Edward Fischer

References
Brown, R . McKenna et al. 1998: M ayan visions fo r a multil ingual society: The
G uatema la n Peace Accords on Indigenous Identity a nd Languages . Fourth

World Bulletin on Indigenous Law and Politics 6: 28-33 .

Browning, Jo hn 1996: Un obstaculo imprescindible: el indfgena en los siglos XVIII
y XIX. Memoria del Segundo Encuentro Nacional de Historiadores.
Guatema la : Uni versidad del Valle.
Cojtf Cux il, Demetrio 1997: Ri Maya' Moloj fJa lximulew; ELMovimiento Maya.
Guatema la: Edito rial Cholsamaj .
Fischer, Edwa rd F. 2001: Cultural Logics and Global Economies: Maya Identity
in Thought and Practice. A ustin: University of Texas Press.
Fischer, Edwa rd F. and R. McKenna Brown (eds.) 1996: Maya Cultural Activism
in Guatemala. Austin: Univers ity o f Texas Press.
Ga lvez, VIctor a nd Esq uit, Alberto '1997: The Mayan Movement Today: Issues of
Indigenous Culture and Development in Guatemala. Guatemala Cit y:
FLACSO-Guatema la.
Lustig, Nora a nd Deutsch, Ruthanne 1998: T he Inter-America n Development
Bank a nd Poverty Reduction: An Ove rview (IADB working paper).
Washington: IADB.
Morales, Mari o Roberto 2000: Su jeros intercult ura les. Siglo X X I, Jun e l 0.
Plant, Roger 1998 : Indigenous Peo ples and Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of
Gua temala (IADB working p ape r). Washi ngto n: IADB.
Ric hards, Michae l 1 985 : Cosmo po li tan worl d- view a nd coun terinsu rgency in
Guatema la . Anthropological Quarterly 58 (3), 90-107.
Sto ll, Davis 1993: Between Two Armies in the Txil Towns of Guatemala. N ew
York : Col umbia Uni versity Press.
Warren, Kay 13. 1998: Indigenous Movements and their Critics: Pan-Maya
Activism in Guatemala. Princeton : Princeton Unive rsity Press .
- - 2000: Lessons from the 'fa ilure' of the 1999 referendum o n indigeno us rights
in Gu atema la . Pa pe r presented at the Ad va nced Sem in ar, School of American
Research, Santa Fe, New M exico, Octo be r 22- 26.

Indigenous Struggles tn
Colombia

Historical Changes and Perspectives

Theodor Rathgeber

The ind ige nous moveme nt in Colo m bia pio neered t he continent-wide
trend of ind igeno us organization. Since colonial ti mes, Colombian indigenous peoples have res isted dom inatio n and economic explo itation. The
<.: urrent wave of ind igeno us activism began in th e 1970s, foc using on the
recovery of ances tral lands. Over time these str uggles expanded to include
issues of control and protectio n of t he en viron ment, the d esire to reduce
dependency on the capita list eco nomy, the protectio n of cult ure and identity, and struggles fo r human righ ts a nd a truly pluriethnic constitution.
In t he process, indigeno us groups and organizations arose at community,
regional, national and in te rnatio na l levels.
As in other countries in La ti n Amer ica, these issues were intensified by
111d igenous participation in the inte rnation al conferences surrou nding the
1992 Colom bus Quincen ten nial. Indigenous orga nizations used these
meetings to p ush d ebates about social emancipa tion and plu rieth nic
rl':-~ l i ty of t heir nations onto t he natio na l agendas. Indigenous gr oups have
p.1 rticipated in other internati o na l m eetings since then- from t he United
N.Hio ns Working Gr o up o n Indigeno us Peoples and the Vienna
<.onference on Hum an Righ ts to t he World Popu lati on Con ference in
<..lll'o. Such internatio nal events have fostered a sphere o f legality and
lq,nimacy in w hich ind igenous claims can be con tested . Ind igen ous move111\'llt S have used these new open ings in a variety of w ays. This chapter
11ffns :111 ovnv il'W of tlw j,rowrh and current sit uation o f the indigenous
tll<I Vl'llll'll t in ( :o ln nti H, t, whi~ It i ~ o ne of t he most rem:u ka ble move ments
ttltt~ ktn d '' ' I '''" \lllttu 1

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

Overview: Colombia's Indigenous Peoples

Historical, Social and Political Context of the

Contemporary Indigenous Struggles

It is estim ated t ha t the total nu m ber of indigenous people in Colombia

fluctuates between 7 00,000 a n d 800,000, or 2-3 percent of the country's
population. T h is estimat e is based o n officia l cens us figures that do not
include the indigenous people living in the cities. Some cabildos (indigenous counci ls) are actually func io n ing in large cities, such as Cali, where
they have the ir governing offices. All in a ll, th ere a re 8 1 indigenous groups
w it h 64 la nguages, located in 27 of the 32 depa rtments (Co lombian equiva lent to states or provinces).
Fifty-six groups live in the Amazonia n Basin and in the Llanos region.
fn so me regions, suc h as the Ca uca Depa rtm ent (wh ich has 1.2 million
inha bitants a nd a n indigenous pop ul atio n o f 15 0,000 to 200,000), indigenous populations constitute a ma jority in man y m unicipa lities. T he largest
group a re th e N asa (formally k nown as Paez) in south ern Colombia; a lso
n umerous are the Embera in t he northwestern part of the country, the
Wa yu u in the G uajira pen insu la, a nd t he Zenu o n t he Atlantic Coast
(Pineda Camacho 1995).
Two n ational and 36 regional orga n izations were fo rmed as a result of
t he indigenous str uggles of the last t hirty yea rs. T he reviva l of the indigenous movem ent in C olombia started in 197 1 wi th the formation of C RIC,
t he Reg ional Indigenous C ouncil of the Ca uca Department. ONIC, t he
C olom bian N a t ional Ind igen o us Organizat ion, was estab lished as a n
um bre lla fed eration in 1982, representi ng the vast majo rity of t he indigenous groups. OPIAC, the Organization of th e Indigenous Peoples of t he
Colombian Amazon, was formed in 1995. It repr esents the indigenous
peoples of t he Amazonia n Basin an d is pa rt of COl CA, t he Coordinatio n
of In digenous Orga nizations in the Amazonian Basin. T wo n a tional politica l parties were also formed in th e l 990s: ASI, the Social Indigenous
Al lia nce, and MIC, the Colombia n Indigeno us Movement.
To a grea t exten t, the orga niza tio nal fragmentation can be attributed
to the patterns of settleme nt throughout w ha t is now Colombia. The
indigenous peoples were largely organ ized on the basis of sm all commu
n it ies a nd were o nly margina lly aware o f im pe ri a l regimes suc h as thl'
Inca. T his constellation made it difficu lt fo r the Sp a nish t o impose thc i1
r egime evenly acr oss all the region s. Only in emergency situations or in
the case of war did people orga nize them selves at the regional levt l.
Inst ead, the Indian groups were organized at the local or community leve l,
often based on traditional structures such as t he minga, collective wor k
p erfor med by a ll t he members of the commun ity. The minga co ntinu es to
be recognized as an institu ti on t hat he lps to mnintn in th e indigen o 11 ~
collective identi ty. Even today, te rrit o ri .d di ... pt'' '" o'' is n fnc tor tlt.tt
com plicates the procec;ses of soc in l .1nd pol1111 .d '''ll"'i ~ .lti OII lw yo 11d
com munit y lr vcl-. {I11 Hiig .111d 1\ 11111/t'l I II H\ )
IUb

Unti l t he ea rly 1960s the system of ownership of la rge holdings in Latin

America, known as latifundismo, was t he economic inst itu tion that structured socia l and polit ica l interests. Through this system, societal values
were articulated and c ul tural identities were p laced into a hierarchical
structure. The ind igen ous - and peasantry - were forced in to ma rginalization , w here t heir existences were little above the level of surviva l.
Latifundismo has given way to neo libe ra li sm as t he ma in force and
ideology str uctu ri ng Colombian society today. T he eage rness to
co mm odify a ll aspects of life, an d to exp lo it natura l reso urces w ithout
hounds affec ts even the most remote co mm u n it ies. Acco rd ing to t his
ideology, society must be regul ated only to the extent t hat t he free flow
o f capital is not hindered. Goods an d services a re va lued on strictly
L'COnomic c rite ria. Political a nd social qu estio ns a re su bsu med to th ese
vnl ues, w h ic h req uires the adaptation of the country's social, political an d
<.: ul tural conditions to a ma rket ideology . O ne prime exampl e is the accelr ration o f exploitation of the natural resources, even in en viron mentall y
'ensitive a reas. Colombia is o ne of many coun tries in Latin Amer ica tha t
~~ rapidl y expa nding t he extracti on of mw mater ials as a result of t his
neoliberal p ush.
The results of t his assau lt o n the en viro nm ent co uld be seen d uring the
1990s. The govern men t of Cesa r Gav iria ('1990-4 ), gave private compa'' ics, especially those invest ing in raw mate ria ls, t he green light in spite of
t he legal restrictions t hat p ro tec ted comm unal la nds. Crude oil became
one of t he most im p ortant materia ls fo r exp ort and foreign revenue. The
An dres Pastra na adm inistration (1998-2002) modified the m ining law,
1111plcmenting a Mining Code t hat weakened the established mechanisms
nl co nsultatio n a nd p a rticipation with the affected commu nities.
l'll'v io usly, every phase of a project required a n en vironmenta l license that
dl mved for the presentation o f concern s by th ose affected. Sin ce 2000,
ltn weve r, a ll impact evaluation proced ures have been red uced to a single
1 II VIro nm ental licen se, transfo rming what was once a coordinated a n d
Jloll t ici patory process into a simplified p ro-forma process. T h is t h reatens
1l11 provisio ns of the nationa l constitution a nd interna tiona l ag reem ents
('oi iLh ns Co n vention 169 of the Interna tio nal La bo r Organization), which
Juntlct indigeno us territorial a utonomy.
i\ t the pol itica I level, th e scenari o presents itself less unilaterally,
dt hough it fo llows similar lines. T he latifundismo structure was a factor
tIt .I I lwlptd s11st ain th e a ut ho ritaria n regime that culm inated in the civil
1\.11 k11ow n :1 ~ l.a Vio/encia {the violence), w hi ch ravaged the country
"''''"!\ tIll 11)'1 0-. .111d l lJ 50s. M 11rdv1 , i11t 11111d.tt io11, :tnd evict ion o f th ose

1U

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

who disagreed with t he system became t he official instruments for solving

the socia l cr isis. None of the ma in actors responsible for the crimes have,
thus far, been brought to justice. Nor did this system com e to an end w ith
the agreement signed by the politicians to end the civil war. The N ational
Front, in effect between 1958 and 1974, was a pact between the liberal
and conservati ve pa rties to share political power in o rder to pacify th t
country. Under the formally dem ocratic National F ront reg ime, electiom
were openly manipu lated, discrediting t he most fundamental participator y institution: the vote.
Political violence became end em ic. W ith th e pretext of containing t hl.'
guerrillas, the governmen t of j ulio Cesar Turbay (1978-82) imposed :1
wave of repress io n t hat ended most so cia l p rotest. In th e second half of
t he 1980s, the electoral participation of the Uni6rr Patri6tica (Patriotic
Union, a leftist pa rty fo rmed by for mer guerrillas) ended in disaster: death
squads and paramilita ry groups ann ihilated most of its leaders. Similarly,
du ring the presidential campa ign of 1989-90, three o f the president ial
ca nd idates wi th t he best chances of being elected w ere kil led.
In 199 1, as we discuss below, t here was a n importa nt poli tical process
which resulted in reforms granting rights to indigenous and peasant
groups. Yet, t he current presid ent, Alvaro Uribe (2002-6) seems to haw
t~ken on the au thoritarian st yle of President Turbay. According to decla
rations made by the H ome Affairs Mini ster Fernan do Londono, the right~
granted by the 1991 constitu tion wi ll be restricted. It appea rs that only
the actors of the " dirty war " have changed. Instead o f the sta te acting aio
t he main source of r epression, as was t he case in the time o f t he Turba y
regime, now the par amilitar y or self-defense g ro u ps are crushing wha t
they co nsider subvers ion. They are not alone, of cou rse, since they receive
support from t he state forces as we ll as the w hole socia l environmen t
wh ich allows t he repression. T he Uribe admi nistration is also bent o n
crea ting a ru ral militia composed of peasan ts a nd a network of in former~
and vigilan tes.
lt is a lso clear that guerrilla groups a lso act w it h th e sa me ratio na li ty,
and t hat t hey are an integral part of the problem . Due to t he basis of thci1
income - especially that coming from " taxes " on drug-traffick ing,
kidnapp ing, and blackm ailing of oi l compan ies- there is little need now
for them to try to reach an understanding with t he rest of society. Th e~
pressure com mu nities into supplying them w ith food and fue l, recruiting
youngsters by force . Th us, the military logic of solving the crisis th rough
a rm ed conflict appea rs to have been adopted by all actor s. T he wa r i,
d irected n ow at the society as a whole, and protesting this brings su bst:111
rial risks. T he state o f emergency has become routine, and participatio11
is increasingly being restricted to activ ity w ithin clientelist netwo rks. 111
Colom bia, authoritarianism has been a historically commo n appronch ttl
managing the relationship between state and society, and is a lways con"d
crcd as a first option w hen it is necessary to de:1l with a crisis (Gui' ll1 .tllt '/

11f. l977; Pizarro 1985; Sanchez and Peiiaranda 1986; Sanchez Gomez

IOU

l lJ9 1, Human Rights Wa tch 1996, 1998; Pecaut 2002) .

The Reforms of the 1990s

l Jnder t he slogan o f " moderni zation" of the state, a legal framewor k was
r stablished to allow for wi der articulation between sectors of t he society.
'-.Lveral important reforms were m ade to the constitution and the political
't ructure which proved helpfu l to Colombia's indigenous peoples .
During the administration of Virgilio Barco (1 986-1990), the implementatio n of the initia tives taken by th e gove rnment of Belisario Betanc ur
( 1982-1986) con ti nu ed, es peciall y state d ecen tralization. Accord ing to
1\oisier (1999), the "winds of decen tral ization" were blowing all o ver
I ..Hi n America by then. Mo re than LOO years after the first attempt (i n
I H63), the first d irect elections for town cou ncilors and mayor took place
111 1988. The Gaviria go vernment also extended the direct vote to t he election of depa rtmental governors.
The n um ber o f town councilors and majors who presented themselves
.t., " independ ent" increased greatly with t he opportunity for direct voting
lor local representatives. However , th e expected break-up of t he hegelllony of the two traditiona l parties and th e cliente list system was not
.tl hieved. One important result, however, was t ha t the electo ra l reform
.tllowed indigenous grou ps to elect their own loca l authorities and obtain
l('prcsentation in depar tm enta l assem blies and the nationa l Cong ress. l n
tltc 2000 elections an indigeno us can d id ate, Floro T un u bala, was elected
11overn or of the Cauca d epa rtment. Together w ith five other governors,
IH openly opposed the national government's policy of fumigation of
dlrga l drug crops (Fals Borda 1989; Restrepo 1991; Rathgeber 2001c;
I .1Jardo 2001).
With the new constitution of 1991 (A rt.] 03), the Gavi ri a government
t~ldcd more participatory clements, particula rl y at the local level. O ne
, \;tmp le is t he transfer of funds to the municipal ities, w hich is now an
tlltportant item in the budget of indigeno us organ izations. Under this
,, lll'me, t he municipality (or a nother public entity of the sa me t ype s uch
,., the indigenous councils) presents p ro jects for the im p rovement of
ptlhltc ed ucation, public hea lth, or other local services. Once the p ro ject
"' .tpproved , the m unicipali ty has the right to receive tra nsfers from the
, 1 11t1 al state to cover most of th e costs of the project. Another factor that
1 qwtt cd the way for more participatio n was the provision o f legal instruttll'ltl ~ t h::t ta llow citizens to claim their rights vis-a-vis the state. In the case
111 the indigenous groups, it is particula rl y important that they can exer t t ~t t hdr derecho de tutela, their r ight to use inju nctions, to make sure
tiLt I tiHy :1n.: consulted before projects a re ca rri ed out in their areas o f residl 'll\ t'. l low('VL' r, nn inj uncti o n d oc~ not gu:1r:1n tcc thnt the gove rn ment

IU'f

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

w ill comply, especially when t he projects have to do wit h oil extraction

or the exploitat ion of other natural resources. For all its importance as a
mechanism that seeks to promote partici patory, democratic, and transparen t p roced ures in govern ment, t he fact is t ha t the tutela right has
become a conflict-r idden legal issue.
Why did t he government make these changes? There were important
fac tors behind these reforms. O n the one hand, the Gaviria government
was keen on mode rn izing th e institutiona l apparatus of the state. It was
evident tha t, apa rt fro m the violence, Colombia's political system was
und ergoing a crisis of governance. Eve n indu st ry had complaints about
t he inefficiency of the adm inistration, underscoring the need to improve
t he management a nd regulation of th e state. In the same way, international
institu tions- at t he bila t eral as we ll as t he m u lt il atera l level - called for
an innovation of the tradition al political structures and emphasized the
need for "democratization " a nd parti cip a tion in decision- m ak ing. To this
end, the state's regu latory ca pac ity at the n ational level was reduced in
some sectors, especially in relation to the welfare question, and at the loca l
level it had less infl uence vis-a-vis the econom y. In oth er areas, for exam
p ie the issu ing of licenses for mining and o il prod uctio n , there was :1
concentration of tran sactions at the state level in o rder to " inc rease" effi
ciency. T hese "modernizing" efforts also pa ved the way for t he sacking o f
employees a n d workers of national insti tutions, t hus complying with th e
neolibera l c hallenge of a minimized state. ln th is sense, the modernizati on
of society is not limited to the free trading of goods (Nolte 1996).
On the other hand, modernization r eforms provided political opening~
for social movements, which h ad demanded in creased di rect participatio 11
since the beginning of t he 1970s. They used t he refo rms to revitalize rlw
po litica l field at t h e m unicipa l level, push fo r fu ll part icipation for all citi
~ens, an d sea rch for ways to regulate the social crises with civil (that i,,
n on-military) methods . Colom b ia's h istory is c haracter ized by t h1
struggle aga inst structu res imposed by the r u ling classes: the centu rit,
long indigenous resistance; t he com moners' rebellion that preceded tlu
indepen dence movement in 178 1; t he craftsm en's struggle for democr;h 1
in 1854; th e social p rotests of the 1930s; the ra dicalization of agran.111
reform in the 1960s and 1970s; the regional and urban civic movemc11t~
that started in the second half of the 1970s; and the confluence of li11
indigenous and civic movements advocating for a multicultural nati1111
Despite the pervasiveness of armed conflict and repression, these sm 1.tl
forces and their debates and activities showed that there were actor'> w ill
the potentia l to d issent w ithi n democratic frameworks . Their prol!''l
forced governments to adjust their programs and develop new in,llll
ments that would fac ilitate negoti ations with the d issa tisfied scc to1 ' \
case in point were t he m obilizations - w ith intense invo lvement of itH IIJ\1
no us gro ups- th at co ntributed to thr c'' t.lhl"lllncnt of :1 ~ IWti . tl l.., l,tt
Att o rn ey offit't' th :lt monitm' h111ILIII IIJ \111 ' \llli.ltiOil ' .111d tlllll llll l'. lito

Co lombian govern me nt to co op erate w ith t he Interna tional Com mission

for the Protection of Hu man Rights. Once aga in, however, there is no
guarantee tha t state agencies will comply with their constitu tional duties
(Meschkat et a/. 1980; Garda 1981; Zamosc 1986; C haparro 1989;
Rathgeber 1991; Huhle 2000 ).
These legal and political changes now make it possible for t he indigenous movement to expand its power, representation, and participation.
This is happening on a number of levels. Some of the decentralization
reforms now a llow the cabildos, or indigenous co uncils, to d irect funding
for bilingual schools, to build hea lth centers with trad itional and western
medicine, an d to set in p lace a water an d energy infrastructure w ith in a
L'ommun a l regime (not p ri va tized). The indigenous pop ulation also
111vested in small industries and o t her inco m e-generating ventures . They
we re also ab le to regain some of t heir tr ad itio nal legal jurisd iction, which
.li lowed room, once again, for the institut io nalization of ind igenous
1 onflict resolution processes. This has no t been without tensions,
however, as some comm unity members (for exam ple, those who saw a
ph ysical p u nishment as a violation of ind ividual human ri ghts) questioned
this indigenous jurisdic t ion . Others conflicts emerged . fn the past, it was
h.trd to find a new governor for a n ind igenous resguardo {reservations
dlocated to the indigenous peoples in colonial t im es). Si nce the posts at
1ill' cabildo of a resguardo imply access to funds, t here is now stiff com petit ion fo r these jobs.
'l'hus, wh ile in ot her countries decentralizatio n was often implemented
111 :1 half-hear ted man ner, in Co lo mbia, dece ntralization reforms were
l.t kcn as a se rious ch allen ge. In a sharp departLl re fro m past p ract ices, in
lh r 1990s, socia l movements an d organ iza tions were able to transform
~tln1 i n istrative reform into a r ea l revitalization of politics, especially at the
11 11.11 level. Th e indigenous organizations in severa l region s of the country
liT It' among t he most com mitted playe rs in t his process.

IIU

Indigenous Groups as Social Actors

\ ltc'll refe rring to the indigenous movement as a social actor in the current
I'' 11 m l, we cannot forget the history of indigenous resistance against
illllllll,ltion si nce the Span ish conquest, or the other complex processes
tit 11 h.1vc a llowed their culture to be maintained, in particular in remote
" I IIIII' w ith a d iffic ult topography and thus difficu lt access. Furthermore,
lllolll\l'llous peoples developed a surprising capacity to adapt some coloIt tl 111.t i1ut io ns to t hei r own pu rposes . The cabildos, or local co uncils,
"'" '"'ti t11t ed in Span ish co lon i:-11 times w it h t he goa l of having commu!1 1111 ~ 111.111.tgc the ir own pown y. This type of "self-government" was
il lolliilld. ltcd hy 11:1tion:d .1111 1 dl'p.lllllll'llt.tl l:l w' p:1sstd in t he 1890s. In
du I 'I 0,, ilw llldl j',t'IICIII ' IIIII Vl llll 111 to Hoi .td viiiii ,IJ',\' of th r pro v i s ion ~ o f

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

these laws, t ransforming the cabildo into the instit utional basis for
winning a uto nomy.
T he main ind igenous protagonist of that period, CRIC, emerged
figh ting alongs id e p easan t organizations for a c ha nge in the d istr ibutio n
of rural la nd and for d emocratization of society. CRIC ad vocated not only
in d igeno us territories, bu t also fo r trad itional rights, the maintenance of
in d igenous c ustom s, a nd t he im po rtance of cultura l d ivers ity in the
co untry. It became the model fo r regional indige no us o rganizations. From
its beginnin g in 1 97 1, Cauca's indigeno us movement a ttracted attention
because of th e strength o f its m obilizations even in times of re pression.
T he grea t capacity o f its leaders to convok e gatherings genera ted its own
dyna m ic, which - according to conserva ti ve estimates - res ulted in t he
reclaiming of more tha n 35,0 00 hectares o f lan d th a t had been previously
occupied by la rge landow ne rs a nd t he c h urch . (CRIC estimates a re o n t he
order of 6 0,000 hecta res.) They a lso did away w ith o th er d uties suc h as
the pol l tax, elimi nating t he bases for the political domina nce exercised
by t he landowners.
In the 1980s, the indigenous pop ula tion of the Amazon basin succeeded
in o bta in ing guarantees to app rox imately 18 millio n hectares. T h is ex pansio n o f ind igeno us territo ries was deeply critic ized by previous
gove rn ments a nd investors because it ham pe red exp loitation of na tural
reso urces in t he region. The recovery o f ancest ra l la nd mea nt not o n ly t he
further ava ilabil ity of add ition al la nd to satisfy t he need s o f the fa milies
of t he ind igenous pop ulation, but a lso loca l gove rna nce, con trol, a nd
u tiliza tion o f the indigenous te rri tor ies accordi ng to t heir own rules a nd
me th o ds. T hese achie vem ents d id not come a bo ut without losses: between
1971 an d 2000, approx im ately 600 ind igeno us leader s we re killed , and
for th e most part their assassins re main un pu nish ed (Ra thgeber 1994;
Pineda Camacho 1995; CRIC 1997, 2000).
Fro m 1 980 onward , t he political platform and d iscourse of t he CRIC
an d t he national ind igenous o rga ni za ti on ONIC promoted the a utonomy
of t he indigeno us councils. In 1985 the cabildos in the Ca uca regio n
presented t he V ito nc6 resolution, which wo ul d become a la n dmark for
the a utono m y of ind igen ous communities. T he concept of auto no m y
consisted of the m anagem ent o f natu ra l resources by t he communities, the
election of their indigenous rep resentatives accord in g to t heir tradition ,
a nd t he develop ment o f t heir own r ules, all fi nanced by fu nds ava ila ble
from the public budget (so-called "transfers") and backed by a system of
justice based o n t h eir c ustomary law (Rathgeber 1994; Pined a Camacho
1995; Bonilla 1995) .
T he ind igen o us movement a lso to uch ed on th e iss ue of seek ing civi l
solutions for social conflicts. O ne o f the most no t:1hlr successes was tlw
1984 CRIC agree men t w ith t he regi on:-~ l ch :1 pi !'I Ill 1:1.'1 )1 .' (;;\ N, the C:1t tlc
Ra isers Pede r:1t io n, w hose mcmlwrs h,u Jt, ,u lt ttnll odl l tl~td pM;un ilit.l l )'
hnnd~ to rcprr~~ tlw l', l !ll l p~ th.l l tlu'd 11''"' Il l'' tl1111 l tllcl' l11 tl11o., h 'l',h l)

violent situa tion, both p a rties put e mphasis on a dialogue to safeguard

their own interests. T h e cattle raisers agreed to peacefully so lve the la n d
con flicts in volving ind igeno us comm unities, w hile CRIC promised to use
its influen ce to p ut an end to t he la nd invasions. Some groups o n t he politicalleft den oun ced the agreement as t reason, bu t most of the in d igenous
comm unities supported it, si nce it a llowed them to consolidate their territories in a time of war. T he C RIC/FEDEGAN agreement became one of
the few exa mp les in Colo mb ian history in w hich civilia n actors were a ble
tO solve a m ajor social conflict w it h out the intervention of state a uthorities. Sti ll, in ma ny oth er regions of th e co untry, in dige nous groups suffered
the conseque nces o f the dirty war that d eveloped in t he second ha lf of the
1980s.

Us ing the same a pproach, Ca uca's indigenous move ment op ted fo r

estab lishing a d ialogue w it h state institutions. After the mid-198 0s - when
the a rmed conflict became m ore acute and the Co ld Wa r cr ushed many
ocial move ments and trade u nions - th e CRIC tried to co nvince t he
govern men t, t he Cath olic Church, a nd even the milita ry to implement the
civil o ption to solve the conflict. At the national level, it ach ieved t he
creation of a Department o f Indigenous Affairs at the Attorney Genera l's
Office fo r th e investiga tion of abuses com mitted by the military and the
police on indigenous te rritories. Since l 996 the indigenous peop les in t he
Antioqu ia region have been tryi ng to reach an agreemen t w ith t he a rmed
gro ups- t he guerrilla and t he p aramil itary -u nder w hich their a utonomy
withi n t heir te rr itOries is to be respected , as is their ne ut ra lity vis-a-vis the
ongoing ba ttl e fo r p owe r. The g uer ri ll as rejected t he agreem ent a nd it
seems that the Ur ibe go ve rnm ent w ill d o the sa me; yet, th e state is now
trying to induce the indigenou s grou ps to collabor ate with state security
forces, even thou gh they do not share the sa me n oti on of nation al sec urity. Th e dialogues contri buted to t he precarious ba la nce between those
in favor of, a nd those aga inst, mili tarizatio n.
T h e continued militarizatio n t hreatens to b ring social a nd political
;Ktivity in t he indigenous co mm un ities to an end. It o bstructs the supp ly
of food and medicine a nd restricts tasks carried out in the different
climatic zones (open -air rel igio us ceremo nies and comm una l assem bl ies)
.1nd even in centr al urban areas. The ind igeno us a uthorities recogni zed by
l.1w need permits from the military or guerrilla comma nde rs to move
w ith in t he region or to call meetings. The guerrillas o f th e FARC
(< :o lombia's Revolutio na ry Armed Forces), have at times imp eded ind igeltous efforts to recuperate territory because it is n ot conven ient to their
~~ r:-~ tegic o bjectives. T h e fighting between of the state's fo rces, the pa rallli li tnry, a nd t he guerrillas is t h rea te ning the p hysical existence of the
111d igc no us co m m uni ties. T he indigeno us gro up "Quintin La me," was
IClmlt'd in 19H4 ns :1 self-d efense group aga inst t he la ndowners' pa ra millt ,li Y group~. It h.1d li ttle ntil it:Hy :H:tio n, hu t w:1s supported by the loca l
Jll 'llpil', NI"VI' It lwlto.,,, 111m 1 of ito., indigt'll !lll\ lt:Hkro., rc:1li:~nl tha t the

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

armed approach d id not suit the needs of the communities, or t he concept

of autonom y, and so t he group was d issolved at the beginni ng of the 1990s
(Rathgeber 1994, 2002; Bonilla 1995).
Despite the militarization o f the country, and the difficulties it causes
them, indigenous organizations have still been ab le to accomp lish significant change. Probably the most impo rtant have been the constitutional
reforms in 1991. The ind igenous movement brought its im pressive discursive abilities to t he debates of t he 1991 Constituent Assem bl y, wh ich came
as the co untry took a brief interl ud e from th e war to t ry to bring the armed
conflicts to an end. Ind igenous organizations were represented by three
elected assembly mem bers who were able to get some significa nt provisions passed into the new constitution. Under t he reforms, the state has
the following obligations : to r ecognize and protect th e ethnic an d cult ural
di versity of th e cou ntry (art. 7); to ensure equality an d safeguard the
dignity of th e d ifferent cultures (art. 70); to recognize t raditional ind igenous institutio ns (art. 72); to guard th e collective property of the
ind ige no us territories and grant them the status of Indige nous Territor ial
En tities (art. 63,286 and 329); to guaran tee ancestral relig ion (art. 18 and
19); to respect the r ight to a sustaina ble development an d to consult with
the ind igenous communities when a p roposed project relates to ind igeno us territory (art. 79, 80 and 330); to give official status to the
indigenous languages and establish bilingual education in the ind igeno us
territories (art. 10, 68.5); to guarantee autochtho no us systems of justice
within the indigenous territories (art. 246); and to ensu re a m inimum of
indigenous representation at the parliamentary level (art. 17 1 and 176).
The ind igenous population witnessed the enshrinement of the ir fundamental rights in th e constitution; an event witho ut p recedent in the history
of Col ombia (Bonilla 1995; Pineda Camacho 1995; ONIC 1996a; M uyu y
Jacana mejoy 1997).
The other arena in wh ich indigeno us peoples have been active is in the
search for peacefu l so lutions to the wa r. In 1996, t he indigenous movement mo bilized at national level to push t his issue. The government o f
Ernesto Sam pe r (1994-8) had not complied w ith the various agreements,
and t he nu mber o f leaders killed had increased dramatically. In the Cauca
region, t he Pa ez, Totor6, and Yanacona gro u ps had secured their land
righ ts w ith t he hand ing over of more t han 20,000 hectares bet ween 1992
and 1994. W ith th e occupation of the Episcopal Conference headquarters
and of other public build ings and t he blocking of t he Pan-American
Highway and other im portant roads, th e indigenous population pressu red
the governm ent into signing two decrees . The first one (No. 1396/96)
created the Human Rights Commission fo r t he Ind igeno us Peoples. The
second (No. 1397/96) created t he Natio na l Com mission for lndi genow.
Territories. This latter decr ee had the tas k - :1 1110 111'. '' ot hn s of defining
t he timeline for t he issui ng of titl es :1nd thl" tx p.111 ~ 1ol1 ol 1 11d lg{' IIOU~ l :111d ~.
A Perm:1nent Cou ncil of /\glt'l'lllt'll l .111d < 1111'1 11 ~ 11 ' 1\ lt h tilt llldlgt'IIOI I\

Peoples and Organizations were also established. The participation of

regional and nationa l organizati ons did not p reclude the involvement o f
local o rgani zations in the negoti ations. The Hu man Rights Commission
and the Pe rmanent Council still exist. T he provision that created the
Commission for t he Indigenous Territor ies was abolished later by the
Pastrana government.
In the past three years, the ind igenous population in the Cauca region
established a " terr itory of coexistence, d ia logue and negotiatio n" in the
community of Piendam6, next to the Pan-Am erican Highway between
Cali and Popayan. This public space has been set up w it h the aim of fulfilling severa l o bjectives: to disc uss alternati ve proposals to Plan
Colombia (th e Uni ted States' drug eradication assistance p rogram), to
exchange a lternative experiences, and to build o n t he r elationships of
solidari ty w ith the inte rnational comm uni ty. It seeks to gather those
groups o f civil society not wishi ng to place themselves wi thin t he bipo lar schemes set by the government and the guerrilla grou p, FARC. T he
ind igeno us population d id not trust t he d ia logue process between t he
two pa rties; no r did they feel represented by either side. They were seeking a new rela tionship between the indigenous groups, the other acto rs,
and t he govern ment, emphasizing the necessity of civil o pti o ns fo r solving social conflicts.
Su rroun ded and t hrea tened on several occasions by th e FARC and th e
parami li tary, the indigen o us population has ma naged to mai nta in th eir
" territory o f coexistence" in Piendam6. W hi le the government and th e
guerrilla gro u ps have not paid mu ch attention to th is initi ative, it has
ge nerated substantial in terest at the international level. Even the presi dent of the Ita lia n Pa rlia men t pa rticipa ted in o ne of th e m eetings in 2 0 00
(C RIC 1996, 1999; ONIC 1996b; Rathge ber 2000, 2001a, 2001d).
However , there are limits fo r indigenous actors trying to neutralize
negative forces and infl uence institutional changes. Since the mid-1990s,
they have not been able to prevent the intensifica tio n of the conflict o r the
111ilitarization wi thin the borders of indigenous territories. Tho se respon-.ihl e fo r t he massacre in t he Ni lo hacienda in 199 1 (in t he m unicipa lity
of Ca loto, Ca uca region), in w hich 20 indigenous Nasa people were killed,
hnve not been p unished. However, the CRIC's investigations have
ltvea led that t he responsibility lies with mem bers of the national police
,1nd drug-dealers. The Inter-American Human Rig hts Commission recomllltnded that the Colombian gove rnm ent pass a d ec ree allowing t he
111ll1gcnous people to acqu ire the lands they have claimed fo r m ore t han
" d ecad e, the conflict over which was the underlying reason for the
'''' "':H.:re. The government still refuses to issue t he decree (O N IC 1996 b,
I J IJ<.Ic; R::1 t hgebe r 200 1 a, 2001 b, 2001d ).
Mtli'L' i111 pona n tly, the govern ment has not imp lemented the laws or
ti n 1tT" nr ct,sa ry to put the consti tu tio n:1l p rovisio ns in practice. T he
'''" ''' ''" nl l.1nd hy w hitt -.tt tl r r ... , l.1 nd lord-., .111d drug t r:1ffickcrs con tinue

114

Theodor Rathgeber
in spite of t he Constitution. Such basic needs as health, education, food,
and housing are not met. In the areas of oil exploration - above all in
Ara uca, Boyaca, North Santander, and Put umayo d epartments- the right
to co nsultation and participation is li mited to mer e attendance to a proforma public event. According to the indigenous organizations, they are
dea ling with a new form of colonization. Those who oppose the indiscriminate exploitation of gold, coal, wood, or medicina l plants are
acc used of belonging to the guerrillas, wh ich in so me areas is equivalent
to a death sentence. Cultural aggression is practiced da ily by a variety of
state institutions, as well as by t he churc h, missions, settl ers, landlords,
dr ug-traffickers, the pa ramilitary, and the guerrillas.
If we compare the curre nt s ituati on to that of t he "1970s, t he im pact of
the indigenous movement on socio-political rea lity in Colom bia is
rema rkable. T hey have successfu ll y st rengthened the pr ocesses of democrat ization, extended citizen pa rticipation, a nd renounced violence as a
met hod of conflict resolution. T hey have managed to t ra nslate the state's
ru les into inst ruments t hat they are now using to meet t he need s o f their
communities, protect their terr itori es, promote im provements in their
livi ng cond itions, and experimen t w ith new forms o f socia l li nks. T he
ind igenous movement has emerged as one of t he loudest critics of the
Colombian state, even though they defend the existence of the constituti on as a core standard and as an indispensable condition for the
development of a different culture. They have come forward as a major
force p romoting t he opening of politica l sp heres, in addition to articulating their own model of development (Ra t hgeber 1994;
Stroebele-Gregor 1994 ).

Shaping the Future from an Indigenous Perspective:

Three Case Studies
Globalization processes impl y an acceleration of th e flow of capital. In
t he process, the activities of extractive industr ies have t he effect o f
spreading insecurity, threatening the cultural an d physica l survival of
indigenous peoples (Ha rdt and Negri 2000). In the previous sections of
this chapter, we have considered broad processes of change at the nationa l
level, paying attention to t he ways in which the indigenous movement has
been adapt ing and trying to influence politics. In the following sections
we review t hree exam ples o f local and regiona l struggles foc used on t he
defense, recovery, and developmen t of indigenous ident iti es a nd teniro
ries .

lib

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

The U'wa: Defending an Ancestral T erritory

T he approxima tely 5,000 members of t he U'wa people have traditionally
lived in the footh ills of t he Eastern mountain range and the Sierra Nevada
del Cocuy. In the depa rtment of Boyaca, the U'wa share the territory with
peasant families. They maintain a land management strategy on their
territory that distributes land in ce rtain areas, according to the agricultural calendar. This strategy, which provides basic food security, has
already been negative ly affected by the loss of la nd and dissociation within
the territory. The Cobaria commu nity lac ks access to land in th e lower
regions, which means t hat they go hungry du ring certain times of the year.
Plans for o il extraction in their territory imply an ad d itional threat to the
food security and cultura l integrity of t he U'wa people. The oi l compan y
Oxy, Occidental of Colombia, planned to carry out exploration act ivities
in the so-called Bloque Samore, o n which the U'wa ancestral terr itory lies.
The Gaviria govern ment signed a contract with Oxy and Ecopetrol (the
Colo mbia n state oil company) a llowing both companies to explore the
entire area of Bloque Samore fo r 28 years. T he Samper government
(1994-8) decided to license the Oxy project (in 1995) without prior
consultation with the indigenous com mu nities.
At the beginning o f the 1990s, th e govern men t licensed areas
su rrounding th e Cobarla resguardo, Aguablanca ind igeno us reserve, the
Curipao resguardo and an :Hea not yet appoin ted as resguardo.
Resguardos are collectively owned lands that, since colon ial times, have
had th e status of indigenous territoria I reservations. Si nce 1994, t he U'wa
had been demand ing t he expans ion and unification of t heir resguardo
from INCORA, th e National Institu te fo r Agra rian Reform . The inspection and cartogr aphic stud ies of t he territory had already been carried out,
but INCORA was undecided o n whether to gran t the changes because of
th e oil interests. The case of the Nu kak territory was also inst r uctive. The
~ ize of their territory had been reduced at the time of its establishment,
the northwestern part being taken away from them. As a semi-nomadic
reople of roving farmers in t he Amazon ju ngle, t his ar ea was indispens.1ble for thei r survival. It was later discovered t hat on t his particular land
there were potential oilfields.
Other indigenous peoples in Colombia have also experienced the cata't rophic impact of oil exploration and exploitation on their culture and
tnrito ri es, including the Yarigui and A ripi peoples from Magdalena, the
Bnri fro m Catatumbo, the Kofan from Putumayo and the Hitni.i, Hitani.i,
lkto ye, a nd J iwi from Arauca . All these gro ups live in the vicinity of the
l l'wn, who were also awa re o f the negative experiences of indigenous
~om muni ti es in Ecuador and Pe ru th rough reports from the environllll" lll :l l o rg:1 ni zatio n Oil W:1tch. The U'wa people dec id ed to defend t heir
.liiU''tr;ll territory .11 ,d l ~o'' ' (ON I( ' 1997a, 1997 h, 1999 b; Rathgeber
1'1'1 7).

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

Accord ing to the Colombian constitution, the resguardos and the other
communal lands o f ethnic groups are collective property of the native
comm unities and, as such, they can not be sold o r confiscated by t he
government. Moreover, the agra rian reform regulation 160 I 1993 established that t hose land sites determined as commun al land are also
regulated . The U'wa succeeded in ensuring that the area for oil exploration be dealt with according to the provisions established by Convention
169 of the International Labor Organization . This meant t hat the project
could not have been carried out w it hout prior co nsul tation wit h t he
community and their expressed approva l. It required them to agree on the
indemnity, reparations, and benefits t he communities sho uld rece ive as
compensation for t heir r ights of usufruct. In ad dition, it req ui red specific
studies regarding t he impact o n t he social, economic, and cultural integration o f t he comm unities.
The en viro nmental license issued in 1995 by t he Mi nist ry for the
Environ ment for the ex ploration in the Bloque Samore conditioned Oxy's
activities to a previous process of consultation and agreement wi t h the
indigenous population in t he reg ion . However, this cond ition sho ul d have
been decided before the authorization o f t he seismic activi ti es was iss ued,
th us verifying t he possibilities of negative impacts on t he indigenous
community. Oxy carried out the first seismic activities on part of the U'wa
territory without complying with these obligations, arguing th at no exploration within the resguardo was to take place, and th at they did not have
the cartography of the U'wa territory. The com pan y went on to suggest
that t he guerril las were acti ng on t he Bloq ue Sa more region and infl uencing the indigenous population. Of course FARC was active in the area
and favored o il exploration, because they hoped to ga in an ad ditional
source o f fun ds. Three foreig n activists who worked for t he U'wa ca use
were k ill ed in 1999 as a resu lt. The U'wa com m unities denou nced this
lack of com plia nce by O xy with various au t horities. T hey p resented a
tutela before the court and agreed w it h t he Foreign Affai rs M inister whose duty is to ensure compliance of t he rights of ind igenous peopleson the establish ment of a com mission to review complaints. They also
sough t to capture the national and internati onal p u bl ic's attention in
order to stop Oxy's activities. Various non-i ndigenous social sectors,
including some of t he blue-collar workers from Oxy and Shell , backed the
U'wa cause.
The Commission verified seismic activities in the U'wa territory, but
sanctions against Oxy never materialized. Besides, the government
insisted t hat the U'wa people did not have a u nified position and that a
considerable proportion of them were in favor of o il exploration. The
U'wa communities responded that they were all agninst the project,
d eclaring t his in multiple opportun ities t hro ug h t h(' ctdll'lt!os :111d t hci r
tradit io na l au thorities. They underlined tlw III'I HIIt .llll c nf ro n ~ ulting
thtse rtprt<,enta ti vl' i n .,ti t uti on ~ .11HI11ot , Ill\ 11(1111 I I w 'l'lllllp

At the legal level, the U'wa did not achieve a favora ble verdict. T he
Constitutional Court passed judgment that in 1997 the government had
granted t he license in accordance with t he legislation. Only one appea l in
the same year before the Inter-American Commission of Human Righ ts
co uld slow down the project in Bloque Samore. Based on the conclusions
of a Harvard Un iversity study, the commission recommended putting an
immediate stop to all oil exploration on U'wa territory and restarting the
consultation process. However, the recommendat io n left open the possibility of restarting oil exploratio n activities in Bloque Sam ore o utside
U'wa territOry and after consu ltatio ns with the U'wa had taken place. It
also proposed t hat the Colombian government continue to recognize
U'wa's ownership of their ancestral territory. The study emphasized t he
importa nce of r ecognizing an d showing respect for t he represen tative
structures of the U'wa people, their trad itional au t horities and t heir
cabildo. It condemned the nega tive rumors t hat were circulating, particularl y regardi ng the link between the U'wa and the guerrillas (0N1C
1997a, J 997b, l 999a) .
After a ll these efforts, t he govern ment established the resguardo {mica
(consolidated resguardo), but at the same ti me t he Mi nistry fo r t he
Environment gra nted a new environ mental license w ith a mod ification
regarding the area, whic h now incl uded a new region of exploration a few
meters away from the resguardo. The indigenous representat ives of the
U'wa peo ple t hen traveled to Oxy's headquarters in the United States to
a shareholders' meeting in 1999, asking them to stop this project once and
for all.
Escorted by the army, w ho on t heir way in crushed several d emonstrations, Oxy brought in the technica l eq uip ment and team to start the
exploration work at the begin ni ng of 2001. T hree ch ildren died as a result
of t he use of for ce. Work con tin ued un til the begin ning of 2002, when th e
company decided to stop further activities, declaring t he area inappropriate for exploration and bringing the project to an end. W hile the U 'wa
and their sympathizers celebrated the fact that they co uld keep their ancestral territory and began repai ring the da mage done as a resu lt of th e
exploration, t he Ministry for the En vironment extended two new licenses
to national companies for exploration on anoth er part of the Bloque
Sa more. T he struggle of t he U'wa has yet to find an end . Mean while the
lJ 'wa have reclaimed a large part of their territory and are resolu te in their
quest to preserve t heir cult ure (Rathgeber 2001a, Asoc iac i6n U'wa 2001,
1()02).

I Ill

11'1

'J'/;e Embera-Katio: Appealing to the rule of law

I'IH F1nhn:1 i(;lt io li ve in an indigenous reSJ!.IItlrdo (comprising th e o ld
lw.tg.ulo .tnd l\ ,11 ,11'"11 lt'.' J!.tltt l't!os), wh ich h.1~ .111 l' Xtl'nsion o f 20 3,290

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

hecta res w ithin the Paramillo natur al park in the northwest of Colombia.
The Embera-Katfo belong to the Embera people consisting of around
57,400 mem bers distributed in the departments of C hoco , Antioquia, and
Cordoba. In the latter, the Em bera-Katfo live s ide by sid e wi th AfroColombian communities, descendants of the Cimarron slaves w ho in the
eig hteen th century sought refuge in these rainforests. Currently, the
Embera-Katfo comprise 19 communities situated in the hydrographical
basins of the rivers Simi, Esmeralda, Verde, and Cruz Grande.
The region is a tropica l jungle, well known for its richness in biodivers ity d ue, in large extent, to the way the Embera-Katfo have lived and
managed the rainforest, w hich demands high mobility in times of scarcity.
T hey li ve scattered along t he rivers a nd strea ms, in family gro ups that
explo it the en vironmental d iversity availa bl9 aroun d the ir settlements.
Th ey have developed t heir own sophisticated syste rn s o f production,
inco rporating fruit tree seeds in to the vegetable ga' rdens distributed
a rou nd the communities. T hey combine horticulture with frui t collection,
hun ti ng, and fishi ng depend ing o n the season. This t ype of economy
sustains the fa mil y and provides food sec urity, but does n ot leave much
excess p rod uction fo r t rade. In genera l, the Embera do not have a centralized system or a hierarchical po litical str ucture. The fam il y nucleus is
a utonomous in terms of decision-making, although advice provided by
the other famili es is taken into account (Mueller-Piantenberg 19 99;
Rathgeber 1999).
The 1960s saw t he beginning of a continuing p rocess of colonization
or settl ement on Embera-Katfo's land. T hese settlers d id not k now a bout
rainforest management. At first they began with small-sca le w ood
harvesting, which d id not cause serio us d amage to the rainforest.
Devastation rea lly commenced with the use of the power saw. lt is estimated th at in the eight ies arou nd 95,000 hecta res of primary forest were
razed. A part o f t he Embera-Katfo populatio n also began to cut down the
for est in o rder to get income to bu y tools, motorboats, flashlights, and
radios. T he traditional indigenous sector s raised the ala rm to pr event t he
destruction of their territor y.
At th e beginning of the nineties th ese traditional sectors began a pr ocess
to elaborate an "ethno-development plan" that wou ld recuperate part of
the traditional economy and revital ize domestic relations between the
communities. However, the plan failed due to differences of opinion
regarding the use of the ecosystem. Balancing the different interests was
the most important part of the plan because it had to ta ke all proposals
into consideration and still be sustainable. To this end, th e plan incl uded
the creation of a political body whose function was to mediate between
different interests according to its own previously agreed-upon reg uln
tions, and to esta blish a mechanism fo r compensation vis-a-tJis diffcrt' lll
forms of authority and socia l relations. T his w~ s necessa ry bcC:lll't"
ex isting gove rnm ent institu tio ns had l o~>t a ll crnlihilit y.

The plan sought to increase food security, esta blish new forms of subsistence, impr ove existing m edical car e, and com plete t he transport
infrastructu re. O n the basis of their mode l of su bsistence they wanted to
broaden their economic activities, gradua lly develop ing an economic
model that wou ld m eet the needs o f a growing popu lation and generated
income. New and adapted tech nologies were introduced which were to
increase yields of trad itiona l production. The plan also covered management of t he Sin u ri verbed to be used as drinking water reser vo ir, financed
by funds fro m the water compan ies that su pply approximately one m illion
customers (Rathge ber 1999).
T he en tire p rocess came to a hal t with rhe construction of the hyd roelectric plant Urra I. Back in t he 1950s, the politica l elite from the
Cordoba depa rtment proposed the construction of a hydroe lectric plant
(Urd I and II) in the Sinu River. For th is pu rpose, at the begin ning of the
1980s, feas ibility studies were carried out and fund ing sour ces sought.
The Urra l project incl uded the floodi ng of 7,400 hectares, mai nly land
from the Paramillo natural park that had been affected by the settlements.
The first part of th e d am was to include 100 hectares of Embera-Katlo
territory, and the second phase, Urd II, plan ned t he flooding of 70,000
hectares, affecting 475 Embera-Katlo families. In addition, the project
represented a threat to approximately I 00,000 people (30,000 families)
who lived on the areas below the da m, fishi ng and farmi ng for their livelihood. A ll in all, it was esti mated that about o ne m illi on peo ple wou ld be
affected by the project.
The electric p lant in Urra 1 was to prod uce 340 megawatts, or 2 percent
of th e country 's energy production . T he im mediate beneficiaries of the
project were planni ng commercia l agriculture and cattl e-br eeding enterprises on 262,0 00 hectares, constructing an irriga tion system that would
turn 150,000 hecta res into producti ve land. Amo ng t he hoped-for bene(its were the cr eation of 3,500 jobs and t he collectio n o f income by the
mu nicipalities from the sale o f energy. However, t he cost-benefit studies
.1 lso revealed tha t the project was not econom ica ll y viable in the long term,
tha t it would cause envi ro n mental d amage to the rainforest, and would
have a negative impact on the population livi ng along t he riverside, all
1en sons w hy t he pro ject was rejected in the first place.
In light of t he power cuts that the country's capital, Bogota, experienced
during 1992, when the city suffered hours-long cuts on a daily basis, the
gove rn ment decided to consolidate the flow of energy with construction
o l additional electric plants like Urra I. Works were started in 1993 by a
1-,wcdish company which used exclusively Canadian and Swedish funds,
"nee th e Wo rld Bank had decided to abandon the project given its negall vt impacts. A Russian company su pplied the equip ment to generate the
t nngy needed du ring co nstru crion. The dam was completed in 1998
(1\ l uvlln Ph1ntcnhl' rg 1'1 1>1>; C::th il dm Mayores Em bera-Katfo 1999a ).
I ht 111h.lhit.1111' ol ti ll' II 'J',BIIIIIt upud hy l Jn .ll , induding the Em hera

l :lCI

~~ I

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

Katfo population and other fishing and peasant families, did not have any
idea of the impact that the plant would ha ve on them . Thanks to the help
of two experts from the Cordo ba and Medellin University - both of whom
were later killed- the population began to realize that their food security
was being threatened. Their staple food, the local fish va ri ety Bocachico
-th eir main source of protein- d isappeared within a period of five years.
In the face such a tremend ous negative impact, the Embera-Katfo and the
fishing fam ilies decided to o ppose the second phase of th e hydroelectric
.
(
proJect.
' '
In 1995, more than 600 ind igenous peo ple - men, women, children
1
and the elderl y- embarked in wooden rafts on the SinCt River to say their
farewell to the r iver. This first mobiliza tion , known as the Do Wa'bura,
attracted in ternationa l and national public attention and forced the Urra
S.A. company into nego tiations with the Embera-Katfo. During the first.
meeting, the company committed itself to con sult them regard ing
compensati o n amo unts for da mages and to implement the recom mendations of environmental impact stud ies . However, 30 percent of the
construction work had a lready taken place, and th e indigenous populat ion was still no t clear about the da mages.
The contr acting company U rra S.A. d id not fulfill its va r ious o bligations. The Embera-Katfo decided to resort to the tutela legal suit to
safeguard their consultation and mitigation rights . ln 1998, w hen the dam
was concluded but no t yet filled, the Constitutional Court, as final
a uth ority, granted the tutela to the Ember a-Katfo, ruling a temporary halt
of the works. Th e court pai nstakingly expla ined th e shortcomings of the
pr oceedings and order ed th e Ministry fo r the Environ ment- responsible
for the issuing of licenses- and the Urra S.A. company to comply w ith al l
the studies, consul tations, consens us processes, and mitigations before
work co uld be continued. T he Court set a deadline of six months for
settlement d iscussions to ta ke place, and emphas ized the fact that the
M inistry and th e com pany should r espect the cultural unity of the communities, refra ining from attempting to foster d ivisio ns when carrying o ut
conversations with the Embera-Katfo. The sentence was rather canny
because, in fac t, there was an attempt to divide the Embera-Katfo in order
to ach ieve an agreem ent for financial reparations instead of la nd compensation. Despite the encourage ment of th is division, the M inistry was
forced into compensating the Embera-Katio w ith land as well , as a resul t
of international protest and mob ilizations (CCC 1998; Cabildos Mayores
Embera-Katfo 1999a; M ueller-Plantenberg 1999; Rathgeber 2001b).
During this time, the para military killed a traditio nal leader of thl'
Embe ra-Katio, a very important figure of the indigenous resistan ce, a nd
six other leaders received death threats. Three consul tants of t lw
Embera-Katfo who worked with ONIC were decla red "mi l it:-~ry t:1 r).1,l't~>"
and had to take re fuge abroad. Before this l'Vl' nt , three p(;() pk who Wt' ll'
co mmiu ecl to th e indi genous l'l'Si~t,l i HI ' lud .llq:Hi y h t'l' ll llll!ld tJI'd ,

From 1999 to 2001, other indigenous leaders who had played a key role
in the negotiations with the M inistry and the company d ied or disappeared. In ad dition, the Alto Sint1 area had been turned into an epicente r
of war, brought about by d ispu tes over territoria l control between the
guerrillas and the paramilitary, involving the ind igenous people and
causing man y deaths.
At t he beginning of the negotiations at the end of 1998, the EmberaKatfo presented an ethno-deve lopment plan they called the plan de vida
(plan for life). T hey proposed severa l programs aimed at long-term food
security for th eir people . The process of implementation of the court
verdict took more tha n six months an d was accompanied by several
demonstrations, includ ing a long march from the Sinu River to Bogota
(800 km) and the occupation of the q uarters of the Mi nistry for the
Environme nt. At the same time the Embera-Katfo extended their support
links, getting an international body to monito r the conversations. At the
internatio nal level, the claims over delays and tricks played by the
Ministry for the En vironment forced the mi nister to travel to Europe twice
to explain matters. The Vice-President and the M inister of Foreign Affa irs
were sharply criticized when the y spoke in public on their European tours,
~:mphas i zi n g th e need for compliance with the decision made by the
Constitutio na l Court. The attitude of state officials suggested that the
sentence wo uld not be respected (Cabildos Mayores Embera-Katfo
1999b, 1999c; ONlC 1998, l999 b, 1999c, 1999d; International R ivers
Network 1999).
The conversations fina lly concluded, a nd th e Embe ra-Kat io opted for
J!lan ]enen, which contained ma ny of the dema nds included in their
l'th no-development plan. They had invoked the ru le of law to make sure
th a t the rights enshrined in the constitution were fulfilled. Meanwhile
th e Em bera-Katfo mobilized all civil m eans in their effort to guarantee
their cultural surviva l. In all these stages, internatio na l solidarity networks kept supporting th e stru ggle. However, this saga is not yet over
.tnd the future does not look prom isi ng. Although the Urra S.A. may
we ll be handing out food and other essentials such as medicine, the
Indigenous often remain em pty-ha nded. Frequently, the paramilitary
~ top them and take away their go o ds upon ret urn from T ierra Alta, the
pl.1ce appointed for distr ibuting goods. In spite of multiple complaints,
tht sta te security forces have not intervened yet (Rathge ber 200 1b).

/'mace: Searching for Economic Alternatives

l'la r>ur:1 cc sulph ur mi ne lies on the p iedmont of the active vo lcano that
1 11'. 11'~> the s:1n1e name, abo ut 40 km to the east of the department's cap-

it.d , Pop.1y:i n. Stnrtin g in 1940, members of rhe resguardo Purace

d<tt'l ll'd tl 11 ~ ~tll ll't't' of sul ph111'. Ill 19 ')(, opt"r:lli on ~ wne ~t:Hted in the
l:l I

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

mine, owned until 2000 by the company lndust rias Pu race S.A. Most of
the mining workers came from the resguardo . The mine is t he largest
sou rce o f employment in the w ho le region, providing jobs - direct and
indirect - to a pproximately 300 families, or one-fo urth of the population of the Purace resguardo, comprising 1,129 famil ies and
approximately 4,200 in habita nts.
O ne of the consequences of the liberaliza tion of the Colom bian market
after 1990 was that impo rted sulphur could be bought at lower p r ices t han
the domestic product. The Purace S.A. com pan y began to lose money and
w ent through its fi rst econo mic crisis in 1992. T hreatened w ith t he possibility o f losing jobs and income fo r t he region , th e cabildo of t he Purace
resguardo decided to talk to the company, proposing that the m ining
w orkers and indigenous community assu me contro l o f t he o peration of
the m ine. T he negotia tions concluded w ithout a co ncrete result. H owever,
a declaratio n of intent was signed in 1995 in t he Piendamo resguardo . A
year later Jndustrias Purace S.A. went bankrupt and put an end to its activities. T he trade un ion en tered in to negotiations with th e company, both
parties seeking a resolution wh ich wo uld a llow t hem to contin ue operating, even witho ut a p rofit for the company, b ut w ith the aim of
generating enough revenue to cove r the socia l obligatio ns o f the company
to t heir workers and emplo yees. Espec ia ll y at stake were the pensions o f
49 mining workers w ho had already gone into retirement. T heir demands
cam e to o ne million dollars.
T hey arrived at an agreemen t in 1998, which established that t he
Colo m bian state wou ld oversee the p roceed ings o f t he contract. Industri as
Purace S.A. continued operating and its shareholders were now the
worker s. The m anagement main ta ined its legal constitutio n as lim ited
lia bility company until 1999. From t hen on, two compa nies operated
par allel to each other. O ne was constitu ted by the managemen t; the other
a su bsid iar y fo rmed by t he mi ners w hose responsibili ty was the running
o f operatio ns. In August 2000 t he management of t he company reo pened
ban kruptcy proceedings. It stated t hat it w ould stop all mi ni ng activitie!>
and stop paying wages. T he cabildo of t he Purace resguardo took over t he
management together w ith the wo rkers. T he mine con tin ued operating
under a new name: Empresa Minera Indigena del Cauca (Ca uca
Indigenous M ining Company) .
D uring the p rocess of negotiations the cabildo relied on the CRIC o n
several occasions fo r infor mation abo ut the legal and econom ic context.
A general assembly decided to continue on their own accor d with the mi 1w
in spite of the concerns raised in meetings with t he CRIC, wit h OIH'
important cond ition: t he exploitatio n of t he mine was to be adapted to
suit t he so cial and cultural interests of t he ind igenous comm uni ty and to
implement programs to improve t he enviro n ment. It t u rned into .1
paradox of La ti n American history in genn:l l, hl~:n usc mines h:lvt hcr n .1
prime ex nm plc of exploitation .111d :ln nd ul.ltiiHI o l lll,lll knH I ,111d 11.111111 ,

and this one was now going to be turned into a source of income fo r
surviva l. It was to guarantee pensions, employment, and benefits, in addition to maintaining goo d social relations with t he members of t he
resguardo. T here are hopes that t hrough management of the mine by t he
cabildo and t he miners, relat ions w ithin the resguardo wi ll be consolidated an d t he resguardo can become better estab lished (Ca bildo lndigena
de Purace 2001; Rathgeber 200 1a, 20 01d).
The cabildos had mad e stren uous efforts to bring together the miners
and in habita nts o f the resguardo, most o f them peasants. For man y years
they had li ved in separate worl ds, m iners usually in the urban areas, peasant farm ers in rural areas. T he lack o f roads also fos ter ed divisions.
Tensions between trade union m ining w orkers of indigenous o rigin and
the cabildo surfaced from t ime to ti me . Before work was sta rted in 1945,
the resguardo had to sacr ifice an area of 600 km . Years later t hey had confro ntations over enviro n men ta l issues. The p rocessing o f sulphur
generates tox ic gases, which caused damages to part of the land in t he res~uardo. At the same time, the mine conta m inates stream wa ter. W ith the
sup port of t he regio na l un iversity and CRIC, the cabildo started researching the environmental da mage in the 1970s, fili ng comp lain ts before the
c..:ou rts.
They orga nized dem o nst ratio ns, blocking th e roads lead ing to t he mi ne.
T he case came up in court in 1974 and the trib un al o rdered pay ment for
damages. T he g o vernment inte rfered, however, arg uing that the indigenous people may have boug ht weapons wi th t ht: mo nt:y, and payments
were stopped. In order to keep mi nimu m relati ons w it h t he cabildo, the
c..: ompan y would now and t hen donate some building ma terials for the
constructio n of a hou se or som e o th er structure in the cabildo (Mesch ka t
1983; Rathgeber 1994).
T he production of sulphu r d uring t he first yea r under t he cabildo
reg ime was below the p revious year's fig ures. In addition, demand for
' ulphur was higher than th e mi ne's previous production capacity. The
rabildo foresaw promising prospects, though, and set itself to the task of
find ing investors to m oderni ze t he mi ning equ ipment and diversify their
' 11pply with p rocessed foods such as fine grains. They currently want to
l'tdu ce th e vo lume o f prod uct io n to prolong the use o f the site and reduce
rn vironmental pollution, while attempting to mi tigate the damages
l .lllsed in t he past. H owever, they req ui re modern eq uip men t and technology . It is estimated that this investment w ill require a round $1.5
n11ll ion. T he previo us compan y had not invested in machinery or techllology fo r a long time. Looking for investors, CRIC approached some
< l'lmnn non-governmen tal organizations in 2 000. Ironically, the cabildo
~tq u ircs an en viro nmenta l license from t he Ministry to modernize and
'X tl'lld its li ne of prod ucts. W hereas befo re, t he Ministry issued licences
w1t ho11t 111\ IC..: h of a problem , it was now hesitant. Some environmenta l
g1111 il' ()jljl0\1' t hr pi;l n.... M ;lilY o t htl g1 H 1Jl" ' II pport t hi' tx peri ment and

l:l4

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

want to h elp the cabildo by putting t hem in contact with co:npanies i? t he

Valle del Ca uca depart ment, w ho are seeking to establish a regwnal
network of orga n ic production to bring to t h e market (Ra thgeber 2000,

o rd er to generate n ew productive cycles an d to have enough resources

available fo r an increasing indigenous population t hat seeks to maintain
their culture. T he introd uction of some cultural guidelines into the capitalist trad ing economy is nothing n ew in the Cauca region. The CRIC
started workin g in 19 78 on projects that d ealt specifically with recovered
land for t he r evival o f t he minga institution and associative work as a way
of rebu ild ing th e in d igenou s commu nity. T h e comm unities experimented
with revolving funds for cattle a nd agric u ltural productions based on
traditiona l a nd cash cr ops, like o rganic coffee . Th ey star ted different
forms of pr od uction and dist ribution o r iented and ma naged by their own
rules a nd institutions. The r o le of the cabildo would extend even more in
this sense with the reconstruction of t he regio ns through t he Entidades
Territoriales Tndfgenas (Ind igeno us T erritorial Entities), implementing
ethno-developmen t p la ns that inclu de bilingual ed ucation and health
projects based o n both traditiona l and western med icine. In Cauca there
is alread y a ne twork of more tha n 150 p rimary sch ools . In addition to the
regu la r curricu lu m, these schools also teach the histor y of indigenous
an cestors, myths, a nd legends.
Faced wi th circumstances t ha t do n ot a llow for a conti nuation of traditional li fe, th e ind igenous commu ni t ies are defying th e d om ina nt
economy, introducing t heir values into t he market. These expe rim ents
have often failed, but have served to strength en the indigenous institutions
a nd orga n izational p rocesses. Some ind igenous rese rves in North America
are also experi men ting in th is area u nder th e slogan of " new work ." In
countries like Brazil, and withi n non -ind igenous groups, th is chall enge is
being d iscussed u nder t he te rms of "economy of solidarity." This w ay of
thi n king takes some elem ents from discussions t hat ha ve been tak ing place
in Europe since the beginn ing of the 1930s (Polanyi 1944, 1997;
Bergmann 2002; Sin ger 2002). These struggles belo ng to the world's laboratory and the continuous search for alternatives to the dominating
economy.
Anoth er theme of ma jor importance is the struggle for autonomy.
Within t h is context the indi gen o us movement has always tried to change
1he r ules of the state as t h e necessary condition for their deve lopment and
preservation as a u niq ue c ultu re. Tha n ks to t heir struggle and the new
poli tica l constit ution, t h e Colombia n indigen ou s movemen t has gained
l on~iderable leverage to retrieve, consolidate, and develop their territo11\'S, t heir own fo rms of government and, once more, their identity. In
.1ddi1 io n, it has p laced emphasis on the fact t hat self-reorgan ization based
1111 identity cou ld provide a valid a nswer to globali za tion and to the
1 Xl\t ing socia l insecu rities surrou ndi ng t he susta inability of cultural
1 ~tntplcxi l ies.
Wi 1h in the l'Oilttxl of po litic:l l mohil izntion, the indigenous movement
llltllllht ltl'd "l',ll tf iLll ll iy In ilw l'lo~ion of ~0111(.' o ld fo rm!-. of politic:1l
.illlllll lol lll I' ,tlld Ill till' ddtll'l' ollld II'V II.d it. ll ltlll ol ilw po litit.tl flr ld . It

2 001a, 2001d) .

Conclusion
T h e p rocesses currentl y tak ing place under th e neoliberal model of globa lization are characterized by th e acceleration of the flow of fn~anctal
capital. T hey require a n a utonomous economic regim~, a re-orgamzatton
of society a nd o f the corres ponding sta te, a nd a parttcul~r d ef.mmon of
the limits o f p o litics. Fro m a n econo mic perspecttve, neohberaltsm advocates t he a uto n om y of m a rket players, the m od ernization o f th e state, a nd
the efficiency o f t he state's administ ra tion. At the social level , it h as
become synon ymo us with instab ili ty a nd insecuri ty fo r the maJonty o f
people. This c ha pte r has shown that Colombian indigeno us people ar~ a t
the center of this loss of secu rity, especially wh en exploratt o n a nd dnllmg
ta ke place on their te rritories. 1 have argued t hat th is econom ic. model
denies the basic structures necessa ry to ma inta in t heir food secun ty a nd
c ultura l identity. In defe nd ing and st re ngt hen ing their iden tity,
Colombian indigenous gro ups fig hting fo r their rights h ave d emonstrated
their d isagreem ent with t he aims and rul es of the dom i na tin ~ economy.
Of cou rse th ere are also indigenous com munities in Colo mb ta w ho are
loo k ing fo r oth er means of surviva l an d w ho are subscribing to t he rules
imposed by the system. H oweve r, t he indigeno us peo~lc 111 t he exam ples
d escri bed in t his cha pter advocate a n economy tha t wtll strengthen soc~al
relatio ns a n d go beyond p ure consu m ptio n. T he U'wa, t he Embera-Katto,
a nd th e Purace resguardo h ave tried to bu ild, conso lidate, a n d develop an
economic regime t hat is in line with th eir c ul tu ral id entity. The U 'wa and
t he Embera-Katfo conti nu e with th e t rad itiona l norms tha t will p reserve
their un iq ue cultures, whic h are d efined along th e pa th of indi geno us resista nce.
The Purace resguardo provides an example of th e co-existen~e of classic
business objectives w ith sustain able a ims like socta l and env tronmenta l
care a friend lier r elationsh ip w ith nature, and the development of culture.
Con~rary to t he restructu ring of the indust ria l areas in othe r parts of the
world wh ich m od ify the regio nal economies according to w o rld ma rker
a ims,' t he indigen o us m ining compa ny ta kes into con s.idera tion thl
geogr aphic, environmenta l, and cultural criteria of the regwn. Contrary
to the neo li ber al trend w hich consider s o n ly t he needs of t he marke t, till'
indigenous com pany of Purace understands t h.e r~SRttnrdo ns :1 soci:tl
fa bric tha t requires initiating p rocesses an d mak 1n g III Vl'~l nwn t~ t hat w dl
allow t hem to susta in their identity. T he b'>t two llll l)',fi'0,\1'" of tiH' CIU<
(in 1997 and 200 I ) f()(.: w;td o n1hi \ 1~\ lll' o li H'lllll lllll\ "I II III ' P H ' I II' IIl \" 11 1

l :lh

Theodor Rathgeber

Indigenous Struggles in Colombia

widened the spaces of civil society and advocated the rule of law and
democratic and participatory principles. It defends the constitution, the
decentra lization of the state, the direct elections of governors, and selfmanagement at communal level as minimum norms for local struggles.
And even though the ach ievements in this area are som etimes small, the
fact that the struggle is taking place at all shatters the image that the
econom ic rules imposed on society are eq uivalen t to natural laws that arc
impervious to a ny type of social change. T he indigeno us movement thus
feeds the process of democratization, seeking new relations between citizens, indigenous g roups, the government, and society.
To conclude, the Colombian indigeno us mo vem ent also challenges the
terms a nd concepts of the experts who define and ana lyze their reality.
Unti l the 1990s their concept of a utonomy was often criticized as a deviation fro m the class struggle. M oreover, they sought social emancipation
at a time when most socia l scientists saw the struggle for identity as essentia lly regressive. In wr itin g this chapter, my own perspective has been
influenced by the conceptual app roaches tha t have dom inated the analysis
of social movements since the 1980s. T his, however, is not the end of the
discussion. It is only the beginning of the debate o n how to adeq uately
understand the realities and asp irations of the indigeno us peoples.

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The Ecuadorian Indian

Movement
From Politics of Influence
to Politics of Power
Leon Zamosc

lk tween 1992 and 2002 Ecuador had five presidents. T h ree of t hem were
llected to the office. T he other two replaced elected p reside nts deposed
hy coups. Although the removals of Abda la Bucara m in 1997 and ja mi l
Mahuad in 2000 transpired under di ffe ren t circumstances, what is
~ trik ing is the similarity in t he p rocesses t hat brought them about. Both
Bucaram and Ma h uad tried to introduce drastic measures to comp lete the
rtc o liber al program in Ecuador, but neither of them was a bl e to secure
tuough political backing in congress. In both cases, the coups took p lace
.tt the heigh t of acute national crises, following massive mobili zations that
h.H.l been organized by the Indian movement. The previous elected presirltnt, Sixto Duran, had experienced a similar squeeze. Batter ed by popular
11pposition a nd aban doned by his pol it ical allies, he h ad been forced to
~ helve h is progr am of reforms, fin ishing h is term as a fig urehead devoid
of effective power.
Political cr ises a nd precari ous presidencies have defi ned Ecuador as
tllt t of the most, if not the most, u nstable co untr y in La tin America . In
t '" ~ c hapter, I w ill take this feature of Ecuadorian rea lity as a starting
Jllll llt for e xami ning t hree aspects of special interest. The fi rst aspect has
111 do w ith t he relationship between n eoliberalism a nd political volatility.
' II III\' .111:1l ys ts ::~rgue t hat pol itical insta bility poses grea t obstacles to t he
~llll'l'S~fu l implcmc nt::~tion o f ncolihcr:1 l reforms (Hagga rd a nd Ka ufman
i 'l'l 'i). 1\trt thi -. i-. :111 '"'ittll'" '''' ''l; trtll \ 111, ~inn it seems ohv iou ~ th:n