). X 16 sup. We have here a non-technical use cruAAoySecr-&ca ( cf. commenta
ry on VIII 1 ini. - IX sup.), just as in Aristotle's phrase cruAAoytcr1:ov C'l) xed
"""''IV "Yjv OWqJop&v ' (E.N. llOla 34). X 9-I inf. When the text resumes, Epi
curus is explaining the difference ( t'l)v Oto:r.pop&v, X 17 sup.; XI 2 sup., 2 inf.)
between the sophist's victim .and the man who is forced into a universal assertion.
If I have indicated the sense correctly in my translation, he defines a universal
assertion as follows (X 9-7 inf. ) : that, while it may well originate from some
sort of empirical study of individual instances, it must at any rate be expressed
in the manner characteristic of universal assertions. The assertion into which
the sophist forces his victim has neither of these features (X 7-l inf.).
It is not immediately clear what is meant by the manner in which universal
assertions are made ' ( E.x[ vwt ye tGiL 1:p6-rtwL Wt xa-&6Aou Op.oAoyd"tat, X 9-7
in.
E v 'CO!hoH "tGit tp6ttwt. X 4-3 inf.). Epicurus may have in mind something
of a purely verbal nature - the words in which the assertion is expressed. But
it would suit the coi1text better if we were to understand this ' manner ' as a
forward reference to the kind of action which characteristically accompanies a
universal assertion, and which he now proceeds to describe (XI 3 sup. ff.).
X 7-6 inf. omcHAo"os : see lntrod. 2d ( i).
X I inf. XI 4 inf. To underline the difference between being forced to concede
a paradox and making a universal assertion, Epicurus now proceeds to describe
the behaviour which typically accompanies a universal assertion, but which is

75

DAVID SEDLEY

It

absent when the assertion is not universal. In doing so, he reverts to the division
which he has laid down above ( 13 VIII 10 inf. - IX 1 1 sup.) for the manifesta
tions of true and false opinions. ( 1) If the universal assertion concerns actions
it immediately leads to some act. (2) It if is a ' theoretical ' opihion, it will either
lead to some false statement about the perceptible world, or indirectly become
the cause of an incorrect action. Once again ( cf. above, commentary on 13 VII
13 sup. - IX 1 1 sup.) he only considers the possibility of an incorrect non-theore
tical statement or action resulting from a theoretical opinion. The statement or
action could of course be correct, but if so it would not be identifiable as
deriving from the theoretical opinion. For example, belief in an incorrect theory
of elements, which taught that matter was liable to disintegrate into nothing at
any moment, might be expected to leave an easily recognisable mark on a man\
behaviour; but knowledge of the true nature of atoms could not manifest itself
in a comparable may. Epicurus does not apparently tell us how a true theoretical
opinion is to be recognised as being universal - unless this question received
a brief mention in the lost lines following XI 19 sup. XI 3 sup. ff. We now
suddenly switch back from a historic to a primary sequence, which continues
down to XI 15 sup. To add to the confusion, the final clause in XI 6-7 uses an
optative as if we were stm in a historic sequence: this is indefensible gramma
tically, but perhaps has something in common with the examples listed by Weber
( Entwickelungsgeschichte der A bsichtssiitze, pp. 101-2) and Kuhner-Gerth (II
3823) of the optative occurring in a final clause in primary sequence where the
notion of a past tense is inherent but suppressed. Cf. also Mayser II i 283.
XI 5-6 sup. [xi<]f1 f1Up'<ht; : cf. KL'. XXXV. XI 6 sup. For f1-/j introducing a
final clause, cf. 13 IV 9 sup., XII 3 inf. ( Mayser II i 237, II iii 81 ; Widmann
H0-1). XI 5-8 sup. Of'OA[o ]rost , Em vdoe[t] : the termination -st stands for
-') t ; see Introd. 2g. The inelegant parenthesis ( [xi] f1 f1Upt<i%t\; "'A.) suggests
that Epicurus distrusts generalisations, and sees them as a means of shutting
one's eyes to factual evidence. Cf. below, XII 7-12 sup. XI 7 sup. bttP'l""iil [; ] :
see Introd. 2d (i). XI 8-15 sup. When he makes a univrsal (xo:&6Aou) assertion
which concerns actions, the man proceeds to act just as if he had also asserted,
or denied, empirically in a particular case J xa%' Z[ v] E:x.acr'toV) that something
was of a certain kind ( 'tot6v0e 'tt d vat). It is hard to avoid seeing here an
allusion to Aristotle's theory of the practical syllogism, which we have discussed
above ( commentary on 13 X 14 sup. - XI 4 inf.). Aristotle regularly uses the
term xaS6Aou of the major premse and xaiV Exacrtov of the minor premise. The
resemblance is strngthened by the ph,rase which Aristotle uses to typify a minor
premise (De an. 434a 16-21), ' o" '61is 'ot6v1is, x&yw OE 'ot6o1ie ', and by the
fact that he too regards recognition of the minor premise in a practical syllogism
as being essentially empirical ( E.N. ll47a 24 fl.).
Epicurus is saying that if a man recognises the major preffiise of a practical
syllogism, he will immediately proceed to act jus.t as if he had also recognised
the minor premise. On his possible reasons for dispensing with the minor premise,
see above, commentary on 13 X 14 sup. - XI 4 inf. XI 11 sup. E7ttA'J""iil;: see
Introd. 2d (i). XI 13 sup. sl = YJL : see Introd. 1g XI 15 sup. : 4 inf. We
now return to the past tense, but the aorists (6 inf. OV!J-ap'tev, 4 inf. btoC'l/crE:v)
are apparently gnomic rather than historic (KUhner-Gerth I 158 :ff . ), since the

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

76

r
I

subordinate claUse, f;L &!J. rtet: xt:A. (7-6 inf.), uses the subjunctive with t:iv, a
in primary sequence.
Vogliano and Philippson take everything following "'"" ( 1 7-20 sup.) as a single
phrase, but do not make it clear what the meaning could be. Although n ( 17
sup.) is separated from 'ou btcfL[GGp], 'u' p'J&'I)oo[p.Evou ( 19-20 sup.), they must
be construed together if the passage as a whole is to make any sense. The latter
phra'!e is no doubt equivalent t o t:oO npocrp,e v ovt:o; -r;'i]v Enq.tapt:Up1jcr v ( cf.
Ep. Hdt. 33, 50 ; Ep. Men. 127; KL':. XXIV; D.L. X 34) - ' that which awaits
positive confirmation '. This means, in effect, hypotheses about the perceptible
world, which alone in Epicurean doctrine admit of poSitive confirmation. The
man who accepts the truth of a universal theoretical statement is immediately
prompted to assert some opinion, not yet empirically proven, about the per
ceptible world, even though to speak in empirical terms (xa-cti -cbv [S]nlAijnxbv
p67toY - cf. Introd. 2d ( i) in this way falls outside the direct scope of the
theoretical discussion ( &AAO-cpfw;, the opposite of olxe(wc;).
In the translation I supply the sense of the missing lines following XI 20 sup. as
' [ and which in fact turns out to be false] '. I base this on 13 IX 3-4 sup., in
view of the otherwise exact parallel between our sentence and 13 VIII 6 inf. .
IX 9 sup. Epicurus is only here interested in false theoretical opinions, since
true ones do not manifest themselves in a man's behaviour ( see above, com
mentary on X 1 inf. - XI 4 in!.).
13 XI 4 inf. - XII 1 inf. There now follows a summary, in very general terms,
of the correct approach to error. It is far too wide-ranging to be regarded as
a summary of the preceding section, and is more probably intended to encompass
the argument of the whole of Book XXVIII. This in turn suggests that the subject
of the whole book, as of this sununary, was how to detect and avoid error of
a certain kind. Hence in XI 2 inf. - XII 2 sup. we are told that the behaviouristic
approach to error, if applied to all AOyot, will be of use with regard to the
' foregoing topic '.
But what is the particular kind of error (XII 3 sup., oU'tw; 18 sup., oUtwc;: ; 9
inf. totoO'to ; 6 in. 'tOtaiha) to which the earlier part of the discussion was
restricted ? Possibly error as embodied in conventional language, which is a
prominent topic in the fragments of the earEer part of the book. See further,
Introd. 2c (i). XI 2 inf. o'GGi'Opav still, as in X 1 7 sup. and XI 2 sup., refers
to the difference between the sophist's victim and a man making a universal
assertion. xliv : for Epicurus' usage of x&v in the sense ' and if ' rather than
the usual ' even if ', cf. . KL':. XXXVII: IIspt i'UoEW, Pap. Here. 1056, 7 IX 8
(text given in Introd. 2d (v)). XII I sup. Aoywv : th;s might be taken to suggest
' arguments ', ' theories ', ' discussions ', or simply ' utterances '. I choose the
latter translation on the assumption that, as suggested above, the earlier part
of the book was C'oncerned with linguistic error. XII 2 sup. [Jpo: presu
mably ' section of our philosophy ' (sc. "11 o'ooocrxxArGG ?). XII 2-5 sup. In
reconstructing the opening lines of this sentence, I have tried to follow as closely
as possible the structure of the sentence starting at XII 1 7 sup., which, as the
resumptive phrase oOv o-f; 'f'fl' implies (XII 18 sup. ; see commentary ad loc.),
picks up the argument of this one. XII 3 sup. oU:w fits the spacing better than
oUtw[c;:, and cannot be ruled out the grounds of the consequent hiatus (. cf. below,

77

DAVID SEDLEY

It

XII 12 sup . ; and lntrod. 1g) ']o -ljf'o:pt') f'OYOY : I know of no parallel for
.
..
this substantival use of the word without the prefix o' ( cf. below, XII 18 sup.).
Xll 4 sup. [tb: Y'YYOf'SW : either this or [tO: 'f'O:'YOfiEYO: or [tb: rc p&yf'o:'o: would
give appropriate sense. I base my choice on a phrase used b_y Philodemus in
Ihpl ""'"'"'y X, IX 35 ff.: av xo:l cruvdcr&'l"'" '0. Y' YOf'E[.vov . XII 5 sup.
x[ax] np[til]tou : I have found no other instance of the phrase % nptiltou; but
'

'

cf. 13 X 5 sup., Ep. Hdt. 75, 1.e apxfis ; and XII 7 sup., xo:l su&u . XII 8 sup.
.. . . .
IJ"crxup[crEC is a hapax-legomenon. XII 10 sup. aAA'JY xo:l li:AA') Y : cf. Xenophon
Cyr. 4.1.15, where it means ' in this direction and that ', and Plato Euthyd.
273 b, where it means ' again and again '. The former meaning seems more ap
propriate here: the philosopher is to hem in the error, like a hunter cornering
his prey. XII 11-12 sup. ['&:] xo:&oAou o f' ooe[ci]l;wv o(hw : viz. as described
'

in 13 X 14 sup. ff. This phrase adds little to XII 7-8 sup., f'il a&poe<' . . . . . o
axup(cre . XII 13 sup. :x.'XvO v rx : for this metaphor of a measuring-rod as a
truth-criterion, which Epicurus chose as the title for his chief work on episte
mology, see Introd. 2b. XII 14-17 sup. oe ou . . . . . ou e<o,sl[']"' : a favourite
construction with Epicurus, carrying the force of a consecutive clause : see
Widmann 129-30. XII l'f-15 sup. ofovl EYPY'l ""1i (IJEo.,: for the form

hep yYjnxO;, which. also occurs in Aristotle, cf. Philodemus Rhet. I 374, 9-10.
The connotation of the stem E.vepy- here is identical to that which it bears in
Aristotle, E.N. ll47a 33, where it is said that the minor premise of a practical
syllogism E.vep yer, in that it is the direct cause of an action. Cf. Evsp ye:La in
Polystratus, 11epl &A6you xo:.'taq:lpovcrew.;, XXIIa 12, referring to cases where
false opinions are translated into action.
The Evsp yr(ct'X.'lj OE.a seems to be for Epicurus the correct endproduct of a
chain of philosophical reasoning - a thought that results in action. Elsewhere
he regards the entire study of philosophy as being an vp ysa or Evtpyrnw.. ,
resembling the practical application of a ski)l. Cf. Sextus Math. XI 169
(
Us. 219). In Ep Hdt. 37 he recommends ' to OUYXZ svep y')f'"' l.v q>Ucr'
oAoy!q.
' persistent activity in the study of nature '. Kleve's defence in this
latter passage of the better attested textual variant l.vap y')f'"' (Symb. Osl. 1971)
is Weak, especially in view of the strikingly close imitation of this phrase by an
Epicurean writer in PHerc. 831 (VIII 7.10, Koerte Metrod., p. 583; I have
checked the reading in the original) : cruvsxLSwv.Ev I 'tS Sv 'tGJt xa'tlX cptAo aocp[av
.
:vsp ylv.an, xal p..&Atcr'ta 'tot xa'tlX cpu crtoAoyLav {h::. tDpp..acr v , - ' Let us
persist in philosophical activity, and especially in the speculative study of nature '.
XII 15 sup. f) &.vo.Ao you : cf. Ep. Hdt. 40; ITpl rpucrsw, Pap. Here: 1056, 5 I 8
(for text, see lntrod. 2 d ( i ii)), 7 I 7. XII 18 sup. oOY 151] 'f''lf'" this phrase

seems to be Epicurus' way of resuming an argument, with the sense ' as I was
saying ', or ' I repeat ' ; d. 1 3 VIII 6 sup., X l inf. In all three instances of
it in our text it is placed after the second word in the sentence ( if x& v oU'tW
be regarded as two words and not three). For the resumptive use of obv Of;, cf.
Herodotus I 1 74.3. X// 9 inf. YJ : we have here a comparatively rare instance
of a relative pronoun introducing an indirect question ( cf. E I 4 in. ; KUhner
Gerth II 438). The grammars do not list the adverbial in this usage, but

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

78

cf. Ep. Pyth. 87, & ifowpel"'" 6n&pxst, XII 8 inf. cr]o( '" :>w.[l] 'olcros : we
are to imagine the preceding text as -a monologue delivered to Metrodorus (see
lntrod. 2a) in the presence of the other members of the school 'olcroe). XII
21 inf. <ipx7Jf' . . . . fti')Y.O exov<wv hwovov Aoywv : Vogliano, in a note ad Joe.,
quotes the criticism of this phrase in Usener's unpublished Index Grammaticl!'s,
where if appears under the section ' conlocatio verborum neglegentissima '.
13 XII 1 inf. - XIII 10 sup. Epicurus closes with an exhortation to his disciples
to remember his and Metrodorus' new teachings. XIII 2 sup. tSdr; : he now
turns from Metrodorus and addresses his concluding remarks to the assembled
company. XIII 3-4 sup. f'Y'Jfl.O]vsus[t]f1 n[stpO:]crSo : cf. Ep. Pyth. 84. The
problem of memorisation was paramount for Epicurus. Pythocles used to com
plain that his master's teachings were hard to remember (:OucrJ.YYJp.6veu-ccx, Ep.
Pyth. 84), and Epicurus' epitomes were attempts to overcome this problem
(Ep. Hdt. 35-6, 82-3; Ep. Pyth. 84-5, 116). He trained his associates in the art
of memorising his writings (D.L. X 12). Even his dying words were ' Remember
my doctrines ' (D.L. X 16). Notice too the mnemonic alliteration ol the letter
f' in XIII 2-6 sup. XIII 7 sup. eloo : I have found no exact parallel for this
use of dOo to signify a section of a work; but LSJ (s.v. dOo II) list some
comparable occurrences in which it is used to refer in one sense or another
to a passage of writing. XIII 7-8 sup. th[po]<XcreW 'il 1) nspo:tv[o]fJ. EY')1
' the consecutively delivered lesson ': this is Epicurus' own description of the
llspl : Uo:ew. The closing sentences of Books II (where EfJ also occurs) and
XI suggest that he regards the content of each book as following naturally upon
that of the preceding boo, and it is in this sense that the phrase should be
understood. Cf. Plato Gorg. 454 c, 'ou 1) voxo: nspo:( vw&o:t 'ov A6yov, ' to
conduct the di.cussion in its proper order '. XIll 10 sup. On the scribal sign
to indicate the end of the book, see Introd. lg,
.

Below the title, the words ] 'wv <ipxo:iwv [

[e]1:X Av['n]t:h1jv are written b y the sae scribe,_ but in a minuscule hand,
in order to distinguish them as an editorial footnote and not part of the text.
Vogliano's restoratiqn Ex] 'tfuv cipxcx.wv seems plausible, meaning something like
' from the old exemplars '. But the phrase used may have been considerably
longer, for, as Vogliano himself observes, several lines of writing could be lost
after &pxo:.wv.
The final phrase gives the Athenian archon-year (296/5 B.C.) in which the
book was written ; cf. In trod. 2b.

79

DAVID SEDLEY

NDEX VERBORUM*

&ya&Or;; ,

&OoAeoxsw :

This index lists all words read in the text,

oU, oUx,
with the exceptions of %at, 'te, as,
acts
this
where
t
(excep
J-1'Yi
oOx, oUxt, and
where
cases
of
and
ction),
conjun
final
a
as
Un
the reading is doubtful are bracketed.
g
readin
the
that
mean
bracketed references
that
sarily
neces
not
but
t,
correc
bly
is proba
it is guaranteed beyond all doubt.
is
The orthography followed in the index
l
ntiona
conve
the
but
us,
papyr
the
not that of
are listed
orthography under which the words
in most lexica.

&oUv 't O :
&at : 13

&no :

13 III I

&?JttiAU"co;; , H

&x:

12 V 3

iioAD :

&ol>Atl :

I b 6 : 13 Vlll 6
VI 6 in.
&n:6xptcrt : 13 IX 5 in.
VI 7 in.
&n:6p'Y)p.ct : 11 I 2 ; 13

II a 4 inf.

&n:o0l5wp. t : 13

13 XIII 1, 9

VI 8

&&poo ' : 13 xu

7
15) ; 13 IV 5, VIII 8 in.
a
I
(10
:
oL
tpe
5
atpBw : L V 3 in.; 13 III
; 1 1 I 1, II 8 ;
3
V
8
;
6
ta&crt : 5 IV
K II 7 in.

lixtnB6w : 8
&A& :

XIII 7

IV 10

VIII 2 in.
a 2, III b 1!,
&Hif. : (H II a 2 inf.); 5 III
Jl VI 1 ; 12
7;
III
IV 5, (12); 6 I 13; 8
f., V 4 inf.,
in
I
IV
6,
Ill
5,
II
V 3; 13
X 14,
VI I, VII 13, 17, VIII 1!, 4 inf.,
9 inf., XI 3, XII 9, 12, 4 inf.
aAA' ' 13 XII 10

H l a 6 in!.; (6 I 11): 8 II 10;

11 IV 9; 12 V 8 ; 13 V 7 in!., VII 1!, IX 2

13 XI 17

&.p.o.p-dct : 12

M:v) :

5 I 11, III b 8; 8 II 7, IV 12, V 10; 13

II 6, Ill 17, IV I, 7, (6 inf.), 2 in!., V 4,
VI 5, 6 in., 2 in,. VII 3 inf., IX 4 in.,
X 15, 1 in., XI 7 in., XII 5 in.
&vap<.uto.;;: :

6 I 6 ; 12 V 10

livocypc.i;rpw : 13

X 19)

V l inf.

II 1 1

a;.,aywy'Yj : 8

III 7 in.
VIII 7 in.

&vuAoytcrtvx6<;; : 13

d:vtiAoyo<; : 13 XII 15
&vacpW'II 'l')Ol : (10 I b 18)
&.vcmA6ytooo<;: 13 VIII 15
&vsnVt'Y)Bst o <; : 13
O:>veu :

IX 8

13 II 7 in.

"'Bp<OO :
CGv"T;['X.IH[J.ctt :

I! I 6 ; 12 III 7 ; 13 VI 2

H I a 2 in. _ 5 IV 4; 6 I 9 ;

1 3 VIII 2, X 4

see s.v. o::u 'tofl

II 8

&,, : 12

IX 7, XI 9, XII 16
EA"ttuv : see s.v. liya&6
tAt ov : 8 IV 10
VI 13
lo> : ( L V 4 in!.); 13
2, IV 8, IX 9 in!.
Hn"' : 6 I 7: 13 Ill
12 III 2 ;
: 3 V 6 ; ( I ! IV 10);
aOl"' : 13

oo).crat

F I 1 in.; H II a 7 in.; 6 I 5 , 18;

13 IV ( 14),
8 V 2, 18, VI 6; 12 II 1 3 ;
in!., Vlll 9,
4
VII
3,
I,
VI
12,
3,
V
in!.,
I
1 5, IX 18, XI 9
1 1 ; 13 II 7,
r : 8 II 7, Ill 2, IV I ; 12 II
inf.
8
10,
X
in.,
VII 2
IX 7 in.
V 5
10 I a 17 ; 12 Ill 9,
ylp oac : (8 IV I4),
V 1 ; 13 VII 13, !0 in!.

yeAci: w : 13

yeAotO : 13

:tt yvtOoxw : 8
yvG'lcrt ; :

IV 7

D I c 1 in f.

yvWo 1;6 :

8 IV 9
&vaAoyiOf1CGl : {E I 3 in.)
&uJ,6ywf1a; : l l J 7 ; (13 IV 14)
&vaAaf1Bci:vw :

&vaAoytof16<;; : 13

a.lnoU :

yci:p :

&f18AS :

&vap:til;;ro : (13

8, IV 3, 6: 12
9 I a 12: I! (I 10), II 7,
I, 5, 8, VI :;,
IV
13
;
7
V
3,
II 9, Ill 2,
9 in., 1 inf.,
4 inf., VIII 8 inf.. IX 14.
3 in!.
8,
6,
XII
13, XI 4, 7 in!.,

1 3 XI 8 in!.; XII 4 in f.

I I 9; 4 IV; 8 IV 3
t:i::J.aptliVt.l : 13 XII 3
& :

VI 3
5 IV 12
dqtq>tBoAta: 13 V 2 inf.
?iv (particle; as conjunction, see s.v.

D I c 1 in. ; 5 II 3
(8 IV 9)

7, IV 8, 14,
""'6< : 5 IV (7), 9; 6 I 14; 8 Ill

13 IX 9 inf.

13 Vll 13, IX 4

0:)J,6,;pto :

&pvSop.cu : 13

au&<> :

ci:/.ioxof1Cn : 13

<lAAD> :

11 II 10
X 1, 2 in., XI 7, 13
2 in!.
&py_ : 13 X 5, XII
1!
VII
13
;
0
1
II
8
&H " :
&a't:ot o : 13 VII 2 in.
&rt:OO'l)[J.o:iVtu :

ci'top.o ;; :

II 6
cdota : F I 2 in. ( l inf.)

rtLcr&'ljO<; : 12

&:x.p6aoL<;; : 13

( 5 1 8)

&oH"' : 9

13_ X 12

&:x.OAou&o<;; :

12 VI 10
( 1 1 I 5): 13 IX 1 2

&apex. 'to :

V 3; 13 VIII Jl, 7 in!.

il.y"' : 12

F I 4 in.

&I,;to :

13 V 5 inf. ; IX 10 in.

&yvo.Hnor;; :

(6 I 12)

&v6rcon'tO " :

X 14

ti.p oEw : 13

11 II 4; 12 VI 4

&ntp.ctp't6p'Y)crt :

E I 3 in.; 13 III 6

a):dwv :

y po::qHj : 13

(13 V 4 in.)

VI 3 in.

IV 8
"(U)-1YO::O(_a; : 6 -1 5
ypa"' : 8

oe< : 13

IX 4 in f., XII 19
.
(E I 7 in.; 12 III 13)

Oe.txvup.t :

asoJ-1M :
o :

8 III 15

3 V 5; 6 I 7; K I 6 inf.;

13 (III 5),

VII 3, !0 in!., 4 in!., VIII 6, X 1 inf., XI 4

in!. XII 18
II 8
II 4 inf.

61JAOY6'tt : 8
lJY)Ao;: 13
oAo"' :

11 I 6 : 12 II 7

CRONACHE ERCOLANE S I

80

anns : 13 III 7, VIII 5

8ul : 6 I IS; I! II 7, VI I ; 12 III 1!, 13,
V 3 in., VII 3

e:I.;, 11-"' Sv : 8 II 2; I3 VII 7, X 9 in., 5

EntAoyLo!J.o:t : I3 VIII 17, X. 10

11
ecr&y w : 13 IX 7

SmA6ytat<;; : 13 VII 18, VIII 13

in., XI

Otat...Snw : 13 IV 4 in.

aha; : (8 IV 9)

ad:&zcrtr; : 6 I 4

;,,

Otcup:w : 13 IV 4 in.
2/Lo::Aayoro:: : 12 VI 9
Otd:ArJtjnr; :

1.3

VII 7 inf.

Oto:: f.Letp'tlivw: 13 IX I, XI 6 inf., XII 1 8, 5 in f.

OtavoSop.o:: t : 12 III 3

Em/.. oytcr!-16<;; : 8 V 8; 13 VIII 7, 11

SntJ-!.etpopSw : 13 XI 19

( : 5 Ill b 9, IV IO; 8 !II I2, V 7 ; I !

Sm!J.etp't6pot.; : H I

I 5; 13 IV 8, VI 5 in!., VII 8, 12, VIII 't

in!.,

(I

in!.), IX

10

in!.,

in!., X 5, XII

inf. ;

11 II 3; 12

V I, VI 3

14

Snq1Svw : 8 VI 8

ihta;cr'tQ; : 13 II 6, III 3 in., X 9 inf., 5 in.,

SmvsUw : 13 XI 8

XI 6, I I

Em'fow : (12 H 12)

lhr.6Szo!1o:t : 13 IV 2 in., V 6

Smn-rc-c w : 13 II 3
'"'"' : 6 I 12; 8 II 8, IV 6 ; I! IV 9 ;
Snicr-cCGfJ.O: : I 3 I X I5, I inf., X I , 13
Old:voto:: : K I I 6 inf.
13 VI 10 in!., VII 5, IX 6 inf., X 9 in!.
Etnz/..Sw : 8 V 15
Ow:nopm : 13 IV 2
S:x:xetttett : 12 III 4; I3 VII 7
Emcppw : 13 II 5 in., 3 inf.
Ot!%cr-coA"Ij : 13 VII 12
bt'tSov : I3 VI 8
pvsia : (5 III b I3); 12 III 5 ; 13 VII 10
8/.. eyzo; : 13 X 9
OtCGcpopli: 5 I 8 ; K II 4 in. ; 13 X 17, XI 2,
Spxof.l.o:t : J3 XII 7
8Hyzw : (8 V 1 0 ; 13 IV 12)
2 inf.
hspo< : (3 V 101; 4 IV I ; 5 III 3, 4; 8 II 7,
''<XHw : 10 I a I2
(}tc!cpopo<; : 13 III 3
lii 12, V 12; 12 III 7 ; (13 V 151
6 : 6 I 4
O to::qnuvSw : ( l l II 2)
in : (H I! b 5 in!.); 13 (VIII 8), XII 9 inf.
8J-11tBptAIX!1ct\l{l) : I3 XII II
ataaoxaAta. : 12 II 5, 12; 13 IV 6
eUClocfJ.OVlet : 13 VI 10
o c a wt : (5 IV I6)
811-rcpoa&e : 13 VII I in.
eoll&, : II I 6 ; 13 VIII IO, XI 9, XII 7
8f.Lcp" "w : 6 I 3
5ttcrz6punb : 13 XII 8
eDxcttpoo;; : 13 IV 1 in f.
;, : 3 V 8 ; 5 Il 12; 8 IV 6, V 9 ; I! I 2 ;
8t6 : 13 IX II, X 4
eUActBSo-tet : 13 X 6, XII 9
lhopLw : 8 V 4; 13 VI 3
I 2 V 8 ; I 3 V 2 in!., VI 7 , VIII 4, I X 2,
eUno:pj.;: 13 VI 9
6 inf., X 4 inf.
o6wa : 5 UI b 3 ; 8 II 4, 6
eDpCcrxw : 8 III 4
8\lo:nwAoySw : 11 IV 7
OoxSw : 13 VI 2 in., X 15, 1 inf., XII 6 in.
eUau ..&eWpYJ'tO : 13 IX 10
oo, : 5 I IO; 8 IV 2 ; 10 I a 9 ; 12 V 6;
8\lo:nto : 12 V 6, VI 6 ; 13 VIl 5 inf., 2 inf.
Scpp!J.6Hw : 13 VII 10, IX 4 -in.
8\IX\I'tt6't : 9 I b 5
13 V I 6, 10 in., VII 5, VIII 4, 7, IO, 5 in!.,
<xw : I I IV 4 ; K I 4 inf.; l2 lll 8; I3 V 4,
8\l&pyetct : 13 XII 6
XI 14
VI 6, VIII 4, 12, IX I, XII 13, l in!.
ao(a'"" 6 I 14; 8 III 5; 13 II 2 in., Vfl 8v6e(X\IU).1L : 6 I 7, (13 III 10)
8v6atet.; : 10 I a 7
5 inf., 1 in., XII 12
Zeu ; : 13 II 5
EvasxoJ.Lat : I3 IX I4, 2 inf.
Ooo::o-c6.; : ( l l I 4)
S\lexct : 13 VI 9
56vo:: !J-tb : -13 VIII 12
( ocl: E I 3 in!.; 6 I 15, 8 V 12, 13;
Evepynx6 : 13 XII I4
Ooawnw : 13 XII l
!2 Ill 13, V 9, VI 5; I3 IV 2, VII I, 2,
8'.1-&oc : 13 XI 8, 14, 17, 5 in.
8 in!., VIII I in!., X 2 in!., XI I3, XII I5
Ev&of.LSOJ.La.t : l3 VI 9 inf.
'"" I! IV 6 ; 13 VIII 12, 2 in!., IX 5, 9,
( than) : I2 lii 8 ; 13 lii 4, 6, V 7,
Snot : 5 I 6
17,
XI
5,
13,
2
in!.,
XII
I7
X
VI!I 8 in!., IX 2, 5
8'.1\loSw
:
1
I
II
l!ctvnep : 13 XI 13
: D I c 3 in!.; 13 IX 5, XI 7 in!., XII
Bvvotct : 6 I 13, ( 1 1 I I 11)
hw-.oll, a.:(rtoU: 13 V 3 inf., VII 8 , XI 4, X U 13
7, 9 inf., 6 in.
5no:tl&o: : 8 II 3, I V 1, 4
Eyyyvorctt : 5 I I 5
o : (D I c 4 in!.); 5 I 7 ; ( 11 IV 3)
8neot
:
I
I
II
12
EyW, Sywya, 1J1-1etr; : 6 I 9 ; 8 II 9, III 3 ;
'/)[J.S1:<;; : see s.v. EyW
eean : 8 v 2
K I 6 in!., 2 in!.; I2 V 4, 7 ; I 3 !II (2),
'/)'fXct : 13 VII {9 inf.), 8 inf.
;;, : 13 Vlll 8
10, IV 3, 8, 14, V 9, I in!., VI 2, 6, 9 in!.,
rj-rcep : 13 VII 8 inf.
ew6w
:
13
VII
16
8 in!., 6 in!., (XII 9 in!.), XI!! 1, 4
1}'to : 13 VI 1 inf., VII 5
i(w : 13 V 8
$&('w : I3 V 9
ij"t'tWY : 8 III l ; 11 IV 2 ; 13 VIII 9 in.
$nocywy : 10 I a 17; 13 VII I !
e&wp.Or;: 12 III 1 1 ; 13 II 6 inf., IX 4 in f.
rrs1 : 5 I 3 ; I3 IV 3, VIII 3
st : (3 V 51; H II a 4 in!.; (5 II 51; 8 II 9 ;
&o:u[J.tiw : {3 V 5)
5-rcetClrjnep : 13 VI 12
1 2 III 2 ; 1 3 I V I2, XI 10, XII 6
&ewpSw : 13 V 5
rri : (5 I 6, IV 12); 6 I 3, 12; S !I IO, Ill 7 ;
eH)o : 13 III 2 in., IV 9, XIII 7
&eWpYJ!J.X : 5 III a 3 ; 10 I a 7
I ! I 10, 1!, IV 8 ; 12 II 5, 9, III I, 8 ;
ebwn6o;:; : 13 XIII 7
&ewp'tot6.; : 13 VII 3, VIII 3 inf., IX 4,
s1c : 1 I I ! ; D I c 3 inf. ; 5 II 9, IV 7,
1 3 V 1!, 5 in f., VI 3 in!.; VII II, 4 in!.,
XI 16
14, (17) ; 6 I 6, (9); 8 II 2, 8, Ill I, (5);
IX 8 in., 7 inf., X 5 in., 3 in., XI 16, 1
lO I a I 3 ; 11 I 7; 12 III 6, V 4; 13 !! 10,
in!., XI! 8, 17, 4 in!., XIII 2
III 4, 6, 8, 12, V I, 13, VII 7 in!., V!II 9,
tOa : H II a 2 in!.; 13 VII 8, XII 15
SntAS-rcw : K II 6 (or ErctAa(jno;:; ? ) ; I3 IV 3
10, 5 in., 3 in., 1 inf., IX 5, 10, 11, 2 in.,
toto; : 12 II 6 ; I3 IV 9
EntA"J]-ctx6.; : 13 VI 1 in., VII 6, VIII 3,
'CltrhYJ : 1 1 II I
4 in!., XI 7, 1!, 18
X I3, XI 13, XU 18, 9 in!.
enc,oJ. : (12 II 3)
etn:ep : 13 IV 7
txetv6o;:; : 13 VIII 11, XII I in.
''' : 10 I a 12; 13 VI! 13, 17, VIII 5, 10,
5-rct/..o:v&&vo[J.O:t: 12 V 5
taxup6 : E I 8 inf., 7 in.
tow ; : 5 I 7; I3 IV 1 in., VI 2 in.
EmASyw : F I 2 in.
IX 6, 8, 2 in., XI 9, XII 6
OtctV61)crt<;; : 5 II 13

.It

81

DAVID

SEDLEY

x&cbtep : 13 IV 3 in f.

Be : I I 1 0 ; 11 VI 2; 13 IX 14

xa.&6Aou: 13 X 18, 8 inf., XI 5, 9 in., XII 1 1

e6eic : 8 III

XO:Lp6 : 1 3 VII 14

).l"!JaSnou :

XO:{'tOL :

xa.x6 xsLpwv :
x o:vovtx6r;:
-x.a.vOOv :

I 3 in.; 12 II 1 1

)-LL)-LV'tjcrxw :

12 I I 4, Ill 4 ; 13 I I 6 , III 4 in., I V 6, II,

)-LV"'J)-LOVE6Ul : 13 XIII 3

15, V 8, VI 6, I in., VII 6, 7, VIII 8 in.,

6voc : 11 II 10 ;

')l."tO:(jJO:'ttX6r;::

( 6 I 16)

5 in., II a 3 inf., 1 inf.; 5 I 11, III a I.

13 II 9, (IV

K I 5 in f.. 3 in. ; 13 III 5 in., 1 in.,

viJv :

IV 2, VII 9, XIII 9

Oyaoo ; : 13 XIII 6

xtv"')nx?; : 13 VII 9, VIII 10 in f.

Oas : E

Attci.vw: D 1 c 4 inf.; H II a 2 inf.; 5 III a

2, II 6, 8; 12 V 7; 13 X 9
11 IV 6

Hyw : (3 V 6) ; E 1 2 in.; 5 I 1 2 ; 8 III 3 ;

I I IV 3, 8 ; K I 4 in.; 1 2 I I I , III 4 ;
VII 6 in., VIII 5 in., IX 3, 2 in., XIII 5

8 IV 6; I I II 7, VI 2; K I 9 in.,
1 2 ; 13 II 14, V 8, 9, VI 5 i f.,

VII 5, IX 3 in.
Aiov :

13 VIII 16

).6yoo : 6 I 4; 8 IV 13;

11 VI

I;

13 VI

8,

12, VII 3, XII 1, I in.

Aon6r;: :

10 in[., 3 in., IX 3, 9, (18), 8 in.,

X 2, 6, 18, 4 in., XI 2, 2 in!., XII 16, XIII 9

13 XII ,6 in.

XII 3, 12, 18

I 5 inf.; (H II a 6 inf.); 5 IV 7 ;
8 I I I ; 1 3 I I 2 in f., III 4, 5 , 6 , 15, Vll
6 in., XII 8 in., XIII 5
O&sv : E I 4 inf.; 10 I a 1 ; Il I 8
otoa : 1 3 II 8, VIII 3
otxetot;;: :
oto"' :

1 3 II 4, III 4, 15, 2 in., IV 4, V 2 in.,

Ill

(!), 13, VI I, VII 16, 8 inf., 6 in., VIII 5,

16,

(Ill 13, IV 4), V 4; 13 VIII 15, IV 5 in.,

Y. LV"'JO"tr;: : 13 VIII 10 in.

2 in.; 12

in.; 13 II 3, Ill 2 in., IV 7, (5 in.), V

oU'tw, oU1:w : I I 10, I 3 ; 5 I 9 ; (6 I 5); 8

xev6; : 1 I 12; 8 III 1, 2, IV 4

Aiocc :

11 IV 4; K II 9 in.; 12 V 5 ; L V 2

14;

3 in.), V 7

13 XII 16

).o:v&civw :

oU-re : (H II a 4 .jnf.)
olioo1 o:Uo'lj, oof5oo1 oou-ri: F I 3 inf.; H I c

13 XI 6, XIII 3

voew : 5 I 5 ; 8 IV 5 ; ( 11 I 3);

XM1jYOP8W : (H I a 4 in.)
xatttc<-t :

K II 5 in.; 13 VI 9, 3 in.,

vewo-r[ : ] 3 XIII 5

K I 3 in.
13 VI 1 1

1 3 ; 11 IV 4 ; 13 VIII 6, X I in!., XII

1 0 ; 6 I 6 ; 8 III 2, 4, IV 5 ; 10 I a 12,

8 V 12, ll I 3

xMo:axculiw :

18, XIII

13 IX 12

xoo:xci.Autr;: :
xoo:vo-w :

12 V 9

VII! 12
)-Luptlixtr;: :

13 V 1 2

13 III 12
13 IV 3. V 3, VII 4 in., VIII 9,

otovet :

Ot.AB-w :

H V 12

nci.Aa.t :

K I 5 in f.

rca.vooaa;n6 : 9 I

nivu : 8 VI 5;

l.J V 3, (X 4)

13 XI 6, XII 13

na:pataru)J.t :

13 XII 14

rcxpxAAa:y"lj :

13 VIII 14
E I 6 in.

na.po:AAci.'toW

: l3 IV 9, 12

8 II 2, (II! 5); 10 I a 1 4 ; (11 I 2);

13 II! 8, XI IO
otxoJ.Lxt : 12 II 5

rc::c.po:-rt&"!Jp. :

OxvSru : 13 XII

ntipeq.J.t

oioo '

o ;u yo : 8
OAO :

8 in.

b 5

nxnoO : 8 V
nape< :

X 8, XIII 6

12 VI 1
13

(adsum):

(VIII 3 sup.), XII 4

in., XIII 2

v 8

n.:xpeJ.L:iAAru :

12 V 4; 13 (VII 17), VIII I

6f1tASw: 3 V 1 0 ; 4 IV 1 ; H I c 5 in., II

n&.r;: :

1 l IT 2

1 I 9 ; - F I 2 in. ; (H II a 4 in.; 5

II 10; 8 VI 8); 10 I a 3 ; 12 III 6, (151;

7 in.
6. : 13 II 5

Op.owr;: : 13 X 14, XI 2

13 II 4 in., (III 9, V 6), VIII 9, X 3 in.,

6)-Lot6"t'Y) : 3 V 9; H II

XI 1 inf.

p.v&livstv : 12 VI 5

b 6 in.
bJ>oAoyw: 13 IX 13, 8 inf., X 5, 18, 7 inf.,
6 inf., 2 in., XI 5, 1 2

no:ujp :

wxpoupEw : 13 XI 3

6J.LoAoy ( C{ : 1 3 I X 9 in.

neWw : 13 IV

f.LeAeoli(.o :

6f16<pWVO : 6 I 8

''"\piw : 13 VII 15, (XIII 41

!-10:Xp6r;: :

8 IV 12

f1ciJ,:x, f1&AAov : 6 I 1 7 ; 13 V 2, 7

iv :

13 VI 3 inf.

E I I in.; 12 V 1 0 ; 13 II 5, VI I in.,

ll

: 8 II 5

ev w : (6 I 13)
ipoc :

8 VI 3;

Op.wr;: :

13 III 4 in., VIII 3 in f.,

Or;:,

t-J.e-c6. : 6 I 1
f.Le"tci.&e::ar;: : 8 n 3,

v 2

7),

11 I I

13 III 3 in., V 2, VIII 7 in.

op&o , :
Opo :

XII 2

9 I a 12;

II 6; 13 II I in., III 6, V 11

Ouaspxo: :

13 VIII 6
O : D i c 3 inf.; 4 IV 1 ; H i a 4 inf.;

5 III b 6; 6 I 9 ; 8 II 10, IV 6, V 4; 12

!-1E"to:-cG.&1J!J-L ; 8 V 6, 1 3 ; 13 V 10

Ill 2;

1-1-E't!X(jJOpli : 13 V 6 inf.

5 in., VIII 4, 7, IX 4, 8 in., X 3, 12, 8

f.L"t8f.W ;

inf., X[ 4 inf., XII 2, 14

13 III 1 1

izpc : 13 V I 4, 7 , XII 14
)-1.7)

(conjunction): 13 IV 9, VII 2 in., XI 6,

XII 3 in.

Oao r;: :

13 III 7, V 5, 2 in!., VI 5, 7 in.,

B VITI 6 inf.

o'"' : 13 V 13, Vlll 14. !X 13, Xl 4, 8

Oot :

nci.axw : 13 X 15
13 IX I7

in.

nspa.bw : 13 XIII 8

13 VII 14, IX 9 in.

o'oa : 4 IV I ; 5 IV 1 5 ; 8 V 1, 1 3 ;

VII 7, XI 9, 17
f1B-no t

13 VI 8,

E I I in. ; 5 I 7 ; 8 (Ill 31, IV 5 ; 10

oGv :

M'p66wpo;: 8 VI 3; 13 II 4, V 2, XIII 4

II 7; 8 IV I, V 5; 10 I a I S ; I I I 8, II 8 ;

IX 3, X 9 in., XI 11, 17

11 II 2 ; 12 III 7, V 10 ;

VIII 9 in., XI 5 in.

J..n]-re : I I I3

-x.o:oli : H I a 7 in., II a 3 in., 1 in. ; 5 J 11,

8 II 7 ; 1 2 I! IO
l l IV 4; 12 II II. V 10; 13 V

10, VII 7, X I, 4 inf.

ota,c, :

p.1jx6vw : I3 V 1

13 XII 13

x:.no:yeAtiw :

oooi : 5 I 4;

(5 IV 7}

J-1/Y.O : 13 XII 2 inf.

: E I 4 in.

-x.o:'to:yHc:no; :

o o v aAAci :

13 VII 14

!-1'/aanOOnooa :

13 X 10

6 I 7; K I 3inf.; 12 III 6 ; 13 lii 3, ;v

11, VI 8 inf., . x 1 1

I ; 13 (VII 14, 15), IX 9

1 I 9; D I c 2 in. ; (H II a 7 in.,.;

nspi : 6 I 4; 8 IV 7 ; ( 1 0 I a I I J ; 11 II 3 ;
12 VI 2, 6 ; 1 3 lii 2 in., V 2 in., VII! 6 in.
neptAJ71tnx6r;: : D I c 2 in; 5 TTl a 3, II 1 2 ;

8 V 9 ; 13 VII I
neptA'l)cjJt :
neptvoSw :

(10 I

rcsptn i1t't Ul : 13
1ttBOJ.L 61; :

8)

13 I!! 2

IV 10, 6 in f.

13 III 3 in.

nn-rw : 13 IX 3 in.
nA.Ii'II'Y) :

1 1 II 9; 12 II 7; 13 V 3 lnf.

nAV ; 5 !I[ b 6 ; 1 3 X 1 1
no&ev : 1 3 IX 6

not-w : 5 IV 8; I3 II 4 inf., III 3, V 5 in..

CRONACHE ERCOLANES I

32

VI !2, VII 9 in!., XI 3, 8 in!., 4 inf., XII

2 in.

UJ-Let; : (3 V 6), 12 II I; I3 IV 3 in.,

ou, ou,

V 4, VII 14, 16, XII 8 in!., XIII 2, 6

Up,et<; : see s.v. ou

fmitJX.W : 5 I 4

noodAo : 13 IV 2

ouyxaA6n1:w :

13 IX 16

Urc6 : 13 (V 4 inf.), VIII 9 in.

TCOtOb : 13 VI 7

ouAAoy[\;o !-Lt:tt :

1 1 IV I ; I3 X 16

UrcoAo:f1Btivm : 13 VIII 1

noAA4u' : 13 VI 9 inf., XII 7 inf.

E I 2 in. ; 13 VI 3

noAAo::xou :

noAU', nAstwv, nAstoco ; :

8 V 9, I S ; I I II

12, V 4, VI 2 in!.

o6v : 8 V 3
ouv6:n1:W :

rcOppw&ev :

ounrp1) :

itOO"O" : 13 VI 4, 7
no-es :

(H I

7 in., V I 5 , VII 2 in., XI 7 in.

7t0"tspo: :

X 5 inL
a

10 I

(4), 6, (10), 1 8 ;

( 10 I

15); 13 III 6 inf., VII 8

8 inf.

np6:sq.tt : 3 V 7

rpanaor:a : I III a 4
rpa;naot&.l,;"w : 8 II 1 0

13 II 6 in.

l"fiJ;il't"IXO't"tXO : 5 I 3 , (5, 9 , 10, I I 4 , III

ox , 12 III 8: 13 III 8 inf.

rp<kaxm : 5 IV 14

OWIJ.CG'ttXOr; : 1 I 12

&pw : 8 VI 2; 12 VI 1 0 ; 13 VI 13
rpe6yw : L V 4 in.

l'i : 5 IV I I ; 8 III 2, 3 ; 13 II 6, III 5, 8,

VIII 6, X l in!., XII 1 8

"tCG1tetv6'b : 13 VIII 1 6

&cbw : 13 V!II 13

-rap ax'I{ : 4 I V 3
't"t'b (cf. """ ) :

FI4

in!.;

&oyyoo: 3 V I I ; 1 3 II 5 inf., IV 15

12 VI

3 V 5, 9, 10, 1 1 ; 4 IV 1 ;

H II

2 in f.: 5 III

8, III b 2,

tppontcr"tE:ov : 13 VI 4
rpopj :

13 VIII 8 in.

(IV 6 ) ; 8 II I, 8, Ill 2, V 8, I I ; l l II 6,

tplltHY.O : 5 II 1 1

npo; : (6 I 14), 13 IV I, VI 10, 6 in!., VIII 16

IV 6, 7 ; !2 III 3 ; L V 2 in!. ; 13 II 4, 8,
14, 2 in!., III 15, IV I, 7, 2 inf., V 6, !3,

wv1 : 6 I 10;

n:poarxyops6w : 4 IV

VI 7 inf., VII 12, (15), 8 inf., 6 in!., VIII

1Cpoa0ori\;w : 12 VI 7

12, IX 3, 13, 14, 4 inf., X 5, 7, 15, l7,

X! 3, 5, 13, 17, 8 in!., 7 in!., XII 6, 8,

xa:pct:x.'t")jp : 5 II l ; ll IV 5

13, 1 8

zpti:op.. C H :

npoASyw : 13 XII 2
np6Ac; ; 12 lii 9, 14

npocr"tUT)')fH :

E I I in.; 13 VIII 8

np6-cspo;;, npi.U"to : 8 IV 2, 7, V 4 ; 13 XII 5

npo:pa.i;Yw : 12 II 14

-rt; :

'otoO,o : 5 II 9 ; 8 III 5, (V 7 ) ; 1 0 I a 14;

I I I 8; 1 3 VII 4 in!., IX 18, X II, XI JO,

5 in., XII 9 in., 6. inf.

(K II 8 inf. ; 13 II 8)
o'l')J-LBov : 13 XI 4 in.
o6rplOJ-LCG : 13 IX 7 in., X 1 9
oorpto't"Jj : 1 3 X 3 , 7 , 12
oorp6;:

83

l l II 1, 2 ; K I 7 in., 6 in.; L V 1 in.

DAVID SEDLEY

see s.v. xo:xO<;

E I 5 inf. ; 5 III b 1 2 ; 6 I 1 0 ; 9
1 2 ; 13 II 15, III 7, IV 7, V 10, VIU

eo31; : 6 I 1 0 ; 1 3 II 2, (V 14), VII 4, IX

l l , XII 10, 1 7

'6" , 4 IV 2 ; 12 III 3 ; 13 II (7), 9, III 5

W : I I l l , 1 3 ; (5 I V 1 8 ) ; K I 4 inf.; 13

in., 1 inf. ; VI 2 in f.

,p6no

IV 3, 4 inf., 3 in., VI 4 in., VII 6 in.,

(13 VI 6 inf.)

'tpbcw :
Ol') f1cdvw :

y_epwv :

13 IV 5

10 inf., XI 3 in.

't"Ot6o0e : 13 XI 12

X 3, 12, XII 7 in., 3 in.

nw; (or nW; ? ) : 12 VI 4

lJ
poc; : 12 III 15

Gac : 5 IV 9, ( J O I ; 8 1V I ; 1 3 IV !0

13 V I 1

np.o-:pSpw : 8 II 9; 13 V I, 4, VI 8 in., IX 16,

p3to> : 13 IX

b 7,

IV 16): 8 II 4, 6, Ill 6, V 5 ; 13 VII 2

,w' : l l II 5:

inf., XI 2 in.

H I

rpavep6; : 13 V 11, VII 9 in.

13 IV 1

ouvotxet6w : 12 III 1 ; 13 VI 5 inf.

13

X 8, XI 14
np&ft;; : 13 VIII 6 in., IX 6, 8, XI 10, 7 in.

npoztpSw :

VI 8

3 in!., XII 19

npaya; 6 I I ; 13 II I inf., III 9, IV !1,

l l I 5 , 9 ; K I 7 inf.; 12 III 10,

qntivop.at :

ouvopcl;w : 8 V 7 ; 13 III 5 in., 1 in f., XI 1,

rcou : 13 IV 4

npci:tow:

13 XII 4

13 IX 6

ouvotxewot; :

12 V 4

TCPO:YJ-11X1Tx6.;; :

Uo""ts po; : III b 2, IV 3, 1 0

13 XI 6 in.

auv[o't"'l'jf.l.l :

7 inf., 2 in.; 8 IV 3); 13 l V

13 VII 17

fmola :

(13 VII 15 sup.)

ouvato&<kvottat :

JtOps6o)-1ct.t : 1 3 XII 8

13 IX 5

13

lmo"ttinw : 6 I l l ; (10 I b 16); 13 VII 4

oUJ.neptAaJ-LB6:vw : 1 3 IX 6 inf.
outtnA8xw :

12 III l l

Urc6AI')'ft; :

Unonn6w : 13 VII 3 inf.

9 ; 12 III I, V 2, 8, 9; L V 3 inf.; 13 IV 9,
-;tQ),6"tp07tO :

10 I

ouAAoytcrf-16;;; : 13 II 7, (VIII 1 in.)

oup.Batvw : 1 3 VI 4 in.

F I I

inf. ; 5 II 1 3 ;

8 V 6, 1 0 ;

l l I 8 ; 1 2 V I 2 ; 13 (IV in!.), VII I, VIII

5, 17, X 2, 8 inf., 3 in., XI 1.8
,urxvw :

H I

VIII 7 in.

4 in.; 13 II 5 in., V 8 in.,

IX 10, 6 in.
Wactln w " :

13 II 11, XI 15

&onep ; 10 I a 5 ; 11 IV 7 ; 12 V 8 ; 13 X 7,

17, XII 5
&O"'t"e : 13 IX 3 in.