Should Transitologists Be Grounded?

Author(s): Valerie Bunce

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 111-127
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______________

COMMENT

Should TransitologistsBe Grounded?

Valerie Bunce

The collapse of state socialism in eastern Europe' has led to a proliferationof studiesanalyzingaspects of democratizationthroughoutthe
region. Central to many of these studies (particularlythose by nonspecialists)is an assumptionthatpostcommunismis but a variationon
a larger theme,that is, recent transitionsfromauthoritarianto democratic rule.
In a recent issue of SlavicReview,Philippe C. Schmitterand Terry
Lynn Karl provide a spirited defense of this assumption by arguing
thatdemocratizationin eastern Europe can and should be compared
with democratizationin southernEurope and Latin America.2Their
case rests on three points. First,theyresurrectthe old debate about
comparativeanalysisversus area studies and argue in support of the
formerand against the latter.This is relevantto the question at hand,
in theirview,because: 1) manyof the objections to comparingdemocratizationin the east with democratizationin the south are made on
traditionalarea studies grounds; and 2) transitology,as a branch of
comparative politics, features all the methodological advantages of
comparativeinquiry.They then turnto the "differencedebate." Here,
theyargue that,while there are some differencesbetween south and
east,the differencesdo not by any means rule out a comparisonamong
countriesin Latin America,southernEurope and easternEurope. Diversityis welcome, theycontend, especially when, as withthese cases,
it involvesvariation around a common and unifyingtheme, that is,
recenttransitionsfromauthoritarianrule. Finally,Schmitterand Karl
argue that there is much to be learned fromcomparing democratization in Latin America, southern and eastern Europe. Such comparisons, they contend, help us define more clearly what is similar and
This commentaryis based upon a larger studyinvestigatingmethodological issues in
the comparativestudyof democratization.I would like to thankthe National Endowment for the Humanities for support of this project. I would also like to thankBela
Greskovitsfor his commentson this paper.
1. In this commentary,the term"eastern Europe" will be used to referto all the
postcommunistcountriesthatduring the cold-warera made up the Soviet Union and
easternEurope.
2. "The Conceptual Travels of Transitologistsand Consolidologists:How Far to
the East Should They Attemptto Go?" Slavic Review53, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 173-85.
Their article is a response to criticismsnot just by specialists in eastern Europe, but
also by specialistsin southernEurope and Latin America. However, thiscommentary
will focus primarilyon easternEurope.
Slavic Review 54, no. 1 (Spring 1995)

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in recenttransitionsto democracy,sensitizeus to new

whatis different
factorsand new relationships,and allow us to test a wide range of
hypotheses.As I shall argue below, their firstclaim is wrongheaded
and irrelevantto the issue at hand; the second is debatable; and the
third,while valid in some respects,neverthelessmisrepresentsboth
the costs and the benefitsof adding eastern Europe to comparative
studiesof democratization.
Is the debate about

Is the
debate about thevalidityof comparing 1 the validity of comparis
tng

democratization, east and south, really a de-

democratization,

east and south, really a

debate between area
bate between area specialists and comparae
specialists and compartivists... I think not, since those who quesativistsas Schmitterand
K
contend? I think
R<Karl
tion such comparisons do not do so on
not, since those who
grounds of traditional area studies but rather
question such compariroundsfamiliar to any comparativist.
sons
gu do not
o tdo so on
on grounds
a.<>groundsof traditional
area studies but rather
;i^aiii_
on grounds familiarto any comparativist.3What is primarilyat issue
is comparability.For example, when Sally Terrycatalogues the many
differencesbetween transitionsto democracyin the south versusexits
fromstatesocialism in the east, she is notadopting whatSchmitterand
Karl have termedan area studies perspective.Instead, she is engaging
thecentralquestion of comparativeanalysis.Are we comparingapples
withapples, apples withoranges (which are at least varietiesof fruit)
or apples with,say,kangaroos?What Terryis arguingis thatthe many
differences
betweeneasternand southerntransitionssuggestthatcom3. This, at least,is how I read the literaturequestioningthe validityof comparing
east and south.See, forexample, M. Steven Fish,Democracy
FromScratch:Opposition
and
Regimein theNew Russian Revolution(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1994);
David Bartlettand Wendy Hunter,"Comparing TransitionsfromAuthoritarianRule
in Latin America and Eastern Europe: What Have We Learned and Where Are We
Going?" paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association,2-5 September 1993, Washington,DC; Piotr Sztompka,"Dilemmas of the
Great Transition,"Sisyphus2 (1992): 9-27; Sarah Meiklejohn Terry,"ThinkingAbout
Post-CommunistTransitions:How DifferentAre They?" Slavic Review52, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 333-37; Grzegorz Ekiert,"Democratization Processes in East Central EuJournalofPoliticalScience21 (July1991):
rope: A Theoretical Reconsideration,"British
285-313; David Ost, "Shaping a New Politics in Poland: Interestsand Politics in PostCommunistEasternEurope," Programon Central and EasternEurope WorkingPaper
Series no. 8, Minde de GunzburgCenter,Harvard University,1993; David Ost, "Labor
and Societal Transition,"Problems
ofCommunism
41, no. 3 (May-June1992): 22-24; Ken
Jowitt,"The New World Disorder,"JournalofDemocracy
2, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 11-20;
Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertaintyand the Transition:Post-Communism
in Hungary,"East EuropeanPoliticsand Societies7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 240-75; Valerie
Bunce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertaintyand the Transition:Post-Communismin Hungary,"East EuropeanPoliticsand Societies7, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 240-275; Valerie Bunce,
"Can We Compare Democratizationin theEast Versus theSouth?"Journal
ofDemocracy,
forthcoming.

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Comment

parisons between the two involve at best apples and oranges (which
would place importantlimits on comparison), and, at worst,apples
and kangeroos (whichwould call the entire enterpriseof comparison
into question). Thus, Schmitterand Karl (and other transitologists)
have a burden of proof.They cannotjustifytheircomparisons of east
and south by simplystatingthatthese cases meet "certain definitional
requirements"(178) or by arguing that we should compare firstand
worryabout comparabilitysecond.4
If issues of comparabilityare a common themein critiquesof transitology,then so are other issues that lie at the heart of comparative
inquiry-in particular,problems involvingcase selection, coding decisions and concept-indicatorlinkages. For example, in their investigations Schmitterand Karl include-for unspecified reasons-some
postcommunistcases and exclude others.This is a problem. As every
social scientistknows,sample selection determineswhich hypotheses
can be testedand the kinds (as well as the quality) of the conclusions
thatcan be drawn.To take another issue: on what grounds do Schmitterand Karl distinguishbetweenpacted versusmass mobilizationtransitions(a distinctioncrucial to theirinvestigations),given the considerable blurringbetween the two in the easternEuropean experience?5
Finally,if the communists-now ex-communists-continueto occupy
importantposts in eastern Europe and if the media in most of these
countriesis stillsubject to undue controlby the governmentin office,
thenis it accurate to argue,as Schmitterand Karl do, thattheseregimes
have moved fromthe transitionperiod to a period of democraticconsolidation?6
All of this suggests,Schmitterand Karl to the contrary,that the
debate about transitologyis in fact a debate among comparativists
about comparativemethodology.To label criticsarea specialists,then,
is to misrepresentthe concerns thathave been voiced about comparative studiesof democratization,east and south.It is also, perhaps not
accidentally,to skirtresponsibilityfor answering some tough questions.
More generally,one can observe that it is a familiar rhetorical
technique to reduce the issue at hand to a choice betweenpositiveand
4. This is the thrustof their discussion of sample selection in "Modes of TranSocial Science
sition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," International
Journal128 (May 1991): 269-84.
5. This problem also emerges in some of the Latin American cases, where pacts
were a consequence of mass mobilization. My thanks to Cynthia McLintock, Bela
Greskovitsand Hector Schamis for pointing this out.
6. This is not to argue thatstatesocialism is stillfullyintact.Rather it is to argue
thatwhat we have seen in eastern Europe since 1989 is the end of communistparty
hegemony.Whetherthatis equal to whathas been understood in theoryand practice
as a transitionto democracy is, however,quite another question. See, for example,
Lilia Shevtsova,"PostkommunisticheskaiaRossiia: Muki i lobyshkoi tiransformatsii,"
unpublished ms.,InstituteforInternationalEconomics and Politics,Moscow, September 1993; and Gail Kligman and KatherineVerdery,"Romania afterCeausescu: Posted. Ivo Banac (Ithaca: Cornell
CommunistCommunism?"EasternEuropein Revolution,
UniversityPress, 1992).

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Slavic Review

negativestereotypes.This is preciselywhat Schmitterand Karl do by

juxtaposing comparativeanalysisto its "other,"thatis, area studies.In
theirrendition,comparativistsemerge as "the good gals." They know
whatconstitutesimportantquestions and the data necessaryto answer
them,theystrikethe rightbalance between theoryand empirics,and
theyare in the mainstreamof theirsocial science disciplines.Because
transitologyis a branch of comparativepolitics,moreover,it is innocent by association, thatis, it featuresall of the positive traitsof comparative study.By contrast,those who object to transitologyare not
comparativists-bydefinition.Instead, theyare area scholars. This is
In
a categorywhichcombines a numberof undesirable characteristics.
theirview,forexample, area specialiststake "refugein 'empirie"'(184);
theyare allergic to theory;theyonly know one case and presume it to
be unique;7 theyare isolated fromtheirdisciplines and "clannish" in
theirbehavior (177, note 6);8 and theyautomaticallyprivilege explanations thatare "particularistic,""cultural" and "ideational" over explanations thatare generic and structural.
Thus, one emergesfromSchmitterand Karl's account witha sense
thatone can be no more "for"area studies,"against" comparativeand,
thus,"against" transitologythan be "for," say, crime,polio and war,
or "against" fatherhoodand apple pie. In drawinga sharp and valueladen contrastbetween area studies and comparative analysis, they
have triedto reduce the question at hand to a valence issue. However,
it is not a valence issue. Some comparativestudies are good and some
are bad. Similarly,work by area specialists can be good or bad. The
qualityof the specific study in question, then, and not the genus to
which it belongs, is what matters.
It is also importantto recognize thatthe distinctionbetween comparativeand area studies,especiallyas drawnin sharp reliefbySchmitter and Karl, is to a certainextenta false dichotomy.In practice,comparativistsand area specialistsoftenworkhand in hand. For example,
comparativestudies can only be as good as theirdata bases and area
specialists(by most definitions)are the ones thatprovide much of the
7. Schmitterand Karl seem to have misunderstoodwhat theircriticsmean when
theyclaim thatstatesocialism and "post-statesocialism" are unique. The argumentis
notthateach easternEuropean countryis unique or that these unique characteristics
are derived from,say, distinctnational cultures.Rather the argumentis a structural
one. The focus is on the distinctivepolitical,economic and social characteristicsthat
all of these countriesshare as a consequence of state socialism.
8. The use of the term"clan" is reminiscentof the linguisticgames the western
imperial powers played when theydecided in the nineteenthcenturyto draw a clear
line between the "civilized" west-which had nations-and backward Africa-which
no longerhad nations,but,instead,had tribes,clans and the like (see Philip D. Curtin,
TheImageofAfrica[Madison: Universityof Wisconsin Press, 1964]). Similar linguistic
games-which allocate power,modernityand responsibility-characterizemanyof the
recent westernanalyses of the formerYugoslavia and, more generally,the Balkans
(see Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,"Slavic Review53
[Summer 1994]: 453-82).

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Comment

data forcomparativework(even forSchmitterand Karl).9In addition,

any list of the most influentialtheories in the social sciences reveals
that a good number of them were authored by area specialists and
were based forthe mostpart on extendedfieldworkin theirparticular
countries,if not counties of expertise.'0Here, I am thinking,for instance,of workbyBenedict Anderson,JamesScottand CliffordGeertz,
as well as by Guillermo O'Donnell, Robert Putnam and Philippe
Schmitter.11
Finally,it is by now well established that among the best
studies in political science and sociology are those thatcombine comparative methodologywith area studies expertise.Indeed, this is the
strengthof the recentvolumes on transitionsfromauthoritarianrule,
edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitterand Laurence
Whitehead."2
A finalconcernI have withframingthe debate as one betweenarea
studiesand comparativeanalysisis the tone adopted by Schmitterand
Karl.Whatseems to be implied in theirdefenseof comparativeanalysis
in general and transitologyin particular,as well as their attack on
"NorthAmerican specialists" in eastern Europe, is that eastern European studies is a social science backwater (see 177). That is why,in
9. This does not guarantee, however, that generalistswill render an accurate
reading of the data. For example, James Fearon's recent formal analysis explaining
the outbreakof war in Croatia restsentirelyupon a particularreading of the political
beliefs of the Serbian minorityin Croatia. This is a problem on two grounds: first,
such beliefsare extremelyhard to decipher in the absence of surveydata; second, his
renditionof these beliefs rests entirelyon a minimal and quite biased sampling of
journalistic (not scholarly)accounts of these beliefs. See his "Ethnic War as a CommitmentProblem,"presentedat theAnnual Meetingof theAmericanPolitical Science
Association,2-5 September 1994, New York. Moreover,Schmitterand Karl regularly
miscode Bulgaria in theirinvestigations.See, forexample, "Modes of Transition";and
"What Kinds of Democracy are Emergingin Southern and EasternEurope, South and
Central America?" (unpublished ms). Finally,by my calculation (which takes the former Soviet Union into account and recent developments in Bulgaria, Hungary and
Poland, as well as measures of influencewhich are less obvious than formalmembership in a governingcoalition), the ex-communistsemerge as a far more dominant
political forcein easternEurope than Schmitterand Karl seem to recognize (see "The
Conceptual Travels").
10. My thanksto Michael Kennedy for making this point in another context.
11. See Benedict Anderson, ImaginedCommunities
(London: Verso, 1991); James
FormsofPeasantResistancein Southeast
Asia (London: Frank Cass, 1986);
Scott,Everyday
CliffordGeertz, The Interpretation
of Cultures:SelectedEssays(New York: Basic Books,
and Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism
(Berkeley:
1973); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization
Universityof California Press, 1973); Robert Putnam, MakingDemocracyWork:Civic
Traditionsin ModernItaly (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1993); Philippe C.
Schmitter,"Still the Centuryof Corporatism?"TheReviewofPolitics36 (January1974).
12. See Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitterand Laurence Whitehead,
Rule: SouthernEurope (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins
eds., TransitionsFromAuthoritarian
FromAuthoritarian
Rule: Latin America(BaltiUniversityPress, 1986); idem.,Transitions
Rule:
more:Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1986); idem.,Transitions
fromAuthoritarian
Comparative
Perspectives
(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1986); Guillermo
O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter,eds., Transitions
Rule: Tentative
fromAuthoritarian
aboutUncertain
Democracies
Conclusions
Press,1986).
(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins University

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Slavic Review

theirview,specialistsin the region object to transitologyand, just as

importantly,
whySchmitterand Karl feel it necessaryto take on the
burden of propagating the comparative message to the unconverted
readers of Slavic Review.Their arrogance in this regard parallels the
attitudessome westerneconomistshave taken when holding forthon
the transitionto capitalism in easternEurope. Justas theyhave advo3 so Schmitterand Karl, and other trancated "designer capitalism,"'
sitologists,seem to be advocating "designer democracy"-if not "designersocial science."14 What Schmitterand Karl do not seem to know
is thatthe wall separatingeasternEuropean studiesfromcomparative
politics came down long before the collapse of the wall separating
easternfromwesternEurope15 -and, thus,considerablybefore the arrival of "democracy,"let alone transitologyand consolidology,to the
region.16 Schmitterand Karl are unaware of thisbecause theyare new
13. David Stark,"A Sociologist's Perspective:Can Designer Capitalism Work in
TheNewsletter
Centraland EasternEurope?" Transition:
aboutReforming
Economies
3 (May
1992): 1-4.
14. Is this response to Schmitterand Karl just a matterof turfdefense?There is
an elementof truthto theirimplied point thatsome easternEuropean area specialists
are quite resentfulof the recent reduced-entrycosts to claiming expertise in eastern
European studies. These feelingssometimessurface,for example, in discussions behind closed doors withrakija on the table.Justas obscurityhad its costs, it appears,
so does notoriety.However, by "designer social science" I mean something quite
differentand, I think,less contentious.First,empirical groundingis a necessarycondition for conducting sound research and for offeringsound advice. Second, social
science is not so developed thatit can predictwhatwill happen in the future,let alone
dictatewhat should happen. Third, postcommunisttransitionsare withouthistorical
precedent yet social science theories are based in large measure on historicalprecedents.This, plus theirmultipleand interactivecharacter,suggeststhatthereare clear
limitson the abilityof social scientiststo speak confidentlyabout these transitions.
Finally,thereis a certain ironyin the notion that,having rejected scientificsocialism
and thus the orchestrationof social, political and economic developments "from
above," the new regimesin the region are now being told by some fromthe westthat
there is "scientificcapitalism" and "scientificdemocracy,"and that theycan be imposed "fromabove." This is despite the purported virtuesof regulation throughthe
hidden hand in liberal orders. Humility,in short,and not arrogance should be the
order of the day.
15. It is interestingto note in thisregardthat,prior to 1989, comparativeanalyses
were more common in the easternEuropean fieldthan in, say,Latin Americanstudies.
This is because of the homogenizingeffectsof state socialism and, thus,the extentto
which easternEurope-far more than Latin America-provided a natural laboratory
for comparativestudy.
16. This was less true for Soviet studies,where single-caseanalysiswas more the
norm,where comparativetheorieswere not widelyemployed and where the assumption of studyinga unique case was more widespread. This seems to have reflectedthe
confluenceof several factors:the sheer size and thus complexityof the formerSoviet
Union (which,afterall, occupied nearlyone fifthof the world's land mass); the difficulties of procuringdata; the absence of a strongsocial science traditionwithinthe
Soviet Union (in contrastto, say, Poland, Hungary and the formerYugoslavia); and
the academic politics of studyinga super power (which led American studies in the
same direction).At the same time,some Soviet specialistsidentifiedwiththe country
theystudied and therebydismissed as irrelevantto theirresearch all those littlecolonies to the westof the Soviet Union. However, these generalizationsare less relevant

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Comment

to thisfield.Moreover,theirapproach to democratization-whichconcentrateson elites and on the liberalized present and ignores other
players,processes and the socialist past-automatically excludes from
theirpurviewmost of the literaturein eastern European studies. All
of thistestifies,
more generally(if we may turna common observation
on its head), to the long and unfortunateisolation of many comparativistsfromthe rich research traditionof eastern European studies.'7
Thus, by preachingthe comparativemessage to easternEuropean specialists,Schmitterand Karl appear to be generalsfightingthe last war.
Is it accidental,one mightask,thatthe academic battletheyare waging
happens to take place in a bipolar world?
Much more relevantto the question of democratization,east and
south, is Schmitterand Karl's response to the "difference"debate.
Here, theydo an excellentjob of reviewingmany of the differences
between democratizationin eastern Europe versus southernEurope
and Latin America. They conclude that these differencesdo not rule
out the incorporationof eastern Europe into comparativestudies of
recent democratizationbecause: 1) the temporal clusteringof these
cases argues for cross-regionalprocesses at work,which,in turn,suggest some commonalities across these regions; 2) comparative study
benefitsfromvariance; 3) the differencesbetween east and south have
been exaggerated(as have the similaritiesamong the southerncases)
and represent,in fact,variations on a common process of transition
and consolidation; and, therefore4) comparison among these countriesis valid and valuable.
I have several responses to the firstpoint. Let us accept for the
moment the assumption that democratizationsin the south and east
occupy roughlythe same temporal space and that this speaks to the
presence of similardynamicsof change. If this is so, then whyshould
we employapproaches to the analysisof democratization(such as those
offeredby O'Donnell, Schmitterand Whitehead,as well as by Schmitter and Karl) thatignorethe veryexplanatoryfactorsthatwould seem
to followlogicallyfromthese assumptions?Here, I referto both international and economic variables thatwould appear to operate in virtually all these cases-for example, the development from the early
to contemporaryscholarshipon Russia and the successor states.Comparativestudies,
expressed eitheras comparison of cases or utilizationof comparativetheoryin singlecase analysis,are now becoming the norm in post-Sovietstudies.
17. This isolation was expressed in many ways-some of which were imperial.
Witness,for example, the pervasive practice during the cold-warperiod of western
European specialists using the term "Europe" in the titles of their books, articles,
courses and even institutes,when the focus in virtuallyevery case was only on the
westernhalf of Europe. To take another example: it has been common practice for
courses surveyingcomparativepolitics to be notjust Euro-centric(which is enough of
a problem) but also westernEuro-centric.This reflectedthe widespread assumptions
withinthe discipline of political science that: 1) the only Europe that counted was
westernEurope and 2) westernEuropeanists were more scientificand more comparative in theiranalyses than theircounterpartsin other area studies.

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1970s onward of internationalnorms supporting human rightsand

democracy,'8the destabilizingconsequences of the global debt crisis
and structuraladjustmentpolicies,'9and the politicalfalloutfromlongterm pursuit in the second and third worlds of import substitution
policies. What I am suggesting,then, is that there is a contradiction
betweentherationaleoffered forcomparingdeWhat I am suggesting, then, is that there is a
mocratization,east and
contradiction between the rationale offered
south, and the apfor comparing democratization, east and
south, and the approaches

transitologists

proaches transitologists
take when carryingout
theirstudies.

Second, did these

transitions actually occur at roughlythe same
time and thus in roughlythe same context?It is true that they are
closer in time to each other than, say, democratizationafterFranco
and democratizationin Great Britain. However, it is also true that a
few years can make a big differencein the causes and contextof democratization.Let us take the examples of Spain and Hungary,two
countrieswhichshare some similaritiesin the mode of transition.The
transitionin Spain occurred in a stable,bipolar internationalenvironment and Spain reaped enormous benefitsfrom this (as well as its
geographicallocation). In particular,the new regime had massive infusionsof internationaleconomic aid, which allowed Spain to delay
by ten years painful economic reforms.Moreover,Spain was assured
of eventualentryinto the European Communityand NATO; the only
question was whetherSpanish political leaders and Spanish publics
would supportsuch actions.By contrast,Hungaryhas received farless
internationaleconomic support and has had to deal immediatelywith
destabilizingeconomic reforms.In addition, the end of the cold war,
the Warsaw Pact and Comecon have created for Hungary (and its
neighbors) a veryuncertain internationalenvironment.Solutions to
thisproblem,moreover,are slow in coming,giventhe manydifficulties
involvedtodayin expanding membershipof NATO and theEuropean
Union to include Hungary and other membersof the formersocialist
world.What I am suggesting,then,is thatthe decade or so separating
these two transitionsmade a significantdifferencein their international contexts.These differences,moreover,had direct domestic repercussions,creating very differentprocesses of democratizationin
Spain and Hungary.

take when carrying out their studies.

_

____

18. See Dan Thomas, "Norms,Politics and Human Rights:The Helsinki Process
and the Decline of Communism in Eastern Europe," Ph.D. dissertationin progress,
Cornell University.
19. For an insightfulanalysisof how internationaleconomic pressuresprefigured
the outbreakof war in the formerYugoslavia, see Susan L. Woodward,Balkan Tragedy:
Chaosand DissolutionaftertheCold War (Washington:BrookingsInstitution,1995).

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Comment

Schmitterand Karl's second point is more compelling. They are

quite rightin arguing thatvarietyis the spice of comparativeinquiry.
Without variation, we cannot develop robust concepts, identifykey
explanatoryfactorsor constructgood explanations. However,thereis
a catch. Meaningful comparative study requires that differencesbe
joined withsimilarities;otherwise,too much is in motion to trace relationshipsand to draw meaningfulconclusions. Moreover,we can no
longer assume in such circumstancesthatwhatwe are analyzingin one
contextis the same as whatwe are analyzingin another.The keyquestion, then, is whetherthe differencesconstitutevariations on a common process-that is, transitionsfromdictatorshipto democracy-or
altogetherdifferentprocesses-that is, democratizationversus what
could be termed postcommunism.Schmitterand Karl take the first
position and theircriticsthe second.
It is not easy to reach a decision on thismatter.Social science lacks
the sophisticationneeded to distinguishbetween differencesin degree
and differencesin kind. One analyst's democratization is another's
postcommunism-and a third might question whether postcommunism is so "post." However, what can be conHowever, what can be concluded is that the
cluded is that the
differencesbetween postcommunism and the
differences
between
and
transitions in the south arefar more substanpostcommunism
in
the
the transitions
tial than Schmitter and Karl's discussion
south are far more substantial than Schmitter seems to imply.
and Karl's discussion

Letme ..,.,, ..... . . ... R R .. . ...R

seems
toimply.
highlightjust the most important of them.
First is the nature of authoritarian rule. What distinguished state
socialism from bureaucratic authoritarianism and other forms of dictatorship in Latin America and southern Europe were its social structure, its ideology and ideological spectrum, its political economy, its
configuration of political and economnic elites, its pattern of civil-militaryrelations and its position in the international hierarchy of power
and privilege. Thus, state socialism was differentalong virtually every
dimension that economists, sociologists and political scientists recognize as important.20If we reach furtherback in time, we find two more
important contrasts: long-established states in southern Europe and
Latin America versus ever-changing states in eastern Europe, and a

20. This was even true for "deviant" Yugoslavia. See, for example, Vesna Pusic,
"DictatorshipswithDemocratic Legitimacy:Democracy Versus Nation," East European
Politicsand Societies8 (Fall 1994): 383-401. Contraryto Schmitterand Karl, the distinctionsbetween statesocialism and other formsof dictatorshipdid not witheraway
whenstatesocialism"softened"(see, forinstance,Maria Csanadi, FromWhereto Where?
The Party-Stateand the Transformation[Budapest: T-Twins and Institute of Economics,

Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1995]).

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120

historicaltraditionof democracyin Latin America and southernEurope versusthe absence (save forCzechoslovakia) of any such tradition
in the east. Nor can we assume-as is the tendencyof many transitologists-that these factorsare "ancient history"insofar as democratization is concerned.2' It is not just that theystructurethe agenda of
transition,the interestsand resources of major actors and, thus,the
balance of forcessupportingand opposing democratization,the transitionto capitalismand the like. It is also thatthe boundaryseparating
the authoritarianpast from the liberalized present is a very porous
one in easternEurope.
There are also significantdifferencesin the mode of transition.For
instance, there is no equivalent in the southern cases either to the
diffusionprocesses we saw in eastern Europe in 1989 or thus to the
role of internationalfactorsin ending the CommunistParty'spolitical
monopoly.22 It is crucial as well to understand the end of state socialism

as a process of national liberation-whether that was a consequence

of the end of the Soviet bloc or the end of an internalempire (as with
the federalstatesof the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).
In this sense, state, nation and identitywere-and are-at the very
centerof these processes of change in easternEurope.
Anotherdifferenceis in the internationalcontextof transition.To
summarizean earlier point: the eastern European transitionsare taking place in an internationalsystemwhich is itselfin transition.What
needs to be added to this is the verydifferenteconomic and strategic
position in the internationalsystemof easternEurope versussouthern
Europe and Latin America.At the timeof transition,easternEuropean
countrieswere not full members by any means of the international
capitalisteconomy,and theywere not allied in any institutionalsense
withthe west.
The most strikingcontrast,and the one thatbears mostdirectlyon
the question of democracy,is in the transitionalagenda. In southern
Europe and Latin America, theissue was democratization;that is, a
change in political regime.23Indeed, the circumscribedcharacterof
21. See, especially,Csanadi, FromWhereto Where.The key article givingrise to
the "proto-science"of transitology(aside fromearlier worksby Machiavelli,according
context
in the process
to Schmitterand Karl) emphasized the importance of historical
of democratization.See Dankwart Rustow,"Transitions to Democracy," Comparative
Politics2 (1970): 337-63. However, transitologistssuch as Schmitterand Karl have
tended to delete the adjective "historical"fromthis argumentand concentrated,as a
result,simplyon currentcontext.
22. This is not to reduce the events of 1989 to the "Gorbachev effect."Rather it
is to argue that the Gorbachev reformswere a necessarybut not sufficientcondition
forthe end of statesocialismin easternEurope. For an explanation-before the factof both the Gorbachev reformsand the collapse of state socialism in easternEurope,
see Valerie Bunce, "The Empire StrikesBack: The Evolution of the EasternBloc From
a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability,"International
Organization39 (Winter 1984/1985):
1-46.
23. See, especially, Robert Fishman, "RethinkingState and Regime: Southern
Europe's Transition to Democracy," WorldPolitics42 (April 1990): 422-40.

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121

political change in southernEurope and Latin America is one reason

whystudentsof comparativedemocratizationcould reduce democratic
transitionsto a process involvinginteractionsamong a handfulof political elites.By contrast,what is at stake in easternEurope is nothing
less than the creation of the verybuilding blocks of the social order.
What is open for negotiation is not just the characterof the regime
not just citizenshipbut
but also the verynature of the state itself,24
also identity,notjust economic liberalizationbut also the foundations
of a capitalisteconomy.25What is also at stake is notjust amendment
of the existingclass structurebut the creation of a new class system;
not just a shiftin the balance of interests,therefore,but something
much more fundamental:the verycreationof a range of new interests.
Finally,whatis involvedin the easternEuropean transitionsis notjust
modificationof the state'sforeignpolicies, but also a profoundredefinition of the role of the state in the internationalsystem.
We can draw two conclusions fromthisbriefsummary.First,if we
are interestedin balancing similaritiesand differences,and in maintainingat the same time a reasonable number of cases, thenwe would
not engage in comparisons between east and south. Rather,we would
compare all or some of the 27 easternEuropean cases witheach other.
Second, we must be verycautious when comparing democratization,
east and south: at best, such comparisons would produce a limited
range of benefits;at worst,we could be placing ourselvesin the unenviable and unviable position of sampling simultaneouslyon the independent and dependent variables.
This leads us to Schmitterand Karl's final set of arguments.What
do we gain when we compare democratization,east and south?I agree
with them that such comparisons can enrich our understandingof
democracy.In particular,theyremindus of the sheer diversityof ways
young democracies come into being and evolve, and theyhelp us define the essential characteristicsof democratizationby alertingus to
24. The 'centralityof state building in postcommunismreflectsnotjust the inextricabilityof state and regime in state socialism and thus the powerfuleffectson the
stateof theend of communistpartyhegemony,but also twootherfactors:the presence
in the region of so many new or newlyliberated states and the necessarilypowerful
consequences for the state of a transitionto capitalism. On the latterpoint, see Ivo
Bicanic, "The Economic Causes of New State Formation duringTransition,"East EuropeanPoliticsand Societies9 (Winter1995): 2-21.
25. It is true thateconomic-liberalizationand structural-adjustment
policies play
an importantrole in the process of democratization,south as well as east. However,
one cannot veryeasilyequate economic reformin Latin America and southernEurope
witheconomic transformation
in the east. This is, first,because the issue in the south
is amendinga capitalisteconomyalreadyin place, whereasthe issue in theeast (though
Hungaryprovides a valuable middle case) is constructionof a capitalisteconomywith
state socialism-its virtual opposite-serving as the point of departure. There are,
moreover,other key economic differences,all of which place unusual economic burdens on easternEurope-for example, the collapse of the Soviet market,the primitive
characterof eastern European economies and the difficultiesimposed by the process
of building new national economies in so many cases.

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122

differences, as well as to similarities, among democratic orders. Such

comparisons also reveal a number of factors that were missing from
prevailing theories of democratization.26 All of these benefits flow quite
naturally from a comparative project that is rich in cases and rich in
diversity. What Schmitand Karl do not
|ter
mention, however, is a
final advantage to such
to such cross-

What
W Schmitter and Karl do not mention,
however, is a final advantage

comparisons.They can provide a

regional
r
powerful critique of prevailing understand_

cross-regional comparisons. They can provide

a powerful critique of

prevailing understandings of democratization.

They may not simply refine the common wisdom, they may overturn it.27
When one looks more closely at transitology from the vantage point
of eastern Europe, one is struck,first,by the fact that this is a literature
rich in description but relatively poor in testable hypotheses. An example of this is constitutional design-an issue of great importance to
many transitologists.28How can we test the relative benefits of parliamentary versus presidential systems if most of the systems in eastern
Europe are in fact a combination of both, that is, a variation on the
French Fifth Republic model? Moreover, how can we evaluate whether
constitutional design matters if we have no measure of impact that
differentiates among recent cases of democratization and if the purported consequences of constitutional developments could also be
judged to be its causes? For instance, is it correct to argue that Hungarian democracy is more secure than Russian democracy because
Hungary opted for a parliamentary system and Russia did not, and
because the rules of the political game were formalized more clearly
and earlier in Hungary than in Russia?29 Or does it make more sense

ings of democratization.
_

RR2

26. This is evident,for instance, in some recent reflectionson democratization

by transitologists(see, for instance,Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems [A Latin AmericanView withGlances at Some
Post-CommunistCountries]," WorldDevelopment
21 [1993]: 1355-69; idem.,"Delegative
Democracy?"WorkingPaper No. 172, Helen Kellogg Instituteof InternationalStudies,
NotreDame, March 1992; Philippe Schmitter,"Dangers and Dilemmas ofDemocracy,"

Journal ofDemocracy5 [April 1994]: 57-74).

27. My thanksto the remarksmade by Gail Lapidus, Shari Cohen, Carol Timko,
Karen Dawisha, David Ost,Jan Kubik and Georgii Derlugian at the panel, "Shooting
Cannons at the Canons" at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the
Advancementof Slavic Studies, 18 November 1994, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
28. See, for example,Juan Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism,"
JournalofDemocracy1 (Winter 1990): 51-69; Arend Lijphart, "Democratization and Constitutional
Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland, 1989-1991" in FlyingBlind, ed.
GyorgySzoboszlai (Budapest: Yearbook of the Hungarian Political Science Association, 1992): 99-113; AlfredStepan and Cindy Skach, "ConstitutionalFrameworksand
Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarismversus Presidentialism,"WorldPolitics46
(October 1993): 1-22.
29. If the latterfactorwere so important,then how do we explain, for instance,
the developmental trajectoriesof, say,Bulgaria and Romania (withtheirearly settle-

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123

to argue that the problems surrounding the transition in Russia are

far greater than in Hungary and that it is this fact that has produced
both differentconstitutional trajectories and differences as well in the
seeming prospects for democratic consolidation?
A second problem is that what is offered in transitions literature
is not, in fact,a theory of democratization-a series of "if, then" claims
that can be tested-but rather an approach to the analysis of democratization-that is, a statement about what should be analyzed and how.
All that this literature gives us is advice: we should look at strategic
interactions among elites and treat democratization as a highly contingent process that is fraughtwith considerable uncertainty. What it does
not give us is any explanation of why some authoritarian states democratize and others do not, why the process of democratization varies
across cases, or why some democracies take root and others do not.
Since this literature is a series of claims about how we should approach the study of democratization, can we then argue at least that
the approach offered is a sound one? Let me suggest one answer to
this question by expanding on a point already mentioned: the addition
of new variables to the equation. By joining eastern Europe with southern Europe and Latin America, we discover a number of crucial factors
that are missing in the recent theories of transitologists-in particular,
the interaction between economic and political transformation, the
importance of the media in the process of democratization, the powerful influence of international factors, the key role of mass publics in
transitions (as well as in consolidation),30 the centrality of national
identity and nationalism in the process of democratization, the importance of the left as well as the right in shaping democratic prospects
and, finally, all those thorny issues having to do with the state, its
boundaries, its strength and its place within the international order.
This is a long list of missing variables, which focuses our attention on
this question: at what point can we no longer tack on these factors to
the prevailing approach to the study of democratization and should
we decide instead, given the desire for parsimony and the considerable
implications these additions hold for our very conception of democratization, that a completely different approach to the study of democratic transitions is required?
We can also judge the soundness of the prevailing approach by
concentrating on what it includes rather than on what it lacks. Central
to the approach of Schmitter, Karl, O'Donnell and their associates is
the assertion that elites are central and publics peripheral. Thus, transitions to democracy are understood to be elite affairs and the more
mentof constitutionalissues) versusPoland and the Czech Republic (given theircontinuingproblems withresolution of the rules of the political game)?
30. See, for example, Daniel V. Friedheim,"BringingSociety Back into DemocraticTransitionTheory:Pact Making and Regime Collapse," East EuropeanPoliticsand
Societies
7 (Fall 1993): 482-512; and SidneyTarrow,"Social Movementsand Democratic
Development," forthcomingin The PoliticsofDemocraticConsolidation,
vol. 1, Richard
Gunther,NikiforosDiamandous and Hans-JurgenPuhle, eds.

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Slavic Review

elitist,transitologists
argue, the better.However,when we add eastern
Europe to the equation, we begin to wonder about thisemphasis since:
1) publicswere importantactorsin ending communistpartyhegemony
in manyof thesecases; 2) bargainingamong elites is-especially before
the fact-a very hard process to trace; 3) it is very difficult-again,
especially before the fact-to determine elite interestsand elite resources and 4) pacted versusmass mobilizationmodes of transitiondo
not explain patterns of success in democratic consolidation in the
postcommunistworld. More generally,one has to wonder whether,in
focusingso heavilyon the machinationsof elites,transitologistshave
not committedthe verytransgressiontheyhave lamented in the work
of area scholars: the preferencefor a particularisticand voluntaristic
understandingof social realityover one which is more general and
structural.
Just as elites and their interactionsare central to the approach
developed by Schmitter,Karl and theirassociates,so are the core concepts of democratictransition,democratic consolidation and, finally,
uncertainty.In each of these,once we add eastern Europe to the calculus we find a number of problems. Transition implies change that
is circumscribedand directional,in these discussions,either towards
or away fromdemocraticgovernance.The firstaspect does not fitthe
inherentlyrevolutionarynature of postcommunismand the second
leads to a misrepresentationof eastern European developments by
forcingus: 1) to draw too sharp a distinctionbetweenthe authoritarian
past and the transitionalpresent, 2) to privilege the democratic dimension over all other dimensions of change, 3) to assume thatpolitical change is separate from,say, economic and social change and 4)
to code any and all major developmentsas factorsnecessarilyaffecting
movementto or away fromdemocracy.31Consolidation is also a problematic concept. First, it is unclear what "consolidation" means in
an empirical sense, aside froma vague notion that "consolidated democracies" are those that,followingtransition,seem to promise longevity.Is democratic consolidation, then,just a matterof time?How
do we factorin capacity to withstandcrises?Is it the absence of democratic collapse or the presence of certain features,such as a democratic political culture?32Does consolidation entail political stability
and, if so, what does this mean? Is it the absence of such factorsas
significantanti-systemprotest,the government'sloss of its coercive
31. Symptomaticof the pervasivenessof theseassumptionshas been the tendency
of scholars (primarilyon the Op-Ed page of TheNew YorkTimes)to pronounce either
that Russia has turned the corner on democracy or that democracy is finished in
Russia.
32. A surveyof longstandingdemocracies would seem to suggestthat:1) thereis
great varietyin what constitutesa democratic political culture; 2) it is veryhard to
distinguishbetween durable beliefs,values and behaviors and more short-termattitudes and the like; 3) some democracies featureby some standards a less than democraticallyminded public; and 4) the key to democracymightbe mass culture but it
also mightbe elite political culture.See, forexample, Putnam,MakingDemocracy
Work.

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Comment

125

monopoly and sharp divisions among citizens and among political

leaders, or is it the presence of such factors as relatively durable governing coalitions and widespread public support for the institutions
and procedures of democracy? There is a final problem. If democracy
is a process, not a result, and if the democratic project can never be
completed, then how can we understand the term "consolidation" with
its implication of democracy as an end state?
The final member of the conceptual triumvirate in transitions literature is uncertainty. Here, again, we encounter a certain dissonance
between concept and reality. On the one hand, transitologists have
made a great deal of the urfcertainties surrounding democratization.
Indeed, this is the foundation for much of the theorizing about transitions from authoritarian rule. On the other hand, we see a clear
pattern in the many new democracies that have come into being since
the 1970s: an extremely high survival rate. If the democratic enterprise
is so fraughtwith difficulties,as transitologists repeatedly assert,33then
how do we explain this? It is not a sufficientresponse to argue either
that these new democracies are still in the throes of consolidation or
to presume that the durability of new democracies speaks in effectto
a global bounty of "heroic princes." Rather the response should be to
question whether democracy (today at least) might be easier than many
have thought-or, at least, whether the imposition of authoritarian rule
might be more difficultthan many seemed to have assumed.34
All of these examples suggest that the addition of eastern Europe
to comparative studies of democratization has one major benefit, aside
from those outlined by Schmitter and Karl. It introduces serious questions about the reigning paradigm of democratization. This leads us
to the final point of this commentary. If Schmitter and Karl have been
in some respects too conservative in estimating the value of comparing
east and south (particularly when it involves "samokritika"),then they
have been in other respects too liberal in their assessment of what can
be learned from such comparisons. It is here that we must switch our
discussion from the benefits of diversity to its costs.
The striking contrasts between transitions to democracy in the
south and postcommunism in the east suggest that certain kinds of
comparative exercises are highly suspect. First, there is a danger in
presuming fundamental similarities when the similarities posited are
in fact superficial and highly misleading. Ethnic diversity is a case in
point. To equate Peruvian, Spanish and Portuguese ethnic diversity
with that of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union (or
even contemporary Russia, for that matter) is to skim over a number
33. See, especially, Philippe C. Schmitter,"Dangers and Dilemmas of Democ5 (April 1994): 57-74.
racy,"JournalofDemocracy
34. See, especially,Guiseppe Di Palma, "Democratic Transitions:Puzzles and Surand Society1 (New York: JAI Press,
prises fromWest to East," Researchon Democracy
1993): 27-50; Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship,"ComparativePolitics24 (April 1992): 273-91.

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SlavicReview

of distinctive features of ethno-politics in eastern Europe. Here, I refer,

for instance, to the sheer magnitude of diversity in the region and its
correlation with religious, political, socio-economic and spatial markers; the powerful historical meanings attached to ethnicity,nation, religion and state; the role played by state socialist regimes in developing
national consciousness, as well as national elites, national institutions
and proto-states within states; the central place of ethnicity, national
identity and national movements in ending the communist experiment; the role of ethnicity in not just the process of nation and state
building and democratization, but also in the transition to capitalism;
the powerful impact of ethnicity on definitions and practices of citizenship; and the ways in which ethnicity in eastern Europe affectsnot
just domestic politics and economics, but also interstate relations
throughout the region. To be succinct: there is a former Yugoslavia, a
former Czechoslovakia and a former Soviet Union, and there could be
as well in the future a former Russia. There is, however, no "former
Peru" or "former Spain."
Another danger is to transplant onto eastern European soil arguments developed in response to the very differentconditions existing
in Latin America and southern Europe. Take, for instance, the argument developed in the southern context that publics are demobilized
during transitions to democracy and that this contributes in positive
ways to the democratization process. This argument makes little sense
in eastern Europe, if only because of the pronounced role of average
citizens as well as intellectuals in many of these transitions. Moreover,
an argument can be made for the eastern European case, at least, that
mobilized publics may very well be assets, not liabilities in the process
of democratization. They may exert needed pressures on elites to adhere to the democratic rules of the game and they may provide the
necessary political capital for the transition to capitalism.35
This leaves us with a final problem. If such differentcontexts call
into question the transfer of concepts and arguments from south to
east, then they most assuredly challenge the validity of using the southern experience to predictdevelopments in eastern Europe. For instance,
Guillermo O'Donnell, as well as Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl,
have voiced considerable pessimism about the future of democracy in
eastern Europe. In particular, they have argued that many of the democracies in the region are incomplete and superficial, that these new
democracies will take a long time to consolidate and that there are
grounds for expecting at least some to revert back to authoritarian
rule.36 There are ample reasons, of course, to wonder about democ35. See Valerie Bunce, "Sequencing Economic and Political Reforms,"East-Central
EuropeanEconomies
in Transition(Washington:JointEconomic Committee,1994); Bela
Greskovits,"Is the East Becoming the South? Where May Threats to ReformsCome
From?" paper presented at the XVI World Congress of the International Political
Science Association,Berlin, 12-15 August 1994.
36. See GuillermoO'Donnell, "On the State"; Schmitterand Karl, "The Conceptual Travels"; Schmitter,"Dangers and Dilemmas"; Schmitterand Karl, "Modes of
Transition".

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127

racy's future in eastern Europe. However, one must ask whether transitologists are engaged in a careful reading of trends in eastern Europe,
or whether their pessimistic conclusions are an artifact produced by
measuring the east against the southern standard. Does eastern Europe
have a problem with democracy or is it simply that eastern Europe is
not Latin America or southern Europe?37
Thus, my arguments are four: first,the debate over comparisons
between east and south cannot be reduced to the old debate between
area studies and comparative analysis. Second, Schmitter and Karl are
wrong when they portray comparative and area studies as polar opposites. Third, there are substantial differences between the east and
the south, and this creates far more problems for comparing the two
than Schmitter and Karl recognize. Finally, there are nonetheless some
good reasons to engage in such comparisons. The most important reason, however, is not addressed by Schmitter and Karl: the ways in which
the addition of eastern Europe to comparative studies of democratization alerts us to fundamental problems in how transitologists have
understood and analyzed transitions from authoritarian rule-in the
east and, one could argue, in the south as well.
37. To this must be added one more point. A major problem in theories of
democracy(of older, as well as of more recentvintage) is thattheyunder-predictthe
incidence of democratic government.There are in effecttoo many democracies,
whetherour theoreticalperspectiveis thatof,say,SeymourMartinLipset; Barrington
Moore; Dietrich Rueschemeyer,Evelyne Stephens and John Stephens; or Guillermo
O'Donnell, Phillippe Schmitterand Laurence Whitehead. This suggeststhat: 1) our
theories of democracy may be over-specified,2) there may be no single path to a
democraticorder,3) democratizationmay be best understood in highlyvoluntaristic
termsand/or4) democracy may not be as difficulta project as has been commonly
assumed.

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