ESMAEL ORQUINAZA vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165596

November 17, 2005

FACTS: On Feb 5, 2003, Edilyn Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers factory, together
with her witness, Julio Espinili, executed a sworn statement regarding the allege act of
Orquinaza, the general manager of the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts
while she was taking a nap. The case was referred as a case of sexual harassment. Orquinaza
filed a petition to dismiss the complaint arguing that it does not contain allegation to constitute
the crime of sexual harassment. The assistant city prosecutor filed with the MTC an information
charging the petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. A warrant of arrest was issued against
Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that the warrant be recalled, the
information be quashed, the arraignment be invalidated and the case be dismissed. He also
claims that he was deprived of his right to due process since the information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for
sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness. The motion was denied. He again filed for
a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary investigation?
HELD: Based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the assistant city prosecutor concluded
that the more proper charge should be acts of lasciviousness. The conduct of another
preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be futile because the
complainant would be presenting the same evidence which have already been studied by the
prosecutor. The lack of preliminary investigation would still not be a ground to quash the
information against the accused much less does it affect the courts jurisdiction. The remedy of
the accused is to call the attention of the court to the lack of preliminary investigation and
demand as a matter of right that one be conducted.
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN
G.R. Nos. 107964-66

February 1, 1999

FACTS: On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were filed
against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty.
Petitioners filed motions for the consolidation of the three informations with the 21 other
remaining cases pending before the RTC. The Solicitor General alleged in its motion that the
indictable acts under the three informations form part of and is related to the transaction
complained. RTC granted the consolidation and the 3 infornations were re-raffled and reassigned to Branch 52-Manila presided public respondent Judge Nitafan. Without any motion
from the accused, Judge Nitafan issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why the
cases should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates Marcos right against ex post facto
law and the two other informations on the ground that private respondents right against double
jeopardy was violated. On August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued an order dismissing the 1 st
criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law and also dismissed the two remaining criminal

cases on the ground of violation of private respondents right against double jeopardy.
Prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge can motu proprio inititate a motion to quash an information.
HELD: In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any
motion to quash and as such she has deemed to have waived and abandon her right to avail
any legal ground which she may have properly and timely invoked to challenge the complaint or
information. If the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case
but also takes the side of the accused. It is clear that the only grounds which the court may
consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those ground stated
in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Pursuant to the
Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the
competence of the court to hear and pass judgement on the cause.
The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules
which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion
was filed by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and MANUEL S. ALBA

G.R. No. 144159

September 29, 2004

FACTS: On February 17, 1999, an Affidavit-Complaint was filed by Luis G. Pabalan in the Office
of the Ombudsman against the respondent, then City Administrator Manuel S. Alba of Quezon
City, and the Chairman of Iglesia Evangelica Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF),
Jeremias T. Cruz. The case was docketed as OMB-0-99-0346 and was assigned to the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) which, in turn, assigned Graft
Investigator Romeo M. Pamute to conduct an evaluation and a preliminary investigation.
Graft Investigator found that the case stemmed from the following facts:
Respondent MANUEL S. ALBA is a high ranking government official being the City
Administrator of Quezon City with a salary grade of 27 while respondent JEREMIAS T.
CRUZ is a private person. The latter is the Chairman of the Evangelist Methodist
Church in the Philippines Novaliches Congregation, Novaliches, Quezon City.
In his sworn complaint, complainant, LUIS PABALAN, stated that he is the owner of a lot located
at Susano Road, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the Congregation of Evangelist Church of the
Philippines (IEMELIF) headed by respondent Architect JEREMIAS T. CRUZ encroached when
improvements on their structure were made sometime in February 1997. The construction was
done without the necessary building permit. The Quezon City building official was, accordingly,
informed and consequently after hearing, the Assistant Building Official ordered the demolition

of the structure. The Order becomes final and executory upon failure of the religious
congregation (IEMELIF) to appeal on time to the DPWH.
On November 4, 1998, however, IEMELIF, through respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ, wrote
respondent City Administrator, Mr. MANUEL ALBA requesting the latter that said order be not
enforced pending appeal to the DPWH stating, among others, that the Order of the Assistant
Building Official is illegal and the implementation of the same will cause irreparable damage and
injury to the church (IEMELIF).
The letter of IEMELIF was received on November 5, 1998 by the Office of the respondent
MANUEL ALBA but a Memorandum ordering the recall of the demolition order was dated
November 4, 1998 or a day before the receipt of said letter.
The complainant objected and in a letter requested respondent ALBA to revoke the Order
recalling the demolition, but respondent City Administrator refused and failed to respond and, as
a result, the Building Official was not able to effect the demolition.
Complainant presented his title to the lot, the Resolution of the Building Official ordering the
demolition of the structure; the Order granting the Motion for Execution; the letter of Appeal by
respondent JEREMIAS T. CRUZ to the Mayor of Quezon City thru respondent MANUEL ALBA
stamped received by the City Administrators Office on November 5, 1998; the Memorandum of
respondent MANUEL S. ALBA to Engr. Romualdo Santos showing that the date is November 4,
1998; and the letter of objection and request that the recall order on the demolition be corrected
was, likewise, presented by the complainant.
The Graft Investigator found probable cause against the respondent for violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 and recommended the filing of the Information against him. The
Ombudsman approved the recommendation.
On September 9, 1999, an Information was filed with the SB, charging the respondent with
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it granted the Motion to Quash on the basis of a Memorandun
issued by Quezon City Mayor which memorandum has already been superseded.

HELD: Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in quashing the information. The records show that the SB quashed the information
with the ruling that the respondent acted on the basis of the January 12, 1994 Memorandum to
him of then Mayor Ismael Mathay.
The SB also relied on the resolution of the Graft Investigator, Romeo Pamute, dated July 23,
1999, duly approved by the Ombudsman.
The January 12, 1994 Memorandum of Mayor Mathay is even contrary to Section 307 of
Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the

Philippines. To rectify his erroneous January 12, 1994 Memorandum, Mayor Mathay had to
issue Memorandum No. 4 to the respondent..
In line with existing jurisprudence, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. (Bacalso vs.
Ramolete, 21 SCRA 519; Garcia vs. De Jesus, 206 SCRA 779) Section 307 of P.D. No. 1096 is
the law that confers jurisdiction upon the DPWH Secretary to adjudicate appeals from the orders
or decisions of the building officials.
The absence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ground for the
quashal of the Information but is a ground for the dismissal of the case.
It bears stressing that, even before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Regional Trial Court issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused only upon a finding of
probable cause based on the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, the affidavits and other
evidences appended to the Information, whatever evidence the Prosecutor may adduce upon
order of the court. If the court finds that there is no probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, it may dismiss the case. The dismissal of the case is without prejudice to the refiling
thereof unless barred by prescription. Indeed, the procedure is now encoded in Section 6, Rule
112, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court is mandated to immediately
dismiss the case upon finding that no probable cause exists to issue a warrant of arrest, and
after having evaluated the resolution of the prosecutor and the supporting evidence:

GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR vs. DINDO VIVAR y GOZON

G.R. No. 134744

January 16, 2001

FACTS: An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for beating Gian
Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out, Gian met Dindo who told that next
time, I will use my gun on you. The injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious
than they had appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was filed and the charge
for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for grave threats was filed against
Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter affidavit, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information for
grave threats since it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries should
have been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for a motion for reconsideration which was again
denied. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC
RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Villaflor.
Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation?

Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation be considered a
ground to quash the informations?

HELD: The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information. In the case a bar, a preliminary investigation was for slight physical
injuries was conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information was however
amended when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious. However the change in the
information was only a formal amendment and did not violate the right of Vivar against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it still involves the same facts.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the grounds on which
an accused can move to quash the complaint or information. Nowhere in the rule mention of a
lack of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. When accused failed to
assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has deemed waived his right.

ATTY. REYNALDO P. DIMAYACYAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 136264

May 28, 2004

FACTS: An information for falsification of public documents at the RTC of Quezon City was filed
against petitioner along with some others.
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the information on two (2) grounds. First, that
the officer who filed the information had no legal authority to do so, and second, that more than
one offense was charged in the information.
Pending resolution of the motion to quash, petitioner was arraigned. Accordingly, the information
was quashed.More than two (2) years after the quashal of the information, Quezon City
Prosecutor filed against the same accused including petitioner two (2) informations for
falsification of public documents at the Quezon City RTC. The Informations arose from the
questioned acts of falsification subject of the earlier quashed information.
Petitioner later filed with Branch 103 of the RTC of Quezon City to which the informations were
raffled a motion for the quashal thereof on the ground of double jeopardy.
Petitioner argued at the court a quo that he would be placed in double jeopardy as he was
indicted before for the same offenses and the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Public respondent thus denied the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. Q-9349988 and ordered petitioners arraignment, he holding that said case did not place petitioner in
double jeopardy.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner would constitute double jeopardy,
considering that when the Information was previously quashed, he had already been arraigned,
(2) Whether or not petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case has been
violated.

HELD: (1) Not all the elements for double jeopardy exist in the case at bench. In People vs.
Tac-An, we enumerated the elements that must exist for double jeopardy to be invoked.Thus,
apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
Was the duplicitous information a valid indictment? We answer in the affirmative. In People vs.
Bugayong,[7] we ruled that when an appellant fails to file a motion to quash within the time
prescribed under Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, he is thus deemed to have waived
the defect in the Information. In People vs. Manalili,[8] we held that an accused, who fails to
object prior to arraignment to a duplicitous information, may be found guilty of any or all of the
crimes alleged therein and duly proven during the trial, for the allegation of the elements of such
component crimes in the said information has satisfied the constitutional guarantee that an
accused be informed of the nature of the offense with which he or she is being charged. Verily, a
duplicitous information is valid since such defect may be waived and the accused, because of
such waiver, could be convicted of as many offenses as those charged in the information and
proved during trial.
In the present case, although there was a valid indictment before a competent court and
petitioner, as the accused, had already been arraigned therein, entering a valid plea of not
guilty, the last requisite that the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent, is not present.
(2) As to whether the subsequent filing of the two informations constitutes a violation of
petitioners constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases, we rule in the negative.
In the present case, no proof was presented to show any persecution of the accused, political or
otherwise, unlike in the Tatad case. There is no showing that petitioner was made to endure any
vexatious process during the two-year period before the filing of the proper informations, unlike
in the Angchangco case where petitioner therein was deprived of his retirement benefits for an
unreasonably long time. Thus, the circumstances present in the Tatad and Angchangco cases
justifying the radical relief granted by us in said cases are not existent in the present case.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or

when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of the delay the reasons for such delay, the assertion
or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the
application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. (Emphasis
supplied)

ARTURO ALANO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 111244

December 15, 1997

FACTS: Petitioner Arturo Alano has filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of
Appealswhich affirmed in toto the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37[2]
denying petitioners motion for the suspension of proceeding of Criminal Case No. 90-84933,
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Arturo Alano as well as his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Region, Pasig, Branch 68. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 55103 and
entitled Roberto Carlos and Trinidad M. Carlos v. Arturo Alano, et al., concerns the nullity of the
sale and recovery of possession and damages. In the aforementioned Civil Case, private
respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of
said parcel of land made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the
said land was previously sold to them. In his answer, petitioner contends that he never sold the
property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute
sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. At
this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years
before June 19, 1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.
On October 3, 1991, the trial court denied the petitioners motion as well as a subsequent motion
for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the assailed order.
ISSUE: Whether the pendency of Civil Case No. 55103, is a prejudicial question justifying the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-84933 filed against the petitioner.
HELD: Petitioner alleges that his signature appearing in the first deed of absolute sale in favor
of private respondent was a forgery, such that there was no second sale covering the said
parcel of land. Otherwise stated, if the Court in the said Civil Case rules that the first sale to
herein private respondent was null and void, due to the forgery of petitioners signature in the
first deed of sale, it follows that the criminal case for estafa would not prosper.

The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved such resolution would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal action. In other words, if both civil and criminal cases
have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised in the other, then
a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied.
We have already ruled that a criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is a
prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale and the defense of the
alleged vendor is the forgery of his signature in the deed.
There is no question that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as
declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence, binding upon the parties and by virtue of
which the prosecution dispensed with the introduction of additional evidence and the defense
waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement contained in the exhibit.
Accordingly, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the
petitioner resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true
that the right to present evidence is guaranteed under the Constitution, this right may be waived
expressly or impliedly.
Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural
matter, the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the
doctrine of waiver is made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and
without detriment to the community at large.
Accordingly, petitioners admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal
amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to
nullify such waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Furthermore, it must be
emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner himself. As such, the rule that
no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.